- TOP SECRET

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

 Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, <u>The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB</u> <u>Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO</u> dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Annex A

Statuments of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

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6 February 1964

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The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

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(Annex A)

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10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKU as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

According to a sensitive source,

compared of the KGB, NOSLNKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source,

KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

<u>Comment</u>: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

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Top Secret (Annex A) 10 February 1964 (continued) According to a sensitive source NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the. Ukraine. Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the EGB. According to a sensitive source, several KGB It appeared quite certain to washing and a second state of the second seco officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG3. Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been. a KGs lieutenant colonel. According to a sensitive source, the The photograph, which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.One appeared worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. the state and the second state and · · 1- · TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Corv .

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(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

<u>Comment</u>: The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSIOV, whom was and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

<u>Comment</u>: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

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JUDICE NO.

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(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advisity the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Wishington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

<u>12-13 February 1964</u>


14 February 1964

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In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

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(Annex`A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GKOMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964


Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".


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	8		for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure	
			of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. Althe First Chief	
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			of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Massey - Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had	
			in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. A KOB officer opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and	
			CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Dimension of the Vice of the First and	
			Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. A KGB officer Second Second	
,			British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much	
			more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."	
-			<u>Comment</u> : NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred	
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According to a sensitive source, for a question in a response to a question whether NOSLNKO actually defected or whether for the defection might be a KOB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KOB

officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

stationed at the American Pubassy in Noncow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGD that he is familiar with the number and location of microgrammed in the Embassy. and 1, 1, 1

<u>Comment</u>: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

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(Annex A)

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24 February 196: (continued)

Connent: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Enhassy to make inquiries about him.

According to a sensitive source, KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

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Top Secret

February-March 1964

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According to a sensitive source:

A KGB conmission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

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Tor Seite. Horas the second According to a sensitive source, officers (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers (NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB. NOSENHO never referred to the dining rooms Comment: until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room". **MENTY** 1.8 K CARLES DE LA CARLES COMPANY 动动 TS No. 197124 Secret CODY

(Annex A)

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23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

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(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source

(from various unnamed KGB officers certain There seems to be unanimous opinion among KGB chiefs that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. MOSENKO would also have had a 100-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some KGB "chiefs" that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

<u>Comment</u>: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers nad in told their agent to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

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TS No. 197124 Copy 10 TALE DESCRIPTION **Top Secret** (Annex A) 31 March 1954 (continued) in February Comment: When recontacted acknowledged that NOSENRO had 1965, in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENRO, and MOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in HOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose namewas unknown to his, who apparently is identical ... to March 1964 According to a sensitive source who briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all. a sensitive source Conment: In this and other contexts has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection. STATES AND IN COMPANY THE REAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE REAL PROPE AND COST AND AND 378 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy

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(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

CALLER FROM

May 1964: According to a sensitive source officers (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers (configuration): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to Jdetermine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

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Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of. <u>22 June 1964</u> According to a sensitive source The consensus amongAKGB employees Constants is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help egents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closenses to 381					è		a a constant
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381 TŠ No. 197124		agents were devel	oped among these Amer	icans. Second, 1	s help t is to		
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22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENFO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO - had concerning the KGB.


29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embasay Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. C.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

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(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)

Conselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as e ⁵ KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, (from unnamed sources, presumably KCB officers ar such set of the set of the set of the set of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSISKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or . less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employe expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

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(Annex A)

CITE IN INC.

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

Top Secre

TS No. 19712

Top Secret E. (Annex A) November 1964 (continued) Conment: GAMERFLIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMERELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Inteiligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country". December 1964 a source Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told **and that he had been** interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK source reported to the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, children thought the KGB might go so far source TS No. 197124 **Top Secret** Copy __10

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. (later identified RESHETNYAK as a RGB officer.) Source

NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Comment: Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.


29 January 1965 According to a sensitive source


(from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers LGs employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable. "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota-tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.


<u>Comment</u>: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in . 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

TS No. 197124

Top Secret







(Annex A)

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source

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<u>Comment</u>: SEMICHASTRYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966 Source, a

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Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. **Ministry of Science** that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):


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
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NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

Top Secret



Top Secret March 1466 (continued) Contrent: NOSENDO has claimed that he prejected an offer to attend the Hilitary Diplomatic Academ. - بر ---- Source (which he, like man, called the GRU ·· :2 Military Agademy), by choice accepting assign-..... ment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attendy the school, he could not have servel anghe claimed in the GRU. Green is Source the sole source (Losides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO sarved in the GRU. 64 ئىتى بەرزىيە. ئ 13. D TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy



(Annex A)

<u>Mid-1966</u>

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine <u>Paris Match</u>. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

<u>Comment</u>: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication <u>Sputnik</u>, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for <u>Novosti</u>, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1956

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to <u>Paris Match</u> editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

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Top Secret (Annex A) October 1966 (continued) life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "SOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important 101 positions in explorage and counterespionage departments and also was clonely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. - NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be givenmuch publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KUROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent. Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. 28 January 1967 According to a sensitive source (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, and said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call call a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer. Source

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(Annex A)

February 1967

According to a sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KCB.

May 1967 According to a sensitive source

THE ALL AND The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight. According to a sensitive source

When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

18 A.

5 June 1967 According to a sensitive source

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KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts "which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to . investigate him. <u>Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious</u> of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

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