

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10002

RECORD SERIES : HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-10

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : KARAMESSINES, THOMAS
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/14/1976
PAGES : 69

SUBJECTS :

ANGLETON, JAMES
CIA
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
MEXICO
FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE
KARAMESSINES, THOMAS
DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/13/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ~~SSCSGO~~ SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10002
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-10

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : KARAMESSINES, THOMAS
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 04/14/76
PAGES : 69
SUBJECTS : KARAMESSINES, THOMAS

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

CIA

ANGLETON, JAMES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
MEXICO

DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/26/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL


Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R2970

Report of Proceedings



Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

760000391732

Wednesday, April 14, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

SHELburne Lynch

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000071733

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

C O N T E N T S

Testimony of:

Page

Thomas Karamessines

2

TOP SECRET

SHELburne Lynch

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091734

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Wednesday, April 14, 1976

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 o'clock
p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Richard S.
Schweiker, presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also Present: James Johnston, Paul Wallach and
Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS KARAMESSINES

Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record you full name and address?

Mr. Karamessines. Thomas Karamessines, 6726 Kennedy Lane, Falls Church, Virginia.

Mr. Johnston. And you have previously testified before the Committee, and have been furnished a copy of the rules, and are aware of your right to counsel with regard to the Committee, is that correct?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Let the record show that Senator Schweiker will be here presently.

But it is my understanding, Mr. Karamessines, that it is agreeable to go ahead without the Senator present?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Would you state for the record your position with the Agency in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Karamessines. I was Assistant Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. Johnson. And the Director for Plans was Mr. Helms, is that correct?

Mr. Karamessines. Correct.

Mr. Johnston. And would you describe briefly --

Mr. Karamessines. I should correct that. The Deputy Director for Plans, that is the title, Deputy Director for

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76003091735

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000021736

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Plans.

Mr. Johnston. That is correct. Would you state briefly your role as Assistant to Mr. Helms?

Mr. Karamessines. It was generally to keep abreast of our operational projects, to review the daily cable and other traffic for referral to Mr. Helms, and matters of particular interest to him, to assist him by looking after managerial problems relating to the general administration of the Directorate of Plans, and to act in his place when he was away.

Mr. Johnston. Were there any other Assistant Directors for Plans?

Mr. Karamessines. In the Deputy Directorate for Plans?

Mr. Johnston. That is correct.

Mr. Karamessines. No.

Mr. Johnston. And did Mr. Helms have an Executive Officer?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he had one or two. But I don't recall who they were at that time.

Mr. Johnston. And would you distinguish your function from theirs?

Mr. Karamessines. Yes. The Executive Officer would have had no command or line responsibility, whereas I did.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go to the period before the assassination of President Kennedy.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1 And to refresh your memory, Lee Harry Oswald visited
2 Mexico City in September and early October of 1963, and CIA
3 surveillance there picked up the fact of his visit to the
4 Soviet Embassy.

5 And I want to show you Director Message Number 74830
6 of 10 October 1963. Principally I am interested in the fact
7 that on the third page of that you are the authenticating
8 Officer. And I will give you a chance to peruse the message.

9 Mr. Karamessines. Actually I am the releasing officer.

10 Mr. Johnston. You are the releasing officer?

11 Mr. Karamessine. That is right. I don't know who some
12 of the other people here are, because their names are not
13 listed. The only name that has been left on here is my name
14 as releasing officer, right?

15 Mr. Johnston. Right. Then the originating unit is
16 what on that message?

17 Mr. Karamessine. WH-3, Mexico.

18 Mr. Johnston. What you your capacity be as reviewing
19 officer of that message?

20 Mr. Karamessines. To make sure that it wasn't violating
21 any particular policies of ours, particularly since it was
22 dealing with a man who at least had been American, and might
23 still be an American. And we were taking an interest in this
24 fellow even though he wasn't an American. And normally we
25 wouldn't do that, unless there was good reason -- as there

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600001737

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

5

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

76000091739

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 obviously was in this case, because he had been a Marine, and
2 had defected, officially defected to the Soviet Union, accord-
3 ing to this message in 1959.

4 Mr. Johnston. We are operating with a zerox copy of the
5 message. But is that a copy of your signature on the third
6 page?

7 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

8 Mr. Johnston. And with that is it fair to establish
9 that you at least read the message and knew of the activity
10 on the date you read the message?

11 Mr. Karamessines. I read the message. And it concerns
12 a Marine defector to the Soviet Union who apparently, accord-
13 ing to the incoming message to which this was a response,
14 was trying to get in touch with some Soviets or Cubans in
15 Mexico. That would be the extent of my interest in it at the
16 time. And I would have ascertained that this certainly was
17 a legitimate interest of the CIA in an American, as an
18 exception to the general rule.

19 Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any operational interest
20 that the CIA had in Oswald?

21 Mr. Karamessines. No, never at any time to my knowledge.

22 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that in the fall of 1963
23 the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

24 Mr. Karamessines. I didn't know that.

25 Mr. Johnston. Were you later aware of it?

TOP SECRET

6

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Johnston. And did he have a unit called the Special Affairs Staff charged with Cuban operations?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he did at one point.

2 Mr. Johnston. Who had in the fall of 1963 counterintelli-
3 gence responsibility for Cuban matters?

4 Mr. Karamessines. General Cuban matters?

5 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

6 Mr. Karamessines. Counterintelligence responsibility,
7 in a case like that, would have been an integral part of the
8 special Staff, with the assistance and the contribution and
9 the general staff supervision of our Counterintelligence Staff,
10 the senior Counterintelligence Staff.

11 Mr. Johnston. And that would have been --

12 Mr. Karamessines. Mr. Angleton's Office.

13 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Angleton's Office. Was the Special
14 Affairs Counterintelligence separate from the general
15 Counterintelligence Staff?

16 Mr. Karamessines. I would have been. How much of it
17 they had, I don't know.

18 Mr. Johnston. Who coordinated the Special Affairs Staff
19 counterintelligence with the Counterintelligence Division?

20 Mr. Karamessines. They just coordinated directly, I
21 would imagine. I don't think we had an additional officer
22 appointed to the former coordination function. They would have
23 been required -- normally that would be the SOP -- to
24 coordinate their actions with the senior Counterintelligence
25 Staff.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-5008

76000091740

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

8

1 Mr. Johnston. Was it SOP for SAS to inform the
2 Counterintelligence Staff of all --

3 Mr. Karamessines. I don't know that. I was not very
4 close to the whole Cuban activity. It was an activity that had
5 been given birth while I was abroad. And it had its disaster
6 in late 1961. And I was brought back in 1962 as a DDP in
7 March. And my guess would be that it was a conscious decision
8 not to involve me too closely in the remnants of the other
9 activity.

10 Mr. Johnston. Moving to the assassination of President
11 Kenney and the day of the assassination, how was the matter
12 and the problem and the investigation if any, of the assassina-
13 tion handled immediately upon receiving word? Was there any
14 task force created to handle the matter?

15 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall the creation of any
16 task force. But I do remember that because the Counterintelli-
17 gence Staff was responsible in any case for conducting our
18 liaison with the other American intelligence security agencies,
19 especially the FBI, the Secret Service, that the Counterin-
20 telligence Staff was designated, to my best recollection now,
21 as the focal point for the receipt of requests for information
22 from these other agencies, and for responding to those
23 requests for information. And as a result of that, as far as
24 I can now recall, all communications going out to Secret
25 Service or FBI in response to requests for information were

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091741

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6009

7600091742

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 prepared by the Counterintelligence Staff, and were either sent
2 directly by that Staff, or if the content warranted, they were
3 brought up the line for review and signature by Mr. Helms or
4 myself in his absence.

5 Mr. Johnston. And again, just so that we are clear, when
6 you refer to Counterintelligence Staff you are referring to
7 Mr. Angleton's operation?

8 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I am.

9 Mr. Johnston. What about the Cuban Counterintelligence
10 Staff, how were they staffed in the investigation?

11 Mr. Karamessines. You mean SAS?

12 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

13 Mr. Karamessine. Which we mentioned earlier?

14 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

15 Mr. Karamessines. I don't know if they were still in
16 being at that time. But if they were -- I don't know the
17 answer to your question, but my assumption would be that
18 anything they had to contribute would have been funneled into
19 the Counterintelligence Staff.

20 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever specifically -- do you
21 recall asking them to make a contribution yourself?

22 Mr. Karamessines. I?

23 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

24 Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not.

25 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall any correspondence or any

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

10

1 information?

2 Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not. There may have been,
3 there may have been instructions from Mr. Helms, for example,
4 to Mr. Fitzgerald. But I don't recall seeing any such
5 instructions.

6 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever participate in meetings or
7 see correspondence in which Mr. Helms directed Mr. Angleton
8 to perform those functions for the Counterintelligence Staff?

9 Mr. Karamessines. No. But Mr. Angleton certainly was
10 performing them, and he wouldn't have stepped in to take over
11 the activity if Mr. Helms hadn't made it plain that that was
12 the way he wanted it handled.

13 Mr. Johnston. Who was Mr. J. C. King in this era?

14 Mr. Karamessines. He was at this time, I believe, the
15 Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

16 Mr. Johnston. For the Deputy Directorate for Plans?

17 Mr. Karamessines. Right.

18 Mr. Johnston. And to the best of your recollection, who
19 was Jack Whitney?

20 Mr. Karamessines. Well, I know Jack Whitten as an Officer
21 of the DDP. But what capacity he was serving in at that
22 particular point, I don't remember.

