

16/17

7/26/18

Date:10/07/93

Page:1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R772

U/I 2/98

SEE ATTACHED DOCS

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DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : CIA  
FROM : CIA  
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM, ATTN: MR. BARONTITLE :  
LETTER W/ATTACHMENTSDATE : 08/15/75  
PAGES : 53SUBJECTS :  
SANITIZED COPIES OF 21 DOCUMENTS FROM VOL I - IV OF THE  
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BOX 408-79-----  
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/2376

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

R 772 16211  
408-79

15 August 1975

SSCI BOX # 408-79

Mr. William G. Miller  
Staff Director  
Select Committee To Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect To Intelligence  
Activities  
Washington, D. C.


Attn: Mr. Frederick Baron

Dear Mr. Miller:

As you requested, attached are sanitized copies of  
21 documents from Volumes I through IV of the AMLASH/1  
file.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994  
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
AS SANITIZED  
(1)(B) (1)(C) 24 Mar 94

Sincerely,



Seymour Bolten  
Assistant to the Director

Attachments:

1. HKH-1385, dtd 30 Nov 56
2. TDCSDB-3/650,097 dtd 2 May 62
3. ~~Wellsink~~ 1609 (In 39865), dtd 4 Aug 62
4. Paris 2629 (In 47183), dtd 17 Aug 62
5. Director 30778, dtd 18 Aug 62
6. Summary Contacts AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1, dtd Sep 62
7. Madrid 7818, dtd 29 Jan 63
8. Summary Info Persons in State Memo, dtd 3 Sep 63
9. Porto Alegre 0704 (In 15210), dtd 17 Sep 63
10. Paris 1006 (In 38361), dtd 11 Oct 63
11. London 5224, dtd 15 Oct 63
12. ~~Copenhagen~~ 3399 (In 50855), dtd 30 Oct 63
13. Memo..Record AMLASH/1 Mtg, Paris, 29 Oct 63, dtd 13 Nov 63
14. Contact Plan C/SAS Mtg AMLASH/1 in Paris, undated
15. Cover for C/SAS for AMLASH/1 Mtg in Paris, undated
16. Scenario for C/SAS Mtg with AMLASH/1 in Paris, undated
17. Fall Back Position re AMLASH/1, undated
18. Memo..Record Plans for AMLASH/1 Contact, dtd 19 Nov 63
19. Contact Report AMLASH/1, 22 Nov 63 in Paris, dtd 25 Nov 63
20. Director 87980, dtd 18 Dec 63
21. JMWAVE 8660 (In 75929), dtd 7 Dec 63

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to  
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exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date impossible to Determine



2/11

3 AUG 62

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DIRECTOR

(C) (S) (U) (K) (R) 14-1

C/TFW 5 (C/TFW TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2215, 3 AUG)

DD/P, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/WE 2, S/C 2

AUG 4 0301Z 62 1

PRIORITY

IN 39365

PPITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE HELS 1609

REF (HEL) 1584

(IN 38396) 4

(HEL) 1610

(IN 39589)

FPOY FALLUCCI

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24 Mar 94

1. IN LENGTHY MTGS 1 AND 2 AUG WITH CASE OFFICER AND AMVHIP/1,

IDEA COLLECTIVE EFFORT GIVES BEST RESULTS BUT ALREADY

INCOME FROM WITHIN HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE

RODRIGUEZ, SOV AND

2. TWO PRINCIPAL CONCERNS SUBJ ARE SOV EXPLOITATION CUEA FOR CUN ENDS  
LATIN AMERICA AND GROWING CONSOLIDATION CASTRO POSITION CUBAN PEOPLE THEN  
" EDUCATION" OF YOUTH AND MASSIVE PROPAGANDA EFFORT ON PEOPLE. ALSO  
FEARS IN EVENT AGGRESSIVE ANTI- REGIME ACTION SERIOUSLY THREATENING ITS  
POSITION. U.S. WILL YIELD EXTREME SOV PRESSURE CUBAN STATUS QUA.  
FEELS ANY EFFORT MUST COME SOON IF TO BE SUCCESS. ALSO RELUCTANTLY

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[REDACTED]

