104-10210-10031 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

7 April 1969

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Anatole Re NOSENKO

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1. 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, Anatole was consulted about the NOSENKO case as a follow-up to the late January 1969 meetings. He gave recommendations concerning the procedures and topics to be covered during the begianing phases of additional elicitation from NOSENKO which is to begin scon.

2. To provide a basis for discussion certain papers had been prepared for Anatole's review. (See Attachment A for list.) These papers were basically questionnaires about some of the unresolved or questionable aspects of the NOSENKO case based largely on the central themes Anatola had highlighted on 17 January 1969 when he commented after reviewing the October 1957-December 1968 interviews of NOSENKO. (See transcripts KY 1, 2, 3 and 4.) Other papers concerned topics related to the NOSENKO case, memoranda NOSENKO had written, summaries and questionnaires prepared from both collateral information and NOSENKO's information

and summaries and questionnaires prepared exclusively on the basis of information obtained from NOSENKO during the 1967-68 interview period. Each of these papers was read by Anatole. Anatole's comment, our discussion, or any comment is detailed in Attachment B, which sets forth crucial questions in the NOSENKO case.

3. Anatole was told The Director had decided that the question of NOSENKO's bona fides had not been resolved and had directed that additional elicitation and questioning of NOSENKO would be undertaken immediately and expeditiously pursued. It was understood, of course, as Anatole knew, that he was to make a major contribution to the questioning of NOSENKO and that information to this end would be made available to him: there will be the closest coordination with him, including a timely review of future transcripts based on the new elicitation phase. It was understood his views, comments and recommendations will be transmitted and seriously considered if not explicitly implemented. Anatole emphasized the need for him to review in advance all topics, if not in all cases the specific questions, to be discussed with NOSENKO after the new elicitation phase begins. He understands the new elicitation phase will begin with Attachment C and that there will be no additional topics discussed

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with NOSENKO until after Anatole has an opportunity to review them and comment.

4. The following summary points emerged during the course of our discussions as things which must be considered in the NOSENKO case information and as papers or questionnaires are outlined and topics selected for further elicitation from NOSENKO:

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a. NOSENKO, as I understand the situation, has had full access to newspapers, magazines, radio and TV since approximately August 1968. Anatole was told I have no knowledge of the periodicals or books he has read.

b. NOSENKO has recently been afforded a controlled break from isolation and an opportunity to have feminine companionship.

c. Since December 1968 the FBI has been interviewing NOSENKO about topics previously discussed as well as other matters of interest to the FBI which do not originate with NOSENKO. Anatole noted that FBI access to NOSENKO must be controlled according to the new elicitation procedures.

d. That it is my opinion only that NOSENKO may think he is entering into or close to entering into a new relationship with the Agency on the basis that he has

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satisfactorily answered all questions during the period 1967-68.

e. That it has not been possible and it may never be possible to isolate or pinpoint either the exact information or the point in time when NOSENKO was given new information or additional information which might be relevant upon analysis to the question of his bona fides or his mission.

f. To date there has been a concentration on preparing elicitation questions on the basis of information obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the information Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information has been considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his information and arriving at conclusions, since these interviews were designed to elicit information which would help resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements, and (c) at this time this information is better organized and in contrast to information from 1962, 1964, etc., is retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement.

g. That the summaries and questionnaires prepared to date may not include every comment or statement NOSENKO has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every

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reference to a person or a topic. Anatole was told that the sorting or isolation process has been completed only through Memorandum N-188, from a total of approximately 260 memoranda. It was emphasized that most topics and persons were discussed with NOSENKO several times at varying intervals, and that the majority of topics were not covered to completion in one or two interviews. NOSENKO also wrote memoranda on topics which may not have been covered during interview or which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet been correlated with the interviews.

h. That research and analysis on most topics is incomplete, both with respect to collateral information and previous statements from NOSENKO.

i. That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral or related information such as information from the FBI concerning NOSENKO which has not been made available to him. Anatole realizes this type of information may be vital to any consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the possible if not probable relationship between FBI information and sources and the problem of penetration of American intelligence and Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will agree to release pertinent information to him and discuss

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sources in the near future. He realizes any analysis or assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent information is withheld from him. Anatole understands the problem even though he obviously does not accept it as logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press the FBI to make appropriate information available to him.

j. That information we are dealing with in the transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not necessarily information previously known to or discussed with NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of information resulting from the 1967-68 information has been expanded considerably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and photographs provided him. It was also noted that it has not yet been possible to isolate topics new to NOSENKO about which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither have we been able to isolate or determine when in the past new topics or questions of possible significance were introduced to NOSENKO.

4. We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations and evolved an initial selection of Crucial Questions (Attachment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).

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Anatole expects to review and comment and to frame additional questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first elicitations. He has requested and expects, as this can be accomplished, to review and comment about a summary of each Crucial Question. The summary is to set forth both collateral and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if necessary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photographs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatola insists that he review and assist in the framing of all questions to be asked of NOSENKO and he states that he will stipulate the order of questioning by both topic and specific question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed without his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted about each topic. He plans to carefully tailor the elicitation approach and, more importantly, to set down detailed guidelines to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes more direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will be a confrontation or hostile interrogation. He also foresees

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5. Anatole continues to express his concern about the problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. He emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the results of the elicitation from NOSENKO although he understands it will be necessary to provide the results to the FBI. He is concerned about the dissemination of his KY tapes and the possible implications since he now believes he may have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the context of considering NOSENKO's bona fides. Anatole was told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the

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FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any proposal or decision to disseminate them.

6. In relation to the point about Anatole's concern about knowledge of his information I told Anatole that it would be necessary for him to comment in detail in the future as he had recently on certain items. He was told that, as he knew, we are at a stage in the NOSENKO case where details such as the organizational assignments of individuals and identifications and the number of leads provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions and divert our attention from the central problem of why NOSENKO would have been dispatched. I told Anatole quite frankly there was a feeling he had not been fully cooperative on the NOSENKO case. There was a belief that he should furnish the details of his knowledge about individuals, operations, the KGB, etc., so that others can try to judge the accuracy or inaccuracy of NOSENKO's information. Anatole was told that it would come as no surprise to him to learn that the fact he has not told everything he knows is still a problem and that there may be some misunderstandings since it is obvious his detailed knowledge has had and will have a direct bearing on the NOSENKO case. Anatole firmly

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but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning cooperation on the NOSENKO case. He said (a) it was obvious that research to date and collateral information supports his position that NOSENKO is a dispatched agent; (b) that he will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has been an exchange of information; (c) that he would not give details now because to do so would result in a situation where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine information and the details are pertinent; (e) that it is unnecessary for him at this time to give additional details about personnel or the KGB organization except when these details reflect on major items -- overall these details are not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering small items and details. If, however, small details become a major point such as in connection with KOVSHUK, CHURANOV, GUK and GRYAZNOV<sup>V</sup> then during the review he will pinpoint the specific and detailed contradictions. He reiterated his previous comments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in pursuing details and leads to recruitments or persons of interest to the KGB when there is nothing crucial or significant involved.

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7. It was agreed I would meet with Anatole when the first elicitation results are ready or when additional pertinent research has been completed and there are papers or ideas to discuss.

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ATTACHMENT B

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## ANATOLE Re MOSENKO CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969 concerning his recommendations on how to proceed to elicit additional information from NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers the <u>CRUCIAL OUESTIONS</u> which need explanation or resolution. These <u>CRUCIAL OUESTIONS</u> are set forth below with comment or notations which emerged during our discussions.

B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the implementation of the program he originally believed was to be followed before there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ANATOLE had been reviewing his file material and the transcripts of his comments in January 1969 (The KY transcripts) so he was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed. Each paper was read by ANATOLE, he retained certain of the papers and, as set forth below, he commented about certain of the papers or related matters. After outlining the <u>CRUCIAL QUESTIONS</u> we worked out an elicitation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as the beginning of the program. The elicitation guide is detailed separately.

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C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation about how to proceed with NOSENKO:

1. Isolate the <u>CRUCIAL QUESTIONS</u> for our guidance and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENKO is to begin immediately and is to follow the procedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph examination. (ANATOLE believes another polygraph based on questions he will help frame will be essential. It is his opinion that it will be possible to make the polygraph meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the results of the elicitation and specifically on the basis of his knowledge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more adequately the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity SECKEI

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such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions and areas where there remains doubt. ANATOLE agreed there might be a question of when a polygraph examination should be administered since it might be more effective after the confrontation or hostile interrogation of MOSENKO.)

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4. A hostilo/confrontation interrogation phase at which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, inconsistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the bagis of NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the dotails of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consideration of all possible problems. For example ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to " NOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine satisfactorily answered all questions during the period 1967-68.

