

# File #:

602-116395

# Serial Scope:

569 THRU 600

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1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW  
65360 Date: 11-17-2022

②

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Cochran
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE: 8/12/75

- 1 - Personnel File -  
Wilbur G. Stevens
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested on 8/12/75 that Special Agent Wilbur G. Stevens be made available for a Staff interview Thursday, 8/14/75, at 10 a.m. in Room G308, Dirksen Building. Stevens is currently assigned at FBI Headquarters in the Laboratory Division. Epstein stated the topic of interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Stevens be released from his existing employment agreement for purposes of this interview concerning the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King in SCLC.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Stevens to assist in making a determination whether a question may be properly responded to.

PVD:lad  
(9)

EX-106

REC-56

*Suggest Seymour  
Gibbs  
wren*

62-116395-660

SEP 2 1975

*Rel. 8/13/75  
67-278117 (Stevens)*

79 SEP 17 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 27, 1975

FBI

#MDR/6

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

10/12/80 SP2 AUM/HB

Dear Mike:

Sensitively - '75

Attached is an additional request for FBI materials in two parts, Part I for delivery to the Committee offices and Part II for access to screen for delivery to the Committee offices.

Except where covered by other arrangements, as with regard to the King matters, the deadline for delivery/access is September 8, 1975.

12

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

John T. Elliff  
Director  
Domestic Intelligence Task Force


ENCLOSURE

Rec'd in  
Sensitivity Unit  
9/2/75

REC-56

62-116375-599

SEP 4 1975



Deadline changed to  
9/2/75 by Mr. Elliff  
in conference, 8/27/75,  
with Mr. Shaheen &  
Supv. D.V. Daly & J.D. Thomas  
Elliff also agreed that  
Part I item 2 would be for  
ACCESS, not delivery.

62-116375-599

LEGAL COUNSEL

sent as Original

5-400

August 20, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

Part I. Request for Delivery

1. Materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, requested for access in Part V.E. of the request of August 5, 1975.
2. Additional materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, as set forth below.
  - a. The original list on American citizens whose names were submitted by the Bureau to the NSA for inclusion on the Watch List. This list is referred to in the 18 May 1962 memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan.
  - b. The original request to the NSA to monitor illegal travel between Cuba and the United States through a third country. This request is referred to in the 16 January 1963 memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan.
  - c. A list of all American citizens among the 65 individuals in Cuba whose names were submitted by the Bureau to the NSA for inclusion on the Watch List. This list is referred to in the 16 January 1963 memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan.
  - d. A list of the 300 Security Index subjects whose names were submitted by the Bureau to the NSA for inclusion on the Watch List. These subjects are referred to in the 16 January 1963 memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan.
  - e. The Bureau's Watch List for the NSA which was current as of 1 April 1965. This list is referred to in the 6 April 1965 memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan.
  - f. Materials pertaining to correspondence between the Bureau and the NSA regarding the Watch List from 1965 to 1970.
  - g. A list of the "New Left Key Activists" whose names were submitted by the Bureau to the NSA for inclusion on the Watch List. This list is referred to in the 3 June 1970 letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Director, NSA.
  - h. A list of the individual black extremists whose names were submitted by the Bureau to the NSA for inclusion on the Watch List. This list is referred to in the "Note" at the end of 9 March 1971 letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Director, NSA.
  - i. The 29 memoranda regarding Weatherman fugitives which were enclosed with the 16 April 1973 letter from L. Patrick Gray to the Director, NSA.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-599



- j. The Watch List current as of 21 September 1973. This Watch List is referred to in the 26 September 1973 internal memorandum on the Keith case.
  - k. A copy of the Watch List which was delivered to Henry S. Petersen. This Watch List is referred to in the 22 January 1974 letter from Petersen to Director Kelley.
  - l. The "product" received from the NSA regarding the following individuals and organizations whose names had been submitted by the Bureau for inclusion on the Watch List:
    - 1) Grover C. McArthur
    - 2) Roy Innis
    - 3) Charles Garry
    - 4) Student National Coordinating Committee
    - 5) Black Student Association, Memphis State University
3. The following materials pertaining to mail surveillance:
- a. Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, dated 26 July 1971, captioned "Mail Covers/Trash Covers."
  - b. Letter from William J. Cotter, Assistant Postmaster General, Inspection Service, to J. Edgar Hoover, dated 12 October 1971. This letter is referred to in the letter from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Cotter dated 14 October 1971.
  - c. Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to E. S. Miller, dated 13 October 1971 captioned "Requests for Mail Covers." This memorandum is referred to in the letter from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Cotter dated October 14, 1971.
  - d. Memorandum from the Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams, dated 15 July 1974, captioned "Mail Covers." This memorandum is referred to in the 15 July 1974 memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, captioned "Mail Covers."
  - e. All materials pertaining to requests by the Bureau for special mail covers from 1971 through 1975 which have not been previously delivered to the Senate Select Committee. This request encompasses all special mail covers which have been terminated, regardless of whether the investigation for which the special mail cover was requested is active or inactive.

- f. All materials pertaining to cases in which prosecution of persons whose mail was intercepted was considered by the Justice Department. This request includes, but is not limited to, material pertaining to meetings or correspondence between Bureau and Departmental personnel in regard to such cases, material pertaining to the decisions not to prosecute, and material pertaining to knowledge of any Department personnel of FBI mail intercept activity in such cases.
  - g. All materials reflecting knowledge and/or authorization of FBI mail intercept activity by Department officials.
4. All materials pertaining to the following FBI practices, including but not limited to the origins, authorization, periodic review, and termination of the practices:
- a. Use of automatic data processing by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections, and any other related Sections, of the FBI Intelligence Division in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number File.
  - b. Incorporation of the Security Index into the FBI's computerized data bank and the availability of this data to all offices through automatic data processing.
  - c. The use of automatic data processing to store, collate, or otherwise handle lists of Key Activists, New Left, and Extremists individuals, addresses, phone numbers, demonstrations in which certain individuals have participated, summary reports or listings required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies, and any related matters, as proposed by Inspector E.S. Miller on 9/1/71 (p.331 of 9/71 Inspection Report).
- 
5. The Executive Conference memoranda reflected in the following abstracts:
- 94-3-1-23957
  - 66-2554-12745
  - 66-2554-12761
  - 66-2554-12790
  - 66-2554-12795
  - 66-2554-12801
  - 66-2554-12806
  - 66-2554-12808
  - 66-2554-12828
  - 66-2554-12832
  - 66-2554-12834

66-2554-12848  
66-2554-12875  
66-2554-12877  
66-2554-12887  
66-2554-12910  
66-2554-12949  
66-2554-12958  
66-2554-12962  
66-2554-12961  
66-2554-12964  
66-2554-12968  
66-2554-12966  
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66-2554-12972  
66-2554-12978  
66-2554-12984  
66-2554-12996  
66-2554-12998  
66-2554-12999  
66-2554-13001  
66-2554-13011  
66-2554-13014  
66-2554-13016  
66-2554-13023  
66-2554-13026

6. The following materials pertaining to COINTELPRO:

- a. Unexcised copies of all originating documents previously delivered pursuant to letter of July 18, 1975.
- b. The July 14, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security (Soviet-Satellite Intelligence)" contains the following statement: "At the end of this 90-day trial period, we will evaluate our success and thereafter submit recommendations. . . ." Please submit all memoranda and other materials reflecting said evaluation and recommendations.
- c. The July 15 airtel to SAC, New York, Chicago, and Washington Field, captioned "COINTELPRO--Internal Security, (Soviet-Satellite Intelligence) contains the following statement: "Within 30 days each of these offices should submit to the Bureau recommendations and detailed plans for implementing one or several such operations." Please submit all memoranda and materials reflecting said recommendations and detailed plans.

- d. The airtel described in Item c. above also contains the statement: "Other offices participating in the COINTELPRO against the CPUSA are urged to. . . promptly make available any comments or suggestions to the Bureau and the 3 offices participating in this new endeavor." Please submit all memoranda and other materials reflecting said comments and suggestions.
- e. The airtel described in Item c. above also refers to "Bulets dated 9/13/63 and 3/16/64" which were attached to said airtel. Please submit copies of these two "Bulets".
- f. The August 25, 1967 letter described in Item e. above includes the statement: "At this time the Bureau is setting up no requirement for status letters to be periodically submitted under this program." Please submit any materials which subsequently set up a requirement for status letters, and all status letters which were thereafter received.
- g. All memoranda and other materials which reflect recommendations and decisions at FBI Headquarters to transmit the letter described in Item e. above.
- h. An unexcised copy of the March 4, 1968 airtel from the Director to the SAC, Albany, captioned "Counterintelligence program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."
- i. The March 4, 1968 airtel described in Item h. above contains "Instructions" that each of the addressed field offices are to submit certain advice, summaries, lists, and suggestions within 30 days. Please forward all memoranda and materials received by Headquarters in response to the instructions. (These need not include the individual suggestions which were to be submitted "by separate letter".)
- j. The March 4, 1968 airtel described in Item h. above also requires each office to "submit a progress letter" each 90-days. Please submit copies of all such progress letters.
- k. All status letters received by FBI Headquarters pursuant to the instructions contained in the May 10, 1968 letter from the Director to all offices, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of the New Left."

1. The "NYlet captioned "Communist Party, USA; Counter-intelligence Program; IS - C: (La Cosa Nostra)," dated 9/22/66" which is referenced in the communication from the Director to the SAC, New York, captioned "Hoodwink (Internal Security)" dated 10/5/66.
  - m. Bulet 11/14/60 captioned BOCOV, which is referenced in the communications from the Director SAC, San Diego, captioned Counterintelligence-Border Coverage Program, dated 1/9/61.
  - n. Please submit all documents which modify the originating documents furnished, including but not limited to the modification of Item h. above, to all BPP offices, requiring the biweekly submission of counterintelligence recommendations and reports, dated 1/30/69.
  - o. Please furnish all 90-day status reports, as otherwise specifically requested, from all COINTELPRO programs.
  - p. Any yearly evaluations of the various COINTELPROs prepared by the Bureau, the two documents relating to the termination of all COINTELPROs: 1) memorandum from C. D. Brandon to W. C. Sullivan dated 4/27/71, Captioned "Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROs)," and 2) airtel to SAC, Albany, dated 4/28/71, captioned "Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO)".
7. The following materials pertaining to FBI activity with regard to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:
- a. Page 7 of FBI's memorandum of July 24, 1975, identifying electronic surveillance reflects that Dr. King "was overheard on three occasions on tesurs on other parties". Please identify the targets, addresses, and dates of installation and termination.
  - b. Memorandum reference in Item a. above indicates that there might have been additional surveillances on which Dr. King was monitored, however, this information can't be retrieved because the elsur indices "did not come into existence until October 5, 1966." Please provide further elaboration of this problem in view of the instructions sent to field offices in October 1966 directing them to submit "the names of all individuals whose voices have been monitored through a microphone installed or a telephone surveillance operated by the office anytime since January one, one nine six zero."

8. The locations, addresses, and telephone numbers of all supervisors and coordinators for New Left and Black Extremist COINTELPROs for 1967-71 in the following cities: New York, Newark, Los Angeles, San Diego, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Boston.
9. The locations, addresses, and telephone numbers of all supervisors and coordinators for White Hate COINTELPROs for 1964-71 in the following cities: Jackson, Atlanta, Richmond, Alexandria.
10. All materials which relate to a meeting between the FBI Director and representatives of Newsweek Magazine (Benjamin Bradlee and Jay Iselin) in September, October or November of 1964, including but not limited to:
  - a. Proposals, invitations, and replies for such meeting.
  - b. Arrangements, briefings, and preparations for such meetings.
  - c. Summaries or other evidence of what occurred at such meeting.
  - d. Conversations between Mr. Bradlee and/or Mr. Iselin, and former FBI official Cartha LeLoach on the day of the meeting or proposed meeting with the Director.

## Part II. Request for Access

1. All materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the following:
  - a. National Organization for Women
  - b. August 26 Women's Strike for Equality
  - c. Philadelphia Organization for Women for Employment Rights
  - d. October 23-October 25, 1970 women's meeting at Fellowship Hall, Limerick, Pennsylvania
  - e. New York Women's Liberation Center
  - f. Women's Liberation Movement
  - g. Women's Action Alliance
2. The following Executive Conference abstracts which are missing from the abstracts already provided for access:

66-2554-12741  
66-2554-12742  
66-2554-12750  
66-2554-12753  
66-2554-12788  
66-2554-12789  
66-2554-12825  
66-2554-12830  
66-2554-12863  
66-2554-12870  
66-2554-12898  
66-2554-12925  
66-2554-12930  
66-2554-12936  
66-2554-12951  
66-2554-12959  
66-2554-12964  
66-2554-12988

3. All documents relating to disclosure of information to IRS Special Services Staff other than the documents actually furnished and all documents relating to (including documents generated as the result of) disclosure to FBI or Justice Department of information gathered by Special Services Staff.

4. All materials pertaining to the opening and maintenance of a Bureau file, if any, on the following persons and organizations, including material reflecting the decision to open the file, the information compiled in the file, and any other Bureau activity related to the subject and recorded in the file:
  - a. Ron Karenga
  - b. Whitney Young
5. The following materials pertaining to events in Chicago in November and December, 1969:
  - a. All materials developed between November 1, 1969, and December 4, 1969, relating to the existence of weapons in possession of the Chicago Black Panther Party at the apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois.
  - b. All FBI inspection reports or other reports relating to the raid conducted on December 4, 1969, by the Cook County State's Attorney's police, at the apartment identified above.
  - c. All FBI materials reflecting dissemination of information pertaining to the Black Panther Party or members thereof to the Cook County State's Attorney's Office or members of the State's Attorney's police between November 1, 1969, and December 4, 1969.
  - d. All FBI materials reflecting dissemination of information pertaining to the Black Panther Party or members thereof to the Gang Intelligence Unit of the Chicago Police Department between November 1, 1969, and December 4, 1969.
  - e. All materials reflecting contacts by personnel of the FBI, including members of the Racial Matters Squad of the Chicago field office, with personnel of the State's Attorney's office, State's Attorney's police and Gang Intelligence Unit of the Chicago Police Department between November 1 and December 4, 1969, with respect to the Black Panther Party and members thereof.



August 28, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Requests

Attached are two letters from the Senate Select Committee, one dated August 22, 1975, the other dated August 27, 1975. Both were received by this Office today.

The letter of request dated August 27, should be treated as part of the document request dated August 26, 1975, as the former specifically references the latter.

The letter of request dated August 22, 1975, is self-explanatory and not of the same priority as that dated August 27.

Please arrange for compliance with these requests as soon as possible.

cc: Paul Daly

REC-53

EX 104

62 116315-598  
12 SEP 4 1975

1-Ad Hoc  
9-2-75  
3 ENCLOSURE

treat as Original

79 SEP 7 1975

5-4002  
LEGAL COUNSEL

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CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 27, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:


Attached is an addition to the Document  
Request delivered to you earlier today. The additional  
items list should be incorporated in the Document  
Request dated August 26, 1975.

Sincerely,

*John T. Elliff*  
John T. Elliff

Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force



62-116375-598  
ENCLOSURE

August 27, 1975

#MDR16

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/jfb

Additional items to be incorporated in the Document Request dated August 26, 1975.

Under Part I, Item 6

- q. Paragraph (e) of SAC Letter No. 63-50, dated 10/1/63, contains the following statements:

"The following offices should submit to the Bureau, by letter under above caption ("Communist Party, USA - Negro Question - Communist Influence in Racial Matters") due 30 days from date of this SAC letter, an analysis of their current coverage of communist activities in the Negro field plus details of their plans for intensifying such coverage: . . . . Also, those 16 offices which are participating in the Counterintelligence Program on a continuing basis should include in their next monthly letters due at the Bureau by October 15, 1963, any plans they may have to neutralize or disrupt any Party activities in the Negro field. Such information should be set out under the category "Possible Counterintelligence Activity."

Please supply all letters received by FBI Headquarters in response to the above-quoted instructions.

- r. All memoranda and other materials reflecting proposals and decisions to issue the instructions quoted in Item q. above, and all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the following statement in the second paragraph of SAC Letter No. 63-50, dated 10/1/63:

"There is also an urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempting to neutralize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field."

Under Part I, Item 7

- c. The following materials which are referred to, described, or discussed in the January 30, 1975 FBI letterhead memorandum captioned "Special Squad at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, August 22 - 28, 1964":

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-598

- (1) August 20, 1964 teletype to all continental field offices captioned "Disruption of Democratic National Convention, Information Concerning (Internal Security)".
- (2) "Follow-up instruction" issued on August 21, 1964..
- (3) All "Bureau memoranda prepared setting forth pertinent developments."
- (4) Letter dated August 21, 1964, to then Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach which "responded to a request dated August 19, 1964, from Mr. John Doar..."
- (5) Memorandum dated July 22, 1964, furnished to the White House "at the request of Walter Jenkins of the White House staff."
- (6) Any materials reflecting Mr. Jenkins' request referred to in Item 5. above.
- (7) Director Hoover's memorandum of September 10, 1964 reporting a telephone call from Mr. Jenkins.
- (8) All 302's and any other materials or reports reflecting the FBI's inquiry into this matter.
- (9) Memorandum contained in Newark files dated August 22, 1964 concerning technical surveillance at the Democratic National Convention.
- (10) Materials reflecting the attribution "to then Senior Resident Agent Clark that on Bureau instructions a mike should be considered for the temporary Congress of Racial Equality headquarters."
- (11) July 2, 1968 instructions that all Agent personnel are prohibited to pose as newsmen or representatives of any wire service for the purpose of establishing an investigative cover.
- (12) All materials pertaining to the instructions described in Item 11. above.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
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CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 22, 1975

#MDR16

10-12-00 SR-2 ALM/216


Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On May 14, 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities requested all memoranda and other materials related to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries related to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. The Select Committee also requested all memoranda and other material related to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison or terminating contact between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. On June 13, 1975, the Select Committee received a very adequate response to the Committee's May 14 request.

