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SX-32554
26 Sept. 77

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ⁰ Two MVD Officers in Minsk Who Are Engaged in the Surveillance of Foreigners

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977



1. The two MVD officers described in this report are part of a small (and otherwise unidentified) section of the Minsk City Internal Affairs Directorate (GUVI) on Dobromyshlenskiy pereulok (the subject of a separate report). This section is engaged in the surveillance of foreigners for the apparent purpose of identifying those of their Soviet contacts who may be black marketeers.

2. KOVALEV, Vladimir, whose nickname is "Boni", holds the rank of senior lieutenant. Born in about 1949, he is 174 cm tall, of medium build, and has slightly wavy short blond hair. He is very nearsighted and wears glasses. He dresses modestly and inconspicuously and has the appearance of an "educated and cultured" person.

3. KOVALEV is married to Tamara nee MATVEYEVA, and they have a son, born in about 1972, who attends a special kindergarden for the children of high-ranking and other privileged officials. KOVALEVA, the daughter of a retired KGB lieutenant colonel, is a graduate of an economics institute and works as a senior economist for the State Committee for Standards, earning 170 rubles per month. The KOVALEVs live on Bobruyskaya ulitsa directly opposite a bus station.

4. KOVALEV is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, where he studied Spanish and English in the Department of Translating. After graduation, KOVALEV left Minsk for one year to go into the Army. However, Source found this hard to believe, as he knew that KOVALEV had been turned down for military service in 1966 because of nearsightedness. During the time that KOVALEV was in the Army, his wife told Source that where her husband was serving "they put army boots on once a month, just for show." KOVALEV's military service card (voyennyy bilet) nevertheless indicates both his 1966 rejection and the year that he supposedly spent in the Army.

5. Source believes **RECORD COPY** KOVALEV's father-in-law was instrumental

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in his choice of a career and probably helped KOVALEV through his own connections. (Fnu MATVEYEV, the father-in-law, had once been an important KGB official in the Belorussian SSR.) Source also believes that KOVALEV, while he is an MVD officer, has close ties with the KGB and may have been co-opted by it. He bases this belief on KOVALEV's close and frequent association with Anatoliy AKSENOV, a KGB lieutenant (the subject of a separate report). The Yubileynaya, a hotel where foreigners stay, is apparently one of KOVALEV's assignments, as he is frequently seen there.

6. (Fnu) PINYAZ⁶ is the MVD officer who works with KOVALEV. Born in about 1945, PINYAZ⁶ is of average height and build, has short blond hair, gray eyes, and dresses simply in an apparent effort to be inconspicuous. During a drinking session, PINYAZ⁶ admitted to Source that he "cooperates closely" with the KGB. PINYAZ⁶ is frequently seen at the Hotel Turist.

7. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 5).

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B. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (paras 2-5).

[redacted]


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(para 6). C. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]



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Distribution:
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in para 7)
1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ^C Organization, Functions, and Personalities of the MVD in Minsk

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

1. The headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Belorussian SSR is on the corner of prospekt Lenina and ulitsa Uritskogo in Minsk. The Minister is General-leutenant KLIMOVSKIY. He is married and has two daughters, both of whom studied in foreign languages at the Belorussian State University.

2. There is an MVD militia unit, called an internal affairs section (otdel vnutrennikh del, OVD), in each of the six rayons (precincts) of Minsk, as follows:

- A. Frunze Rayon OVD, on Obuz'naya ulitsa.
- B. Tsentral'nyy Rayon OVD, on the corner of Respubli-kanskaya ulitsa and Komsomol'skaya ulitsa.
- C. Sovet Rayon OVD, on Ploshchad' Ya. Kolasa.
- D. Oktyabr' Rayon OVD.
- E. Lenin Rayon OVD, at Serebryanka Mikro-rayon.
- F. Zavod Rayon OVD, on Partizanskiy prospekt.

3. Each of these rayon OVDs (known as ROVD) consists of the following departments (otdeleniye):

A. Investigations Department (Sledstvennoye otdeleniye), the largest component of the ROVD, conducts investigations of all crimes committed within the boundaries of the rayon. According to Source, the best educated and most highly trained investigators and inspectors of the militia are to be found

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in this department. In the Frunze ROVD, Inspectors Aleksandr GLYDOVSKIY and Vladimir MELESHKO were friends of Source, who stated that both men have anti-Soviet leanings. An MVD major, Vladimir KOMAROVICH, investigates the most serious cases.

B. The Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation (OBKhSS) is concerned with protecting socialist property in state establishments such as stores, plants and factories, hotels and restaurants. The following OBKhSS personalities were known to Source: (fnu) MALYSHKO and (fnu) POLYANSKIY in the Frunze ROVD, (fnu) KELLER and (fnu) VYSOTSKIY in the Tsentral'nyy ROVD, and (fnu) SUCHKOV in the Oktyabr' ROVD.

C. Department for Combatting Parasitism (Otdel bor'by s tuneystvom). Source thought that the term "parasitism" (tuneystvo) had recently been removed from the USSR Criminal Code and replaced by "vagrancy, begging and other parasitic types of existence." But the official procedures remain the same. Soviet citizens not engaged in socially productive labor are first given a warning, which they must sign at the department. If they remain unemployed, their case is turned over to a court, and the offense is punishable by a sentence of up to two years. However, there are ways to get around the law. Source says that if it can be shown that parents or a spouse are providing support or if a person can get seasonal work, he can defend himself before the department. But most citizens are not aware of these loopholes, according to Source. After the Investigations Department, this militia department turns over the greatest number of citizens to the courts. Also, this department and the law that it enforces are frequently used against dissidents.

D. Passport Department. Employees of this department make entries in the internal passports of citizens regarding their place of residence, and this department therefore gets many visitors. The department also enforces passport regulations.

E. The Guards and Protection (Okhrana) Department is responsible for providing militia protection to special establishments, such as radio and television studios and stations. This department also provides escorts for prisoners and guards at trials.

F. Department of Burglar and Intrusion Alarms (Otdel vnevedomstvennoy okhrany OVO). Source did not have any information on this department except that he thought it provides guards and watchmen for various enterprises in addition to its work with alarm systems.

G. Motor Pool (Motodivizion) provides and maintains patrol cars and motorcycles for the militia.

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4. The rayon OVDs (ROVDs) fall under the Minsk City Internal Affairs Directorate (Gorodskoye upravleniye vnutrennikh del, GUVD) of the Executive Committee of the Minsk City Soviet. (fnu) PISKAREV, who holds the rank of general-major of internal affairs, is chief of the Minsk GUVD. The GUVD, which is on Dobromyshlenskiy pereulok, houses the pretrial detention cell (kamera predvaritel'nogo zaklyucheniya, KPZ and OVIR). Even though the Minsk city OVIR falls under the Belorussian Republic OVIR, there is no republic-level OVIR office in Minsk, although there are some republic-level OVIR officials who sit in the MVD headquarters building on prospekt Lenina.

5. Shortly before Source left Minsk to emigrate, he learned of a very small section in the GUVD, consisting of two or three people engaged in the surveillance of foreigners. Of particular interest to this section are the foreigners' contacts with black marketeers (fartsovshchiki). Although Source previously thought that only the KGB was concerned with black marketeers, he concluded that the MVD is also involved and that the two organizations probably work closely together, both posting their representatives in the hotels where foreigners stay, such as the Turist, the Yubileynaya, and the Minsk. Source knew of two members of this small section, Vladimir KOVALEV and (fnu) PINYAZ' (who are covered in a separate report).

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
Distribution:

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SX-32430

2 September 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Druzhinniki and Operativniki, Voluntary Civilian Militia Patrolmen

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1969-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

1. The druzhina is a group of civilians who volunteer to assist the militia in maintaining public order. Although the druzhiny originated spontaneously in about 1962, they have since become official appendages of the militia. There is at least one druzhina in each factory, public and commercial enterprise, institute and technical school. Although the druzhina officers are supposedly elected, they actually are appointed by the administration at the factory. A duty roster is posted. Almost everyone except the management has to be on duty at one time or another; no one can refuse. It is very hard to make people, especially the factory workers, roam the streets on druzhina duty after a day's work because they would rather go home.

2. In the institutes the druzhiny operate this way. After lectures all the students of a particular department have to attend a compulsory meeting. The senior druzhinnik of the institute is in charge of the meeting, together with the senior druzhinniki and deputies in the departments. Those students who for some reason did not manage to escape this duty (using a medical excuse, influence with the chief, or other means), are then marched to the nearest druzhina post. There are dozens of such posts in each rayon (precinct) of the militia, usually in the basements of apartment houses. Usually there is an officer of the militia there, with several militiamen of lower ranks.

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3. At the druzhina post, each druzhinnik gets a red arm band to wear. Then, they are dispatched to different locations to patrol and uphold public order. What actually happens is that they just walk around the streets for a while, then return the red arm bands and go home. Not all of them, however, just walk around: for any number of reasons (desire to get ahead, anger at the world, or exercise of a little power) some of them grab off the streets either innocent people or obvious drunks, and take them to the post. Source himself was taken in several times to such a post. There a militia officer fills out a report, and does not even try to listen to the detained person's explanation of what happened. If you do not try to prove your innocence, the matter will end just with a fine of five to ten rubles and a report to your place of work, which will cause you to lose any bonus pay at work. If you try to argue, to prove your innocence, then the action is more serious. A patrol car that periodically visits each post, picks you up, and takes you to the rayon MVD. There, the militia holds you all day. In the best case, you have to pay a fine of ten rubles, and in the worst case, you receive fifteen days of confinement with compulsory labor, only if there was nothing criminal in your behavior. If there was, then you get a trial and a jail sentence.

