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## BACKGROUND

In April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale is detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings, but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. Those officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no evidence of a foreign conspiracy." (p. 7, Book V)

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer, at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possible relevant information. ("Relevancy" is, of course, the "buyword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.) On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ....The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (p. 10, 1977 Report)

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It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance to the work of the Warren Commission of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts and to resolve the parties controversy as to the operations' importance. Instead, this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in the CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-1963. Certain influences and conclusions will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivation of the syndicate participants in the operations.

INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CIA PLOTS  
TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO

The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.\* (1967 IG Report, p. ; Interim Report, p. 74) Edwards assigned the specific tasks of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu,\*\* who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Roselli's name for consideration, there was a meeting between Maheu and Roselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960. (Interim Report, p. 75)

Comment: Maheu seems the logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In the

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\*\* Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp. 74-75, Interim Report.

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Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that: "Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip." Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was, in fact, a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.")

(Comment: Confirmation of the earliest Maheu-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Roselli.) (See Roselli Write-up)

(Comment: Maheu and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.)

Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details. (Interim Report, p. 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 November 1970) Although the Inspector General's Report placed the meeting at the Plaza Hilton on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that the discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

(Comment: Tony de Varona admits going to New York City at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or (testimony of de Varona) that his visit had an assassination motivation. According to a 19 November 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd.")

0002151 (Comment: The timing of the introduction of both Giancana ('Gold') and Trafficante ('Joe') is important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According to the 1967 IG Report, the entrance of Giancana took place "during the week of 25 September 1960"... (1967 IG Report, p. 18))

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p. 76, does not fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but (although it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p. 76)) because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IG September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the initiation in November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October

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18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated 18 October 1960, which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro". (FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 from Hoover to Bissell, Interim Report, p. 79)

(Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately below.)

(Comment: Although the 1967 IG Report stated that "Maheu pointed out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Gold' or 'Joe'", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who was using the name 'Jim Olds'," said he had met 'Sam' and 'Joe', once, and then only briefly. (O.C. 5(30)75, pp. 26-29; Interim Report, p. 77))

(Comment: Conflicts appear also on several relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in New York City and Miami. For instance:

1. Did Roselli know from the beginning that the operation was CIA?

a. O'Connell stated that Maheu told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA (Interim Report, p. 76). Also, footnote 1 on page 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about three weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I am not kidding. I know who you work for."

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA initiation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and Trafficante could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2. Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some business interests of Wall Street that had... nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/75, pp. 9, 17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of January 19, 1971, which stated that "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy?....None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

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In Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3. The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, although it is possible that the Senate Committee staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Roselli, et. al, until approximately March 1961. Whatever, the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. (Interim Report, p. 77, fn. 1)

The principals in Phase I of the operation also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a 'key' role, (Maheu, 7.2.975, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli, 6/24/75, p. 15) (Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open to question.) Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged recountment of Giancana's due to his "knowledge of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 November 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 IG Report and Senate Interim Report state that "'Gold' identified 'Joe' to Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there". (IG Report, p. 19; Interim Report, p. 77) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 IG Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business".

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(Comment: This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October 1, 1959, and received that document in Havana on February 1, 1960. (See Trafficante file, State Department) No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department, or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during this period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp. 4-53, Oct. 1, 1977) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point even below Giancana's. He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Roselli's 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in 1963 by the principals.

(Comment: The Senate testimony of Trafficante and Roselli needs to be outlined with a view to contrasting the "courier vs. interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross-examine either man on this discrepancy nor did the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.)

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method to be employed to accomplish the foal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight-forward approach of shooting Castro, but this plan was rejected by Giancana. In a comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that would be put into Castro's food and drink...Trafficante (Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to received kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. (I.G. Report, p. 25)

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(Comment: The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill modus operandi originated with Giancana, not the Agency, a point which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below. Secondly, Trafficante is identified as having access to and providing for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-serving role description of "interpreter". His ability to recruit Orta apparently was directly tied to his former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his alleged conduct both during and after his Cuban days.) (See Trafficante profile.)

(Comment: Speculation concerning Orta's role arose during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "the third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidels' private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana).

What was disturbing to the writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman profile) Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob relationships is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Orta in receiving gambling kickbacks.①

A second aspect of Meskill's news series concerned a claim of Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's". (Memo, Hoover to DCI A.H., DD 10/18/60)

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

(p.21) It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...."

Additional considerations:

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1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been on-going, when CIA reactivated plan in 1962, April.

2. Syndicate operators could have had activities such as these in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of the syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation with Orta, it was not CIA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orta returned there.

Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency processed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Roselli. (Interim Report, p. 80) The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Roselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February-early March 1961. (Interim Report, p. 27; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon whose memory was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante and the Cuban." (Interim Report, p.81) Shimon's story is filled with vivid details, which are documented on p. 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as his account is not shared by anyone else connected with the plan nor is his relationship with Roselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Roselli as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few weeks later.

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The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to SHIMON before his "leak" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.) *Also, Orta was present in the CIA office in early 1961 (not 1960)*

(Comment: One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington"...It would seem though that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27)

With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Roselli told O'Connell that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 29; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The exile leader was, of course, Tony de Varona, who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961 associating him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which pre-dated the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction into the CIA-mob plots, de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

Interest in de Varona was also being expressed in 1960-61 by Mike McLaney whose advertising agency was engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McLaney's friend "Chirri" or "Chilli" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate.))

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini, McLaney and Lansky business associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington, D. C. public relations firm, Edward K. Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that this group would have "privileged treatment 'in the Cuba of the future.' Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 30)

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The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a mutiny in Miami in approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to "educate the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. (See Varona transcript.)

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, probably independently, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. De Varona was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. Government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Varona testimony).

Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona, Roselli, Giancana and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960's. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously recruited Gener, but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba, and Roselli's admission to O'Connell that Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta, who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

(Comment: Paralleling the situation at the Senate hearings during 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role changed from his "courier" characterization in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was an intermediary with de Varona only for Roselli. The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure. (Cf. Fonzi interview with Gener, May , 1978 and Trafficante testimony, October 7, 1977.))

If ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination plots, more confusion surrounds de Varona's actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I.G. Report indicates that de Varona attempted a second poisoning before the Cuban invasion but Roselli was positive that only one attempt<sup>2/15/78</sup> (Orta's) was made. He was also positive that he delivered

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both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... (de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... (Orta)... to administer the poison.

(Comment: There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts, especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Varona transcript).)

(Comment: The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots while continuing his post on the Revolutionary Council. However, "steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but (they) were apparently ineffective." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 32))

## PHASE TWO

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation." (I.G. Report, p. 33) The exact details of what that operation might have been has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona was to provide the individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

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First: In Phase One, Rosselli, et. al., demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source, who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the putative assassins was deliberately vague. After Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food (which involved) an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 47) By June, 1962, after Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills into Cuba, "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned their names or anything about them." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51)

(Comment: As the 1967 I.G. authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity was familiar in that Edwards had described precisely the same plan." The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

1. Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an on-going operation in April 1962; or
2. The mob had been using de Varona before, during and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
3. De Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directions from organized crime.)

Second: The cast of underworld characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy.

(Comment: "Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history, without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" with the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

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Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes "Maceo" as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

The termination of the CIA-Mafia plots was slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey that the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan. (Interim Report, p. 84)

During September 1962, Rosselli related to Harvey that de Varona was readying a second three-man team who were "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period, the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51) However, the second team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and January, 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected \$2,700 for the maintenance of these individuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harvey. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52)

In mid-January, 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52) Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting between Harvey and Rosselli occurred in Washington, D. C. in June 1963, when he was Harvey's overnight guest. However, their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots.

*Comment: Harvey and Rosselli continued their plotting in 1967-71*

#### CONCLUSION

The available evidence suggests the thesis which, in part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way...In a sense, CIA might have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." (1977 I.G. Report, p. 20)

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The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 October 1960 re: Giancana ELSUR:

...Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions...Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. (1977 I.G. Report, p. 19)

Comment: Although the dates of initial meetings between Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana are subject to different interpretation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties until sometime after October 18, 1960, the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February-early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their private plot actually worked, and Castro died, then the syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their intrigue back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their government.

Additional Comment: The actions of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain, raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission to the FBI that he had joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Giancana's payroll, Cain's approach to the CIA Chicago Office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer information on the Cuban community appears a little more than coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life Magazine (one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story), the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the FBI memo of October 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

(Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing

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second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of October 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point.)

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August, 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. Interestingly, Cubela was the former head of the Director's in Cuba when he was a major power in deposing Batista.

In September, 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture", a directive which is subject to several interpretations, including the fact that the CIA was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the Chief Investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of the Potential Assassin(s)

In describing the putative poisoner, Giancana spoke in October 1960 of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

It was common for American gamblers to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

(Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness, to say the least, and her potential as a assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship

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with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment: Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome, however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1967 I.G. Report (p. 28), Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta receipted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them". (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27) If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility exists, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises, then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase Two of the operation which began in April 1962, the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "on-going operation", then it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated CIA participation according to FBI memos of 21 December 1960 and 18 January 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With the resumption of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts, Rosselli and "Maceo".

Due to the loose structure of Phase Two in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that activities were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of interest or ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly,

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the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new opportunity for ~~belly~~ operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

Despite the relatively useless business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along". First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of this strategy at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu

- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966. (Interim Report, p. 79, note 3; Interview Edward P. Morgan)
- Solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization. (Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in November 1960 and was himself in an alliance with the CIA which, in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent.) (Interim Report, p. 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?)
- Dispute with Hughes. See memo 20 May 1971 in Office of Security file on Edward P. Morgan.

2. John Rosselli

- Avoiding criminal prosecution. (Interim REport, p. 85, note 4)
- Use in legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence.
- Attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included Jack Anderson's personal intervention with IRS. (See Anderson Interview; CIA Rosselli file; CIA Office of Security file re: Edward P. Morgan)

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3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.
- Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re: possible deportation. (See Tab C Rosselli CIA file, stating that only Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and Houston know.)
- Attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 129)
- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Giancana and Rosselli have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 131)

NOTES RE: JACK ANDERSON  
"CASTRO RETALIATION" THEORY

March 3, 1967)      Drew Pearson article  
March 7, 1967)

Source:

1. 1967 I.G. Report:

- It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients. (p. 126)
- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from nits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source, Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked. (p. 126)

Impact

The Rosselli-                      contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination

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in retaliation for U. S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this. (p. 127)

Maheu

Does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion.

-- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team.

Comment: Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the three-man team initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the three-man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase One.

Comment: In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

-- If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. (p. 125)

Since Agency cannot figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to Morgan, who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun (and Pearson).

Comment: Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies: the story of the pills and the fact of the State Department meeting. (p. 127)

Comment: See p. 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Department of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p. 112)

(RFK was not present.)

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2. Other Sources

## a. Memo re: 15 February 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident." (Memo in Office of Security file re: Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971  
Subject: Intertel

Mr. Al Pease [ (former CIA) ] now with Intertel, said Maheu and Anderson together on some oil mix deals...Recent exposure of Anderson re: Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary. Pease's theory is that Maheu probably would "scare them off" (i.e., Intertel would not want CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes).

Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA (Memo in Security file re: Morgan).

4. Memo - 19 November 1970

-- Harvey had contacts with Rosselli in November-December 1967 and January 1968 following Rosselli Conviction.

-- 17 November 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who represented Rosselli that Rosselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally."

## 5. 19 December 1967

-- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention

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directly or at least discover how good Government case against Rosselli was.

- Calls from Rosselli began in October to Harvey. Rosselli knew what Agency had done for Maheu with Senator Long because Ed Morgan told Rosselli.
- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a news clipping re: Agency use of Giancana (presumably the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy Smith).

Rosselli said that the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story.
- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase One operation due to Agency delaying on Long Committee subpoena.
- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes.
- Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter phase of ~~operation~~ and said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962.
- Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950's.
- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Garrison in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Rosselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances.
- Rosselli under pressure from FBI, drinking heavily and had a 19-year-old girl.
- Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan.

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-- Morgan also tight with Pat Cayne of NSC.

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# Back Ground

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(SSC) In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CPT and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its ~~present~~ attempts on the life of <sup>the</sup> premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~presented~~ <sup>described</sup> on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P7  
Book II  
have "Senior CPT officials who should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro communications. They should have realized that CPT operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an extensive hunt without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPT had no

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000279 evidence of a foreign conspiracy?

SSC Stung by the Senate criticism and the "reptiling effect" that Book II ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the C.I.A. prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Ford Report. Ironically even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the C.I.A.'s <sup>unusually</sup> response to the Warren Commission's quest for all <sup>possible</sup> relevant information. ["Relevancy" is, of course, the "buzzword" upon which <sup>both</sup> the Senate and Agency each base their position <sup>on the importance</sup> of the anti-Castro plots to the Communis work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that: "10

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. C.I.A., it could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement <sup>SECRET</sup> in the assassination (get) because of tension of the time.

..... The Agency should have

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P 10  
1977 ~~Final~~  
Report

taken broader initiatives, then,  
as well."

*Conflicting* It is not the purpose of  
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the  
viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA  
with regard to the significance  
of the CPTA's Castro ~~involvement~~  
attempts and to resolve <sup>the parties</sup> ~~the~~  
controversy as to <sup>the operations</sup> ~~the~~ importance.  
~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks  
to present a comprehensive  
review of all the facts, drawn from  
a variety of sources, of organized  
clandestine involvement or potential  
involvement in CPTA operations  
against Cuba during 1960-63.  
Certain influences and conclusions  
~~the~~ will then be drawn upon  
the nature, scope, and motivation  
of ~~the operations~~ of the syndicate  
participants in the operations.

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Involvement of Raymond Maim in  
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the <sup>utilization</sup> ~~use~~ of the United States criminal syndicate & the ~~CIA~~ <sup>attempt</sup> to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.<sup>+</sup>

[1967 IG Rpt. p. ; Interim Rpt p 74, <sup>comment</sup>]

Edwards assigned the specific task of breaking the right path to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahon <sup>who</sup> ~~was~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

<sup>+</sup> [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Prison Duty Station in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [Interim Report, p 75]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the



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logical person to have thought of and contacted Rosselli for several reasons. In an office of Secretary in St Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCD dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Rosselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machines on the Strip! Mahan stated that, if Rosselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had extensive dealings with the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

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Comment

Confirmation of <sup>the</sup> earliest Mahan - Rosselli contact is found in Rosselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Rosselli work-up] from Mahan to Rosselli

Comment

Mahan and Rosselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960. [See Mahan's report, p. 10, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.]

date?

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahan and Council to discuss further details.

[ Defense Report p. 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970 ]

Although the Dujeanowski Report places the meeting at the Plaza Hotel on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~actual~~ discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

[ Comment:

Tony de Varona admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [ Festung of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation ]

p. 3

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahan) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

[ Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~varona~~ <sup>varona</sup> (Gold) and Traffim ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. Randy

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77 to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~ of biancana took place <sup>④</sup> during the week of 25 September 1960:.....

[ 1967 I. G. Report, p 18 ]

In contrast, the SSC Inform Report at p. 76, does not ~~state~~ <sup>for</sup> biancana's initial appearance <sup>was</sup> ~~it was~~ "cutting prior to October 18." (p 76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I. G. September date and Mahen's Senate testimony which set the introduction in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Inform Report reasoned that biancana had been introduced to the Mahen "prior to October 18" because the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSA quoting biancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro <sup>④</sup> FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Horro to Bissell; Inform Report, p 79 ]

[ Comment:  
Each ~~of~~ dual reasons listed in the

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Inform Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the below.~~

[ Comment:

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Although the 1967 I. G. Report said

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that "Mahan counted out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Gold' or Joe"; the Tribune Report disparaging this observation by assuming that O'Connell's words were merely an attempt to say that "the support which was working the name 'Gold' was not 'Sam' and Joe, me, and them out fairly".

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~~Comment~~  
Several  
Conflicts appear also on ~~the~~  
ward must not be overlooking  
the September 19th meeting in  
N.Y. and Mexico. For instance:

N.Y.C. and Mexico. For instance:  
 1) Did Roselli know from the beginning  
 that ~~there~~ the situation was CPT?  
 a) O'Connell stated that Malibu  
 told Roselli that they were representing  
 international business interests rather  
 than Roselli testified that Malibu told them  
 that O'Connell was CPT [In turn Roselli  
 told, first time, on p. 76 in details  
 that Roselli had O'Connell "about  
 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which  
 is during the Malibu involvement of Roselli,  
 that "I am not hiding, I mean  
 will you wait for". The importance of Roselli's testimony  
 of CPT ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> definition is that it is  
 doubtful if Roselli had sufficient

The importance of British recognition  
of a ~~new~~ <sup>new</sup> position is that it is  
doubtful if Government had felt want

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could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer critics of Wall Street that had... rich interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that (4) Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

Inf. Anderson's source for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Harry, who was not privy to the details of Phase F, it is another ~~example~~ <sup>example</sup> of serious discrepancies <sup>which exist</sup> between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "seriously discrepancy" by Mahan and O'Connor as to the ~~precise~~ identification of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is



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Mahan, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed  
 his job as "to locate someone in  
 Castro's entourage who could  
 accomplish the assassination", Roselli  
 downplayed Bonanno's part to  
 that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli  
 6/24/75, p. 15) ~~All of the individuals who~~  
 In either Roselli received a message  
 from Bonanno's murder four  
 days before Roselli's Senate appearance  
 is open for question. Roselli's  
 characterization of Bonanno's role  
 as minor <sup>is</sup> in contrast to  
 his alleged <sup>recruitment of</sup> ~~recruitment of~~ Bonanno's  
 "knowledge of the Cuban word" which  
 the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficants' involvement  
 in Phase I is even more justified by the  
 available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report of  
 Senate Internal Report ~~also~~ state that "  
 "bold" identified "Joe" to Mahan  
 as a man who would serve  
 as a courier to Cuba and  
 make arrangements there" (Feb. Report  
 p. 19; Internal Report, p. 775). To  
 support the description of Trafficants  
 as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~  
 Internal Report quotes p. 19 of the  
 1967 Feb. Report in stating that  
 "At that time, the gambling casinos  
 were still operating in Cuba  
 and Trafficants was making  
 regular trips between Miami  
 and Havana on syndicate business."

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Comment <sup>factually</sup>

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records <sup>of other agencies</sup>. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffante applied for a passport <sup>in Cuba</sup> on October 4, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960.

(See Traffante File, State Dept). ~~None~~ ~~was~~ ~~used~~. No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and State~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffante during the period. Dr.

recalled ~~Traffante~~ testified that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and

placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release <sup>from prison</sup>. Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 1, 1970. His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos <sup>in Havana</sup> were either closed or operating in the mid-1960s, and two extensive reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~visiting~~ during the pre-Payoff Big game period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of ~~Reese~~, however, Traffante's role had diminished to a point



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even below Biancanas, <sup>from "courier"</sup> he had been reduced to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ <sup>communications</sup> between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. ~~Initially~~ <sup>Initially</sup> Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dove tail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as they were being reported in 1963 of the principals.

### Comment 8

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~specifically~~ <sup>specifically</sup> with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not rigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this <sup>SECRET</sup> plan was rejected

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by Bincaena. In a Comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Bincaena was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Bincaena stated a preference for lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. (Significant) (Joe: the courier) was ~~in touch~~ in touch with a ~~disposable~~ Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangster said that Orta had once been in a position to receive backhanded from the gangster interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

### Comment

The observations of the 1967 F.B. Report ~~are~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~inspired~~ <sup>inspired</sup> ~~vigilance~~ <sup>vigilance</sup> with Bincaena, not the Agent; a prison

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which is cited to the final conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappante is identified as ~~person~~ <sup>putative</sup> having access to and providing the assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-serving role description of "infiltrator". His ability to recruit into apparently ~~as~~ was directly tied to his former gambo empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his alleged conduct for Trappante both during and after his Cuban days. [See Trappante profile]

### Comment

Speculation concerning this role arose during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Stuper, written by Paul Mushkin of the New York Daily News. Stuper was quoted as saying, "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro office. Fidel had access to the Rome Menzies office," Stuper said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Soto. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." <sup>SECRET</sup> American Embassy in Havana. What was his job for the

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writer of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Trappento and with a "gamby partner" of Trappento, Norman Rothman (See Rothman Papers). Coupled with Stugis' <sup>alleged</sup> ~~past~~ relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gamby casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Onta in running gamby "high balls".

