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1977 IGR

6 AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the CASTRO regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

Little concrete progress during JFK's life in 1965 CIA w/drew from its assoc. because believed to be compromised

basic ?'s about security since inception due to involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents

IGR speculates that its inability (AMTRUNK) to develop any substance till long after JFK's death suggests that it is unlikely to have provoked Castro at that time to use assas in retaliation

7 "a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had the CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate [illegible]"

"[illegible] CASTRO [illegible] about the relationship [illegible] AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have [illegible]

7 known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the base for the postulated provocation"

IGR doesn't + dismiss possibility that actual C.I.A. plotting w/ criminal syndicate which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assas

Items Selected by the SSC for Cuciane Comment

8 reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cubana airlines flight from Mexico Cy, awaiting arrival of mysterious passenger
* see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ
IGR says flight on ground for only 4-hrs + it departed 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man after CIA so reported who departed on another Cubana flight - info was avail for use in SSC report (so what), "a single report that caused him to be dramatized as so full of errors as to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphase on cable from Mex Cy station replying to 11/23/63 inquiry from CIA HQ asking for report on contact w/ certain [illegible]

cable DIR 84385, 23-11-63 [illegible]
MEXI 7045 (IN 67281)

24 November 1963
[illegible]

8 as having contact w/ the Soviets but as the subject of a December 1960 meeting
9 between functionary of Cuban Embassy w/ a Soviet, concerning press conference to be held by AMLASH/1 in Feb + March 1961
"In any event, the meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/1's name did not lead to detailed research about him"

2 gen'l conclusions
(1) "the SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents."
(2) "while one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could have well broadened its review to include the anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book II of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths with its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it as generously."

(3)

11 "it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission's) its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms — the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticism's made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt — as they obviously did — that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review.

11111937

"it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B: CIA Pref. on The Inquiries

2 b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AMLASH operation inaccurately "The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assas. of JFK, in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the WC

c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 + 11/27/62 to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passenger" folder

Travel to + fr USSR 1959-1962
11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63
sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London + Ottawa - requesting any scrap info which bears on JFK's assas.

replies on 11/27/63:

HELS 2299	(IN 68739),	11/27/63
ROME 1235	(IN 68802)	"
OTTA 1275	(IN 69005)	"
COPE 3469	(IN 69011)	"
LOND 6097	(IN 69100)	"
OTTA 1277	(IN 69233)	"
OSLO 4490	(IN 69290)	"
MADR 9789	(IN 69328)	11/28/63
BRUS 8731	(IN 69352)	11/29/63
ROME [illegible]	(IN [illegible])	"
PARI 1710	(IN 74234)	12/5/63
PARI 1833	(IN 77148)	12/10/63
PARI [illegible]	(IN 77377)	"

LOND 6097 (IN 69100) 11/27/63

4 London reported that British journalist claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in 1959 – Santos (Trafficante), living in luxury in jail, Santos visited frequently by other Americ. gangster Ruby

OTTA 1277 (IN 69233) 11/27/63

Ottawa reported delight of Cuban embassy staff over JFK death & instructions from govt to cease looking happy in public

OSLO 4490 (IN 69290) 11/27/63

Oslo reported Soviets shocked – blame assas on extreme right-wingers

Other than above, initial response produced no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to Hague & Frankfurt on Oswald travel back fr USSR

12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn & The Hague

BONN 5579 (IN 73338) 12/4/63

HAGU 5110 (IN 73378) "

MUNI 8316 (IN 75065) 12/6/63

STUT 5545 (IN 76758) 12/9/63

ESNT 1400 12/9/63

11111939

above reporting produced details about Oswaldo's travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands

5 No evidence found through these queries + related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's assas. of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963
Cable to Mexcy on 11/28/63 DIR 85655,
"We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban Installations and your liason w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63
Please follow all leads + tips - Question of Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63
Continue watch of Soviets + Cubans for complicity, propagandizing about the case. "FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letter sent to [U.S. Government) leaders demanding full investigation of case."

11111940
HMMW-12193, 17.12.16 12/17/63
7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mexcy station commending them on job well done
"Your LIEWVOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN and your analyses were [illegible] in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84608, 22.11.63
all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. — Be on quick alert while new Pres. takes over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant or significant information on the subject (of JFK assas + Oswald) it would have been reported either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources"
If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously
9 would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

11111941
comment in HQ dispatch to Mex Cy Sta on 12/17/63 - HMMW-12193, 17.12.63 re limited reporting from other stations "... this partly dictated by the facts of the Oswald's life ..."