4. If the druzhinniki do not bring anyone in, they are criticized for not doing their job conscientiously. Another reason for pressure on them, in Source's opinion, is that the government needs the money from the fines.

5. Some of the more active druzhinnik are offered jobs in militia after graduation.

6. Source heard about another organization, the operativniki, but he does not know the difference between them and the druzhinniki. It seems that the operativnik are a little higher in rank. They meet in secret, no one announces their meetings, or the names of the members. No one knows or talks about it.

7. In the Institute of Foreign Languages, the chief of the operativnik was Vladimir SHUMRIKOV, born 1939, about 186 cm. tall, sturdy build, an athlete (former shotputter) who has short wavy hair, dark eyes, large features, and a fairly handsome, but somewhat hard face. He graduated from IMIYaz in 1973, speaks English and German, likes to drink, always hangs around the foreigners at the sport meets. SHUMRIKOV has been a Party member since 1973. Source saw him several times with Yevgeniy SURGATOV (KGB) in a Minsk bar. SHUMRIKOV also knows KGB senior lieutenant Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV.

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8. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 7).

B. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 7).

C. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 7).

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SE/SAG/OP: (7 September 1977)

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S E C R E T

SX-31590
17 Jun 77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Selection and Recruitment of KGB Officers, Agents and Informers in the Belorussian SSR

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-1976

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

2. Source's curiosity about the selection and recruitment of KGB personnel was aroused when AKSENOV told him that he was considering the recruitment of Source as a KGB informant. Source asked AKSENOV who is selected and for what reasons. AKSENOV replied that the KGB usually uses spotters, who recommend people for recruitment. Background is important. A person from a peasant or worker's family is considered a better choice, and he must either be a quiet and colorless type who blends into the circle of people in which he operates, or else a conspicuous loudmouth who asks embarrassing questions. The latter would be more likely suspect of being a member of the opposition rather than a KGB informant. The average informant, according to AKSENOV, is not very bright because KGB officers themselves are not particularly intelligent and are afraid of anyone who is smarter than they. Source says that he was never recruited.

3. Both Source and AKSENOV think that in the remote areas of the USSR there are very few cases of such a recruitment pitch being turned down. Far from the big cities the KGB is an all-powerful instrument, and anyone who refuses just to report on the conversations of his friends in the name of patriotism will end up with dismal career prospects unless he has friends in high places. However, it is unlikely that such a person would be chosen for a KGB recruitment pitch in the first place. Therefore most of the lower levels of the KGB consist of people from simple backgrounds for whom there are no other career prospects and who prefer this kind of service to being in the Army.

4. The KGB officers in the Belorussian SSR are also those who are not bright enough to make a career in some other field, such as science, engineering, or foreign languages, but they differ from the lower-level cadres in that they are the sons of high-ranking

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17 June 1977
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Party and government officials. This is why so many sons of Belorussian dignitaries work for the KGB. Otherwise they would be doomed to jobs which would pay them, at most, 120 rubles per month for the rest of their lives, even if they could survive the competition in a Party job. In the KGB, an officer, who achieves such status by going through a school, can look forward to steady promotions until he reaches the rank of major. And if his sponsor retains his influence, the officer can eventually be promoted to lieutenant colonel or even colonel before retiring. Also, it is a prestigious, interesting, and financially advantageous job which places the KGB officer above the common people to the point where many officers consider themselves to be above the law. Their salaries are often supplemented by discreet cooperation with black marketeers, who pay off either in goods or a percentage of the take. And there are the services of the women who sleep with foreigners, for money or for other considerations, and who report to the KGB. So a person like AKSENOV, responsible for a large tourist hotel like the Yubileynaya, actually presides over a small kingdom.

5. A KGB officer meets each of his agents (filer was the word used by Source) in a safe house (konspirativnaya kvartira). Other officers are not supposed to know who these agents are, and this "conspiracy" is a matter of great pride to them. Source was once caught leaving the hotel room of a Bulgarian girl with whom he had spent the night, but he was released when he gave AKSENOV's name to the junior KGB officer on duty (thereby implying that Source was on assignment for AKSENOV).

6. Source described KGB influence as "overwhelming". For example, a Soviet going abroad on an official assignment cannot refuse to cooperate with the KGB because such refusal would mean that the person wouldn't be able to travel, as the KGB has a say about his final clearance. Source also gave the example of an applicant for an unimportant job with the Minsk Symphony who was originally turned down. But when AKSENOV spoke to the KGB officer responsible for the Symphony, the applicant was not only hired but received the greatest respect from the Symphony Director during the entire period of his employment.

7. The KGB likes to recruit retired military personnel (otstavniki) because they are considered politically reliable and patriotic. Many otstavniki recruited by the KGB are former Osobyi otdel (Special Section, security functions) people, so KGB work is not a novelty for them. Such retirees are frequently used in stationary positions, reporting on or guarding specific areas.

8. Since the KGB relies on spotters for the selection of its agents, the spotters themselves can get into trouble if they recommend the "wrong" person. This means that the spotters are afraid to select clever people, so in the end they select mediocre ones. Selection is determined by the following: If the prospective agent or informer is a kolkhoznik, he is immediately 50% qualified. If he was in the Army, particularly in the Osobyi otdel, this adds another 30%. Other qualifications are based on the person's being "quiet", "average", or "ordinary".

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9. The spotter is supposed to turn in a list of potential recruits and write a recommendation for each person. The prospective agent or informer is then called in and an offer to cooperate with the KGB is made. Source never heard anything about money being mentioned, but the KGB does offer help in the advancement of one's career. The initial assignments are very simple: The agent or informer just has to keep his eyes and ears open and to report anything that smacks of anti-government or illegal activity. Who can refuse such a call to patriotic vigilance? And if one does, he might well be classified as an enemy of the state and end up doing the lowliest physical labor rather than enjoying a promising career.

10. AKSENOV also told Source that the KGB usually opens a file on a Soviet citizen who corresponds with anyone abroad. After this, his telephone conversations are monitored and periodically recorded. And finally, KGB agents and informers who come into contact with him will be asked to report on him.

11. Source once asked AKSENOV what the KGB would consider its greatest accomplishment. AKSENOV replied that the discovery of a secret agent (nelegal) would be first on the list, followed by the discovery of an illegal printing press. Without printed matter a revolution cannot take place, according to AKSENOV. Third on the list is the discovery of the illegal possession of a rifled weapon, such as a rifle or pistol. This last item would not be considered particularly important in itself, but a KGB officer can do very well for himself if he plays his cards right. He must time the discovery of the illegal weapon with a public event involving the visit of an important Party or government dignitary. Thus, in the eyes of his superiors, his discovery is tantamount to thwarting an assassination attempt. Any one of the three accomplishments would lead to automatic promotion, a medal, and tenure for life in the KGB.

12. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

[redacted] There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 1).

[redacted] In charge of [redacted]

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Distribution:

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S E C R E T

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2 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/BIO, Attn. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Photos for Photo File

1. Attached are photos on four Soviets, provided by a Soviet emigre.
2. KOROBOCHKIN, Leonid Ivanovich. DOB ca 43, probably in Minsk, USSR. OCC truck driver. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.
3. MIKHEDO, Anatoliy. DOB 48, Minsk, Belorussian SSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC tourist guide. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.
4. TETEKHIN, Sergey. DOB 49, Borisov, USSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC French-Russian translator. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31465, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.
5. AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. DOB 48, Minsk, Belorussian SSR. Graduate of French Department, Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. OCC KGB lieutenant. LOC USSR, Belorussian SSR, Minsk. REF SX-31466, 12 May 77, 201-0948382.

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Attachment:
Envelope with photographss

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SX-31533
23 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Keeping of Large Sums of Money in the Soviet Union

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

1. Unless you have iron-clad proof that you got the money legally, the balance of your account in any one savings bank (sberkassa) should not exceed a thousand rubles. Each savings bank has a militia representative who reports suspiciously large accounts to the OBKhSS (Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation) of the militia for investigation. Source got this information from a militia lieutenant who was an OBKhSS officer in his rayon.

2. Since savings banks do not have a centralized accounting system, another way of keeping large amounts of money is to have accounts in several banks, as long as none of them exceeds the thousand-ruble limit.

3. One of the best ways of keeping money when traveling, or even at home, is in the form of an akkreditiv (a personalized cashier's check). An akkreditiv can be bought at any bank or savings institution and can be cashed anywhere at any time but only by the person to whom it is made out and only on presentation of an internal passport. Without the passport, the akkreditiv cannot be cashed, thereby making it a safer form of keeping money than currency.

4. If money is to be kept at home, it is somewhat less suspicious to have it in the form of three-percent government loan bonds (trekhprotsentnyy zaem). These are not personalized and can be cashed at any time at a small discount. They also have the advantage of a prize that can be won at one of the periodic drawings based on their numbers.

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23 May 1977
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SX-31225
20 May 1977

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6. EDUCATION:

- 1956-66 He attended and graduated from Secondary School No. 24, specializing in German language instruction. The former head of the school was fnu UDAL'TSOVA.
- 1969-72 He attended Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages (INYAZ), German Department. He did not graduate.
- 1972-74 He attended the History Department of the Belorussian State University. He did not graduate.