A second aspect of Mushko's ~~news~~ news series concerned a claim by Maria Joreng that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro who dove tailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on prominent electronically surveilled curriculum in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' <sup>SECRET</sup> some drink or food of Castro" (Memos, Harris to DCI, 10/10/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own anyway prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been ongoing when CPTA was active during 1962/64.
2. Syndicate operators could have had accounts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a useful source. He probably knew Orla in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orla assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Orla, it was not CPTA; it could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orla killed him.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report  
or the SSC Interim Report can

pinpoint the precise date on which  
the Agency processed the poison pills  
which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli  
{ Interim Report, p 80. The chain of  
custody, according to the 1967 I-C-  
Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal  
pills to be delivered from Rosselli  
to Truffante. Although the next  
intervening steps remain a  
mystery, Rosselli reported to O'Connell  
that the pills had been delivered to  
Ota in Cuba in late February - early  
March 1961. { Interim Rpt. p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

### Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported  
the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~  
~~and~~ whose memory was that the  
money and pills for the operation were  
delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau  
Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by

"Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the  
Cubans." { Interim Rpt p 81. Shimon's

~~memory~~ ~~is~~ story is filled with  
verid ~~into~~ details which are documented  
on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility  
is subject to serious question as  
his account is not shared by  
anyone else connected with the plan  
~~and~~ nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Roselli, bianca, or Trafficante  
appear as "copy" as he would  
lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shuman  
was a source for ~~John~~ <sup>John</sup> ~~William~~ <sup>William</sup> column  
of January 19, 1961, which fixed the  
date of the passage of the garrison at  
the Fortanabla <sup>by Roselli</sup> as March 13, 1961,  
and contained the report that Castro became  
ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shuman's  
stay is that the pills were  
returned to the CIA for a  
few weeks because Ota could  
or would not, attempt the  
poisoning; a fact apparently  
unknown to Shuman before  
his "leak" to ~~William~~ <sup>William</sup> and his  
Senate testimony.]

### Comment

One additional fact concerning  
Ota's inability to carry out the  
mission ties in with the final phase  
of this report. Ota "lost" his  
position in Castro's office on  
26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ <sup>he</sup> planning for  
the operation was still going on  
in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the  
gangster did know that Ota had  
already lost his access to Castro  
[~~the~~ 1967 ~~to~~ <sup>Report</sup> p. 27]

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With the failure of Onto  
to produce the desired results,

the project was at a standstill  
until, once again, Santo Trafficante  
assumed command. Russell Fox  
commented that "Trafficante believed  
a certain leading figure in  
the Cuban exile movement ~~who~~ might  
be able to accomplish the mission."  
Σ Feb 1967 DB Ex 10 29; Dater Rpt 88

Comment:

The well known was, of course  
Tony de Viana, ~~who was~~  
who was the subject of speculation  
in an FBI memorandum of 8 Jan 1961  
incriminating him with receiving financial  
aid from American gangsters for  
anti-Castro activities which were  
the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction  
into the CIA mob plots, de Viana was already  
being funded by the Agency through  
the Revolutionary Front and was heavily  
involved in CIA planning for the  
Bay of Pigs invasion which was  
imminent.

De Viana was also <sup>being</sup> ~~used~~  
by Mike McRaney whose address  
agency was ~~located~~ <sup>engaged</sup> in  
promoting Viana's image in  
collaboration with McRaney from  
in 1960-61

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0002210 <sup>10</sup>Chirri or "Chille" Mendezal Mendez  
is described in Trappenberg's FBI file  
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of  
support for Varona is the promotion  
efforts of the Dins and Eddie  
Cellini, McHenry and Ramsey Musson.  
associates, who were reportedly  
working through a Washington DC,  
public relations firm, Elvir &  
Moss and Associates. Moss had  
previous CPTA associations and  
was supposed acting as a conduit  
for funds supplied by the Cellini  
benefactors with the understanding  
that this group would have  
"privileged treatment" in the  
Cuba of the future. Attempts  
to verify these reports were  
unsuccessful [1967 FBI Report  
p 30]

77-1  
The Ramsey influence  
using the Cellini brothers as a  
"front" is particularly interesting  
in light of Varona's admission  
that Jorge Pujol arranged a  
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~  
1960 wherein Ramsey offered to  
financially "back" Varona's  
efforts to ~~again~~ "educate"  
the Cuban people about Castro,  
which may be a euphemism for  
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript]

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ engaged some, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, as an <sup>excellent</sup> individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ multitudes of exile groups who were in a continual internecine feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S.

government and criminal syndicates to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors.

[ See Vanna testimony - ]

Although de Vanna has no <sup>direct</sup> memory of meeting Traffante, the Tampa crowd has admitted that he acted as an "interceptor" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Roselli, Benavides, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Penner, a Traffante gambler partner from Havana who continued to serve Traffante in Miami during the 1960s. Traffante claimed that Roselli had primary control Penner but this appears unlikely in view of Traffante's long-standing friendship with Penner on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

7  
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O'Connell that ~~the~~ Trafficante  
would provide the replacement  
for the ill-fated, Juan Orta  
who had escaped to the Venezuelan  
Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: <sup>Paralleling</sup> ~~Paralleling~~ the situation at  
the Senate hearings July 1975 when  
Rosselli's depiction of Trafficante's role  
~~changed~~ changed from ~~the~~ his  
"counsel" ~~characterization~~ <sup>characterization</sup> in 1960 as reported by  
"interpreter" State memos, is the recent interview  
with Cener who agrees with  
Trafficante's Committee testimony <sup>that de Vama</sup>  
he was an ~~interpreter~~ <sup>with de Vama</sup> ~~only for~~  
Rosselli. ~~the~~ the net result in both  
instances is to minimize Trafficante's  
exposure (See CF. Forgi interview  
with Cener, May 7, 1978 and Trafficante  
testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~However, the meetings with~~  
~~Vanna came to pass, the~~  
~~ambiguity~~  
If ~~confusion~~ exists as to the  
Speaker of the introduction of de Vama into Phase  
one of the Castro assassination plots, more  
~~the~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds  
de Vama's ~~as~~ actual participation  
prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The  
I & Report indicates that de Vama  
attempted a second ~~poison~~ <sup>poison</sup>  
before the Cuban invasion but  
Rosselli was positive that only one

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Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison gifts from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time.  
{See Vanna transcript}

Comment

The Agency was aware of  
the possible dangers inherent  
in having all known participants  
in the mob's plots while ~~a~~ employing  
his post on the Pershing Award.  
However, "Stephenson" decided his  
participation in the syndicate plan  
but they were apparently ineffective!  
Encl. G. Report, p 325

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and it was not until, April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". [I.E. Rpt p 3] The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous ~~del Verna~~ was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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success in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the ~~operation~~ <sup>operation</sup> and the ability of the ~~source~~ <sup>source</sup> assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry met with Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the actual material was to be introduced into Castro's food [which involved] an asset of Vanna who had access to some in a <sup>restaurant</sup> ~~restaurant~~ frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vanna had received money and instructions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the goods into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Rosselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vanna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or one person they recruited will make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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their names or anything about them"  
 [1967 DO. Report p51]

### Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "Loraine restaurant" personifying apparently ~~was the same plan that~~ Edwards was familiar in "that Edwards had decided pieces of the same plan". The fact that Vauma related the exact modern equivalent to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the mob had been using di Vauma before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) di Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain <sup>their</sup> financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

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### Second

The cast of underworld

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character changed. Harry had insisted that Mahon and Boncane be dropped from the operation which Roselli readily acceded to. Traffante's "in person" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Boncane and today.

### Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive C.I.A. covert actions in history without any attempt <sup>by the Agency</sup> to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely to bed ~~to~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the R.F.B. Report characterizes Marco as "Roselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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0002508  
1. mafia <sup>was</sup> termination of the CPA -  
plots slow and undramatic  
Russell, in May 1962, reported to  
Hany that the pills and guns which  
had been delivered to Varma in Miami  
in April had arrived in Cuba, and an  
unidentified three-man team had been dispatched  
in June to execute the plan. [Interim Report  
p843]

2. During September 1962, ~~and~~ Russell  
related to Hany that ~~de Varma~~ <sup>brother</sup>  
readying a second three-man team  
who were "supposedly military men  
whose assignment was to penetrate  
Castro's body guard. During this period  
the 'medicine' was reported as still in  
place and the three men of the first  
team safe. [1967 IG. Report, p51]  
However, the second team never  
made Cuba and a series of alibis  
were constructed during December and  
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma  
supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance  
of these individuals from Russell  
who had received the payment from  
Hany. [1967 IG. Report p52]

In mid-July 1963 both  
Hany and Russell agreed that "nothing  
was happening and that there was  
not much chance that anything would  
happen in the future" [1967 IG. Report p51]  
Russell was instructed to ease  
his way out of touch with  
Varma ~~which he~~ personally did.  
The last meeting between Hany

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and Roselli occurred in Washington  
D.C. in June 1963. when he was  
Saveri's ~~guest~~ ~~for~~ overnight guest. Hence  
their meeting ostensibly was not directly  
related to any assassination plots.

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# CONCLUSION

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in part, the available evidence suggests that ~~Covert~~ ~~the~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate Annual Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... On a ~~large~~ <sup>small</sup> scale, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 DB Rpt p 10]

the relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biancamano ET SUR:

... Biancamano reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. ... Biancamano claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. [1977 DB Rpt p 10]

Comment

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Although the rumored meetings between Mahon, Pomali, and ...

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are subject to different interpretation,  
it is clear that no plans were  
finalized between the parties <sup>0002211</sup> until sometime after October 1, 1961.  
The date of the <sup>FATS</sup> interrupted conversation of  
Biancana.

The grim joke, reported by the  
CIA at Biancana's request, will  
not wait for delivery until late  
February - early March 1961, so that it  
is difficult to see how Biancana's  
November 1960 assassination plot  
could be a part of the CIA operation.  
Rather, it appears that the plot had  
its own plan in progress, using  
a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the  
deed, when the CIA fortuitously  
happened along to offer its support.

The plot was then in a perfect  
position. If their ~~present~~ private  
plot actually worked and Castro died,  
then the Syndicate had enormous  
blackmail potential against the CIA  
which it could exercise at the  
opportune moment. However, if their  
intrigue ~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position  
would be that they were  
only attempting to execute the  
wishes of their Government.