The Select Committee would, however, like to request one further item in relation to the Riha case. Specifically, the Select Committee would like to request all information relating to the disappearance of Associate

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS



62-116 395-595

ENCLOSURE


DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.  
Page Two

August 22, 1975

Professor Riha, any and all background material the Bureau may have on his disappearance, and any subsequent information the Bureau has developed on his current whereabouts.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John T. Elliff". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" being particularly prominent.

John T. Elliff  
Director  
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC JACKSON

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

AUGUST 25, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

1 - Mr. S. S. Mignosa  
 1 - UAF

SENSTUDY 75; BUDED AUGUST 29, 1975. 1 - Mr. T. F. Howard

REBUCAL AUGUST 25, 1975.

THIS CONFIRMS REFERENCED CALL WHEREIN YOU WERE INSTRUCTED  
 TO FURNISH TWO XEROX COPIES OF CERTAIN MATERIALS WHICH WERE  
 SPECIFIED TO YOU REGARDING A. I. BOTNICK, TOM HENDRICKS,  
 ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS, RAYMOND ROBERTS, GORDON CLARK, THOMAS A.  
 TARRANTS, AND KATHY AINSWORTH. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE YOU  
 TO EXCISE ANY INFORMATION FROM MATERIALS WHICH YOU COPY.  
 EXCISION WILL BE DONE AT FBIHQ.

WHERE INFORMANTS ARE CONCERNED, ADVISE WHETHER THEY ARE  
 ACTIVE OR FORMER. IF PUBLICLY DISCLOSED AS INFORMANTS, ADVISE  
 WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES.

AUG 26 1975

BUREAU DEADLINE MUST BE MET WITHOUT FAIL AND MATERIAL

MUST BE MAILED TO ARRIVE FBIHQ NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 1, 1975.  
 BY COVER AIRTEL.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TFH: rbs  
 (8)

AUG 26 1975

**NOTE:**

The above concerns a request from the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, dated 8/20/75. The request is for materials pertaining to FBI activities with regard to the above individuals in the Jackson and Meridian, Mississippi, areas during the period of 1967-1970. These materials are requested for access by 9/4/75. The materials specifically requested were furnished telephonically to Field Supervisor Larry Buteau by SA T. F. Howard, who is handling this specific matter.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

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Director Sec'y	_____

NR005 PH PLAIN

645 PM NITEL AUG. 27, 1975 DCC

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-2)

SEN STUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL, AUGUST 26, 1975.

MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, PHILA. DIVISION, CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975, BY ASAC LEE F. LASTER RE POSSIBILITY SHE MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. SHE INDICATED THAT WHILE ASSIGNED TO FBIHQ SHE PERFORMED DUTIES RELATING; TO THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. CASE. BOTH SHE AND HER HUSBAND INDICATED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, SHE WILL IMMEDIATELY ADVISE PHILA. DIVISION AND CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PRIOR TO INTERVIEWS AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REQUEST PRESENCE OF AN AGENT, PROBABLY HER HUSBAND, DURING ANY INTERVIEWS.

END

REC-1

62-116395-596

12 SEP 2 1975

*Records*  
*cc 67-567078 (Logan)*

*5- P.B.*

84 SEP 4 1975



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR006 AL CODE

11:36 PM NITEL AUGUST 27, 1975 LVV

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM ALBANY (62-2368)

SENSTUDY. - 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ALM/STB

Assoc. Dir.	_____
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Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.

ON AUGUST 27, 1975 JOHN H. KLEINKAUF WAS CONTACTED  
BY ASAC ALBANY ADVISED CONTENTS RE BUTEL.

END

SMD FBIHQ CLR FOR ONE

*[Handwritten signature]*

*On my signing, SAC Kleinkauf, AL,  
keep. Adv. that Kleinkauf  
was not - uninitial as to action he  
take if contacted by SAC. 8/27/75*

COPY RETAINED IN  
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

*cc-67-77766 (Kleinkauf)*

REC-162 116 395-595

12 SEP 2 1975

*[Handwritten signature]*

84 SEP 4 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

AUG 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 BA CODE

1055AM URGENT AUGUST 27, 1975 BJW

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

NORFOLK

FROM: BALTIMORE (66-3127)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TEL, AUGUST 2, 1975, AND BUREAU TEL TO  
ALBANY, AUGUST 26, 1975.

LATTER TELETYPE ADVISED OF FOLLOWING:

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
(SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS  
THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF  
INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL  
LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN  
THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND  
MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF  
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL  
MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN  
ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY  
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

SEP 2 1975

84 SEP 4 1975

CC - mlgwca

PAGE TWO

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

PAGE THREE

TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

RE FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND, 20014.

INQUIRY IN VICINITY OF BLAND RESIDENCE AUGUST 26, 1975, REVEALS JAMES F. BLAND ON VACATION AT WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA, DATE OF RETURN TO BETHESDA, MARYLAND, NOT KNOWN. MR. BLAND CAN BE CONTACTED THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER, MRS. MARY LYNN WILDING, 105 RONDANE PLACE, WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA, TELEPHONE NUMBER 804-564-9477, HER HUSBAND'S TELEPHONE NUMBER BEING 220-0060. IF NOT AT ABOVE, MR. BLAND MAY BE CONTACTED THROUGH HIS SON, ATTORNEY ROBERT BLAND, WILLIAMSBURG AREA TELEPHONE NUMBERS 229-6381 OR 229-3770.

LEAD:

NORFOLK

WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

IMMEDIATELY CONTACT JAMES F. BLAND PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RE BUREAU TEL, AUGUST 26, 1975.

END

VLN FBIHQ CLR

The Attorney General

August 26, 1975

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Lee

UNITED STATES SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

On August 15, 1975, Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, and two members of his staff were briefed concerning our participation in mail intercept programs as well as our participation in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mail intercept program per your approval based on our letter dated August 13, 1975.

During this briefing members of the SSC staff expressed interest in our participation in the CIA mail intercept program and inquired about a Stop List maintained by the Bureau of individuals in whom we were interested. The names on this Stop List were furnished to CIA for its guidance. The staff members inquired if we requested and received information on the citizens of the U. S. and domestic organizations in the U. S. At the time of the briefing the Stop List was not available.

We have now located the Stop List maintained in the Bureau for this project. From a review of the cards in the Stop List we have determined that names of American citizens as well as domestic organizations are included.

On receipt of your concurrence, we will make arrangements to inform Mr. Elliff of the location of this Stop List and the fact that it included names of American citizens and domestic organizations and make it available for him for review.

REC-1

12 SEP 2 1975

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

JPL:emg  
(10)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

1 - Mr. J. L. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
August 26, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-22-99 BY SP4BJA-MLB

#421800

Reference is made to the August 20, 1975, request  
of the SSC for FBI materials.

Enclosed is a memorandum for your approval and  
forwarding to the Committee in response to Part I of the  
referenced request on which a deadline for delivery was set  
for August 26, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the  
memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-1

62-116395-592

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

SEP 2 1975

LFS:lhb/lhb  
(10)

**NOTE:**

3-ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

A copy of Part I of the SSC request of 8/20/75 is  
attached to the file copy of this communication. Exact copies  
of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of  
the Senstudy Project and a detailed record has been maintained of  
the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a  
representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the  
attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to  
the SSC on 8/26/75.

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

August 26, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

Reference is made to Part I of the August 20, 1975, request by the SSC for FBI materials for delivery by August 26, 1975.

The materials requested in Part I have been processed and will be delivered to the Committee on August 26, 1975, with this communication.

Considerable research has been necessary to gather the material requested in Part I, Item 7 of your request. Material pertaining to the origin and approval of Item 7b ("The Extremist Speaks") and Item 7d ("Stop the Bombing Campaign: A Communist Cause") is being furnished herewith. We are continuing our research concerning the remaining publications listed in Item 7 and any pertinent material located will be forwarded by September 4, 1975. With regard to your request for material pertaining to periodic review of the preparation and dissemination of the publications listed in Item 7, it is noted that Item 7d and Item 7e were single publications. The remaining publications were subject to periodic review with each specific publication of the particular item.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

In connection with Item 9 of your request, special arrangements between the Department of Justice and the SSC provide that this material be furnished to the Department prior to being furnished to the SSC. The Department is presently studying this matter.

The information requested in Items 11 and 12 is being forwarded by separate memorandum.

- 1 - The Attorney General

**ENCLOSURE**

**TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED**

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

This document is exempt from automatic declassification and is not for dissemination outside the Department of Justice. It is to be controlled to authorized personnel only.

#MOR/6  
10/12/00 SP-2 ALM/HTG

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
Jm  
WDC  
WDC

August 20, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

#MDR.16  
SP2ALM1376

/ Part I -- requested for delivery by August 26, 1975

1. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of SAC letter 70-48 dated September 15, 1970, which authorized development of Security Informants between the ages of 18 and 21.
2. Materials pertaining to a two-day conference held at FBI headquarters on September 17-18, 1970, with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal attaches, including the initiation of the conference, the subjects discussed, and any advice or instructions to the field related thereto.
3. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of decision in 1970 to grant approvals for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions.
4. Materials pertaining to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past." (This material was previously made available for review per III. D. of your letter of August 1, 1975. Delivery is now requested.)
5. All SAC letters and SAC memoranda previously made available for access by SSC staff at FBIHQ. (Cf., Part IV, item 3.)

let 4 Hm 40 H3 1-PA3  
5.75.146 8/26/75

5-8

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-592



6. Materials pertaining to the furnishing of information to the White House in February 1970 and March 1970 regarding the role of Klan organizations in mailing letters to the President protesting school desegregation.
7. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and periodic review of the preparation and dissemination by the Research Section of the Intelligence Division of the following:
  - a. CINAL, a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items of interest in the security field;
  - b. "The Extremist Speaks", a monthly compilation which shows the extremist views of right, left, and racially oriented groups and individuals;
  - c. "Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances", an extensive brief prepared at the request of Vice President Agnew;
  - d. "Stop the Bombing Campaign: A Communist Cause", a study prepared at the request of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board;
  - e. A secret paper for the U. S. Intelligence Board analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean";
  - f. "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities", a weekly summary of racial extremist activities.
8. Materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and maintenance of additions to, and periodic review of, the National Security File maintained by the FBI laboratory.
9. All materials pertaining to Project HUNTER, including, but not limited to, all memoranda discussing the origins, approval, implementation, and periodic review of the requests by the FBI for the opening of mail by the CIA in connection with this project and any other CIA mail intercept activity; and all materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and implementation of the requests by the FBI for CIA mail intercepts directed at the

following: SNCC, Institute for Policy Studies, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, and Jeremy Stone.

10. Copies of the 90-day status letters on COINTELPRO activities submitted by the Chicago FBI field office to the Bureau.
11. Last known address of former FBI clerical employee Katherine Osborn Jensen.
12. Present office of assignment or last known address of the following present or former Special Agents:
  - a. John Kleinkauf;
  - b. William Forsythe;
  - c. James Bland;
  - d. Paul Cox;
  - e. Theodore P. Rosack;
  - f. Robert Denz;
  - g. Fred Fox.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/26/75  
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Caption of Document: Activities. (Part I of 8/20/75  
request by SSC.)

Origin g Office: FBI

Delivered by: *Paul Maly* Date: 8/26/75

Received by: *Office Manager*

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

**8/26/75**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

HSC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2 ALM/276

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum and enclosures**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

**SSC letter 8/20/75, Part I, Items 1-6, 7B and D,  
8 and 10**

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

**TS**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Operating procedures  
Intelligence collection**

**TREAT AS YELLOW****5-wo**

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Materials pertaining to: Origins, approval, and implementation of SAC letter 70-48 dated 9/15/70 which authorized development of Security Information between ages 18-21; A 2-day conference held at FBI headquarters 9/17-18/70, with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal attaches; origins, approval and implementation of decision in 1970 to grant approval for SACs on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a SA or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions; Attorney General's testimony on 2/27/75, regarding "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past"; All SAC letters and SAC memoranda; Furnishing of information to the White House in 2/70 and 3/70 regarding the role of Klan organizations in mailing letters to the President protesting school desegregation; Origins, approval, and periodic review of the preparation and dissemination by the Research Section of the Intelligence Division of the following: "The Extremist Speaks", and "Stop the Bombing Campaign: A Communist Cause"; Origins, contents and maintenance of additions to

**62-116395**

3791 (6-75) FMK:fmk (4)

ORIGINAL VIA MAISON TO THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75 (OVER)

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Page two

and periodic review of, the National Security File maintained by the FBI laboratory; Copies of the 90-day status letters on COINTELPRO activities submitted by the Chicago FBI field office to the Bureau.

-2-

- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. J. Cochran  
(Attn: W. G. Stevens)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

August 25, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-23-81 BY SP4JPM/HL

6076

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of FBI Special Agent Wilbur G. Stevens. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

REC-1

62 116395-591

- 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
- 1 - 67-278117 (Personnel File SA Wilbur G. Stevens) 2 1975

SFP:1hb-1hb  
(11)

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- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**ENCLOSURE**

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. J. Cochran  
(Attn: W. G. Stevens)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

August 25, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. Q. Gregar
- 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT  
(SA) WILBUR G. STEVENS BY  
SSC STAFF MEMBERS**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2-23-81 BY SP4JRM/ML  
6076

Set out below is information concerning an interview of FBI SA Wilbur G. Stevens by SSC Staff Members. Stevens is currently assigned to FBI Headquarters. The details of the interview are as furnished by Stevens.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Stevens was advised that he was to be interviewed at 11:30 a.m., August 14, 1975, in the SSC offices. Stevens was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to Stevens that he had a right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Stevens was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which had originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Stevens was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of these areas, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with an FBI representative

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
- 1 - 67-278117 (Personnel File SA Wilbur G. Stevens)

SFP:1hb (10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

**ENCLOSURE**

GPO 934-546



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

who was to accompany him to the interview. This representative would not be present during the actual interview but would merely be available nearby in the event consultation was desired.

Stevens was interviewed in SSC offices for the approximate period 11:30 a.m. to 12:20 p.m., August 14, 1975, by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeGreo. At the outset of the interview, Stevens was requested to, and did, sign an ADVICE OF RIGHTS statement, a Xerox of which is attached hereto.

The following is a statement of areas covered in the interview, as furnished by Stevens.

It should be noted that the subject matter does not necessarily follow in a chronological fashion as it concerns dates and times, or as it concerns the order in which the questions were asked. It should also be noted that the Committee and Epstein were evidently interested in activity pinpointed in the area of 1961-1967.

Stevens was first questioned about his background and employment at the FBI. He advised that he was employed in March, 1942; terminated temporarily January, 1944, for military service; continued in March, 1946; terminated temporarily in August, 1950, again for military service; and again continued from August, 1951, until September, 1956, when he was appointed an SA with the FBI. After training and a short assignment in the Charlotte, North Carolina, Field Office, Stevens was transferred back to FBI Headquarters and assigned to the Radio Engineering Section in the Laboratory. He has continued work in this Section since then.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

Stevens was next questioned about the chain of command in the Laboratory and who made the assignments of work. The chain of command was explained starting with the Director; then the Assistant Director, in this case of the Laboratory; next the Section Chief; the Number One Man in the Section; finally down to the SA level. It was also pointed out that at the time in question there were no Unit Chief positions in the Laboratory.

The next question by Epstein concerned the physical location of various facilities of the Radio Engineering Section; i.e., where certain SAs were assigned office space. Included in this question was the SA complement in the office Stevens occupied. Stevens replied that at the time he occupied space in Room 7110 in the Department of Justice building along with five other SA Supervisors: John M. Matter, William L. Harvard, Robert A. Miller, Bruce P. Fisher and Charles K. Corbett. Stevens also said that this complement changed as people retired and that as changes occurred there were additions to this group: Joseph B. Parsons and William D. Campbell.

The question was then asked as to whether Stevens knew anything about magnetic recording tapes concerning Martin Luther King, Jr. Epstein was told by Stevens that he, Stevens, did have knowledge of this but received his information only through hearsay, having no direct knowledge as to the existence at the time that Epstein alleged the tapes were made. Asked if he had listened to the tapes or to composite tapes, Stevens advised that he had not.

Epstein then asked Stevens who would have the ability to work on tapes such as these. Stevens advised that almost any of the SA Supervisors previously mentioned would have the ability to work on tapes of this kind.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

Asked if John Matter and William Campbell could have worked with this type of magnetic recording, Stevens advised that they could have.