Members of INYAZ who travel abroad are:

- A. the former Chief of INYAZ, Lyudmila KRASNOVA, born about 1930, a former girl friend of Kiril T. MAZUROV, a member of the Politburo. She has recently been replaced, but UZLOV does not know by whom. She speaks German and frequently travels abroad.
- B. the chief of the German Department, Lyudmila Aleksandrovna SUKHAREVA. She has been there for a long time. She travels abroad, but, presumably, to GDR only.
- C. Prorector fnu KHOZYAYEV who speaks English. He has traveled to London.
- D. Professor fnu USILOV went to GDR as an exchange teacher.
- E. the dean of Teacher Retraining (povysheniya kvalifikatsii), Spartak Ivanovich KARASEV, who also teaches psychology. He went to Germany.
- F. Professor fnu TRUNOVA, who teaches English.

7. EMPLOYMENT:

- 1966-67 He was a movie operator at the theatre "MIR". At that same time, he was a salesman at the State Department Store, Minsk.
- 1967-68 He had a variety of seasonal jobs: a concrete worker at Settlement Korelyugi (Grodnetskiy rayon), Mosty village, and at Pukhovichi (Minsk rayon).

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- 1972-74 He worked with a sound and public address system at the Belorussian State University.
- 1974-76 He was a street photographer at the Outside (vyvezdnoye) Bureau of the Minsk Factory for Photographic Work.
- 1976-departure He had miscellaneous employment.

8. RESIDENCE IN THE USSR: From before 1966 to his emigration, UZLOV lived at 47 Volgogradskaya ulitsa in Minsk.

9. EMIGRATION: UZLOV emigrated from the USSR on 28 November 1976. He arrived in Rome shortly thereafter, and departed for the United States on 22 March 1977.

10. PRESENT SITUATION: UZLOV currently lives at 414 Avenue N, apartment 6B in Brooklyn, NY 11230. He is unemployed.

11. PERSONAL EVALUATION: UZLOV is a smart, witty, outgoing, aggressive person, accustomed to living by his wits. He is willing to take chances and play roles, but, at the same time, he is not afraid of hard work, as long as it pays well. He is somewhat given to romanticizing, for example, by seeking a job in intelligence and not fully realizing that it is a steady and, often, dull job. He is not persistent, not able to stick to his studies or hold a job; instead, he prefers to work hard for shorter periods to earn money, and then do nothing.

UZLOV seemed to be completely won over by the United States, saying that he is willing to do anything that would be asked of him, such as his voluntarily bringing in photographs of some of the personalities he described, and suggesting that he would try to use the loose code system that he had established with his friends back in Minsk to obtain information for us, if we so require. At the last possible moment, he admitted that he was incarcerated in the USSR for participation in a fight, but was later found innocent by a higher court.

Physically, UZLOV is good-looking, trim, athletic, and is a former boxer, who tries to keep himself in good shape. He likes to dress well and, seemingly, no longer drinks to excess, as he used to do in the Soviet Union.

PART II: OI KNOWLEDGEABILITY

12. KGB: See KGB Personalities in the Minsk Area (SX-31466) and KGB Presence in a Tourist Hotel in Minsk (SX-31527).

13. SOVIETS WHO TRAVEL ABROAD: See Graduates of the Minsk

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State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages who Travel Abroad or are Disaffected (SX-31465).

14. SAFEKEEPING OF MONEY: See Safekeeping of Legal and Illegal Money in the Soviet Union (to be published).

PART III: TRACES (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report, with an active interest in any of the subjects, should run full traces of their own.)

15. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 6E).

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[REDACTED]

19. There are no Headquarters traces on
(para 6B).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

20. There are no Headquarters traces on
(para 6F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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S E C R E T

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SE/SAG/OP: [REDACTED] (25 May 77)

Distribution:

Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948382, index indicated names in Part III, and ZR into 201-0809235, 201-0890689, 201-0185622 & 201-0901995 with the phrase "mentioned in a debriefing report by Soviet emigre 201-0948382.")

- 1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
- 1 - SE/RR
- 1 - SE/CI/I
- 1 - SE/SAG/CA
- 1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

Sterile Distribution:

- 1 - FBI (part I only)
- 1 - DCD/ETF via SE/RR (part I only)
- 1 - PCS/DEF (part I only)

S E C R E T

201-948382

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SX-31527
12 May 1977

25	
X	2
X	8
LESENKO?	

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ⁰ KGB presence in a tourist hotel in Minsk

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

1. Most of this information was obtained from Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV, a senior lieutenant of the KGB, and other friends and classmates of Source who are at present KGB and militia officers. AKSENOV was at that time in charge of the KGB unit in the Yubileynaya Hotel, Minsk.

2. In each tourist hotel in Minsk there is a so-called militia punkt (unit). It is usually in a room on the first floor of the hotel somewhere off the lobby. Supposedly this is a militia unit whose purpose is to protect foreigners, maintain order in the hotel, and prevent black-marketing. Actually, this unit is manned by KGB representatives in militia uniforms who carry militia as well as KGB identification. The militia seems to be the favorite cover for the KGB.

3. In the Yubileynaya Hotel this unit always had four or five persons on duty. During the day it had two privates and a sergeant in uniform and two officers in civilian attire. At night, when on duty, all of them usually wore militia uniforms. Aside from the above-mentioned militia functions, their actual mission was to prevent what they considered to be unnecessary contact of Soviet citizens with foreigners, to observe any suspicious actions by either, and to ensure that only approved persons had access to the hotel. All other Soviet citizens would be stopped, their documents checked, and their business questioned. An officer from such a unit once stopped Source after he had spent the night with a Bulgarian girl in the hotel. Source thinks he was discovered through audio surveillance.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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This officer showed his militia identification, and asked for and checked Source's documentation by telephone. He released Source without making any report, because Source, by veiled references to AKSENOV, managed to make this officer believe he was AKSENOV's agent. Later Source learned that this officer was AKSENOV's KGB subordinate.

4. The KGB also has an audio surveillance room and possibly several saferooms in the hotel. Once in 1975, after drinking with Source for several hours in a restaurant, AKSENOV invited him to come to the "special place" in the Yubileynaya Hotel. Source thinks that AKSENOV probably telephoned before going to the Yubileynaya. Source was led through a number of corridors to a room in the back of the hotel which AKSENOV unlocked with a key. There was no one in the room, although AKSENOV later told Source that there are supposed to be two people on duty at all times. AKSENOV and Source continued drinking in the room. Source did not pay too much attention to details, but at one point, apparently in order to impress Source with KGB capabilities, AKSENOV showed the Source a tape recorder, which was of foreign or Baltic republic make, and let him listen through the earphones to what was being recorded from a room under surveillance. Source claimed that he could hear all the sounds in the room, that of running water, etc. AKSENOV switched from room to room; audio quality was uniformly good. AKSENOV later explained that this is the audio surveillance room (komnata proslushivaniya) and that the KGB is capable of listening in to any room in the hotel. A log using notations in code (according to Source's best recollection) is kept indicating the time periods of listening in on each room, and the conversations actually recorded. Source was unable to recall whether there was more than one tape recorder in the room or how one recorded segment was distinguished from another on the tapes. He presumed that it was done by voice announcement, but he did not remember seeing a microphone which would be used for this purpose. None of these technical details were explained either then or later by AKSENOV.

5. AKSENOV never mentioned any phone surveillance and Source presumed that this is done in a different location, outside the hotel.

6. In subsequent conversations, AKSENOV told Source that all rooms occupied by foreigners are listened to by a spot check from the time that the occupant enters his room. There is apparently a device which indicates when this occurs. The running of water as an audio hindrance is a useless measure, AKSENOV said, as KGB audio technicians are able to eliminate this as well as many other extraneous noises in order to make the conversations audible.

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7. Later Source learned (he does not remember from whom) that telephones are also used as audio listening devices and that they are effective even without the receiver being taken off the hook (i.e., hot mike).

8. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 1).

[redacted] In charge

SE/SAG/OP: [redacted] (7 Jun 77)

Distribution:

Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948382 and index indicated name in para 8).

- 1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IG, SE/USSR
- 1 - SE/RR
- 1 - SE/CI/T [redacted]
- 1 - SE/CI [redacted]
- 1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

C O N F I D E N T I A L

201-948382

S E C R E T

SX-31466

12 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: KGB Personalities in the Minsk area

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 29 1977
MICRO. SER.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76.

DATE OF INTERVIEW : 26-28 April 1977

The following is in response to a requirement
by SE/CI/I on 6 April 1977.

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 29 1977	2
REVIEWED	✓
PREPARED	✓

1. The KGB building in Minsk is on Leninskiy prospekt. There is another entrance at ulitsa Volodarskogo 2. The building occupies an entire city block and has its own prison within this area.

2. AKSENOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. Born in 1948 in Minsk. He lives at the House of Scientific Workers, prospekt Lenina, Apt. 12, Minsk. He is 168 cm. tall, has a solid build (he is a former gymnast), blond hair, hazel eyes, and a soft-looking face with prominent red veins. When conversing, he has the habit of looking downward and then suddenly raising his eyes to look up. Source does not consider him to be particularly intelligent but rather as having a "crafty, peasant approach to life."

A. AKSENOV is the son of Aleksandr Mikhiforovich AKSENOV, a member of the Central Committee and Second Secretary of the Belorussian CP. This makes the father the second highest ranking Party official in the Belorussian SSR. He has been characterized as a ruthless careerist. The mother is a physician who no longer practices.