#### Additional Comment

The admission of Biancana's  
"hired hand", Richard Cair, ~~was~~  
~~not to~~ raise some interesting  
possibilities. Cair's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~permanent~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~separate~~ <sup>a little more than</sup> coincidental, then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for a - Puerto Rico (second stay) the coincidence seems more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Brennan to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" when Brennan refused to in <sup>the FBI</sup> ~~the FBI~~ Oct 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[ Tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which ~~is~~ strongly supports of the idea, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Las Vegas writing of Oct 30, 1960. Mahan needs to be quoted on this point ]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In August, Cuba

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was the former head of the Directorate  
in Cuba when he was a major  
~~W. J. Porter~~ in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported  
to the Chicago office of the CPTA that  
DRB was in a deal to purchase  
a large arms shipment. He was  
told by the Agency to "get out  
of the picture" ~~with~~ a dispatch  
which is subject to periodic updates.  
including the fact that the CPTA  
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain  
now the chief investigator for CPTA  
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency  
some information that Oswald was  
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with  
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and  
had purchased the ~~measures~~  
up to March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ <sup>the potential</sup> Assassins

In discussing the ~~potential~~ <sup>putative</sup> poisoner,  
Giancana spoke of a "girl" who  
was close to Castro while the  
individual recruited for the CPTA pills  
was Juan Ortiz, a secretary in  
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred  
to by Giancana can never be ascertained  
but Traffante was clearly in the  
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~  
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to  
his multitudinous contacts in the  
Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

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It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Torrence were typical examples. Also, one woman told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Macina Hotel (owned by Mike McHenry) concentrated on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

L. Maria Torrey is a conspicuous woman, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stuger has been previously discussed. However, one interesting point is that she was also Charles Torrence's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torrence is totally uncooperative and Torrey was not asked about her relationship with Torrence in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably involved by Trafficante, due to his former receipt of gangster "kickbacks". One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the move toward an assassination plot to execute the mass murder plan. According to the 1947 FO Report 1942

Osta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office in early 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Osta accepted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them." [1967 FBI Rpt p 273]

7. If the mob was close enough to Osta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Osta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility is that the pills were left in the United States and then were available to go to de Vanna when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the going for the ultimate motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and Conrad are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then ~~it is~~ <sup>it can</sup> be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Vanna, which put them in the CIA participation according to the FBI Memo of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jan 1961, had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With the receipt of



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0002217 business sense in continuing the paramilitary attempts against Castro in a substantive way. There still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along." First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Vicious Squad. There was the mounting pressure from the ~~Joint~~ FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish their goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of ~~this~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

### 1. Robert Mahon

- Quarry of Long Committee subpoena in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Internal ~~Edward~~ P Morgan]
- solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Department [Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahon in Nov. 1966, and was himself involved in an alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred later when Mahon was Hughes' principal agent] [Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahon Senate testimony?]
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971 on office of Sec of State file on Edward P Morgan

### 2. John Roselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern Report, p 55, note 4]
- use in ~~illegal~~ memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce pressure
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation hearing with INS which included

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Jack Anderson's journal intervention  
with PRS (See Anderson interview, and  
CFA Russell's file; ~~re~~ CFA office  
of Security full re Edward P. Morgan)

### 3. Sam Biancari

- October 1960 were up in Las Vegas  
where Biancari got Martin to take the heat  
for him by blaming the tap was a  
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, interview with FNU  
Farrell of FNS re possible deportation  
[See Tab C, Russell CFA File,  
stating that inf. Edward Osborn, Captain  
Locca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance  
in 1963 & 1967 DC Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Papish  
on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that  
Russell and Biancari have CFA  
'over a barrel' because of that operation.  
He said that he doubted that the FBI  
would be able to do anything about either  
Russell or Biancari because of their  
previous activities with your people.  
[1967 F.B. Rpt p 131]

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Notes re Jack Anderson  
"Castro Retaliation" theory

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March 3, 1967 }  
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.O. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Andum and Pearson the recipients  
(p 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(p 120)

- Fragment

The Rosselli-bureau contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Bureau may also have been this (p 121)

- Mahan

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does have good reasons for not wanting the story aired further. Unhappily, publicity might cause him to lose his narrative

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Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion.

- The Pearson story, which is now causing so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team  
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have told Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase I  
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a link to Pearson, Agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Ep 12:

Since Agency c/n figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~is~~ talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to Pearson.

Comment

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Don Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordons: the story of the job.

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting  
[P 1275] SECRET  
GOC22222  
Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson  
claims to have a report that there  
was a high-level meeting at the  
Dept of State at which plans for the  
assassination were discussed."

I.e. speculate that Pearson is  
talking about the 10 August 72 meeting of  
the Special Group (Seymour) which was  
attended by Harvey. (p 112)

[R F K was not present]

## 2 Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCD aware that Rosselli  
was going to expose plots. He "decided  
to ignore his threats and take a  
calculated risk as to the consequences  
that may occur with the disclosure  
of his story. This was subsequently done  
by Rosselli or someone on his behalf  
furnishing Jack Anderson details of the  
incident."

(Memo in office of Larry Bell re Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Intel

Mr. <sup>He</sup> Pease [former CIA] saw with Intel  
said Mahen & Andrew Taylor on some  
oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of  
Andrew re Mahen oil on the Carter  
Revolution was a deliberate exposure  
instigated by Robert Mahen using  
his son Peter, an oil intermediary.

Rease' theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (i.e. Intell w/ a new CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes)

-Magan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA  
 [Memorandum in Security File re Mahan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7? - Kay had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli's conviction -  
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow stay. DCP decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected upon himself."

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Summary of conversation instigated by Kay on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least discover how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Harry. Roselli knew that Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because Ed Magan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director (Kalmus) had sent Kany a news clipping re Agency use of binocular (concerning the Bryant 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the back canal from Senator Kennedy's office where Kany was still Acting General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Puma story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase P operation due to Agency delaying on long committed subpoena

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity of his relationship with Kany. with Roselli

- Mahan denied discussing latter phase of operation & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Kent Reensman in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Baum in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI in hunting Kany had a 19 yr old son

- Believed Morgan had done some



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work for Pearson and did learn  
that Anderson had more than a  
passing acquaintance with Mayan.  
- Mayan also fought with  
Pat Coyne of N 82

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John Hammett  
Review of Office of Security File

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June 6<sup>th</sup>

15 Jun 1977

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Memo re request of Dade City  
investigator for information on  
8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Don Pesterrey  
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas  
c. Luciano Nieves  
d. Jose De La Torre  
e. Jose Quintana  
f. Joaquin Arturo Cortez  
g. Manuel Artime  
h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in  
Riselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec  
1970 Office of Security memo.

v. No background investigation done on  
Riselli or Francisco

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect  
between Riselli & Agency officials reported  
approx. 1971.

ix. O'Connell has always been informed  
by Dade City.

x. Office of Security has no such  
evidence (Has Cuban Embassy been very close  
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area  
during time of his death)

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Nieves

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to [Madril Station]
- August 1965 entered US
  - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shannon

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shannon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship uncertain

30 August 1966 report by S/H Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FRO office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

Was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was originally selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Varona

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. Varona was to use

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assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son's influence to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Marco", who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Marco, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523 F. No info in regard to death or redacted threats against Roselli or Cuban in G/L or Mexico, Panama - Togo, SUMMA, or Magoni inc/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that might occur by the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & William details of the incident.

SECRET

0002229

Memorandum 20 May 1971

016 Subject. Inter Tel

Magan had been engaged by Hyman Tool regarding the Mahan efforts. H. Pearce [former Army] and InterTel now, said Magan made noises to certain Hyman officials, that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement w/ LFT

[John Southard] in 1962-64 was in touch w/ Mahan & simultaneously worked out details of a non official cover arrangement w/ Aircraft Div & Hyman Tool.

For past several years Magan had been quite mild.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Mahan & Andrus are involved together in some oil field deals. Pearce took into this roll other much smaller matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent exposure by Andrus re Mahan roll in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by both Mahan & Andrus with his son Peter as an intermediary.

Pearce's theory is that Mahan prob. that such publicity would 'scare them off'. The InterTel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Mahan and John Andrus at a number of his stops.

SECRET

Mama

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I

Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1969, Mr. Richard M. Bissell advised Col. Geoffrey Edwards, to whom of the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring ganyaku-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Maken advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting him. He did know him casually thru clients, but was given to understand that he was a "high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and involved all of the old money makers on the strip."

Maken stated that, if R was in fact a member of the club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family interests.

6. Maken to approach R who knew M as a per spec. handler of private & foreign assets.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His initial reaction was to sound pretty good but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd. No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Maken introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was assigned

SECRET

0002232

to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade 9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a perpetuine nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-bait payments from the guerrilla outfits, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was cut out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Mann . . . . and Mann disapproved w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the job and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 for communication.

SECRET

7 Feb 62

SECRET

secretly buy R.F.K. in circumstances leading up  
to making in report on subject. At our agent previously  
17. May 1962 Harry took over as Case  
officer & it is not known by this office  
whether R. was used operationally from  
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R secretly of FIA am.

19. Harry reported to office of Harry his  
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.  
It was his belief that John W. N. Schmitt  
the Agency for assistance in deportation  
unless he actually forced deportation.  
R expressed confidence that he would win  
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahon called O Connell to advise  
that Mahon's attorney, Ed Morgan, had  
rec'd a call from Tom Wadden who stated  
appeal exhausted & R forced deportation.

If someone did interfere on R's  
behalf, he would make a complete  
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. D & F bought & decided  
not to arrest R. Mahon was so  
advised of Agency's position & he was in  
complete agreement w/ our stand. He further  
advised that he was not concerned about  
any publicity in it appearing publicly.

London 18 Nov 1970

be acting to build links, but return on a

SECRET



SECRET

stop: last of Feb or first of March 1963  
 March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his  
 contact at Fontainebleau  
 - a few weeks later Cus to ill

GL 02235

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the radio boss  
 Sam Mancana to line up a contact.  
 The confidential files report that he had  
 "gambly interest and an interest in the  
 shrimp business in Cuba". However, the  
 Cui gangster took no direct part in the  
 assassin plot.

19 Dec 1967.

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn  
 2. The first revealed Dir of Security  
 the subject of our last meeting in Miami  
 is J.R. the validity of the information was  
 not known; & whether or not the King James  
 to consider any possible information on  
 his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the  
 policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,  
 but that he felt it would be a simple  
 matter for the Dir to see Howard personally  
 & determine on an individual basis  
 what would case the James Dept had.

