Hem I.a.

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# OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

| I. Identifying Information:  Name Central Intelligence Agency Telephone  Address Langley, VA  Type of Contact: Telephone  X Person  II. Summary of Contact:  Reviewed the 1967 IG Report. See attached memorandum. It should be noted that I reviewed the Report on Jan 5 but I did not receive my notes until Jan 10.  THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.  III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):  Obtain and Review an undeleted version of the report and, if possobtain and review the memorandum referred to in the report which are underlined in the attached memorandum. |                |   | DATE Jan10, 1978 TIME 2:30            |
|---|----------------|---|---------------------------------------|
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| attached memorandum   | obtain and rev | riew the memoranda referred to in the report  | which are underlined in the           |
|   | attached memor | Al .  |                                       |
| Signature: Keslu Wyllman RETURN TO CIA Form & Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce  | •              | Signature: Ablis Wyllinan                     | Rackground Use Only                   |


141-10406

To: G.B. Blakey

From: Leslie Wizelman

Date: 1/10/78

Re: Notes from the 1967 IG Report



The 1967 Inspector General's Report begins with the statement

This Reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or were put on paper from memory years afterward...

The Report states that "We can identify five separate phases in Agency assass-planning." (p2) and "Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime." (p3).

## The Five phases are:

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- 1- Prior to August 1960 during which all "identifiable schemes" with the possible exception of onere, were aimed at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or altering his appearance.
- 2-August 1960 to April 1961-plots were "aggressively pursued."
- 3-April 1961 to late 1961- a major scheme begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, "as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba."
- 4-Late 1961 to Late 1962- The August 1960 scheme was reactivated 5-"Late 1962 until well into 1963"- Aug 1960 scheme was terminated Two other plots originated but impractical and "nothing ever came of them."

## On page 4 the Report makes 3 points:

- 1- The elimination of a dominant figure may not change the government. This point was stressed by an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961.
- 2- The bringing about the downfall of a government always risks the the resort to assassination.
- 3- Synecdoche- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa, meaning when"the getting rid of Castro" statement is made, the speaker may not mean the assassination of Castro, but may mean a change in the government of Cuba. Semantics. The report implies this has led to some misunderstandings.

Page 6 discusses the delivery of the pen to Cubela.

Page 7 discusses a meeting of the Special Group (augmented) in Secretary
Rusk's office on August 10, 1962 when McNamera brought up the "liquidation
of Cuban leaders. Followed by the preparation of the Project Mongoose
Action memo prepared by Lansdale.

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Another meeting was held on July 31, 1964 to duscuss a Cuban exile plot. The Report states that the CIA refused funds and had no involvement. On page 7 the report states that the CIA twice (early 1961, early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. ganbling syndicate members. When the plot was aborted in 1961 the pills recovered. In 1962 the pills were passed by a gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who had been them sent to Cuba in May 1962.

In June 1962 the exile leader (Verona??) reported that a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

#### Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

- A. March to August 1960- During this period there were three or four schemes. The Report states that "None of those we interviewed who was first assigned ot the Cuban task force after the Bay of Pigs knows of any of these schemes." The Report does not specifically state who was interviewed. J. D. (Jake) Esterline was the head of the Cuban task force prior to the Bay of Pigs. One project discussed was an aerosol attack on a radio station, but nothing came of it. Consideration was also given to "psychic energizers." The contaminated cigars project was never carried out, according to Esterline, because of the "danger of blowback on the Agency." The use of a dipilatory was also considered.
- B. Gambling Syndicate operations— The Report states that "The first seriously pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960" and involved the gambling syndicate. There were two phases: August 1960 to late April or early May 1961 and April 1962 to February 1963.

#### Phase I

- a- In August 1960 Richard Bissell- DDP- asked Edwards, Director of Security if he could "establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba." The objective was stated as "clearly the assassination of Castro."
- b- the idea originated with J.C. King
- c- Maheu, Robert- contacted by Edwards. Maheu was described as a "private investigator who had done sensitive work for the Agency."

  He opened a private office in D.C. in 1956 after being a special agent for the FBI. arranaged to subsidize Mahue to the extent of \$500/month. The report states that "Over the years he has been intimately involved in providing support for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations."

At this point the report notes that they are "struck" by the fact that many of the names appearing in this report once worked for the FBI and lists \_\_\_\_\_\_, Maheu, Harvey, O'Connell, and E. Morgan.