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12 May 1977
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B. AKSENOV's wife is Tat'yana nee KONDRAKOVA, born in 1950 or 1951, in Dzerzhinsk-on-Volga. The father had wanted Anatoliy to marry the daughter of another member of the Belorussian CC, Aleksey Alekseyevich SMIRNOV, and this has caused much conflict between father and son, in addition to that already generated by the son's heavy drinking and his frequently getting into trouble when drunk. AKSENOV is afraid of his father. In order to curry favor with her father-in-law, AKSENOV's wife reports episodes of her husband's drunken behavior to him. The younger AKSENOVs fight frequently and separate from time to time; at the time of the source's departure they were living apart. The wife is materialistic and takes advantage of her husband's position. She deals frequently on the black market.

C. They have a daughter, Galina, born in 1973 in Minsk. AKSENOV has a brother who works for the CC, CPSU in Moscow, and a sister.

D. AKSENOV attended Minsk Middle School 24 together with source, graduating in 1966. He graduated from the French Department of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages in 1972, after which, on his father's insistence, he enrolled in a KGB school (apparently in Minsk), graduating as a lieutenant in 1973.

E. He has since been working as an operations officer (operupolnomochennyy) in the Operations Department (Operativnyy otdel or operotdel) of the KGB in Minsk. His first assignment was at the Yubileynaya Hotel, followed by the Turist Hotel, and at present he is responsible for the Yubileynaya Hotel. He holds the rank of senior lieutenant.

F. After becoming a KGB officer, AKSENOV continued to associate with the source and other classmates, and through him the source met a number of other KGB officers and was able to learn something about certain KGB operations in the Minsk area.

G. Photographs of AKSENOV are available in SE/B10 photo file.

3. BORICH, Yuriy (pnu). Born in about 1950. He is the son of a KGB general (fnu). BORICH is app. 180 cm. tall, thin, has light hair which he parts on the left side. He is

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a quiet person. He plays the guitar. He and his wife are both graduates of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. He speaks German and English. BORICH was on assignment in The Netherlands (for the KGB, the Source thinks), had returned to Minsk but was scheduled to return to The Netherlands just before the Source's departure.

4. CHISTYY, Fedor (pnu). Born in about 1949. He is tall (182 cm.), heavy-set, has blond hair and deeply set eyes. The source describes him as clumsy, with a crude-looking face, and as "stupid but crafty". He is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages and was an informer while a student there. CHISTYY served in the Army. He is a KGB officer, he works with AKSENOV (see paragraph 1) in the Operations Department. He is a heavy drinker and smoker.

5. GURIY (fnu, pnu) is 173 cm. tall, burly, and has a face, according to Source, which resembles that of a bulldog. He is a KGB major, works in the Minsk KGB Operations Department, and serves as the overseer (kurator) of the Minsk Motel, which is about 11 miles to the west of the city.

6. LAPSHOV, Vladimir (pnu). Born in about 1946. He is short (166 cm.), heavy-set, looks like a boxer, has short hair, blue eyes, and a birthmark on the left side of his face. He has a penetrating gaze.

A. He was formerly a black marketeer. He is a construction engineer, he has been to Iran but now works in Moscow (he is originally from Minsk). Source suspects that LAPSHOV may be KGB on the basis of an incident when he was stopped by the militia for speeding. He showed some sort of identification which prompted the militiaman to salute him and let him go.

B. He is married to the daughter of cosmonaut Pavel Ivanovich BELYAYEV, who died on 10 January 1970. LAPSHOV likes to dress well and is considered by Source to be a show-off.

7. MOLOCHKO, Viktor Nikolayevich. Born in about 1946, he is the son of the Minister of Trade of the Belorussian SSR, Nikolay Petrovich MOLOCHKO. Viktor MOLOCHKO at present is a lieutenant in the KGB Operations Department (Operotdel). He is snort, fat, has dark hair, is married and has children.

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8. MOROZ (fnu, pnu), works for the KGB. He has been in Africa on assignment, possibly with military or economic aid, and has published a work on Africa. MOROZ always moves in KGB circles. He is married to the daughter of a lieutenant general (general leytenant), who commands an Army. He is short (about 167 cm.) has bulging eyes, a short neck, and looks "like a toad." He owns a new model Volga, a sensation in Minsk, as only a few of these cars per year, are allocated for civilian purchase.

9. NIKULIN, Yakov Prokop'yevich. Is a lieutenant general (general leytenant) in the KGB and head of the Belorussian SSR KGB. He is a friend of Aleksandr Nikiforovich AKSENOV (see paragraph 1).

10. POKHIN, Aleksandr (pnu). Is a retired KGB major, was formerly a deputy chief of the Minsk KGB Operotdel and an immediate superior of Anatoliy AKSENOV. POKHIN's daughter, Lyudmila, is a graduate of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages and is a friend of the Source.

11. SECHAYKO, Vladimir (pnu). Born in about 1946. He was the only person who graduated from a KGB school (apparently in Minsk) with the rank of junior lieutenant, because of his bad behavior. He was later expelled from the KGB for excessive drinking and now works at the meteorological station in Minsk. His wife's name is Tamara.

12. SAZANOVICH (fnu, pnu). Is a KGB colonel, Chief of the Special Department (Osobyy otdel) of the Belorussian SSR KGB. SAZANOVICH interrogated a black marketeer, a friend of the Source.

13. SURGANOV, Yevgeniy Fedorovich. Born about 1945. Is a KGB officer. He is a graduate of the Physics Department of the Belorussian State University. His father is Fedor Anisimovich SURGANOV, Chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. Yevgeniy SURGANOV is about 190 cm. tall, blond, of medium build, attractive. His left shoulder is noticeably lower than the right. He likes to drink.

14. ZENOVICH (fnu, pnu). He is a Captain in the Belorussian KGB, was responsible for Philharmonic Orchestra but has been replaced. His wife's name is Svetlana, she was born in 1950. They have a daughter, Anna, born 8 March 1972. At present ZENOVICH is learning to drive a bus. Interviewer's Comment: This possibly indicates that ZENOVICH may have been fired from the KGB.

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15. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted])

[redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
[redacted] (para 2).

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
[redacted] (para 3)./

[redacted]

[redacted]


C. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
[redacted] (para 4)./



[redacted]

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(para 5). D. There are no Headquarters traces on 



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G. There are no identifiable Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 8).

H. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 9).

I. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 10).

J. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 12).

K. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 11).

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**I. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
[redacted] (para 13).**

**M. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
[redacted] (para 14).**

SE/SAG/OP

SE/SAG/OP: [redacted] (17 June 1977)

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SECRET

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Distribution:

✓ Orig - IP/Ad (please classify into 201-0948382 and index indicated names in para 15)

1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR

1 - SE/RR

1 - SE/CI/I

1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono

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
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SX-31465
12 May 1977

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 14 1977	
FBI - NEW YORK	

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Graduates of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages who travel abroad or who are disaffected.



DATE OF INFORMATION: 1972-76

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 26-28 April 1977

JUN 14 1977
MICROFILMED

The following is in response to a requirement levied by SE/X/AF on 11 April 1977 and SE/CI/X on 12 April 1977.

1. CHADLIYEV, Anatoliy pnu. Born in 1949 or 1950. He is 176 cm. tall, of medium build, has short red hair, full lips, protruding eyes, freckles. He is single. He does not drink or smoke and is very reserved. In 1973, he graduated from the Institute, having studied in the English Department. He spent two years in Burma and since 1975 has been in Guinea as a contract interpreter.

2. DAVIDOVICH, Aleksandr pnu. Born in about 1948 in Minsk, he is 178 cm. tall, thin, has narrow shoulders, light hair, grayish blue eyes, full lips, and a large head. He likes to dress well and is considered by Source to be good-looking. He gesticulates when talking, he drinks and is an ardent card player. He likes women.

A. DAVIDOVICH's father is a colonel in the Personnel Department of the KGB in Minsk. His mother is a physician. During his school days, DAVIDOVICH got into trouble with the militia when he was caught, along with two other students, stealing a private car. But the matter was settled out of court, and DAVIDOVICH's only punishment was a reprimand at a Komsomol meeting.

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12 Nov 1977
201-948328

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B. DAVIDOVICH left the Institute in 1971 to go to Algiers for two years, before taking his final examinations, but returned after one year to take these exams and to graduate. He speaks French, English and German.

C. In 1972, he married Nataliya (maiden name unknown), who is from Yevpatoria (in the Crimea), and is a graduate of the French Department of the Institute. In 1972, he also entered the Army but was discharged by a commission three months later due to a nervous disorder. To an ordinary person this would mean never being able to go abroad again. But in 1975, Source heard that DAVIDOVICH was in fact leaving the country again, with his wife, going possibly to Guinea or to Ghana. When asked how he managed this despite his record of illness, DAVIDOVICH told Source that his medical problem was curable and that he was now well. Source thinks that DAVIDOVICH is most likely working for the KGB, at least as a co-opted agent.