3. DURING MTGS SUBJ EXTREMELY INTENSE AND OBVIOUSLY UNDER HIGH EMOTION-

L STRAIN. APPEARS CAPABLE PASH VIOLENT ACTIONS UNDER PROVOCATION,

FPUPTATION, OR TENSE SITUATION. CONSIDER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] YET. CONTEMPLATED SUICIDE LAST YEAR. TALKS WENT WELL BUT

OBVIOUS [REDACTED] PRESENT [REDACTED] PROBLEMS IN ANY SITUATION

STATE REPEATEDLY HE NOT TYPE SIT TIGHT BUT PREFER VIOLENT ACTION. SAID

HE AGREED WITH ARGUMENT MUST COLLECT INFO, COORDINATE, ETC., BEFORE HIS

TYPE ACTION PAYS, BUT NOT CONVINCED HE BUYS IT. SUBJ SHOW STRAIN NOT

BEING ABLE TRUST ANYONE. STATED ANYWHIP HIS ONLY TRUE CONFIDANT ANYWHIP

DID GOOD JOB CONVINCING SUBJ HE SAFELY TALK ↑. SUBJ COMPLETELY STRAIGHT

[REDACTED] ONLY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] U.S. HE PROMISED MAX SECURITY THIS AREA.

4. NO DISCUSSIONS YET ANY FINANCIAL AID OR OTHER COMMITMENTS.

CASE OFFICER

5. SUBJ MOST WILLING BE DEBRIEFED ALL FIELDS. A FEELS THIS AND FUTURE HANDLING BEST DONE BY U.S. SPANISH SPEAKING C/O WHO INTIMATELY FAMILIAR CUBAN SCENE AND LATIN PERSONALITY. TYPE FELT MOST EFFECTIVE WITH SUBJ IS IDEN. ALSO RECOMMEND PolyGRAPH BEFORE USING SUBJ IF COMPATIBLE HIS PERSONALITY. FEEL PARI BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR ABOVE.

6. SUBJ PLANS REMAIN [REDACTED] 14-1 FESTIVAL FOR COVER SAKE, AIR TRAVEL STCC 7 AUG FOR TWO DAYS, AIR TO PRAGUE FOR TWO DAYS RECOVER LUGGAGE, AIR PARI ABOUT 14 AUG WHERE WILL SPEND AT LEAST ONE WEEK. THIS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUBJ ALSO CONTEMPLATES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GETTING NAME FROM ANYWHIP.

7. HAVING DECIDED RETURN CUBA SUBJ ANXIOUS SPEND MINIMUM TIME EUROPE.

AUG 1975 CUBA WILL ENROLL OFFICER REFRESHER COURSE TO RENEW ARMY CONTACTS

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AND ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH SOME FOLLOWING THESE AND GOVT CIRCLES. <sup>CASE OFFICER</sup>  
 8. AMWHIP PRECEDING SUBJ STOC FOR HANDHOLDING. FEEL ADVISABLE A ALSO  
 PRESENT STOC AMWHIP AND CHANNEL CIA IF NEEDED. REMAINING <sup>(14-1)</sup> ~~WALS~~  
 AS CONTACT IF NEEDED BY SUBJ, THEN FOLLOW HIM STOC 7 AUG. MAKING PARI  
 CONTACT PLANS WILL ADVISE.

9. SUBJ'S REVIEW CUBAN <sup>WORLD</sup> <sup>YOUTH</sup> <sup>(14-1)</sup> FESTIVAL LEADERS AND DELEGATES SHOW ~~NO~~  
~~OTHER~~ OTHER NOTABLES <sup>(14-1)</sup> ~~(HERE)~~ WHO LEADERS IN "YOUNG COMMUNISTS"  
 ARE GIRALDO MAZOLA, ALSO ALVAREZ, PRISCO BARROSO. SUBJ CONTINUE LIVING  
 COMMON DELEGATE QUARTERS. HE NOT DELEGATION LEADER AS <sup>AGENT</sup>  
 REPORTED, BUT "SPECIAL DELEGATE" BY FIDEL'S OK. PLOY GIVEN WAS THAT SUBJ  
 FATIGUED AND SICK, NEEDED REST, THUS GOT CHANCE TRAVEL TO MEET AMWHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: \*AMWHIP/1 FIRST CONTACTED AMASH/1 1 AUG. OUTCOME NOT YET KNOWN.