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#### ATTACHMENT B

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B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the implementation of the program he originally believed was to be followed before there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ANATOLE had been reviewing his filo material and the transcripts of his comments in January 1969 (The KY transcripts) so he was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed. Each paper was read by ANATOLE, he

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C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation about how to proceed with NOSENKO:

1. Isolate the <u>CRUCIAL QUESTIONS</u> for our guidance and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENKO is to begin immediately and is to follow the procedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph examination. (ANATOLE believes another polygraph based on questions he will help frame will be essential. It is his opinion that it will be possible to make the polygraph meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the results of the elicitation and specifically on the basis of his knowledge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more adequately the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions and areas where there remains doubt. ANATOLE agreed there might be a question of when a polygraph examination should be administered since it might be more effective after the confrontation or hostile interrogation of NOSENKO.)

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4. A hostile/confrontation interrogation phase at which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, inconsistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consideration of all possible problems. For example ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to NOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine

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what influence that letter has had on NOSENKO during the 67-68 interviews.

D. It was necessary to emphasize to ANATOLE the fact that at this time it is not possible for no to assure him that everything NOSENKO has said on any topic has been recovered or is retrievable even for the interview period of 1967-1969 (and 69). Noting the papers we had prepared ANATOLE had to be told there was no assurance that everything NOSENKO has said was included or considered when attempting to extract or summarize his statements about a person or event. Specifvically it was noted that with a few exceptions no topic or item is fully covered during one or two interviows. Even though AMATOLE recognized the problem based on his review of the transcripts of the 1967-68 interviews it was necessary to cuphasize the fact that the validity of any given question we had framed might be challenged, reversed or modified as the process of indexing the transcripts continued. ANATOLE was told that as of 31 March 1969 we had been able to index and extract the transcripts and memoranda of the 1967-68 interviews. only through N-188 of approximately 260 N-memoranda. ANATOLE also was told it is not possible to be certain that all previous information from NOSENKO can be accurately and fully recovered. For this reason it is difficult if not impossible to isolate what he night have said in 1964 and/or 1965 and coupare that

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"statement with what he said in 1968. ANATOLE also acknowledged noting the possible significance of the interview techniques as these have varied over the years. Centrast in the technique and the approach to MOSENKO where, for example, he is provided information or asked only to confirm a leading question has tended to dilute if not obscure what MCSENKO actually has had to say about many subjects; at this stage it may be virtually inpossible to distinguish NOSENXO's original infornation from subsequent statements modified as a result of questioning. This problem is an important consideration because the approach to the elicitation phase was developed with this in mind. Essentially it was agreed with ANATOLE that despite previous statements or information from NOSENKO the elicitation phase would be nanaged to attempt to obtain from NOSENNO everything he has to offer or say about each CRUCIAL QUESTION at this time without reference to any previous statement. It is ANATOLE's opinion that if MOSENKO provides a 'full statement without prompting that further questioning can be meaningful after analysis of his statement despite the possibility NOSENNO has modified or revised his information as he has learned or apparently learned what he thinks is wanted or he should say. ANATOLE believes the fundamental problem remains and that despite MOSENKO's twists and turns it will be possible to sort through the various stories to focus on the reason for NOSENKO's dispatch and determine the

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key iteas of diversion.

E. In reply to ANATOLE's question he was told that the FBI continued to interview NOSENKO usually with Mr. Solie present but that I did not know in advance anything about the topics of any interviews. I told AUATOLE it was my opinion that once elicitation from NOSENKO began on the basis of his recommendations that other interviews would stop. We recognized and agreed that there night be a tactical and/or psychological problom with NOSENKO by shifting the interview technique to elicitation rather than consultation and a response to questioning. ANATOLE could not emphasize too strongly the need to let NOSENKO respond fully with minimal prodding or stimulation and without refreshing his memory. ANATOLE was told it was my understanding the elicitation phase would be conducted by Mr. Solie without FBI participation although I did tell ANATOLE that the elicitation transcript results would undoubtedly be given to the FBI just as have the results of all the 1967-69 interviews.

F. ANATOLE expects and recommends that the period of elicitation will be followed by the period of interrogation or confrontation to be conducted by a team of three persons -The security expert, Mr. Solic; a counterintelligence specialist who knows related cases and CI problems, and a Soviet specialist. ANATOLE says this team approach will be necessary to implement a fast moving interrogation, based on the script he will help devise, which will not permit NOSENKO time to reflect or think about his answers. The tactic will be to insist on immediate and full answers and <u>ANATOLE insists that once the new elicitation phase begins NOSENKO not be permitted to write any answers: He is not to be given any written assignments: every response and reply is to be oral and transcribed and NOSENKO must be encouraged and permitted to respond fully: he is not to be asked to confirm or deny any statement por is he to be assisted in replying to any question with suggestions or reminders.</u>

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G. ANATOLE recognizes the problem of information from FBI sources and the release of this information to him. He respects the FBI need to protect its sources and understands the FBI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He believes that our failure to make relevant information available to him is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and our ability to decipher the NOSENKO puzzle faster. ANATOLE recalls that at the time NOSENKO defected in 1964 and there was discussion with the FBI about the SASHA lead and related matters he asked for FBI file and source information pertinent to the problems. ANATOLE continues to believe there probably

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is a serious question about the possible significance of NOSENKO to penetration of the FBI and the bona fides of FBI sources in terms of misinformation (disinformation) in relation to both NOSENKO and other information. He is of the opinion that a FBI source(s) probably came to the FBI after his defection and perhaps after NOSENKO's contact if not dispatch in 1964. He suggests the possibility there may be a false arrest and show trial of a FBI source in order to further belster NOSENKO's story. Although it has not been possible to discuss this aspect of the NOSENKO story with ANATOLE it seems clear that if we are to gain full neasure from ANATOLE it will be necessary for the FBI to approve or conduct a briefing of ANATOLE appropriate to puting a perspective on the FBI sources so he can assess what they have said about NOSENKO and COLITZYN.

H. The following are the <u>CRUCIAL CUESTIONS</u> which are to form the basis for elicitation from NOSENKO. They are set forth in the order discussed.

1. <u>Hisinformation in the Second Chief Directorate</u> (SCD) (This is an immediate topic for elicitation as set forth separately)

2. Leadership of the KGB

3. Leadership of the First Chief Directorate (FCD)

4. Leadership of the SCh

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5. SHELEPIN's 1959 Report (This topic will be discussed

more thoroughly with AMATOLE before the question is raised with NOSENKO again. ANATOLE was emphatic in stating that it had been a mistake to raise the subject of the KGB policy and 1959 reorganization with NOSENKO. He read the paper with attachments but deforred comment except to note that NOSENKO had said very little of significance. It was at this time that ANATOLE first noted it was a mistake to permit NOSENKO to write memoranda. ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect of the NOSENKO case most important and a topic which requires his study particularly in view of the fact he now has extracts from the GOLENIEWSKI letters which relate to the 1959 KGB reorganization and disinformation. ANATOLE also did not recall the book so it will be necessary to make certain he has a

6. <u>Penetration of the American Embassy Moscow</u> (ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires additional study and elicitation later after research will permit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically in this area that NOSENKO's reassurance of no KGB successes is most likely diversion. ANATOLE expressed his concern that in January he may have commented too extensively and theoretically about this problem. He now wants to re-examine this problem and refocus everyone back more precisely to NOSENKO and his story)

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7. <u>Penetration of CIA</u> (This is a topic for later elicitation from MOSENKO.)

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8. <u>VASSALL Case</u> (AMATOLE believes NOSENKO should be asked to reconstruct completely in detail everything he knows about the VASSALL case: times, sources, officers, etc., at one taped session. Simultaneously AMATOLE says we should construct a complete chronology of everything NOSENKO has said about the VASSALL case since June 1962, including the questions or comments put to NOSENKO about VASSALL. An analysis comparison of these two papers will follow.

ANATOLE proposes it may be possible to demonstrate how a possible penetration of CIA could have precluded NOSENKO's safety from 1962 to 1964. This may assist us to solve our problem and also be ultimately useful in confronting NOSENKO on the point of his dispatch and apparent immunity.

9. <u>Boris BELITSKIY Case</u> (ANATOLE approved elicitation and questioning on the basis of the summary and questionnaire. ANATOLE stresses the need to confine the questioning to the questionnaire and the fact that NOSENKO is not to be given additional information about the case, its origins, etc., either as we knew it or now know it from ANATOLE. There will be some tie-in to the elicitation about Vladimir Luovich ARTEMOV and Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV but other than the questions as set forth in the papers ANATOLE reviewed there should be no questions asked which brief MOSENNO or relate the three or any other persons.

والمتصادم ولله مساجر الشكروا وجرال بيراجه وأرامهم ووالدر المركبة مجافة وتترجي والمركبة المحالي

ANATOLE needs a photograph of ARTEMOV to make certain of identification and he needs photos others in the delegation with BELITSKIY to try to determine if there were other KGB officers in the delegation who might have been in on the case or the disinformation aspect)

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10. The 1960 period of NOSENKO's career.