23 Mr. Johnston. Was he at that time involved with SAS?

24 Mr. Karamessines. I don't know.

25 Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. King?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091743

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

11

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091714

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. Was Mr. King? Well, he would have
2 been generally aware of SAS's activities, since they were taking
3 place within his geographical area, as a Special Staff.

4 Mr. Johnston. Did he have operational control of SAS?

5 Mr. Karamessines. I don't believe so.

6 Mr. Johnston. And operational control of SAS was --

7 Mr. Karamessines. It would have been in the nads of the
8 Director of SAS, Mr. Fitzgerald, who would have been
9 responsible to Mr. Helms.

10 Mr. Johnston. Directly to Mr. Helms?

11 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

12 Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald respond through you to
13 Mr. Helms?

14 Mr. Karamessines. Not to these matters.

15 Mr. Johnston. We have touched before --

16 Mr. Wallach. Is there a reason why he didn't respond
17 on those matters?

18 Mr. Karamessines. I had explained before you came in,
19 I think, that I came back here in March of 1962, after the
20 collapse of the Cuban thing, and the changes that had taken
21 place, and the place was in a bit of a turmoil. And my
22 instructions were to look after the day to day business.

23 Mr. Johnston. Off the record a minute.

24 (Off the record discussion.)

25 Mr. Johnston. Back on the record.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

12

Phone (Area 202) 544-3000

76000021715

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. My charge from Mr. Helms was that in
2 view of the turmoil that had been taking place in the Agency,
3 and specifically in the DDP, that we needed more than ever to
4 get back to normal operating, in other words, to bring people
5 down off the chandeliers. We had a change of guard, Mr. Bissell
6 had been removed, and Mr. Dulles had been removed, and Mr.
7 Helms had been brought in as Deputy Director for Plans. And
8 the idea there was that we were going to get back to basic,
9 classic intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and
10 we were going to be done with some of these high flown ventures
11 that just get us into trouble, some of these ridiculous things
12 that had been happening prior to that time.

13 When I came back my charge from Helms was, look, you
14 see the general running of the DDP, the day to day, normal
15 functioning. We have got Fitzgerald -- I think it was
16 Fitzgerald -- and he will be worrying about Cuban things.

17 He was a senior officer, don't forget. When Mr. Helms
18 went up to the Deputy Director of the Agency, Mr. Fitzgerald
19 was selected to be the DDP, not I, even though I had been the
20 Deputy to Mr. Helms.

21 Senator Schweiker. (Now presiding)

22 When was that that that happened?

23 Mr. Karamessines. 1965.

24 So that my job was to get matters back to the kind of
25 procedures, controls and phase by phase, and step by step

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

13

1 administration that I was familiar with, and which had
2 functioned, I thought, very well all through the fifties, when
3 I was serving for the most part back in Headquarters most of
4 the time at all.

5 In 1959 when Mr. Bissell took over he changed a lot of
6 things. And controls became very loosey goosey. And I think
7 the Agency and the Clandestine Service suffered quite a bit
8 from that short but for me devastating interval in the history
9 of it.

10 But what Helms tried to do was get this thing back on
11 track. And I was supposed to help him do this. That is why
12 he brought me back, when my tour of duty was nearly up.

13 Senator Schweiker. You were excluded from the chain of
14 command?

15 Mr. Karamessines. It was simply made clear that this
16 was a Special Staff whose only job would be this, and I
17 didn't have to be all that concerned about it. That didn't
18 mean that I couldn't know what was happening there if I wanted
19 to know. But I had my hands absolutely full with things that
20 I had to deal with myself. And here was a very senior fellow
21 with a staff of his own dealing with just this special thing,
22 which was an outgrowth and a result, or whatever you want to
23 call it, of the Cuban operations, which I knew nothing about.

24 Senator Schweiker. And how did the White House
25 coordination or liaison go with that Special Affairs Section?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600001716

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

14

7600091742

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

15

1 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, in part it was. But the
2 Counterintelligence Staff had a good part of that, too.

3 Mr. Wallach. Who in the Counterintelligence Staff?

4 Mr. Karamessines. I don't know, I can't put my finger
5 on it. But SAS had a good part of that, because SAS, don't
6 forget, had to protect itself against the activity of the DGI,
7 the Cuban Intelligence Service. And we knew that the DGI
8 was very active, particularly in Canada, in sending fellows
9 down into the States as agents through Canada. And ever so
10 often SAS, through its activities in Miami would pick up
11 reflections of DGI activities and report these of course into
12 Counterintelligence and the FBI.

13 Mr. Johnston. Let's go back to the investigation of the
14 assassination. Do you recall the incident with Sylvia Dura,
15 who was the Mexican employed by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
16 City?

17 Mr. Karamessines. From the Cuban Consulate?

18 Mr. Johnston. The Cuban Consulate, that is correct.

19 Do you recall that you received information that Sylvi
20 Dura was going to be arrested by Mexican authorities?

21 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I have a recollection of that.
22 I don't recall the circumstances, but that rings a bell, if
23 that is what you mean. And she was going to be arrested and
24 questioned, is that right?

25 Mr. Johnston. That is correct.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000091743

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

16

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000021749

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. For our account, if I recall
2 correctly, is that right?

3 Mr. Johnston. That is less clear, as to your account.

4 Mr. Karamessines. I see.

5 Mr. Johnston. My question is, first of all, were you
6 ever told or do you know whether Sylvia Dura was a contact for
7 the Agency?

8 Mr. Karamessines. No, and I don't believe she was ever
9 -- I have no knowledge and do not believe she was ever a con-
10 tact for the Agency, for the CIA.

11 Senator Schweiker. Let's ask the same question of
12 Alvarado.

13 Mr. Karamessines. He was that nut that you mentioned
14 earlier that came in and gave them a tall story which turned
15 out to be false.

16 Senator Schweiker. Was he ever an informer or source of
17 information?

18 Mr. Karamessines. The answer is no as far as anything
19 I ever heard from anybody.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall ordering Mr. Whitten to call
21 off the arrest of Sylvia Dura, proposed arrest of Sylvia
22 Dura?

23 Mr. Karamessines. Do I recall ordering Mr. Whitney to
24 call it off?

25 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

17

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000071730

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall that. Are you
2 sure I ordered him to call off the arrest? Maybe somebody
3 else did. I don't recall any such thing. I don't recall
4 anybody ordering it.

5 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, then, a cable which
6 apparently was sent out after -- by way of background, prior
7 to this cable going out, Mexico City had cabled and said,
8 Mexican police have already arrested Dura, so we can't call
9 off her arrest.

10 Mr. Karamessines. I see.

11 Mr. Johnston. And then this cable followed, Director
12 84916 of 20 November 1963.

13 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

14 Mr. Johnston. Who originated that cable?

15 Mr. Karamessines. The origin of this cable -- it looks
16 like it came from the Mexican Branch of the WH Division. I
17 notice that the CI Staff is on distribution.

18 Senator Schweiker. Who was Head of the Mexican Branch?

19 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall at this point.

20 Senator Schweiker. Wasn't David Phillips working down
21 there at the time?

22 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall. You can get that,
23 I am sure, very easily from the Agency. I certainly can't
24 recall who was in charge of the Mexican Branch at that time.

25 Senator Schweiker. On the structure of operations the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

18

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76003721751

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 way that you were structured then, would the Head of the
2 Mexico City Branch have reported to whom under your procedures?

3 Mr. Karamessines. To the Director of the Western
4 Hemisphere Division, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere
5 Division, who as J. C. King.

6 Mr. Johnston. And he would have reported to whom?

7 Mr. Karamessines. And he would have reported to Mr.
8 Helms, or in his absence, to me.

9 Mr. Johnston. In other words, it would go to Mr. Helms
10 unless you were acting in this capacity?

11 Mr. Karamessines. That is right, he was the DDP at that
12 time.

13 Mr. Johnston. Now, if operations were going on out of
14 Mexico City against Castro, would they have fallen under the
15 Special Affairs Section, or would they have gone up the chain
16 of command we have just described, or would it depend?

17 Mr. Karamessines. It could have happened either way.
18 In other words, they could have been handled by the Special
19 Affairs Section in close coordination with the WH Division,
20 because it happened to be not in the States here but over in
21 the WH Division.

22 Mr. Johnston. In Director 84916 which you just looked
23 at, it is a flash message which is of the highest priority,
24 is that correct?

25 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, in terms of the emergency of the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

19

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7 6 0 0 9 1 7 3 2

WARD & PAUL

310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 messages getting there, correct.

2 Mr. Johnston. And it says, arrest of Sylvia Dura is an
3 extremely serious matter which could prejudice -- using the
4 code word which I think means United States?

5 Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

6 Mr. Johnston. -- freedom of action on entire question
7 of -- another code word which means Cuban --

8 Mr. Karamessines. Right.

9 Mr. Johnston. -- responsibility. Why was the arrest of
10 Sylvia Dura such an extremely serious matter that it could
11 prejudice the US freedom of action on the question of Cuban
12 responsibility?

13 Mr. Karamessines. The only thing I can surmise here --
14 and this is now out of context, and 15 years later, or whenever
15 it is -- that while she was still there, and we had the lines
16 on the phone, and she was in here job -- and maybe we had
17 informants, I don't know, I don't recall -- the idea was there,
18 maybe we would learn some more about Cuban responsibility,
19 possible Cuban responsibility, since this guy had been talking
20 to the Consulate.

