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i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	Summary of Osnald C	ase Prepared for 10 Dec 63
	Discovery of OSWALD in Nexico C	Bitti Dunne Circa 10 Dec (3

On 1 October 1963, the CIA Mexico City Station intercepted a telephone

call Lee CNMALD made from an unknown location in Maxico City to the Soviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, OSWALD was talking to the Embassy guard, OEMEDKOV, who often enswers the phone. OSWALD said he had visited the Embassy the previous Saturday (23 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had promised to send a talegrees for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladimirovich) KCETIKOV. The guard checked with someone else and said that the message had gone out out no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from a telephone tap center which we operate [jointly] with the office of the President of Mexico. It is highly secret and not known to [Mexican] security and law enforcement officials, who have [their own center] By 9 October, the OSWALD telephone conversation of 1 October had been transcribed and a suzzary of it cabled to Washington.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

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The called report was received in Mashington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWAID phoning the Bowiet Embasay in Maxico City was probably the Lee OSWAID who had defected to the Sowiet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Maxico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWAID's phone call to the Sowiet Embassy; the report went to the FBI, the Department of State (because OSWAID was a U.S. citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine). The cabled report to these

agencies highlighted the liklihood that the Lee OSWALD sentioned was probably the

former defector. A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the

Insigration and Naturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The

same day a long cable went out to Maxico City informing our Station of the

background of defector Lee OSWAID and asking for more information. Our Station

was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices

of the FBI, the Exbassy, the Naval Attache, and the Insigration and Naturalization

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Service. This was done.

Our Mexico City Station very often produces information on U.S.

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citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the

information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we

have a even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military

personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters

desk requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans

to pass the derogatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government egencies.

We were not informed of what action the FBI and other egencies may have taken at

that time based on our report. Later investigation has confirmed all the details

of his trip, where he stayed, and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the

FBI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now

know, OSWALD left Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report

was put out.

(Since this telephone tap operation is a joint one with the residen

Residency, the Hend cans also had the 1 October Intercept on Lee CSMALD, but it a

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spearently slumbered in their files until the assarsination took place.

22 November 1963

As soon as the name of Lee OSWAID was mentioned in connection with the

assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November, CIA file checks were begun

and the Maxican station was asked by cable for more information on OSWALD.

Within a week, twenty-seven cabled reports had been sent to the white House, the

CIA field stations provided many litts of information during the week

State Department, and the FBI.

af after the assassination. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone

taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably

involving OSWAID, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him

also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested

and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really

up to. A host of fabricators, some anonymous, boxbarded overseas embassies

with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these were

soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FBI,

which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the

investigation. The Department of State photographed its entire file on

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OBMALD and passed them to us, and the FBI gave us a copy of the Soviet

Consular file on OSHAID which had been publicly given by the Soviet Andessador

to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy Attorney General

Katzenbech invited us to review the FBI's comprehensive report on the case to

make sure our sources were not jeoperdized and that our information was correctly

quoted. We found the report highly interesting and no threat to our security, as

long as it was read only by the suthorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was handled

at Headquarters by a staff usually charged me with investigation and analysis of

the most important security cases, and by officers and analysts of our Western

Herisphere Division.

Reports from Mexico

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Lee OSWAID was the prime

suspect, it began re-acreening all the written telephone transcripts in its

files a covering the Soviet Enbassy for the pertinent period. The actual tapes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the normal two weeks

wait. Several calls believed to involve OSWALD were discovered as and their

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contents cabled to Washington, where they were disseminated to the white

House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

OSHALD's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but

similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to bin. These

calls are summarized below in chronological order. They cover the period from 27 September 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of CSWALD's visit to Mexico

City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Military Attache and says he needs a visa to go to Odessa. Man answering says he should call 15-60-55 and esk for the Consul. Caller asks for the address, and it is given to him.

(There is no special reason for linking this call to OSWAID.)

27 September, 4:05 PM - The Cuban Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate.

Silvia Duran, Mexican national clerk of the Cuban Consulate talked to a Soviet

official, saying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She

wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet Consulate and who told him he would

have no problem about it. If a Soviet visa is assured, the Cuban Consulate

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can grant him a trensit vice and simply notify Cuben immigration authorities.

The Soviet first asks her to wait, and then she has to explain the whole thing

over egain to another Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and

promises to call her back. Silvia DARAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she barself has noved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embassy

bulletin. He asks her to phone (Sergey Semenovich) KINHAREIKO (Second Secretary who puts out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuban

Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Teresa PROENZA and

adds her telephone number.

