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10 Dec 63

Summary of Osnald Case Prepared for

Discovery of Osnald In Hextoo City Briefing Purposes Circa 10 Dec 63

On 1 October 1963, the CIA Hexico City Station intercepted a telephone call Lee CSWAID made from an unknown location in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, CSWALD was talking to the Embassy guard, CSYMDKOV, who often enswers the phone. CGWAID said he had visited the Exbassy the previous Saturday (23 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had proxised to send a telegram for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladimirovich) KONTKOV. The guard checked with someone else and said that the massage had gone out but no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from a telephone tap center which we operate jointly with the office of the President of Mexico. It is highly secret and not known to Mexican security and law enforcement officials, who have Their own centers By 9 October, the OBWAID telephone conversation of 1 October hal been transcribed and a susmary of it cabled to Washington.

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The cabled report was received in Washington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWAID phoning the Soviet Embassy in Maxico City was probably the Lee OSWAID who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWAID's phone call to the Soviet Embassy; the report went to the FRI, the Department of State (because OSWAID was a U.S. citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine). The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the liklihood that the Lee CSWAID mentioned was probably the former defector. A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Designation and Naturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The some day a long cable went out to Mexico City informing our Station of the background of defector Lee OBVAID and asking for more information. Our Station was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices of the FRI, the Embassy, the Haval Attache, and the Immigration and Maturalization Service. This was done.

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our Mexico City Station very often produces information on U.S.

citizens contacting Soviet bloc cabassies in Mexico City. Frequently the

information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we

have is even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military

personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters

deak requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans

to pass the darogatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government agencies.

We were not informed of what action the FBI and other agencies may have taken at

that time based on our report. Later investigation has confirmed all the details

of his trip, where he stayed, and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the

FBI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now

know, OSWAID left Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report

was put out.

Since this telephone top operation is a joint one with the Mexican exceidency, the Mexicans also had the 1 October intercept on Lee CSWAID, but it experently slumbered in their files until the assessination took place.

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22 November 1963

As soon as the name of Lee CSWAID was mentioned in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 Hovember, CIA file checks were begun and the Hexican station was asked by cable for more information on OSWAID.

Within a week, twenty-seven cabled reports had been sent to the White House, the State Department, and the FBI.

CIA field stations provided many lists of information during the week

m2 after the assassination. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone

taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably

involving CSWAID, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him

also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested

and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really

up to. A host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies

with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these were

soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FRI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The Department of State photographed its entire file on

Consular file on OSWAID which had been publicly given by the Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach invited us to review the FRI's comprehensive report on the case to make sure our sources were not jeopardized and that our information was correctly quoted. We found the report highly interesting and no threat to our security, as long as it was read only by the authorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was handled at Headquarters by a staff usually charged at with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases, and by officers and analysis of our Western Hemisphere Division.

Reports from Next co

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Les (SWAID was the prime suspect, it began re-screening all the written telephone transcripts in its files a covering the Soviet Embassy for the pertinent period. The actual tapes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the normal two weeks wait. Several calls believed to involve CSWAID were discovered as and their

contents called to Mashington, where they were disseminated to the White House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

GHAID's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to him. These calls are summarized below in chronological order. They cover the period from 27 September 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of CSWAID's visit to Haxico City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Hilltary Attache and says he needs a visa to go to Odessa. I'm answering says he should call 15-60-55 and ask for the Consul. Caller asks for the address, and it is given to him.

(There is no special reason for linking this call to CSWAID.)

27 September, 4:05 PM - The Cuben Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate.

Silvia Duran, Hexican national clark of the Cuben Consulate talked to a Soviet official, saying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet Consulate and who told him he would have no problem about it. If a Soviet visa is assured, the Cuban Consulate

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can grant him a transit visa and simply notify Cuban immigration authorities.

The Soviet first asks her to wait, and then she has to explain the whole thing over again to another Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and promines to call her back. Silvia DEAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she herself has moved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embassy bulletin. He asks her to phone (Sargey Sammovich) KURHARGERO (Second Secretary who puts out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuban Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Teresa PROESZA and adds her telephone number.