Osborn - speculates / Harry says to  
 find out validity of case for James to King  
 James to work for James

SECRET

Page 0002234

not in this folder

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0002236

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported luncheon meeting w/ Pagon on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.
- 27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Byrd & Harry introduced R as "Mr. Ralston."
- 28 Nov. Spent 11 hours at Bethesda
4. Harry to Harry, Country Club.  
R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worried re what he brought.  
- R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)  
- R I/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.
6. Goly told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1964 & they meeting O'Connell had w/ Madu & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Taiwan.
7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, then Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the subject "billed". If it is not a good case, then Harry will tell Goly & he will recall it and.
10. Harry independent as regarding his report was not to be put to Agency.

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~  
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but  
Harry refused to discuss R's activity

- R wondered if ~~Harry~~ could not  
do as much for him as it did for Mahan.  
Ed Morgan knew what Harry did for Mahan  
w/ Sen. Long & had told ~~Harry~~ about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re  
Mahan indirectly Mahan would "sell anyone  
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping  
re use of banana. R said leak came  
from Sen. Kennedy office when he was still ~~for~~

Ex. Org Mahan

28 April 67

Canal - ~~Wagon~~ allegedly contacted some high level  
officials in port indirectly he had a client  
who had been involved in an ~~operation~~ ~~operation~~  
~~Wagon~~ recalled & said he had told Wagon  
when ~~Wagon~~ alleged on Long subcommittee.

2 Mahan possibly upset to find if he  
had been identified as client source

SECRET

0002238

activity on this subject in 1950.  
5. Not known by name of the subject.  
6. Mark - R met Morgan then became  
in 1950 when Morgan began legal work  
for the Wilson firm.  
R & Morgan in 1950 would have met  
Mark. From "Wilson in 1950" it was known  
that there were individuals in  
some time together. He was with the  
Morgan that they sought legal advice  
from Morgan but did not know of their  
connection.  
7. Clark R had different copy, <sup>short</sup> amount  
of 1950 gift & amount of amount  
for legal to Morgan. R partly known  
for Mark & have his friends.  
8. Richard Morgan had the same  
work for Morgan & had been that Morgan  
had met them & passing acquaintance in  
Morgan.  
Morgan kept all past copies for  
NSA.  
9. Name of Morgan in the  
the law firm.  
10. It is evident that Mark is doing  
work about possibly of being involved  
in the project. But should be confirmed in  
a long period.

002239

Sen Long Mahu

Sherman, Long's personal staff, told him that Mahu needed a copy.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is daily w/ St Louis staff, a personal friend of Long, re Mahu's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified same names, etc by name to O Connell & Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois & a copy of his technical manual were more of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hancock.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in the unit

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he knew Long's personal staff who exerts great influence on Long. They flew to St Louis & then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald wanted Mahu as his "ace in the hole" in that Mahu's clients have great appeal for T.V. He thought Mahu was not just enough to make a point. Unless Long says so, Fensterwald would proceed.

13. Mahu client Sam Reynolds

SECRET

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances  
that were planned at our request.  
The Hun RB. NFX was orally  
briefed on the background that led up  
to Mihai's involvement as Top Secret  
document furnished to Juxta Dept  
which served as a backup of the  
copy

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SECRET

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Gov't attitude toward the Cuban reg.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at directly Castro personally. By influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; views of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminated in BOB.

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Bay of Pigs was called off after BOB & remained dormant for several months.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Monrovia.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After monrovia & collapse of Project MONROVIA, aggressive scheme began Aug. 60; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated early 1963.

P6 Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ gifts



SECRET

5. If signature ~~embodiment~~ is now  
question, tends to reinforce thought  
that details named ~~them~~ ~~been~~  
character of direction or security ~~direct~~  
FBI Oct 1946 report.

pg 5 Final Report recognizes that sub-  
plots have no relation in a procedure  
being

---

### Ruby - Traffante

#### I thru Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent manager now identified that  
made reference to plans to kill Castro or  
proposing such action. Three of the  
messages related to the same operation  
the other two relating to separate  
proposals; there is no indication  
that any of these proposals was the  
result of CFT initiative.

[PMARMC/5] dated 29 May 1962  
and was identified as Agent 62. He has  
been reported as never admitting that  
he was a CFT agent. His name not  
given to me. There were

0002243

SECRET

AM LASH

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inform that AM LASH a cut agent  
with the memo of providing a plot agent list.  
so that costs had justification for release.

or

2) AM LASH so indicate the details could have  
been known thus providing costs

whatsoever, should have been reported to W.C.

Agay - The character of the relationship  
between CIA and AM LASH, prior to the  
murder of Dan Kandy, was so insubstantial  
and inconclusive that it provided no basis for  
AM LASH to feel that he had any specific  
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

..... there was little for him to  
report or leak?

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August  
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next  
contacted by CIA. In terms of the  
relationship that he had with CIA the  
critical period, since is therefore between  
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for hiatus is that  
CFP 13  
Final Report AM LASH If a name Cuba; he was  
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7<sup>th</sup> says "BMHASEH ~~very~~  
totally spoiled but who will always  
be a control problem.

... is best approached as a  
chief conspirator allowed to recruit  
his own cohorts among whom we  
may then find persons susceptible  
to long distance and covert action.

" Clearly, at that point, when BMHASEH  
was viewed as potentially important, he  
was also viewed as a person of uncertain  
loyalty, requiring careful but long  
range development for whatever course  
of action that might later ensue.

p3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, present  
BMHASEH as an unreliable plot  
& inferred is that Carter Sept 7<sup>th</sup>  
speech might have been a result of leak  
by BMHASEH

p10 " The fact remains that whatever  
views BMHASEH may have expressed, he  
had no response from his CIA contacts  
of any support for his proposals at that time.

Fitzgerald meeting still be reported  
high-power up w/ religious rights

SECRET

14 Nov from WHIP reported that Mr. H. S. KENNEDY was policy considerations but mainly over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given technical assistance.

Comment

In essence he (Mr. H. S. KENNEDY) was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt., it is directly relevant to the question of what Mr. H. S. KENNEDY was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how Mr. H. S. KENNEDY interpreted the put off to Fitzgibbon.

Cites July 1964 FBI Report stating that Mr. H. S. KENNEDY was in contact with CIA agents and that KENNEDY had refused to support the CIA.

19 Nov 63 Fitzgibbon approved policy Mr. H. S. KENNEDY he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

SECRET

SECRET

0002248

Could, if he requested it, include...  
high-power rifle w/ scope...

19 Nov. Whitcomb tells CFA he is  
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him  
to delay for 1 more meeting.

Whitcomb agrees "if it is really  
important."

p. 19 SSC speculates that this in fact  
indicates he might receive specific info.  
Agency - at best a piece of highly  
speculative analysis, not supported by  
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ collecting  
Quinn.]

M H. [redacted]

p 24

"A"

"unaware of Whitcomb's 1963 association  
with CFA"

No info at least 1 1/2 years  
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963  
CFA ties w/ Whitcomb what were  
very intricate

SECRET

SECRET

0002251

c. CFA trace (sent in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied list of pills to US gambler syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambler up. To a Cuban wife leader. Fila now in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

at ... while the events described of Miami Season did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven."

Q18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell & Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Mahan to "Sam Bold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Bold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan pointed out "Bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Bold" or "Joe".

Q19 At that time the gambler season was still operating in Cuba. Truffante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate runner.

SECRET

p. 24 Despite the dilemma that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

00022529

(Comment - Giancana was fully opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trapp (Joe; the courier was on touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personality of a sort that would enable him to smuggle poison into Castro. The gangster named then was inside Juan Ortiz who was then Official Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. The gangster said that Ortiz had once been in a position to receive such things from the gangster contacts, had since lost that source of income and needed the money.)

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Trapp. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Cuban U.S. Ortiz is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangster, Ortiz got cold feet.

Comment Ortiz lost his position on 8 Mar

SECRET

SECRET

offered on 26 Jan. 1961, while going for the  
operation was still going on in Miami & Washington.  
He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy  
0002254 April, 1961...

... It would seem that, that the  
gangster did know that Vita had already  
sent his access to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to  
in touch with Vanna. From them and were  
reported to have offered Vanna large sums  
of money for his operations against Castro, with  
the understanding that they would receive  
"privileged treatment" in the Cuba of the future.  
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff approached Vanna and told him  
that he had contacts who wanted to do away with  
Castro & that they would pay big money for the  
commit.

Roselli said as a loyal Cuban he would  
whatever he could & would never divulge  
the operation.

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.  
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls  
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Roselli gave the jobs and money to Vanna, who  
Roselli dealt with under a pseudonym. Little  
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET



SECRET

p. 32 <sup>22</sup> Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was started April 1962, Harvey took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Roselli needed Gran. & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Valera. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. <sup>51</sup>~~48~~ June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. <sup>perhaps using the pills.</sup>

SECRET

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't badly hurt. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 2201 RFK - I trust that if you ever <sup>try</sup> to do business with organized crime - with gangsters, you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in possession of the AG's office.

p. 67. Major Sam-Tones letter of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Trick puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

SECRET

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent taking beer who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?

I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by CIA but denying

00002258

AMLABH

- 179 - DR took Presidential Oath which they refused to surrender to the; Mr. de la Torre - Cuba believed to be an participant in assassination of HCol Antonio Blanco Rios, head of Batista's military in Havana
- ✓ - DR quite apart from 20th of July but signed a note just

⇒ ... Agency was primarily intended as a means Cuba action in [MTH PRON] program directed against Cuban military leaders, with assistance plus for technical assistance in an armament attempt. The various project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuban govt.

187 16 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tizendino - "I don't intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again! whom you should tell him," so they don't

SECRET

make the trip: I want to get away from politics completely!

1992 Sancy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

### The Drew Pearson Story

- a) Published Details The Facts as we know them  
 Robert Kennedy may have or not have. He was caught on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not ~~briefed~~ briefed on Phase 2
- b) Three (3) hood assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison  
 It tells Henry on 21 Jan 67, that I can say 3 men involved. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disguised. Most of the assassins captured and executed during this period of this team

SECRET

Carro heard enough at ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> this report has come  
to beneath of H was sent to ~~him~~ in the Bureau investigation. It  
was also stated by Castello in  
the Philippines under secret  
information. We have no  
direct corroboration of any sort. (M)  
that Camson met w/ Randall  
in Las Vegas March 1965

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beauchamp apparently to be used as a source  
of information to find Oswald a CIA agent  
& was to be used to identify Castro. Beauchamp  
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps  
or by Sen. RFK asking certain persons  
to work with Beauchamp in name of Castro.  
This memo is intended to record that  
such letters never existed & therefore could  
not be in Beauchamp's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain  
Richard Scalpette  
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not found after  
- 18 Jan 1961  
identified individuals

- Identity of W1 ROOCE

- April 61 to April 62 makes  
- ~~some~~ 'something going on'  
independently of Agency.