21 Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss this matter with Mr.
22 Helms?

23 Mr. Karamessines. I haven't the faintest recollection.
24 I couldn't possibly answer a question like that.

25 Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss it with Mr. Whitten or

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

20

1 Mr. King?

2 Mr. Karamessines. I couldn't possibly answer a question
3 like that. That would have been one of hundreds of cables I
4 would have seen that one day, any given day.

5 Mr. Johnston. Let me just put to you, though, my review
6 has not necessarily been comprehensive, but this appears to be
7 the only flash message sent out in the course of these events

8 --

9 Mr. Karamessines. I would be surprised if you didn't
10 find others, number one. And number two, even though it is
11 a flash message, and I read it, I couldn't possibly recall with
12 whom I might have discussed it at the time, who brought it to
13 me for signature, and whether it was sent, just sent in, or
14 handed to me by my secretary, I don't recall the circumstances.
15 But it is a very natural and very proper and quite under-
16 standable operational message, given the great interest that
17 we had in what this woman might be able to tip us off to if
18 we could continue listening secretly to her conversations
19 with others. She might call Aunt Tillie living in Guadalajara
20 and say, Aunt Tillie, I am going to take it on the lam here,
21 because I think we have been caught trying to skip the bill,
22 or whatever.

23 Now, here are the Mexicans going to arrest her. And this
24 kind of cut the ground out from under our feet at that point.
25 And what the message is saying in effect is, let's try to keep

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

21

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

760000771754

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 this as quiet as possible and see what we can salvage from it.

2 We are also hopeful that we could get to talk to her or
3 interrogate her or question her ourselves, or arrange for the
4 FBI or Secret Service to do it.

5 Mr. Johnston. And they also put to you that this
6 message indicates the existence of a question at CIA of Cuban
7 responsibility?

8 Mr. Karamessines. There was a question at that point
9 after the President was killed of anybody's responsibilities,
10 starting with the Russians, because Oswald had been a defector
11 to the Russians, and then going right away to the Cuban,
12 because they were palsy walsy and even in touch with the Cuban
13 Consulate in Mexico.

14 These were natural suspicions at the time and we would
15 have been derelict not to have had them. What we didn't have
16 was the kind of evidence that would have proved one or the
17 other.

18 Mr. Johnston. And to explore the question of Cuban
19 responsibility, who should have been directed to investigate
20 that?

21 Mr. Karamessines. It was under investigation constantly.
22 That is what was being done. This message is an indication
23 of that. WH was doing it, and CI Staff was interested in
24 pursuing it.

25 Mr. Johnston. But didn't it occur to you that SAS

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

22

1 should have also been involved?

2 Mr. Karamessines. I think anything SAS might have had
3 to contribute on this thing at the time it contributed.

4 Mr. Johnston. Do you know that?

5 Mr. Karamessines. No, I assume that, I don't know it,
6 from the way we worked.

7 Mr. Johnston. You do know that the CI Staff was involved?

8 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

9 Mr. Johnston. And you do know the Western Hemisphere
10 Division was involved?

11 Mr. Karamessines. Right.

12 Mr. Johnston. But you only assume htat SAS was involved?

13 Mr. Karamessines. That is right. SAS's business was
14 an offensive role, responsibility, to send agents -- their
15 counterintelligence intelligence was a very limited thing
16 designed to protect their own activities against penetration,
17 whereas this had much wider scope. This was talking about
18 some fellow who had been a Marine, and had deserted and gone
19 to the Soviet Union, all of these things. And then when he
20 shows up in Mexico he is not within SAS's parameter, he is
21 within WH's parameter.

22 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether SAS
23 had gotten involved in the investigation?

24 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall asking such a question.

25 Mr. Johnston. Off the record a second.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091755

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

23

(Off the record discussion)

Senator Schweiker. Back on the record.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you two more messages. One is Director 84855, 23 November 1963. And the other one is Director 84837, 23 November. And you are the releasing officer for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division on both of them.

Mr. Karamessines. He probably wasn't available at the time and they brought it into me. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And is it a fair statement that those two messages together ask Mexico City Station for all information on Alferiev or Kostikov --

Mr. Karamessines. One is Alferiev, as I read it here, and the other one asks information on one Kostikov, both of whom apparently were either identified or suspected Russian intelligence officers.

Mr. Johnston. Now, when you sent these two messages out, when you signed on as releasing officer, would you have expected to receive back everything Mexico City Station had on those two?

Mr. Karamessines. Not I, the Division would that sent the message.

Mr. Johnston. But that was what was being called for by the two messages?

Mr. Karamessines. Well, whatever the messages ask for,

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000001755

WARD & PAUL

310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

24

1 whatever information do you have on his movements on a certain
2 date, and so forth.

3 Mr. Johnston. The message on Kostikov says: "Urgently
4 require the following information about Kostikov, the names
5 and background, his contacts not already reported to
6 Headquarters."

7 And the message on Alferiev said: "Request reported in
8 coverage Alferiev as with Kostikov." Now, is it correct that
9 Mexico City should have interpreted this to give you everything
10 they had not already reported on these two individuals?

11 Mr. Karamessines. Not already reported, yes.

12 Mr. Johnston. As an experienced Intelligence Officer and
13 as Assistant DDP, what would you have expected the Counter-
14 intelligence Staff to do with those contacts, with the reports
15 coming back from Mexico City?

16 Mr. Karamessines. With the information?

17 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

18 Mr. Karamessines. It depends on what the information
19 said.

20 Mr. Johnston. The message reporting back on this gave
21 all contacts, known contacts that these individuals had in
22 Mexico City. And what is the next step in your process?

23 Mr. Karamessines. You check these names out to see
24 whether your files give any evidence of suspicious activity.
25 And if they don't, if they simply don't indicate any suspicious

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091757

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

25

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091753

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 activity, that would be the end of it. If it does indicate
2 suspicious activity, then you would follow from there, and you
3 would pass this information on to other interested parties
4 within the Agency or within the Government, and you would
5 carry on from there and investigate further.

6 Mr. Johnston. That is the point I am getting to. If
7 it reports back that Alferiev has contacts with a named
8 individual, is it routine standard operating procedure to
9 check the CI file on that named individual?

10 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, unless the desk officer that
11 receives it happens to know who that fellow is and doesn't have
12 to check. And that happens quite frequently.

13 Mr. Johnston. And do you know anything about the
14 responses on these two messages?

15 Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall the messages going
16 out, and I certainly don't recall any responses.

17 Mr. Johnston. Your response earlier on why we might have
18 warned about the arrest of Sylvia Dura in terms of damaging
19 our tap, the telephone surveillance --

20 Mr. Karamessines. I didn't suggest, sir, that we might
21 be damaging our tap. What I was suggesting was that by
22 arresting her they were taking her out of her office, her
23 living quarters, and putting her under arrest. And this would
24 reduce and eliminate indeed our chances of hearing her further.

25 Mr. Johnston. I understand that. What I don't reconcile

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

26

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000021759

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 that with is the way the first sentence is worded: "The
2 arrest of Sylvia Dura is an extremely serious matter which
3 could prejudice all freedom of action on the entire question
4 of Cuban responsibility." It doesn't say specifically the
5 thing that I would share with you as the logical thing to be
6 concerned about, it seems more concerned about whether we have
7 to come to some conclusion we may not want to come to relating
8 to Cuban responsibility. And I am puzzled by that for two
9 reasons. Number one, it doesn't express the things that you
10 would logically say, which is what you said, and number two,
11 why are we more worried about our freedom of action as opposed
12 to finding out what happened?

13 Mr. Karamessines. I can answer that very quickly, I
14 believe. I see what you are driving at now. I can easily see
15 a situation in which we wouldn't want the Mexican Government
16 or any other government to know what Sylvia Dura may have to
17 say about Oswald or the President's assassination, assuming
18 she had anything to do, we wouldn't want anybody else to know
19 until we had had a chance to focus on it ourselves and decide
20 what our Government, what position our Government was going
21 to take about it.

22 Let me put the case this way, if I may. Let us assume
23 that Sylvia Dura is hauled in by the Mexicans, and she says,
24 fellows, it is very simple. I know, because she was hired --
25 because this Mexican, ex-Marine, was actually hired by the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

27

1 Soviet Government with the assistance of the Cuban Intelligence
2 Service to kill President Kennedy. And you get a real hot
3 little Mexican counterintelligence police guy, and he says,
4 I have got the scoop of the century. And he calls his newspaper
5 guys in, and he says, this is the information, fellows, this
6 is what the witness has said. And the next morning the world
7 is reading: Soviets and Cubans planned assassination of
8 President Kennedy.

9 Now, you are sitting downtown in the White House or in
10 the State Department, and you are wondering, where do we go
11 next, declar war on the Soviets and the Cubans? Where do we
12 go? You would prefer to be in a situation where, if this
13 woman had had a -- and I use the term had had, because to my
14 recollection she didn't have much light to throw on it, or any
15 light really -- if she had that kind of dynamite information
16 we would have been in a much better position, our Government,
17 or President, and the State Department would have been in a
18 much better position had we had a chance to focus on whatever
19 information she had to give us. Now, here she would be giving
20 it first to somebody else, assuming she had it, which she did
21 not.