3. FISHMAN, Yakov Iosifovich. Born in about 1950. He was a neighbor of Source for 15 years. FISHMAN's father, Iosif, and a brother live in New York. Two days before Source's departure FISHMAN asked him to transmit the following information to authorities in the West. In 1973, FISHMAN served as a sergeant (serzhant) in a strategic missile unit 4 kilometers from the poselok (settlement) of Novobelokorovich, Zhitomir Oblast'. This unit was armed with medium-range strategic rockets targeted against Munich. Twenty-four kilometers from this unit was another battalion with the same type of rockets, targeted against Frankfurt. These units were part of the 82nd Rocket Division of the Vinnitsa "Rocket Army." While assigned to this battalion, FISHMAN traveled to a rocket-connected manufacturing and repair plant at poselok of Kolosov near Minsk, and the poselok of Bataysk in Rostov Oblast'. The pickup points at both of these places were underground. FISHMAN wants to leave the USSR, but when he tried to apply, the officials would not even accept his papers because of his having been in the rocket troops.

4. KOROBOCHKIN, Leonid Ivanovich. Born in about 1943. Graduated from the Institute with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich AKSENOV (KGB operations officer in Minsk and a friend of the Source). KOROBOCHKIN's father, born in 1902, is now a retired Air Force colonel and has been a Party member since 1921. KOROBOCHKIN was in the Army for one year and worked for the Belorussian Philharmonic Symphony for a year. He cannot find a good job but is trying to become a truck driver with the idea of driving the USSR-West European routes and then defecting. KOROBOCHKIN despises the Soviet government and system. He was one of three people, including Source, involved in a plot to

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burn down a Party museum in Minsk, but they decided against this, thinking that it would jeopardize their chances of leaving the USSR. Source can communicate with him by pre-arranged code. A photo of KOROBCHKIN is available in SE/BIO photo file.

5. LAZERKA, Vladimir pne. Born in 1949 in Minsk. Is a graduate of the Spanish Department of the Institute. His wife's name is Tat'yana, she was his classmate at the Institute. His father is an engineer. After graduating, LAZERKA worked as a dispatcher at the Minsk airport and in 1974 went to Cuba with AEROFLOT.

6. MIKHEDO, Anatoliy pne. Born in 1948 in Minsk of a Belorussian father and a Jewish mother. Graduated from the French Department of the Institute. He is a very good friend of Source, who considers him well-educated and cultured. MIKHEDO served in an (unknown) African country as a contract interpreter in 1973-75 but is now back in Minsk. He is working as a Sputnik tourist guide in Minsk but is very unhappy and dreams of going abroad again on another contract, though his chances are slim. He has become a heavy drinker. Two photographs of MIKHEDO are available in SE/BIO photo file.

7. MUZKOV, Yuriy pne. Born in about 1936. He is KOROBCHKIN's (see paragraph 4) half-brother. MUZKOV was a military specialist in the Higher Engineering and Missile Technical School (Vyssheye inzhenerno raketno tekhnicheskoye uchilishche, VIRTU) in the poselok of Uruch'ye near Kalinin. At present he is a lieutenant colonel in one of the Baltic republics, possibly Latvia.

8. MYAGKOV, Valeriy pne. He is the son of a colonel on the staff of the Belorussian Military District. MYAGKOV and several other students of the Belorussian State University typed and pasted up in prominent places in Minsk about ten paper leaflets proclaiming "Down with Communist tyranny!" The KGB found them out by comparing the characteristics of the type-written proclamation with the typewriter samples in their files. MYAGKOV got four years in prison, at least two of which he spent in the KGB prison in Minsk at ulitsa Volodarskogo 2.

9. PETROV, Dmitriy pne. He is the grandson of a retired Army colonel, and was brought up by a widowed mother. PETROV was born in 1949 in Minsk. He graduated from the French Department of the Institute in 1972. He was a contract interpreter in an (unknown) African country and is now in Minsk. He worked as an interpreter in the economic achievement exhibit in Minsk. Source heard rumors that PETROV will be going abroad again quite soon.

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10. PETUKHOV, Oleg pnu. Born in 1949. His address is ulitsa Likhonova 111, Apt. 116, Minsk. He is single and has a sister and mother in Minsk. PETUKHOV graduated from the Institute, where he studied German and English. At present he is working in an automobile repair shop.

PETUKHOV was in the Army in the Western Ukraine in a restricted zone where some secret units were stationed. He was one of the three participants in the plot to burn down the Party museum (see paragraph 4). PETUKHOV is trying to leave the USSR but has been unsuccessful thus far. The Source can communicate with him by a code based on associations which they have devised.

11. SHOR, Mstislav pnu. Born in about 1936. He is Jewish. He lives at ulitsa Ol'shevskogo 9, Minsk. SHOR is a former wrestler; he now works in a radiator factory. He has two sons. SHOR has divorced his wife and applied for an exit visa. He has been a neighbor of Source for many years.

12. TETEKHIN, Sergey pnu. Born in 1949 in Borisov. He is 183 cm. tall, of medium build, and wears glasses. His father is a major general (general-mayor, equivalent to a brigadier general in the U.S. Army) who lives in Borisov and is commander of a tank unit in the poselok of Pechi. TETEKHIN graduated from the French Department of the Institute in 1972 and spent two years in Uganda. He has now gone to Africa (country unknown) again. A photograph of TETEKHIN is available in SE/BIO photo file.

13. TSIRLIN, Leonid Abramovich. Born in about 1934, he is married, has a son. His address is ulitsa Volgogradskaya 47, Apt. 2. He is a senior economist at the Belorussian Land Reclamation and Water Resources Trust (Trest melioratsii BSSR), ulitsa Kommunist 6, Minsk. He wants very much to go to Israel but is having difficulties because of alimony from his first marriage. TSIRLIN is an anti-communist who has organized a group of 6-7 Jews who meet to study Hebrew, spread the word on emigrating to Israel, explain how to fill out the necessary forms, etc. TSIRLIN approached Source on the day before his departure for the USA and told him about the above, asking him to contact Israeli military and civilian authorities to obtain Zionist literature and possibly to be assigned intelligence missions. Source was introduced to TSIRLIN by his neighbor, Mstislav SHOR (see paragraph 11). Source delivered TSIRLIN's request to a Mr. GOREV of the Israeli Embassy in Vienna.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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14. Traces: (SE/SAG/OP routinely uses the following sources in tracing: [redacted] These traces should not be construed as being extensive or complete and any recipients of this report with an active interest in any of the subjects should run full traces of their own.)

A. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 4).

[redacted]


D. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted] (para 2).

[redacted]


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E. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
(para 5).




F. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
(para 6).



G. There are no identifiable Headquarters traces
on [redacted] (para 9).

H. There are no Headquarters traces on [redacted]
(para 12).



SE/SAG/OP

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SE/SAG/OP: [redacted] ch (3 Jun 77)

Distribution:

Orig - IP/AN (please classify into 201-0948328, index indicated names in para 14, and ZR into 201-0925018 with the phrase "mentioned in an interview report by Soviet emigre 201-0948328.")

- 1 - C/SE/SAG, C/SE/IO, SE/USSR
- 1 - SE/RR
- 1 - SE/X/AF
- 1 - SE/CI/X
- 1 - SE/SAG/OP chrono
- 1 - SE/CI/I

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201-948328

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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 PAGE 1 OF 1

CLASSIFICATION
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STAFF

220103Z DIRECTOR

022946

CONF SE 8 INFO FILE IP/OMS, FR 5, OLO 3,
 PES/OPS, IP/CS, SIA/1, SIA
 C14, EPS/CG 2, LSN/110, CCS 2

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TO: FR/NEW YORK.Y

UNINTEL CKTOP FORRES PDSEKY

M.

1. HQS OFFICER (IDEN) USING ALIAS FRED STEVENS PLANS VISIT
 TO NEW YORK 26-29 APRIL FOR INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET EMIGRES SERGEY
 UZLOV AND GEORGE MARKOV.Y

2. FBI HQS COORDINATION EFFECTED. NO BASE CONTACT OR SUPPORT
 ANTICIPATED.Y

3. FILE: 200-008-096/09. E2 IMPDET.H

ORIG: SE/SAG/OP [] ; COORD: SE/X/FR [] ;
 [] ; AUTH: C/SE/SAG (KARPOVICH) ; REL: []

DATE: 21 APRIL 1977
 ORIG: []
 UNIT: SE/SAG/OP
 EXT: 5622

[Signature]
 C/FR/2

SE/X/FR *[Signature]*
 FR/02 *[Signature]*
 FR/OPS *[Signature]*

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PAGE 1 OF 1

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DATE-TIME GROUP

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CONF SE 8

INFO FILE

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PCS/DEF, C/RES, SIA/1, SIA/

C14, EPS/EG2, LSN/10, CCS2

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TO: FR/NEW YORK-Y

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REF: 022946 PLS FILL IN 4

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FR/OPS (); AUTH: C/SE/SAG (); REL: ()

DATE: 21 APRIL 77

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UNIT:

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RELEASING OFFICER

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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

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CL BY: NSCLNA

20 April 1977

PR R
Meady
Katalie - fls
main copies
for all files

On 20 April 1977 the FBI telephonically granted approvals on Boris BRODETSKIY, Boris PALANT, and Sergey UZLOV.

As regards Vitaliy GOLDEN, the FBI has no current address on him. (The undersigned advised the FBI on this date that G. was destined for JFS, Worcester, Mass. The FBI stated they would now query their appropriate office and advise us once an address is obtained. Earlier, they had queried another office.)

Recorded on cards
20 Apr 77 mjt

Uzlov file

14-00000

S E C R E T

12 Apr 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/SAG/OP

FROM: SE/CI/X/Africa

SUBJECT: Requirements for Sergey UZLOV and Boris
PALANT -- Your memo 8 Apr 77

1. I don't have Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH (para 1-A-1) on my presence list for [] but I would be interested in learning more about him, especially if he is in []. Also anything UZLOV may have on Aleksandr CHADLIYEV.