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The Report states that "Maheu was authorized to tell Roselli that his "clients' were willing to pay \$150,000 for Castro's removal." (pl6)

- d- September 1960- O'Connell was Roselli's case officer and met with Roselli and Maheu in New York City on September 14. Roselli agree to introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold." At this point the Report refers to a memorandum prepared by Edwards, dated 14 May 1962, re money not paid to Giancana or Roselli. As of late September, 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of plan against Castro involving the Mafia. Edwards briefed Allen Dulles and General Cabell. Bissell committed \$150,000 for the support of the operation. On September 25, 1960, O'Connell and Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana at the Fountainbleau. O'Connell never met Joe (Trafficante) or Sam. The Report referes to an Office of Security Memorandum to the DDCI, dated 24 June 1966 which contains a summary of the operation. This memo is also referred to on pages 28 and 29.
  - e- Key dates- Jan. 7 1959- Casinos closed
    Jan.13 1959- Casinos opened for tourists
    Feb.17 1959- Cabinet (Cuban) authorized reopening
    Sept. 30, 1961- New York Times announces the last of the
    casinos were closed.
- f- Fall and Early Winter 1960- On August 16, 1960 the Chief of OD- Office of Medical Services received box of Cuban cigars to treat. reported the cigars were ready for delivery on October 7, 1960. His notes show delivery on Feb. 13, 1961 (p22)
- g-January-February 1961- Pills were chosen to kill Castro. The Report states that "Trafficante was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as who was then of the prime minister (Castro). The gangsters said that (Orta) had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed money."

  (Page 25)
  Page 27 is missing

|                | ition in the F  | rime Minister's   |  |
|----------------|---|---|--|
|                |   |   |  |
| n Miami and in | Washington. H   | le took refuge in   |  |
| cassy on       | and became  | the responsibility  | σf,  |
| ssy when       | broke relati  | ons with Cuba in  | -  |
| refused to g   | ive him a safe  | e conduct pass until  | L  |
| he was allowe  | d to leave for  | Mexico City. He   |  |
| in early       | •   |   |  |
|                | , while n Miami and in cassy on ssy when corefused to g | lost his position in the P, while planning for h Miami and in Washington. H bassy on and became ssy when broke relation to refused to give him a safe he was allowed to leave for | lost his position in the Prime Minister's , while planning for the operation was Miami and in Washington. He took refuge in cassy on and became the responsibility sy when broke relations with Cuba in orefused to give him a safe conduct pass until he was allowed to leave for Mexico City. He |

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| time of's fall from favor It seems, though, that the gangsters did know that had already lost his access to Castro."  |
|---|
| The June 24, 1966 summary memorandum, referred to on page three of this memorandum, states that "whenasked out of the assignment he suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success." Edwards and O'Connell do not know the replacement.  |
| h- March-April 1961   |
| The Report states   |
| "Following the collapse of the channel, Roselli   |
| told O'Connell that Trafficante knew of a man higher up in the Cuban exile movement who might do the job. He identified him as  |
| This statement is followed by a lengthy comment.  |
| "(Comment: Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante   |
| may have known of On 21 December 1960 the Bureau  |
| forwarded to the Agency a memorandum reporting that efforts   |
| were being made by U.S. racketeers to finance anti-Castro activities in hopes of securing the gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies in Cuba in the event Castro was overthrown. A later report of associates with those schemes had hired Edward K. Moss, a Washington public relations counselor, as a fund raiser and public relations adviser. Bureau Report alleged that Moss'Mistress wasJUlia Cellini, whose brothers represented two of the largest gambling casinos in Cuba. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in touch with through Moss and were reported to have offered large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding they would receive privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the Future." (p30) |