27 September, 4:26 FM - A Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN back and

tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and shown them a

letter from the Boviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been

waiting for visas for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet Union for a long

time, but that no answer had come from Washington, adding that the wait was

sometimes four or five months. The "American" had shown the Soviets a letter

showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that

the Cubens could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN

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rejoins that they have the same problem; the "American" is still at the

Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet

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visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa

to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on

this note. Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the

Soviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He excuses himself for

the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right.

28 September - Silvia DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy from the Cuben

Consulate. She says that she has the American with her egain. The Soviet

answering eaks her to wait. When another Sovist takes up the phone, Silvie puts

the American ca. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers

in English. The American asks him to speak Russian. The American says that he

had been in the Soviet Enbassy and spoken with the Consul, and that they had

taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American then

says, somewhat enignatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban

Enbassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him

to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so.

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(In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian.)

As far as our records show, OSWALD did not phone the Soviet or Cuben

Enhessies again until Tuesday, 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a

Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he did not contact the Soviets on this those days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attache in broken

Russian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September)

and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington,

and he wanted to know if there were anything new. The Soviets ask him to call

enother phone number and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October, 10:45 AM - (This is-the-phone call in which OSWAID used his

true name and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9 October 1963.)

Lee OSWAID called the Soviet Exbassy and announced his own name, saying he had

visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they

would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were snything

new. He did not remember the name of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Embessy

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guard OFYFIKOV replied: "KOSTIKOV; he is dark." OFWALD replied: "Yes, my

name is OSWAID." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they hadn't received anything yet. OSWALD asked if they hadn't done anything and the guard replied they had sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet." CSWALD started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet hung up. 3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55. The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off enother question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with OSWALD, who is now known to have re-entered the U.S. at Laredo the same day.)

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Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet Inbessy phones in Mexico City is is an aged jointly with the office of the President of Mexico, the information on Lee OSWAID also came to the attention of President LOPEZ Mateos after 22 November. The next day, 23 November, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicons noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular employee Silvia DURAN, a 13-00000

Mexican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSVALD. The Mexican authorities had the same idea and she and her husband were errested on 23 November 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 November 1963. Silvia's husbend, Horacio DURAN Nevarro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OSVAID was need as the assessin of President Kennedy, his vife had recognized the name end recalled she had vaited on OSWAID then he cans to apply for a Cuben transit visa; he represented she had said by she dealt with the Soviet Consulate as well to find out whether he had a Soviet visa. Horacio DURAN recalled his wife had said (SWALD became anery and she had to call out the Cuban Consul, Eusebio AZCUE, to quiet him.

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Silvia DURAH told the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with Cuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations. She recalled OSWALD well, described him accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered his tiff with the Consul. She admitted also had phoned the Soviet Embassy about him.

The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was

to star confirm that OSVAID was in Mexico to get a Cuber vise so he could wait

in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed a to the State

Department in Mashington by the Soviet Exbassy confirms a long exchange between

first, Mrs. Marina OSWAID, and later her husband, and the Soviet Consulate in

Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union.

CSWAID was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as

9 Nov 1963.

Silvis DERA was arrested again on 27 Bovenber and bolk satil 29

loverbor. She told eccenticily the same story over sain.

Woll-placed sources within the Coben Makenay in Desired Tity states

that when Silvia DURAS was relevand from police arread the distance for on the

25 Bovender, she was guite planed with bornelf. The told har collempted

the ence story set out above, sking only that the Merdican police led

throutened to extradite her to the United States to confront Les Sarroy


OSNALD. The reaction within the OnDen Babasey to the news of Prosident

Rennedy's Seath was senders. To date, there is not anydible information in

CIA files which would appear to link Los OGWALD with the Other Covernment SFREFT

or the Caban intelligence service.


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with the Soviete of Cubers in Maxico cannot yet be servance, but curacia

parts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Silvia DEMA and the

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Sevier Commise officials spoke of him as a man with "mo francia in tobar"

on the east hand, and as a son not "incer" in the lawis; Makay, as the

other. The very spennes of his visits and the pines while spent against way

secret rale. His trip to Mexico was not itself a secret act; in travelar

ender his real note or a close variant of 12, 11984 evenly is Wexisen

botels, and corresponded with the Soviets through the open sails about

it ween be get back to the CB. His trip to Healer was approvally saws

measury because it was the nearest Caban diplementic impublication phere

be could apply for a visa.