This is to be an elicitation topic later after we have summarized what we can about NOSENKO's story of this period. In reply to ANATOLE's question based on his review of the paper <u>NOSENKO Timetable and Associates</u> I told ANATOLE the researcher had found it impossible to date to sort out and isolate NOSENKO's 1967-63 statements about his career during the period 1960 to 1962. ANATOLE was told this was obviously a priority job but that it just had been an impossible task without additional research and analysis. We will discuss this fully when the isolation is completed and in conjunction with other topics.

11. Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV 's November 1960 trip.

This item is for later elicitation after more research is completed about the code clerks, perhaps a reinvestigation to make positive identifications, etc. ANATOLE asked if KOSOLAPOV's trip to Copenhagen was confirmed (N-167 pg. 16) and I told him I thought it was under a different name. ANATOLE would like details.

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12. The Robert Lee JOHNSCH case.

ANATOLE considers this an important aspect of NOSENKO's throw-away material. He again questions why the SCD would lend technicians to the FCD and wants NOSENKO to explain this in detail as well as to fully detail again how. from whom, etc. NOSENKO learned of this case. AMATOLE is of the opinion new questions can be asked but agreed to defer elicitation on this case primarily because I pointed out that in 1965 a paper was written setting forth apparent inherent security weaknesses in the Johnson case some of which at least suggested strongly that, in addition to Johnson's lack of access at one time, the KGB could have anticipated a blow at any moment. I outlined some of the points I recall about the weaknesses of the principals and quite frankly I told AMATOLE that I doubted that anyone currently of the opinion NOSENKO is bona fide would be any more inclined to credit the 1965 paper today than he has in the past. I agreed that it might be useful to again attempt to get NOSENXO's story about the JOHNSON case when this story would be exclusively NOSENKO's.

13. Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBATENKO.

ANATOLE wants NOSENKO to tell in detail everything he knows about GORBATENKO. ANATOLE notes the 1955 promotion is a key element but stresses no mention of this is to be made to NOSENKO. Despite previous mentions of GORBATENKO, which should be collated, NOSENKO is to restate everything completely.

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14. Serafim Nikalayevich LYALIN


Elicitation about LYALIN is to follow later. All references to LYALIN by MOSENKO should be collated with collateral information about him. If there is a photograph of LYALIN, ANATOLE wants to see it to verify any MOSENKO identification.

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15. <u>Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK</u>. ANATOLE considers NOSENKO's information about KOVSHUK most important as a later elicitation point. He does not want NOSENKO asked any questions about KOVSHUK which may relate to KOVSHUK's trip to the U.S.A. or KOVSHUK's association with KISLOV. If NOSENKO in connection with detailing the biographics of his friends includes any of this about KOVSHUK he is <u>NOT</u> to be questioned on this matter or about the woman trouble previously mentioned.

ANATOLE needs exact dates KOVSHUK was in the U.S. and any details of activities he can be given from FBI reporting. In connection with our discussion about KOVSHUK possibly working with and associating with journalists ANATOLE said he recalled an incident which he thinks took place in 1959 when he met KOVSHUK on the street not far from the KGB offices when KOVSHUK signalled him not to speak. ANATOLE did not and observed KOVSHUK meet a Soviet journalist in an apparent agent type meeting.

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16. Eugene Peter SEREBRENNIKOV.

ANATOLE says what NOSENKO has said is clear but that this needs full research and analysis - what he said contrasted with what NOSENKO said and what SEREBRENNIKOV said before asking NOSENKO about this again.

17. Adam BROCHES Case

ANATOLE was told this lead information was being reviewed in detail. That there was some apparent confusion and possibly misinterpretation or misunderstanding about his lead information.

ANATOLE reiterated his point that the KGB wanted to reestablish relations which had been broken after BROCHES left France. ANATOLE knows about this from reading ZARUBIN paper and he knows that the KGB wanted to talk to ZARUBIN about this.

ANATOLE said that he would leave the decision about when NOSENKO would be asked about BROCHES again to SM it could be immediately when the review was completed or later. The review is in process and we will have to see what FBI may have asked recently.



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19. The CHEREPARGY Papers

ANATOLE stresses the importance of this case but says this must be a later topic for NOSENKO probably in interrogation although it may be useful to have NOSENKO review his knowledge again in detail before confrontation.

ANATOLE referred to the need to analyze the results of the BOWDEN investigation before proceeding too far with HOSENKO. In this connection ANATOLE was told State Security was securely organizing this investigation and that it was currently planned that interviews would commence with BOWDEN first including mention to BOWDEN about his mention in the CHEREPANOV papers. In response to ANATOLE's question he was told that to my knowledge the FBI did not yet know about the BOWDEN investigation since to date it was a State Department inquiry based on a need to clarify certain possible problems. ANATOLE said that he saw CHEREPANOV after CHEREPANOV had transferred to the American Embassy Section wearing a Lt. Col. military uniform. ANATOLE said this was unusual and it suggests to him that CHEREPANOV was engaged in an operation, perhaps a contact posing as a nilitary beginning in 1959. He said CHEREPANOV had as a constant companion a young man in the American Department but ANATOLE cannot recall the young man's name. (ANATOLE suggests later NOSENKO be asked if CHEREPANOV wore a military uniform and who was his companion, ---- r i

probably in operations.) I told ANATOLE I did not know if NOSENKO had named any friends of CHEREPANOV but would check for names. ANATOLE said he recalled also there was a big change in CHEREPANOV's attitude and demeaner between early 1959 to mid - 1960 or, more probably. Dec. 1960 when ANATOLE saw Cherepanov again. ANATOLE said he can only interpret that CHEREPANOV was in a better mood, more confident in personality because he may have had some operational success. ANATOLE is of the opinion that CHEREPANOV's change in demeaner and mood could only relate to American Embassy operations.

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#### Case

ANATOLE says this is not really a crucial question although an important case which needs resolution eventually along lines set forth in the paper <u>MOSENKO</u> -<u>Homosexual Aspects</u> but not on the basis of the homosexual angle (see separate discussion re homosexual aspects).

21. The TOPOV and PENKOVSKIY Cases

ANATOLE says both of these cases should be delayed until later. They require special consideration and more research and discussion. We are not ready now to delve into these and it is his opinion be may have tended to obscure some of the points about MOSENKO by drawing parallels with PENXOVSXIY in January. He believes there are parallels and a relationship and we should continue to examine all aspects of the cases but he concedes a better base of understanding should be laid before it will be possible to make a meaningful tie to NOSENKO.

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22. NOSENNO's Friendship with GUK, CHURANOV, KOVSHUK, etc.

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ANATOLE emphasized the need to get from MOSENKO complete details about his friends or claimed friends. ANATOLE agreed with the line of inquiry outlined in the paper "Knowledge Because of Association with other KGB Officers" and said elicitation should include information sufficient to give us in one place a perspective on NOSENKO's associates and friends. This topic can be covered immediately. ANATOLE stresses real importance of Guk, Kovshuk and Churanov to NOSENKO. He notes Guk's wife was the daughter of a minister and asks if NOSENKO could have introduced them. He also points out CHUPANOV in school with NOSENKO.

23 Lead.

s Ec e ANATOLE agreed elicitation on this topic should wegin immediately and was most interested in the possible significance of this case vis a vis disinformation. He noted, of course, the different perspective on the case and that apparently when this case was considered in the context of support to NOSENKO's bona fides analysis had not taken into account the actual origins and development of the case. ANATOLE immediately connected the SLAVACHENSKAYA angle to the PENKOVSKIY case and speculated that the KGB may have been attempting to establish a separate ostensibly confirmatory source to the FBI to bolster PENKOVSKIY

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who was in contact with the British and CIA. ANATOLE emphasized his view that NOSEVKO should not be given a hint about the actual beginnings of the case to prevent NOSENKO from modifying his story or being led to explanations. NOSENKO should retell his account of the case and then be asked the questions listed without confrontation or explanation.

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(See N-24 - This a later topic) ANATOLE requests everything available about GINSBURG and specifically everything NOSENKO has ever said. After the research ANATOLE thinks he can spot something in connection with GINSPURG which is significant but which he says eludes him at this cime.

25. The Military Attache Incident. (

ANATOLE stresses importance again as he did in KY transcripts. He persists in thinking there may be more here than we have covered - that one of the MA's may have been recruited or someone else was recruited and advised about the trip. He refers to N-32, and maintains this incident needs reexamination and that probably after research the Attaches should be questioned again. ANATOLE says it his recollection that the KGB knew exactly the device they were looking for: that the KGB did not have a detection device which could have been effective and that the use of a box which looked like a detection machine was staged

to cover up fact KGB knew exactly where to find the device and what it was. He says his recollection is that KGB knew where to look and there was no search or monitoring. They just went to the right place. This means to AVATOLE a human not a machine source. He says questioning NOSENKO about this can only follow research.

(ANATOLE asked if the heformation about the Japanese Colonel in intelligence had been reported to the Japanese and what was the outcome. ANATOLE was told I did not know - would check.)