22 Mr. Johnston. Did conversations like that actually take
23 place at CIA on November 22nd and 23rd?

24 Mr. Karamessines. There were all kinds of conversations
25 about this thing taking place, certainly.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000091760

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

28

1 Mr. Johnston. And did this take place with regard to
2 Dura?

3 Mr. Karamessines. All I can tell you is that they must
4 have, but if you were to ask me to recall a specific one, I
5 can't do that.

6 Mr. Johnston. I am not asking you to recall a specific
7 one, but whether you participated in conversations at CIA with
8 other officials of the Agency to the effect that you have just
9 talked about, that if the word gets out that there is Cuban
10 or Soviet involvement in this, we need to know that first
11 independently, we want to know it first independently, it would
12 give our Government that much head start in deciding what the
13 heck it wanted to do about it.

14 Were there any conversations -- and again in a general
15 sense -- that looked at US courses of action in the event
16 Cuban responsibility was established?

17 Mr. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations.

18 Mr. Johnston. In the event that Soviet responsibility --

19 Mr. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations, and
20 I was not a party to them, to the best of my recollection.

21 Mr. Johnston. But there was great concern that your
22 investigation might turn up foreign involvement?

23 Mr. Karamessines. There was no great concern that it
24 might turn up. We weren't afraid of it. If it came it would
25 come. What we were hoping to do, though, as a service to the

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000021761

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

29

1 Government, was to try if possible to have that information
2 before anybody else -- before any foreigners had it, to get
3 it exclusively, so that our Government could focus on what
4 if any action it felt it would wish to take in the situation.
5 As it turned out, we never had that kind of information. So
6 it was a moot question.

7 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you two specific areas. And
8 my question will be whether they came to your attention. Were
9 you aware that the CIA received information that on the
10 afternoon of the assassination an unidentified passenger landed
11 at the airport in Mexico City on a two engine aircraft, boarded
12 a Cuban aircraft bound for Havana, bypassed customs and rode in
13 the cockpit of the Cuban aircraft that afternoon?

14 Mr. Karamessines. Was I aware of that?

15 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

16 Mr. Karamessines. No, at least I have no recollection
17 of it. Somebody might have mentioned it at the time in
18 passing. What was the significance of it?

19 Mr. Johnston. I just wondered whether you would
20 attribute any significance to it.

21 Mr. Karamessines. No, none at all. The DGI had quite
22 a lot of freedom of movement, freedom of action in Mexico in
23 those days.

24 Senator Schweiker. When was this, the day of the
25 assassination?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091753

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

30

1 Mrs. Johnston. That is right.

2 Senator Schweiker. That wouldn't be significant to it,
3 the day of the assassination?

4 Mr. Karamessines. No, not particularly.

5 Senator Schweiker. You don't think that there some
6 special orders that went out to DGI as to where they were and
7 what they were doing on the day of the President's assassina-
8 tion?

9 Mr. Karamessines. First of all, I never heard of this
10 report. Let's start to that. And secondly, I didn't under-
11 stand you to say that it was a DGI officer that got on the
12 airplane, you said somebody got on the airplane and sat next
13 to the Cuban pilot and took off, without going through
14 customs.

15 Mr. Johnston. I am sorry, I did not tell you that they
16 held up the Cuban aircraft.

17 Mr. Karamessines. You see the difference now? You know
18 the story. He gives me a couple of tidbits and then you get
19 excited because I am not excited, see?

20 Senator Schweiker. The Cuban aircraft was held up for
21 1700 hours to 2200 hours awaiting this passenger. That was
22 the information the CIA received. And the passenger arrived
23 on a twin engine aircraft, bypassed customs, and went into the
24 Cuban airlines craft and rode in the cockpit. So he was
25 basically unidentified arriving under those circumstances.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000091753

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

31

1 Mr. Karamessines. I had never heard of that report.
2 I wasn't familiar with it.

3 Mr. Johnston. Were you familiar with the travel of a
4 man named Gilberto Lopez who crossed the border into Mexico
5 sometime on November 23rd?

6 Mr. Karamessines. No, that name doesn't ring a bell.

7 Mr. Johnston. And went to Mexico City, and on November
8 27th went to Havana as the only passenger on a Cuban airline
9 flight to Havana.

10 Mr. Karamessines. No, that name doesn't ring a bell
11 with me.

12 Mr. Johnston. And that never came to your attention?

13 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall that. That doesn't
14 mean it never came to my attention. But what I am telling
15 you is that I don't remember having been apprized of that
16 particular bit of information. It may well have been brought
17 to my attention. And we might have done a lot about it at the
18 time, and we might have reached conclusions on it. I just
19 don't remember.

20 Mr. Johnston. If that was handled by SAS would you have
21 been involved in it, the Lopez matter especially?

22 Mr. Karamessines. Well, I might have been, if Mr. Helms
23 didn't happen to be there and they needed to report it to
24 somebody, yes, I might have been. But I don't recall being
25 involved in it.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091764

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

32

1 Mr. Johnston. As of November 1963 what knowledge did
2 you have about CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders?

3 Mr. Karamessines. None.

4 Mr. Johnston. And as Mr. Helms' Assistant you had not
5 bee informed?

6 Mr. Karamessines. No.

7 Mr. Johnston. Have you read the Senate Select Committee
8 report on Assassinations?

9 Mr. Karamessines. No, I have not.

10 Mr. Johnston. According to the information the Senate
11 received, in August of 1963 Mr. Helms told Mr. McCone about
12 certain CIA plots against Castro. Were you at that meeting?

13 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

14 Mr. Johnston. Do you know of that briefing or that
15 report to Mr. McCone?

16 Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not.

17 Mr. Johnston. When did you first learn that the CIA
18 had plots to assassinate Fidel Castro?

19 Mr. Karamessines. You will find this surprising, but
20 it is true. At about the time that a fellow named Bill Harvey
21 retired and went out to work as a lawyer in the Midwest, or
22 shortly thereafter, he gave an interview which was published
23 in one of the columns. And he then mentioned the names of
24 Roselli and some other guy.

25 Senator Schweiker. Giancana?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091755

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

33

1 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, Giancana. And how they were
2 involved in an effort to do away with Castro, and he, Harvey,
3 had been the CIA man in charge of the activity, or some such
4 story.

5 Now, when I read that I asked a couple of questions about
6 it, what are you talking about. And a couple of fellows
7 around there who were knowledgeable and had lived through this
8 period -- and I was then not in the States, I was overseas --
9 told me that they had tried to do something -- at the White
10 House request, incidentally -- they had tried to do something,
11 but it hadn't worked, and that was it.

12 Senator Schweiker. Had you heard any talk about what
13 role Bobby Kennedy did or didn't have in that situation?

14 Mr. Karamessines. Yes. What I was told -- and this
15 was absolutely hearsay -- was that Bobby Kennedy was the one
16 that was pushing for this, and that he was reflecting his
17 brother's desires.

18 Senator Schweiker. Did he use a desk over at CIA
19 Headquarters during this period?

20 Mr. Karamessines. Not to my knowledge -- I think I would
21 have known if he had, but not to my knowledge. Remember, I
22 was not in the building, I was overseas from 1959 to March
23 1962. So what was happening in that period I just don't know.
24 He might have had a desk. But I never heard that. And I
25 didn't know of it.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091756

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

34

1 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that Harvey and Roselli
2 met in June of 1963?

3 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

4 Mr. Johnston. Do you know the crypt AMLASH?

5 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I have seen it. I don't know
6 whether I have seen it in Congressional reports or in the
7 newspapers or in the office.

8 Mr. Johnston. In the fall of 1963 when you were serving
9 as Mr. Helms' Assistant did you ever see any documents with the
10 crypt AMLASH on them, any reports involving AMLASH?

11 Mr. Karamessines. I am sorry, but I simply cannot
12 answer that question. I don't know. I may have, or I may not
13 have. But there were thousands of crypts, and I couldn't
14 possibly remember. And what AMLASH means right now I haven't
15 the vaguest notion.

16 Senator Schweiker. The answer you gave a moment ago was
17 as to the time frame when you learned about the assassination
18 attempts relating to a column by Bill Harvey, the Army.

19 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

20 Mr. Johnston. What year was that?

21 Mr. Karamessines. That must have been around -- my best
22 recollection would have been about 1964, somewhere in there,
23 late 1963, 1964, or maybe even 1965.

24 Senator Schweiker. It wouldn't have been the Jack
25 Anderson 1967 story, would it?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091767

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

35

1 Senator Schweiker. I don't remember whether Harvey's
2 name was in that or not.

3 Mr. Karamessines. It might have been, but it was a
4 story in which Harvey was specifically mentioned by name.

5 Senator Schweiker. So prior to that time you had
6 absolutely no knowledge about the assassination attempt?

7 Mr. Karamessines. That is right. This is one of the
8 things I am very grateful about.

9 Senator Schweiker. In retrospect it was best not to have
10 known?

11 Mr. Karamessines. I asked a fellow that used to work
12 for me named Sam Halpern. And he chuckled and he said, look,
13 you weren't around when it was all happening, you were
14 overseas. But I was there when Bissell came back from talking
15 with Bobby Kennedy. And he said it was a messy business. And
16 he said, when you came back and you were made a DP everybody
17 agreed that we wouldn't tell you about these things, because,
18 he said, you are the kind of fellow that would have either
19 left or raised holy hell about it.

