Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10323 RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 68261 Date: 09-01-2022

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 20

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

> Date:08/20/93 Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

C 20 T T

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10323

RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77 PAGES : 34

SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION CHENOWITH, JAMES H.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box #:1.

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Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 Mapphe \$ 201 Jess unnaity Jess & 19,764 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY **U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES** MEMORANDUM 20,713 21, 913. Jess Annuity \$

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM.

or Ballpoint Pen)

(Please Use Typewriter JU.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

...

_To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
James H. Chenoweth	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	Type of Action
091 12 1326	Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	Salary Adjustment
Assassinations	Termination (At close of business on effective date)
type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, comp	olete the following information.)
Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)	
1. 🗌 Standing Committee: Staff— 🗋 Clerical or 🗌 Profes	ssional.
2. 🗋 Special or Select Committee: Authority–H. Res.	ofCongress.
3. Joint Committee.	
Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)	\dot{c}
Position NumberIf applicable, Level	Step
I certify that this authorization is not in violation atives.	or 5 0.3.C. STIU(b), prohibiting the employment
te, 19 ⁷⁷	
	(Signature of Authorizing Official)
 Cina) (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)
	(Title—If Member, District and State)
All appointments and salary adjustments for employees un yees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the C approved by the Committee on House Administration.	nder the House Classification Act and for Committee er
APPROVED:	Chairman, Committee on House Administration
Office of Finance use only:	in A
Office Code	611

NW 68261 Docld:32243289 Page 5 .

June 1, 1977

The Honorable Louis Stokes Chairman, Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

Dear Congressman Stokes:

For purely personal reasons I am tendering my resignation from the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I would like my resignation to become effective as of the close of business on July 11, 1977 but am expressing my intent at this time so as to provide you with as much advance notice as possible.

Very truly yours,

James H. Chenoweth Staff Investigator June 16, 1977

Mr. James H. Chenoweth 13122 Turkey Branch Parkway Rockville, Maryland 20853

Dear Jim:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes Chairman

LS:tle

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

(202) 225-4624

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C. WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C. YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN. HAROLD E. FORD, TENN. FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND. ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA. SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL. STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN. CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. House of Representatives

3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 1, 1977

The Honorable Louis Stokes Chairman, Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

Dear Congressman Stokes:

For purely personal reasons I am tendering my resignation from the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I would like my resignation to become effective as of the close of business on July 11, 1977 but am expressing my intent at this time so as to provide you with as much advance notice as possible.

Very truly yours, times H. Chenoweth

James H. Chenoweth Staff Investigator

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
James H. Chenoweth	5/2/77
Employee Social Security Number	Type of Action
081 12 1326	Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	Salary Adjustment
Assassinations	Termination (At close of business on effective date)

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	\$28,000
f Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)	LESS ANNULTY
1. 🔲 Standing Committee: Staff—[] Clerical or [] Professionc	al. An an
2. 🗶 Special or Select Committee: Authority–H. Res. 465	_of <u>5th</u> _Congress.
3. 🗌 Joint Committee.	
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elatives.	
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All appointments and salary adjustments for employee's under- loyees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Comm e approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:	ittee on the Budget; and the Joint Committees; must
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Office Code	5/11
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8261 :32243289 Page 9	

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

Washington, D.C. 20515

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: at september of the

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

		·
Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)		Effective Date
James H. Chenoweth	4/1/77	
Employee Social Security Number	1949 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 - 1940 -	Type of Action
081 12 1326	🗌 Appointm	nent
Employing Office or Committee	Salary Ad	djustment
Assassinations	Terminat	ion (At close of business on effective date)
(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, comple	ete the follow	ving information.)
Position Title		Gross Annual Salary
	•	\$47,500
(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)		LESS ANNUITY
 Standing Committee: Staff — Clerical or Professi Special or Select Committee: Authority – H. Res. 465 		
 Special or Select Committee: Authority-H. Res. Joint Committee. 	of	_Congress.
(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)	et the	
Position NumberIf applicable, Level	Step	
l certify that this authorization is not in violation or relatives.	of. 5 U.S.C.	3110(b), prohibiting-the-employment of
Date April 29 19_77		(Signature of Authorizing Official)
	Louis	Stokes
and the second se		pe or print name of Authorizing Official)
	<u>Chairm</u>	(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:			
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PAYROLL AUTHO	RIZATION FORM		i.		, · · ·	•-	
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(Please Use Typewriter U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES or Ballpoint Pen) Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

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To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
James K. Chenoweth	3/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	Type of Action
081 12 1326	Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	Salary Adjustment
Select Committee on Assassinations	Termination (At close of business on effective date)

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(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

relatives. Date	Position Title	• • ·	Gross Annual S	alary
If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1		· · ·	\$21,913	
2.	If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item	n below.)	LESS ANNUITY	
3	1. 🗌 Standing Committee: Staff–[] Clerical	l or 🗌 Professional.		
If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number	2. 🔀 Special or Select Committee: Authority	/-H. Res. 222_of_	95th Congress.	
Position Number	3. 🗌 Joint Committee.			
L certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5. U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employm relatives. Date	(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete i	tem below.)	a digense og som en et generatione.	· ·· · · · · · ·
(Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes, Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Select Committee on Assassinations (Title-If Member, District and State) All appointments and solary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee ployees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Monthly Annuity \$00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee	Position NumberIf applied	able, Level <u> </u>	Step	· · ·
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(Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes, Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Select Committee on Assassinations (Title - If Member, District and State) All appointments, and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification. Act and for Committee ployees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Monthly Annuity \$00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee	·	7 200	de a	and the second
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All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee playees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations; the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:	a server a s Server a server a s		(Type or print name of Authorizing Officio Committee on Assassina	
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PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515

GPO: 1975 O - 57-255

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
James K. Chenoweth	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	Type of Action
091 12 1326	Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	🗌 🔲 Salary Adjustment
	, Termination (At close of business on effective date)

Select Committee on Assassinations

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

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	Position Title		Gross	Annual Salary
Staff Invest	dator		0.964.00	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

LESS ANNUITY \$19,764.00

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1. Standing Committee: Staff Clerical or Drofessional.

2. Special or Select Committee: Authority-H. Res. 222_____of95th__Congress.

3. Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______If applicable, Level_____Step_

l certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date_

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All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code____

Monthly Annuity \$_____00 ,

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

DocId:32243289 Page 13

(Please Use Typewriter U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES or Ballpoint Pen) Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
dates K. Chanoweth	11:111
Employee Social Security Number	Type of Action
087 12 1326	Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	Salary Adjustment
Solect Committee on Assassinations	Termination (At close of business on effective date)
(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, comp	lete the following information.)
Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	\$20,020,
(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)	,
1. Standing Committee: Staff-Clerical or Profes	sional.
2. 🗌 Special or Select Committee: Authority–H. Res	ofCongress.
3. 🗍 Joint Committee.	
5. joint Committee.	
(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)	
Position NumberIf applicable, Level	Step
I certify that this authorization is not in violation relatives.	of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of
Date, 19_52	(Signature of Authorizing Official)
	Renry B. Renzalez
	(Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Cite i アバロバ
	(Title – If Member, District and State)
All appointments and salary adjustments for employees un ployees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Co be approved by the Committee on House Administration.	
APPROVED:	Chairman, Committee on House Administration
Office of Finance use only:	
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Monthly Annuity \$00	
Copy for Initiating Óffi	ice or Committee

CPAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Úse Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

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To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)		Effective Date 🖂
James K. Chenoweth	1/1,	177
Employee Social Security Number		Type of Action
	K Appo	ntment
Employing Office or Committee	Salary	Adjustment
Select Lowalttee on Assassinations	Termi	nation (At close of business on effective date)
(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, compl	ete the fol	owing information.) 🔹 ć
Position Title		Gross Annual Salary
Staff Invectigator	``	\$22,000
(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)		
1. 🗌 Standing Committee: Staff – 🗌 Clerical or 🗌 Profess	ional.	
2. Special or Select Committee: Authority-H. Res	of ^{04.}	Congress.
3. 🔲 Joint Committee.		·
(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)	ters i te	
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Position NumberIf applicable, Levél		
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relatives.	,	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Date December 30 1976		
Tik	mas (i. i	(Signature of Authorizing Official)
	* _ · · - ·	(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)
<u>Set</u>	act tom	PICCE UN ISSNERTATIONS (Title-If Member, District and State)
All appointments and salary adjustments for employees un ployees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Co be approved by the Committee on House Administration.		
APPROVED:		irman, Committee on House Administration
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Office Code		
Office Code Monthly Annuity \$00		

MEMORANDUM

All Staff Employees TO:

Budget Officer FROM:

DATE: January 3, 1977

Payroll Certification RE:

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father	nephew	brother-in-law
mother	niece	sister-in-law
son	husband	stepfather
daughter	wife	stepmother
brother	father-in-law	stepbrother
sister	mother-in-law	stepsister
uncle	son-in-law	half-brother
aunt	daughter-in-law	half-sister
first cousin		

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved Richard A. Sprague

I am not related

I am related by the following relationship

Chenoweth of Employee Signature of

NW 68261 DocId:32243289 Page 15

250 1.00

U.S. House of Representatives 949-4419 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Select Committee on Assassinations

Jim Chenowsch seference Raymond N. Kisly M. Y. Conty N. A. H.

James H. Chenoweth 13122 Turkey Branch Parkway Rockville, Maryland 20853 Oct. 9, 1976

Richard Sprague Director, House Select Committee 1622 Locust Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

You've undertaken quite a task. I think I can be of use to you and I hope you'll agree.

As my attached resume shows, I have considerable practical as well as executive experience, not only in investigating homicides and conspiracies (real or imagined) but in effectively handling problems that involve delicate interagency relationships.

I retired from Federal service a little over a year ago because my retirement would have been mandatory within a few years anyway and there seemed no purpose in marking time until then; I am now working as a free lance photographer. I have no cloud over me and was cleared for Top Secret at the time I retired. My ability and reputation are well known to various officials within Treasury law enforcement circles including the Commissioner of Customs. As an ex-Treasury investigator I can be objective about both the FBI and the CIA; as an ex-Internal Security Inspector I have lived with the problems of information leaks and unethical disclosures. My retirement status would allow me to work at a minimal salary and for a fixed period of time.

I hope I have said enough to interest you; I can supply additional details or discuss the matter with you at your convenience. But even if you are not interested, I have a suggestion which might be helpful to your future inquiries: After the assassination of President Kennedy, some witnesses claimed to have heard shots fired from somewhere other than Oswald's location. There is a phenomenon called the "bow wave report" in which persons hearing riflefire from a high-velocity weapon undergo a "hearing illusion"; they think the shot came direction other than its actual origin. (The attached reprint of an article I wrote some years ago touches on the "bow wave report".)

NW 68261 Docld:32243289-Page-17I don't know whether the Warren Commission investigators considered this phenomenon in their analysis of witness statements; I have seen no mention of it in any published material concerning their inquiry. However the phenomenon can be tested and consideration of it could resolve some of the questions that arose from certain witness statements.

I hope I will hear from you. Whether I do or not, I wish you the best of luck in your endeavor.

Sincerely. ames H. Chenoweth James H. Chenoweth (301) 949-4419

Enclosures: 2

Resume of:

J	AMES	H.	CHENO	WETH	Ŧ	·
13122	Turk	ey	Branc	h Pa	irkwa	iy:
Rock	ville	, M	aryla	nd	2085	53
	(301) 9	49-44	19		

PERSONAL DATA

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نور المراجع مرجع المرجع المرجع - Born of missionary parents on Chinese-Tibetan border on February 14, 1922

- Married 27 years; two grown children.
- Good physical condition; uses reading glasses.
- Currently holds Top Secret clearance.
- Honorably discharged from U. S. Army. Served during World War II as combat engineer and paratrooper.
- Enjoys photography, camping, canoeing.

II. EXPERIENCE

वेद्यविषयितः अत्य स्टब्स्ट्रिप्तः २२ २२

<u>1/52 - 1/54</u> - Police officer, detective, undercover agent with Anchorage Police Department, Anchorage, Alaska.

- <u>1/54 6/62</u> Chief Deputy U. S. Marshal in Alaska with law enforcement duties comparable to a State Police agency. Handled recruitment, training, budget, processing of prisoners, supervision of investigations (including homicide, rape, robbery, embezzlement, assault with dangerous weapon and similar offenses.) Acted as Deputy Coroner. Taught law enforcement training within agencies and in Anchorage Community College.
 - <u>6/62 8/65</u> Internal Security Inspector, Treasury Department, conducting investigations of bribery, embezzlement, attempts to corrupt Federal personnel.
 - <u>8/65 10/68</u> Internal Security Inspector, National Office, responsible for developing and conducting training programs, writing technical manuals, researching data, and inspecting the operation of Internal Security field offices.

<u>10/68 - 11/69</u> - Staff Assistant to Assistant Commissioner, conducting special studies relating to management aspects of Internal Security operations.

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A. Salar

- <u>11/69 2/71</u> Senior Inspector, Internal Security Division, supervising training programs, research projects, technical issuances, manpower allocation, grade structure analyses, and field inspections.
- 2/71 7/73 Executive Assistant to Director, Internal Security Division, acting as consultant, researcher and advisor on all Internal Security management activity.
- <u>7/73 7/74</u> Chief of Investigations Branch, Internal Security Division, directly responsible for sensitive investigations involving activities of high level Federal personnel.

<u>7/74 - present</u>- Acting Assistant Director, Internal Security Division, responsible for assisting in all phases of leadership, direction and coordination of the planning, development and execution of the Internal Security program.

III. PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- Contributor to Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
- Science and to Pacific Northwest Law Enforcement & News.
- Past president and life member Alaska Peace Officers Association.
- Member of American Society of Criminology.
- Conducted weekly TV series (The Hidden Beat) on law enforcement.
- Recipient of Alaska Press Club Award for public service,
- Recipient of Federal High Quality Award and Special Performance Award.
- Recipient of various commendatory letters from U. S. Attorneys, U. S. District Judge, Federal Grand Jury and other officials.

IV. EDUCATION

- Attended Georgia School of Technology 3/43 1/44 under Army Specialized Training Program.
- Attended Columbia College 9/46 8/49 as liberal arts student; all requirements for degree fulfilled except foreign language.

V. ADDENDUM

- Personal references upon request.
- Retiring July 31, 1975, after 26 years of Federal service; retirement mandatory by January, 1978.

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Resume of:

<u> </u>	AMES H	. CHENOW	ETH
$1312\overline{2}$	Turke	y Branch	Parkway
Rock	ville,	Marylan	d 20853
	(301)	949-441	9

I. PERSONAL DATA

- Born of missionary parents on Chinese-Tibetan border on February 14, 1922
- Married 27 years; two grown children.
- Good physical condition; uses reading glasses.

- Currently holds Top Secret clearance.

- Honorably discharged from U. S. Army. Served during World War II
- as combat engineer and paratrooper.
- Enjoys photography, camping, canoeing.

II. EXPERIENCE

1/52 - 1/54

- Police officer, detective, undercover agent with Anchorage Police Department, Anchorage, Alaska.

- 1/54 6/62
- Chief Deputy Ø. S. Marshal in Alaska with law enforcement duties comparable to a State Police agency. Handled recruitment, training, budget, processing of prisoners, supervision of investigations (including homicide, rape, robbery, embezzlement, assault with dangerous weapon and similar offenses.) Acted as Deputy Coroner. Taught law enforcement training within agencies and in Anchorage Community College.
- <u>6/62 8/65</u> Internal Security Inspector, Treasury Department, conducting investigations of bribery, embezzlement, attempts to corrupt Federal personnel.
- 8/65 10/68 Internal Security Inspector, National Office, responsible for developing and conducting training programs, writing technical manuals, researching data, and inspecting the operation of Internal Security field offices.

<u>10/68 - 11/69</u> - Staff Assistant to Assistant Commissioner, conducting special studies relating to management aspects of Internal Security operations.

- <u>11/69 2/71</u> Senior Inspector, Internal Security Division, supervising training programs, research projects, technical issuances, manpower allocation, grade structure analyses, and field inspections.
- <u>2/71 7/73</u> Executive Assistant to Director, Internal Security Division, acting as consultant, researcher and advisor on all Internal Security management activity.
- 7/73 7/74 Chief of Investigations Branch, Internal Security Division, directly responsible for sensitive investigations involving activities of high level Federal personnel.
 - 7/74 present- Acting Assistant Director, Internal Security Division, responsible for assisting in all phases of leadership, direction and coordination of the planning, development and execution of the Internal Security program.

III. PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- Contributor to Journal of <u>Griminal Law</u>, <u>Criminology and Police</u> Science and to Pacific Northwest Law Enforcement & News.
- Past president and life member Alaska Peace Officers Association.
- Member of American Society of Criminology.
- Conducted weekly TV series (The Hidden Beat) on law enforcement.
- Recipient of Alaska Press Club Award for public service,
- Recipient of Federal High Quality Award and Special Performance Award.
- Recipient of various commendatory letters from U. S. Attorneys, U. S. District Judge, Federal Grand Jury and other officials.

IV. EDUCATION

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POLICE TRAINING INVESTIGATES THE FALLIBILITY OF THE EYE WITNESS

JAMES H. CHENOWETH

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The conjunction of these two incidents refocused attention upon the difficulties facing police officers who must evaluate the accuracy of witness testimony. It is one thing to disprove the statements of a witness who deliberately lies; it is quite a different thing to extract the factual truth from statements of witnesses who are honestly mistaken in what they think they see or hear. Any police officer confronted with the seeming impossibility of a family of five actually sleeping through two dynamite explosions has our sympathy, as does any officer whose case is shattered when the testimony of five eye witnesses is proven wrong. The best safeguard for officers today is a constant awareness of the fallibility of the "eyeball witness", an awareness that is tempered by understanding some of the factors causing fallibility. This was the approach used by the Alaska Peace Officers Association when they included a six-hour course on this subject in their advanced training program called "Scientific Approaches to Investigation" which was available to all local police officers. For those who attended, the course itself produced some thought-provoking results.

Our first session began with a brief introduction to Sigmund Freud's three famous lectures on the psychology of human errors. We discussed the basic mechanisms involved in making slips-of-thetongue, slips-of-the-pen, in mis-reading, mis-hearing, forgetting, and in mis-laying things. The observation of insignificant human errors is of as much assistance to a police officer as it is to a psychoanalyst. An understanding of such errors must include a knowledge of the physiological processes that allow errors to be committed, so we went on to discuss fatigue, illness, excitement, distractions, medication, and alcohol, and the part each of these plays in human errors.

Epistemologists frequently remind us that we are all caught in the "solipsistic predicament," a term embracing the theory that all external data comes to us only through our senses; the "predicament" exists because the limitations of our senses also limit our knowledge and our awareness of experiences. Police officers and witnesses alike are subject to these limitations.

In our course this theory was illustrated graphically. We started by passing around paper bags containing various objects which the students were to identify by touch alone, each student using his weakest hand. Vials containing different liquids were handed out to be identified by taste alone, each student being requested to pinch his nostrils while swallowing. Still other materials were to be identified by aroma alone. At this point we discussed briefly the problems created by individual

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Problems frequently arise for investigating officers who must determine the source of sound, and they are especially troublesome in cases involving gunfire. A high-velocity bullet in flight builds up a bow-wave in front of it which assaults the ear of a listener with a sound-impact. Because this bowwave originates from a different location than the gunshot itself, the listener who hears the bow-wave before he hears the gunshot may easily be mistaken; confusing the bow-wave report with the gunshot report, he may honestly be in error concerning the source of the gunfire.

To illustrate some of these audio-problems, we asked the students to close their eyes and listen to a variety of sounds which were produced from different locations, including up near the ceiling. With their eyes still closed, they were requested to point to the source of the sounds. When they opened their eyes, the variety of directions indicated drove the point home. This test is made more interesting if different sounds are used and the students are asked to identify them. Some of our experienced police officers could not distinguish between the sound of a gun being cocked and the sound of a cigarette lighter.

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The skit was relatively simple in plot. A masked man entered the classroom, carrying a suitcase and flashlight. He placed the suitcase on a chair, examined the adjacent area with the flashlight, took a tobacco canister from a table-top and placed it in the suitcase. Then he erased a drawing of a safe on the blackboard and re-drew it so that the safe door was open. Next, he took a drink from one of two bottles on the desk, closed the suitcase, placed the flashlight in his pocket, and left the room. A clock stood ostentatiously on the desk; by its mechanism, the entire skit took approximately two minutes.

The next twenty minutes were spent in discussing other aspects of visio-error, during which time the skit was not mentioned at all. The questionnaires were handed out; students were asked to fill them out without additional help from other students. The class was dismissed.

A week later, twenty-seven questionnaires were collected at the beginning of the class. Although the questionnaire had been designed to fulfill a number of purposes not pertinent to this article, some of the questions were simple, direct, and unambiguous. Oddly enough, the answers to these questions caused the greatest consternation when

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interpretations of general terms such as "sweet," "bitter," "strong," "faint," "sharp;" some knowledge of semantics is beneficial to a peace officer who must work from the descriptive terms used by witnesses.

About ninety per cent of what we experience comes to us through the organs of sight and hearing. Reliability studies in both of these areas are worth our attention. For example, Frances Mc-Gehee made a reliability study to determine the accuracy of 740 people who attempted to identify an unfamiliar voice after various intervals of time had elapsed after they heard the voice. This study indicated that approximately eighty-three percent of the listeners were able to identify the voice during intervals that extended up to two weeks, but beyond that point there was a notable drop in correct identification.

Problems frequently arise for investigating officers who must determine the source of sound, and they are especially troublesome in cases involving gunfire. A high-velocity bullet in flight builds up a bow-wave in front of it which assaults the ear of a listener with a sound-impact. Because this bowwave originates from a different location than the gunshot itself, the listener who hears the bow-wave before he hears the gunshot may easily be mistaken; confusing the bow-wave report with the gunshot report, he may honestly be in error concerning the source of the gunfire.

To illustrate some of these audio-problems, we asked the students to close their eyes and listen to a variety of sounds which were produced from different locations, including up near the ceiling. With their eyes still closed, they were requested to point to the source of the sounds. When they opened their eyes, the variety of directions indicated drove the point home. This test is made more interesting if different sounds are used and the students are asked to identify them. Some of our experienced police officers could not distinguish between the sound of a gun being cocked and the sound of a cigarette lighter.

Visio-errors cause more trouble for police officers than any other form of sensory data. We introduced this topic by discussing retinal fatigue, nightvision, color-blindness, Vincent's Rule on the limiting distance for visual recognition, and Rohrschach tests. Using visual aid cards which contained numerous optical illusions, we helped each student to commit his own "eyeball error."

At this stage in our course, we digressed a bit and began relating the many psychological tests that have been sprung upon unwary students by having an unannounced incident occur in the classroom about which the students are later questioned. With the element of surprise, it is not too difficult to force someone to commit a human error. But this type of test does little to remove from the student's mind the thought that he would not have made an error had he not been either concentrating on the lecture or subjected to the bewilderment of surprise. To remove this doubt, thus emphasizing our discussions even more strongly, we announced that the students were about to witness a skit that would be enacted in front of the class. We instructed the students to take positions where they could see clearly everything that occurred. Although they were specifically prohibited from taking notes during the skit, we warned them that at the end of the session they would be handed questionnaires to take home and answer before coming back to class the next week. Because these questionnaires required information about the skit, the students were warned to watch closely and remember accurately.

The skit was relatively simple in plot. A masked man entered the classroom, carrying a suitcase and flashlight. He placed the suitcase on a chair, examined the adjacent area with the flashlight, took a tobacco canister from a table-top and placed it in the suitcase. Then he erased a drawing of a safe on the blackboard and re-drew it so that the safe door was open. Next, he took a drink from one of two bottles on the desk, closed the suitcase, placed the flashlight in his pocket, and left the room. A clock stood ostentatiously on the desk; by its mechanism, the entire skit took approximately two minutes.

The next twenty minutes were spent in discussing other aspects of visio-error, during which time the skit was not mentioned at all. The questionnaires were handed out; students were asked to fill them out without additional help from other students. The class was dismissed.

A week later, twenty-seven questionnaires were collected at the beginning of the class. Although the questionnaire had been designed to fulfill a number of purposes not pertinent to this article, some of the questions were simple, direct, and unambiguous. Oddly enough, the answers to these questions caused the greatest consternation when

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they were tabulated. The following is a sample of what we found:

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- What time did the skit begin?—The answers covered a time-span of twenty-five minutes. (One officer stated he did not know because he had no watch, apparently overlooking both the clock on the desk and the one that hung on the classroom wall.)
- 2. How long did the skit take?—Answers covered a span of two to fifteen minutes.
- 3. What did the burglar wear for a mask?—27 correct answers.
- 4. What did he carry in his right hand when he entered?—Only 10 correct answers out of 27.5. What did he carry in his left hand when he
- entered?—Only 8 correct answers out of 27. 6. What did he carry in his right hand when he
- left the room?—Only 17 correct answers out of 27.
- What did he carry in his left hand when he left the room?—Only 1 correct answer out of 27.

- 8. When, in the course of the action, did he open the suitcase?—Only 16 correct answers out of 27.
- When, in the course of the action, did he look at his wrist watch?—Only 10 correct answers out of 27.

The moral of this story was obvious. The students who attended our advanced training program were experienced police officers from a variety of police and enforcement agencies. Attending this course of their own volition, they manifested a healthy and intelligent attitude toward their police responsibilities. This experiment, limited in nature and not without some flaws in its own structure, seemed to indicate rather strongly that many police officers have not developed the ability to see accurately, or remember with clarity what they have seen. Carried out under circumstances which eliminated the element of surprise and focused attention upon the skit itself, we can only conclude that at least this aspect of police training needs further encouragement from our agencies.

Oct. 9, 1976

at tig chi 28,00

Richard Sprague Director, House Select Committee 1622 Locust Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

You've undertaken quite a task. I think I can be of use to you and I hope you'll agree.

As my attached resume shows, I have considerable practical as well as executive experience, not only in investigating homicides and conspiracies (real or imagined) but in effectively handling problems that involve delicate interagency relationships.

I retired from Federal service a little over a year ago because my retirement would have been mandatory within a few years anyway and there seemed no purpose in marking time until then; I am now working as a free lance photographer. I have no cloud over me and was cleared for Top Secret at the time I retired. My ability and reputation are well known to various officials within Treasury law enforcement circles including the Commissioner of Customs. As an ex-Treasury investigator I can be objective about both the FBI and the CIA; as an ex-Internal Security Inspector I have lived with the problems of information leaks and unethical disclosures. My retirement status would allow me to work at a minimal salary and for a fixed period of time.

I hope I have said enough to interest you; I can supply additional details or discuss the matter with you at your convenience. But even if you are not interested, I have a suggestion which might be helpful to your future inquiries: After the assassination of President Kennedy, some witnesses claimed to have heard shots fired from somewhere other than Oswald's location. There is a phenomenon called the "bow wave report" in which persons hearing riflefire from a high-velocity weapon undergo a "hearing illusion"; they think the shot came direction other than its actual origin. (The attached reprint of an article I wrote some years ago touches on the "bow wave report".)

I don't know whether the Warren Commission investigators considered this phenomenon in their analysis of witness statements; I have seen no mention of it in any published material concerning their inquiry. However the phenomenon can be tested and consideration of it could resolve some of the questions that arose from certain witness statements.

I hope I will hear from you. Whether I do or not, I wish you the best of luck in your endeavor.

Sincerely,

James H. Chenoweth (301) 949-4419

Resume of:

JAMES H. CHENOWETH 13122 Turkey Branch Parkway Rockville, Maryland 20853 (301) 949-4419

I. PERSONAL DATA

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- Born of missionary parents on Chinese-Tibetan border on February 14, 1922
- Married 27 years; two grown children.
- Good physical condition; uses reading glasses.
- Currently holds Top Secret clearance.
- Honorably discharged from U. S. Army. Served during World War II as combat engineer and paratrooper.
- Enjoys photography, camping, canoeing.

II. EXPERIENCE

- 1/52 1/54
- Police officer, detective, undercover agent with Anchorage Police Department, Anchorage, Alaska.
- <u>1/54 6/62</u> Chief Deputy Ü. S. Marshal in Alaska with law enforcement duties comparable to a State Police agency. Handled recruitment, training, budget, processing of prisoners, supervision of investigations (including homicide, rape, robbery, embezzlement, assault with dangerous weapon and similar offenses.) Acted as Deputy Coroner. Taught law enforcement training within agencies and in Anchorage Community College.
- <u>6/62 8/65</u> Internal Security Inspector, Treasury Department, conducting investigations of bribery, embezzlement, attempts to corrupt Federal personnel.
- <u>8/65 10/68</u> Internal Security Inspector, National Office, responsible for developing and conducting training programs, writing technical manuals, researching data, and inspecting the operation of Internal Security field offices.
- <u>10/68 11/69</u> Staff Assistant to Assistant Commissioner, conducting special studies relating to management aspects of Internal Security operations.

- <u>11/69 2/71</u> Senior Inspector, Internal Security Division, supervising training programs, research projects, technical issuances, manpower allocation, grade structure analyses, and field inspections.
- 2/71 7/73 Executive Assistant to Director, Internal Security Division, acting as consultant, researcher and advisor on all Internal Security management activity.
- 7/73 7/74 Chief of Investigations Branch, Internal Security Division, directly responsible for sensitive investigations involving activities of high level Federal personnel.
- <u>7/74 present</u>- Acting Assistant Director, Internal Security Division, responsible for assisting in all phases of leadership, direction and coordination of the planning, development and execution of the Internal Security program.

III. PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- Contributor to <u>Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police</u> Science and to Pacific Northwest Law Enforcement & News.
- Past president and life member Alaska Peace Officers Association.
- Member of American Society of Criminology.
- Conducted weekly TV series (The Hidden Beat) on law enforcement.
- Recipient of Alaska Press Club Award for public service.
- Recipient of Federal High Quality Award and Special Performance Award.
- Recipient of various commendatory letters from U. S. Attorneys, U. S. District Judge, Federal Grand Jury and other officials.

IV. EDUCATION

- Attended Georgia School of Technology 3/43 1/44 under Army Specialized Training Program.
- Attended Columbia College 9/46 8/49 as liberal arts student; all requirements for degree fulfilled except foreign language.

V. ADDENDUM

- Personal references upon request.
- Retiring July 31, 1975, after 26 years of Federal service; retirement mandatory by January, 1978.