In contrast to SSC report, citing Oswald's intel [illegible] in Cuba, JFK says that

9 There were no penetrations of CASTRO's inner circle where any info on subject (JFK assn) would exist,

10 However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements

IV. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mystery passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11 Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mexico were passenger flights –
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/1 passenger – the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to HQ
CIA had surveillance team, so did the Mexicans which provided photos of passports, + copies passenger list

Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy of transcripts of conversations w/ Cubana office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11111942

11/22/1963 Flight

Book I of SSC [illegible] report + [illegible] could not explain, at time of SSC [illegible] why no record of follow-up on 11/22/63 flight. In fact the SSC was advised

12 that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject

13 "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight fr Mx Cy to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter"

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight re CIA passing report to FBI & FBI not doing followup investig. for WC

15 IGR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report on their position

1) Mx Cy Sta did not cable HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, that registered at hotel in Mx Cy on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport

11111943

2) dispatch followed HMMA-22579, 12/5/63 reporting info & [illegible] photograph & containing following:

"Source states the timing and circumstances [illegible] Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana [illegible]

15 Also internal memo in Mex Cy Station — see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63 which stated that the man was reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 Monterrey Base Cable 3/19/64
MNTY-0829 (IN 43193) — info on Cuban American of 11/27/63 flight had by agent of Mexican federals

"The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement that he "was involved in the Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico Cy (while the date and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico Cy, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida)."

11111944

Mx Cy Sta [illegible] to Monterrey station cable contributed to confusion on this episode. When Mx Cy Sta received cable, the Deputy Chief of Station [illegible]

SECRET

17 In MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940) 3/20/64 that the information in Monterrey report "jibes fully w/ that provided Station by (Mx Cy source) 4 December 63".

"The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more info. on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources w/ access to info concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available w/ such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved (in Cuban operations (supply of info to W.C.), as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary - which has been suggested by some - would require a unanimous conspiracy of many Cuban citizens employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects of even the most [illegible] activities, M

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 — Operations to Split CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK operation)

Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Robera

Cuban exiles — developed operational concept to overthrow the CASTRO govt — know as the Leonardo Plan

8 Moreno assoc's in Miami
Jorge Aybuszyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of polish origin
married Cuban national after WW II
reportedly imprisoned following B.P. go to
reportedly avid Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/ Ad Szulc
Szulc claimed high govt contacts — it was
through his intercession that Leonardo
Plan gained govt-level support & approval
↓ Richard Goodwin was Szulc contact at WoHo
Volsky & Szulc met Robert Hurwitch
1 State Dept official to discuss the
plan — he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned it to Miami Station &
became known as AMTRUNK
→ 4/17/63 — Szulc tells Hurwitch that Miami Station gave Volsky a copy to decide if operation to proceed not consistent with CIA intentions

9 Early Sept 1963 — AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence sources in CUBA

1111946

1) [illegible]
2) [illegible]
3) [illegible]

[illegible] reportedly [illegible] to AMLUSH/[illegible]

10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate Moreno from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in estab org. or any capability for action

11. Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

12. also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

13 Marine Corps - held job until 1960 when apptd Chief of Rural Housing defected to US in 1962 - recruited by JMWAVE Sta + used in AMTRUNK activities - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 year in prison but set free in July or August of 1967. "There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

14 IGR says very little planning + concrete progress in AMTRUNK during JFK's life

11111947

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14 —

15 "While Orta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info. on the Cuban leadership."

16 —

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro govt re gambling, Orta's availability for assass attempt was understood to be due his lost payoffs ~~to~~ he had received from gambling interests. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18 Rosselli tells CIA he knows Cuban exile leader, Tony Varona of Dem. Revolu. Frnt

received 19 CIA support "... it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination

#1111948

20 As late as 6/10/64 — it was reported that [illegible] gangsters [illegible] to [illegible] Castro [illegible] available when approached by Rosselli

525-1800

20 In '67 IG R, notes that case officer ~~[illegible]~~ said that the program reactivated in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing in interim. "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way" ... "In a sense ~~[illegible]~~ CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution, was also supplying an aura of official sanction."