FROM

AUG 15 1975

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2/4

428

17 AUG 62

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1	4
2	5
3	5

DIRECTOR

PARIS

AUG 17 1942Z 62

TION: C/WE 2 (WE &amp; TFW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1540, 17 AUG)

O : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI, C/TFW 2, S/C 2

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 47183

OPTM DIR INFO WAVE MADR CITE PARI 2629

IN 47183

DL

19-1

PFF A (HLS) 1609 (IF) 39865

B DIR 27934 COVT 62687

C DIR 23521 COVT 63601

D DIR 29395 COVT 64493

*Assessment*

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24 Mar 94

FROM Case Officer

1. [REDACTED] LASH ON 15 AUG

ALTHOUGH LASH OBVIOUS UNDER CONSIDERABLE MENTAL STRAIN HE WAS FAIRLY  
RELAXED AT BOTH SESSIONS AND ENTERED FREELY ALL DISCUSSIONS. HE  
IS SUPER SENSITIVE ABOUT SECURITY AND OWN PERSONAL SAFETY.

CONCERNED ABOUT CARELESS TALK BY LUCIA ECHEVARRIA AND EXPRESSED

DEFINITE WISH HIS GOOD BUT INSECURE FRIEND PONCHO VERONA REMAIN  
UNWITTING HIS COOPERATION. HE APPEARS SINCERE AND HONEST IN HIS  
EXPRESSED DESIRE RETURN PERUEN REMAIN IN PLACE AND COOPERATE.

HE NEITHER ASKED FOR NOR WAS OFFERED ANY FINANCIAL OR OTHER  
CONSIDERATIONS.

2.

HE HAS

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[REDACTED] IN  
[REDACTED] HE CLAIMS  
HE CAN COLLECT INTEL IN ALL FIELDS BUT STRONG PTINTS ARE THE  
UNIVERSITY, ONE ANTI AIRCRAFT BATTALION IN SANTA CLARA AND THE  
AIR FORCE. HE SAYS HE HAS TWO PERSONAL FRIENDS IN WHOM HE  
HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE BUT CAN CIRCULATE FREELY AND OBTAIN INFO  
FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING TOP GOVT LEADERS. HE FURTHER PLANS,  
AS MENTIONED REF A, ENTER MILITARY COURSE FOR SENIOR MILITARY  
OFFICERS AT MATANZAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON RETURN BUT DOES NOT  
KNOW DATE NEXT COURSE WILL BEGIN.

3.

[REDACTED] CUBAN  
[REDACTED]  
HIS ONLY RESERVATION WAS THAT NO ONE RPT NO ONE KNOW OF HIS  
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE OR AFTER ACT. ALSO EXHIBITED WILLINGNESS  
CONDUCT SABOTAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE  
[REDACTED] CUBA  
[REDACTED] CASE OFFICER  
ARRANGE THIS. HE [REDACTED] HE

[REDACTED] (PARI CAN ARRANGE EXPLOSIVES  
INSTRUCTION, WITH FIELD DEMONSTRATION IN SECLUDED AREA, VIA  
TECHNICAL OFFICER WHO WOULD BRING OFFICER FROM SITE FOR PURPOSE.)

4. HE SAYS HE CAN DO NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO BUILD UP CONSPIRACY  
WITHIN ARMED FORCES OR ELSEWHERE IN PORUMEN BECAUSE OF TIGHT SECURITY  
CUBA

RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] REFERRED TO HIS FORMER GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY  
IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE ON THE SOUTH COAST AND [REDACTED]

CIA

PER INSTRUCTIONS PAPA 3 REF C

6. BECAUSE APPARENT FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE DETECTED 15 TO 16 AUG  
LASH STATION HAS INFORMED LIAISON CIA HAS INTEREST IN LASH  
AS POTENTIAL DEFECTOR AND IN CONTACT WITH HIM. LIAISON COOPERATIVE.

