JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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COMMENTS: INC 3 MEMO, LIST, 329 OF 344 PAGES NAR

2 - J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

July 10, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9) mam

RLM

REC-88 62-116395-38

3 JUL 21 1975

ENCLOSURE

Returned by O'Connor 7/15/75

Delivered to Comm 7/15/75

PLM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : The Director

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED GMB 6-22-94

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

6-24-94
Classified by SP8 MAC/KSR
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

There is no need for a personal discussion.
H

~~Classified by 13~~
~~Exempt from CDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

SECRET

possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Re Cassius Tulcea, Bureau file (S) 105-64024) (S)

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES (S)

The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that Colonel Tenorio, Chief of Police, Manila, was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source (S) of CIA. This information was given to the Legal Attache by Colonel John B. Stanley, G2 Head in Japan. According to Stanley, (S) CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H." (Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Hong Kong and Manila, Philippines")

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

During the period October 20-25, 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a lecture given by John B. Corbett of CIA. Subsequent to the (S) briefing, General Millard Young of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by Corbett. He was particularly critical of (S) Corbett's reluctance to furnish certain information, using the (S) excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General Young stated that the position taken by Corbett was only an (S) excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA.

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, "Joint Strategic Planning Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October 20-25, 1958")

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of [CIA in Cuba.] This could (S) be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States.

42. [MIKHAIL N. KOSTYUK] (S)

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. The individual involved was [Dr. William Randolph Lovelace II,] a well-known expert in the field of (S) (S) [medical] research as it applied to [space flying. Lovelace] was (S) also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. In April, [1959, Lovelace] was preparing (S) to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to [Lovelace] concerning (S) his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us. [(Mikhail N. Kostyuk,] Bureau file [105-69694)] (S)

43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959")

44. "TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock," which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

On February 7, 1962, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with Edwards on February 26, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on Karlow over an extended period. (S) Edwards explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27, 1962, "Unknown Subject; KGB Agent Known as 'Sasha'") (S)

56. ISAAC MONCARZ (S)

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau file 105-99947) (S)

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES (S)

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, Sam Giancana. (S)

The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, "Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memorandum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58. ALWIN ODIO TAMAYO (S)

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962, "Alwin Odio Tamayo") (S)

59. THELMA KING (S)

On April 23, 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting Panamanian national. We (S) immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, "Thelma King") (S)

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national. Interrogation of Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations With CIA")

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED GMB 5-31-94 (SP8 MAC/GCL) 6-2-94

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (X)

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that (X) [we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum NAME to NAME, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source] [used in an intercept operation between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC] should be (S) turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [of Venezuela.] (S) [Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau.] (X) The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants,] (X) NAME noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time NAME met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [concerning the CPC] (X) and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.] (X) We instructed NAME to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [through informant sources] to obtain needed information regarding security (X) matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound. 6-2-94

Classified by SP8 MAC/GCL
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
GMB 5/31/94 (SP8 MAC/GCL-64/94-JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (S)

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that (S) [we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source] [used in an intercept operation between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC] (S) should be turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [of Venezuela.] (S) [Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau.] (S) The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants,] (S) the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [concerning the CPC] (S) and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.] (S) We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [through informant sources] (S) to obtain needed information regarding security matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound.

Classified by SP8 MAC/GCL
Declassify on: OADR JFK
6/2/94

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HCF:bsf/mst
(5) mst

~~SECRET~~

WCS