27 September, 4:26 PM - A Soviet official calls Silvia REAN back and tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Sashington indicating that he had been waiting for visas for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet Union for a long time, but that no answer had come from Washington, adding that the wait was sometimes four or five months. The "American" had shown the Soviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN

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rejoins that they have the same problem; the "American" is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this note. Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the Soviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He converse himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right.

28 September - Silvis DURAN calls the Soviet Embessy from the Cuben

Consulate. She says that she has the American with her again. The Soviet

answering asks her to wait. When another Soviet takes up the phone, Silvia puts

the American on. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers

in English. The American asks him to speak Russian. The American says that he

had been in the Soviet Embessy and spoken with the Consul, and that they had

taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American them

says, somewhat emignatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuben

Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him

to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so.

(In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian.)

As far as our records show, CSWAID did not phone the Soviet or Cuben Embassies again until Tuesday, 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he did not contact the Soviets on that those days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attache in broken
Rushian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September)
and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington,
and he wanted to know if there were snything new. The Soviets ask him to call
snother phone number and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October, 10:45 AM - (This is the phone call in which CSWAID used his true name and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9 October 1963.)

Lee CSWAID called the Soviet Embassy and announced his own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were snything new. He did not remember the name of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Embassy guard CEYETKOV replied: "KOSTIKOV; he is dark." OSWAID replied: "Yes, my

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name is OSWAID." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they hadn't received anything yet. OSWAID asked if they hadn't done anything and the guard replied they had sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet." OSWAID started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet hung up.

3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55. The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off another question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with CSWAID, who is now known to have re-entered the U.S. at Laredo the same day.)

Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet Embassy phones in Mexico City is managed jointly with the office of the President of Mexico, the information on Lee OSWAID also came to the attention of President LOPEZ Mateos after 22 Movember. The next day, 23 Movember, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular caployee Silvia DURAN, a

Mexican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSWAID. The Nexican suthorities had the same idea and she and her husband were arrested on 23 Rovember 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 Rovember 1963.

Silvia's husband, Horacie DERAH Newarro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OBWAID was named as the assassin of President Kennedy, his wife had recognized the name and recalled she had waited on OBWAID when he came to apply for a Cuben transit wise; he remembered she had said be she dealt with the Sowiet Consulate as well to find out whether he had a Sowiet wise. Horacio DURAH recalled his wife had said OBWAID became angry and she had to call out the Cuben Consul, Eusebio AZCUE, to quiet him.

Silvia DERAM told the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with

Cuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations. She

recalled CSWAID well, described him accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban

visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered

his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had phoned the Soviet Embessy about him.

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The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was
to sixt confirm that OSWALD was in Nexico to get a Cuben visa so he could wait
in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed s to the State
Dopartment in Washington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange between
first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet Consulate in
Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union.
CSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as
9 Nov 1963.

Silvia DEMA was assected again on 27 Bounder and beld until 29

Rovember. She told eccentially the same story over main.

Well-placed sources within the Cuben Emberry in Maxim City stated that when filvin DURAN was released from police arrest too first time or 25 November, she was quite placed with horself. The told her collectors the same story set out above, adding only that the Maximum police had threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Survey CHEALD. The resetten within the Cuben Babassy to the news of President Lemmany's death was sentere. In date, there is not credible information in CIA films which would appear to link Lee OSHALD with the Cuben pavernment SECRET.