21 Considerations:

1/ Possible Indep crim syndicate operas re Castro prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. ~~[illegible]~~ May have continued after B.P 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing in some form when reactivated by CIA in 4/62

2. Frank Sturgis may have had contact w/ crim syndicate. Could

22 have been used by syndicate in its activities

3. Sturgis prob'ly knew Orta. However, Sturgis not in Cuba when Orta given assassins role. But Sturgis may have fabricated his story from Miami gossip

[illegible] Arthur [illegible] CIA [illegible] was connected w/ AMMUG-66, Cuban exile involvement. He propositioned Castro [illegible] in 3 occasions CIA 12/60, 7/62, 4/66 [illegible]

Agent Messages in '61 re Castro assass

26 5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro or proposing same. 3 related to same operation, 2 were separate proposals. No indication that these resulted from separate CIA initiative. LA Division prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75. Records of Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. Subject not covered in Church committee interim report.

27 B messages: relate to same plan

1st, 3/27/61 sent by agency asset AMBRONC/5 re proposed sabotage of electric company in Havana - coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen'l Plan) no record of message answered

2nd 3/29/61 - AMBRONC/5 sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61, message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan - addressed gen'l issue but didn't comment on proposal to kill Castro

1111950

3rd 4/5/61 - presumably from AMBRONC/5 persons he had been directed to contact only [illegible] for [illegible] Said [illegible] out 4/9/61 plan would make it impossible to maintain clandestine org. in Cuba

"your military aid [illegible] If [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] message" answered

The 4 agents named in plan

28

① AMBRONC/5 - a) 201 file opened on 7/15/60
POA issued 12/18/61
OA issued 1/31/62
debriefing on Nov 1960 -
indicates that he had contact
w/ plotters against CASTRO -
claimed to have attempted to
make ~~[illegible]~~ similar plans. Infiltrated
on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
3/3/61
exfiltrated
4/19/61
Sold mission was to org. resistance
groups

(c) infiltrated
12/19/61
exfiltrated
3/29/62
still same mission

(d) infiltrated
5/2/62
arrested 5/29/62 & executed 8/30/62
reported to never admit was CIA agent
29 name not in McGovern's book given by Castro

11111951

② AMCOAX/1 - AMBRONC/5 told to contact
him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/5/61
[illegible] to org. [illegible]
[illegible] in Cuba
infiltrated
[illegible]/61
exfiltrated
7/61 following B.P.

29 (b) reinfiltrated
7/29/61 same mission
arrested
8/17/61 — serving 30 year term
in McGovern's book
(3) AMPUG/1 — another AMBRONC contact
for 4/61 plan
a) recruited in 9/60 & infiltrated then
received airdrops in 12/60
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.
b) infiltrated
6/29/61 — mission to org. resistance groups
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 & 30 year term
name in McGovern book
30 (1) AMPANIL/7 — another AMBRONC 4/61 contact
a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60
POA — 1/30/61
MOC since 8/12/60
mission to org. resistance in
Havana & Pinar del Rio
b) infiltrated 3/3/61
arrested 4/23/61 — 30 year term
in McGovern book
c) was infiltrated on 8/60
infiltrated 11/60
(prior to POA) 1111952
mission was sabotage & assass.
of prominent Cuban communist
[illegible]
[illegible] his functioning
in Cuba at that time
[illegible] was not authorized
[illegible] on AMPANIL [illegible]

TABD AMLASH OPERATION

1 1977 IGR says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH is much def. than Book II

Book II suggests that AMLash may have been Castro agent w/ provocation mission that would justify LHO retaliation & in alternative Amlash was a security risk by which details of plotting could have become known to Castro, providing same provocation. & whatever the reasoning Amlash should have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither these applies. The character of the relationships between CIA and Amlash/1 prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for Amlash/1 to feel that he had any tangible
2 CIA support for plotting against CASTRO. Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

11111953

5 Comment

" It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time — nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1963 the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact w/ potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had w/ the CIA the critical period, for purposes of the paper, is therefore between 5 September and 22 November 1963

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLASH case officer ~~[illegible]~~ approach AMLASH as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom he may find persons susceptible to long distance & covert disciplines — Cable also spells out long range requirement prior to action based on Amlash possible internal organization

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meeting w/ Amlash "Amlash still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question, According AMWHIP, Amlash still awaiting for US reveal plan of action

[illegible] to "inside job" did not specify [illegible] in Book II as p. 4 [illegible] more [illegible]? [illegible] how to bring about change [illegible] not specific [illegible] Book II

10 "The fact remains that whatever views Amlash/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the arise for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amlash/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 – Amlash case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amlash even tho Amlash told Amolhip he does not "intend to see your friend again"
Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 – case officer cables HQ that Amlash claimed to have "necessary people and equipment
11 inside (Cuba) to accomplish verthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