Stevens was asked whether they both could have been doing the same things with these tapes and Stevens advised he did not know as he was not present at any time that the alleged tapes were being worked on.

Stevens was asked whether he knew what a composite tape was. Stevens answered in the affirmative. He was then asked if he had ever made a composite tape and Stevens again answered in the affirmative. Stevens was then asked whether he knew that a composite tape was being made at this particular time which concerned Martin Luther King, Jr. Stevens answered, "No." He was further asked whether he knew what was done with this alleged composite tape and Stevens again answered, "No."

Questioning then changed somewhat and Stevens was asked if there were any personal favors done by the Radio Engineering Section personnel. Stevens advised that there were once in a while; in fact he, Stevens, had repaired small radios at various times for people. Epstein asked if Stevens had any knowledge regarding complaints to the Section Front Office about the frequency of these personal favors or requests. Stevens presumed that there were complaints once in a while. When asked how these were handled, Stevens said he did not know.

Epstein again asked Stevens about assignment of work in the Radio Engineering Section and was again told that at that time the work was assigned from the Section Front Office, either by the Section Chief or the Number One Man, directly to the SA Supervisors.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SA BY SSC

Stevens was asked when he had last seen John Matter and replied that he, Stevens, had seen Matter approximately three weeks ago. Epstein asked if the subject which this interview concerned was discussed with Matter. Stevens responded, "No." Epstein then made inquiry as to the time spent with Matter and was advised that Matter was in Stevens' office for approximately two or three minutes. When asked who was present at the same time as Matter, Stevens said that a number of people were present but that he could not indicate names.

Epstein asked Stevens if he had discussed anything concerning the current interview with anybody in the FBI prior to the interview and he was advised that he had not. This reply by Stevens addressed itself to substance rather than procedure.

Enclosure

NOTE:

Legal Counsel Division briefing of Stevens prior to interview was by Supervisor P. V. Daly. Stevens was accompanied to the interview by Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project but it was not necessary for Stevens to consult with Phillips during the interview.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., T.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#m DR16  
SP2 ALM/JTG  
10-12-00

### ADVICE OF RIGHTS

Before you answer any questions, we would like to advise you of your rights.

This interview is completely voluntary and you have a right to leave without being interviewed, or to terminate the interview at any time.

You have the right to remain silent.

Although the Senate Select Committee is not a prosecutive body, it is possible that anything you say might become available to a prosecutive body and could be used against you in court.

You have the right to consult with an attorney before any questions are asked, and you may have an attorney here with you during questioning.

If you cannot afford an attorney, the Committee shall then endeavor to obtain counsel for you.

If you decide to answer questions without an attorney present, you still have the right to stop answering questions any time; or you may defer your answer until you consult with an attorney.

### WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I have read this statement of rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to be interviewed and to answer questions without a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed: Walter B. Stettin

Date: 8/14/75

Witness: [Signature]

Witness: Murray McPee

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available  
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

☒

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

8/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding  
to the White House

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,  
interviewee, testifier and subject)Memorandum reporting results of an interview of incumbent  
Special Agent Wilbur G. Stevens by members of SSC Staff5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-  
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are  
used underline for emphasis)Organization and staffing  
Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.

62-116395

FMK: fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

- 2 - Mr. J. A. M. (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

August 25, 1975

Director, FBI

~~EX-103~~ ~~REC-1~~  
 U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16  
 IT INFORMATION...  
 DATE 10/12/00 SP2 ALM/ATG

Reference is made to the SSC request dated August 20, 1975, for materials from this Bureau.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is in response to some of the requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
 Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
 Special Counsel for  
 Intelligence Coordination

SFP:1hb/lhb  
 (10)

REC-1 62-116395-590  
 SEP 10 1975

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Delivered to Shaheen's office by post 8/26/75



2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

August 25, 1975

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

Reference is made to the SSC request dated August 20, 1975, for materials from this Bureau.

Part I, Item 11 requested the last known address of former FBI clerical employee Katherine Osborn Jensen. Part I, Item 12 requested the present office of assignment or last known address of the following present or former Special Agents: John Kleinkauf, William Forsythe, James Bland, Paul Cox, Theodore P. Rosack, Robert Denz, and Fred Fox.

In respect to Item 11, this individual's name is Kathleen Logan, the wife of Richard E. Logan, an FBI Special Agent assigned to our Philadelphia Field Office. The Logans reside at #4 William Ellery Building, Clusters at Washington, Turnersville, New Jersey 08012.

Data responsive to Item 12 is as follows.

As of 1969, John Henry Kleinkauf resided at 1153 Cullen Avenue, Schenectady, New York 12309, and was employed as Director of Security and Safety, Union College, Schenectady, New York 12308.

William T. Forsyth (not Forsythe) was last known (1971) to reside at 350 Boca Grande Boulevard, Punta Gorda, Florida 33950. Note should be taken that on August 4, 1975, during an interview by SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein of Special Agent Seymor Fred Phillips of this Bureau, Phillips furnished Epstein Forsyth's name and also advised Epstein that Forsyth is deceased.

SFP:lhb/lhb  
 (9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

*woc/lb*

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-590

GPO 254-546

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. It is not to be used in official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

*#mde/6*  
*10-1800 SP2ALM/1716*

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

James Field Bland was last known to reside at  
4310 Rosedale Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland 20014.

Paul Leslie Cox was last known to reside at  
2101 Ingraham Street, Hyattsville, Maryland 20782.

11450 Frederick F. Fox was last known to reside at  
~~1450~~ West Biscayne Canal Road, Miami, Florida 33161.

Theodore P. Kosack is currently Special Agent in  
Charge of the Denver Field Office of the FBI.

Robert Charles Danc is presently assigned as one  
of the Special Agents in Charge in the FBI field office in  
New York City.

The foregoing information is the most recent  
available in the files of the FBI.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/25/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee.  
Caption of Document: 8/20/75 request: Part I, 11 & 12

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: [Signature] Date: 8/26/75

Received by: [Signature]

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-12-00 BY SP2 ALM/1716

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER**8/25/75**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

**SSC letter 8/20/75 Part I, Item 11 and 12**

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

**U**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Organization and staffing**

#MDR16  
10-12-00 SP2 ALM/275

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

**Last known address or office of assignment of present or former Special Agents and clerical employee****62-116395****FMK: fmk  
(4)****ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75****TREAT AS YELLOW****5-ubc/18**

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 17 1975

NR 001 NH C O D E

12:20 PM URGENT 8/17/75 RG

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: NEW HAVEN

SENSTUDY 75

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep. A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep. A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Serv.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

#mde 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2ALM/776

REBUTEL 8/15/75.

FORMER SA JAMES T. HAVERTY CONTACTED 8/16/75, BY SAC AT  
HIS RESIDENCE, WESTPORT, CONN.

HAVERTY HAS ALREADY BEEN CONTACTED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
(SSC) AID, FREDRICK BARON. HAVERTY IS TO MEET WITH SSC AIDES IN  
WASHINGTON, DC, 2PM, WEDNESDAY, 8/20/75. HE WILL ARRIVE IN  
WASHINGTON, DC LATE IN THE MORNING OF THAT DAY AND GO DIRECTLY  
TO THE BUREAU'S OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL FOR DISCUSSION REGARDING  
HIS MEETING WITH SSC AIDES.

END  
COPY RETAINED IN  
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC-1

SEP 2 1975

EX-103

cc - Legal Counsel

F B I

Date: 8/15/75

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: ADIC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243) (P)

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Re Bureau teletype to Los Angeles dated 7/31/75  
captioned "SENSTUDY 75", Los Angeles airtel dated 8/7/75  
and Bureau telephone call 8/15/75.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original  
and seven copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) concerning  
the above interview.

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)  
2 - Los Angeles

wew/nc  
(4)

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

84 SEP 4 1975 Special Agent in Charge  
NW 65360 DocId:32989634 Page 51



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Los Angeles, California  
August 15, 1975

#mDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP2 ARM/H6

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Special Agent (SA) Wallace E. Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at Los Angeles Field Office regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m. to 9:22 a.m.

SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this matter.

Seidel asked how long SA Ward had been a Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati, Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June 1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could not remember, but believed general criminal work.

Seidel requested to know what specific instructions were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not feel he could respond to any further questions. Seidel advised he understood SA Ward's position as he, Seidel, had worked criminal matters himself and knew the need for secrecy. The official interview was terminated at this point.



ENCLOSURE

62-116 395-588



In a friendly conversation that followed for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, SA Ward advised Seidel that he had only been assigned the Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter for three months and had no knowledge that would be of value to Seidel. The Cointelpro/Black Panther Party matter was not further discussed. The rest of the time was involved in discussing points of interest in the Los Angeles basin of tourist value, such as Marineland, Palos Verdes, and Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles.

SA Ward advises that he is aware that the Director waived his employment agreement with certain exceptions regarding privileged areas. With this in mind, SA Ward reviewed his employment agreement and concluded, after noting the following quotation, that he could not disclose any information without following the prescribed procedure:

"The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed, and in this regard, I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure".

With this in mind, SA Ward answered Mr. Seidel as noted heretofore.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Los Angeles, California  
August 15, 1975

#MDR 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/12/00 BY SP-2 AM/116

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

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- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

August 13, 1975

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

UNITED STATES SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16  
10-11-00 SP-2 ALM 1216

Reference is made to the letter dated June 13, 1975, from John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, requesting information concerning the technique referred to as mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail and the utilization of this technique in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities. An oral request has been made by John T. Elliff of Special Agent W. O. Cregar of this Bureau for a briefing on these matters.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of the briefing we propose to give to Mr. Elliff and his staff providing you concur in this procedure. This briefing was originally prepared for presentation to the House Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail and Labor Management; however, the briefing of this Subcommittee has not taken place.

With reference to the request made in paragraph three of referenced letter, we are currently attempting to accumulate the documents in response to that request and they will be made available to the SSC for access.

Upon receipt of your concurrence we will make arrangements for the briefing of Mr. Elliff and his staff.

Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Com. \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosure **ENCLOSURE**  
62-116395

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

JPL:cm1  
(10)

SEP 2 1975

**TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED**

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

**ROUTE**

**LOPE**  
W. W. Cregar

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Proposed briefing will be conducted by  
Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, INTD, and appropriate  
members of his staff.

- Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

The Attorney General

August 25, 1975

REC-112

Director, FBI

587X

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT  
 COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL  
 OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDP16

SP2 ALM/FIS

10-11-00

Reference is made to the memorandum dated August 13, 1975, from Mr. Douglas R. Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General, to Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, of this Bureau, captioned "Senate Select Committee Request for Information on Warrantless Electronic Surveillances," which enclosed an SSC request dated July 7, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the originals of separate memoranda containing responses to some of the requests. Questions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17, and 24 involve statistical data and identifying specific documents. This information is currently being compiled and will be furnished to you immediately upon completion.

A copy of this memorandum, with attachments, is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (16)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
 Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
 Special Counsel for  
 Intelligence Coordination

JWD:jmn jmr  
 (9)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

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Not delivered: copy of 7/11/76

REMOVED TO SA 10/20/75

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2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

62-116395

August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #2 asked: "Do Justice Department standards  
and procedures for the authorization and reauthorization of  
warrantless electronic surveillance require the concurrence  
of the State Department in the request for such surveillance?  
If so, in what types of cases is such concurrence required?"

With respect to this question, State Department  
concurrence is requested by the FBI prior to initiating any  
electronic surveillance directed against a target with  
diplomatic immunity. The fact that State Department concurrence  
has been received is set out in the initial request for an  
electronic surveillance submitted to the Attorney General for  
his approval and in any request for continuation of the  
electronic surveillance. State Department concurrence is not  
requested in certain highly sensitive matters involving  
defectors-in-place.

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_ JWD:caw  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ (8) JWD  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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Classified by 4375 <sup>ABF/RPA</sup>  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

62-116395-587

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~SECRET~~

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless  
Electronic Surveillances for  
National Security Purposes

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure  
would jeopardize sensitive methods.

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- 2 -



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2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

62-116395

August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #3 asked: "What procedures, if any,  
have been followed to obtain the concurrence of the State  
Department in the request for warrantless electronic  
surveillance?"

With respect to this question, the FBI submits a  
written request in memorandum form to the State Department  
requesting concurrence in electronic surveillances directed  
to targets with diplomatic status. A State Department  
official indicates his written concurrence by his signature.

1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

JWD:caw  
(8) *PAW*

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure  
would jeopardize sensitive methods.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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Classified by 4371 *ABE/RJA*  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

August 25, 1975

62-116395

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

IS THE  
90-DAY  
A CONCERN  
AS IT'S HERE  
IN A GENERIC  
SENSE.

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #9 asked: "What procedures have been  
followed for the review of all such surveillance on a  
regular basis to ensure that the criteria for the surveillance  
are satisfied?"

With respect to this question, prior to December,  
1966, Attorney General approval for the continuation of  
national security electronic surveillances for periods of  
six months was obtained with individual letters which set  
out the facts and circumstances predicated the request.

After December, 1966, written approval of the Attorney  
General for continuation of national security electronic surveil-  
lances was obtained on a quarterly basis effective on the first  
of January, April, July, and October. These quarterly requests  
took the form of a listing which identified each surveillance.

Since December, 1966, requests for continuation have  
been submitted on a 90-day basis.

Assoc. Dir. — JWD:caw  
Dep. AD Adm. — (8) CAW  
Dep. AD Inv. —

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Asst. Dir.:  
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Director Sec'y —

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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Classified by 4375 <sup>ABJ</sup>  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless  
Electronic Surveillances for  
National Security Purposes

Beginning in June, 1969, requests for continuation of national security electronic surveillances were submitted on a 90-day basis, but in the form of individual requests for approval rather than previously submitted listings. These individual requests specify the facts and circumstances bringing about the request.

Currently all requests for continuation of national security electronic surveillances are reviewed on a 90-day basis and each request for continuation includes a statement of the facts and circumstances predicated the request. In certain current instances prior to approving requested continuation of electronic surveillances the Attorney General has personally examined the record setting forth the results of the surveillance.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize sensitive methods.

The Attorney General has examined logs of surveillances on three recent occasions.

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- 2 -

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2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

62-116395

#mdc16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/HR  
ON 11-13-00

August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #10 stated "With respect to non-  
consensual electronic surveillance instituted outside the  
United States by agencies of the United States government"  
and continued with specific inquiries.

With respect to this question, and excluding one  
particular electronic surveillance installed by a foreign  
intelligence service in a foreign country at FBI request,  
the FBI does not engage in electronic surveillances outside  
the United States.

1 - The Attorney General

JWD:caw  
(8)CAW

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

NOTE:

The reference to the surveillance in a foreign  
country is to Joseph Kraft (Bufile 65-75629). The SSC has  
previously been advised that an electronic surveillance of  
Joseph Kraft was conducted at the request of a Bureau official  
while Kraft was in a foreign country.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure  
would jeopardize sensitive methods.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 4375 ABX  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

62-116395

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JTG  
ON 11-15-00

August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #14 asked: "What have been the standards  
and procedures, if any, that have been established for  
determining that 'the minimum physical intrusion necessary  
to obtain the information will be used'?"

With respect to this question, the specific  
standards and procedures for determining "the minimum physical  
intrusion necessary to obtain the information (that) will be  
used" vary with the type of electronic surveillance, i.e.,  
telephone wiretap or microphone and with the target of the  
electronic surveillance. Telephone wiretaps do not involve  
physical intrusion since the actual cutting in on the telephone  
wire is accomplished externally to the target's premises. The  
circumstances of a microphone installation with regard to  
physical intrusion can vary from actual physical intrusion  
under secure conditions to no physical intrusion as, for  
instance, when the microphone is introduced to the target's  
premises in equipment to be delivered to the target. Currently  
the requests forwarded to the Attorney General indicate the  
means by which the installation will be accomplished.

Assoc. Dir. — 1 - The Attorney General

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

Dep. AD Adm. —

Dep. AD Inv. —

Asst. Dir.: JWD:caw

Admin. — (8)

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. —

Gen. Inv. —

Ident. —

Inspection —

Intell. —

Laboratory —

Plan. & Eval. —

Spec. Inv. —

Training —

Legal Coun. —

Telephone Rm. —

Director Sec'y —

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SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Classified by 4375 AB/SP4  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless  
Electronic Surveillances for  
National Security Purposes

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure  
would jeopardize sensitive methods.

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- 2 -

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*Reviewed from file on*  
62-116395

# mdr 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BLM/176  
ON 11-15-00

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg  
August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7,  
1975, with attached questionnaire:

Question #15, "With respect to warrantless -  
electronic surveillance in cases of 'leaks' of information  
deemed either 'essential' or 'important' to the security  
of the United States," asked the following questions:

Question #15a asked: "Has there been a Justice  
Department policy specifically addressed to such cases?"

Question #15b asked: "Have there been Justice  
Department standards or procedures specifically addressed  
to such cases?"

With respect to questions #15a and #15b, by  
memorandum dated May 9, 1962, the Attorney General approved  
specific procedures which reflect the policy of the Department  
in "leak" cases and the procedures involved in the investi-  
gation. These procedures are still in effect. A copy of  
this memorandum is attached.

