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ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM : DIRNSA
TO : DOD GC

TITLE :
PENDING CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS

DATE : 01/05/78
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SUBJECTS :
INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY NSA RELATING TO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755Serial: N0015
5 January 1978~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DEANNE SIEMER, GENERAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Pending Congressional Requests

- REFERENCES:
- (a) 15 December 1977 letter from Senator George McGovern to Secretary of Defense
 - (b) Undated letter received on 20 December 1977 from Congressman Louis Stokes to Director, NSA
 - (c) 16 December 1977 letter from Mr. Ira Nordlicht to the Honorable Deanne Siemer

1. Referenced letters iterating requests for information from the National Security Agency present two common issues: namely, whether signals intelligence information is to be provided to Congressional Committees which exercise no traditional oversight over intelligence matters; and, if it is to be provided, how it is to be done. NSA Charter legislation, now in draft form, would obligate the Director to keep the Committees of the Congress, having jurisdiction over the Agency, fully and currently informed of the Agency's activities. Provision of information to other committees would be responsive to policy developed within the community.

2. We anticipate that requests for information, as illustrated by the three referenced letters, will continue to increase and can present difficulties in maintaining good relations with the Congress. While this Agency has been fully responsive to the needs of the Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees, we have treated requests for information by other committees on a purely case-by-case basis. Several times during the past two years, Committees of the Congress which do not have jurisdiction for intelligence oversight have approached NSA directly for foreign signals intelligence information. In each case it has been our understanding that the SIGINT information NSA has provided to the requesting committee is being used as background information in assisting that committee in formulating U.S. policy matters. On these infrequent occasions, NSA has responded directly to the requesting committee providing either access to SIGINT product or briefings, as required.

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3. Regarding these three specific requests, inclosed for your information is a summary of NSA's contacts with Senator McGovern's Subcommittee on International Operations. As indicated in the summary and as discussed previously with Mr. Andrews of your staff, we have not shown nor discussed any material with Senator McGovern's staff representative pending the drafting of an approved memorandum of understanding by your office and the execution of such an MOU between the Executive Branch and the Senator.

4. In his letter received by NSA on 20 December, Representative Louis Stokes, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, requested certain information from NSA relating to the Cuban intelligence network during the period 1959 - 1964. Chairman Stokes also certified that access to any NSA material would be restricted to those staff members with a TOP SECRET security clearance; access to NSA material, of course, requires indoctrination for SI as well. No response has been made to Chairman Stokes' correspondence pending resolution of how NSA should deal with non-oversight committees. Once that decision is made, we recommend that any SIGINT information selected for the Select Committee on Assassinations be provided only by the DoD or DCI as part of a larger submission of data and that the SIGINT be properly sanitized.

5. Mr. Ira Nordlicht's 16 December letter to you requested information from NSA on the flow of oil to South Africa and Rhodesia. At the time of his initial telephone call, Mr. Nordlicht had a TOP SECRET clearance. It is our understanding that he has since been indoctrinated for SI/TK by DIA. While any SIGINT pertinent to Mr. Nordlicht's request may contain unique information, it must be emphasized that SIGINT alone may be incomplete or misleading unless it is examined in the context of all-source intelligence information. In this instance, after the execution of a suitable MOU, we recommend the requested information be furnished by the DCI combining the SIGINT with other materials available to him. You may recall that earlier this year the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy requested and was provided information on Arab foreign investments and the lifting and sale of Saudi and Iranian oil. This is the information which was provided specifically to Mr. Jerome Levinson, then counsel of the Subcommittee, and which subsequently formed the basis for a 20 June 1977 letter from Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Subcommittee, to the Secretary of State citing "...a substantial discrepancy between CIA and NSA estimates of Saudi crude oil exports in the first quarter of 1977." This charge was repeated

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by Mr. Levinson in an article by Seymour M. Hersh appearing in the New York Times of December 25, 1977. Mr. Nordlicht stated his present request is not related to the previous inquiry.

