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OGC 69-0399

4 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (Thomas L. Roberts)⁰³

1. Messrs. Ward Greene, Office of Security, (Kenneth⁰³ Heinonen), (L)GLOBE Case Officer, and I arrived in Frankfurt, Germany, at 1100 hours⁰² 19 February 1969, and were met by a representative of the (Frankfurt Base)¹⁵⁻²⁰ Mr. Greene and I then were taken to a safehouse and Mr. (Heinonen)⁰³ waited for Mr. 03 (Roberts) to arrive from (Dakar) and then brought him to the safehouse.⁰³ It had been agreed upon earlier that the debriefing of (Roberts) would not commence until Thursday morning; however, Mr.⁰³ (Heinonen) did discuss general (L)GLOBE matters and some broad aspects of the Itkin problem with (Roberts) on the afternoon of 19 February. Mr. Greene and I went to⁰³ the (Frankfurt Base)¹⁵⁻²⁰ where we met with the (Chief of Base) Mr. McManus, and Chief of Security, Mr. Crawford. 27

2. It was decided to start the debriefing from (Roberts')⁰³ earliest contact with the FBI, which occurred in Boston some time in 1950, and proceed chronologically covering (Roberts') subsequent move to New York⁰⁶ City, then discuss his employment with the law firm of (Delson, Levin and Gordon) which was followed in 1957 by the formation of the law firm of (Itkin, Roberts and Greenbaum).⁰⁸ Subsequently we discussed his employment with CIA, which involved his disengagement from the New York law firm and cover for his various trips to (Africa).¹⁰ We repeatedly stressed his contacts with Herbert Itkin over the years 1955 through 1967.

3. It was considered that (Roberts)⁰³ had a very difficult task if he intended to conceal or deceive the Agency about his relationships with Herbert Itkin. This conclusion was reached since 03 (Roberts) could not anticipate what information was available to the debriefers.⁰³ (Roberts) was advised that Mr. Greene was from

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the Office of Security, which carried with it the inference that he had been privy to all the reports⁰³ (Roberts) gave to the FBI. Roberts was told that I had dealt with Mr. Hogan's office, the New York District Attorney, and Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and had talked with Herbert Itkin personally.⁰³ (Roberts) was fully cooperative during the entire debriefing and did not hesitate to discuss any topics.

4. We concluded that (Roberts)⁰³ has not been involved in any of Itkin's illegal activities since (Roberts)⁰³ has been an employee of CIA. It is my opinion that (Roberts)⁰³ is an individual with a strong sense of dedication to principles⁰³ so long as they result in what he considers a worthwhile sense of accomplishment. I think it is significant to mention this assessment since (Roberts)⁰³ does not give the impression of having been motivated solely by monetary rewards in any of his activities. This lack of concern for money was disturbing during certain phases of the debriefing because (Roberts)⁰³ was rather vague about the amount of income he received from the law firm of (Itkin, Roberts and Greenbaum).⁰³ He stated that he used a drawing account and only took what was needed for his living expenses.⁰³ (Roberts) gives the impression of being a proud individual who is not prone to admit to his personal deficiencies. The⁰² (LP)GLOBE files contain several references to admonitions given by station representatives to (Roberts)⁰³ for non-achievement in the operational field. Although (Roberts) did not allude to these admonitions voluntarily, he⁰³ did discuss them when asked.

5. It was our feeling that (Roberts)⁰³ did not discuss with Herbert Itkin his employment with CIA, nor did he discuss with Itkin his earlier reporting activities to the FBI.⁰³ (Roberts) was not aware of Itkin's relationship to CIA and did not know of Mario Brod's affiliation with CIA.


6. After the debriefing had been concluded, (Roberts)⁰³ was told of the possible exposure of his employment with CIA by Itkin's defense counsel, F. Lee Bailey, should Itkin be tried in the New York state court.⁰³ (Roberts) appeared to be genuinely disturbed and expressed bitter feelings toward Itkin since he

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feels that such exposure could prevent him from performing future operational assignments. He is enthusiastic about his future assignment to (Paris) and is hopeful that circumstances will permit him to pursue¹⁵⁻⁴ his operational tasks in the very near future.

7. Mr. (Roberts)⁰³ left Frankfurt for Dakar the night of 21 February and was told to continue with his disengagement plans as his departure from Dakar had already⁰³ been announced to his local contacts. It was suggested that (Roberts)⁰³ take a boat⁰³ from Dakar to Marseille. After his arrival in Marseille, (Roberts) was to proceed to Austria and take a ski vacation which is consistent with earlier vacation plans when he traveled from Dakar to Austria during the month of March for skiing in previous years. Roberts has been instructed to remain in contact with⁰² (LPGLOBE) so that further instructions can be furnished him when a firm estimate of future events with regard to the Itkin trial can be decided.

8. On 24 February 1969, I discussed with Mr. David^{27, 15-4} Murphy, (Chief of Station, Paris)⁰³, the possible exposure of (Roberts)⁰³ in the event Herbert Itkin is tried in the New York state court. I explained how (Roberts)⁰³ had been a (law partner)⁰⁶ of Itkin but as a result of our debriefing in Frankfurt we had concluded that⁰³ (Roberts) was not involved with illegal activities with Itkin since⁰³ (Roberts) has been employed by CIA. Mr. Murphy appreciated being briefed on the complicated case but indicated that he was anxious for (Roberts)⁰³ to arrive in (Paris)¹⁵⁻⁴ for his operational assignment in view of the priority need for¹⁵⁻⁴ his services in penetrating certain leftist organizations. Mr. Murphy felt that if Headquarters was considering a cooling off period for (Roberts)⁰³ of approximately three or four months, Murphy would hope that (Roberts)⁰³ could spend this time in (Paris)¹⁵⁻⁴ establishing himself with the target community and not have any station contacts. Mr. Murphy understands that this decision of necessity must be made at Headquarters, but that he as (Chief of^{27, 15-4} the Paris Station) does not feel that circumstances as they exist today represent a compromise of such magnitude that would preclude (Roberts)⁰³ operational assignment to (Paris).


JOHN K. GREANEY
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cc: C/EurDiv
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