Page five

| Moss was granted covert security clearance in March 1959 for use by NE Division   |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|
| in his role as consultant to Indian Embassy and In November 1962 for use by CA  |  |  |  |
| staff under Project ZR/MAJOR program for explitation of political consultants.  |  |  |  |
| The report states that Trafficante approached and told them that he had   |  |  |  |
| clients who wanted to do away with Castro and they would pay big money. was   |  |  |  |
| very receptive. Roselli was to deliver money to for expenses.According  |  |  |  |
| to O'Connell it was \$50,000. (p31)   |  |  |  |
| The Report adds a Comment.  |  |  |  |
| (Comment: As a sidelight, Esterline says that, when he  |  |  |  |
| learned of the intended use of, steps were taken  |  |  |  |
| to cancel the plan. was one of the key figures in the   |  |  |  |
| Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in support of the  |  |  |  |
| approaching Bay of Pigs operation. If steps were in fact  |  |  |  |
| taken to endAparticipation in the syndicate plan, they were   |  |  |  |
| ineffective. It is clear that he continued as an integral part of   |  |  |  |
| t the syndicate scheme.) (p32)  |  |  |  |
| The Report states that "Little is known of the delivery channels beyond .   |  |  |  |
| was believed to have an asset inside Cuba"(p32)   |  |  |  |
| i- April-May 1961- The operation was called off after the Bay of Pigs, and remained dormant until April 1962.  Page 34 of the Report refers to a memorandum of 14 May 1962 in which Edwards states that knowledge of the operation was limited to six people.  Dulles, Cabell, Bissell, Edwards, O'Connell, Esterline, Chief TSD,, Chemical Division, TSD, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services, William Harvey, Chief, FI/D, and Special Assistant to the DDP.( name was encounted repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the Operation in 1960-61.), Bannerman,DDS, J.C. King, Robert Maheu, Roselli, Giancana, Trafficante., the man originally selected to poison Castro, Cuban exile leader, the of who is known to have been involved with him closely during this time. (p35) In May 1962 R.Kennedy and Lawrence Huston learned of the operation. Those now knowledgeable- Edward P. Morgan, Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, C.J. WArren, Rowley, Pat Coyne, executive secretary of PFIAB, Ramsey Clark and various members of the FBI. |  |  |  |
| PHASEII  a- Harvey was briefed in Feb. 1961 and placed in charge of developing an Executive Action capability- ZR/RIFLE. The asset was QJ/WIN who had been recruited earlier by for use in a pecial operation in the Congo (the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.)  |  |  |  |
| b- On November 15, 1961, Harvey has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba. Harvey took over Cuba task force.(p   |  |  |  |

c- February-March 1962- Harvey recalls first meeting with Edwards on subject of Castro operation. (After Harvey left Task Force W and was winding up he wrote a memo to Chief, FI staff, dated June 27, 1963 stating that the original justification for employing QJ/WIN no longer existed and raising the question of QJ/Win's termination. QJ/WIN was terminated 21 April 1964) (p40, 41)

## d-April 1962

Harvey briefed Helms on meetings with Roselli.(p41) "Edward's records show that on 14 May 1962 Harvey called Edwards 'and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Roselli for the future." (p42) Harvey believes he took over "a going operation." O'Connell now believes there must have been "something going on between april 1961 and April 1962." (p43). On April 8 and 9, 1962 O'Connell and Harvey met Roselli at the Savoy Plaza Hotel in NYC. O'Connell says Maheu was present but Harvey disagrees. (p44) There is a large deletion on page 45 following the statement mentioning Phyllis McGuire, Dorothy Kilgallen, and Liberace at the Copacabana. Harvey recalls another meeting of O'Connell and Roselli in D. C. in April 14. O'Connell was in Miami with Roselli and Harvey as late maybe as April 27. O'Connell was assigned on June 1962 PCS to Oknawa. 3-17 Harvey says he arrived in Miami on 21 April 1962 and found Roselli already in touch with , the Cuban exile leader who had participated in phase one. (p47). Santos and Giancana were no longer involved. "Roselli now had a man known to Harvey as Maceo, who also used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy." He was a Cuban who spoke Italian. (p48) \_\_\_requested arms When the pills were given to \_\_\_\_\_ through Roselli, and equipment needled for support. Harvey with the help of , the chief of the JM/WAVE station, procured explosives, detonators, 20 .30 caliber rifles, 20 .45 caliber hand guns, 2 radios, and one boat radar. (p49) Harvey and rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name, loaded it with arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. Keys given to Roselli "Evidently Harvey and for delievery to Maceo, to \_\_\_\_\_, or to \_\_\_\_\_. Roselli had not yet come to trust each other. Perhaps fearing a double-cross, each set about independently to assure himself that the equipment reached the proper hands. After parking the truck, Harvey and kept the parking lot under surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselli, accompanied by O'Connell, did the same. Neither pair knew that the other was watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. (Does not say by whom). It was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says that never knew to whome delivery was made nor for what purpose. was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded." (p 50)

e- May 1962- Roselli reports pills were in place.

f- June 1962- Roselli reports to Harvey on 21 June that \_\_\_\_had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba.



