

# DISPATCH

RYBAT/SECRET

CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY  
CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE  
COB, BONN - COB, FRANKFURT

CHIEF, EE of  
RYBAT (UPHILL) LCIMPROVE/AELADLE  
o/UPHILL COMMENTS ON AELADLE

- A. MUNI 6508
- B. BONN 4768
- C. EGOA 20103

*File 20*

1. WE FIND THE OPINIONS REPORTED IN REFS A BIT DISTURBING. WHILE WE DO NOT SUGGEST A POINTED AND DETAILED REBUTTAL AT THIS TIME, IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANY FUTURE EXPRESSIONS OF THIS TYPE BE FIRMLY COUNTERED WITH A REITERATION OF OUR PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, NAMELY-

- A. AELADLE ADMITTEDLY HAD LITTLE INFO ON KGB OPS IN GERMANY INASMUCH AS HE WAS NEVER DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH KGB GERMAN OPS. THIS POINT WAS MADE CLEAR FROM THE START.
- B. AELADLE PROVIDED A WEALTH OF INFO ON MATTERS CONCERNING OTHER AREAS WHICH HAS CHECKED OUT WITH INFO AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. THIS INCLUDED INFO ON THE VASSAL CASE. WHILE WE DO NOT WISH TO CITE STATISTICS OR SPECIFIC CASES, FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY AND POLITICAL REASONS, IT IS THE OPINION OF NOT ONLY KUBARK CI EXPERTS, BUT OF OTHERS, THAT AELADLE'S INFO IS BONAFIDE.
- C. THAT HE WAS A HANDLING PROBLEM WAS MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING.

DISTRIBUTION  
BY TAPE  
2-COS  
2-MLB  
2-BONN  
2-FOB

BY POUCH  
1-COS

//CONTINUED//

**RETURN TO CIA  
Background Use Only  
Do Not Reproduce**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>EGOM - 3763</b>	DATE <b>5 JULY 63 TOR-</b>
	CLASSIFICATION <b>RYBAT/SECRET</b>	MOB FILE NUMBER <b>(24)-6-496/3</b>
1-RI 1-DC/CI 1-C/SR/ 1-C/EE 1-EE/G/IS 2-EE/G/CE 1-C/WE	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE <b>EE/G/CE</b>	OFFICER <b>[WAGNER] 03</b>
	COORDINATING	
	OFFICER'S NAME	
	<b>C/EE/G</b>	
	<b>C/CE</b>	
<b>C/SR</b>		
<b>C/WE</b>		
RELEASING		
OFFICER'S NAME <b>AC/EE</b>	OFFICER'S NAME <b>[HEIMANN] 03</b>	

# DISPATCH

5/17

THE GERMANS WERE TOLD AT THE OUTSET THAT HE INSISTED ON KEEPING COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPTS.

2. WHEN THE <sup>01</sup>[UPHILL] TEAM WAS HERE THEY RAISED WITH THE UNDERSIGNED THE 'THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY' THAT HE WAS A DISPATCHED AGENT. WE STATED THAT THIS WAS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF THE INFO HE HAD PROVIDED. THE KGB WOULD NOT HAVE NEEDED TO PAY SUCH A HIGH PRICE IN COMPROMISED AGENTS AND OPERATIONS IF THEY WANTED TO FEED US A PHONY DEFECTOR. WE ALSO MADE THE UNSUBTLE SUGGESTION THAT THE KGB DIDN'T NEED TO SEND US AN AELADLE TO GET INFO ON <sup>01</sup>[UPHILL] INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS.

3. WE REALIZE THAT THE ABOVE IS NOT SUFFICIENT AMMUNITION TO PERSUADE THE DOUBTING THOMASES TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS. HOWEVER, AT THE APPROPRIATE OPENING YOU MIGHT WISH TO POINT OUT TO <sup>01</sup>[UTILITY] OR ALIAS FLEMING THAT THEY ARE IN FACT PERPETUATING THE KGB/ <sup>01</sup> DISINFORMATION'S OWN LINE ON AELADLE.

4. FINALLY, WE WONDER IF THERE IS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF <sup>01</sup>[UTILITY] <sup>01</sup>ET AL, AND SOME SIMILAR RUMBLINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM PARIS. IT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTING TO KNOW IF <sup>01</sup>[UPHILL] AND THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN GETTING TOGETHER ON THE AELADLE MATERIAL. <sup>01</sup> PLS REPORT ANYTHING THAT COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION ON THIS MATTER.

PETER A. RAMOS