35 - 539

23 November 1963

3

Disposition - This document was denied. The information was received from a foreign liaison service and the message contains cryptonyms, Agency unit designations, information confirming the existence of an Agency station in a foreign country and filing instructions internal to the Agency. This denial was made under the authority of exemptions (b) (1), (b) (2) and (b) (3).

	CLASSIFIED ME	SSAGE AND	
	33 (SECRE	T)	ROUTING FR PP 4 FS
TO: DIRECTOR		2 3	10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FROM: MONTEVIDEO			
ACTION: (IW)			
DC1, D/DC1, DDP, AD CA/PROP, C1, C1/OPS F1/INT 6, WH 9, SR VR.			
		TDCs-3	/565,829
SECRET 232010Z		IN 67186 23 N	NOV 63 21 ØØZ
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INTEL Of	tel Cable Requile	Thiles	Lection for Cuban)
SUPDATA: SOURCE	AVALANCHE-6. WITH	HIS USUAL INACC	CURACY, AVCANE-1)
HAD ADVISED THE STA	TION THAT THE CUBAN	EMBASSY HAD RE	QUESTED
POLICE PROTECTION B	EFORE THE SHOOTING.	HOWEVER,	
AVALANCHE 6 CHECKED	THE OFFICIAL LOG 1		
IT OCCURRED AN HOUR FILED: 232Ø1ØZ	AFTER SHOOTING ANN DOI: 22 NOVEMBER	1963	
PADA: (URUGUAY, MON	TEVIDEO, 23 NOVEMBE	R. 63	PDET CL BY 0/2208
SUBJECT: CUBAN PRECA	AUTIONS FOLLOWING A	SSASSINATION OF	PRESIDENT
KENNEDY APPR: 2 HUM-24 SOURCE: (MONTEVIDEO	POLICE OFFICIAL (B)	
IW COMMENT:	Document Nu	35 mber 3539	100 145 3 12 144 1997, CARE
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WH/REG 8			TDCS PRECEDENCE
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X-RIE, COPY	(SECRE	L BACLUDED	GROUP : PROM AUTOMATIC GRADING AND ABBIPIGATION
REPROD	OUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSU	ING OFFICE IS PROHIB	ITED. Copy No.

CRAVIN DRMATION REP(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized-person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS SECRET When Filled In URUGUAY COUNTRY REPORT NO. 24 NOVEMBER 1963 SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION DATE DISTR. OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY PRECEDENCE ROUT INE 22 NOVEMBER 1963 DATE OF REFERENCES in 67186 INFO. uruguay, montevideo (23 november 1963) PLACE & DATE ACQ. APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2414 THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B). (CUBAN INTELLIGENCE (RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/ CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS, THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING TO STONE THE EMBASSY (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES KENNEDYS ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT CONDUCTED ON 6 APR 1976 E/82IMPDET CL BY 0/2208 APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME). THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD Y CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

INFORMATION REPORT

Document Number 539

STATE/INH DIA ARMY/ACSI HAVY AIR LES SECORT NEAT NIC -AID USIA COL CORE OCR ORRE XXXX

for FOIA Review on

(201-289248)(15-20)

1K obsolete previous editions.

(SECRET)

APR 1976

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

(NO FOREIGH DISSEM)

TDCS-3/565,829

6 7186

PAGE

MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDED HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS

CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE (3000 PERSONS)
MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF
22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).

3. (FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO.)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

cation — dissemination controls

2

Disposition – This document was denied. The document is a memo which recites the speculative thinking of an Agency officer on the assassination of President Kennedy. The paper deals with a possible explanation of the assassination. He treats the problem experimentally with a thesis which is not born out by facts available then or later developed. The thinking expressed was imaginative but not definitive. No decision was based on this paper: It appears clearly to be the type of documents contemplated for exemption under subsection (b) (5). The document also relates information received from a foreign liaison service. It contains information from and about a sensitive source. The document also identifies Agency officers and components and contains internal Agency filing instructions. This denial was made under the authority of exemptions (b) (1), (b) (2), (b) (3) and (b) (5).

To:

From:

Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

Chief, (SR/CI)

Subject: Cable from Chief, SR Division, re Possible KGB role in Kennedy

1. The following is the text of a cable from Chief, SR Division, sent via closed channel from Frankfurt at 2316Z on 23 November, for the attention of Mr. Angleton:

- "1. I desire that you consider these reactions to the Kennedy assassination:
 - as heard in London attributed the assassination to "rightwing elements." Only as the true identity of the believed assassin became known did Moscow begin to complain that U.S. reactionaries were using Oswald as a pawn.
 - b. Should not the assignment of 13th Dept. officers to the KGB residency in the United Nations in New York be considered in a new light?
 - c. (I discovered from Arthur Martin (of MI-5) during our long and exceptionally valuable discussions, that one of Harold Wilson's principal scientific advisors is Captain Ian Maxwell, who has a long Soviet intelligence background. This may shed new light on AELADLE's report /I.e., that Harold Wilson may be a Soviet agent?)
- 2. Putting it baldly, was Oswald, unwittingly or wittingly, part of a plot to murder President Kennedy in Dallas as an attempt to further exacerbate sectional strife and render the U.S. Government less capable of dealing with Soviet initiatives over the next year? If AELADLE's views on Wilson and the information noted in paragraph 1c above have any substance (and they cannot be ignored), this suggests that we can expect major Soviet pressures over the next several months, for which the Soviets have made careful, long-range preparations."
- 2. The above reference to 13th Dept. officers in New York refers to the presence, reported by an FBI penetration of the KGB locally, in New York or Washington of one or two known officers of the 13th Department of the 1st Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the KGB. This department is charged with "liquid affairs," sabotage and assassination. One of the 13th Dept. officers,

Document Number 337

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RECORD COPY

23 Nov 63

CONDUCTED ON 1 6 APR 1975

E/82 MPDET CL BY 0/220

REVIEWED BY FBUJFK TASK FORCE
ON 9-13-95-16-1

THELEASE IN FULL

A PELEASE IN PART

☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Yes

by the way, met clandestinely with a Soviet "exchange student" from a Pennsylvania university during the school year 1962-63, which suggests that the Soviet student is also a 13th Dept. officer or agent. Perhaps significantly, his course of studies was in food chemistry!

- 3. You will note that Mr. Murphy's comments come without benefit of the traces we passed to you earlier today, showing that Oswald had contact with a 13th Dept. representative in Mexico City.
- 4. (Another recently-arrived cable, being sent to the Director tonight, suggests that Oswald's business with the Soviet Consul was connected with his own visa to the USSR and Cuba (in transit) and may, therefore, have been really rather than ostensibly innocent.

(T. H. BAGLEY)