A perplexing aspect of OSMALD's traffishing with the Chinas and

Eovista in Manice City is his essertion in his call of 25 contextar tent and

did not know his address about he was at the Soviet Consulate and come to

the Cubes Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just was

he ment, but it should be remembered that he was talking in Andrian, a

language he could not manyo, and that when he came to Merica as was in the

process of noving from Des Orleans to Texas. He say not best manarized

he cars shares in terms, where is say are apprent to a provide the

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lay hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvia DURAN and wanted to look it up on her card. A particularly simister aspect of OSWALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mexico City arises from the likihood that he met with Soviet Consul Valeriy (201-305052) In his 1 October phone call to the Soviet Rebassy, the Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. guard OBYEIKOV suggests that the Consul OSWALD had talked to was KOSTIKOV 1f he was dark. OSWALD seems to agree with this, but the identification is very casual. In his 9 November letter to the Soviet Consulate in Mashington, OSWALD gives the neme of the ran he dealt with as "KOSTIN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Enhansy in Mexico City. KCSTIKOV is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is known, on the bests of his position, associates, work habits and operational intelligence activity, to be a Soviet KGB officer, and there is reason to believe, on the basis of FBI information, that be works for Department 13 of the KGB, the Department charged with sabotage and essassinations.

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•	Embassy guard Ivan Ivanovich OSYEDKOV is himself balieved to be a KGB
	man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and surveillent. But unless some
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· · · · ·	direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that
· · · ·	CSWALD's dealing with KGB men OBYELKOV and KOSTIKOV was nothing more than a grim
	coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence
	connumence, a connumence due in part to the Soviet month of proving interrigence
•	
• •	men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the
	visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embassy
· •	
· .	ere known or suspected intelligence officers. Although it is not usual for a
· .	
·.	KOB egent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet
	Enbassy, top secret Soviet intelligence documents which set forth Military
·	
	Intelligence doctrine state that very important agents can be met in official
	installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open
· · ·	THE ATTACK AND AND AND TOX ADDIT TO CONTROL DOTA DOTA DOTA DOTA OF AND ADDITION
	business. Thus, while it is unlikely that OSWALD's contacts with the Soviet
	Embussy had a more sinister purpose, it cannot be excluded.

Some insight on the Cuben attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the involvement of the Cubsa Consulate in the OSWALD case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuban President Osvaldo DORTICOS and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Josquin HERMANNEZ Armes on 25 Nov 1963, the day after Silvia DURAN was released from her first errest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DCRTICOS phoned the Ambessador from Hevana and asked him several questions about a report which the Arbassador had sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the Lee CSWALD case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that OBVAID merely wanted a visa. The Asbassador did mention the altercation which OSWALD had with Consul AZCUE, and he says that Mexican police bruised Silvia DURAN's arcs a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of their questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with OSWALD and she had denied it. President DCRTICOS twice asked Ambessedor

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BEALTER whether the Maxicas police had asked filvis SSAI questions

about "money," and the President experently wanted to how whiter the

Fazicans throught the Cuhans had paid CONALD money. EPERLAND instatus

the Maricane had not offered Silvia DURAN money, and DURTIONS gave

us trying to put corves his point. President DCRIICCS instructed

EZHIANERZ to know on questioning Silvin DUHAN and to phone his back.

At 7:39 PM that evening Anhenender BEREARDEZ did call President

DOBTICOS back, saying he had quastiseed "that person" a sin and sin bas

nothing new to edd. President DOBTICOS returns to the issue of whether

"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the -

Compulste had given money to the manda" that American." But American

SERNAMER persists in misunferstanding DORTICOS, ancres in the relative,

and says: "Absolutely nothing was given to her." DONTION seems to give

up, and the convertion disc sut either a few sum galantic severices

We do not know for same what made Provident DORTHONS press for information about Cuban manoy passed to OSWALD, but remars were current in Maxico

and group, we understand, in the U.A. that What we want to prove

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City with about \$5,000. Perhaps DORTICOS was trying to learn whether the

Kexican police believed that the Cubana had financed OSWAID. In any event,

in the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the

arrest and detention of Silvia DURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.

At 1445 hours on 22 November, the Yugoslav Anhassador to Mexico, Gustav

VLAHOV telephoned and insisted on speaking to Soviet Ambassador to Mexico BAZAROV.

In a conversation concerning news of President Kennedy's assassination, VIAHOV

said, "I lnew be was wounded even before the Americans." Both then Laughed.

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