- RFE security called on 4 March 67  
to obtain memo; already saw article  
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65

Bango in Madrid & claims group  
in Cuba ready.

Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 arrests in Cuba

Trial resumed after 11 to fall 64 & 1965  
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Reper" Brucki Room approach The WH.

SECRET

0002266

O'Connor's interview of Malcom in May 1970

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SB contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cair

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 moved city

- April 1962 moved city

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 May 63 Infr - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase

- told to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NOV 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~S. S. Spaulding~~ under direction Michael Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Sturgis suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April

SECRET



SECRET

0002267

1. Ramon Don Pesterrey Dominguez  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
  2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas  
DOB 12 Jan 1918
  3. Luciano Nevès
  4. Jose de la Torre
  5. Jose Quintana  
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replacé par*
  6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 43
- Edward Prosper Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St. Louis

SECRET

TAB B

(2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

[Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Hollywood DIT Studios & John Hopton Wells.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects] ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resort

Resorts Int. #591 722  
Walden Groves OS file #473 865  
- assoc. w/ Meyer Lansky  
- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp  
w/ Robert Whisart (#633 974) and  
John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to De Mar, Cain in Mexico 1941 into 1942  
-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

0002269

7 - Mar - 35  
St Paul, Minn  
364r

Bradley Earl Ayers  
Eglin AFB Fla.

April 17, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

CUU name? Daniel B. Williams

Paragon Air Service

Zenith Technical Enterprises - south  
campus of MMU

Realtor; Harry, Robinson (Rip) Big Fader

Tracing sites

Palo Alto Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of Papyrus

Date 10 Aug 1964  
Secrets Approval

Refund 23826 (DDP) (WH) (SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Personal Return

Serial No  
366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SVC

12-15-64

Organized Disruptors:

DDP / SHS

US Field Office

Forward operator Section - JMWAVE  
Paramilitary Branch Section 117  
Reinforce C R C Indiv Pol groups

SECRET

SECRET

0002270

20/01/75

All (calls) before being 20/01/75 to  
be allowed in Ball except to Chief  
FI/Dev. D, 15021 Rly only

- Presently. agreed to DD Plan

Harry  
Chief FI/Dev D

19 Feb 1972

To Harry re discussion of ATAM  
for 20/01/75 elsewhere this Dec 1972

Because of sensitive nature of this  
activity, necessary for funds will be in  
general category of your department  
2. Salary 1500 per year; 7500 in addition to salary  
3. Name to be considered in view of  
project's sensitive nature; authorization for all travel  
you claim; operating & other expenses  
4. Ego only

Recd. 2 Returns.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Riddell - Morgan - Gorman

Mackin last year

Morgan & Jack Mackin

1) Power to Angus

2) Angus to Riddell (Boss)

3) Riddell to Mackin

4) Mackin to Mackin & 2 (Gorman must know)

5) Mackin & 2 to Mackin & 3

SECRET

Roselli of started in Sept 66  
(Mahan to Roselli to Gracena)

to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS  
on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,  
Gardner, Gilpatrick, Lammell,  
Murray, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; assigned  
to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been copy (FO)  
all notes, & other derived source material  
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WTT (Daren)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Object)

Final account of memo prepared on  
a separate page of initial of DD/P, Chief WTT  
& Dir of Security

Distribution:

25 Sept 1968 thru  
6 Feb 1969

SECRET

TO: Cabinet

6907.

SECRET

0002272

11 Feb 1961 To Principal Agent 1000  
 31 Jan 1961  
 14 Feb 61 CMMMO R. S. M. 1043  
 26 Sept 1961  
 H. M. 993  
 12 Feb 1961

Page 3  
 I/O Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After Merrill crisis Oct 62 &  
 collapse of McWoods, aggressive scheme  
 that was begun in Aug 1960; covered  
 in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963

Two other plots were organized in 1963  
 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 7

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Regimental)  
 wherein McNamara broached subject of  
 liquidation of Cuban leaders.

See (C)

Result - Original McWoods memo by  
 Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussed at Special Group of a Chamberlain  
 serves memo of special plot to kill Castro;  
 CIA had refused to fund. who had no involvement.

Missing  
 page

and Osseturi

P 2 Gonzalez Ballanterra

Press Release  
 9 March 1966

-prisoner of conflict for intelligence; not

truth to form purpose

-Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramon and Tapia

Shaved have  
been deleted.

Charles  
Tepelenis

↓

not in ~~June~~ with Oden Hwang

SECRET

6002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell my guess  
unpleasant; Edwards then brief  
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Maher called O'Connell & pointed out  
Paradise sector shiny Gold & Joe  
(Presumably just home, Maher & O'Connell  
know names)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make  
arrangements there re entry to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana  
10. 7 Jan 59 - casino closed  
13 Jan 59 - Casino announced re-opening  
17 Feb 59 - Casino announced opening  
30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23. Technical Chief TSD  
4 approaches: (1) high tech like shellfish  
poison to be administered via pin (which Cordeiro  
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers  
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar  
or 1) handwriting

P 29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a  
man high up in exil movement. (Vanna)  
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest Sun Traff.



SECRET

6002274

know Valmco.

at 21 Dec 1968 FBI memo re gangster  
funding Cuban activities to overthrow Castro  
b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to VI with these  
scholar: That hired Moss as a fund-raiser

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication  
of any involvement in Cuba.

[March 1959 for use in NR/Dunn as  
consultant to Indian Embassy]

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under 2C MATSOB  
a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselli to deliver \$ to H.V. Estimate  
very but Esterline says 10,000 + 100 of  
communication as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev.  
Front & many involved in BOP. Steps  
taken to end his participation in syndicate  
plan but apparently ineffective.

People who know:

1. O. O - original man to poison
2. A V -
3. son-in-law of H.V.

SECRET

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell  
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general  
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem  
w/ [Arnold Silver] Sidney both Helms  
both parties probably cut in to Cuba  
project

Helms briefed on general concept but  
not on ongoing Cuba plot.

QJ WIN account of <sup>involvement</sup> Silver to use  
[in Congo;] Justin O'Donnell omitted out

ZRRIFLE covered as a FID operation  
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter ships  
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses applicability of  
ZRRIFLE to Cuba; initiated by Bissell  
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in  
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- Much later Harry takes over Castro
- Harry over-

came to think of Castro operations  
ZRRIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Action is synonymous w/ QJWIN
- ZRRIFLE ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> related to Exec Action
- ZRRIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry's  
interpretation

SECRET

0002276

A review of his correspondence was  
unrevealing

[Permanently] handled Castro operation  
& L/n use any of assets being developed  
in 2R RIFLE

- Memo of Hany after he left Task  
Force W & gave to [Rome] on 27 June  
1963 to Chief FI / Staff that <sup>original</sup> ~~the~~ reason  
to keep QJ was no longer valid & suggested  
termination.

- Records [OLLA-1974,] 24 April 64  
show termination of [L. vonburg Station]  
on 21 April 64.  
There is no indication in the file that the Exec Action  
Capability of 2R/RIFLE / QJ was ever used.  
Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until  
Hany met Roselli & reactivated April 62.

- Edwards met contact w/ RFE  
over McGuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Hany called Edwards &  
indicated he was bringing Roselli for further use

742 Hany - took me a "guy" question.  
since he described plan for getting poison  
to a favorite Castro restaurant the mechanics  
were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's

- O'Connell thinks "something gray on"  
between April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

SECRET

SECRET

0002277

April 8<sup>th</sup> 1952

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell  
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there  
/ Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry sent to [Budri]  
- Edwards, deliberately did not mention Mahan when he first

p45 O'Connell out by June 62 when he was assigned PCS to [Oahu]

p47 18 April 62

O'Connell gets plk for Russell meeting w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he can't remember when V was there.

Harry specified that Brian not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Roubli would appear.

Roubli right that Brian asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Brian - "Too bad"

p48 Macco - unlikely a V-associated person known MHCFO Macco who Harry probably would have known. Also 1/5 clear Macco was Roubli man.

Roubli eventually to 2nd phase as a contact to Valma.

SECRET

p 49. When the folks were given to running your records, Vama reported arms and equipment needed for his end of the operation.

6002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20, 30 caliber rifles
- d) 30, 45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V requested arms & support & Roselli joined next to Harry. With help of Shady, chief of TMDAHS, about 5M of weapons & equipment.

Harry & Shady went U-Haul, & put truck in parking lot for delivery to Maco, V, or via son in law. Harry & Shady set up watch on do Roselli & I could.

Shady not aware of plan.

p 30

May 62 - Roselli reported that the folks were in Cuba at the restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.

Jan 62 V had ~~sent~~ <sup>disappeared</sup> 3 men from to Cuba Sept 1962

Harry saw Roselli in Miami on 7-11 Sept. Another 3 men from of militia men assigned to penetrate Castro's body guard but never happened. "Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe Sept 62 - Jan 63

p 51

militia men  
used to  
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a Tar saw Roselli & Maco send letter. Dave Roselli 27 Dec to V for return of 3 militia men who never left in Fla Keys!

Delay due to  
at conditions

Feb 63

Harry left word for Maco in Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this word for Maco is not clear)

SECRET

SECRET

0002279

Apul May 63

Helms approved a last meeting  
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left  
for [Rome]

P 55 People who knew  
[Bruce Chiver] (Harry died 1962)  
how Harry meeting w/ gangster in  
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lawrence Houston briefed  
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to  
pursue writing case but wanted to be  
informed of Harry's deal w/ "gangster" again.

RFK asked for a memo of  
the meeting via a "phone call" memo  
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.  
NO briefing of McLean, <sup>Carson</sup> Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had  
begun; that V had little & arrived late that

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;  
advises against briefing McLean & Carson  
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli  
is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67  
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

SECRET

0002280

of Pearson article of 7 March 47 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been told upon.

Helms had lunch w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

---

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connor rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he might buy his attorney to manipulate in past activities.

SECRET

AMLA 88A SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 (Muscovy Station)  
P78 [Jack Stewart] met w/ Cubela  
in Muscovy City, arranged by [Carlos]  
[Tepedino] HMMWOP 1, a long-term  
furn. Cubela then [Stewart] from  
Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR  
are like group of leftist students signed in  
1956 to fight Batista, Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Chik wanted to  
defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off as report  
that Cuban police aware of Cubela's  
desire to defect & his departure plans.