6. The lack of an MOU or other agreed procedure for dealing with requests for SIGINT from other than the three traditional oversight committees mentioned above has severely hampered NSA's ability to be responsive to the Congress. We urgently recommend that an agreed procedure be developed between the Executive and Legislative Branches which would set forth the terms and conditions on which sensitive cryptologic or other intelligence information would be provided to the non-oversight committees. In the absence of such an agreement with both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, we cannot respond to these queries. We also recommend that your office so advise Congressman Stokes and Mr. Nordlicht and also determine a proper response to Senator McGovern consistent with the President's instructions.



B. R. INMAN
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Incl:
a/s

Copy Furnished:
Col. Stephen Harrick
OASD (LA)

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not necessary for the file

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SUMMARY OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
DISCUSSIONS WITH NSA
MAY - NOV 1977

On 6 May 1977, Senator George McGovern, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to NSA informing the Agency of the Subcommittee's pending investigation into matters relating to (1) the activities of intelligence agencies of foreign nations in the U.S. and foreign-sponsored surveillance, harassment or intimidation of private persons, and (2) efforts by foreign interests to influence official U.S. Government policy. We understand that a similar letter was sent to the Secretary on 15 June.

Since that time, Mr. Michael Glennon, Legal Counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited NSA on 15 June to explain in more detail the scope of the Committee's investigation of item (1) above: (a) whether intelligence agencies of foreign nations are engaging in harassment, intimidation and surveillance of foreign nationals here in the U.S.; (b) against whom these activities are directed; (c) who is performing these activities on behalf of the intelligence agencies; (d) how often it occurs and what form it takes; (e) where these activities are conducted; and (f) to what extent U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies may be "cooperating" with or "acquiescing" in this activity. This information will, according to Mr. Glennon, help the Committee evaluate the extent to which intelligence agencies of foreign nations can conclude that their activities are condoned. He stated that it was his intention to talk also with the FBI, DIA, and CIA, and we understand he has done so.

NSA made no substantive contribution during this visit since Mr. Glennon did not hold an SI clearance.

On 14 September 1977, Mr. Glennon requested by secure telephone that NSA brief him on information NSA may have

44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

Classified by DFRNSA/CROSS (NSA/CSSM 123-2)
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

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Mr. Glennon did not ask for information on efforts by foreign interests to influence U.S. Government policy at this time and no search was made for SIGINT on this aspect of the Subcommittee's investigation.

The Director, NSA, reviewed these reports on 17 November and said they were not to be shown to or discussed with Mr. Glennon until the memorandum of understanding between the Executive branch and Senator McGovern on behalf of the Subcommittee on International Operations is executed. Mr. Glennon was so advised in late November and again in early December.

Although the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been conducting a similar investigation since January 1977, they have focused primarily on KCIA activities. None of the product records pertaining to Mr. Glennon's request have been provided the SSCI.

44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

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
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U1	D4
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M/R: a. On 17 May 1977, the Director proposed in a memorandum to the DCI that the DCI assume responsibility for acting as the focal point for requests for intelligence information from any Committee of the Congress which does not have direct oversight responsibilities. This proposal included the recommendation that the channel of communications for such requests should be through a designated individual on the IC Staff and that responses to the Congress should flow back through the same person, providing the DCI, on behalf of the President, the opportunity to review what intelligence information is made available to the Congress. The DCI has never responded to this memorandum.

b. Instant memo recommends that an agreed procedure be developed between the Executive and Legislative Branches which would set forth the terms and conditions on which sensitive cryptologic or other intelligence information would be provided to the non-oversight committees. It also recommends OSD GC assume action on R/S 5507 and provides background information on two Congressional requests (references a and c) for SIGINT information now pending in OSD.

c. Deadline on R/S 5507 response to Ms. Siemer extended to 4 January per Col. Steve Harrick, ATSD(LA), and Mr. Bob Andrews, OSD(GC).

d. Mr. Yeates, Exec DDO, and Mr. Brady, GC, concur. Classification reviewed by Mr. Michael Levin, D4.


JULIA WETZEL, U2, 3161s, 4 Jan 78, bj


LAO