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ANATOLE was interested in this but we did not dwell on this subject. ANATOLE believe it a give away diversion although probably true. Decision re additional elicitation to be made by SM on basis time and framing questions.

27. Microphones in American Embassy

ANATOLE still suggests review this information from NOSENKO and requestioning particularly to establish exactly what NOSENKO said when and if he said anything about NOVITE (?) Wing. Decision re timing of questioning by SM.

28. NATKINS - Canadian Ambassador Case.

AVATOLE thinks it necessary NOSENNO retell in detail everything he knows about WATNINS in same way-he to be asked about Vassall. Then it will be necessary line out and compare

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exactly what ANATOLE said and what NOSENKO said. ANATOLE points out importance of early information from NOSENKO before he was given background information or leading questions. ANATOLE thinks this can begin early in elicitation or he done later. Decision re timing by SM.

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(ANATOLE thinks it might be helpful for him to review what MOSENKO has said about Svetlana STALINA ALLILUEVA This is speculative but ANATOLE recalls or was told NOSENKO should or did know something and he thinks there may be some clue here about NOSENKO's associates. friends, etc., possibly of importance.)

29. Code Clerks - 59-62

ANATOLE again emphasizes his need to see a full review of results of investigation of all the code clerk cases. He is convinced there may be a case here and that the clues have been missed or overlooked. He says he cannot recall the necessary detail and that it is only when he can be stimulated with names, dates, etc., that he may be able to pinpoint some angle of significance. ANATOLE was told we were also bothered about these cases - that much work had been done but that, quite frankly, I could not estimate how long it would take to assemble the information for orderly review. ANATOLE was told this is on the agenda - it is a matter of time and people. Any questioning of NOSENKO about these cases can only be done later.

# 30. CIA Complex Moscow

AMATOLE said it would be necessary to research and cellate all the information about CIA officers and operations in Moscow including visitors, i.e., TDYers, to get a picture of their activities, associates, KGD officers they not and operational activities which might have made them vulnerable. ANATOLE opines NOSENHO should know more specifics about this and that later it will be necessary to question him with specifics during the confrontation stage after comparing late elicitation results with collateral details.

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31. A Code Clerk in American Enbassy with Spanish Language or Spanish Background.

ANATOLE noted the reference in the paper re Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV to NOSENKO's information that ARTEMOV knew Spanish and said there might be a connection to something he vaguely recalled about an interest in or a case against an American code -clerk of Spanish background or who spoke Spanish. ANATOLE said the period was 1957-60. He could not recall details. He said this should be considered a special case for him to work on now for later questioning of NOSENKO if research indicated this necessary. ANATOLE requested for review any information available re code clerks, civilian or military, in Moscow 57-60 with Spanish language or background.

ч. . к.с. 32. Vindimir SUSLOV and Vasiliy V. VAXURUSHEY

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ANATOLE agreed that the questions to VAKEPUSHEV should be asked of NOSENVO during the first elicitation stages. ANATOLE was concerned that NOSENKO not be given any indication of our current special interest in VANHRUSHEV. (SM NOTE: Question re deleted from paragraph 11 by SM on basis unnecessary when reviewing paper with ANATOLE. De, of course, asked about down and was told was on same ship once with VAKHRUSHEV and researcher had included question because had high US Government contacts including some carly 1950 work on U.S. intelligence community reviews.)

A specific question ANATOLE asked was about any collateral or documentary information that VAKHENSHEV attended the Institute of Foreign Relations. He also asked if there were photographs of VANHEUSHEV's wife(s) available and if NOSENKO had identified them. He would like to see them too. (SM NOTE: See 12 August 1954 interview).

ANATOLE thinks there may be a significant aspect about NOSENKO's schooling and VAKHRUSHEV's schooling which needs checking. ANATOLE is speculating on possibility NOSENKO was in Military Institute of Fereign Languages. I had to answer ANATOLE that I did not know if there was any collateral proof that NOSENKO was a student at the Institute of Fereign/International Pelations but would check. ANATOLE projects this point on the logical

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progression of MOSENKO's schooling in the military and probability that higher education would have been under military unless some special family or other influence permitted change. He also notes MOSENKO's continuation in Naval Service and confirms he saw MOSENKO in Mavy uniform in March 1953 in KOB Hdgs.

ANATOLE suggests this aspect be reexamined after elicitation in light of NOSENXO's answers and information about VAEHPUSHEV and SUSLOV, who was in Institute of Foreign Relations. ANATOLE says CHURANOV was in Foreign Relations Institute and that Guk was in Military Institute. ANATOLE speculates this may be area where NOSENKO is hiding his close relationship with Guk that he might have first known Guk in the Military Institute although GUK a couple of years older than NOSENKO. Guk worked in GRH will but ANATOLE does not remember if Navy. ANATOLE says he/consider furher elicitation later and also a surprise question on new polygraph about NOSENKO's attendance at the Military Institute.

A. The paper <u>NOSENKO's Defection</u> was read by ANATOLE with interest. I did not have 2 copies of this paper. ANATOLE was told a copy would be furnished him at next meeting. Certain comments which follow are based on information from this paper but a specific comment by ANATOLE was (see para 2 page 2 of paper):

It is true TSYMPAL was a former member of Department 4. It is illogical that TSYMPAL was transforred to the Illogal Directorate and more illogical he would travel with the delegation if he were head of the Illegals Directorate. As head of the 4th

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Department he would go with the delegation but normally and logically there would be no mixing of legal and illegal elements. The KGB would not permit any publicity or identification of TSYMBAL if he were head of the Illegals. ANATOLE can only conclude this information is to create the impression of reorganization after his defection.

B. ANATOLE also points out the illegic aspect of a Tourist Department officer as security officer to such a delegation. He also notes that when senior officials such as GROMIXO travel there are specially assigned expert security officers with their delegations if any are sent at all. He notes that for the most part the senior officials travel without security officers except protective experts assigned such as would be the situation NOSENKO describes.

ANATOLE says a basic question for confrontation will be about the inclusion of a "special security officer" in a delegation such as one headed by the Fereign Minister. He says the inclusion of a person such as NOSFNEO is very unusual. The Foreign Minister and his aides, etc., are trusted men who go abroad regularly. These are always experienced KGR officers on the operations in support of the delegations and the planning is well in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a later date ANATOLE says we can confront NOSFNEO with this opposite position from ANATOLE.

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C. AMATOLE said the story about NOSENKO's role with SHAKUDV just gives a reason to us about why NOSENKO was in Geneva. There would be no reason for any special interest by NOSENKO. The residentura could and would handle any technical devices and operations such as NOSENKO describes.

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D. , MALER DOORSKIY.

ANATOLE found this connection and final drinking hout interesting and said both Guk and KREPKOGORSKIY would know what NOSENVO's mission was in 1962. I could provide re information about KREPKOGORSKIY and ANATOLE asked to see photo of KREPKOGORSKIY, nothing he could not recall name.

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ANATOLE asked for information about (SM NOTE: SM needs check significance - where in "NOSENKO - Defection" paper., What NOSENKO say, etc.).

F. ANATOLE says a later question NOSENKO should be asked/why in 1962 he rejected the idea of using his position in the Tourist Department as the logical position from which he could keep in contact with AIS, i.e., a tourist sent to be recruited by NOSENKO, etc.

33. Personnel of 1st Section, 1st Dept. 1959 - 61

AMATOLE believes this will be important area for later elicitation and, perhaps, confrontation after we have opportunity to analyze everything MOSENED says vs the collateral and AMATOLE's information. It will be necessary to research this. ANATOLE suggests we double check the debriefing of about NOSENKO's approach and reexamine Stackground and what he has been doing to see if there is anything which looks significant now, i.e., anything important given hindsight and more information.

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34. The Maurice De Jean Case

ANATOLE said it was important to line out in quotes by date everything that NOSENKO said about De Jean and do the same for the information from Yuriy Vasilyeyich \_\_\_\_\_ KROTKOV. These should then be lined out and chronologically compared with what AN\*TOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the time sequence we should a memory the problem of the leakage of lead information to try to get indications and the leakage of lead where ANATOLE's information leaked. ANATOLE said we should also consider the possible problem of leakage in connection with the WATKIN'S Case and the RCMP in this. He also notes that GRIBANOV's role and visit to Paris may be important so when NOSENKO responds to questions about GRIBANOV we should examine this aspect also. Specifically, NOSENKO should comment about why GRIBANOV went to Paris.

35. BUSHEK and GPIBANOV

In connection with discussions about GRIBANOV and bis trip in 1964, we discussed the BUSHEX case and ANATOLE was told the following re chronology:

18 January MOSENKO to Geneva from Paris.

1 Feb (CM believes) GRIPANOV arrives Paris from Vienna -

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7 Feb. GPIBANOV departs Paris for Vienna (GPIBANOV uses name GORBENOV in Vienna and with BUSHEE.)