Involving questions #15c through #15i, no "leak"  
cases have involved warrantless electronic surveillances  
other than the matters involving the "Kissinger 17" wiretaps,  
Joseph Kraft and Yeoman Charles Edward Radford. These matters  
have been the subject of individual Senate Select Committee  
inquiries. The material furnished to the Committee or to which  
it has been given access provides the response to or explains  
the application of questions #15c through #15i. No further  
response is therefore being made.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

RHR:caw

(8) PAW

Classified by 4375

Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2

Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~SECRET~~

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless  
Electronic Surveillances for  
National Security Purposes

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure  
would jeopardize sensitive methods.

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- 2 -



Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Attorney General

May 9, 1962

Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified  
Information to the Press

By memorandum of February 12, 1962 relative to the captioned matter you requested that the Department advise whether the policy outlined therein meets with the approval of the Department. The policy as delineated in your memorandum with respect to various types of leak cases is set forth herein followed by the advice of the Department.

1. Restricted Data Under the Atomic Energy Act - Upon receipt of allegations, usually from the Atomic Energy Commission, of a leak of Restricted Data we request detailed data from the Atomic Energy Commission, where not previously furnished, on such items as date and identity of the article; exact statements alleged to be classified; whether the data published is accurate; whether the data published was classified properly; whether the data can be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification; the extent of dissemination of the data; whether the data had been the subject of prior official releases; whether declassification had been decided upon prior to publication; whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of the document; name of the individual responsible for the security of the classified data published; whether the material, or portions thereof, or enough background data had been published officially or in the press to make educated speculation on the matter possible; and whether prior clearance for publication was sought from proper authorities. We obtain such data to assist the Department in determining whether an investigation is warranted. Upon receipt of the detailed data we refer the matter to the Internal Security Division for an opinion.

This procedure meets with the approval of the Department.

ENCLOSURE

62-116345-587X

## 2. Leaks of Classified Defense Information -

The espionage statute applies to such leaks. Upon receipt of an allegation of a leak of classified defense data, not involving Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act, we advise the referring agency that the leak in question is administrative in nature and is one to be handled by the agencies possessing or distributing the classified data involved. In each instance we send a copy of our referral and of our reply to the Internal Security Division.

In the light of the specific statutory responsibility assigned to the FBI to investigate leaks of Restricted Data subject to the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2271(b)) and the responsibility pursuant to a directive issued by President Roosevelt on September 6, 1939, reissued by President Roosevelt January 8, 1943 and reaffirmed by President Truman on July 24, 1950, "to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations", it is the opinion of the Department that while cases involving leaks of classified defense information should be considered primarily matters to be handled by the agency which is responsible for safeguarding the information, it remains, however, the responsibility of the Department to determine whether a specific set of facts constitute a violation of our criminal statutes.

It is recommended that the responsible department or agency be requested to furnish the FBI at the time it reports the leak to the Bureau the same background data as now supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission in its cases. The FBI could at that time refer the matter to the Department for a determination as to whether the investigation should be taken over by the Bureau for the purpose of attempting to develop evidence to establish a violation of the espionage statutes.

## 3. Data Covered by Paragraph 5, National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 1 -

Normally we are not involved in the investigation provided by this Directive. If we were one of the recipients of the particular data which was leaked the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency can call upon us to conduct an inquiry to

- 3 -

determine whether the leak occurred within the FBI. If called upon, we conduct such an inquiry but we do not get involved outside the FBI.

This procedure meets with the approval of the Department.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg

62-116395

August 25, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
 WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO WARRANTLESS  
 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES FOR  
 NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES

Reference is made to SSC letter dated July 7, 1975,  
 with attached questionnaire:

Question #21 asked: "In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Clarence M. Kelley stated that he would accept a requirement of judicial warrants for national security electronic surveillance if the standard for issuance of the warrant was "less than probable cause." When asked by Mr. Badillo what the appropriate standard should be, he answered, "I think reasonable grounds, that as a result of the pursuit of an investigation (it is), possible to believe that there has been, or will be, or there is a need for the gathering of intelligence." Does this statement reflect the official position of the FBI in regard to (1) a warrant requirement for national security electronic surveillance, and (2) the appropriate standard for the issuance of a warrant?"

With respect to this question, my response was in connection with hearings on H. R. 214 and H. R. 141 which were designed to restrict the powers of the President and executive agencies in electronic surveillances.

There have been a number of proposals for judicial approval of national security electronic surveillances. Such proposals may raise serious Constitutional questions regarding Congressional authority to limit the powers of the President in matters affecting national security.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

JWD:lps  
 (8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request Pertaining to Warrantless  
Electronic Surveillances for  
National Security Purposes

I indicated in my opening remarks when I appeared before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice on June 26, 1975, that there were certain provisions of H. R. 214 and H. R. 141 which were ill-advised. I discussed my reservations at length in my opening remarks. I feel the specific provisions of each proposal of this type must be studied at length and my response to Congressman Badillo which is quoted should not be read as my definitive position regarding warrant requirements or the standard necessary for the issuance of warrants in national security electronic surveillances.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Question #20 is to be answered by the Department regarding the Department's opposition to a specially-designated court to review applications for warrants in national security electronic surveillances. Above reply is being used in order that the Bureau's position would not appear to conflict with that of the Department.

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. Raymond Wannall  
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: August 13, 1975

FROM : Douglas R. Marvin  
Counselor to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for Information  
on Warrantless Electronic Surveillances

#m DR16  
10-11-00 SP-2 ALM/JTG

In accord with our telephone conversation of August 12th, I am forwarding to you a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting answers to questions relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the Federal government in the interests of national security. The Committee has been told that we would try to respond to their request by August 20th. That date is fast approaching and may not be a reasonable period of time in which to compile the information requested and respond to their questions. That date is a useful target, however, since any issues to be presented to the Attorney General with respect to complying to this request must be considered prior to August 19th, the date the Attorney General is scheduled to leave Washington.

Da

Would your office please prepare responses to the following questions that involve areas with which, I believe, you are familiar: questions 2-10, 11(b)-(d), 12, 14, 15, 17, 21 and 24.

Thank you.

REC-112

62-11639-587X

FEB 17 1976

ENCLOSURE

5-Phillips

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



5010-110

*John*

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R432

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOOMEY, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
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ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
EDWARD H. RYAN, JR., TENN.  
CHARLES DILLON, P. ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MATTHEWS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 11, 93RD CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COPY 6 OF 8

July 7, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

#mDE16  
10-11-00 SP2 ALM 1376

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letters of June 24 and June 25, 1975, relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the federal government in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence. The Select Committee also appreciates your providing the information of a sensitive nature in your separate letter of June 24, 1975.

Your letters, and the recent testimony of Kevin T. Maroney and Clarence M. Kelley before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, have raised several additional questions which the Committee wishes to pursue. Further questions are raised by the July 1, 1975, White House news briefing by the Press Secretary relating to the effect of the recent Zweibon decision. Some of these questions relate to general policy considerations in the electronic surveillance area; others address our need for a more complete factual base from which we can draw our conclusions. A list of these questions is attached to this letter. These questions, of course, do not supersede prior requests for material relating to electronic surveillance, which are itemized in the document requests of May 14, June 16, and June 27. Rather, they should be considered as supplementary to the prior requests.

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The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Page two

July 7, 1975

I believe that the answers to these questions are essential to a complete understanding of the policies and procedures followed by the Justice Department in electronic surveillance cases. Full information on these matters is necessary for the Committee to fulfill its mandate "to recommend the enactment of any new legislation . . . necessary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to these activities." With the continued cooperation of the Justice Department, I am convinced that the Committee will be able to discharge this responsibility in the critical area of national security electronic surveillance.

Sincerely,

Frank Church  
Chairman



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Warrantless Electronic Surveillance for National Security Purposes

- A60
1. With respect to the "Special Review Group" which you have established within the office of the Attorney General for the purpose of examining requests for non-consensual electronic surveillance without a judicial warrant, the following questions are asked:
    - a. What have been the names and titles of the persons serving on the Special Review Group?
    - b. If the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is not a member of the Special Review Group, does he normally have the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?
    - c. Have any individuals other than those serving on the Special Review Group or the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division had the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance? If so, whom?
    - d. Does the Special Review Group have the authority to deny requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?
    - e. Does the Special Review Group review requests for reauthorizations of warrantless electronic surveillance?
  - A60 2. Do Justice Department standards and procedures for the authorization and reauthorization of warrantless electronic surveillance require the concurrence of the State Department in the request for such surveillance? If so, in what types of cases is such concurrence required?
  - FBI 3. What procedures, if any, have been followed to obtain the concurrence of the State Department in the request for warrantless electronic surveillance?

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4. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from 1966 to the present?
5. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
6. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
7. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of previously approved surveillance?
8. How many of the requests for the continuation of previously approved surveillance made by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
9. What procedures have been followed for the review of all such surveillance on a regular basis to ensure that the criteria for the surveillance are satisfied?
10. With respect to non-consensual electronic surveillance instituted outside the United States by agencies of the United States government, the following questions are asked:
  - a. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, established for the authorization and review of such surveillance?
  - b. What has been the total number of such surveillances by year and by month for each year from 1966 to the present?
  - c. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated such requests from 1966 to the present?
  - d. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
  - e. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

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- f. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance?
  - g. How many of the requests for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance have been approved by the Attorney General?
  - h. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been instituted in (1) North America, other than the United States; (2) South America; (3) Western Europe; (4) Eastern Europe; (5) Africa; (6) the Middle East; (7) South-east Asia; (8) the rest of Asia?
  - i. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been directed at subjects who are United States citizens?
11. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power or a foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:
- a. To what extent does the recent decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia limit or otherwise affect this standard?
  - b. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power" and under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 to the present?
  - c. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "b" above have been United States citizens?
  - d. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "b" above?

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12. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance is "assisting a foreign power or foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:
- a. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "assisting a foreign power" and under the standard "assisting a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 until the present?
  - b. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "a" above have been United States citizens?
  - c. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "a" above?
13. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the requested surveillance is "necessary for national security or foreign intelligence purposes important to national security", the following questions are asked:
- a. Is this standard intended to supplant the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson (i.e., that the proposed surveillance must be necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power, that it be necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or that it be necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities)?
  - b. Is this standard intended to modify the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?

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- c. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for such change?
  - d. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the precise legal authority supporting such change in the formulation of the standard?
  - e. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for the deletion of the word "essential" from the formulation of the standard under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?
  - f. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, please give examples of hypothetical situations where national security electronic surveillance would be permitted: (1) under the current standard but not under the former standard, and (2) under the former standard but not under the current standard.
14. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, that have been established for determining that "the minimum physical intrusion necessary to obtain the information will be used"?
15. With respect to warrantless electronic surveillance in cases of "leaks" of information deemed either "essential" or "important" to the security of the United States, the following questions are asked:
- a. Has there been a Justice Department policy specifically addressed to such cases?
  - b. Have there been Justice Department standards or procedures specifically addressed to such cases?
  - c. Have surveillances in such cases been approved by the Attorney General under the standard "assisting a foreign power or a foreign-based political group"?
  - d. If the answer to "c" above is no, under what standard have surveillances in such cases been approved?
  - e. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved for such cases for each year from 1966 to the present?

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- f. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance in such cases from 1966 to the present?
  - g. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
  - h. How many of such requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
  - i. Of the total number of subjects under surveillance in such cases for each year from 1966 to the present, how many were (1) employees of news media organizations; (2) current employees of the federal government; (3) former employees of the federal government; (4) other?
16. With respect to the dissemination of information obtained from national security electronic surveillance, the following questions are asked:
- a. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information?
  - b. What have been the identities of the agencies and Presidential appointees who have received information obtained from national security electronic surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?
  - c. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information to agencies and Presidential appointees who did not initiate the request for the surveillance?
17. Can additional monthly data on warrantless electronic surveillances prior to November 1972 be made available in view of the fact that the FBI was able to precisely state the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation on nineteen separate days, ranging from March 4, 1965, to March 31, 1972, in response to a request by the Select Committee? (By letter of June 9, 1975, the FBI's Office of the Director informed the Committee of the number of warrantless electronic

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surveillances in operation on, thirty days before, and thirty days after testimony by the Director before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 to the present.)

18. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, stated in reference to a three-man Executive Branch commission used in Great Britain to review applications for national security electronic surveillance, "Whether such a commission would be feasible under our system . . . I think it might well be." Is it the official position of the Justice Department that a similar commission composed of Executive Branch officials would be an acceptable alternative to the present system for authorizing national security electronic surveillance?
19. In the testimony referred to above, Mr. Maroney also stated, "I think the Department has previously committed itself . . . to complete disclosure to an oversight committee." With respect to this statement, the following questions are asked:
  - a. When and in what context has the Justice Department committed itself to complete disclosure to an oversight committee?
  - b. What material or information, if any, that relates to the authorization for, identities of the subjects of, conduct of, and dissemination of information from particular electronic surveillances would the Justice Department be unwilling to disclose to an oversight committee?
20. What is the basis for Justice Department opposition to the concept of a specially-designated court, composed of one or three federal judges, which would review applications for warrants in cases of national security electronic surveillance?
21. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Clarence M. Kelley stated that he would accept a requirement of judicial warrants for national security

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electronic surveillance if the standard for issuance of the warrant was "less than probable cause". When asked by Mr. Badillo what the appropriate standard should be, he answered, "I think reasonable grounds, that as a result of the pursuit of an investigation (it is), possible to believe that there has been, or will be, or there is a need for the gathering of intelligence." Does this statement reflect the official position of the FBI in regard to (1) a warrant requirement for national security electronic surveillance, and (2) the appropriate standard for the issuance of a warrant?

22. What have been the standards and procedures followed by the Justice Department for the authorization and conduct of national security electronic surveillance where one (but not all) of the parties to the conversation consents to the monitoring?
23. With respect to the July 1 White House news briefing by Ron Nessen relating to the effect of the Zweibon decision, the following questions are asked:
  - a. What is the nature of the directive from the President to the Attorney General, referred to by Mr. Nessen, relating to Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?
  - b. How does this directive affect Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?
  - c. Will the Justice Department support legislative proposals that would require a court order for any electronic surveillance, as was indicated by Mr. Nessen's statement?
  - d. If the answer to "c" above is yes, which of the pending bills in Congress, if any, would the Justice Department be willing to support?
  - e. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate judicial standard for the issuance of a warrant?
  - f. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate court or courts to issue such warrant?



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24. With respect to electronic surveillance directed at encoded, non-conversational communications conducted in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence, the following questions are asked:

- a. What were the total number of such surveillances for each year from 1966 to 1968?
- b. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for such surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?
- c. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee for each year from 1966 to the present?
- d. How many of such requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General for each year from 1966 to the present?
- e. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?
- f. How many of the requests made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance have been approved by the Attorney General for each year from 1966 to the present?
- g. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been instituted in (1) the United States; (2) North America, other than the United States; (3) South America; (4) Western Europe; (5) Eastern Europe; (6) Africa; (7) the Middle East; (8) Southeast Asia; (9) the rest of Asia?

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FURTHER DETAILS REGARDING THE  
FBI'S USE OF MAIL COVERS, MAIL SURVEYS,  
AND PARTICIPATION IN CIA MAIL INTERCEPTS

Downgrade to  
Secret UC/Baw  
60324 8/31/11

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CLASSIFIED BY 2355  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Mr. Chairman, I wish to furnish the Subcommittee additional details regarding our mail covers and surveys; however, some of this information enters sensitive areas involving national security, and I respectfully request it be presented in executive session.

As I have indicated previously, the FBI's use of mail covers and surveys as investigative techniques has been based on fulfilling its lawfully mandated responsibilities.

The list of intelligence accomplishments resulting from mail covers on foreign establishments alone is long, but perhaps these examples will suffice:

In February, 1975, a member of the military holding a "secret" clearance obtained while in training was determined to be in contact with a foreign establishment.

Also last February, an individual with a "secret" clearance employed on a missile project was in such contact.

In November, 1974, a scientist involved in atomic research was determined to be in such contact.

We have discovered through mail coverage on the United Nations Mission of a communist country that a wide range of individuals and corporations have been in contact with an official establishment of a foreign country with which the United States has no diplomatic relations.

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With reference to our former use of mail survey programs in which we surveyed mail for indicators as to whether further processing is warranted, permit me to further explain the seven programs which I previously outlined in public testimony:

Of these surveys, one was established in New York as a result of the experience gained in the investigation of a Soviet illegal. This illegal cooperated with the FBI; and we learned that in directing mail to his Moscow center, he addressed it in a specific fashion and also directed it to mail drops in Europe.

From this experience, we were able to develop a set of indicators which allowed us to select mail which we felt was illegal agent mail. This, coupled with our knowledge of known Soviet mail drops on this side of the Iron Curtain, permitted effective screening of the mail and selection of letters on a knowledgeable basis.

This method was proved successful when we uncovered three such illegals and successfully neutralized their activities. This survey was conducted between 1959 and 1966.

A second survey was based on the use of these same indicators in examining incoming mail directed to certain areas of New York City and other cities in an effort to detect mail being directed to illegal agents in the United States. This survey was conducted between 1961 and 1962.