2. Re para 1-B-1, any further details you can obtain on Anatoliy RUSANOV from PALANT would be most helpful. We don't have any record of RUSANOV arriving in Turkey.

[]
SE/CI/X/Africa

R-1902

S E C R E T

UZLOV

14-00000

SECRET

11 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SE/SAG/OP

FROM:

C/SE/X/AF

SUBJECT: OI Requirements for Interviews of
Soviet Emigres

REFERENCE: SAG Memo Dated 8 April 1977

1. Reference alerts us to provide OI requirements for SE/SAG/OP's scheduled debriefing of two Soviet emigres--Sergei UZLOV and Boris PALANT. We are keenly interested in what these two persons have to say about the young people who graduated from the French interpreters' faculty and proceeded to posts in Africa, as several of these names are familiar to us as leads. We are even more interested in background and assessment data on the three military instructors TARASENKO, LIPIN, and VOROBEV, who are currently in Africa and of interest to this branch.

2. In addition to straight bio and assessment data, we would like answers to the following:

A. What were the career and personal objectives/goals of these young persons who accepted assignments in Africa? Were they aware of the climactic/sociological/anthropological differences/difficulties they would encounter in Africa? Did they accept their assignments primarily to save money? Were any of them looking upon their African assignments as a form of "escape" from the Soviet Union? Had any of them ever mentioned suffering

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mistreatment by the KGB or the Party?

B. Did the two sources have the opportunity to talk to any Soviet interpreters who had returned from tours in Africa? If so, what did these persons have to say about the climactic/sociological/anthropological problems they had encountered there, and how they handled them? African assignments are particularly difficult for Soviets who do not adapt easily to conditions in Africa. Because this inability to adapt to African conditions is operationally exploitable, we would like to learn as much about it as possible. We would also be interested in what they said about their duties as interpreters.

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8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE Division Branch and Group Chiefs

SUBJECT: OI Requirements for Interviews of Soviet Emigres

1. SE/SAG/OP has scheduled two Soviet emigres for interviews in Washington within the next two weeks. We solicit your OI requirements for them, if you think--based on the following biographic sketches--they might have information for your branch.

A. Sergey UZLOV, born 19 Nov 49 in Minsk, Belorussian SSR. From 1969-72 he studied in the German pedagogical faculty of the Minsk Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, where he became friends with several people who later traveled abroad as Soviet interpreters:

(1) Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH, DPOB 1948, Minsk; 1973 graduate of the French interpreters faculty; served 71-72 in Algiers; left for Guinea in 75 with wife Natasha; father is KGB colonel and high official in personnel department of Belorussian KGB.

(2) Sergey TETEKIN, DPOB 49, Borisov; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; was sent to Uganda; father is major general, division or corps commander in Borisov.

(3) Anatoliy CHADLIYEV, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served in Burma; left for Guinea in 75.

(4) Anatoliy MIKHEDO, DPOB 48, Minsk; 1973 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served 73-75 in some African country; now working in Minsk as a guide.

(5) Dmitriy PETROV, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1972 graduate of French interpreters faculty; served in some African country and may be sent again soon.

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UZLOV

S E C R E T

(6) Vladimir LAZERKA, DPOB 49, Minsk; 1974 graduate of Spanish interpreters faculty; now in Cuba with Aeroflot.

(7) A number of UZLOV's friends entered the KGB in Minsk.

B. Boris PALANT, born 15 Jan 52 in Kharkov, Ukrainian SSR. In 1974 he graduated from the foreign language department of Kharkov State University, where he became friends with the following Soviets who later traveled abroad, probably as KGB officers:

(1) Anatoliy RUSANOV. Had a TDY to Britain, now is PCS in Turkey; speaks medium-level English.

(2) Sergey MASHENKO. Was an exchange student at Oxford or Cambridge; now teaches English in Kharkov and may be preparing for new PCS.

(3) Vladimir TARASENKO, Aleksey LIPIN, and Aleksey VOROBIEV--all will be assigned PCS to African countries, are now officer-instructors at Frunze Military Academy training third-world nationals.

(4) Yuriy KOTLYAR. Was exchange student at Oxford, married British citizen Cynthia CARLILE; now is an instructor at Frunze Military Academy. Speaks excellent English.

2. If you have any OI requirements for these interviews, please notify me on R-1404 by 15 April 1977.

SE/SAG/OP

Distribution:

Orig. - SE/SAG/OP (requirements)

1 - SE/TO
1 - C/SE/SAG
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1 - C/SE/CI/I
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UZLOV

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S E C R E T

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PAGE 1 OF 2

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TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 4

ATTENTION: CI-1 SECTION 4

IR-316/01254-77 4

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED 4

SUBJECT: SEEK/SQ: INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET ENIGRES 4

REFS: CIR-3016/00794/77 - 28 MARCH 1977

CIR-316/00726/77 - 3 MARCH 1977 4

1. REQUEST PRIORITY APPROVAL TO INTERVIEW FOLLOWING SOVIET
ENIGRE WHO HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION VIA PRELIMINARY SCREENING IN
EUROPE: 4

BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH BRODETSKY

DPOB: 9 SEP 46, KAZAN, USSR

OCC: ENGINEER

INSE: A21-703-838

WIFE: MARINA NEE VAINSHOK

DPOB: 19 OCT 51, MOSCOW, USSR

OCC: SINGER/MUSICIAN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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7 April 77

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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**SPONSOR: JEWISH FAMILY SERVICE,
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.**

CSUDJ DEPARTED ROME FOR LOS ANGELES
ON 22 MARCH 1977} 4

2. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE
A REPLY TO REFS REQUESTING CONTACT APPROVAL FOR BORIS PALANT AND
SERGEY HZLOV. 4

33455555

3. SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED. 4

4. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER.

FILE: 200-8-96/31

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6 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/SAG/OP
FROM : SE/CI/I
SUBJECT : Requirements for Sergey UZLOV
REFERENCE : [] 54329, 9 March 1977

Following are SE/CI/I requirements for Sergey UZLOV, who is to be interviewed by SE/SAG/OP in the U.S.:

1. Please ask Subject to provide the location of any KGB installations in Minsk known to him, any places besides the Hotel "Yubileynaya" used by the KGB in Minsk for operational purposes, and any KGB telephone numbers in Minsk of which he may be aware.
2. Ask Subject to pinpoint the location of and describe as fully as possible the KGB audio control room in the Hotel "Yubileynaya" (layout, equipment, etc.). Approximately when did Yevgeniy AKSENOV take him to the room, and for what purpose? Can he recall any comments made by AKSENOV about the room or its equipment, or about AKSENOV's responsibilities in connection with the Hotel "Yubileynaya"?
3. Please debrief Subject fully about his relationship with AKSENOV and obtain full biographic details. Please also ask him to provide a personal description and an assessment of AKSENOV. Does he know any more about AKSENOV's KGB training or his KGB career?
4. Does Subject know if AKSENOV was ever in contact with foreigners? Does Subject have any knowledge, from AKSENOV or otherwise, about KGB/Minsk operations against foreigners?
5. Please obtain from Subject as much biographical information as possible on each of the following whom he named as KGB officers he knew superficially through AKSENOV:

WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.

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CL BY 056479

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- 2 -

Yevgeniy SURGANOV
Vladimir MOLOCHIKO(V)
(FNU) BORICH (correct spelling?)
Aleksandr POKHIN
Fedor CHISTYY

6. Did AKSENOV explicitly tell Subject that the above are KGB officers? If not, how does Subject know? Did these officers frequent the Hotel "Yubileynaya" only for social purposes? For operational reasons? Both? Dates/time frame? Can Subject provide any additional information about their intelligence training, specialties, operational activities, past assignments, or current assignments?

7. How did Subject learn that Aleksandr POKHIN is Deputy Chief of the Ops Department of the Belorussian KGB? From POKHIN? From POKHIN's daughter Lyudmila? From AKSENOV? What is the designation for this component in Russian? Does Subject have any idea who is the Chief?

8. Does Subject have any other knowledge of the organization and structure of the KGB in Minsk? Or of other personnel? Please ask him to provide names and biographic data on any additional KGB/Minsk officers he may have met or any he may know of but does not know personally.

9. Please obtain a full account of what Subject knows about Leonid Abramovich TSIRLIN, including additional biographic information, how TSIRLIN happened to approach Subject before Subject's departure, and details regarding the underground Zionist group in Minsk on whose behalf TSIRLIN is allegedly acting. How well does Subject know TSIRLIN? What is his appraisal of TSIRLIN? Does Subject know any of TSIRLIN's associates besides Slava SHOR? If so, please obtain full details.

10. Please ask Subject to provide the full name of his neighbor Slava SHOR and biographic information. Please also ask Subject to describe his relationship with SHOR and SHOR's relationship with TSIRLIN.

11. Please obtain biographic information on Yakov FISHMAN, including the full names of his parents who according to Subject have been in New York since 1974. Where in New York? As emigres? How well does Subject know FISHMAN? For how long? Ask Subject to describe fully the background/circumstances for FISHMAN's request that Subject memorize PI for the benefit of Western intelligence.