20 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware, then, of the meetings
21 that were taking place in the fall of 1963 between CIA case
22 officers and the high level Cuban whose code name was AMLASH,
23 whereby he was proposing the overthrow of Castro, and solicit-
24 ing US support for him?

25 Senator Schweiker. I would like to qualify that a little

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091763

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

36

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091759

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 bit, in view of your other answer, in terms of overthrowing
2 Castro as opposed to assassination, because apparently both
3 elements were involved.

4 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I understand.

5 Senator Schweiker. Would one have come to your attention?

6 Mr. Karamessines. One might have come to my attention
7 as a DP, yes. But AMLASH, what was he, a Cuban? I don't
8 remember.

9 Mr. Johnston. Let me mention his name off the record.

10 Senator Schweiker. Let's go off the record a moment.

11 (Off the record discussion.)

12 Mr. Johnston. Back on the record.

13 Mr. Karamessines. I had heard about him, but I wasn't
14 running him. He was being run by the Cuban Task Force.

15 Senator Schweiker. That would have been Special Affairs
16 Section that you were talking about?

17 Mr. Karamessines. Right.

18 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that meetings were taking
19 place in the fall of 1963?

20 Mr. Karamessines. I would have assumed at the time that
21 we were in touch with somebody like that, yes.

22 Senator Schweiker. In other words, they were going along
23 regularly as a matter of policy?

24 Mr. Karamessines. Yes. And I knew that we were trying
25 to put agents into Cuba, drop men by air, put them in by boat,

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

37

1 and try to recruit people within the Cuban Government. And
2 this was for intelligence information, and to see whether
3 there was any possible hope for restirring and reagitating and
4 getting another indigenous revoting.

5 Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald had
6 flown to meet with AMLASH and to assure him that his proposed
7 overthrow of Castro which he, AMLASH, included in the
8 assassination of Castro, had full US support, were you aware
9 that Fitzgerald had done that?

10 Mr. Karamessines. Not at all.

11 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that on November 22nd the
12 case officer offered AMLASH a poison pen or some kind of
13 poison device?

14 Mr. Karamessines. No. I have heard of that in connec-
15 tion with publications in the papers subsequent to the
16 inquiries of the Senate. But I did not know of anything like
17 that, I was not kept posted on anything like that.

18 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a Cuban policy review
19 within CIA in early December 1963?

20 Mr. Karamessines. We had Cuban policy reviews from time
21 to time in the Agency. The one that I am most aware of is
22 the one in which I urged that we get the Forty Committee to
23 allow us to wrap up this Cuban program, because the budget
24 couldn't take it, and we weren't accomplishing a thing but a
25 waste of time and effort. And I ordered written and sanctioned

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091770

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

38

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091771

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 the papers that were written and present-d the papers down at
2 the Forty Committee. And the best we could get out of it was
3 that we could get rid of some of the ships and reduce some
4 of the expenses, but we were instructed to maintain a standby
5 capability anyway. And all of this must have taken place
6 about the middle of 1960s, 1963, 1966, it was before I became
7 DDP in 1967. But I don't have any specific recollection of a
8 policy review in December 1963.

9 Mr. Johnston. And you don't associate -- you had no
10 knowledge of a Cuban policy review that you would associate
11 with the Kennedy assassination?

12 Mr. Karamessines. No, no recollection -- I don't want
13 to say no knowledge, because you could produce something that
14 shows that I knew about such a thing. I just don't recall any
15 such.

16 Mr. Johnston. You were aware of the JM Wave Station that
17 existed?

18 Mr. Karamessines. In Florida, absolutely. I visited it
19 once on a brief trip to Miami.

20 Mr. Johnston. And did you know of Oswald's possible
21 connections with the Cuban groups, that he was a member of the
22 Fair Play for Cuba?

23 Mr. Karamessines. No, I didn't know about that until
24 after the assassination had taken place and the newspapers
25 printed up a lot of stuff about Oswald and the Fair Play

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

39

1 Committee, and I saw some of the material that the Bureau had
2 that we had on Oswald, I learned about it then, yes.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever recall any orders being
4 given to the Wave Station in Florida to use their sources to
5 assist the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

6 Mr. Karamessines. After the assassination had taken
7 place?

8 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

9 Mr. Karamessines. To assist in the investigation of it?

10 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

11 Mr. Karamessines. It wouldn't surprise me that such
12 orders were given. But I don't recall it. It would have been
13 appropriate to have asked them some questions about it if they
14 could be responsive. There may have been questions about the
15 local Cuban community with which Oswald might have been in
16 touch, in view of this fair business.

17 Senator Schweiker. If they did in fact do that which
18 flow of command would that have come from probably?

19 Mr. Karamessines. That would come up on the Special
20 Affairs Staff.

21 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a relationship between
22 the CIA and US customs agents in Florida in 1963?

23 Mr. Karmessines. I knew that the CIA had working
24 relationships with Immigration and Nationalization customs,
25 the FBI, and I don't know who all else, in Florida, in

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091772

TOP SECRET

40

1 connection with the Cuban refugee situation, I knew that.

2 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of it going farther than
3 that with regard to customs to the extent that the customs
4 agents were detailed to CIA operational use?

5 Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall it.

6 Senator Schweiker. Or that they were using customs
7 cover for the CIA agents?

8 Mr. Karamessines. That would not surprise me. I didn't
9 know it at the time, but if somebody told me that we were
10 using customs covers for some of our agents with customs
11 permission, that would not have surprised me. But I don't
12 recall knowing it at the time. We were using various covers.

13 Senator Schweiker. I asked you about David Phillips.
14 Did he work under your operations in any form when you were --

15 Mr. Karamessines. When I was DDP David Phillips was
16 in charge of our Chile operation. And he was in charge of
17 the Chili Task Force in the DDP.

18 Senator Schweiker. Were there any other operations
19 besides Chile that he worked for under you?

20 Mr. Karamessines. Well, he served in Latin America in a
21 variety of poses, and he served in the Latin American Division
22 here in Headquarters, the Western Hemisphere Division. But we
23 never worked together closely.

24 Senator Schweiker. Were there any Cuban responsibilities
25 that he had that you are aware of?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000091773

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

41

Phone (Area 202) 544-5000

7600031774

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any.

2 Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss with Mr. Helms or anyone
3 else the decision to make the CI Staff the point of contact
4 of the liaison with the Warren Commission?

5 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall such a discussion. It
6 may have taken place, but I have no recollection of it. But
7 making the CI Staff a point of contact for the Warren
8 Commission would have been a perfectly natural thing to do.

9 Mr. Johnston. And you have talked about it previously.
10 But why was it?

11 Mr. Karamessines. The reason that it would have been
12 the natural thing to do was because this matter, the
13 assassination of the President, concerned primarily the FBI,
14 the Secret Service and other agencies having a plain undisputed
15 unambiguous domestic security responsibility, and the Secret
16 Service of course, having the explicit responsibility for the
17 protection of the President. And we were organized in the
18 DDP so as to concentrate or focus our liaison activities with
19 the agencies I have just mentioned in the CI Staff. So that
20 seems a very natural place in which to vest this responsibility.

21 Mr. Johnston. But that left a hole from the CIA stand-
22 point because of the SAS counterintelligence being separate
23 from the CI Staff?

24 Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily. Because the CI
25 Staff, as a senior staff, had responsibilities which transcended

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

42

1 any of the divisions or the SAS.

2 Senator Schweiker. But wouldn't SAS have been the more
3 logical connecting point, because of the dealings with both
4 the pro and anti Castrol groups, in view of Oswald's
5 connection first with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and
6 second, with allegedly some of the anti Castrol Cubans?

7 Mr. Karamessines. Not really, because SAS's expertise
8 on any of this would have stopped dead after the first name
9 or two. It was the CI Staff that had the counterintelligence
10 files which would support the extensive investigation which
11 was conducted. SAS could never have done it because it didn't
12 have the files with which to do it. It wasn't its responsi-
13 bility.

14 Senator Schweiker. But Jim Angleton comes in and tells
15 us just about the same story that you are telling us, which
16 was the compartmentation they had, and the Cuban activities
17 per se really weren't under his province, they were over at
18 SAS?

19 Mr. Karamessines. Cuban activities, that is correct.
20 In other words, the Cuban activities means the conduct of
21 operations again Cuba largely, that is what it means. And
22 these operations were being conducted out of SAS largely, to
23 a smaller extent the WH Division, but largely SAS. Angleton
24 was right.

25 Senator Schweiker. But it almost looks as if whoever

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091775

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

143

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091776

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 set up that structure really didn't want to have any communica-
2 tion with Cuban activities and the Warren Commission.

3 Mr. Karamessines. No, I think that is absolutely wrong,
4 and I don't agree with that. I think you are wrong to believe
5 that.

6 Senator Schweiker. But they would have had the most
7 intimate knowledge of the very thing here that we flash as a
8 top secret message: "Arrest of Sylvia Dura is extremely
9 serious matter which could prejudice freedom of action on
10 entire question of Cuban responsibility." Who would know that
11 but SAS, and why not plug SAS into it?