[Comment:]

First of 3 rumormongers within USA; but  
unknown if Cubela aware of rumormongers in Cuba.  
Other two links are even more dubious

~~15 Jan 61~~ 14 Regent 61

Message from Havana Station (good source)  
[Tepedino] that Cubela going to Paris &  
wanted to talk to <sup>and end of Stewart</sup> no indication of any  
muf. <sup>Cubela</sup>

SECRET

15 Jan 62

[Lucia Echevarria Branci] told  
an asset (HMMWOP-1) that Cubela going  
to Helsinki & wanted to defect.



SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see [Tepedino]

0002283

27 June 1962

[Tepedino] approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew [Tepedino] to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

[Tepedino] dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on rumors for defection were [Wicharriac].

30 July - 6 August 62

[Wm Wainwright] met w/ [Tepedino] a Jewell in NYC & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Talked into being recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet leaders.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met [Tepedino] in Helsinki.

SECRET

10-11 Sept 62

SECRET

[Wainwright, Tejedor] Cubela in  
Copenhagen [Wainwright] used "unassessable"  
& Cubela insisted on "eliminate"

14-23 Sept 62

Cubela [Tejedor, Wainwright]  
[Earle Williamson] from [Medel:] met in Paris

Cubela given S/W financing &  
supplies; shown a document demonstrating

Refused to be photographed.

[William] cables that no physical  
elimination missions be given as a  
requirement but he might do it on his  
own initiative. Headquarters strongly counter that  
no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brayil - met by [Wainwright]  
[Tejedor] & Nestor Sanchez who became  
case officer.

Cubela denied 2 S/W missions but  
only 1 rec'd. Official & postal censorship.

That night of [Ramon Luis Diaz]  
[AMTRUNK-10] who was badly injured  
[DIAZ Isalguera (AMICE-14)] who had  
been sent to recruit [BUIW]

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris  
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cuba who had written [Taped] saying that he didn't want to continue.

[CIA had to tell French Govt that contacts were for purposes of defense, French unilaterally keeping Cuba under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cuba insisting on meeting w/ RFK; announced Cuba going to try an attempt in Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgibbon, U.S. AS, goes to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that U.S. would have no part in attempt in Castro's life.

Walter went from Sandy in contact

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cuba would get caches of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting gen w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~ as per

Sandy says Cuba accepted gen but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a camera  
arms & be placed at [AMTRUNK is]  
[2 high-power rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000  
amm.]. As they left morning, heard  
JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an  
OP in cable from Fitzgerald that briefly  
is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela w/ a take 5/10 with him to Prague  
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba  
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in  
place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on  
[AMTRUNK VIII]

24 April 1964

[Tegedino] had been brief to  
meet [Carlos Jorge ROBILLO many]  
who has message from Cubela.

097 3 May 64 [Robillo] says Cubela wanted a silence  
30 August 64

Artome rec'd info from Madrid  
that a group of dissident members of Castro  
regime want to ~~then~~ establish direct  
contact. 7 Oct 64, Artome sends

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artome agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1  
if it turns out he is contact man  
for internal dissent group. Artome

SECRET

Think if BM2A#1 is chief of medical group we can forget about ops  
4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for [6570] for Arteme to maintain contacts w/ dissident groups' reps in Prague. Arteme does  
6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was told going to continue his plans  
Told US. could not be involved.  
10 Dec 64.

Arteme didn't know nor Cubela that CIA in direct contact with each. Rather SAS continued to put both men together.

AIA didn't want to put silver weapon in ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly but could do it thru Arteme.  
27 Dec; 30 Dec (subline)

Cubela & Arteme meet in Madrid. Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela had requested a silver for FAT rifle but Americans w/n gave him one.

Arteme to come up w/ silver or different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silver & Belgian FAT rifle w/ silver for Arteme's secy. ~~SECRET~~ Both weapons come from ~~the~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

Conflict

12 Feb 65

SECRET

6002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of Tepedino who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia Bango Derube  
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & informed  
[a station officer.]

Outgoing close friend of Cubela; & claims  
to be in touch w/ group of military leaders  
planning to overthrow Castro.

Dead in July 62 for rep. Traff.  
as lawyer for Cypri Kell. Traff. ex-mayor.  
[Another name - Luis]

June 1945 [Verde ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former  
PM turned who was arrested as a militant  
on 20 March 1946, contacted FWS now living  
FBT on 3 June 65.]

ESpinosa stated he had received letter  
from a friend in Paris urging him  
to meet w/ Alberto Flores who had a  
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered  
to CIA.

Message - Cubela in a position to help Castro  
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them  
by "yes"; then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris  
on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset.

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave him info.  
0002290 [Tepeduro] 7,000 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from [redacted] group insecure, terminate ASAT

1 March 66 - Cubela & bin arrested for activities w CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarín, Alberto Blasco Romera,  
Juan Alsina Navarro. Confirmed  
Also appearing - Guillermo Cienfuegos  
Alvarez, Royal Herminio Valse

Gonzalez Ballarín - attests in Spanish  
[contact of Juan Noel <sup>where "lover"</sup> ~~with~~ official  
at US Embassy in Madrid.]

Cubela met w/ Artemi in Spain  
in Feb. 1965.

Artemi sent Ballego to US to get  
Helicopis sight & silencer. Delivered to  
Blasco Romera who delivered it to  
Gonzalez Ballarín then to Cubela the  
day before he left Madrid.

Tasco Sight in Cubela's residence were  
Helicopis sight, F&L rifle +.  
9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that  
death sentence not be asked.  
10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencer did <sup>SECRET</sup> not work; I threw it  
away because it was turning my hands

000229 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened  
the door to me ~~but~~ I did not have

the courage to tell him  
(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to Europe in late 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Botkin. No mention of March at this Nov 85 contacts w/ Agony.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Specimen

If full details would have come out,  
Custer would have better & enough money,  
& probably not to execute someone in corner well.

2 high-level  
unusually meeting  
where two  
arranging  
discuss

d Special Group (August 1  
up 10 August to 2 (probably one described by Pearson)  
State: Dean Rush, Alice Johnson, Edwin  
Morton, Richard Fordwin, Robt Heurwiter  
Walt Gure

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFK absent)  
DeFunse:

McNanna, Delpatrick, Lemminger, Lonsdale  
CIA - McConnell Harvey

US/A - Edward Murn, Donald Wilson  
Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrish's note I'm not a member  
but Madam & my son Mr. Madam ~~member~~  
raising it & Munson County.

No Com raised excepted McNamee  
'heartily agree' 52.11

Laurie took notes on 13 August  
to Harry, Harvitch, Havis, & Wilson which



SECRET

Lansdale memo argued shifting papers  
for various subjects related to Cuban  
operation. A portion excised from CIA  
copy of memo was "immediate elimination  
of Castro? Lansdale repeatedly tried to  
raise assassination of Castro in Bay over  
next several weeks but Bay did not.

0002292

It must 5 people in Lansdale's office  
know Moore & Lansdale involved in  
assassination as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room  
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas  
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion  
of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jennings as secy.

18 June 64 memo from DD/P to Don  
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 upsur.  
Cuban exile; Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch,  
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed  
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused to sign.

19 August 64

DCI (McGuire) to Bundy - re  
FBI interview w/ all participants

SECRET

SECRET

Probab Peasens info re a high-level  
mety was 10 Sept 62

Scannell interviewed Mahan in May 67  
& wrote a report:

- 0002293
- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phoenix
  - 2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli  
or anyone
  3. Roselli started to Morgan by transpenn
  - 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chum of Morgan
  - 5 - Roselli doesn't hear; Morgan in  
Vegas recently "induced"
  - 6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas  
in March. <sup>been with</sup> In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan
- It is our impression that Greenspan also involved  
in the conversation.

<sup>p122</sup>  
and to confirm <sup>finger to</sup> Roselli as source of info.  
& Morgan as Peasens source.

<sup>p123</sup>  
Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli  
had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli  
he in front RFX of Roselli's confabulation.  
Peasens story seems to rely on ref  
phase. Could be Harry if ref, source.  
Probab from 2 sources:  
State Dept meeting + not against  
so Roselli's chief suspect.

SECRET

Dr. Peasens: Roselli didn't tell much &  
Morgan didn't talk to a newspaperman friend (Morgan).

Es Roselli Mahan  
are strong non  
CDA participants  
with immediate  
knowledge of the  
Robert Kennedy  
quest

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not run its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P wants to remain in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in chuds & detail found  
only in place the 3 man team.

p126 Put in it but light - that there is no  
subter motive in Speedy the story

p127. We do not know that Castro ~~could~~  
tried to retaliate, but we do know  
that there were such plots against Castro.  
Unhappily, it now appears that Baum  
may also know this.

p129. Mahan says that Taylor fell on Tampa. Possible  
pluma was ~~grate~~ <sup>with police</sup> in his legs, being ~~upheld~~  
suffered ~~any~~ <sup>with police</sup> from his in form. None of  
them would have ~~complaints~~ <sup>complaints</sup> about ~~disapp~~  
in his CIA connections when he was ~~found~~  
by law enforcement ~~authorities~~. Evidence has  
already shown it when the FBI was ~~working~~  
him in 1963, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~up to~~ <sup>up to</sup> the day of  
his conversation with ~~Mahan's~~ <sup>Mahan's</sup> ~~baum~~.

P 131. French - 3 May 1967

Commented Red base CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

6002295

241 July 75 memo

Sarita Trapp

4. ST delivered poison pills to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Make formal contact subject w/ office of security
- Russell's conviction

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fingerprint

Serrano Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROUZ's operational aliases?

- who was WIZARD 14 (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who controlled WIRROUZ DDO

- want to know John Stein & all WIRROUZ & the by Walt Elder

SECRET

MEMO

SECRET

5 May 1967

Subj: Wm K. Harvey

0002296

1. <sup>Bill</sup> ~~Harvey~~ <sup>Harvey</sup> contacted Payson to report to Payson some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his corp to FBI. He explained to Payson ---

Missing

16 May 67

Tab B <sup>Adventer Edward Cohen</sup> <sup>from Chambers</sup> 7 April 77

Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Edward Pierpont Morgan

DDO 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

MCA - Richard Scullette SS 357-22-3335  
1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day & Maggie's Day - rumor that assassination planned w/ FBI of <sup>group</sup> ~~Cole~~

SECRET

1 Sept 67 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino,  
a henchman of Marcello, as far as  
known denied knowledge of Marino's connect  
to Marcello.