Amlash wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amlash determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

[illegible] planned meeting [illegible] to rep. self as personal rep of RFK + assurance of full U.S. support if there is a change of the [illegible] in Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Amlash meets w/ Fitzgerald in Paris. Case officer also at meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes meeting of D.F. w/ Amlash
U.S. support only after real corps effected + group involved in position to request U.S. support.
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

13 D.F. in 1967 IGR recalled that Amlash repeatedly requested high powered rifle w/ telescopic sights or other weapon to kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated he rejected the request.
Case officer memo said nothing of operational nature discussed at Fitz. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amlash meeting in New York re Amlash reaction to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -
Amlash happy about policy but not fact that wasn't given technical assistance for operational plan.

14 If Amlash doesn't get advice and materials from U.S. got technician he will become fed up + we'll lose progress made

11111956

Comment Book V at p. 18 characterizes Amlash feelings in Fitz. meeting as unclear - IGR says this not true as corroborated by above contact report

11/19/63 - Fitz. approved telling Amlash that he would be given a cache inside Cuba, to include high power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amlash tells CIA officer he plans return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cables Paris to delay Amlash departure to permit one more meeting which Amlash requested

On same day, Amlash agrees to delay departure if its something interesting. Case officer said couldn't assure it but it was a meeting Amlash requested.

16 IGR says this is highly speculative evidence of indication that Amlash might receive specific support he requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets w/ Amlash in afternoon

conclusion 11 ... there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life Amlash/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocation reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and lacked what he knew, he had no factual basis for linking a reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro

Specific Sections of Book II

17 View of SSC as to why AMLASH should have been examined by WC is stated at p 5 of the Report

IGR disagrees saying Amlash w/out substance prior to JFK's death

18 incorrect to say CIA endorsed Amlash's proposal. No agreement w/ Amlash 1 or committment to him and even if Castro learned of contacts w/ him there was nothing to learn beyond fact of contact relationship was tenuous w/no support promised to him for whatever he planned.

at p 68 SSC outlines position on syndicate plots

19 "...we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility - not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry - that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the Amlash operation by the SSC Report."

11111959

"we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to Atlantic - Castro proposal of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities."

19 p 4 & p 19 SSC Final Report - attribute Fitzgerald saying that U.S would support a coup & gave gen'l assurance that U.S would help in bringing about the coup

attributed to case officer testimony

20 which doesn't jibe w/ 1963 memo on subject

IGR says Fitzgerald assurance of support contingent on if there is a change in govt in Cuba

21 re to CIA case officers who were responsible for investigation at time of WC - saying knowing of Amlash operation would have affected investigation - IGR says "it is likely the views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were reponsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was"

21

Interview CIA officer resp for investigation
read Fitzgerald testimony, interview memoranda

the AMLASH case officer

same w/ syndicate stuff

interview 67 IGR staff & internal docs also

21 p. 249 Book II — reference to 67 IGR wherein case officer Amlash ordered to break contact w/ Amlash due to Assas of JFK
77 IGR says 67 IGR states that case officer got cable from Fitz. saying "everything was off" — but case officer didn't testify that reason for everything being off was JFK's assas.

22 OPM cable never found — it may never have been sent being case officer misrecollection. IGR says 2 sources in Book II don't support its version

11111960

f. n 30, p 17 Book II — ? of Amlash op. security not until after JFK assas was ? of security of sufficient concern for CIA to break relation w/ him

22 Amlash is provocateur — reworked strangely — served 10 years of 30 year sentence — Mr. Gover [illegible] Amlash [illegible] not for prod of C.A. contact 3/61 - 11/64

23

p 26 of Book II - re Amlash name as known contact of Soviets in Mx Cy - Amlash real name in list of names on the Mx Cy cable above risen as basis for Book II discussion of why Amlash name in list did not lead to identification of Amlash operation

24 Amlash name brought up by Soviet embassy official and Cuban cultural attache in 12/60 re Amlash planned press conference in Mx Cy 2/61-3/61 not a report of contact between Amlash and the Soviet which was subject of inquiry -
the 12/60 removes the question from relevance to subject because before Kennedy inaug.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report concerning C/A meeting w/Amlash FBI report says meeting was to plan Castro assas. - badly mixes times & events - substantially post date JFK death & not relevant to WC inquiry

25 p 75 Book II re testimony of Chief SAS/CE recollections uncertain. Book II gives his opinion re Castro assas by Amlash fell plan despite extensive [illegible]

25 p 68-75 Book I re what CIA Empe's knew about Amlash, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn
IGR says Book I verlooks inchoate quality of Amlash relationship during the period in question

26 p 78, 79, 105 Book V re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Amlash Activities + Amlash involve w/ CIA. IGR says if read Book V carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Amlash 63 assoc. w/ CIA
1) info was 1½ yrs after JFK ass
2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Amlash relationships

27
28 "At the time of the 1967 FS report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC Report is both imprecise and misleading."