12 Feb Soviets in Switzerland strongly protest to Swiss about NOSENKO's defection.

14.Feb (maybe 13 Feb.) GRIBANOV, according to BUSHEK, relaxed about MOSENKO defection when PUSHEK raised question. AMATOLE suggests questions re BUSHEK come later.

36. Recall Tolegram

It is apparent to ANATOLE there is significant information about this aspect of the NOSENKO case from the FBI. This goes to the basic question of cooperation with the FBI and his knowledge which he concedes is a basic FPI decision about what he sees of the recall telegram information. ANATOLE has seen only NOSENKO's information (transcripts, etc.). The significance of this may bear on the question of rank discussed separately but even without being able to discuss all aspects of the recall telegram with ANATOLE he suggests we should examine if we have not done this the details of NOSENKO's admissions he lied about his rank and the recall telegram. ANATOLE says it is necessary to determine: the exact date NOSENKO broke on each story: who was involved: who knew he was being pressured; was there coordination with the FBI about the pressure on the recall telegram;

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what and who led us to conclude the stories were false; what were the dates involved between MOSENNO's story of the telegram and the information from another source(s) was there time for NOSENKO to confirm his use of the recall telegram story; could the message from NOSENKO have gotten to another source or would It appear the telegram story had to be planned in advance and not triggered by confirmation from NOSENKO: after NOSENKO broke was the other source(s) confronted; was there any change in the relations with the other source(s); has there been any collateral information reflecting KGB knowledge he has broken on rank or the Stelegram stories. ANATOLE suggests this aspect of the question of bona fides come later in confrontation and he assumes SM will be covering this fully even though he hopes there will be permission for him to be fully read into this. He was told, for the record since he obviously understood the implications, I could promise nothing since any discussion about the recall telegram and any other source would mean opening to him full information about any Source since everyone, including the FBI, knew he would never be satisfied with partial limited information. He laughingly agreed he would press for full information but did concede he might (temporarily?) settle for less than the full source information if the context of the information about NOSENGO was complete and he could understand the significance of the source's position, etc.

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I said we would think about what could be done but that antimism was not in order.

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37. NOSENKO Statement Condenning Seviet Regime

ANATOLE outlined the steps to be taken to obtain from NOSENED a statement which in its ultimate written form may serve both as a control and a propaganda instrument. ANATOLE believes that leading NOSENEO to a final absolute written and documented statement against the Soviets will not only permit us to judge NOSENEO more accurately by observing his reactions but also provide additional psychological pressure useful in the final stages of dealing with NOSENEO when we confront him with the evidence we know he was on a mission. ANATOLE believes the final-demunciatory statement may help the balance in gaining NOSENEO's cooperation/confession.

The steps to be taken are as follows:

A. Elicit from NOSENKO statements as detailed and specific as possible condemning the Soviet regime, the KGB, the party, Individuals, etc. This should be at a fast tempo. (This, can begin immediately.)

B. After reviewing these statements elicit from
NOSENKO increasingly detailed condemnatory statements by having
him add details about persons and activities.

C. Concurrent with 37A above NOSENKO should be asked to enumerate in detail each example of these things he did, saw or heard about which brought him to the point of defection. If he does not mention the NGB then at later stage in the elicitation process he is to be pressed for reasons he distikes of the formation in the states of the s the KGB. He should be led to make statements about repugnant KGB techniques such as blackmail, betero-sexual and homosexual entrapments against diplomats, tourists prominent Western scientists, etc. He should be led to express his disgust at every, stage about the intimidation practiced and should include Pussian youth and the spying on intellectuals.

D. After NOSENKO has enumerated and elaborated his demunciation and condemnation of the Soviets, orally and at length he should be asked to write in his own words a statement which he will agree can be published. He should be asked at this point, although it may be necessary to ask him earlier, if he is prepared to make an official statement condemning the Soviet regime and specific people. He will be told that with his cooperation we want to expose the Soviet regime on the basis of real knowledge. This first statement will be revised by us to include specifics and which will include statements such as "I condemn SHELEPIN, GRIBANOV, etc. for -0 - -"; "I condemn GRIBANOV for forcing me to engage in reprehensible homosexual entrapments - "; "I condemn a system which deals in misinformation and confusion such as that led by AGAYANTS - ".

E. At a later stage after review of his other statements about personnel, the KGB organization, etc: as followup he should in interview only detail what steps were taken to counteract the damage from COLITZYN's defection and the KGB reorganization. He should list all personpel structural and

- 31 -

particularly the functional changes in the KGB. He should be asked the specific question of when was a conference hold to consider the impact of COLITZYN's knowledge about tourists and the loss of documents. He should relate this to the 1964 Tourist Conference he says was scheduled.

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- 32 -

F. The final written condepatery statement will be considered for publication with or without NOSENKO's approval or agreement. The statement should be a key element in assessing his reaction at the point where his confession/cooperation is solicited and he is told it will be published.

38. NOSENKO's "SASHA" Case

There was little discussion of this except to consider need to review more and consider this a topic for later questioning.

39. PREISFREUND

ANATOLE considers this a topic worth more study and review on the basis that something may have been overlooked which relates to misinformation about the American Embassy or American personnel. We should not consider this case closed and more research is needed.

(ANATOLE sees no relevancy to the questions re GOLITZYN. If we have some operationally significant angle he can approve questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question 15 especially unnecessary. ANATOLE

STEP 1

pointed out the b. Jic and only question with espect to NOSENXO is misinformation and he sees no advantage or assistance resulting from questions about GOLITZY<sup>H</sup>. However, he said this was not his decision. He was told the paper about the GOLITZYN question was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively at this time on the 1967-1968 materials and the researcher responded to a general requirement to extract information and frame questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested against known information. The researcher obviously believes that if NOSENKO were to make a false or misleading statement which GOLITZYN has or could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that w compartmentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on "larger issues means that we will review a few papers which are useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who has a narrow view the concern is real.)

## 40. Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV.

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ANATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they will not accomplish much of significance re GRYAZNOV since he thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clerk cases which can only be determined after that research and analysis of information about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could be used later during elicitation as time fillers and preliminary to hard questions but not much will come because the questions are not to the point, which he did not explain fully.

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ANATOLE did specifically challenge MOSENKO's story of his close relationship with GRYAZNOV as a lie. ANATOLE notes the possibility there was leakage of his identification to the FEI and CIA of GRYAZNOV as a source. Particularly ANATOLE says MOSENKO's story of a close relationship with GRYAZNOV in 1962 is probably false because there was no previous relationship leading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GPYAZNOV would have been punished if the KGB knew he was identified as a source to GOLITZYN.

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ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with NOSENKO trying to build up his relationship with GRYAZNOV and down-play or, more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with CHURANOV and GUK. ANATOLE believes it was a deliberate part of NOSENKO's legend to set him close to GRYAZNOV since GRYAZNOV was an acknowledged source of some of GOLITZYN's information. The NOSENKO-GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element in future questioning:

A. "Comment on NOSENKO Family Relations" was a paper in which ANATOLE found little of importance or significance as a crucial point except that as the discussions progressed he developed the idea that the 1945-50 period may be crucial after all. ANATOLE sees little question about most of his life and specifically ANATOLE says the homosexual question is not "in line with available evidence". ANATOLE thought these questions would give NOSENNO the impression we are "unprofessional" but

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immediately conceded this is really not a problem since NOSENKO has not been handled very professionally in the past.

-35-

Sec. 1

B. "NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects"

ANATOLE questions any assumption that NOSENKO had any "expertise" on homo operations. He just does not think NOSENKO was an "expert" or a "specialist" and points out he can run then at level he has described with very little knowledge. ANATOLE says he knows NOSENKO was not a homosexual before and doubts he would have been consulted by anyone as a "specialist". In view basic doubts <u>if</u> any questions to be used should be woven into other topics and not treated as separate subject.

### 41. RUMYANTSEV

After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing to ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE maintains this will be a special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV case to what he considers was the serious mistake of asking NOSENKO about the May 1959 conference. (See N-223) He also thinks further questions on the conference should only come later. ANATOLE saw clearly why no questions should have been asked about RUMYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after mistake made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might gain by some questions during elicitation or if touching on this

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point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSENKO. This matter will be discussed further after ANATOLE reads the papers carefully. ANATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the May 59 meeting was known through GOLIENEWSKI and there was some indication from this source also of wide scale misinfornation programs. It was also noted that in my opinion the questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and my knowledge of how seriously GOLITZYN's information about this conference has been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions which NOSENKO could expect based on the overt information made available. Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact Sthat they indeed were different from other questions asked of NOSENKO because they rouched on political matters. To the extent that N-228 showed NOSENKO someone at a late date was interested in political matters NOSENKO may have been alerted. Certainly it would seem those questions were completely out of context out of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up NOSENKO may feel there is no real interest because there has been no real interest in matters political with him.

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A. "NOSENKO - Uso of Alias by KGB Officers"

ೆ ಕೊರಿಸಿ ANATOLE commented these were very good questions. They could be asked during elicitation or later during the crucial or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up questioning.