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- 3 -

12. Can Subject supply any further biographic or career information on Aleksandr DAVIDOVICH's father, who according to Subject is a KGB colonel and the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Personnel Department of the Belorussian KGB? Did Subject learn this from the son? Does Subject know if the son is still in Guinea? By which Ministry was he sent to Guinea? Could he be working for the KGB? Did Subject ever meet the elder DAVIDOVICH? Can Subject describe him? Does Subject have any idea at all what the father's full name is, or of the patronymic of the son whom Subject described as his friend in both grade school and college?

13. Does Subject know or know of any graduates of the Interpreter Faculty of the Minsk Institute of Foreign Languages who became KGB employees? Details?

14. It is not clear from Reference what Subject's entree was to the group of children of Minsk "top society and KGB officers" with whom he claims to have associated. For this reason, details about the background and position of Subject's father may be particularly pertinent. Please ask him to amplify as much as possible.

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - SE/CI/I

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PAGE 01

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CITE: [REDACTED]

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP

SUBJECT: MNINTEL RYBAT PLAEPCNAUT PDSEK

REF: [REDACTED]

CIN 231135

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IN 210967

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CITE [REDACTED] (SECTION 1 & 2 of Two)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP INFO C/EUR

SUBJECT: WMINTEL RYBAT PLAEONAUT POSEK

1. SUBJECT IS SERGEY U Z L O V (USLOV), BORN 19 NOVEMBER 1949, MINSK, OF RUSSIAN FATHER AND JEWISH MOTHER, INS NO. A-21-723-170, DEPARTED USSR 28 NOV 1976, DEPARTING ROME SOMETIME IN MARCH 1977. SUBJ ASSESSED BY BGDINS 4 MARCH 77 FOR OI INFO ON SOVIET INTERPRETERS TRAVELLING ABROAD AND KGB OFFICERS IN MINSK.

2. AFTER GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL IN 1966, SUBJ WORKED AT SEVERAL MANUAL LABOR JOBS AND IN 1969 ENROLLED IN MINSK PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES WHERE HE STUDIED AT GERMAN TEACHER TRAINING FACULTY. HE DROPPED OUT AFTER THIRD YEAR SINCE HE FELT THAT THERE WAS NO FUTURE FOR HIM AS HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER OF GERMAN AND THAT AS A JEW HE WOULD NOT BE GIVEN FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS. FROM 1972 TO 74 SUBJ EMPLOYED AS RADIO LAB WORKER WITH BELORUSSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY, SIMULTANECUSLY STUDYING AT HISTORY FACULTY.

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PAGE 02

IN 210967

TOR: 291707Z MAR 77

HE DROPPED OUT AFTER ONE YEAR AND FROM 1974 TO 76 WORKED AS
A PHOTOGRAPHER FOR MINSK PHOTO CENTER.

3. MINSK INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES WAS LOCATED ON
ULITSA ZAKHAROVA, NEAR POBEDY SQUARE. IT HAD FOUR TEACHER
TRAINING FACULTIES (ENGLISH, GERMAN, FRENCH AND SPANISH)
AS WELL AS INTERPRETER FACULTY COMPRISED OF FOUR DEPTS
REPRESENTING SAME LANGUAGES. SUBJ CLAIMS THAT ABOUT EIGHTY
PER CENT OF STUDENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF GERMAN AND SPANISH,
WERE DRAWN FROM RURAL AREAS OF BELORUSSIA. AMONG THE OTHER
STUDENTS WERE SOME CHILDREN OF BELORUSSIAN VIPS.

4. SUBJ KNEW SEVERAL GRADUATES OF INTERPRETER FACULTY
OF HIS INSTITUTE WHO WERE PART OF A SMALL GROUP EVENTUALLY
CIRCULATING ON FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS. SUBJ STATED THAT THEY
TRAVELLED ABROAD UNDER CONTRACTS WITH VARIOUS SOVIET MINISTRIES
(THOUGH IN MOST CASES WORKING AS MILITARY TRANSLATORS/
INTERPRETERS). UPON RETURN TO USSR, THEIR CONTRACTS WERE
TERMINATED AND THEY HAD TO SEEK OTHER JOBS WHILE AWAITING
POSSIBLE NEW ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD. SUBJ WAS NOT INFORMED ON
THEIR CP MEMBERSHIP AND BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THE TRANSLATORS
KNOWN TO HIM DID NOT BELONG TO THE PARTY.

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5. SUBJ RECALLS FOLLOWING INTERPRETERS:

A. ALEKSANDR (PATRONYMIC UNKNOWN) D A V I D O V I C H ,
 DP03 1948, MINSK, A JEW, MARRIED TO NATASHA, MAIDEN NAME
 UNKNOWN, WHO ALSO GRADUATE OF FRENCH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTIT-
 TUTE THEY RESIDE IN MINSK ON ULITSA LENINA, HOUSE NUMBER
 UNRECALLED. DAVIDOVICH'S FATHER IS KGB COLONEL AND HIGH
 OFFICIAL (CHIEF OR DEPUTY) IN PERSONNEL DEPT OF
 BELORUSSIAN KGB. DAVIDOVICH'S MOTHER IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR.
 AFTER FOURTH INSTITUTE YEAR, DAVIDOVICH SENT IN 1971 FOR
 ONE YEAR APPRENTICESHIP TO ALGERIA, THEN RETURNED HOME TO
 GRADUATE, THEN DRAFTED FOR ONE YEAR INTO ARMED FORCES,
 AFTER THREE MONTHS IN THE SERVICE, DAVIDOVICH RECEIVED
 MEDICAL DISCHARGE FOR NERVOUS DISORDER WHICH NORMALLY
 WOULD MEAN END OF INTERPRETER CAREER. SURPRISINGLY,
 DAVIDOVICH (POSSIBLY THROUGH HIS FATHER'S CONTACTS) WAS
 AGAIN GIVEN CONTRACT AND LEFT FOR GUINEA WITH HIS WIFE IN
 1975. DAVIDOVICH, WHO SUBJECT'S GRADE SCHOOL AND COLLEGE
 FRIEND, IS INTELLIGENT AND CULTURED. HE LIKES TO DRINK AND
 IS A SKIRT-CHASER.

B. SERGEY (PNU) T E T E K I N , DP03 1949, 90R150V,

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RUSSIAN. MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN. SON OF A MAJ. GEN. WHO DIVISION OR CORPS COMMANDER IN BORISOV. AFTER GRADUATION IN 1973, SENT TO UGANDA. TETEKIN DESCRIBED AS VERY STUPID.

C. ANATOLIY (PNU) C H A D L I Y E V , DPOB 1949, MINSK, RUSSIAN. SINGLE, GRADUATED 1973 AND SENT TO BURMA. WORKED AS WATCHMAN UPON RETURN TO MINSK AND CA 1975 CONTRACTED FOR WORK IN GUINEA. CHADLIYEV DOES NOT DRINK OR SMOKE, IS NOT INTERESTED IN WOMEN, IS VERY RESERVED AND VERY ORDINARY, OF MIDDLE-CLASS BACKGROUND.

D. ANATOLIY (PNU) M I K H E D O , DPOB 1948, MINSK. PAGE 3 S E C R E T OF BELORUSSIAN FATHER AND JEWISH MOTHER, MARRIED. VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF SUBJ. WELL EDUCATED AND VERY CULTURED. AFTER GRADUATION IN 1973, SPENT TWO YEARS IN AN UNIDENTIFIED AFRICAN COUNTRY. PRESENTLY WORKING AS GUIDE IN MINSK "SPUTNIK" TOURIST OFFICE MAKING 92 RUBLES PER MONTH AND DREAMING OF ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT ABROAD. COMPULSIVE DRINKER.

E. DIMITRIY (DIMA) P E T R O V , DPOB 1949, MINSK, MARRIED. GRANDSON OF RETIRED ARMY COLONEL, BROUGHT UP BY

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WIDOWED MOTHER. VERY STUPID. AFTER GRADUATION IN 1972, SENT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED AFRICAN COUNTRY AND UPON RETURN WORKED AT BELORUSSIAN EXHIBIT OF ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN MINSK AS GUIDE/INTERPRETER. SUBJ HEARD THAT HE IS SCHEDULED FOR ANOTHER AFRICAN TOUR IN NEAR FUTURE.


(NOTE: ALL ABOVE GRADUATES OF FRENCH DEPT OF INTERPRETER FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE. EXCEPT FOR PETROV, TETEKIN AND CHADLIYEV, ALL EXPRESSED ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS IN POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS WHICH, ACCORDING TO SUBJ, WAS A RECENT TREND AMONG HIS ACQUAINTANCES.)

F. VLADIMIR (VADIM) LAZERKA, DPOB 1949, MINSK, MARRIED TO TANYA, A CLASSMATE AT SPANISH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE. LAZERKA'S FATHER IS AN ENGINEER. AFTER GRADUATING IN 1974, LAZERKA WORKED AS DISPATCHER AT MINSK AIRPORT AND IS PRESENTLY IN CUBA WITH AEROFLOT.

G. (FNU) MAKHUN, DPOB CA 1948, GRADUATE OF SUBJECT'S HIGH SCHOOL AND MINSK LANGUAGE INSTITUTE. SUBJ HAS NOT SEEN MAKHUN SINCE 1966, BUT ACCORDING TO DAVIDOVICH, MAKHUN WORKS CONTINUOUSLY AS MILITARY TRANSLATOR ABROAD.