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A third survey was based on our knowledge that illegal agents in the United States directed communications to Soviet bloc intelligence officers employed at the United Nations in New York City. Again, this survey was based on solid information that this means of communication was utilized by the hostile intelligence service. This survey was conducted between 1963 and 1966.

A fourth survey was conducted in the Miami, Florida, area. It also utilized the known indicators and the known mail drop addresses on mail being sent from the United States to Cuba. As an example, during the period of time this program existed in Miami, from January 2, 1963, until July 21, 1966, 60 letters were determined to contain secret ink messages either on the letter or on the envelope.

Two other surveys were directed against mail being sent to the United States from the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, as well as mail directed from the United States to China. The coverage of mail from the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong was initiated August 1, 1956, and was discontinued on January 24, 1966. The coverage of mail directed to China operated between 1964 and 1966.

The purpose of these two surveys was to acquire information concerning Americans living in China of interest to the intelligence agencies of the United States; to detect

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efforts by the People's Republic of China to persuade scientists of Chinese descent in the United States to return to the People's Republic of China; to detect efforts to arrange travel by these scientists and to learn any information they would provide the People's Republic of China; to ascertain identities of subscribers to and recipients of Chinese propaganda publications; and to develop information concerning persons of security interest in the United States who were corresponding with persons in the People's Republic of China.

The seventh survey, conducted from 1940 to 1966, was of mail addressed to Soviet-bloc and other embassies and diplomatic missions of national security interest.

This program was initiated shortly before the United States entered World War II and its vital necessity during those perilous times seems obvious.

Following World War II, the seventh program was concentrated against the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc countries, and much greater selectivity was used in screening letters to be opened.

We were able, for example, in 1964 to detect the fact a civilian employee of the United States Navy offered to sell classified information to the Soviet Embassy for \$50,000.

With regard to the FBI's participation in the CIA mail interception project, when we were offered data from

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that operation, we initially set forth four specific areas of data which could be of value to our national security responsibility:

1. Correspondence of a suspicious nature which might contain double talk;
2. Correspondence indicating Soviets might be using a hostage situation to develop sources in the United States.
3. Correspondence indicating a weakness or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet in the United States.
4. Information indicating Soviet control or direction of the Communist Party, U.S.A.

In August, 1961, we advised the CIA that we were interested in letters in which the United States addressee or addressor was a Government employee, working in a sensitive industry, or an American wishing to defect to Russia.

In February, 1962, we established additional guidelines regarding the type of letters for which we had a requirement to help further our efforts to uncover illegals.

Knowledgeable FBI officials reviewed this data periodically, and surveys were conducted, to assure that we were receiving only data pertinent to our legitimate responsibilities.

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May I conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, that the FBI was motivated in these matters by a genuine desire to faithfully discharge our national security responsibilities -- to detect and identify illegal foreign agents and persons willing to serve them.

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STATEMENT FOR RECORD ON  
FBI PARTICIPATION IN CIA MAIL INTERCEPTS

Downgrade to Secret  
VclBaw 60324  
8/31/4

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The FBI first learned of the CIA mail intercept project from a CIA official in January, 1958. The official confidentially advised our liaison Agent that CIA had an operation in New York in which mail going to, and coming from, Russia was being examined by CIA.

We were advised the project had been furnishing valuable economic and political information in Russia as well as the identities of sources and potential defectors in Russia. The CIA operation presented excellent potential for uncovering Soviet espionage operations in this country.

On January 24, 1958, our liaison Agent was told by CIA representatives that the CIA had initiated negotiations with the Post Office in 1952, and finally had worked out arrangements for this project, with the approval of Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield.

Our understanding was that under that arrangement CIA would be permitted to initiate mail cover on mail going to and from Russia.

The CIA coverage first involved merely photographing the envelopes, and later resulted in the opening of mail.

CIA told us it had acquired considerable data of foreign intelligence value. CIA also indicated a willingness to handle leads for the FBI regarding matters within our national security responsibilities.

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It was recommended, and approved by Director Hoover, that we ask CIA to advise us of any product of their operation that would be valuable to us in discharging our national security responsibilities. Once the receipt of material began it was reviewed by knowledgeable Bureau officials to assure the information was pertinent to our responsibilities and justified our continuing to receive such information.

Our interest was in detecting foreign espionage agents and individuals in a position to do harm to our national security and indicating willingness to do so.

In August, 1961, we further clarified for CIA the scope of our interest. This was to assure no material not relevant to our responsibilities was furnished to us.

In February, 1973, the FBI was approached regarding taking over this CIA mail intercept project. We did not, and in May, 1973, we received the last data from this CIA operation.

In summary, our relationship with this CIA project extended from 1958 to May, 1973. We have no figures for the number of items we received during the initial stages of that operation; however, beginning in August, 1964, we began preparing summaries of items received.

The full-year count ranged from a low of 1,353 in 1972 to a high of 6,256 items in 1967.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
101-5131

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT PERTAINS TO CUBAN MAIL INTERCEPTS

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Re Cuban Mail Intercepts

In December, 1962, we were advised by CIA that it was handling mail between the United States and Cuba. We were asked if we had any requirements for the product of that operation. We responded with a request for data -- which we carefully delineated -- that would be of assistance to us in fulfilling our mandated national security responsibilities.

In March, 1963, the CIA discontinued coverage of mail going to Cuba. ~~(S)~~

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UC/Baw 60324  
9/2/11

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STATEMENT FOR RECORD ON  
FBI USE OF MAIL COVERS

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10-11-00

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SP-2 ALM/776  
10-11-00

### Legal basis for mail covers

The FBI utilizes mail covers as an investigative technique in accordance with requirements set down by law and the Postal Service. Procedures for obtaining mail covers are precisely set out in the Postal Manual, Section 861.

The legality of mail covers has been substantiated by a number of court decisions, beginning with Mr. Justice Field's statement in Ex parte Jackson (1877); recognition of this view through Oliver v. United States (1957); United States v. Costello (1958); United States v. Schwartz (1960); Cohen v. United States (1967); Lustiger v. United States (1968); United States v. Isaacs (1972); cert. denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974).

### History of Utilization by FBI of mail covers

The FBI has utilized mail covers allowed by the U. S. Post Office Department and subsequently the Postal Service as early as 1928. FBI procedures have been in accordance with Post Office policies and procedures in effect at a particular time.

From 1928 to 1945, Special Agents in Charge of respective field offices were authorized to request a mail cover from the appropriate Post Office official in their respective territories. In 1945, the FBI policy was changed to allow the SACs this authority only in cases involving deserters, fugitives and escaped Federal prisoners. All

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other cases required FBI Headquarters approval. In 1947, the FBI's policy was returned to the pre-1945 rule and SACs were again permitted to request authority from the Post Office without approval of FBI Headquarters. In 1954, however, regulations were instituted whereby all mail covers were to be limited to thirty days and justified to Headquarters prior to being requested. This policy of final determination by FBI Headquarters is in effect today.

Current statistics of mail covers utilization by FBI

As of June 17, 1975, current mail covers requested or in place totaled 129. They were as follows: National security - 69; Fugitive - 59; Criminal - 1.

The number of mail covers represents a minute fraction of the total number of investigations pending on a daily basis.

Authorization procedures consistent with Postal regulations

The FBI follows the procedures for obtaining mail covers set out in the Postal Manual, Section 861. Inasmuch as the FBI fits the "law enforcement agency" definition in the Manual, we make our requests to the Chief Postal Inspector or the Regional Postal Inspectors in Charge, depending on the type of mail cover requested.

No level of authorization in the requesting agency is specified in the Postal Manual. However, as indicated

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above, present FBI regulations require that mail cover requests must be first cleared through FBI Headquarters for approval.

FBI Headquarters screens the request to insure that the mail cover can be potentially productive and that the nature of the case is of sufficient import to justify the technique. These decisions are made upon justification from the field office, review by Headquarters' supervisory personnel, with final decision resting at the Deputy Associate Director level or above.

#### Benefits achieved by mail covers

Mail covers have proved to be valuable as an investigative technique in certain investigations. For example, mail covers have led to the identification of individuals holding security clearances who contact hostile intelligence services and who have provided intelligence information of interest to the hostile foreign intelligence services.

Over the years mail covers have provided leads which have resulted in the location of fugitives. In criminal cases, mail covers have provided information that has led to the discovery of evidence of criminal violations.

#### Purpose of mail covers

Lawful mail covers as an investigative technique are based on the premise that discovery of an individual's contacts provides knowledge of the individual's actions,

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as well as indicates other avenues by which knowledge of the individual can be obtained.

Objectives, of course, vary depending on the type of investigation involved. For example, in fugitive cases, mail covers may be used in instances when the fugitive's close associates or relatives are obviously hostile or suspected of being so. When official contact by law enforcement with these persons is rebuffed or impractical, mail covers are often useful.

In selected situations where a crime has been committed or an attempt made to do so, mail covers can be used to identify participants or co-conspirators and provide leads in investigations.

In national security matters, the insight provided by mail covers is invaluable. The FBI's successful fulfillment of its national security role rests largely in determining the activities of hostile intelligence services. The mails are obviously a means of communication which allows a foreign intelligence service accessibility to persons or places from which they would otherwise be prohibited by law or where their physical presence would be suspect and thereby negate a covert effort on their part. Knowledge of their mail contacts can open avenues of lawful investigation which can be most productive.

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STATEMENT FOR RECORD ON

FBI USE OF MAIL SURVEYS

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The FBI has conducted seven mail survey programs solely in the discharge of its national security responsibilities. None has been conducted since 1966.

These surveys were instituted because of their potential value in discharging the FBI's responsibilities in the national security field.

These surveys were conducted to detect and identify foreign agents who threaten this Nation's security and to detect other persons who indicated willingness, and were in a position, to sell out this country to hostile foreign powers. Each survey program was carefully circumscribed as to its scope and was conducted for specific objectives with strict administrative controls.

These surveys involved the processing, or opening, of mail; but they did not involve wholesale, indiscriminate opening of mail. In these surveys we were looking for indicators as to whether review of the correspondence might lead to the detection of an illegal foreign agent or a person cooperating with a hostile foreign power. Although considerable volumes of envelopes were surveyed, the vast majority of this mail was not further processed because it did not contain indicators which would make it relevant to the survey.

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#MDR16  
TRANSMITTED BY SP2 ALM/216  
ON 10/11/00

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

August 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR 16  
 10-11-00  
 SP2 AM/176

Reference is made to August 5, 1975, "Request For FBI Materials" received from the SSC.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the Committee which responds to requests identified as Roman numerals I. and III. Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2) **ENCLOSURE**

62-116395 **ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM**

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
 Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
 Special Counsel for  
 Intelligence Coordination

EWL:1hb 1hb  
 (9)

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NOTE:

All material described generally under the categories enumerated in the enclosed LHM has been recorded in detail. In order to expedite delivery of this material today, this material is not being identified herein and a comprehensive memorandum is being prepared separately for record purposes.

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
 W.O.C. [Signature]  
 [Signature]  
 [Signature]  
 [Signature]

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

August 11, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

# mdp/6  
 10/27/60 SP-2 ALM 1/376

Reference is made to "Request For FBI Materials," dated August 5, 1975. This communication responds to Roman numerals I. and III. of the request which required delivery by Monday, August 11, 1975. All materials indicated for delivery will be delivered to the SSC with this memorandum on August 11, 1975.

I. A. This request is being handled by the Department of Justice.

B. This material will be delivered. It is noted certain items were requested in unexcised form. However, excisions were necessary in Item 8, due to the sensitive nature of some sources of foreign intelligence named therein.

C. and D. This material will be delivered.

III. A., B. and C. These requests deal with portions of the Manual of Instructions and the Manual of Rules and Regulations. This material will be delivered.

D. Items 1. through 7. will be delivered. Item 8. involves inspection reports of some 17 legal attache offices and will require additional processing. We expect to include this material in delivery scheduled for August 18, 1975.

It is noted that difficulty in this area was anticipated and discussed with SSC Staff Members during conference August 4, 1975.

E. Mass Media Program. Prior correspondence concerning this matter indicated we were unable to locate any control file for this program. Pursuant to the current request, we are conducting extensive review of logical files to develop additional information which might be responsive to the SSC request. Specifically, to date, we have located memoranda

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

EWL:1hb 1hb  
 (8)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

GPO 551-545

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

dated January 16, 1968, and February 4, 1969, which bear the caption "Mass Media Program," and which were recovered from a miscellaneous administrative file not connected with the program itself. It seems apparent at this point that the Mass Media Program was an informal program created at FBI Headquarters and we have thus far been unable to locate any recorded correspondence relating to the inception of the program or its termination, as such. The above-mentioned memoranda will be delivered to the SSC on August 11, 1975, and we are continuing efforts to develop additional information of record concerning this program.

F., G. and H. This material will be delivered.

I. Material pertaining to "INLET."

1. By memorandum June 12, 1975, SSC was furnished certain material relating to INLET. Among this material was a memorandum, dated November 7, 1969, which recommended, "Pursuant to the Director's instructions" that "attached letters to the President and the Attorney General be approved enclosing the proposed current intelligence letter." This is the initial correspondence reflecting approval of INLET. No other support or underlying material was located.

2. This request concerns an "Inspection Report referred to in SAC letter of December 26, 1972." The SAC letter is apparently the letter to Albany and all field offices dated December 26, 1972, a copy of which was furnished to you by memorandum June 12, 1975. In a review of this letter, we have been unable to detect any reference to an inspection report; likewise, a review of all available INLET material failed to reveal any inspection report or any reference thereto.

3. We have no record of a letter from the FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 (or at any other time) regarding INLET. We have located in our files a copy of a letter dated April 21, 1973, to Mr. Aspin from the White House. This copy was furnished to us as an enclosure to correspondence from the White House concerning INLET. We are currently in the process of obtaining clearance for delivery of this material to the SSC.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

J. This material will be delivered.

K. On the basis of information made available, we have been unable to identify Special Agent (or former Special Agent) John Kunkle, who was assigned to the Bureau's Hawaii office in 1955. Upon receipt of any additional information, we will conduct further inquiry to identify this individual.

1 - The Attorney General



5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/11/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee to study Govt.  
Caption of Document: Operations with Respect to Intelligence activities. Request for FBI Materials, 8/5/75 Includes Foreign Operations Policy Manual

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul W. Saly Date: 8/11/75

Received by: [Signature]

Title: Cancel

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

# mdr16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2ALM/STG

~~SECRET~~

August 5, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2 Am/jk

- I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access;  
delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:
  - A. The notebook or binder containing materials on the  
FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of  
the Special Counsel.
  - B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970  
previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised  
form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing  
the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
  - C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously  
made accessible at FBIHQ.
  - D. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division  
and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently  
sanitized.

62-111385-586

ENCLOSURE

5-PAID 15

II. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 15, 1975:

- A. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:
1. Agreement between FBI and Secret Service;
  2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
  3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
  4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
  5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
  6. Directives (60);
  7. Cook, Fred (52).
- B. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access requests).

III. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Monday, August 11, 1975:

- A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
- B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, since January 1, 1960.
- D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI legal attaches:
  - 1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
  - 2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
  - 3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
  - 4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970
  - 5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21 1970;
  - 6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
  - 7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971:
  - 8. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.
- E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.

- F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
- G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
- H. "The Standard Sub List"
- I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:
  - 1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.
  - 2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC letter of December 26, 1972.
  - 3. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.
- J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.
- K. The current address and assignment of Special Agent (or former Special Agent) John Kunkle, who was assigned to the Bureau's Hawaii office in 1955.

IV. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:

1. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
2. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
3. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
4. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971.

V. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew:

1.

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.
3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968, but not including "logs".
5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.
6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.
7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:
  - a. Phil Claridge
  - b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.
2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford, one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.
3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.
4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.
5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;
2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;
3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;



4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.
5. The materials in 1 through 4 above which may pertain to any surreptitious entry directed at the following targets:
  - a. 

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
  - b. 

[REDACTED]
  - c. Daniel Ellsberg, Mill Valley, California (1973, 1974)
  - d. Gerald Lefcourt, New York City (1970, 1971)
  - e. Charles Garry, Oakland, California (1970, 1971)
  - f. Egbal Ahmed, Chicago (1970)
  - g. United States Servicemen's Fund, Boston (1971)
  - h. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City (1971)
  - i. Marvin Kalb, CBS News (1972, 1973)
  - j. Dan Rather, CBS News (1972, 1973)
  - k. Sol Linowitz (1972)
  - l. Institute of Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. (1971)
  - m. Michael Kennedy, San Francisco (1969, 1970)
  - n. Radical Education Project and SDS, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1969)
  - o. Carol Wild Scott, Gainesville, Florida (1972)
  - p. Henry di Suvero, New York City (1972)
  - q. The Washington Free Press, Washington, D.C. (1969)
  - r. The home of a "known bigot... (who) might (have been) plotting violence against Jewish leaders," referred to in Jack Anderson's column in the Washington Post of June 21, 1975.

D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.

E. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list":

1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;
3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;
4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.

F. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service.

G. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

I. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the Philadelphia FBI field office from 1969 to the present.