12 Mr. Karamessines. But that didn't come from the CI
13 Staff, it came from the Western Hemispher Division.

14 Senator Schweiker. I understand. But here is the top,
15 priority at that point in that particular connection. My
16 only point was that since it was top priority message that
17 the best way to give the Warren Commission the knowledge it
18 needed to pursue in whatever way it might lead would have been
19 to have a pipeline to SAS. But from what we can find out no
20 such pipeline existed to the Warren Commission from SAS, in
21 fact if anything, there was a closed door between the SAS
22 and the Warren Commission. And Angleton keeps coming up with
23 -- and I believe him -- the same kind of answers you are
24 giving, well, I didn't know, and we didn't communicate, and
25 you will have to talk to them. So that the one logical and

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

44

1 most urgent top priority information was denied to the Warren
2 Commission.

3 Mr. Karamessines. The SAS, if that is what you are
4 focusing on, SAS's charter, if that is what you mean, I don't
5 know when they were put into business as SAS. For a long time
6 it was known as the Cuban Task Force W, that is it. And later
7 they were called SAS. I don't know when they were created,
8 or when they became one or the other. But I do know this,
9 that their responsibility was the conduct of what you might
10 call offensive operations against Cuba, intelligence and action
11 operations against Cuba. And that was their charter.

12 The President was assassinated by a fellow who has some
13 contact with the Fair Play Committee in Miami, and he is in
14 touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, and he is a former
15 Marine. I don't see how that would tie in with SAS at all,
16 in the absence of some indication that there was a tieup. But
17 I don't see the connection at all. And therefore I don't see
18 why one would get concerned about SAS not having been paraded
19 up to appear before the Warren Commission.

20 And I will tell you this. My clear recollection is that
21 there wasn't anything that we could provide the Warren
22 Commission as far as we were concerned that we didn't provide,
23 anything we were asked for, everything we could put in.

24 Senator Schweiker. Knowledge of the assassination
25 attempts against Castro?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091777

TOP SECRET

45

1 Mr. Karamessines. I didn't know about that. And I am
2 not sure that that would have changed matters any, really.

3 Senator Schweiker. Well, hypothetically it was certainly
4 one of the most logical motivation factors to have pursued as
5 an investigative unit.

6 Mr. Karamessines. I suppose. But in any case, any
7 information the Warren Commission asked for, or any of the other
8 agencies asked for they got, and I think the record will show
9 that they got in spades. I took the Warren Commission down to
10 the Registry of our building and explained to the Chief Justice
11 and to several members of the Commission how it was that we
12 were able to report as promptly as we reported on Oswald being
13 in touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico whenever it was,
14 September or October. And he couldn't understand how we could
15 have gotten that report out so quickly. And I showed him how
16 it is done automatically with the machines, and so forth.

17 Senator Schweiker. One of the Senators asked Director
18 Helms when he was before the Committee why he didn't provide
19 the Warren Commission with information about the assassination
20 attempts against Castro. And he said he wasn't asked. I don't
21 quite reconcile that with what you are just telling me, although
22 I know you can only speak for yourself, obviously. But it
23 just strikes me as peculiar that a key question like that was
24 a matter of being asked. So that is why I think there is a
25 gap with the SAS Section here. If they are the ones that are

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091773

TOP SECRET

46

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091779

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 counterattacks against Cuba, they are dealing with both the
2 pro-Castro Cubans and the anti-Castro Cubans. Here is a guy
3 that allegedly had some tie with the pro-Castro Cubans. What
4 better source of information than SAS? In fact they are the
5 only source. And Angleton said he had virtually no source,
6 and the FBI had very little. So the only people with a
7 knowledge was SAS and they never plugged into the Warren
8 Commission. That is the problem that is a peculiar thing.

9 Mr. Johnston. You were not aware of that problem at the
10 time?

11 Mr. Karamessines. I still don't consider it as a
12 problem. But I was not aware of it at the time as a problem
13 or otherwise. Any information that SAS might have had was
14 not locked off somewhere in another building with no allowed
15 access or anything like this. It was there, Angleton, I, the
16 Director, anybody, you know, could check names -- and names
17 were checked against their files continually. And this guy's
18 name, the information on Fair Play for Cuba and all that
19 business that we had, I will bet you money came from SAS's
20 files very likely. You see what I mean? This was accessible.
21 The only question you are raising is, why didn't somebody go to
22 the Warren Commission -- and that somebody should have been
23 SAS -- and tell the Warren Commission, you know, we tried to
24 kill Castrol a couple of years ago or last year, or whatever
25 it was. Isn't that what you are asking? I can't answer that

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

47

1 Question.

2 Senator Schweiker. In other words, that is really the
3 question. And the reason you can't answer it is that the
4 Warren Commission didn't know enough to ask the question.
5 You have Commissioner Dulles in there who instigated some of
6 these plots in 1959, and then Director Helms coming before
7 and not volunteering information.

8 Mr. Karamessines. I can't answer that question. But
9 I can assure you that SAS was not being kept locked up in the
10 back room somewhere, their files were not being sequestered
11 from the Warren Commission or anything like that, if you think
12 you are making a point.

13 Senator Schweiker. I see your point.

14 Mr. Johnston. How do you know their files weren't being
15 sequestered?

16 Mr. Karamessines. Well, I know whenever we needed to
17 get a run on any Cuban name or whatever, it would have been
18 run through their files, our Central Registrar, WH Division,
19 a check -- in other words, there would be a three or four way
20 check. And I remember one of the complaints at the time from
21 several of the people was, well, you have got to check this from
22 three or four different points to make sure you have covered
23 all the bases.

24 Mr. Johnston. Are you aware that at least one of their
25 files had a notation on it, do not remove from that office?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-5000

76000071730

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

48

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

76000071731

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Karamessines. Lots of files have notations like that.
2 Mr. Johnston. Dated December 1963?

3 Mr. Karamessines. That doesn't mean anything to me.
4 I wasn't aware of that. It doesn't mean anything to me,
5 because there are lots of files that have a stamp on them which
6 says, please don't take out of this office, you may consult
7 them. That is not significant to me at all.

8 Senator Schweiker. That is a routine procedure, you say?

9 Mr. Karamessines. It is not a routine decision. But
10 to me it doesn't have any special significance.

11 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the 1967 IG report on
12 assassinations at the time it was being prepared?

13 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

14 Mr. Johnston. Were you talked to by the Inspector
15 General?

16 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not, to my recollection.

17 Mr. Johnston. Were you informed about Mr. Helms meeting
18 with the President on the report?

19 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you know that there was such a meeting?

21 Mr. Karamessines. No, I did not. You are talking about
22 a meeting between Mr. Helms and the President in 1967 dealing
23 with assassinations?

24 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

25 Mr. Karamessines. The answer is no.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

49

1 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware -- and again in 1967 you
2 were Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, in the spring of
3 1967 --

4 Mr. Karamessines. I was ADDP, right. Mr. Fitzgerald
5 was the DDP.

6 Mr. Johnston. And in August of '67 --

7 Mr. Karamessines. I became the DDP.

8 Senator Schweiker. Who was the top Assistant to
9 Fitzgerald, who would have been right under Fitzgerald?

10 Mr. Karamessines. When he was DDP?

11 Senator Schweiker. No, when he was in charge of the
12 special action.

13 Mr. Karamessines. The Cuban thing?

14 Senator Schweiker. Yes.

15 Mr. Karamessines. I can't remember. You can get it
16 easily enough, but I just can't remember.

17 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in March and April of
18 1967 that the Inspector General's Office was conducting an
19 investigation of assassinations?

20 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

21 Mr. Johnston. And that they were talking to Mr.
22 Fitzgerald, who was your boss?

23 Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

24 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of any information the
25 FBI was receiving in 1967 regarding CIA assassination plots?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091783

TOP SECRET

50

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091737

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not.

Mr. Johnston. You were out of that stream of communications altogether?

Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. When you did become DDP did you then see the IG report?

Mr. Karamessines. No, I have not.

Senator Schweiker. They really compartmentalized that operation.

Mr. Johnston. Let me just once again recap: Were you knowledgeable of the course of the CIA investigation of the Kennedy assassination? You have indicated throughout your testimony today that you were kept abreast of those.

Mr. Karamessines. I was kept abreast of the activities that were taking place to support the investigation being conducted by the FBI and the Secret Service of the Kennedy Assassination. We were not conducting a separate, special investigation of the Kennedy assassination. But we were trying to get as much information as possible from our overseas posts that might throw any light whatever on who Oswald was and why he killed the President, and who put him up to it if somebody put it up to it. And I was fully familiar with the fact that we were knocking ourselves out trying to get to the bottom of those questions.

Senator Schweiker. In your recollection again, who

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

51

1 headed that up with whom? In other words, who headed it up
2 within CIA?

3 Mr. Karamessines. The Counterintelligence Staff, I
4 believe. Everything was -- I don't want to use the word
5 focus --

6 Senator Schweiker. You are saying that SAS would have
7 plugged into them to the extent --

8 Mr. Karamessines. If they had anything at all to
9 contribute, number one. And number two, the CI Staff was
10 the senior staff and could have at any time have gone to SAS
11 and said, we want this and that and that, check your files and
12 give us this or that. They were the senior staff.

13 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in 1963 --

14 Mr. Karamessines. Let me say one other thing. Mr.
15 Angleton very properly would say, SAS had its own thing, and
16 I didn't have much dealing with SAS. He didn't. He is sitting
17 up here somewhere. But Mr. Angleton doesn't always know what
18 the eight or one guys under him or doing, SAS and all these
19 others. But then thing float up to him. And he gets a report,
20 let's say, on Oswald, or somebody. It doesn't say, we have
21 got this from SAS's files. He just sees a report, it came from
22 the files.