- g-September 1962- Harvey says Roselli was in Miami on September 7th and 11th.

  ready to send in another three man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard.
- h- Sept. 1962- Jan 1963- Harvey was in Miami between 22 Dec and 6 Jan.Says Roselli and Maceo met with him many times. Harvey and Roselli had telephone discussions of operations between January 11 and 16th. The Report states that "AS far as Harvey knows, three Militia men never did leave for Cuba. He knows nothing of what may have happened to the three reported to have been sent to Cuba." (p52)
- i-February 1963- Harvey in Miami Feb 11-14. Left word for Maceo that there was nothing new and it looked like it was all over. Feb 15 Harvey left Miami to meet Roselli in L.A. Roselli agreed that he would continue to see \_\_\_\_\_, gradually reducing the frequency of contact until there was none.
- j-June 1963- Roselli met with Harvey in D.C.-Dulles Airport. Stayed with Harvey.
- k- People knowledgeable of Phase VII;
  Helms, Harvey, O'Connell, Edwards, King, Harvey's deputy in 1962, Chief of JM/WAVE, TSD, , Maceo.
- 1- Operation linked perhaps through:
  Roselli to Maheu; Maheu to Morgan; Morgan to Pearson; Pearson to
  Warren to President; Warren to Rowley; Rowley to Pat Coyne; FBI to
  Ramsey Clark (p56)
- m- Late 1961- Early 1962- Wiretapping incident.
- n- May- June 1966- Long Committee

Page 72 is missing or deleted-can't tell.


Page 71- Maheu's backgound- he was hired in 1954 and 55 by Greek shipping magnate, Niarchos to help in a "financial tussle" with Onassis.

Page 72-"O'Connell stated that at one point in the negotiations with the Long Committee Maheu indicated that he might brief his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, fully about his post activities so that Morgan would be able to decide how best to represent him."

Schemes in Early 1963- Fitsgerald took over Cuban Task Force- Jan 1963 skin-diving suit booby trapped sea shell Amlash - March 9, 1961 and March 28, 1961

| The Report sta               | ates   |
|------------------------------|--|
|                              | An asset of the Miami Station reported that <u>a</u> and <u>a</u> wanted to defect and needed help in escaping.  ( was the gangster's'man inside Cuba' with access to Castro in lethal pill operation— Phase One.) Headquarters expressed interest in exfiltrating <u>and</u> . Called off because of report that Cuban police knew. (This is one of three name—links found in AMLASH file between <u>and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodesIf was in fact one of the gangsters' assets inside Cuba, that fact was unknown to either the CIA officers running the gangster episodes or to hose handling)  (p80)</u> |
| On Page 91 of                | the Report in states that under the date Nov 20, 1963  Thus far, this account of the project has been based almost wholly on documents found in the project file. Beginning here is an account of an episode in the operation on which there is no documentary evidence has a record of nine contacts and their dates; otherwise, this summary is drawn from the recollections of those involved.  |
| Amlashes case much of the de | officer, Sanchez, distinctly recalls thatdidn't think evice. (p93a)  |
|                              | 7, 1964 (ARtime) and Noel) or (Cubela) met for the first d. On Dec 30, 1964 they met again. On March 15, 1965 The Madrid Stateion cabled that one had arrived in Madrid from Cuba on March 15 and had been introduced to a station officer claimed to be   |
| in                           | in contact with a group of Cuban military leaders who were planning to eliminate Castro and take over the government. It quickly became clear that he was referring to   |





Page nine

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People involved in plot to kill Castro as reported from first day trial proceedings and dispositions;

Ramon Guin Diaz-25 years
Rolando Cubela Secades-25 years
Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta- 20 years
Alberto Blanco Romariz- 20 years
Juan Alsina Navarro- 10 years
Guillermo Cunill Alvarez- free
Angel Herrero Veliz- free

Page lll-entitled "Discussion of Assassination at High-level meetings" DELETED

P120- O'Connell briefed CIA on source of Pearson's story.

- 1- Maheu briefed Edward p. Morgan on Maheu's participation
   in phase one
- 2- Maheu knew nothing of Phase 2
- 3- Morgan and Roselli were acquainted. Roselli was steered to Morgan by H.M Green spun, editor and publisher of Sun
- 4- Garrison, Morgan and Roselli were all in Las Vegas at the same time March 1967. O'Connell stated "It is our impression that Greenspun was also involved in the conversations."

The Report blames Roselli for the leak.

The Report concludes with a discussion of what should be done.

One question is asked- "Should we try to silence those who are talking or might later talk?"

The answer begins "It appears to us that this tactic offers little chance of success. For one thing, the story is already out and probably in about as full detail as it ever will be." (128)

<u>\_\_.</u>