- J. The additional SAC letters and memoranda identified on the attached list.
- K. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees:
  - 1. George Berley
  - 2. Wilfred Bergeron
  - 3. William D. Campbell
  - 4. Richard Suter
  - 5. William Tucker
  - 6. Terry O'Connor
  - 7. Joseph English
- L. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in K. above.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

8/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC  
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum and enclosures**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

**SSC letter 8/5/75, Part I, A thru C, Part III,  
A thru K (except D, 8)**

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

**S**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Intelligence activities, foreign  
Operating procedures**

*Handwritten:* AMDR 16  
10-11-00 SP2 ALM/HB

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970; Foreign Operations Policy Manual; Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office; Various Sections of Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations and superseding versions of Section 6 of Manual of Rules and Regulations since 1/1/60; Various memoranda regarding FBI legal attaches during years 1969, 1970 and 1971; Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division; "Guide to Indexing" and Rules Pertaining to the General Index"; "The Standard Sub List"; Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

62-116395

**TREAT AS YELLOW**

*Handwritten:* 5-WOC/16

FMK:fmk

(4)

**ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75**

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

August 8, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#m0216

10-11-00 SP2ALM/376

Reference is made to a request from the SSC dated July 28, 1975, entitled "Superceding Request for FBI Materials." Item V. G of this request pertained to four individuals mentioned in a letter to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General dated July 1, 1975, which letter requested certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning Cointelpro activities directed against these four individuals.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC is an original of a memorandum which responds to item V. G of the July 28, 1975, request from the SSC.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

It should be noted the SSC letter dated July 1, 1975, requested the identity of FBI personnel connected with operations relating to the four individuals of interest and indicated interviews would be sought with all FBI personnel so involved. Department memorandum dated July 8, 1975, from K. William O'Connor to John A. Mintz of the FBI advised interviews of any FBI Agent personnel with respect to the above would be an "abuse interview." Set forth in the enclosed memorandum are the identities of FBI personnel which were requested in the July 1, 1975, letter.

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Enclosures (3) ENCLOSURE

REC-1

EX 106

SEP 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-450364 (M. Starsky)  
1 - 100-452984 (M. White)  
1 - 100-398576 (E. Sell)  
1 - 100-481841 (M. Shockey)

KAM:lm  
(13)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1-J.B.Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall  
August 9, 1975

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

Reference is made to SSC request dated July 28, 1975, entitled "Superceding Request for FBI Material." Item V, G, on page five of this request pertained to material relating to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White, and Martha L. Shockey, which material had previously been requested in SSC letter dated July 1, 1975. The July 1, 1975, SSC letter had requested certain documents and other information from the FBI concerning Cointelpro activities directed against Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, and Maude Adams White. The July 1, 1975, letter also requested certain documents and other information concerning alleged Cointelpro-type activities directed against Martha L. Shockey.

Item A of the July 1, 1975, letter requested all documentary materials of the FBI pertaining to the authorization and implementation of operations concerning the four individuals named above. Since the thrust of the SSC request pertains to Cointelpro, only those documents pertaining to Cointelpro activities against the four individuals of interest are being provided. Set forth below under the names of the individuals of interest is a list of those documents.

**MORRIS STARSKY**

1. SAC, Phoenix letter to the Director, FBI, dated May 31, 1968.
2. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated July 1, 1968.
3. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated October 1, 1968.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL**

KAM:ekw  
(12)

**ENCLOSURE**

SEE NOTE PAGE EIGHT

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI*

**SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED**

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

4. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated October 8, 1968.
5. C. D. Brennan memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated October 24, 1968.
6. Director, FBI, letter to SAC, Phoenix, dated October 25, 1968.
7. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated March 31, 1970.
8. SAC, Phoenix, airtel to the Director, FBI, dated April 7, 1970.
9. Director, FBI, letter to SAC, Phoenix, dated April 24, 1970.
10. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated May 12, 1970.
11. SAC, Phoenix, letter to the Director, FBI, dated June 30, 1970.

EVELYN ROSE SELL

1. SAC, San Antonio, letter to the Director, FBI, dated October 8, 1969.
2. SAC, Detroit, letter to the Director, FBI, dated November 12, 1969.
3. SAC, San Antonio, letter to the Director, FBI, dated December 10, 1969.
4. SAC, San Antonio, letter to the Director, FBI, dated January 13, 1970.



U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

5. SAC, San Antonio, letter to the Director, FBI, dated March 31, 1970.

MAUDE ADAMS WHITE

1. Director, FBI, letter to SAC, Washington Field, dated April 11, 1969.
2. SAC, Washington Field, letter to Director, FBI, dated April 23, 1969.
3. Director, FBI, letter to SAC, Washington Field, dated May 7, 1969.
4. SAC, Washington Field, letter to the Director, FBI, dated May 23, 1969.
5. Director, FBI, letter to SAC, Washington Field, dated June 3, 1969.
6. SAC, Washington Field, letter to the Director, FBI, dated July 3, 1969.

A review of documents pertaining to Cointelpro and Martha L. Shockey failed to reveal any information that Martha L. Shockey was ever the target of any Cointelpro activities.

Item B of the July 1, 1975, SSC letter requested a list of all investigation, criminal or other, related directly or indirectly to the four individuals named herein and an explanation of the disposition of each investigation.

During 1968 a Selective Service Act investigation was instituted concerning Morris Joseph Starsky. Investigation in this matter was instituted to determine if there was a violation of the counseling of evasion section of the Selective Service Act. Information obtained during the course of this investigation was submitted to the United States Attorney's Office in Phoenix, Arizona, and during April, 1969, it was the opinion of the United States Attorney that no prosecutive action was warranted in this matter and no further investigation for a possible violation of the Selective Service Act was necessary.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

During May, 1968, a Federal Housing Administration Matters investigation was instituted against Mr. Starsky when information was received that Mr. Starsky had obtained a Federal Housing Administration loan to buy a house which would then be rented. Investigation in this matter determined the house which had been purchased by Mr. Starsky was going to be used by him and therefore the United States Attorney's Office in Phoenix, Arizona, declined prosecution in this matter during September, 1968.

Mr. Starsky was also the subject of an investigation concerning his activities on behalf of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). This investigation was instituted during July, 1968, and the case was closed in April, 1974. In addition to being the subject of this investigation, information pertaining to Mr. Starsky during the above time period was also obtained during the FDI's investigation of the SWP, YSA, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, The Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and the Committee of One Thousand to Defend Academic Freedom. Information was also received concerning Mr. Starsky during an investigation of his wife, Pamela, which was being conducted as a result of her activities with the SWP and YSA during 1970 through 1973.

An investigation was conducted wherein Evelyn Rose Sell was the subject. This investigation which was instituted during 1955 developed information concerning her activities on behalf of the SWP and YSA. The case in which Sell was the subject was closed during March, 1974. In addition to being the subject of investigation, information was also received during this same time period concerning Evelyn Sell in investigations of the SWP and the National Peace Action Coalition. Additional information concerning Sell was obtained as a result of information being received concerning the Texas Abortion Coalition Sidewalk March during 1971.

Maude Adams White was the subject of an investigation from March, 1969, until September, 1972, after information was developed concerning her activities on behalf of the SWP and the YSA. In addition, a Security of Government Employees investigation was conducted during 1968 when information was developed that Maude Adams White was a member of the YSA and an employee of the United States Government. Results of this investigation were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Martha L. Shockey was the subject of an investigation during 1974 after information was developed concerning her activities on behalf of the VSA.

Item C of the July 1, 1975, SSC letter requested a list of all persons outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employers, relatives, friends, media personnel, members of clergy, Federal, State, and local law enforcement, and other officials, etc.) contacted in relation to the four individuals named herein and the purpose of their contact.

Item V, G, of the July 28, 1975, SSC letter indicated the list of persons contacted was not to include persons in their capacity as sources. In view of this no list of persons outside the FBI who were utilized as sources is being furnished and information which would tend to identify these individuals in the documents being submitted has been excised. Identity of other individuals contacted is set forth in copies of communications being furnished and therefore no list as such is being provided.

Item D of the July 1, 1975, SSC letter requested a list of all FBI personnel connected with the operation relating to the four individuals named herein, their specific connection, and their present location. In this regard it is to be noted each document being furnished has located in the area of the lower left-hand corner of the first page the initials of the Bureau supervisor or field office Agent who dictated the communication. For those communications which were sent from FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) to a field office, the individuals at FBIHQ who are being considered as "connected" with the case were the dictating supervisor, the Section Chief, and the highest level of authority who approved the document. For communications received at FBIHQ from the field office the identity of the individual who initialed the communication for filing will be provided. The identity of those other individuals who have initialed the documents are not being furnished as they are considered as intermediate reviewing supervisors and officials and as such are not specifically "connected" with the case. For those communications which originated from the field office, the identity of the case Agent, the dictating Agent, and the field supervisor who approved the communication for transmittal to FBIHQ is being furnished. In three instances the identity of individuals whose initials were placed on the document cannot be determined. Set forth below are the identities of those individuals identified, both at FBIHQ and the respective field offices, their specific connection, and their present location.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

FBI HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

Brennan, Charles D. - Retired  
467 North Owen Street, Alexandria, Va. 22304  
Section Chief

Crescioli, Louis A.  
FBI Headquarters  
Bureau Supervisor

Grubert, Herbert A.  
Dallas FBI Office  
Bureau Supervisor

Herington, Jack  
FBI Headquarters  
Approved document for Section Chief

Hoover, John Edgar - Deceased  
Approving authority

Horner, Russell H. - Retired  
5110 Althea Drive, Annandale, Va. 22002  
Bureau Supervisor

Reboan, Robert - Retired  
6913 Sherborn Lane, Springfield, Va. 22152  
Bureau Supervisor

Still, Frank P.  
FBI Headquarters  
Bureau Supervisor

Thompson, Conrad W. - Retired  
2413 Drexel Street, Vienna, Va. 22180  
Approved for Section Chief

PHOENIX FBI OFFICE PERSONNEL

Billings, William F. - Retired  
906 Newberry, Richardson, Texas  
Dictating Agent

Fauver, Earl L.  
Phoenix FBI Office  
Supervisor

- C -

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Pickles, Paul H., Jr. - Retired  
3377 Cyclorama Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio 45211  
Supervisor

Hull, John - Retired  
2500 E. Campbell, Phoenix, Arizona 85020  
Supervisor

Peters, Ray P.  
Phoenix FBI Office  
Dictating Agent

Lowen, J. James - Retired  
623 Chauncy, San Antonio, Texas 78216  
Supervisor

Taylor, Paul G. - Retired  
4098 North 29th Place, Phoenix, Arizona 85016  
Dictating and Case Agent

WASHINGTON FIELD FBI OFFICE PERSONNEL

Palmer, John E.  
Washington Field FBI Office  
Supervisor

Quigley, Robert C.  
Quantico  
Dictating and Case Agent

SAN ANTONIO FBI OFFICE PERSONNEL

Cole, J. Myers - Retired  
7134 Horton Road, Quail Hollow, Charlotte,  
North Carolina 28210  
Supervisor

Deffenbaugh, Bernan E., Jr. - Retired  
331 Ave Maria Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78216  
Dictating and Case Agent

Faxner, James E.  
San Francisco FBI Office  
Dictating Agent

Moody, Thomas E., IV  
San Antonio FBI Office  
Supervisor

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Riley, Howard W.  
San Antonio FBI Office  
Case Agent

Roso, Donald E. - Retired  
630 Shadywood Lane, San Antonio, Texas 78216  
Supervisor

DETROIT FBI OFFICE PERSONNEL

Sawinsky, Lloyd E.  
Los Vegas FBI Office  
Dictating Agent

Enclosures - 17

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

As noted in cover letter to the Attorney General, identities of FBI Agent personnel who were connected with the cases on the four individuals of interest in the SSC request dated 7/1/75 are being furnished. The 7/1/75 letter also indicated interviews would be conducted with all FBI personnel so involved. Department has advised any such interview with Agent personnel would be considered an "abuse interview."

Serials being furnished to SSC in excised form are as follows:

Morris J. Starsky; 100-449698-38-1, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 100-449698-543.

Maude Adams White; 100-452984-3, 4, 5, 6.

Evelyn Sell; 100-449698-45-66, 69, 70; 100-449698-889 and 100-398576-33.

Documents being furnished relating to White and Sell have previously been released in the SWP lawsuit. Documents being furnished relating to Starsky have previously been released in the SWP lawsuit and in a request by Starsky under the Freedom of Information Act with the exception serials 100-449698-543 and 100-449698-38-6. These two serials were reviewed with Assistant U. S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, who felt SWP and YSA were not entitled to them.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/8/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee. (7/28/75 request)  
Caption of Document:  
Item V,G; Item A of 7/1/75; Item B of 7/1/75;

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 8/8/75

Received by: Office Meyer

Title: Office Meyer

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index		FROM: <b>FBI</b>			
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees					
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)		2. DATE PROVIDED			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOCUMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> BRIEFING	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW	<input type="checkbox"/> TESTIMONY	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<b>8/8/75</b>
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SSC					
<input type="checkbox"/> HSC					
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)					
<b>Memorandum and enclosures</b>					
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)				6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)	
<b>SSC letter 7/1/75 and 7/28/75, Part V, Item G</b>				<b>S</b>	
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)					
<b>Counterintelligence Intelligence collection</b>					
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)					
<b>Certain documents and other information concerning alleged Cointelpro-type activities directed against four individuals.</b>					
<b>62-116395</b>					
<b>FMK:fmk (4)</b>					
<b>ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75</b>					
<b>TREAT AS YELLOW</b>					



## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
August 18, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI *584X* - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REC-10

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney  
General, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.,  
has asked for comments of this Bureau concerning a letter  
addressed to him by Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic  
Intelligence Task Force, SSC, and dated August 7, 1975.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the  
SSC which sets forth an analysis of the problem involved  
and the position which this Bureau is taking in this matter.  
A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

SFP/JTA:dmt  
(9)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

G2-116395

August 18, 1975

*#mde 16*  
*10-11-00 SP-2 ALM/THG*

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to letter dated August 7, 1975, from John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, SSC, to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., which states as follows:

"With reference to the matter discussed in my letter yesterday concerning the Atlantic City materials, I would appreciate it if you would examine the series of memoranda from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Jenkins (Tab K) and give me your personal assurance that there are not included therein any portions which summarize or describe any overhearings obtained as a result of any electronic surveillance directed at Dr. King and/or members of his family.

"We will await your reply before further examining these materials."

For purposes of clarity and better understanding, there follows a summary of the correspondence involved.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_

SFP/JTA:dmt  
(3)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

*JTA*  
*PLM*  
*WAL*  
*once*

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

SSC letter May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requested certain documents and other information from the FBI. Appendix D of this letter captioned "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance," requested the following specific material under the designated item numbers:

Appendix D, Item 7, requests all memoranda and other materials which: (a) relate to intelligence activities at or in connection with the Democratic National Convention (DNC) at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August, 1964, and (b) relate to electronic surveillances of telephones and/or premises at 2414 Atlantic Avenue and/or Clairidge Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964.

Appendix D, Item 8, requests Committee staff access to all memoranda and other materials reflecting the identities of persons monitored, the contents of conversations monitored, and/or any information obtained from conversations monitored on the surveillances described in 7(b) above.

Appendix D, Item 16, requests all memoranda and other materials containing the results of any administrative or other inquiry undertaken by the FBI as a result of and/or relating to the allegations contained in the January 26, 1975, issue of The Washington Post concerning activities of the FBI in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in August, 1964.

The FBI's response to the above is contained in a memorandum dated July 15, 1975, and its attached exhibits (tabs) A through L.

By the very nature of the title of Appendix D, "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance," and the language used in the specific requests in Items 7 and 8, it is obvious we are dealing with material which is substantially in the area of electronic surveillances and falling within the language of Mr. Elliff's inquiry where he refers to, "any portions which summarize or describe any overhearings obtained as a result of any electronic surveillance directed at Dr. King and/or members of his family."

**RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE**

As will be illustrated by the following resume and examples, the FBI can give no assurances of the nature being requested by the SSC of the Justice Department.

By comparing information in the DeLoach memoranda (Exhibit/Tab K) with actual logs of overhears on King's telephone during the DNC, it was determined that some of the information in the DeLoach memoranda came from electronic surveillance of King and that, while we cannot determine the precise sources for a majority of the information, there is logical belief that much additional information in these memoranda also came from electronic surveillance of King. The following are examples:

(1) DeLoach memorandum to Mr. Jenkins dated August 25, 1964, (which bears a side heading on page one regarding Martin Luther King), page one, paragraph two which concerns a call received by King from Bayard Rustin in which King stated he was very encouraged by the way things were going and there had been no demonstrations by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP).

(2) DeLoach memorandum to Mr. Jenkins dated August 25, 1964, (which bears a side heading on page three regarding Martin Luther King) page three, paragraphs one through three which concern a call from a member of King's staff to a Mrs. Jackson regarding arrangements for her to come to the Atlantic City area; a call from John Sutton of the California delegation asking King to meet with California delegates; and information indicating that MFDP leaders had asked King to call governors of two states in an attempt to enlist their support.

(3) DeLoach memorandum to Mr. Jenkins dated August 26, 1964, (six pages in length) pages three and four, which concern a contact with King by Dick Gregory to discuss convention events including MFDP.

