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REFERENCE FOR: CIA/C, W/4.

SUBJECT : Comments on W/4 Plan for Anti-Castro Operations

1. The Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) has submitted a plan for the conduct of anti-Castro operations. The original was received from the MRP Chief, Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivero, in Miami on 17 June 1961 and a copy of it backmailed to Headquarters on 19 June 1961. It is our understanding that certain (to us unspecified) elements in the United States Government view the Ray plan with favor, feeling that the "take" in the way of information and the existence of a resistance organization in Cuba would be worth the price.

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2. We have been asked to comment on the W/4 plan. Attached are the comments of Mr. [Michael Taylor] formerly of this Section, and several members of the W/4/P4 staff. Paragraph 6 was submitted by Mr. Doug Phillips, Chief, W/4/Propaganda. I might add that no one is in agreement with the entire plan. We all agree, however, with the conclusions that the plan, as submitted, is not too inviting support from this or any other U. S. Government agency. We see little chance for a reasonable return for cost unless real control by the provider of the funds is built into the plan.

Robert B. Moore  
CIA/C, W/4/PX

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DISCUSSION OF THE KGP CENTRAL PROGRAM

1. The KGP plan presented by Henrique Bay proposes, in brief, that the KGP be provided with funds in the amount of \$2,350,000 for a six-month period, with which to mount anti-Castro operations. It is agreed that additional financing would be provided, at a rate exceeding \$2,000,000 per year, until the objectives were achieved.

2. No store in the plan is there any statement as to what return, if any, the providers of the funds would receive for their support, other than the knowledge that the money had been provided for furtherance of the deductible goal of bringing about the demise of the Castro regime.

3. It is noteworthy that the plan insists that the KGP retain complete and sole control of all the operations contemplated. Thus, it states, on page 6, that:

"Contributions will be received without compromising the responsibility for decisions and organization of the plan... This does not rule out our search for compatibility and coordination with other factors ~~however~~, but without ever surrendering the responsibility and absolute control of the operations." (Underlining added)

It also appears to be the KGP view that its position should be analogous to that of a government-in-exile which has been recognized as the rightful regime of its country. Thus the plan states that:

".....with the government's willing to support us we should establish high-level contact which will make it possible to discuss questions of basic policy of events and places opportunity, on a formal footing." (Underlining added)

4. The operations contemplated by the KGP are not too dissimilar from those proposed by the KU/4/PX Section for FY 1962. They include the operation of maritime assets capable of reaching all Cuban ports, the operation of aerial supply craft (from two bases), the training and infiltration of V/H operators and intelligence agents, support of internal guerrillas, and the training of eight or ten 150-man groups for introduction into Cuba at the right time. (There is also considerable stress given to the mounting of extensive psychological warfare). The KGP plan could pose many of the problems that any PW program does -- the when, where, how, and how much questions involved in procuring and operating air and maritime bases and the policy questions relating to actions which include sabotage and active resistance.

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5. It is our view that the MCP plan should not be supported in its present form for these reasons:

a. The MCP seeks exclusive control of the anti-Castro resistance. The plan itself states that the best hope for the Cuban people is "achieved by the set of ideas and aims of the democratic left". Aside from the truth or falsity of that statement, the MCP is in no position to claim effective leadership of the anti-Castro resistance. There have been, and are many groups in that field. The MCP has no record or action of which we have reliable evidence which would argue for giving them preferential status. In specific instances their claim to certain capabilities have been tested and found wanting. It is our view that reliance upon groups as such, with no control, is detrimental to operational achievement.

b. The MCP seeks "blended-check" financial support while retaining complete control of operations. So far as we are aware there is no provision in either Agency or U. S. Government policies and regulations which would permit the handing over of the substantial sums envisaged by the MCP plan without retention by the donor of the same measure of control over the use of the funds. The MCP plan, e.g., almost certainly would involve operations mounted from bases within U. S. territorial jurisdiction, yet those operations would remain under MCP "absolute control". We doubt that the F.B.I., Customs and Immigration Service, Coast Guard and other concerned agencies would ever agree to any such arrangement where U. S. territory is concerned, and we would certainly be in no position to remon for the MCP operations. Anti-Castro operations mounted from anywhere outside of Cuba are going to be attributed to the United States. Since that is the case, the U. S. Government must control those operations as effectively as it can.

c. The MCP seeks to operate on an equal footing with the providers of funds. While governments, including in some instances governments-in-exile, can be treated as equals by the U. S. Government, there is no precedent for extending such treatment to a private organization. To do so in this case would result in the lessening of the bitter enmity of the anti-Castro resistance groups, of which there are many, without any corresponding benefit.

d. The "new" form MCP organization would not justify the cash envisaged. The MCP take, to date, whether in intelligence or in resistance activity, has been negligible. There are many news stories which refer to the MCP as the largest and best organized of the resistance groups. The MCP plan claims organization down to the township level and states that:

"The MCP has an extensive communication net and is competent in obtaining indiscreetible elements of intelligence."

This may be so, but we are not aware of any conclusive valid information from the MCP of any important resistance activity conducted by them. The entire history of Agency operations involving groups suggest the impossibility of handing over substantial sums in the hope of a future

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"...". And it is certain that this arrangement, the "line", is taking  
its normal course under our direction, regardless of the groups to which they  
do or do not belong.

6. It should be pointed out, that from a political standpoint, the KEP  
organization and K.P., are elements worthy of consideration. The main  
importance is that the KEP program is one that is according to the basic  
standards, especially the new stable ones. (Because at all times progress  
that of the KEP is the mirror to the originally stated but now changed  
platforms of the former revolution.) For the same reason, the KEP is  
desirous to work toward Latin American governments which do not consider  
the actions of other anti-Castro. Working up, the platform of the KEP is  
political and progressive, in that it, unlike other stable groups, allows  
the people of Cuba a positive program of social and economic reform. (However  
such a program would be compatible with U. S. interests if, of course, a  
major or such controversy.)

7. In conclusion, we believe that the KEP plan is essentially an  
university of further consideration in its present form. We do not see any  
possibility of securing a reasonable return for money required by this plan  
unless full control by the provider of the funds is effected by all and  
paid a part of the plan. To us appears that future diplomatic  
operations to come should be centralized and directed by the United States  
and organized by a military body throughout the island. While some agencies  
would belong to one or another of the several resistance groups, and through  
them would receive aid to the groups, the entire expense would be an ~~open~~  
operation.