23 So I can't fault Angleton for feeling as he does.

24 Senator Schweiker. I am not faulting him.

25 Mr. Karamessines. But I do think that it is wrong to

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

760000091734

TOP SECRET

52

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091735

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 suggest that somehow SAS was something that we completely
2 sequestered in connection with this whole Kennedy assassination
3 business. Because it is not true.

4 Mr. Johnston. When we get to any questions we have
5 asked you today about SAS's role you have indicated that you
6 don't know what they did. You do know what the CI Staff did.
7 And you do know what the Western Hemisphere Division did. But
8 you have testified that you don't know what SAS did.

9 Mr. Karamessines. I did not say that I didn't know what
10 they did. What I did say was that I was certain that SAS
11 would have contributed from their files, or from agent contact
12 in Miami, to the effort that was being made. And this would be
13 true of any other of the operating divisions. We might have
14 had a reflection of some activity in Timbuktu, or in some
15 South American or African division.

16 Mr. Johnston. You have previously testified that you
17 did not know about the meeting between Mr. Fitzgerald and
18 AMLASH.

19 Mr. Karamessines. I did not.

20 Mr. Johnston. And you said you did not know that on
21 November 22nd a CIA case officer met again with AMLASH and
22 showed him a poison weapon to use?

23 Mr. Karamessines. I did not, no knowledge whatsoever.

24 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether there was any
25 investigation made connected with any relationship between

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

53

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000091786

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 the AMLASH operation and the assassination of President Kennedy?

2 Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not.

3 Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any talk as to whether
4 AMLASH may have been a provocation agent?

5 Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not. I have no recollection
6 of anything like that.

7 Mr. Johnston. Would it be a relevant inquiry?

8 Mr. Karamessines. Well, I don't know. I didn't know
9 all that much about AMLASH. I would have to know a lot more
10 about AMLASH and the details of that operation to be able
11 to respond to that question.

12 Senator Schweiker. Going back to the structure of
13 understanding your functional definition of flow of lines of
14 authority, JMWAVE, would that have been under you, or SAS,
15 or how would JMWAVE have tied into this functional breakdown?

16 Mr. Karamessines. JMWAVE was the Miami extension of
17 activity against Cuba headquartered in our Headquarters, which
18 took place -- in the Cuban invasion, you know, they had a
19 station down there, I don't know whether they called it JMWAVE
20 at that time or gave it some other name. But there was a
21 group down in Miami, in that area, two or three groups,
22 probably, when they mounted the Cuban invasion in the Bay of
23 Pigs in 1961. And there continued to be an installation, one
24 or more installations like that, in that area down there. And
25 at one point it was called JMWAVE, and at another point it may

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

54

Phone (Area 202) 544-4000

76000091737

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 have been called something else. But this was the forward base,
2 the forward operational base of a headquarters group in
3 Washington which at one point was called Task Force W, and
4 at another point was called Special Affairs Staff.

5 Senator Schweiker. So this was really an extension of
6 that you are saying?

7 Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

8 Senator Schweiker. In 1963 time frame, October, would
9 that have been exactly the picture pretty well then? Was
10 that the Special Affairs Staff, was that in operation?

11 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

12 Senator Schweiker. So that would have been true. So the
13 overwhelming bulk would have come through SAS except for
14 coordination and some things that might have been done jointly
15 with a concurrent knowledge kind of thing?

16 Mr. Karamessines. You m-an from JMWAVE you are talking
17 about?

18 Senator Schweiker. Right.

19 The man in the picture at Mexico City, can you shed any
20 light on who that man in the picture was?

21 Mr. Karamessines. That was really a problem at the time.
22 I don't think we ever determined, did we?

23 Senator Schweiker. Nobody seems to know.

24 Mr. Karamessines. And then there was a lot of fuss
25 about a picture being provided by the Bureau -- that was a big

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

55

1 goof-up. I don't recall the details of that one, but I do
2 remember an awful lot of back and forth.

3 Senator Schweiker. That is where it was photographed.
4 There is no problem on that.

5 Mr. Karamessines. That is right.

6 Senator Schweiker. It just struck me as unusual that we
7 couldn't have ascertained who this guy was.

8 Mr. Karamessines. It isn't all that unusual, really.

9 Senator Schweiker. But you have a listening device
10 inside you certainly could have figured out.

11 Mr. Karamessines. I know, but that didn't hear everything
12 that went on everywhere.

13 Senator Schweiker. But you could have pretty well
14 figured somehow what there was that day just in business
15 transactions?

16 Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily. Let's say it was
17 a local agency of some kind, and he had instructions, and his
18 instructions were, you go in and the receptionist will
19 recognize you, you just walk right by her or him and walk down
20 the hall and go in Room 407. We don't happen to have a
21 listening device in 407, and he comes and goes and all we do
22 is get a picture of him. We don't know who he is. Sometimes
23 we can find out who he is by working with the locals. They
24 will help us. Other times if he makes repeated visits, then
25 you have got a chance to surveil him as he leaves and see where

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-5000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000091739

TOP SECRET

56

1 he goes and find out who he is. In this case we never did
2 determine who that person was.

3 Mr. Johnston. A couple of final questions. And forgive
4 me if I repeat, I am not sure whether we have got these on
5 the record or off. Where there any written orders to conduct
6 any kind of investigations into the Kennedy assassination that
7 you are aware of?

8 Mr. Karamessines. If I say I don't recall any, I do
9 not wish my answer to suggest that there weren't any. It
10 simply means that I do not recall any. It is likely that there
11 were, but I don't remember them.

12 Mr. Johnston. Any time did you receive an order from
13 Mr. Helms or anyone else above you not to investigate a certain
14 area or a certain question?

15 Mr. Karamessines. Never.

16 Mr. Johnston. That is all.

17 Senator Schweiker. That is all I have.

18 Mr. Johnston. He has never taken an oath.

19 Senator Schweiker. We will do the first thing last.

20 We appreciate your cooperation. And just for formality's
21 sake we would like to swear you in.

22 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given
23 is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
24 help you God?

25 Mr. Karamessines. I do.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-4000

76000091709

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

57

1 Mr. Madigan. I have a few questions I wonder if we could
2 put on the record, if Mr. Karamessines does not object to your
3 leaving.

4 Senator Schweiker. I think I will run along.
5 Would you mind a few more minutes?

6 Mr. Karamessines. No, it is all right.

7 Mr. Madigan. It is kind of an adjunct to this AMLASH
8 thing.

9 Mr. Karamessines. Okay.

10 Mr. Madigan. I want to ask you a few questions, Mr.
11 Karamessines, about a couple of areas that are involved
12 tangentially with the AMLASH situation, in that they take
13 place in the same time period, the first of which is with
14 regard to Howard Hunt. And as you may know, the Agency had
15 been trying to determine for sometime what Hunt's assignment
16 was in Spain in 1965, And that is the first area that I want
17 to ask you about. And my first question would be, do you
18 yourself know what Hunt was doing when he was assigned to
19 Spain?

20 Mr. Karamessines. Yes.

21 Mr. Madigan. As background I might recall for you that
22 he was as you know a staff employee up until June of 1965,
23 when he was assigned on a contract basis over to Spain, until
24 November of 1966, a 14 month period. And you were Assistant
25 DDP, I think at the time.

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091790

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

58

1 Mr. Karamessines. Mr. Fitzgerald had wanted us to have
2 an operational capability in Spain, divorced from, totally
3 divorced from, the official station in the Embassy. He
4 anticipated quite properly that one of these days Spain would
5 kind of begin coming apart at the seams with the death of
6 Franco, and that it would be necessary to have someone who knew
7 the language and who could get along with people, and who could
8 reasonably pass himself off as a retired former Service officer,
9 and one who could write, for example, as Hunt could write and
10 did write. And Hunt fitted the bill. And it coincided with
11 a period in time when Hunt's services weren't being, let's say,
12 eagerly sought in other parts of the Directorate. And this
13 seemed good solution. And he was sent to Spain for just that
14 purpose.

15 Mr. Madigan. And what was the purpose, to do what?

16 Mr. Karamessines. The purpose was to establish himself,
17 to fit into the community, and hold himself available for
18 operational tasks as they might be given him to do at some
19 point in time.

20 Mr. Madigan. Who did he report to?

21 Mr. Karamessines. He would report back to the offices
22 of DDP.

23 Mr. Madigan. Did he report to someone in particular?

24 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he reported to the DDP and to me.

25 Mr. Madigan. The DDP, then, would be Mr. Helms?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-5000

76000071791

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

59

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600091792

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Karamessines. No, Mr. Fitzgerald.

Mr. Madigan. Mr. Helms was then --

Mr. Karamessines. In 1965 to 1969 Mr. Helms was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Madigan. Now, did Hunt during that period have any association with ARTIME to your knowledge?

Mr. Karamessines. During that period of time? I don't know. I just don't recall. I know others of our people did. But whether he did or not I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Were you aware that they were close friends at the time?

Mr. Karamessines. I didn't know the Cubans all that well. I do know that Hunt was very active in the invasion of the Bay of Pigs thing in 1961. And I gather ARTIME was active in that also. So he would have known ARTIME very well, and he would have known a group of several others very well.

Mr. Madigan. What is your information or knowledge about Hunt's being in effect blocked for a position over there at that time by Woodward, who was then the Ambassador, because of prior problems in Montevideo? Does that ring a bell with you, or had you not heard of that?