TO Chief SRS  
Sulz. Carr

9 Oct 1967

Info re meeting of Fair Play  
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

[Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBAR  
who was 'int of' Horace Speeds' (SAS)  
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (444265)  
Speed # (199499)]

WSCobar recruiting Cubans for Communist  
Party in Chicago.]

0002297

SECRET

1000  
File

9 Dec 1970 DCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Joly

9 Aug 1976

SECRET

Bird memo "Sally" Joly Ruselli

0002298

Tab B & C

Added info re Traff, Ruselli, &  
Bancroft contained in mutual privacy  
w/and for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bruckner  
re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hume

1. 12 Jan 1941 memo told FBI he  
recommended DuBois to an L.A. atty whom  
he w/ll disclose

2. A Hay is James Cantillon per a  
13 March 1941 report.

3. 22 May 41 FBI memo re interview  
w/ Col. P. Swann who said he contacted  
Mahan in fall of 1940 for use as a "cut-out"  
for Havana. Swann gave any indication  
to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish some  
clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Brown

Subj: Salvatore Bramante & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Rice Squad in 1960; Accused  
Lohnman.  
a J.I. firm

### CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960

SECRET

6002299

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office  
& obtained info on Cuban exil groups in  
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohnman of Chicago Field office  
re a Mr. Kroug<sup>an</sup> who was rep<sup>er</sup> w/  
Pundit of Panama to investigate Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met w/ [Mexico City CIA staff]  
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohnman from Panama  
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unnamed visit to Hong  
Kong. Warden Scott & [Warden Dean in Mexico City]  
says he had an investigative agency w/  
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to  
provide training to Mexican Govt Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for broad review  
has handles & informant a Mexican official  
& working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Hotel  
Club & Dolphin Club w/ [Grace Speed] w/ a  
Dev staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office



SECRET

0002360

He would like to work overseas  
for CIA

Cain worked for Cosh by Shuff  
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago  
area & would provide info on underground  
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra  
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain inform the Student Directory,  
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Mario Cordoyos informant in  
purchase arms

12 Sept 63 J. DRP people who had purchased  
arms. [Horace Speed] from Washington & Chicago  
told Cain to get out of the picture  
H. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's arms w/ Mob  
& resumed CIA server contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico  
City; then disappeared. May 1972 says he  
was going to Latin America. Involved  
in illegal arms deals (international) &  
on various occasions stated he was CIA  
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in [Mexico City] used  
[Mexico City Station for] traces on Cain  
Eastern Airlines got ed. Cain as  
skyjacker who fled from Honduras. 5 May 72

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0002301

27 Nov 63

By Robt B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Wiley, Secy Chicago Chapter. Assassination of President
3. LHO passed up in March 1963 Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officer of UPT
4. Shuff advised in late Feb 63 so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI.

~~Could not read~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago took over operation in US for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he called it re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show up to Ed Butman but to someone in Butman's office (justified)

SECRET

Brackenridge Memo to Paul G. requests

1. Passes in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one of volumes of materials
2. Section B has 3 known origins.

Contact is minimal

3. Question in Section C

B1 is Atomic, also used by  
M again as to operation

Deborahs have already interviewed / contact

who is retired.

## TAB C

1. Ramon Don Estefano Dominguez (shanty)  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family

DOB 12 Jan 1948

3. Luciana Nieves (shanty)

4. Jose de la Torre (shanty)

5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45

applied a system of maps to Puerto

6. Joaquin Armas Cortez DOB 10 Jan 45

7. Manuel Arfene

SECRET

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Mufson as Terry Kenyon

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Group.

- O'Malley knew Hughes is client of Mullen's; this information pushed up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Fair Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan.

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible impact on cover placements and consternation.

- Hunt approved O'Malley for an individual having no known or suspicious contacts.

- Thomas C. Smith apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul G. intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible deportation of Brancusa.

- only people who know well P. Inwood, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use suspected personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Early '63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Fernando Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Presumably USSR<sup>1940s</sup> & then in Polish Air Force under British Command. Married Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

Early '63 Volsky contacts Tad Szulc & met with Goodwin & Herwitt (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK.

Never progressed very far & by Sept 61 had 3 sources including Guin.

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indiscipline. He was given to appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szulc.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In '65 Guin & Plan aborted.

Szulc & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez  
suspected agent who defected Dec 62 &  
joined AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on his own

SECRET

0002305

X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested  
& given 30 yrs. not freed in 67.

Accusation RABET a Cuban agent  
as early as July 1963.

Possibly -

It MTRANK might have been an influence.  
Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was  
laying Castro & some info & infiltration.

M.C.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Marshall.  
- quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts  
including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I  
recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of Rota, prior to its disclosure  
by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security wrote memo in 1975  
noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1962  
citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960  
indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be.  
& girls in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA girls not until Feb 1961,  
seems that mob had their own plan.

SECRET

- Loreny claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Vanna

SECRET

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for Xilce

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Stugis could have learned of Xilce's  
role after Xilce settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a  
person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

### Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a  
contact employee stated that in Feb 1961 he  
was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro  
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re  
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Hydco  
he proposed to CIA. The promising Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to  
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

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1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents



so probably same plan

0002308

1. 27 March 1961 [AMBRONE 15]

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sport Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with different  
mission on 30 March but no communication  
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only mission for 50 men; would try  
9 April but need military aid.

a) [AMBRONE] infiltrated several times  
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May  
62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was  
CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) [AMCOAX 11] <sup>the</sup> ~~both~~ persons in

c) [AM PUB 11] touch w/ [AMBRONE]

d) [AM PANIC 17] <sup>2</sup> mentioned in McBrown book, Doug

30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay of Pigs  
none had assassination mission. Only  
[AMBRONE] mentioned that!

4. 4 June 61 Moratori of Italian Embassy  
claimed he had plans for mission w/in  
30 days after belly feed.

Reply was that info was  
untrue & Moratori condemned.

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SECRET

5. 3 May 61

- from a member of Revolutionary <sup>6002309</sup>  
Recovery Movement saying they would try to  
kill "Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"

- Maybe [HMPut 1]

Tab D

AMLAASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and  
Sept 1963.

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that  
AMLAASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intel  
performer; but approach as chief com. speaker  
allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

Book V leaves inference that Castro's  
speech to Dan Harker after AMLASH leak  
Summary's Findings but CIA had not proposed anything at that  
time. D. & M. met until 3 Oct 62

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer  
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov  
he was reported to delay until Fidel arrived  
"of something interesting" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov. Mexico Station responded to a  
Headquarters request for names of known  
contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City

Payne was to determine significance  
LHO's contact w/ Soviet

But in reference to contact before a member  
of the Soviet Embassy & a Cuban cultural  
attache. NOT a report of a contact between  
Hm LASH / 1 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of  
Hm LASH 1963 association w/ CIA

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### Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban President's Policy  
Assessment of Pen Kennedy

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)  
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FIP report, Agency reports Almeida  
be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)  
Subj - Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SCC)  
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)  
Photos of individual closely resembling LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (C/I/Re)  
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 3/6/61446-64  
[U/ADUCT] interview on 9 Sept 1964  
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded 7/25

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21, 1978

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Prologue

The contents of the CFT are more a series of summaries of how various investigations shall all be handled, and in the non-reporting of various Agency operations. It is the SSC Final Report judge to have been followed to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. It stated those of the SSC Final Report in the the quality of the intelligence against Cuba showed a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. coverage.

"It goes without saying . . . . investigation p 2  
they should have . . . . facts . . . p 7  
Certainly . . . . information, p 7

A central feature of the report is the concept that if Castro had been out of the activities it would have justified serious investigation against Cuba. Finally, the SSC Final Report makes it clear that if these things should have been presented and accepted at the time of the intelligence against not to mention the W.C. coverage a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

They were the primary thing in the Final Report & part of the

result of an evolution in perception.

ie. Provocation started in 63 from  
both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs.  
Minskis, 'along with the army of US  
colon program.

"The SSC Find Report has started to  
emphasize instead CIA general activity  
against Cuba is requiring specific attention.

Review by Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~<sup>very</sup> know details of 1963  
or 1964 operations for the most part are no  
longer available. Primary reliance on records.

CIA has now conducted such a  
review - looking at "the other end"  
of a possible chain of evidence, which they  
theoretically could have started. This has  
produced no new evidence bearing on the  
massacre, altho' it has produced the basis  
for new lines of speculation. In fact, the  
review sometimes seemed to become  
a futile exercise in trying to put  
facts to the provocation theory  
rather than being able to identify  
evidence actually bearing on the  
assassination of Pres. Kennedy. To improve  
sometimes became one of asking if this  
activity (which was under review)  
could have provided clues to solve  
the assassination. ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

Red Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLABH operation actually fit the thing for which the SSC's operation seemed to be tailored!

### Tab C

AMLABH

The Agency had not a tentative allyship with this man during Pres Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - int'ing to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pres. Kennedy's death the allyship ~~to~~ with AMLABH was anonymous and without substance. Red Castro said if he could ~~not~~ claim my that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

### p14 New Consideration on the Septulotto Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Marshall in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"The Cuban Comintern scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

SECRET

access to the Prime Minister's office, Stugor said. I knew Fidel's private security guard Ota. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (mission embassy in Havana).

"He (Stugor) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Ota was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him access that would make it possible for him to pass letters. The plan failed because Ota lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was just to delay of the prime gifts to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Ota's role in this campaign was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974  
Same news source discussed a possible relationship between Stugor and [redacted], also mentioning a [redacted] as a family member of [redacted]. [redacted] wrote a memorandum in 1975, noting

SECRET



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6002316

a connection between Sturgis and Portman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

But even that Sturgis's reports to her had a role in gambling and. On this availability due to her "lost profits." One could deduce that Sturgis and Portman could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men behind the gambling operations.

June 1976 Sturgis also reports claim by Maria (maurice) Loring that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poor pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Barman."  
"This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Carter with poison known, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for selling until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is probable that Vanna already was involved in independent

squadrons with the command syndicate when first appeared prior to 13 of July in Madrid to contact the Castro command. The 1407 DB Report refers to two FID reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, indicates support by the command syndicate for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jan. 1961, suggests that Varna was one of these receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... to late 22 June 64 another group plot in Meridiana for 150,000.

Speculation that when activated in April 1962 can officer felt there was something already "ongoing."

It is possible that CFT simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way.

In a sense CFT may have been simply backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.