7. IN SUMMARY

HE ALSO HAS ABILITY AND COURAGE PREPARE VIOLENT  
ACTION TO ELIMINATE PRESENT LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS ACTS SABOTAGE.  
CONTROL PROBLEMS POSSIBLE DUE ISOLATION AND LACK PERSONAL DIRECTION  
AND GUIDANCE ONCE HE RETURNS PERMEN. <sup>CUBA</sup>  
DEBRIEFING 17 AUG ON POINTS OUTLINED REF D PRODUCED LITTLE BUT HE  
HAD AGREED ACCEPT THESE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS ANY OTHERS WE  
CHOOSE LEVY AND FULFILL THEM ON RETURN <sup>CUBA</sup> PERMEN.

7. NEED FOLLOWING OPIM:

A.

AUG 15 1961

CIA

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This not seen  
according  
Am...  
not



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PAGE 4

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: \*FELT THAT USE OF U.S. DROP FOR COMMO FROM CUBA NOT WORTH RISK.

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Sept 62

Summary of Contacts with

AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1

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AS SANITIZED (1)(b)

24 Mar 94

HELSINKI:

1. [REDACTED]

AMWHIP arrived in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's abysmal understanding of English), Case Officer established contact with AMWHIP without further difficulty. The meeting took place in the restaurant of his hotel, [REDACTED] and later in his room. We had not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AMWHIP on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMLASH when they met. The meeting lasted about one and a half hours.

where did  
they stay?

Later the same day we called AMWHIP at his hotel to report no progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AMWHIP occupied, we took him out to dinner at Fisketorp, located in the suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 1200, terminating with a drink at the roof bar of the Vaakuna. During the six hours, we had an opportunity to explain carefully to AMWHIP that in order for us to help his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hqs. parties). AMWHIP realized that this was necessary, and agreed with our ideas. However, he is attached to AMLASH, and will continue to look upon him in the most benevolent and subjective manner. This being rather far removed from our intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AMWHIP will require handling on a close nature in order that he fully understands and is aware of our

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[REDACTED] talked to AMEASH for at least seven hours, from about 1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. When AMEASH called us at 1730, he presented us with the fact that he had [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] We would have preferred to talk longer with AMEASH about AMEASH's reactions, but time did not permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The White Lady", a restaurant some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a private dining room, a practice not uncommon in this [REDACTED] (4-1) recommended restaurant, as it is often used by businessmen to have private dinners and afterwards, business discussions.

We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and awaited AMEASH and AMEASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AMEASH had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to getting acquainted the first evening, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

As reported in our cable, [REDACTED] (4-1)  
[REDACTED] Although obviously under emotional strain, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] of  
[REDACTED]

He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon. These he said

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-4-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL - MURKIN AND SUSPICIOUS CUSTOMER CLAIMS~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

\_\_\_\_\_ Signed

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As a matter of record, AMELASH stated during the evening that he had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually. He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMELASH thought Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too literally at his word.

In dealing with AMLASH, one trait of his which confronts the C/O at every turn is his temperamental reactions over points which would generally be considered minor. For example, at one time when we were discussing the various aspects of AMLASH's future role in Cuba, we used the term "assassinate". The use of this term, we later learned from AMWHIP and from AMLASH himself, was most objectionable to the latter, and he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of word used to describe it. "Eliminate" was acceptable but obviously the term "assassinate" had a disastrous connotation. From discussions with AMWHIP, this label of "assassinate" had been directed at AMLASH after some article appeared against Batista's suppression in the pre-Castro era. Another example, which AMWHIP discussed with us, occurred during a meeting in [redacted] According to AMWHIP, AM [redacted] These examples are pointed out here in order to indicate the degree of pride and sensitivity one finds in AMLASH, and to note that [redacted] the C/O [redacted] experience, quite necessary to [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted]

AUG 15 1975

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3 Sept 63

DC/SAS

1. The following is a summary of information on the persons mentioned in the attached memorandum from THE STATE DEPARTMENT

A. Jose de Jesus JINJARRA

A Castro bodyguard who is described as a gangster interested in financial gain.

B. (Osvaldo) Antonio CASTELL Valdes

An ~~OPS 4 target~~ and old friend of Rolando CUBELA (more commonly known as ~~OPS 4 target~~). CASTELL was reportedly with the Cuban Security Department and is a cousin of Ramiro Valdes, the Interior Minister. CASTELL is anti-regime and CUBELA believes that he will "fall in line" if there is a successful coup.

C. Rolando CUBELA

A medical doctor at Manuel Fajardo Hospital in Havana. He's determined to kill Castro.