6. SUBJ WAS VERY CLOSE TO A KGB OFFICER, ANATOLIY

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A K S E N O V , DPOB 1946, MINSK, MARRIED TO TANYA
K O N D R A K O V A , FRENCH TEACHER AT MINSK POLYTECHNICAL
INSTITUTE. THEY RESIDE AT APT 12, PROSPEKT LENINA (HOUSE
NUMBER NOT RECALLED). IN SO-CALLED "HOUSE OF SCIENTIFIC
WORKERS" NEAR TS. U. M. - CENTRAL DEPARTMENT STORE. AKSENOV'S
FATHER IS SECOND SECRETARY OF BELORUSSIAN CP (FORMERLY,
SECRETARY OF VITEBSK OBLAST) AND RECENTLY ELECTED TO CC
OF CPSU. AKSENOV GRADUATED FROM FRENCH DEPT OF INTERPRETER
FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE, BUT JOINED KGB AND IS NOW SEN,
LT. AND CASE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF HOTEL "YUBILEYNAYA" IN
MINSK. HE IS VERY APOITICAL PERSON AND COMPULSIVE DRINKER.

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CITE [] (SECTION 2 OF 2)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/SAG/OP INFO C/EUR

SUBJECT: KXINTEL RYBAT PLAEORNAUT PDSEEK

PAGE 4 [] SECRET

ON VERGE OF ALCOHOLISM. AKSENOV IS SUBJECT'S CLOSEST FRIEND SINCE GRADE SCHOOL. "YUBILEYNAYA" WAS SUBJECT'S FAVORITE HANGOUT AND THERE HE WAS INTRODUCED BY AKSENOV TO SEVERAL OTHER KGB OFFICERS LISTED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH. AKSENOV TOOK SUBJ ON ONE OCCASION TO KGB AUDIO CONTROL ROOM (KOMNATA PROSLUSHIVANIYA) IN HOTEL "YUBILEYNAYA".

7. THROUGH AKSENOV, SUBJ KNEW SUPERFICIALLY FOLLOWING KGB OFFICERS IN MINSK: SEN. LT. YEVGENIY SURGANOVA, DPOB 1945, MINSK, GRAD OF PHYSICS FACULTY OF MINSK UNIVERSITY, SON OF CHAIRMAN OF SUPREME SOVIET OF BELORUSSIAN SSR; VLADIMIR MOLODCHIKOV, SON OF TRADE MINISTER OF BELORUSSIAN SSR; (FNU) BORISCH, DPOB 1951, MINSK (FATHER IS A MAJ. GEN.), GRADUATE OF GERMAN FACULTY WHO LEFT FOR HOLLAND IN MARCH 1974; MAJOR ALEKSANDR POKHILIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPS DEPT OF

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BELORUSSIAN KGB (POKHIN'S DAUGHTER IS LUDMILA, GRADUATE OF ENGLISH FACULTY OF MINSK INSTITUTE AND SUBJECT'S FRIEND); FEDOR C H I S T Y Y , DPOB 1952, IN UNIDENTIFIED BELORUSSIAN VILLAGE, STUDIED WITH SUBJ, THEN CHANGED TO INTERPRETER FACULTY. WORKED IN GDR AND IN 1975 OR 76 WORKED IN OPS DEPT OF MINSK KGB.

8. SUBJECT'S GRADE SCHOOL AND COLLEGE FRIEND, 1972 GRAD OF GERMAN PEDAGOGICAL FACULTY, VLADIMIR G A S T I L O - V I C H , BELORUSSIAN, BORN 1949 IN MINSK (MOTHER IS MEMBER OF BELORUSSIAN SUPREME COURT), IS PRESENTLY INTERFLUG REP AT MINSK AIRPORT AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS TO GDR. DRUNKARD. ANOTHER FRIEND OF SUBJ, GRAD OF SPANISH FACULTY, MINSK MILITIA LT. VLADIMIR K O V A L E V WORKS NOW WITH "PARTSOVSHCHIKI" (BLACK MARKET WITH FOREIGNERS) DEPARTMENT; HIS FATHER-IN-LAW IS RETIRED HIGH-RANKING KGB OFFICER; SUBJ AND LAZERKA WERE BEST MEN AT KOVALEV'S WEDDING. SUBJECT'S FRIEND, NATASHA T A R A S O V A (MARRIED, BUT RETAINED MAIDEN NAME), 1971 GRADUATE OF GERMAN FACULTY, PRESENTLY WORKS IN GDR CONSULATE IN MINSK.

9. PRIOR TO SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE FROM MINSK HE WAS

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APPROACHED BY LEONID (LENYA) ABRAMOVICH T S I R L I N , WHO
 ASKED HIM TO SPEAK TO ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN THE WEST OR TO
 (FNU) S H O S T A K , REP OF JEWISH COMMUNITY IN MARYLAND.

PAGE 5 SECRET

TSIRLIN ALLEGEDLY ACTED ON BEHALF OF AN UNDERGROUND ZIONIST
 GROUP IN MINSK CONSISTING OF 7 TO 8 MEMBERS (NONE KNOWN TO
 SUBJEC). TSIRLIN REQUESTED CONTACTS WITH THE WEST, DELIVERY
OF ZIONIST LITERATURE AND POSSIBLY INTEL MISSIONS. TSIRLIN
 WORKS AS SENIOR ECONOMIST WITH TRUST "BELMELIORATSIYA" ON
 ULITSA KOMMUNISTICHESKAYA 6. HE RESIDES AT ULITSA
 VOLGOGRADSKAYA 47, API 2, MINSK. SUBJ HAS KNOWN HIM SINCE
 1974 AND MET HIM THROUGH SLAVA S H O R , SUBJECT'S NEIGHBOR
 AT ULITSA OLSHEVSKOS09, IN MINSK. SUBJ DELIVERED ABOVE
 MESSAGE TO MR. (FNU) G O R E V OF ISRAELI EMBASSY IN VIENNA.
 (SHOR RECENTLY APPLIED FOR EXIT VISA.)

10. ANOTHER OF SUBJECT'S NEIGHBORS (PHONE 24-13-61), YAKOV
 FISHMAN, WHOSE PARENTS HAVE BEEN IN NEW YORK SINCE 1974,
 ESCORTED SUBJ TO BREAST AND WANTED HIM TO MEMORIZE FOLLOWING
PI FOR THE BENEFIT OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE: FISHMAN SERVED
 IN 1973 IN STRATEGIC MISSILE UNIT 4 KM NORTHEAST OF POSELOK

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NOVOSELOKOROVICH, ZHITOMIR OBLAST. HIS ROCKET BATTALION (DIVISION) WAS ARMED WITH INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES TARGETTED AGAINST MUNICH. ANOTHER IDENTICAL ROCKET BATTALION WAS LOCATED 24 KM FROM FISHMAN'S. BOTH BATTALIONS A PART OF 82ND ROCKET DIVISION OF VINNITSA ROCKET ARMY. WHILE IN SERVICE, FISHMAN TRAVELLED FOR MISSILE PICK-UP TO UNDERGROUND PLANTS IN POSELOK KOLOSOVO NEAR MINSK AND IN BATAYSK, ROSTOV OBLAST.

11. SUBJ VERY AGGRESSIVE AND OUTGOING INDIVIDUAL. HE COULD NOT HOLD STEADY JOB AND WAS NOT PERSISTENT IN COLLEGE STUDIES. IT SEEMS THAT HIS FAVORITE PASTIME WAS HANGING AROUND "YUBILEYNAYA" HOTEL BAR WHICH FREQUENTED BY CHILDREN OF MINSK TOP SOCIETY AND KGB OFFICERS. SUBJ CLAIMED THAT HE COOPERATING WITH AMERICAN AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF HIS ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS AND DESIRE TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON COMMUNIST REGIME IN USSR. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR EVENTUAL INTELLIGENCE CAREER IN HIS NEW HOMETLAND. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, REFRAINED FROM GIVING SUBJ BIRDFIELD AA. SUBJ IS MIAS CASE. TRAVELLING WITH MOTHER TO NEW YORK CITY. DURING FIRST FEW WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL CAN BE REACHED C/O ANNA ZELDOVICH, 2425

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12. FILE: 200-008-296/2. E2 IMPDET.

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14-00000

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division
CI-1 Section

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: SEEK/SQ: Interviews with Soviet Emigres

28 Mar 77

1. As a follow-up to preliminary CIA screening in Europe, we plan to interview the following Soviet emigres about foreign intelligence information:

- a. BOLDYREV, Petr Matveyevich
DPOB: 12 December 1936, Leningrad, USSR
OCC : Philosophy teacher
INS#: A21-658-204
SPONSOR: International Rescue Committee,
New York, New York
- b. GOLDIN, Vitaliy Yefimovich
DPOB: 16 February 1940, Severodvinsk, USSR
OCC : Mathematician
INS#: A21-703-897
SPONSOR: Unknown
- c. SVETLOV, Feliks Viktorovich
DPOB: 22 July 1932, Moscow, USSR
OCC : Lawyer
INS#: A21-375-520
SPONSOR: HIAS, New York, New York
- d. UZLOV (USLOV), Sergey
DPOB: 19 November 1949, Minsk, USSR
OCC : Photographer
INS#: A21-703-170
SPONSOR: HIAS, New York, New York

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SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). DATE
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METHODS INVOLVED.

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2. Should our interviews produce any information likely to interest the FBI we shall, of course, forward it to you promptly.

3. Please let us have a FBI name check on each of these emigres, and, if you have them, their current addresses.

CIR-316/00994-77

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