TAB E — Material furnished TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI

Listed here are reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) and the Warren Commission.

4 sections to the list

E. 1 Dissem to Outside Components

E. 2 Dissemination to W.C. SEE

E.3 Dissem to FBI on Rumors & Allegations
E.4 Memorandum to W.C

E 2 Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff.

18 "Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretically) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cable dissemination were released by CI/LIAS on. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordination short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's.

18 Dissem. of Material to W.C

19	C.D.	Date	NOT C.D.'S Date	Subj
	100	12/13/63	1/21/64	memo from DDP Helms to J.L. Rankin re: Draft ?'s for submission to Soviet Govt
	300	1/21/64		
	691	1/22/64		
	321	1/25/64	2/5/64	note from Karamessines to Rankin 14 attachs including recent Soviets Statements on LHO
	347	1/31/64		
	361	2/5/64		
20	1182	2/8/64	2/18/64	memo for FBI [illegible]

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin
Subject: Apparent Inconsistencies in Material Furnished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Public. of Docs furnished to Commission by CIA

	DOC DATE	DOC NO.	ORIGINATING OFFICE
1	1. 11/23/63	DIR 84915	(WH/3)

Info related to telephone call on 9/28/63 to Soviet Embassy in Mex Cy. Recipient FBI

2

Tab E - Material Forwarded To W.C

Tab F - Mex Cy Coverage of Oswald Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald Visit to Mx Cy in '63

1. Unilateral Coverage

umbrella type project { LIPSTICK - multi-line phone taps
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps -
- handled by case officer
+ recruited agents

3 photographic site subcrypts under LIPSTICK:

managed by a Mex agent { LIMITED - fixed site directly opposite Soviet Embassy
LILYRIC - alternate photo base on same street as Limited front gate
LICALLA - South side of Soviet Compound backdoor - get good ID photos of Soviet personnel

2

closed down when Station received word that photo of the "unidentified man" was being released by W.C

Film collected 3 times/week from Limited and Lilyric site
Licalla film processed on outside by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by 2 American staff officers - had team of 10 recruited agents [illegible] by radio from Limited site [illegible] of interest left the [illegible] Soviet Embassy

11/11/1965

3 unilateral mail intercept; Libight — handled by American case officer

Liason Coverage
unreliable & insecure as was the nature of Mexican Services at the time

4 telephone tap w/ Mexicans called Lienvoy run by Mex office — 30 lines on the at one time listening post. In 61 Station chief became project case officer on LIENVOY

Oswald Coverage
Mexicans asked for telephone members of Soviet, Cuban & Satellite Embassies to do Lienvoy tap — we disconnected our unilateral lines to avoid discovery Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines, and 1 Yugoslav lines — recorded, transcripted
Live monitor made short summaries for Station chief of interesting conversations time lag of a day or two

5. Boris Yarasoff and Russian translation translations ran about a week behind date of conversation. All transcripts made in Spanish or English since this is all Sta Chief could read & because he screened these transcripts for operational [illegible]

5 Anne Goodpasture started screened all photograph as soon as station learned that Lee Oswald had phoned Soviet Embassy

6 Oswald came to attention of listening post operators from tap of Soviet Line. It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally w/ the typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Stories w/ Comment

G 5 - Comments on Ronald Kessler's Wash Post article of 11/26/76 re CIA w/held details of Oswald call

2 memo - 1) J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for DDP Helms Subject: CIA Dissem of Info on LHO date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64 re Info developed by CIA on LHO activity in Mxcy 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from Helms - re Info on LHO Mxcy Activity 9/28 - 10/3/63

Tab G & w/ CIA comments

1 Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleging CIA activity in Dallas on 1963

2. " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA tied to false Oswald story

3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald

4. Clare Booth Luce involvement w/ Cuban exiles

5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents

6. John Gishko story 11/13/76 alleging Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy

7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro

8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LHO in 1960