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO  
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

(4) DeLoach memorandum to Mr. Jenkins dated August 26, 1964, (which bears a side heading on page two regarding Martin Luther King) page two, paragraphs three through six and page three, paragraph one which concern conversations by Rustin regarding MFDP delegates, a call by Rustin to a representative of the National Council of Churches and whether or not there would be a street demonstration on that date.

In addition to Exhibit K, the FBI memorandum dated July 15, 1975, and its other exhibits, which pertain to FBI coverage during the DNC at Atlantic City were similarly reviewed to determine if any portions summarized or described overhears obtained as a result of electronic surveillance of King. The below outlined portions were determined to contain information from such type coverage:

(1) FBI memorandum dated July 15, 1975, page seven, paragraph five made brief references to type of information received from King technical surveillance regarding the MFDP.

(2) Exhibit G, pages three and four, items one through six are samples of information, some of which was obtained through FBI technical coverage during the DNC. Page four of this exhibit refers to technical coverage which provided hour-to-hour strategy followed by King and others and referred to information received regarding the MFDP.

(3) Exhibit H, pages four and five, refer to results of technical surveillance of King.

(4) Exhibit J, page one, paragraph three, refers to results of technical coverage of King. Page four, under paragraph captioned "Tuesday, August 25, 1964" refers to information from technical coverage that King had prevailed upon Rustin to come to Atlantic City that day, and that King had attempted to arrange a rendezvous with Mrs. Jackson in Philadelphia.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUNDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARTZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 7, 1975

#m DB16

10-11-00 SP-2 Alm/ITG

*Sensitively*

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

"With reference to the matter discussed in my letter yesterday concerning the Atlantic City materials, I would appreciate it if you would examine the series of memoranda from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Jenkins (Tab K) and give me your personal assurance that there are not included therein any portions which summarize or describe any overhearings obtained as a result of any electronic surveillance directed at Dr. King and/or members of his family.

We will await your reply before further examining these materials."

Sincerely,

*John T. Elliff*  
John T. Elliff  
Director  
Domestic Intelligence  
Task Force


REC-1

62-116395

FEB 17 1976

584X

5-11-75



FBI

Date: 8/7/75

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

Via \_\_\_\_\_

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243) (P)

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER  
BY SSC MEMBER

Re Bureau teletype to Los Angeles dated 7/31/75,  
captioned SENSTUDY 75.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original  
and seven copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning the  
above interview.

② - Bureau (Enc.)  
2 - Los Angeles

SPR/jer

(4)

79 SEP 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

REC-1

62-116395

AUG 14 1975





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California

August 7, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/7TG

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 5, 1975, Supervisor Richard H. Bloeser was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at the Los Angeles FBI Office regarding the COINTELPRO/Black Panther Party (BPP).

Mr. Seidel advised Supervisor Bloeser that the interview was voluntary, but did not advise Supervisor Bloeser of his rights in this matter.

Mr. Seidel inquired of Supervisor Bloeser as to how many offices he had served in, his length of service in the Bureau, and how long had been spent on intelligence investigations. Supervisor Bloeser replied that he had served in Philadelphia, El Paso and Los Angeles, had been in the Bureau approximately 24½ years, and had been assigned to intelligence work for 22 years.

Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser believed that the Bureau had placed undue pressure on the field to come up with counter intelligence proposals concerning the BPP and was it difficult to come up with a proposal. Supervisor Bloeser responded that there was no undue pressure placed on the field by the Bureau, that the COINTELPRO/BPP was merely another case assigned to an agent and that agent, as in any other case, had the responsibility of handling the matter whether it concerned the solving of a case or the submission of proposals. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was not unduly difficult to come up with a proposal and that a number of proposals were rejected at the field level and never submitted to the Bureau.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically as to counter intelligence proposals involving cartoons ridiculing the BPP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



ENCLOSURE

62-116395-584

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

---

Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered such proposals but without reviewing the file had no definite recollection. Mr. Seidel did not request that the file be reviewed.

Mr. Seidel inquired specifically about a business card which allegedly had been prepared by the Bureau bearing the phrase "Karenga is impotent." Mr. Seidel requested Supervisor Bloeser's views on the distribution of this card by the FBI. Supervisor Bloeser responded that he vaguely remembered the card, that he thought it was humorous, and that the word impotent had various meanings.

Mr. Seidel then inquired about the blood feud which existed in the past between the US Organization and the BPP and the efforts of the Bureau to keep this feud alive and thus promote violence. He specifically inquired as to the personal feelings of Supervisor Bloeser concerning any counter intelligence proposals which, if placed in operation, could lead to violence between the two groups.

Supervisor Bloeser responded first that personally he had no apologies for the counter intelligence program as a whole, that proposals submitted six or seven years ago were believed necessary at that time due to the circumstances, specifically that at that time the BPP and the US Organization were involved in violent activity against the community as a whole. Mr. Seidel was informed that the feud between the US Organization and the BPP occurred long before the FBI COINTELPRO became involved in the feud and that any proposals approved by the Bureau had relatively little effect on the violence committed by either group. Mr. Seidel was also reminded that six or seven years ago the Congress of the United States fully supported the war in Vietnam in which thousands of people were killed but that under today's circumstances no support has been given to South Vietnam.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

---

Mr. Seidel then posed a hypothetical question involving the following factors: Would Supervisor Bloeser now or in the past approve a counter intelligence proposal whereby one extremist with a criminal record of violence be anonymously informed that another extremist with a record of criminal violence was an informant for the FBI, knowing that the alleged informant might be injured or killed. Supervisor Bloeser replied that under the present conditions such a proposal would not be approved, but that he could not give an answer as to what his feelings might have been six or seven years ago under any given situation. Mr. Seidel was again reminded that Congress in the past has not hesitated to support wars which kill thousands of people but that recently they have criticized the CIA for allegedly plotting to assassinate one individual whose death might prevent a war. Mr. Seidel was also informed that it was ironic that Congress was investigating another agency of the Federal Government which was attempting to prevent revolutionary violence in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired into the counter intelligence proposals approved by the Bureau in relation to the actress Jean Seberg and Raymond Hewitt, a leader of the BPP. This proposal concerned the fact that Seberg, who was then married to a French producer, admitted being pregnant by Hewitt who was also married at the time. The Bureau approved anonymously leaking this information to a Hollywood columnist. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether Supervisor Bloeser did or did not believe that this was an invasion of privacy. Supervisor Bloeser responded that the item was newsworthy and that it would have been any fair game for any newsmen had they come across it in the course of their business which they could have probably easily done, and that certainly Congress would not have criticized a newspaper for printing such an item or claim it to be an invasion of privacy. Mr. Seidel inquired as to the purpose of this particular operation and he was informed that Miss Seberg was giving support to the BPP and that it was hoped that such publicity would prevent any future support by her of the BPP.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);  
INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISOR RICHARD H. BLOESER  
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

---

He was further advised that it was the responsibility of the FBI to determine who was funding revolutionary groups in this country.

Mr. Seidel then inquired as to whether or not it was difficult to conduct intelligence investigations under present statutes and under the Criminal Rules of Procedure. He was informed that it was somewhat difficult to conduct an effective intelligence operation under present circumstances and that perhaps new legislative or executive orders would be helpful to the FBI in order to allow the FBI to continue its investigations in the Domestic Intelligence field. Mr. Seidel inquired as to whether it would be helpful to have specific legislation which might completely separate criminal and intelligence operations so one would not taint the other. He was informed that if such legislation could be enacted that it would undoubtedly help the FBI.

The interview lasted approximately two hours and it was not necessary to consult with another Bureau representative during this time.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
August 1, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/27/00 BY SP-2 ALM/116

Reference is made to July 28, 1975, superseding request for FBI materials received on that date from the SSC.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the Committee which responds to the requests contained in Categories I through IV on which a deadline for compliance was set for August 1, 1975. As noted in the enclosed memorandum, Categories V and VI of the request were designated for compliance by August 8, 1975; these latter categories are receiving continuing attention and you will be advised of compliance at the earliest possible time.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

REC-1

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

SEP 2 1975

13- ENCLOSURE

EWL:mjgr  
(9)

NOTE: ENCL BEHIND FILE

The 7/28/75, request is the first received under the new procedures which were placed in effect on 7/24/75. These provisions, in effect, require compliance by a date designated by the Committee. As noted in our letterhead memorandum to the Committee, we have complied with Categories I through IV. All material described under these categories, whether for delivery to the Committee or access for screening at FBIHQ, has been recorded in detail. A comprehensive memorandum is being prepared for record purposes. Also, exact copies of the materials are maintained in the office of the Senstudy Project or are readily available for reference purpose upon approval of the attached LHM by the AG. Arrangements have been made for representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver this memorandum as well as the materials designated for delivery to the Committee on 8/1/75.

Shahen, obtained from Shaheen and delivered to Senate Select Committee. all on Aug. 1, 1975

11/27/00 #moe/b  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 1216  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

02-116305

August 1, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

Reference is made to the superseding request for FBI materials dated July 28, 1975, which was received on that date from Committee Staff Representatives John T. Elliff and Mark Gitenstein. This request provides for access to or delivery of materials in six categories, I through VI.

During a conference held on July 28, 1975, attended by Messrs. Elliff and Gitenstein with representatives from the Department of Justice and the FBI, certain modifications of the original list were agreed upon. Also, by letter to the Committee from the Attorney General on July 29, 1975, other modifications/exceptions to the list were stipulated.

Following is an accounting, by category and for each specific item therein, of the status of each request in Categories I through IV which were designated for compliance by August 1, 1975. In order to make this response as complete as possible, each request is being identified and any modification or exception noted where applicable. Requests contained in V and VI were designated for compliance by August 8, 1975, and you will be advised concerning the status of this material by separate communication as soon as possible.

**I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:**

- A. FBI file #100-00
- B. FBI Inspection Guidelines
- C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters
- D. Peterson Committee Report on COMINTLPRO

**ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG**

EWL:njgmys

(8) This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

**ENCLOSURE**

~~SECRET~~

62-116395-583

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

F. All superseding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents.

H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

Processing of the above material has been completed and will be delivered to the Committee on August 1, 1975, with this communication.

II. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Requests immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials to designate COINTELPRO operations. Requested material in this regard is currently and will on a continuing basis, be made available.

B. Refers to underlying materials pertaining to mail covers as specified in Mr. K. William O'Connor's letter to the SSC, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, dated July 15, 1975. Responsive material in this regard furnished with this communication was compiled from a review of Bureau files based on a list received from the Post Office Department containing inactive mail covers which have been operated by the Post Office at the request of this Bureau dating back to 1971. Additionally, in response to request contained in SSC letter of May 14, 1975, Appendix B, part one, item 4a, b, there is attached material relating to the decision, policies and procedures maintained by this Bureau regarding mail covers.

**U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

C. Refers to materials relating to the "Huston Plan." Responsive material to this request has been prepared by this Bureau and has been furnished to the White House awaiting approval for transferral to the SSC.

D. Refers to material relating to FBI termination in 1966 of investigative techniques mentioned in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973. This Bureau's reply to this request is contained in our memorandum to the SSC, dated July 16, 1975.

E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance. By letter to the Committee July 29, 1975, the Attorney General designated this requested material as extraordinarily sensitive and advised that access to this material shall be governed by special procedures.

F. Requests specified material contained in Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. Requested material in this regard is being delivered to the SSC with this communication.

G. Refers to specified communications directed to field offices from FBI Headquarters. Responsive material to this request was furnished to the Committee by Bureau memorandum dated July 30, 1975.

H. Refers to material relating to COINTELPRO operations directed against Black Panther Party in the California area. According to agreement on July 23, 1975, this material will be prepared to reach the SSC by August 3, 1975.

III. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Materials relating to Joseph Kraft. By letter July 29, 1975, the Attorney General advised the SSC that access to the Kraft material would be delayed due to need to confer with Kraft's attorney.

B and C. Material contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information (B); and which do contain derogatory information (C). Access



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U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

to material relating to both (B) and (C) was given to SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein at FBI Headquarters commencing July 31, 1975. The review of this material is being made in the presence of SA Hugh Mallet of FBI Headquarters in accordance with agreed procedures.

D. Materials pertaining to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past." This material is available for review.

E. SAC Letters and Memoranda. This material is available for review.

F. Material pertaining to surveillance at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964. FBI memorandum July 15, 1975, delivered to SSC on August 1, 1975, furnished this material. It is recognized that excisions appear in this material which are beyond those under current agreements which were not in effect when the material was prepared. Inasmuch as this material has been delivered, as against current request for access only, the FBI is taking no further action on III. F. Should the SSC, after review of the material it now has, desire access to some of the material with lesser excisions and in accordance with current excision agreements, same will be provided upon request.

G, H and I. Materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. By letter dated July 29, 1975, the Attorney General advised the SSC that response to these requests must await an agreement which is pending between the SSC and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would delineate the type of information to be furnished to the SSC.

IV. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Requests abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to present. According to July 28, 1975, agreement, this material will be made available to SSC for screening by August 8, 1975, and you will be advised when it is prepared.

**U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

B. Requests materials related to the so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA coordination prepared in 1966. According to July 28, 1975, agreement, this material will be made available to the SSC for screening by August 3, 1975, and you will be advised when it is prepared.

C. Requests access to this Bureau's "Foreign Operations Policy Manual." This manual is available for review.

D. Requests access to the annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division 1970 to the present. This material is available for review.

E. Deleted.

F. Requests materials pertaining to surreptitious entries considered, proposed or conducted by this Bureau at the Chilean Embassy, January 1, 1970, until the present. This material is available for review. (S)

G. Requests all project INLET letters prepared for dissemination to the President, the Attorney General or any other recipient during the period 1969-1973. This material is available for review.

H. Requests access to summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division of specified individuals in connection with the "Official and Confidential" files. This material was made available for review on July 31, 1975.

I. Requests access to control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program. A review of Bureau files has failed to indicate that any such control file is currently maintained by this Bureau. Knowledgeable FBI Headquarters personnel, upon contact, have advised they have no recollection of a control file ever being maintained by the Bureau concerning this subject. Any recorded action taken in this regard would be located in individual case files, not identifiable through our record system.

1 - The Attorney General

- 5 -

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☒ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/1/75

& enclosures

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee.

Response to Superseded Request 7/28/75, I-IV

Enclosures: Part I, A thru H; Part II, B&F

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller

Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by: Officer Dwyer

Title: Officer Dwyer

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDP/16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/1216

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

**8/1/75**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC  
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum and enclosures**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

**SSC letter 7/28/75**

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

**U**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Operating procedures**  
**Organization and staffing**  
**Counterintelligence**

*5-woc/B*

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Materials delivered to SSC that they previously had access to: FBI file 100-00; FBI Inspection Guidelines; Index to all SAC memoranda and SAC letters; Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO; All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations and superseding sections; Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents; FBI Forms; Underlying materials to designate COINTELPRO Operations; Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers. Materials available for review: Information contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information and which do contain derogatory info; materials pertaining to the Attorney General's testimony on 2/27/75, re "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past." SAC letters and Memoranda; Foreign Operations Policy Manual; Annual 5-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

prepared for dissemination to the President, the Attorney General or any other recipient during 1969-1973; Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division in connection with "Official and Confidential" files.

3791 (6-75)

62-116395

FMK:fmk (4)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Original via liaison to Central Community  
Index in connection with SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

DATE: 8/6/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/29/70 BY SP2 TAP/H

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The purpose of the memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

Senate Select Committee On  
Intelligence Activities (Church's Committee)

Date of Request

Nature of Request

Status

Letter, 5/14/75

Includes among other things information concerning wire-taps, including the reconstruction of Bureau files, as well as Inspection surveys for ten offices.

Responses to most questions prepared, approved, and delivered. Some responses are awaiting White House and/or Departmental approval.

Letter, 6/27/75

Request for information concerning alleged abuses.

Department seeking clarification.

Letter, 6/30/75,  
received by  
Bureau, 7/8/75

Request pertaining to  
COINTELPRO.

Partial response delivered.

Letter, 7/3/75

Requests documents pertaining to COINTELPRO be furnished to the Committee in Committee space.

Response being prepared.

Letter, 7/8/75

Communication to all employees concerning Senate Select Committee inquiries.

Response being prepared.

1 - Mr. Wannall  
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)  
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

AUG 12 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

LAD:lad

(8)

84 SEP 4 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning two highly sensitive Bureau programs in the foreign intelligence field.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning COINTELPRO documents.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.	Awaiting Departmental decision.
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Ku Klux Klan.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/16/75	Information regarding functions of Attorney General with respect to supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities.	Response prepared and delivered to Department.
Letter, 7/24/75	List of Agents in New York City area who had surname "Kehoe."	Response prepared and delivered to Department.
Letter, 7/28/75	Superseding request for FBI materials for delivery and/or access of Committee.	Response being prepared.

Committee on the Judiciary  
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/18/75	Material concerning Flagging procedures in Identification and NCIC Systems.	Response being prepared.

CONTINUED - OVER



Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Subcommittee on Oversight  
Committee on Ways and Means (Vanik's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/14/75	Description of FBI's informant programs.	Response prepared and delivered to Department.