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The whole question of whether Les (SMID follow secure connection

with the Seviets or Cohene in Maxieo esmost yet be assurped, but cortain

nexts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Bilvin MEM and the

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en the een hand, and as a man not "more" in the Seviet Debaary, so the other. The very symmess of his visits and the phone calls speak against my perret yels. His trip to Maries was not thealf a secret not; he tryraked water his real mass or a close variant of it, livel speaky in Arrican totals, and corresponded with the Seviets through the open mails about it when he get back to the W. His trip to Maries was apparently made necessary because it was the mercent Coben diplomatic installation where

A perplanting aspect of OSNALD's traditioning with the Cutane and

Coviete in Mexico City is his assertion in his call of 26 leguester time no

did not know his address when he was at the Soviet Consulate and came to

the Cutan Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just what ;

is sment, but it abould be remembered that he was talking in insurant, a

insurant he could not manage, soil that when he came to Mexico be was in the

process of neving from New Columns to Taxas. He may not being asserted

in qualities, in Darse, visuaryon it was, and may not have asserted.

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lay hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvia DURAN and wanted to look it up on her card.

A particularly simister aspect of GSVALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mixico City arises from the likilihood that he met with Bowiet Consul Valerly (201-305052)

Vladimirowich KOSTKOW. In his I October phone call to the Soviet Embassy, the guard CHYNKOW suggests that the Consul CSWALD had talked to was KOSTKOW if he was dark. CSWALD seems to agree with this, but the identification is very casual. In his 9 Hovember letter to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, CSWALD gives the name of the man he dealt with as "KOSTIN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. KOSTIKOW is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is known, on the basis of his position, associates, work habits and operational intelligence activity, to be a Soviet KEB officer, and there is reason to believe, on the Department charged with sabotage and assassinations.

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Embassy guard Ivan Ivanovich CEYEDKOV is himself believed to be a KCB
man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and surveillant. But unless some
direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that
CSWAID's dealing with KCB men CHYENKOV and KCSTIKOV was nothing more than a grim
coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence
men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the
visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embassy
are known or suspected intelligence officers. Although it is not usual for a

Embassy, top secret Soviet intelligence documents which set forth Military

Intelligence doctrine state that very important agents can be met in official

installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open

business. Thus, while it is unlikely that OSWALD's contacts with the Soviet

Embassy had a more sinister purpose, it cannot be excluded.

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Some insight on the Cuben attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAH and the involvement of the Cuben Consulate in the CSWALD case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuben President Covaldo DURTICOS and Cuben Ambassador to Mexico Josquin HERMANNEZ Armas on 26 Nov 1963, the day after Silvia DURAH was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DURTICOS phoned the Ambassador from Havena and asked him several questions about a report which the Ambassador had sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAH and the Lee CSWALD case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that CSWALD nerely wanted a visa. The Ambassador did mention the alternation which CSWALD had with Consul AZCUE, and he says that Maxican police bruised Silvia DURAH's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of their questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with OSWALD and she had demied it. President DURTICOS twice asked Ambassador

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EXELUTE shother the Maxima police had asked Silvin DURAN quantions shout "money," and the President apparently wanted to know whether the Maximus thought the Cohene had paid OSMALD money. HERMERI Insisted the Maximus had not affected Silvin DURAN money, and DORYDOOS gave as trying to yet across his point. President DORYDOOS instructed MINISTERS to know an quantioning Silvin DURAN and to phone him back.

At 7:39 PM that evening Anhanceder MEMARIES did call Provident
DOBTICOS back, saying he had questioned "that person" again and she has
nothing new to add. President DOSTICOS returns to the issue of whether
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"TRIMESE persists in misunferstanding DOSTICOS, shows in the negative,
and says: "Absolutely mething was given to her." DOSTICOS seems to give

We do not know for sine what made President DORTICOS press for inferest time about Cuben manay passed to CEMALD, but remore were current in Maxico and syon, we enderstand, in the UEA, thut UEALD had removed the contract to the contract time.

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City with shout \$5,000. Perhaps DORITICOS was trying to learn whether the Kexican police believed that the Cubana had financed CSWAID. In any event, the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the surrest and detention of Silvis DURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.

At 1445 hours on 22 November, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico, Gustav
VIAHOV telephoned and insisted on speaking to Soviet Ambassador to Mexico BAZAROV.

In a conversation concerning news of President Kennedy's assessination, VIAHOV
sold, "I knew he was wounded even before the Americans." Both then laughed.

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