D. Marcos GIRON

A negro, about 40, who is described as a communist opportunist. He was formerly a National Police Chief in Havana.

E. Luis FERNANDEZ de la Camara

Reportedly an undercover agent for Castro and member of of the G-2. As of July 64 he was a Castro bodyguard.

F. Faure CHOMON

An old friend of Cubela's and Castell's. All fought together against Batista and all were members of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a leftist student organization. CHOMON was the Cuban Ambassador to the USSR and is presently the Transportation Minister.

2. Cubela, as you know, has frequently expressed his desire to kill Fidel Castro, in fact, some officers in WH/SA, believe that if anyone would attempt such a feat it would be Cubela. Cubela's concern, however, seems to be one of assurance and certainly not cowardness. He wants U. S. assurance of immediate intervention should he be successful in disposing of Castro and other leaders. Perhaps this is the "personal Safety" JINJARRA refers to in his letter to Zarraga.

09 15 1975

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24 Mar 94

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3. The presence of two bodyguards in this group indicates the : accessibility to their target, a significant factor in a plot of this type, especially since Castro is so closely guarded.

4. Finally, it is not extraordinary that ~~J. N. T. A. M. A.~~ should direct his letter to a JURE member, namely Zarraga. In his talks with ~~CASE OFFICER~~, Cubela has clearly stated that of all the exile leaders in the United States, he considers Manuel Ray as the only person who would be permitted to return to Cuba, if Cubela is successful in a coup against Castro. Cubela realizes, of course, that Ray is not a politician nor a good organizer, but as an engineer, Ray has the qualities that would be extremely useful in Cuba's reconstruction.

5. If you desire to have this information sent to *STATE DEPT.*, we would like to include a few questions on Zarraga; viz his knowledge of several individuals mentioned, on whom there is obscure information.

A1

Addendum: Marcelino ~~ARTIME~~ Vera

08

ARTIME has been a cutout between Cubela and (AMWHIP).  
Like AMWHIP ARTIME is ~~located~~ in Havana. Learning that  
ARTIME is closely tied in with Cubela and AMWHIP supports  
the belief that the group is tightly knit.

I have learned too, that the information we have received regarding a possible assassination of Fidel Castro has, in nearly every case, originated from a member of this group, which again indicates that this group is united and they each understand that one misdeed will destroy all of them.

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C O P Y (Original copy cannot be reproduced)

TO : DIRECTOR 14-6  
FROM : COPENHAGEN  
ACTION : C/WE 2  
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR (SUSPENSE DD/

S E C R E T 301530Z

PARI INFO DIR LOND OSLO MADR CPT **COPE** 3399

19-6  
REF **COPE** 3386 (NOT SENT PARI)

1. [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AND ANGEL QUEVEDO  
AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, FEU, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE DIFFI-  
CULTIES OCCURRED AFTER BOTH HAD COMPLETED A SENIOR ARMY TRAINING  
COURSE AND INSTEAD OF RECEIVING THE RANK OF COMMANDER WHICH THEY  
HAD HELD DURING THE REVOLUTION, THEY WERE TOLD BY RAUL CASTRO  
THEY WERE BEING DEMOTED TO CAPT. BOTH THEN RESIGNED.

2. AGENT ALSO REPORTS THAT CARLOS FRANQUI HAS BEEN FIRED FROM HIS  
POSITION AS EDITOR OF REVOLUCION. THE NEWS WAS PASSED TO  
KFRANQUI'S DEPUTY SARUSKY WHO IS PRESENTLY OSLO BY CUBAN PRESS  
ATTACHE LOND PABLO ARMANDO FERNANDEZ. AGT STATES THAT HE HAS  
HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT FRANQUI HAS BEEN A PROBLEM TO  
CASTRO FOR SOME TIME AND THE LATTER HAS OFTEN COMPLAINED TO  
CESAR OSCAR [REDACTED], CUBAN PROPAGANDA CHIEF THAT FRANQUI WAS TOO

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IN 50855 PAGE 2

INDEPENDENT IN HIS WRITING, THINKING. ESCALANTE USUALLY  
DISMISSED COMPLAINTS BY SAYING HE HAD NO CONTROL OVER FRANQUI.

3. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

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