Mr. Karamessines. I recall something like that, but I don't remember the circumstances and details of it. I can't throw any light on it.

Mr. Madigan. Did he file any written reports with your

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

60

1 office?

2 Mr. Karamessines. Hunt?

3 Mr. Madigan. Yes.

4 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he did. He sent in a paper to
5 me from time to time.

6 Mr. Madigan. What do you know about his writing spy
7 novels while he was over there?

8 Mr. Karamessines. He wrote a couple of them, which were
9 checked by us at Headquarters before they were sent to the
10 publishers.

11 Mr. Madigan. Was that part of the reason he was sent
12 over there?

13 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, that was part of the reason he
14 was over there. As I indicated earlier, he had a job of
15 setting up out in the boondocks -- he would act as a retired
16 Government Service fellow who was supplementing his income by
17 conducting an active business which we could prove to the
18 Spanish authorities if called upon to do so with a publishing
19 firm, that he was writing novels, books. And he did indeed
20 do that. And he wrote several books. I don't know how many
21 he wrote while he was in Spain. He may have written one or
22 two.

23 Mr. Madigan. I think three.

24 Is that a normal practice with regard to the Agency?

25 Mr. Karamessines. No, it is not, because we don't have

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000091723

TOP SECRET

61

1 that many publishable novelists onboard. But it is a good
2 cover, and you can use it, I mean you can use it palpably
3 and plausibly.

4 Mr. Madigan. The documents at the CIA indicate that
5 normally the cover relationship such as that would involve
6 the man receiving a certain salary, and just as if you had
7 a cover entity, the profits or whatever from his enterprise
8 would go back to the Agency, whereas in this case Hunt received
9 all the royalties, himself. Is there some particular reason
10 for that?

11 Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall what the arrange-
12 ments were. But I think the understanding was that if there
13 were any royalties of any significance we would talk about
14 how they should be split up.

15 Mr. Madigan. The documents also indicate that he had
16 done some writing for Allen Dulles, and that this was sort
17 of a promise that had been made that he would be allowed to
18 go abroad and write books.

19 Mr. Karamessines. I am not familiar with that.

20 Mr. Madigan. You never heard of that?

21 Mr. Karamessines. No, I am not familiar with that.

22 Mr. Madigan. Was his assignment over there in the
23 general course -- did everyone or the key people know about it,
24 or was it some special assignment that only yourself and a
25 few people knew?

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000091724

TOP SECRET

62

1 Mr. Karamessines. We kept it as quiet as we could keep
2 it, for obvious reasons.

3 Mr. Madigan. Did he do any work with the Franco people?

4 Mr. Karamessines. No. We tried to keep him away from
5 the Franco people.

6 You are talking about officials of the [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] Spain, is that what you mean?

8 Mr. Madigan. What about the opposition, the underground?

9 Mr. Karamessines. No, he was not instructed to go out
10 and seek contacts, he was instructed to hole himself ready
11 to serve as a servicing depot, a safe house, an intermediary,
12 if we wanted him to be an intermediary, or if a station
13 spotted certain situations in which it could not act but had
14 to have somebody outside who could act, so that it wouldn't
15 rub off on the station, he would be available for that kind
16 of task.

17 Mr. Madigan. The Chief of Station over there at the
18 time indicates that Hunt never did any operational assignments
19 for him.

20 Mr. Karamessines. That is correct.

21 Mr. Madigan. So these theoretical items that you listed,
22 such as providing safe house, and so on, he never did any of
23 those?

24 Mr. Karamessines. No sir. The occasion didn't arise
25 where he was called upon to do it. But he was put in place

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000091725

TOP SECRET

63

1 so that he would be available to do them if the situation arose.
2 And Mr. Fitzgerald felt very strongly that the Spanish
3 situation was going to develop faster actually than it developed
4 in the event.

5 Mr. Madigan. There are quite a few Agency documents
6 that contain the opinion that, as you may know, the Agency
7 looked into this matter and found that there was no operational
8 purpose for him being over there, and that he was simply over
9 there to write spy novels to increase the image of the Agency.

10 Mr. Karamessines. Well, that would come from individuals
11 who hadn't directly heard from Fitzgerald. I did. At the
12 time of Fitzgerald's incumbency he had studies made, and they
13 were available at the Agency, and this was very far sighted
14 of him. Several of us felt that we ought to do this and
15 studied matters on the suggestion of situations and what we
16 would be confronted with as a Government and as an [redacted]

17 [redacted] about eight or
18 10 or 12, areas. And [redacted] was practically at the top of the
19 list. He felt pretty strongly about it, and he felt this
20 would be one move where we would begin positioning ourselves
21 for the eventuality.

22 Mr. Madigan. What was the reason, then, that he was moved
23 out of there after a year?

24 Mr. Karamessines. I think he wanted to come home, he
25 got tired of it and wanted to come home, if I recall.

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000021796

TOP SECRET

64

1 correctly. I don't remember now.

2 Mr. Madigan. Let me ask you some questions on another
3 matter. And that is about a fellow by the name of Jack
4 Valenti. And you may have covered some of these in your
5 questioning. Did you have any knowledge while you were at the
6 Agency of any dealings that the Agency had with Jack Valenti?

7 Mr. Karamessines. None whatever. You mean Jack Valenti
8 in the White House?

9 Mr. Madigan. In the Motion Pictures?

10 Mr. Karamessines. None whatever.

11 Mr. Madigan. Do you know of any involvement between
12 the Agency and Valenti concerning the assassination of
13 President Kennedy?

14 Mr. Karamessines. None whatever, no information, no
15 knowledge --

16 Mr. Madigan. No meetings?

17 Mr. Karamessines. No. What are they? I am curious.

18 Mr. Madigan. These are just a bunch of random questions
19 I have. I am trying to complete our record here.

20 In 1971 and 1972 periods do you have any dealings with
21 Cuban exile activities in Costa Rica in the DDP?

22 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any. But we may have
23 had. You don't mean personally, do you, you mean the DDP?

24 Mr. Madigan. Do you have any knowledge of any generally?

25 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any myself.

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

TOP SECRET

65

1 Mr. Madigan. Do you ever recall being advised of or
2 learning of an effort in Florida to recruit people for Costa
3 Rican exercises under the guise of the Agency, some people down
4 there who were claiming to be representatives of the CIA when
5 in fact they weren't, having to do with the Cuban exile
6 movement in Costa Rica?

7 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall.

8 Mr. Madigan. Jumping back to the '65-'66 Spain period,
9 did you have any involvement yourself, or to your knowledge
10 did anyone in the DDP have any involvement with this fellow
11 that I mentioned earlier, Manuel Artime?

12 Mr. Karamessines. I never knew the man, never met him,
13 so I didn't have any involvement with him. And I can't tell
14 you now who in the DDP actually worked with him or handled
15 him or saw him or dealt with him. You mentioned earlier that
16 Hunt did, and I am quite sure that he did. I wouldn't be
17 surprised if Fitzgerald didn't know him pretty well, because
18 Fitzgerald had been intimate with Cuban activities.

19 And there would be a number of other DDP officers dating back
20 from the time of the Bay of Pigs situation and before who
21 would have been ware of Artime or might have worked with him
22 or handled him. But I never did.

23 Mr. Madigan. Did you ever know --

24 Mr. Karamessines. I wasn't in the States during that
25 period, remember that, I was overseas.

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000021720

TOP SECRET

66

1 Mr. Madigan. '65 and '66?

2 Mr. Karamessines. No, I am talking now about the Bay
3 of Pigs period, when Arttime and all the rest of these guys
4 came out of the woodwork, and that is how they came on the
5 blitzkrieg. I wasn't one of the fellows available to be in
6 touch with Arttime.

7 Mr. Madigan. But you were in the DDP in the '65-66 period?
8

9 Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I was in Headquarters then, yes.

10 Mr. Madigan. Have you any knowledge whatsoever about
11 an effort to try to promote the Agency's image by having some
12 of these novels Hunt wrote made into motion pictures and
13 television shows?

14 Mr. Karamessines. There was a lot of thought going to
15 trying to push some of these CIA novels of Hunt's. But
16 nothing ever came of it as far as I know. I believe Mr.
17 Helms or somebody up the line decided against it.

18 Mr. Madigan. And you didn't have any personal dealings
19 with him?

20 Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not.

21 You mean did I deal with the motion picture people?

22 Mr. Madigan. Or the TV people?

23 Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not.

24 Mr. Madigan. What time frame do you place it in your
25 recollection hearing about this?

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

76000091729

TOP SECRET

67

1 Mr. Karamessines. I guess it would have been '65-66,
2 in there somewhere.

3 Mr. Madigan. How about '72, that late?

4 Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall anything in '72 on
5 that, no sir. If something happened, I don't remember it.
6 I certainly never went around and tried to get anything like
7 that put into moving pictures. There would be speculation
8 once in awhile that the Director or something would say, the
9 Bureau does it, the Defense Department does it, and maybe we
10 ought to crank up a program or something like that. And Hunt
11 used to think that this would be a good idea. And whether
12 he was in touch with some people or not I just don't remember
13 now. He may well have been.

14 Mr. Madigan. How do you know that Hunt thought it was
15 a good idea? Did he talk to you about it?

16 Mr. Karamessines. Sure, absolutely.

17 Mr. Madigan. That is all.

18 Mr. Johnston. That is all. thank you.

19 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 4:25 p.m.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL