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#### TOWARD A NEW DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

#### Introduction

Until recently general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban were the keystone of U.S. disarmament policy. Our success in negotiating a limited test ban treaty has changed the situation, for Premier Khrushchev has made clear that he has withdrawn his offer of three on-site inspections and, therefore, a comprehensive test ban treaty is no longer a major factor in future negotiations. Although the Soviets will undoubtedly continue to use their proposals for general and complete disarmament as a political weapon, Premier Khrushchev's recent private comments indicate no interest whatever in destroying missiles. All of this indicates that in the fall of 1963 we should consider shifting our disarmament strategy to new ground.

Present proposals for general and complete disarmament are framed in a political void which implies that all nations and weapons are created equal. In our future policy we may wish to draw a greater distinction between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers and between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. It could recognize the fact that nations are not equal -- that nuclear powers do have more power and, therefore, should have greater influence and control in any international agreements. Finally, it should come to grips with the issue of China and France.

Since the advent of atomic weapons in 1945, the control of nuclear weapons on a world-wide basis has been one of the primary objectives of U.S. national policy. There is no reason now to change our objectives.



The hot line, observation posts, and proposals to destroy B-47's may be worthwhile but they should not be allowed to distract our attention from the primary issue, the control of nuclear weapons. The shift we should, and to some degree have made, is to emphasize agreement among the nuclear powers rather than an international agreement. While resulting conventions should be open to signature by all nations, they should be negotiated and inspected primarily by the nuclear powers. It is no accident that both DeGaulle and Khrushchev have emphasized negotiations by nuclear powers while China has called for a world-wide disarmament conference of all nations.

Therefore, we should be prepared to negotiate a strategic force freeze without requiring concurrent reductions in conventional forces. As long as we can freeze the present strategic nuclear balance, then the question of whether the Soviets have five or ten divisions, more or less, in Central Asia is not a controlling factor. In any confrontation between China and the United States, the Chinese are less likely to use their local conventional superiority in the face of our atomic superiority. This is not to suggest that conventional force reductions on the part of the Soviet Union or other nations are not desirable, but rather that they can and should be analyzed separately.

THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY COULD BE TO GAIN WORLD-WIDE

ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES IN STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS. THIS

SHOULD INCLUDE LIMITING STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AT THEIR EXISTING LEVEL,

A CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A

BAN ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THIS NEED NOT MEAN DISARMAMENT

AT THIS TIME.



In broad outline, our strategy could be based on a two-phase program, as follows:

<u>Phase I</u> - the nuclear powers agree to freeze strategic nuclear forces at their existing levels, forbid the construction or deployment of antiballistic missile systems, and stop the further production of atomic materials for military purposes under adequate inspection. They concurrently announce that, when all the militarily significant states sign the treaty which is open to all nations of the world, they will meet together to negotiate reductions in their existing strategic force levels.

<u>Phase II</u> - Participation of all important nations will be sought in the above treaty, including China and France.

In the Washington disarmament debate, there has been great dispute between those who advocate the continuation of our present arms build-up and those who advocate proposals to the Soviet Union to agree to sharply cut back nuclear delivery systems and warhead stockpiles. Little or no attention has been given to the possibility that the Soviet Union would be willing to agree to freezing its nuclear forces at existing levels. To be sure, such a position contradicts all Soviet disarmament statements, but such an agreement might serve Soviet interests within the Communist world and confirm what the Soviet Union may do regardless of agreement. Such an agreement would advance the joint interest of the United States and the Soviet Union against the minor or aspiring nuclear powers. Paradoxically, a U. S. proposal for a cut-off of fissionable material and cessation of production of arms has never been thoroughly studied or staffed because Soviet approval was not expected since such a proposal would be so obviously in the interest of the U.S.

This memorandum discusses primarily the Phase I proposal and includes, in TAB F and G, an outline of a possible approach to France and China. The Soviet View

# Military Analysis


This agreement has military advantages for the Soviet Union. If implemented on a world-wide basis, it would close the doors of the nuclear club, thereby strengthening the military position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis both the non-nuclear powers and the minor nuclear powers, Britain and France. This agreement would, in effect, confirm Soviet military superiority over all nations of the world except the United States.

On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that it would clearly freeze US strategic superiority.

U.S. and Soviet Strategic Delivery Vehicles							
		64	1965		1966		
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	
Long-Range Bombers	630	185	630	175	630	<b>17</b> 5	
ICBMs	855	200-260	1055	270-350	1.205	300-450	
Sub-Launched Missiles	346	254	449	292	<b>60</b> 8	<b>32</b> 8	
*Medium-Range Bombers	<b>5</b> 63	900	337	850	75	800	
Medium Range Missiles	54	700-750	54	700-750	54	700-750	

<sup>\*</sup> Due to overseas bases and tankers U.S. medium-range bombers can attack Soviet targets. Due to shortage of tankers very few Soviet medium-bombers can hit targets in the United States, with the exception of Alaska. Soviet IRBMs, in present positions, cannot strike the US except in Alaska.

Clearly the Soviet Union would prefer not to accept a position of strategic inferiority if they had an alternative. They do not. Now that the United States Polaris and Minuteman programs are hitting a




production rate of better than a missile per day, it is very doubtful that the Soviet leadership could believe that they have any reasonable chance of obtaining parity with the United States. If this truth is perceived by the Soviet leadership, then they have no choice but to accept numerical inferiority which does not alter the qualitative balance. Therefore, the determining factor in the Soviet view will undoubtedly be, not the balance of thermonuclear power, but the political impact of such an agreement within the Communist and non-Communist world.

Another disadvantage would be the fact that the Soviet Union would have to permit inspection. Clearly this would be odious to the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, it need not represent an insuperable obstacle. Khrushchev's test ban offer of three on-site inspections, if made in good faith, would indicate that if the political benefits of the agreement were high enough, the Soviet Union would allow inspection. In Western terms, adequate inspection for a production cut-off could be achieved with relatively modest inspection, to-wit, permanent parties at declared production plants plus a few on-site inspections of suspicious plants. This inspection network which would be primarily in fixed locations should be far more acceptable than the mobile inspections that would be required for any agreement on force level reductions.

# Political Analysis

The current Sino-Soviet dispute has brought and will probably continue to bring about changes in Soviet political assessments. The recent Soviet acceptance of the long-standing Western offer for a partial test ban treaty was undoubtedly primarily due, not to economic pressures or any shift in



the military balance of power which have remained relatively static, but to a changed Soviet assessment of the value of the treaty in their dispute with the Chinese. This proposal would have a number of political advantages for the Soviet Union:

- (1) It would increase pressure against diffusion, consolidating the nuclear status of the USSR, U.S. and Britain, and probably further dividing France from its NATO allies.
  - (2) It could save the Soviet Union billions of rubles.
  - (3) It would seriously hinder the formulation of the MLF.
  - It would also have some disadvantages:
  - (1) It would permit Western inspection in the Soviet Union.
- (2) It would guarantee continued U.S. nuclear superiority.

  Despite these arguments, probably the principal incentive for the Soviet

  leadership would be their assessment of the political utility of this proposal,
  both in strengthening their hand within the Communist movement and in dividing
  the Western alliance.

If the Soviet Union could justify the treaty in terms of advancing the cause of the International-Communist Party and Soviet leadership, this agreement might be viewed by Moscow as a powerful tool in strengthening their policy of peaceful coexistence. If not, this fact in itself would probably be sufficient to cause the rejection of the proposal. Evidence from the present Moscow-Peiping debate indicates that the Soviet Union has already begun to defend the nuclear status quo as a Soviet (not U.S.) advantage. (See Tab C.) In their August 20 reply to the CPR government, the Soviet leadership clearly implied that Soviet strategic

forces are adequate to "shield" the Socialist camp and that the present nuclear balance is in the interests of the Communist movement. It would appear that this ideological position could be readily extended to cover an agreement to freeze the present balance of forces. Certainly if the Soviet Union takes the position that the present balance of forces has changed to their advantage, they should not find it hard to argue that freezing the present balance would be in the Soviet interest. In order to increase the likelihood of Soviet acceptance if such an agreement were worked out, we should indicate to the Soviet Union that we would be willing to include in a separate communique a statement that "at such time as all militarily significant states have signed this treaty, the original signatory powers agree that they shall confer to seek agreement to reduce their military forces as a further step toward the common objective of general and complete disarmament." This would put the responsibility for disarmament failure on China and possibly France.

To date, the lack of any lengthy substantive Soviet discussion on nuclear delivery vehicle limitations may be due to the fact that they have no expectation whatever that the United States would agree to such limitations at this time. The Soviet leadership, like the U.S. leadership, must be very wary of proposing new agreements which are rejected, particularly if they include concessions. Last October at the U.N. Mr. Gromyko indicated Soviet interest in cutting back strategic vehicles and this spring Mr. Tsarapkin said the Soviet Union would permit on-site inspections as controls on an agreement to limit strategic delivery vehicles; but neither statement evoked any apparent interest in the U.S. The US Government



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has never made clear to the Soviet Union a specific proposal which would result in a freeze or a reduction in nuclear delivery forces. Therefore, the very existence of a firm U.S. proposal would profoundly change the existing situation and require a searching reappraisal by the Soviet leadership.

#### The US View

# Military Analysis

While this agreement would significantly alter existing US military plans, its military advantages appear to out-weigh the disadvantages. According to present plans (SIOP-63 and future force projections) on 1 July 1965 the strategic power of the U.S. measured in initial delivery capability will be stabilized at approximately 4100 warheads and 9200 megatons. Therefore, despite appearances such an agreement will not have a major effect upon the size of U.S. strategic force.


#### NUMBERS OF WEAPONS

	<u>FY 63</u>	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	FY 69	<u>FY 70</u>
Missiles	436	834	1034	1178	1378	1507	1507	1507
Bombs	2800	3000	3100	2850	2850	2850	<u> 2650</u>	<u> 2650</u>
Total	3236	3834	4134	4028	4228	4357	4157	4157

### MEGATONNAGE

	<u>FY 63</u>	FY 64	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>FY 67</u>	<u>fy 68</u>	FY 69	FY 70
Missiles	1250	1890	2130	2300	2390	2450	2450	2450
Bombs	6350	7200	7150	7100	7100	7100	<u>6650</u>	<u>6650</u>
Total	7600	9090	9280	9400	9490	9550	9100	9100

If we provide weapons from our existing stockpile, either JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D.





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or to a MIF, this would result in a relatively small decrease in U.S. strategic forces but no net decrease in NATO strategic forces. The major impact would be a freeze in the qualitative strategic arms race. The current transition from manned forces such as the B-47 and B-52 to invulnerable missiles such as Minuteman and Polaris would be halted. Nevertheless, by 1 July 1964, relatively large invulnerable forces will be in operation. The following chart shows this transition.


U.S. STRATEGIC INVENTORY

	1 July	1964	l July 1	.965	1 July 1966		
Aircráft (	Operation	al Total	Operations	l Total	Operational Total		
B-52 B-47 B-58	630 483 80	705 1071 89	630 257 80	699 1065 <u>85</u>	630 0 <u>75</u>	695 1063 82	
TOTAL Aircraft	1193	1865	967	1849	705	1840	
Missiles							
Atlas Titan Minuteman Polaris Regulus Mace B	138 117 600 346 0 54	183 149 656 346 121 105	137 117 800 449 0 54	173 149 824 591 110 105	131 117 950 608 0 54	173 149 999 853 110 105	
TOTAL Missiles	1255	1560	1557	1952	1860	2389	

Such an agreement would, of course, stop the deployment of any ballistic missile defense system. At present we probably do not know how to build a ballistic missile defense system with high-kill probabilities against more than ten warheads each equipped with 10 heavy objects and known penetration aids, due to

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interceptor self-kill, decoys, etc. An agreement to freeze Soviet ballistic missile forces would not seem to increase the vulnerability of U.S. cities and strategic forces. While the level of Soviet bomber defenses will influence our attack capability, it is recommended that we do not explicitly negotiate such an agreement but privately convey to the Soviet Union that increases in Soviet or U.S. air defense would result in abrogation. (An attempt to limit air defenses would raise major inspection problems and would undoubtedly ultimately require limitations on all aircraft because of the air defense capability of tactical aircraft.) Similarly, we would have to insure that the Soviet Union did not suddenly launch a major civil defense program. Since this too is amenable to intelligence checks, it is recommended that this be made clear to the Soviets in private but that no explicit agreement on this be established.

The cut-off of fissionable material would in itself limit two basic areas of future weapons development. First, the development of a ballistic missile system which would already be forbidden by the treaty. The other area of emphasis is current fissile material production for tactical nuclear weapons, particularly atomic artillery. The development of more efficient small nuclear weapons would not be ruled out by such an agreement for these weapons could be fabricated from fissile material in the stockpile including material fabricated from obsolete weapons. Because of the short life time of tritium, which is essential for a number of our strategic weapons, it is essential that, explicitly



or implicitly we be permitted to maintain our tritium stockpiles at existing levels by producing sufficient quantities to compensate for losses due to radio-active decay. Relatively small quantities, a few kilograms, are involved.

Finally, while it is unlikely that this proposal will immediately lead to a cessation of Chinese efforts to build atomic weapons, it might well be the first step in a series of events which would lead to this result. Certainly the position if agreed to by the Chinese would make production of Chinese weapons impossible. In summary then, an agreement of this kind could well be in the interest of the United States Government.

# Political Analysis

A successfully negotiated agreement on these terms would probably gain broad support throughout the free world including many "neutralists". By opening the treaty to all nations of the world a clear line would be drawn between those governments supporting limitations on nuclear weapons and those rejecting such limitations. Probably all European countries with the exception of France and Germany would support the agreement. The Germans probably could be persuaded to support it by continued assurance that the U. S. would maintain arms in Germany and/or by US/FRG cooperation in a multilateral force constituted from nuclear delivery vehicles in existence prior to the effective date of the treaty. (The multilateral force would have to be constituted by transfer of some existing United States weapons rather than the construction program which is now envisioned.)



Such an agreement would represent a moment of trutly Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

On the one hand, limitations on proposals for nuclear delivery vehicles
has been the position supported by Act 5 (g) (2) (D) rom the moment vek Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) inally proposed it in 1953 untivek Act 5 (g) (2) (D) lost recent statement following the signing of the test ban. We can and should take the position that we are willing to share some of our JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) delivery vehicles is Act 5 (g) (2) (D) ill agree to the test ban and a cessation of further production. JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) ay or may not agree to participate on such terms. In any case, the political pressure for agreement should be very great. (This is discussed in

It is almost certain that the Chinese government would reject the proposal but it would further divide the Communist world and undermine support of the revolutionary wing of the International-Communist Party. Furthermore, it would put both the USSR and the United States Governments on record against a ChiCom acquisition of nuclear weapons, thus laying the foundation for later initiatives.

Domestically the agreement should probably fare about as well as the test ban treaty. That is to say, there would be a vocal minority rabidly opposed but the clearly demonstrable advantage to the United States should gain broad support in all of American society, including the United States Senate.