B. "NOSENKO - Knowledge Because of Association with other KBG Officers".

ANATOLE thought this was excellent approach. He

commented in connection with paras 9 and 11 and using this paper stressed need to elicit all possible from NOSENKO orally during interview and no written memorandum. ANATOLE outlined need for NOSENKO to list exact dates of all his service assignments; when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each officer, etc. He retained without comment the 28 March 1969 addendum re RAEOVSKIY, KUTYREV, and SUROV.

- 37 -

42. Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Vladinir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY

ANATOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB officers of special significance as part of the enumeration of CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are not only prominent in NOSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work against Americans. They are important even without NOSENKO. In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation about them from NOSENKO. Then NOSENXO's previous information will be collated and compared with collateral information, including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANATOLE will review, comment with new information, if any, and frame pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist operations 1955-59 is nonsense. SKVORTSOV was in Germany until 1959. NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations, etc.

## 43. Nikolay Grigoryevich BAGRICHEV

### 44. GRIBANOV (GORBUNOV)

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ANATOLE stresses the importance of collating all information about the activities of GRIBANOV and separate the sourcing.

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45. NOSENKO-Asen GEORGIEV Case

ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has said about Anatoliy S. KOZLOV and view any photos. I could not confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the composed case. ANATOLE asks if we can confirm KOZLOV was Chief of the American Section when NOSENKO left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO said about early relations including precise dates when NOSENKO says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that NOSENKO says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page 1 of paper) then Deputy Chief of Dept 7 (page 4). ANATOLE says as elicitation question NOSENKO should be asked why the demotion and also what happened to GORBATENKO.

Not unexpectedly, ANATOLE said he would eventually want to see the file on the GEORGIEV case to see what the tie-in to the Sovicts may have been.

46. Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV

مجاهسة المراجع بدائية المرتبة المستوجان المشتقين بالمحاجة المراجع المراجع المراجع المحاجة المراجع المراجع المر المراجع المراجع

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ANATOLE would like photograph and travel record for ANTEWOV.

Mikhail Stepanovich BANNIKOV
ANATOLE wants background info and photo.

-39-

48. Fedor Alekseyevich SHCHERBAK See 47

49. FNU GOLOVKOV.

A. Nikolay Dmitrievich ARKHIPOV

ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should fully explain how and why he became involved with a journalist and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc. SUNDAR's targets should be described fully and NOSENKO should explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations.

B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL case but I could not answer with complete assurance the details of his recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. ANATOLE was told, however, everyone satisfied about this apparently but would check.

C. ANATOLE suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY, and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the recruitment of the British tourist Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship to the Johnson case.

50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV

المتلفة ومناجرة والمتقالية المتلا والتشغيط

ANATOLE wants photo and travel record.

A. In connection with this also, ANATOLE requested a list of all CIA personnel in contact with Soviets in Berlin. (Page 2) He said he had originally or carlier asked for this

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several times and he related this request to the larger question of his analysis which he raised with Mr. Solie and which has gone unanswered - he asked for and wants a list of <u>all</u> CIA people in overt contact with Soviets world-wide. My only comment was to the point that compilation of such lists was difficult if not impossible.

51. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO

See 50.

52. PIVNEV

ANATOLE says this topic is definitely a confrontation

ANATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up and results of the case case to frame questions re PIWNEV but he also makes the point he considers the case important separately from considerations of NOSENKO. He recalled Mr. O'NEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview of case but he has heard nothing. On the basis of short discussion ANATOLE believes there are unexplored aspects to this case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far as NOSENKO is concerned which may go to penetration in the AM EMB, Moscow or even to Germany. The timing is important.

A. Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV

ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSHUK as well as to the BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about KGB officers. He wants to review the FBI information about

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KISLOV'S U.S. activities and surveillance reports of his association with KOVSHUK. All the questions re KISLOV should be used in elicitation.

3 A A

B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE would like to review all verified info against NOSENKO's statements. For example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc.

C. ANATOLE would like to review the lists of other members of the delegations of which he was a member as well as the lists of other delegations there at the same time.

(SM NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of Chairman on POPOV case. Compare with other info re POPOV case from NOSENKO. Why would have orders on POPOV case in his safe in 1964? The order was put out in 1959 ( $5\frac{2}{5}$ , 60). NOSENKO would know this in 1962 - immediately after American Section duty. He would have it or access to it but why as late as 1964 in Tourist Dept.)

D. After considerable reflection ANATOLE thinks it is quite possible that NOSENKO held the rank of Lt. Col. but that when he saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history and his assignments as he described them did not warrant the Lt. Col. rank states of the cover his dispatch/mission and the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his

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importance. He had to accede to his interviewers to avoid more questions about why and how he became a Lt. Col. ANATOLE thinks he may have been rewarded (promoted) quietly with only a very few persons knowledgable. (SM NOTE: Check all reports.)

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ANATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which began in June 1962 in Geneva?

In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions in one year (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then Deputy Chief of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this when he was not in his first job even three months and he had no major successes in Geneva (except contact with CIA?) - What wro the cases he handled and the recruitments he made in 1962?

53. American Ambassadors

ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors.

However, as an elicitation question ANATOLE thinks he should be asked if he knew of any American Ambassador who was recruited at any time by SCD?

Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be asked if he knew about an important high level SCD American agent who was recontacted and reactivated when he visited Moscow in 1959. Other questions to follow from the team of interrogators such as who did or would have handled this agent, etc.

Seite I

# 54. Yuriy GUK's Agent in Washington

ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even though it may not bear on the NOSENKO case. He says it needs analysis and future research on the basis of what action the FBI took. If there is something pertinent to NOSENKO we can consider for later use.

55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV

ANATOLE says we should extract and review what NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels in the info. ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov -Nov 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame questions to include KROTKOV in cur considerations. He recalls KROTKOV promised an expose of the KGB and this never camee about.

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CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of ATTACHMENT B TO MEMO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969, SUBJECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO:

11 Jan 64 GRIBANOV applied for Austrian, French, 2 (8 Jan) and Swiss visas. 18 Jan NOSENKO arrives in Geneva from Paris. Mikhail S. ROGOV arrives Switzerland. 19 Jan 25 Jan ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern 24 ROGOV registered Hotel Krebs, Bern ~28 Jan 25 -28 Jan ROGOV to Rome

3 Jan - 3 Feb GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV and NOVIK at Winter Olympics, Innsbruck. 4 Feb C-RIBANOV in Vienna

4 Feb NOSENKO defects

6 Feb

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Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation Disarnament Conference NOSENKO disappeared 4 Feb. GRIBANOV arrives Paris. KOVSHUK was in Paris. Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss police NOSENKO missing.

8 Feb

7 Feb

8 Feb

ROGOV returned to Bern

9 Feb Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had defected.

10/Feb

12 Feb

1 4

GRIBANOV left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK claims to have seen him 10 Feb.

TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland, holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting NOSENKO's kidnapping. Swiss called Soviet Ambassador Bern and strongly protested TSARAPUIN action.

14 Feb

GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKO.

14 Feb

18 Fal

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ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria.

KOVSHUK Left Paris as member of the RUDNEY Delegation.

#### ATTACHMENT C

# ANATOLE De MOSENSO Elicitation

A. As a result of consultations with ANNTOLE 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, it was concluded the following topics or items were to be used to begin the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO. The following outline notes of the topics are arranged in the order they are to be discussed with NOSENKO although it is important only to begin with the topics listed 1 and 2. Additional elicitation topics to be added by SM in consonance with discussion set forth in Crucial Questions.

B. ANATOLE emphasizes that it is necessary that NOSENXO he permitted to respond fully and completely about each topic with all possible details. NOSENKO should not be reminded of any previous statements or comments nor should be be corrected about dates; places or persons. He is not to be given any written assignments and each topic is to be covered as completely as possible in one interview without digression into other topics except, of course, where NOSENKO may take the initiative in the digression. He should, however, he brought back to the main topic as soon as possible without losing value of digression.

C. Topics:

1. Defection Motivation -

Most serious to set stars progressive elicitation.

SEGET

- A. Retall Metivation -
  - (1) Why he hates regime.

- 2 -

- (2) Can be give particulars and specifics concrete examples why be bates regime.
- (3) Concrete examples of actions, operations of KGB (security), why he developed negative attitude vs KGB and regime.
- (4) Concrete examples of this re Party.
- (5) Concrete examples of actions, attitudes, etc., of party leaders, the elite, the hierarchy which caused him to take negative attitude.

The above must be special session - then to be reviewed for further consideration re statement.

2. Detail career

-All assignments, nonth, year, naming head of departments and sections 1953 - highlighting major assignments accomplishments.

3. General question to have NOSENKO describe and detail with examples how misinformation handled in SCD - give cases - name personnel - what Find of games - relations with FCD - entire KGB - everything he knows without suggesting anything to him.

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4. Leadership of KGB.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each.

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5. Leadership of FCD.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each.

6. Leadership of SCD.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each. (do not go to Heads of Departments)

7. Vassall

8. BELITSKIY - go ahead on basis questionnaire.

9. All heads of American Department and deputies 1953,

a series and a series of the series of th

on yearly basis, with complete details re biography - ask questions on each - oral.

10. GUK, CHURANOV, etc. - explore in detail as with questions.

11. VAKHRHSHEV

1st years in Institute Foreign Policy.

2nd question list of friends, classmates with biography when/if mentions VAXHRUSLEV and SUSLOV - then ask substions outlined. 12. GRIBANOV Trip.

13. SEVORTSOV (with friends).

14. BAGRICHEV (with friends).

15. KOZLOV.

16. ARTEMOV.

17. YEROFEYEV.

18. PANASENKO.

19. KISLOV.

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20. Documentation -

Explain again how, when received documentation, why discremancies, how can you travel - identity card one rank order another rank.

أشويتين ولماها بالأواسة فأتعباد والمتكرة شويتين والعالة فريسانها

- 4 -

21. Travel abroad, cover, etc.

22. Use of alias, questionnaire.

23. Yuriy V. KROTKOV -

(probably nothing yet)

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
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5 August 1964

MEMORAJUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT:

GOLITSYL's comments on the NOSLARO Case

## Introduction and General Assessment

1. In reviewing the value and validity of GOLITSYN's comments on the NOSENKO case, it must be borne in mirely that although his current comments do not provide muthat is new GOLITSYN himself has always been a key to our understanding of the NOSENGO case. In 1962 NOSENKO's information was closely keyed to what we could presume to be a KGB damage assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, a fact which we only notice on comparison of NOSENKO's information with GOLITSYN's. Similarly, what GOLITSYN had told us about Department "D" enabled us to see how such a highlevel provocation could be run. Furthermore, his most recent comments do in fact provide useful support to our analysis which had already been completed. We do need now to assess how much GOLITSYN may be in a position to help in our assessment and future handling of NOSENKO and other ramifications of this KGB provocation. His value and future contribution can be assessed on several levels:

a. How much new hard information can he contribute?

b. How much new insight can be provide us through his own knowledge of KGB procedures and personnel applied to the materials of this case?

c. How much guidance can he provide in our future manipulation of these operations and in breaking KROTKOV and NCSENKO?

2. Point "a" is discussed in paragraph 5 below. While there are several useful items, the total of new hard facts is not great. On point "b", his insight, as reflected in his oral comments and analysis, is disappointing as one would have expected him to provide a more penetrating analysis than that which we completed earlier. And in point "c" he himself admits to having no idea about how to break

NOSENHO and KROTHOV, other than to point out that it will be most difficult, that we need to do some more groundwork and proparation before proceeding to an active attempt to do so (including perhaps uncovering a penetration of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow first), and that we should use well qualified interrogators.

3. We are faced at this point with the eminently complicated task of breaking NOSERKO. (While preparing to do so we are keeping him productive and examining the ramifications of the operation.) Our great need now is for hard, incontrovertible facts with which we can confront NOSENKO, to prove to him that our conviction about his guilt is based on something more than analysis, which is what he now evidently thinks it is. For this, our only immediate asset is GOLITSYN, who locms so importantly as a factor in this operation. We therefore hope, despite GOLITSYN's relative lack of contribution thus far, to exhaust all possibilities and get from him every possible detail. Therefore, since there are many loose ends and unclear bits from his 29 June report, we are preparing followup questions for GOLITSYN which might assist our task. Some of these questions are attached hereto as Attachment A.

4. GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENKO case was contained in the oral presentation of 28 June 1964. As background for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was given a wide range of materials on NOSENKO including 113 pages of responses to specific questions GOLITSYN wanted put to NOSENKO (see attachment B for a listing of all materials pertaining to NOSENKO which were shown to GOLITSYN). In addition, GOLITSYN was given the CHEREPANOV papers with supporting documentation, as well as the KROTKOV case and manuscript, the BELITSKIY, the UNACUTE and POPOV cases. In general, this was nearly everything available to us in our analysis of 25 March, 11 May and 8 July, with the exception of the SCOTCH case.

#### What GOLITSYN said

5. Statements of fact: What GOLITSYN could contribute in the form of personal knowledge, as against supposition, is summarized in the subparagraphs below. Comments on each point are appended where appropriate. Several of these points are of real assistance, but certain aspects of their content or presentation weakens their impact or opens them and the source's accuracy to some question.

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a. This man is the person he says he is, Yuriy Ivanovich NOSEAKO, the son of former Himister NOSEAKO, and he really was a KGB officer.

## Courents:

(1) COLITSYN knows this because he says he knew NOSENKO personally, having met him two or three times in II/1/1 in 1953 when GOLITSYN was there on other business. GOLITSYN also met NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1953-1959. In 1959, GOLITSYN asked NOSENKO where he worked, and NOSENKO said in the Tourist Department. GOLITSYN asked him about CHURANOV. In addition, "NOSENKO and GOLITSYN know one another indirectly through their common friends CHURANOV, GUK, KASHEYEV, etc.

(2) NOSENKO, however, could not identify the photo of GOLITSYN and, when told who it was, repeated his earlier statements that he had <u>never met GOLITSYN</u> and would of course remember if he had. He had once been shown a group photo of him. (It is difficult to see why MOSENKO would lie about this, since we clearly could check through GOLITSYN and a contrary statement would throw immediate doubt on NOSENKO's bena fides, and there would apparently be nothing for him to lose merely admitting it. This raises the question of why GOLITSYN might lie about this point, similarly not very easy to answer.)

b. NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible during the period 1953-54 for American military personnel in the Embassy. In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same responsibilities, or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was definitely in II/1/1.

#### Comments:

(1) NOSENKO says he was in II/1/1, working first against correspondents and then against military personnel, from March 1953 until mid-1955, and claims then to have transferred to the 7th

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(Tourist) Department of the Second Chief Directorate (11/7).

(2) In our own analysis of NOSENKO's story (11 May report) we had expressed doubts that NOSENKO actually even served in the American bepartment at all, since he was so vague about details he should have known, since he was suspiciously self-contradictory about when he entered and what he did, and since his later period in that Department (1960-62) is clearly a complete fabrication.

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c. NOSENKO served from 1957 or 1953 in the Tourist Department (II/7), where in 1959 he was a senior case officer.

## Conments:

(1) As noted above, this contradicts NOSENKO's story of having made this transfer in mid-1955, thus creating a period of two to three years which NOSENKO's legend is trying to cover up. This suggests to GOLITSYN that there was some success in the Embassy during this period, which is supported by other observations (see below).

(2) There is reason to doubt the validity of GOLITSYN's statement, since NOSENKO is independently known to have been involved in at least one, and perhaps two, strictly touristtype operations involving U. S. citizens in the period 1956-1958. One was Richard BURGI, whom NOSENKO recruited in June 1956 in the company of Anatoliy KOZLOV, Chief of II/7, who has confirmed NOSENKO's story and identified his picture. There was possibly one other American, Gisella Harris, in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly identified his photo) and he claims to have worked on three foreigners, one of whom, Sir Alan Lane, British, has confirmed the story and recognized NOSENKO's photo. The two others (Hans GERKENS, a German and fnu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not yet been identified.

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(3) Supporting GOLITSYN's statement, however, are the following points:

(a) DERIABIN considers it quite possible that an American Department man might be used in a Tourist Department operation, if he had qualifications needed and others were not available at the time. There is an outside chance that this is what happened here.

(b) In the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENED claimed to have personally participated in the recruitment operation in 1956 against U. S. Empassy security officer, Edward Smith. When concrented in 1964 with this earlier stateme in MOSENKO vigorously denied it. His earlier claim could thus have been a slip, or perhaps merely a gratuitous boast (paralleling his 1962 claim to have been involved in the October 1959 attempt against Russ Langelle).

(c) NOSENKO has reported personal participation in only a few checkable touristline activities during the years 1955-58 although his year 1959 is replete with them, almost all confirmed independently.

(d) The only other independently known activity of NOSENKO during this period was two trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958. These, he claims, were merely to serve as watchdog for two Soviet sporting groups (and to give him some flavor of the West). They could presumably have taken him from II/1 just as well as from II/7.

d. NOSENKO did not work in II/1 at any time in 1960, and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there for the one year 1961 either.

Conments:

(1) This confirms our finding, as reported in 11 May report.

(2) GOLITSYN claims to know this because he was

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aware in detail of who served in II/1/1 until his departure for Belsinki in July 1960, and because he visited Joscow and II/1 in December 1960 and talked with the then head of II/1/1, KOVSHUK. He would have known if NOSENKO were in the section then at all, much less as deputy chief.

### However:

- NOSENKO was away in Cuba until 13 December 1960 and thus may not have been there at the time. Nonetheless, the fact that he had become Deputy would presumably have come out of GOLITSYN'S talks with KOVSHUK, anyway.
- GOLITSYN had earlier said that PETROV was chief of II/1/1, GRYAZNOV the deputy. Insofar as SR records show, GOLITSYN had never named KOVSHUK in this position, as far as we know, until he saw the NOSENKO materials. KOVSHUK was, of course, named by GOLITSYN many times as an active case officer in II/1/1.

e. Contrary to NOSENKO's statement that GORBATENKO remained as chief of II/1 until 1959, GOLITSYN knew that GORBATENKO was sent as senior KGB advisor to Hungary shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, probably about January 1957.

## Comments:

(1) Since this is a high-powered job and represented a promotion, GOLITSYN thinks it may well have been given to GORBATENKO as a result of success in operations against the American Embassy, specifically a recruitment. GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO may be covering this up by changing the dates of GORBATENKO's transfer, and associates this with KOVSHUK's trip to the U. S. in early 1957, presumably to follow up or complete a Moscow Embassy recruitment (about which trip NOSENKO also gave apparent disinformation, linking it to the "ANDREY" case, which we all agree is unlikely, especially since "ANDREY" left Moscow in the spring of 1954).

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Since the period involv. There is the same one GOLITSYN thinks NO. 1 is covering up in his oun biography (1955-2017, this might indeed be a clue to an important penetration.

(2) We are examining U. S. Embassy departees from Moscow during 1956, and are preparing a paper presenting the circumstances of one possible theory.

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f. NOSENKO did, in fact, have the woman trouble he claims, but GOLITSYN "recalls" that this took place in 1957 or 1958, not in 1954, and this was the reason he was transferred out of the more sensitive American Department to the Tourist Department.

#### Comment:

(1) GOLITSYN also said that the events "must have happened" after NOSENKO became a CP member (in 1956-57), suggesting GOLITSYN is not stating a fact but making a supposition. It is not clear, in fact, whether GOLITSYN knows or supposes that this caused NOSENKO's transfer out of II/1 into II/7.

g. The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which GOLITSYN says NOSENKO claimed to occupy in 1960-62 -was abolished in 1959, those holding this title being made senior case officers.

Note: GOLITSYN is apparently confusing POMNACH (Assistant to the Chief) with ZANNACH (Deputy Chief). NOSENNO also reported that Pomnaches were abolished and made senior case officers, while Zamnaches continue to this day. GOLITSYN must also believe this, since he has reported GRYAZNOV as Zamnach II/1/1.

6. <u>Statements of opinion</u>: In addition to the opinions connected with the facts summarized above, GOLITSYN provided a number of opinions, theories and suppositions on various detailed aspects of this case. By and large, these merely provide additional support for opinions already presented

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in our earlier reports on this operation. GOLITSYN concluded without doubt that NOSENKO is a KGB provocateur, that the operation could only have been run with KGRUSACAAV's personal approval, and that it is designed abong other things to hide various penetrations, one perhaps related to the POPOV conpromise, and some of them threatened by leads provided by GOLITSYN. He considered that the MOSENKO operation is being run in close coordination with the MOSENKO operation is being provocations, and that in order to carry out his mission properly NOSENKO must know many of the significant truths the KGB is trying to hide or protect. He believes that much of what NOSENKO has said is keyed to MGB knowledge, rather than supposition, about what GOLITSYN had reported to Western intelligence authorities. Since all of this has already been dealt with in detail in our earlier analysis, it is not repeated in the body of this menorandum.

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David E. Jurphy) Chief, SR Division

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Attachments A and B

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# \* Questions for GOLITBY' based on 29 June Interview

What is your opinion of the general accuracy of what NOSENKO has reported on KCB organization and personnel assignments? (Aside from ops and special incidents connected with provocation)

Any contradictions between your present knowledge and the information he provided re who was where when? (Aside from GORBATENKO's departure date)

In your opinion, would the KGB give NOSENKO carte blanche to tell the truth re organization, persennel (including photo idens) and procedures? Nould it feel safe enough to permit him to make major lies on this, especially general organization (such as Sluzhba, Directorate of II, etc.)?

What are the specific points you think NOSENKO is lying about re personnel?

You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the 1st (Embassy) Section of the American Department, and GRYAZNOV the deputy, as of 1960. NOSENKO reports KOVSHUK had long been the chief, PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only became deputy after NOSENKO left in January 1962. How do you explain NOSENKO's statement?

What is your opinion about the general information NOSENKO gave on Tourist Department ops, i. e., the totals he reported (about 34 tourist agency owners and employees, about 25 non-American tourists recruited, and a few miscellaneous others), plus about 19 American tourists - practically all already identified, known or useless - and 5 American tourist company personnel?

Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting tourists prior to 1961? Any considered solid or important?

Did you have direct, earlier, knowledge of NOSENKO's career and activity? Had you heard about his trouble with women, the flaphe reports as having occurred in 1954? (The transcript leaves it unclear whether it was your belief that it happened in 1957-53 or whether it was hard fact.)

Could you provide details of the approximate date, location, circumstances under which you met NOSETKO each time?

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Do you know for a fact (or did you hear from XGG personnel) that NOSENKO entered the FGb in 1953? Or is that merely the first year you personally saw or heard about him? Had you ever heard of him before 1953?

Did you ever hear anything about Mosenko's background other than his father, i. e., his GRU service, schooling (especially Institute of Foreign Relations), residences (including dacha), neighbors?

Can you describe the Obzor you saw on the POPOV case, particularly its format and length? (NOSENKO has described it as hard-cardboard covered, only about five inches wide by eight high, and about 20-25 pages long.) Are all obzors produced in this or other standard format?

You have reported that a KGB officer named KOTOV, formerly in Yugoslav ops in Austria, suspected POPOV and was sent in 1958 to Germany on the POPOV investigation. We know of no KOTOV in Vienna in the period concerned. Did you mean Mikhail ZHUKOV? Another? Could you give us more details on KOTOV, such as full name, description, career?

Do you have any knowledge of direct contact between NOSFNKO and PREISFREUND? NOSENKO claims not only to have been a case officer for PREISFREUND, but to have been his close friend, even prior to the time you left Helsinki. Can you comment?

What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958? Would this be likely for Tourist or American Department officer? How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961?

Why, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling" name from Nikolayev, which he used in England trips, to NOSENKO, which he used for Cuba trip and for application for U. S. visa earlier in 1960?

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Materials made available to GOLITSYN listed in chronological order of passing to COLITSYN, with Jates passed.

- Copies of first four substantive cables from Geneva relating circumstances of his contact with us in June 1962, including first meeting with MARK and first meeting with EAGLEY. (2 March 1964)
- Copies of transcripts of all meetings between CIA and NOSENKO in 1962 (3 March 1964)
- Copies of all transcripts of Geneva meetings, January-February 1964. (All passed to GOLITSYN by 13 March 1964)
- Report of biographic information provided prior to hostile interrogation. (17 April 1964)
- Final chronology, with our notations, of NOSENKO's life and KGB career, prepared after hostile interrogation. (Attachment A to 11 May 1964 report) (Passed 11 May 1964)
- 6. Copy of NOSENKO's handwritten notes and documents he brought out with him in 1964. (Passed in mid-April)
- 7. Resume of first week's hostile interrogation.
- NOSENKO's comments on KROTKOV's manuscript "Fear". (Passed in mid-April)
- 9. Complete collection of photo identifications made by NOSENKO to date, with explanatory note re method of notation.
- Questions re NOSENKO for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April). Special questions passed on 15 June and 22 June.
- 11. CHEREPANOV papers, (22 April 1964)
- 12. Information on American personnel named in CHEREPANOV papers and otherwise of interest re Moscow Embassy security (WINTERS, including his ops activity; BOWDEN; LANGELLE; LIEBERMAN; Edward SMITH; WASHENKO; Leonid GRAN). 4 May 1964.

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13. List of questions KROTKOV suggested be put to NOSENKO in order to confirm and clarify info given by KROTKOV.

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14. Copies of two reports prepared on KGB audio technical operations, one prepared on basis of GOLITSYN information in 1962, another based on NOSENKO information 1964.

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- 15. KOZLOV case (ACFOSDICK) 4 May.
- 16. Case summaries: REPNIKOV, SIDOROVICH, AGAFONOV, IZHOOLDIN, RAFALOVICH, REPNIKOV, MARYUTIN (4 and 11 May). JUNG, PRIBYTKOVA (15 June).
- 17. Transcripts and chronology with background sketch on BELITSKIY.
- 18. File summary on FEDOROV aka RAZIN. (11 May and 12 June)
- 19. Charts re NOSENKO CI production (leads). (11 May)
- 20. Chronologies on KOVSHUK, GUK, FOMIN and IVANOV.
- 21. Outline of information on KCB structure and personnel assignments as reported by NOSENKO. (11 May)
- 22. ARTAMONOV case. (November 1963)
- 23. PENKOVSKIY case. (November 1963)
- 24. POPOV case. (November 1963)

25. Answers to special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked of NOSENKO in interrogations in May 1964. Total 113 pages; all questions answered and passed by 12 June.

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