

DISPATCH

Chief of Station, [illegible]

101-201002

Chief, [illegible] via Chief, [illegible]

12 Oct 59

ASPERER/S
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Return photos to ASPERER/S

OPRA-703

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FBI - [illegible]

1. Comments regarding the continued participation of ASPERER/S in your BRISKID efforts have been held pending customer evaluations of her reporting. With those in hand, we felt a more equitable judgment on our part could be made of her potential as a second short-term oriented KENNEDY or as a long term resident asset in the USSR.

2. The CR implications of A/S's relationship with Gregory GOLOB and an assessment of A/S for utilization in a CR operation, have been summed up in CFB-2415, and it is generally agreed here at Headquarters that A/S would be unsuitable for this type of an operation. Depending on the end results desired of an operation, a relationship with Soviets outside by a prospective BRISKID traveler, could be viewed either positively or negatively. If, for example, A/S had been encouraged to further her liaison with GOLOB, then a trip to the USSR at some future date might have been recommended for the purpose of gaining additional information on HIS notes regarding on board ground. On the other hand a trip for FI or PI purposes would, we feel, be limited by those contacts in that A/S would probably be subject to provocation once inside or inhibited in performing her given tasks by heavy surveillance. Her relationship with GOLOB, however, is only one of the restraining factors in deciding on a repeat oriented trip for A/S.

3. The evaluation of A/S's FI production resulting from her first trip have provided some idea as to her potential as an observer and reporter of positive and operational intelligence. Her overall rating as an observer was "not stated". Customer evaluations of the one positive intelligence dissemination resulting from her trip are enclosed. W. J. found it to be of slight or no value. KUMBI gave a slightly higher evaluation: of value, of importance, but accuracy could not be judged. Vital details were notably lacking, the reporting was vague. KUMBI's comments and indications of basic observations which would have considerably enhanced the report (time of sighting, altitude of plane, name of airport, take-off time, etc.) indicate shortcomings of A/S's reports. In comparison with reports of other travelers with little or less operational briefing than A/S had, her reports rating was low. The long report on education, statistics on A/S's part, although supposed to represent a scholarly treatise on the subject was evaluated as fragmentary, general and based purely on A/S's own conclusions. It struck us as being naive to attempt to analyze such a broad field as Soviet education with so obviously little factual knowledge or intimate acquaintance with the subject. This report was not disseminated. The only portion of CFB-2415 which is being considered for additional dissemination is paragraph 2 containing GOLOB's statements regarding KUMBI's personal which A/S was "reluctant to put in her report," and which KUMBI included in his covering dispatch. A/S's reporting of her contacts was fair. All in all, we can say that A/S's production was not startlingly impressive, and justification for a repeat trip on this basis could be a little less.

4. Lacking a full personal assessment of A/S, it is difficult to state categorically whether or not A/S should be considered for a trip on the basis of a qualification. In a literature bearing, the possible cost of a CR operation, A/S would have to have a comprehensive knowledge of the Russian language to cover both carrying in literature or distributing it. A/S does not have this fluency. In questionnaires last week, as we have discovered this past summer from operations of this type, a few sharp individuals,