House Select Committee (Pike's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/22/75	All documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations and request for all materials related to budgetary authority.	Partial response delivered to the Department.
Letter, 7/24/75	Review documents and materials related to budgetary matters.	Briefing concerning budget matters being arranged.
Letter, 7/28/75	Inquiry to encompass all aspects of the FBI budget as it relates to gathering, use and dissemination of intelligence.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 7/30/75	Various materials related to the Spring Planning Call and for briefings with different Bureau officials.	Response being prepared.

Hearings

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
	Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings.	Date of testimony has not been established.

CONTINUED - OVER



Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Hearings (continued)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
7/29/75	Orally advised by Committee staff members letter sent requesting Bureau testimony relating to budget matters.	Assistant Director Eugene Walsh to appear with Assistant Attorney General Glen E. Pommerening on 8/8/75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JBH  
Rm

amc

Ky

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 013 TP CODE

5:58 PN NITEL AUG 26, 1975 JMM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: TAMPA (105-5390)

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

RE BUREAU TELS MAY 2 AND AUGUST 26, 1975; AND BUREAU TEL  
TO TAMPA, AUGUST 26, 1975.

ON AUGUST 26, 1975, SEYMOUR PHILLIPS, UNIT CHIEF, FBIHQ,  
ADVISED TPO HE WILL HANDLE LEAD TO CONTACT FORMER SA PAUL L.  
COX.

NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY TAMPA.

END

HOLD

REC 27  
EX-106

62-116395-581

AUG 28 1975

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/ATB

84 SEP 2 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR 011 BA CODED

AUG 21 1975

8:44 PM NITEL 8/21/75 JAN

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: BALTIMORE (62-3127)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUNITEL AUGUST 20, 1975.

FORMER SA'S GEORGE A. BERLEY AND JOSEPH M. ENGLISH CONTACTED BY THE ASAC ON AUGUST 20, 1975 AND AUGUST 21, 1975, RESPECTIVELY. INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL FOLLOWED.

NEITHER OF THESE FORMER SA'S HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF TO DATE AND EACH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT THE FBI SHOULD THEY BE CONTACTED IN THE FUTURE.

END

#MDR 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/HTB

COPY RETAINED IN  
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

REC 27

EX-106

AUG 28 1975

84 SEP 4 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereinafter referred to as the Group) held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 6/16/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. William Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Mr. Roderick Hills, Counsel to the President; Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President; Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Security Council (NSC). The Bureau was represented by Inspector John B. Hotis and Section Chief William O. Cregar

## FOREIGN AGREEMENTS

There was considerable discussion among the members as to whether the intelligence community would furnish to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) copies of agreements between various agencies of the intelligence community and their counterparts in foreign governments. This apparently presents a very difficult problem for the community and no decision was made as to how these will be handled. The White House, as well as the Secretary of State, are considering how the community should proceed.

Enclosure

62-116395

WOC:1hb 1hb  
(18)

REC 27

EX-106

62-116395-579  
5 AUG 26 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 SEP 2 1975

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

10-1-00 #mdp/6 SP2 ALM/276

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

Attached is a copy of the procedures for interviewing current and former employees of any agency or department of the intelligence community which interviews are to be conducted by the SSC. The agreement was negotiated between the White House and the SSC with little consultation with the individual members of the intelligence community. The most significant aspect of the agreement is identified on page 1, paragraph A. This paragraph identifies two categories of interviews SSC Staff Members expect to conduct. They are:

1. Those primarily seeking information concerning the overall structure and function of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; the substantive work done in the past or being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

2. As designated by the Committee, those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

As a general rule, an agency representative will be present at interviews or preliminary testimony in the first category. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews or preliminary testimony in the second category (alleged abuse situations).

Although the agreement was worked out between the White House and the SSC without consultation with the FBI, the Intelligence Division believes it is workable and is certainly better than the situation which currently exists where there is no agreed-upon procedure established for the conduct of interviews of current or former employees.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

SSC FOREIGN TRAVEL

The CIA was informed by Senator Walter F. Mondale, a member of the SSC, that he intended to travel to Europe to inspect some of the [REDACTED] and other locations. The White House, and particularly Mr. Roderick Hills, was very concerned about this type of trip feeling that it could cause all sorts of problems with friendly [REDACTED]

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

Mr. Colby felt that such trips had been arranged for in the past involving congressmen and that some good came out of such trips. The Committee discussed the pros and cons of the contemplated trip by Mondale and possibly Senator Gary Hart, also a member of the SSC, and decided that the purpose and procedures for such trips would be discussed with Senator Church by Mr. Colby and a senior official of the Department of State.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The SSC has asked Colby for detailed briefings as to how National Intelligence Estimates are prepared by the United States Intelligence Board for the NSC. Colby contemplates giving a rather detailed briefing to the SSC on this procedure accompanied by several senior officials of the Intelligence Community Staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

W R W

OK

I recommend that we confirm this by letter to Senator Church. I have been unable to find any other documentation that it was accepted by the Committee.

Agreed  
Jm

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency\* under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. It is further recognized that these procedures do not in any way constitute a precedent for other committees of the Senate or House.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work done in the past or being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

(2) As designated by the Committee, those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

\*References to "agency" below are to all Governmental entities covered by the Select Committee's inquiry.

42-116395-579

#mde/b  
p/11/60 SP-2 A/M /JTG

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make every reasonable effort to provide the Select Committee with all information and all materials that it has on the subject. The agency will also specifically indicate any of such materials which are extraordinarily sensitive in order to facilitate the mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

(1) Subject to the exceptions set forth below, witnesses



will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

#### Exceptions

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegate, by written authorization, believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative. The Committee will explain and make available the security arrangements between the Committee and the agency, the relevant waivers of secrecy oaths or agreements for the purpose of this inquiry, and these ground rules.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee recognizes that there may be matters

disclosed which are particularly sensitive from a security point of view and concerning which the agency should be advised in order to give it an opportunity to facilitate the mutual effort with respect to special handling techniques referred to above. With respect to such matters, the Committee will advise the agency as soon as possible and in a form which discloses the substance of such matters without making discernible the identity of a confidential source. In addition, the Committee will, prior to making any findings with respect to a matter, inform the agency of the substance of what was said in order to provide an opportunity for clarification or response.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested as well as the date set for the appearance. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and promptly advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If, because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry the Committee--in accordance with Committee Rules, the Rules of the Senate, and any previously made commitments to an agency--will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel *Jan 1976*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE: 8/6/75

- 1 - Personnel File -  
James Patrick Kehoe
  - 1 - Mr. Hotis
  - 1 - Mr. Daly
- J. Patrick Kehoe*

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. ☒  
Dep. AD Inv. ☒  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☒  
Legal Coun. ☒  
Plan. & Eval. ☒  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

James Dick, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested that Special Agent James Patrick Kehoe be made available for interview to be taken under oath by a Senator at 9 a.m., August 8, 1975, in Room G308, Dirksen Office Building. Kehoe is currently a supervisor in our New York Office.

The focus of the interview would be mail openings, covers and intercepts. This has been determined to be an abuse-area.

Despite the fact the Department is examining various types of mail surveillance with the view to possible prosecution, Michael Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, has determined that SA Kehoe's furnishing information on this subject would not impede the Department's inquiry.

On August 5, 1975, SA Kehoe was advised of the above and that he should be available for briefing at 7:45 a.m., August 8, at Room 4509 in the Justice Building.

SA Kehoe said that he would probably be represented by private counsel during the interview and planned to invoke the Fifth Amendment. He asked whether this would prejudice his position in the Bureau. SA Kehoe was told that the decision as to whether or not to invoke the Fifth Amendment was his alone to make and that under no circumstances would it be used to his detriment in the Bureau.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Kehoe be released from his existing employment agreement for purposes of this interview consistent with the above limitations and that the provisions of Title 28 be also waived for the purpose of this interview.

RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

RCD:lad  
(9)

*Interview  
done 8/12/75*

*51  
4063  
J. B. Adams*

8 4 2 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(2). That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Kehoe in the event that questions arise concerning the proper scope of the interview.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
P.M.

*[Handwritten signature]*

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Mr. W. R. Wannall

8/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton  
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

A. B. Fulton

COINTELPRO

#mdl/6  
10/19/00 SP2 ALM/ATG

Senstudy - 75

This is to make a matter of record our delivery of the Peterson report on FBI Cointelpros to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and to record excisions which have been made in this report with the consent of the SSC or in accordance with procedures established by the SSC.

The "superceding request for FBI materials," dated 7/28/75, page 1, requests delivery of the Peterson Committee report on Cointelpros, including all appendices and case summaries, to the SSC by 8/1/75. The SSC indicated the names of authors of analytical appendices could be deleted from this report and we have excised page 3 of the report eliminating the names of both Department attorneys and FBI Agents who were members of the Peterson Committee. Additionally, in Exhibit E of the report which constitutes individual write ups of proposals submitted under the Communist Party, USA, Cointelpro, we have inserted the following amended pages to protect sensitive sources and ongoing investigations: 221, 306, 623, 723, 728, 733, 735, 740, 753, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 762, 764, 765, 766, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 1285, 1326, 1430. There are attached copies of the above pages for which excised pages have been substituted in Exhibit E.

On 7/31/75 Exhibits A through E of the Peterson report were obtained from Mr. Steve Blackhurst, Room 4313, of the Justice Building of the office of Michael T. Shaheen, Special Council for Intelligence Coordination. The Department copies of these exhibits are being referred to the SSC with the understanding that the FBI will prepare an additional copy of these exhibits which will be returned to the Department.

Enclosures  
62-116009

CONTINUED - OVER

1- 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DR:lfj  
(8)

NOT RECORDED

48 SEP 2 1975

84 SEP 4 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

also:  
1542  
1554  
1560  
1562  
1566  
1569

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Cointelpros  
62-116009

At the same time, on 7/31/75, excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Peterson report, which had previously been referred to the Department for referral to SSC, were retrieved from the Department. Because the SSC is being referred the original exhibits, the excised copies are no longer needed and they will be destroyed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

SUBJECT : SENSTUDY - '75

DATE: 8-8-75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a copy of a letter I received from Chief Ed Davis of Los Angeles which he sent on August 5, 1975, to the Chief Counsel of the Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This letter sets out Chief Davis' views concerning this matter and his refusal to furnish information to the Chief Counsel.

## ACTION:

Submitted for information.

#mdr 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/ATG

REC 27

K/ 62-116395-577

EX-106

5 AUG 25 1975

Enc.

TJJ:pm

(6)

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams (Enc.)

1 - Mr. Mintz (Enc.)

1 - Mr. Walsh (Enc.)

1 - Mr. Wannall (Enc.)

ENCLOSURE



# LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

EDWARD M. DAVIS  
Chief of Police



TOM BRADLEY  
Mayor

Mailing Address: Box 30158  
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030

Ref. No. 1.1

August 5, 1975

Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.  
Chief Counsel, Senate Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations with  
Respect to Intelligence Activities  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Schwarz:

Your request for information about the gathering of intelligence at a local level, including the names of individuals who engage in gathering of intelligence, is incredible! I think that the elected politicians in Washington who are supposed to represent their states are doing a pretty good job of raping the FBI, the CIA, and the DEA. This, however, involves incest because they are federal agencies. I suppose if members of Congress decide to destroy the effectiveness of the FBI, the CIA, the DEA, and the military that this is their prerogative as long as their constituents hold still.

The attempt to penetrate the appropriate criminal intelligence mechanisms of local government by federal lawmakers is an absolute violation of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. It will be a cold day in hell when I provide you with the information you have requested.

If I didn't gather necessary intelligence information on criminal activity in my city to assist me in applying my resources at the right place at the right time, this city would be in the same shape as many others. We are proud of the fact that when crime went up nationally 26 percent between 1970 and 1974, crime went down in this city almost five percent. One of the prime reasons is appropriate intelligence operations.

62-111375-577  
ENCLOSURE

Mr. F. A. O. Schwarz, Jr.  
August 5, 1975  
Page two

We are proud of the fact that this is the only major city in the country relatively free of any organized crime influence--that is because of appropriate intelligence gathering functions. We are proud of the fact that terrorists don't intimidate the citizens of our city--that is largely due to appropriate intelligence gathering processes.

Our intelligence gathering is in absolute conformance with California law and is done under guidelines set forth by our civilian Board of Police Commissioners. I would suggest that you stick your nose back in your own tent.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'E M Davis', written in a cursive style.

EDWARD M. DAVIS  
Chief of Police

2 - Mr. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

August 6, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

*Handwritten:* MDR 16  
 100-SP2 ALM/5/6

Reference is made to a request for FBI materials which was formally presented August 5, 1975, by SSC Staff Representative John T. Elliff. This request is categorized under three main captions, Roman numerals I through III. Categories I and II require delivery by August 11, 1975, with certain exceptions; category III requires access to certain materials by August 18, 1975.

We have completed our initial review of this overall request and anticipate we will be able to comply with the designated deadlines with the following exceptions:

I. A. This request is to be handled by the Department of Justice.

D. and E. By agreement with SSC Staff, the deadline for these items has been deferred to August 15, 1975.

II. C. By agreement with SSC Staff, we will attempt to comply with this request by August 11, 1975; however, if we are unable, we will advise of the status of this request in the August 11 response.

D. Requests numbered 1 through 7 will be complied with by August 11. Requests numbered 8 through 11 will be complied with by August 15, 1975. An attempt will be made to comply with request number 12 by August 11, and if unsuccessful, status of the request will be reported on that date.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
 Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gen. Inv. 62-116395  
 Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Intell. EWL:lhb/lhb  
 Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
 Plan. & Eval. (9)  
 Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**ENCLOSURE**

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

AUG 28 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

III. C. and D. It is our understanding that response to information requested concerning surreptitious entries will be deferred pending receipt of specific guidelines from the Department of Justice since this area is currently under special consideration by the Department.

E. The specific response to this request will be governed by arrangements to be made between SSC Staff and FBI Representatives.

H. Since it is not possible at this point to evaluate the difficulties represented in this request, an arrangement was agreed upon with SSC Staff to attempt to comply by the designated date (August 18, 1975), and if not possible to comply fully at that time, offer whatever material was then available.

It should be emphasized that the above exceptions are the result of a preliminary review of the request. It is possible that unforeseen problems might arise during our continuing research in the various areas of the request which will make it necessary to extend the deadlines; however, we do not anticipate such problems at this time and should they arise, you will be immediately advised. Also, we are mindful of the request by the SSC Staff for a partial proffer of materials and will attempt to comply whenever circumstances allow.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Referred-to request is the most recent received from the SSC. Agreed-upon procedures dictate that Attorney General respond to Committee within 24 hours of the receipt of any request to identify any problem areas and exceptions. This communication will be delivered forthwith upon approval to Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

SECRET

August 4, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

#mDE16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-14-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access;  
delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. The notebook or binder containing materials on  
FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office  
of the Special Counsel.
- B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970  
previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised  
form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing  
the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
- C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously  
made accessible at FBIHQ.

(8-15-75) - D. The following materials maintained in the so-  
called "Official and Confidential" files and  
designated "non-derogatory," previously examined  
by SSC staff:

- 1. Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
- 2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by  
FBI;
- 3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
- 4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence  
Coverage;
- 5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
- 6. Directives (60);
- 7. Cook, Fred (52).

E. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by  
Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the  
individuals whose names are underscored on the  
attached list (slightly expanded from previous  
access request).

F. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division  
and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently  
sanitized.

62-116395-576  
ENCLOSURE

1  
Lct to AG 1-DAG  
EWL:146 8/6/75

II. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
- B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:
  - 1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
  - 2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
  - 3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
  - 4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970;
  - 5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21, 1970;
  - 6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
  - 7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;
  - 8. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
  - 9. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
  - 10. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
  - 11. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971;

12. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.
- E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.
- F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
- G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
- H. "The Standard Sub List".
- I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:
  1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.
  2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC Memorandum of December 26, 1972.
  - ~~3. Any materials pertaining to recommendations that the Project be terminated.~~
  4. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.
- J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:

1.

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.
3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.
6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.
7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:
  - a. Phil Claridge
  - b. William Jackson



B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.
2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.
3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.
4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.
5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;
2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;
3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;
4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of

the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

- D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.
- E. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees;
  - 1. George Berley
  - 2. Wilfred Bergeron
  - 3. William D. Campbell
  - 4. Richard Suter
  - 5. William Tucker
  - 6. Terry O'Connor
  - 7. Joseph English
- F. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in E. above.
- G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list:"
  - 1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
  - 2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;
  4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.
- H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. (CIRCA 1969)
- I. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".
- J. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.
- K. Philadelphia FBI Field Office file number 100-51132 (Women's Liberation). (1970-72)

1 - Mr. A. Ninen  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotel)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Warrall  
 1 - Mr. T. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

August 6, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#m D016  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 11/27/00 BY SP-2 ALM/176

Reference is made to a request for FBI materials which was formally presented August 5, 1975, by SSC Staff Representative John T. Elliff. This request is categorized under three main captions, Roman numerals I through III. Categories I and II require delivery by August 11, 1975, with certain exceptions; category III requires access to certain materials by August 18, 1975.

We have completed our initial review of this overall request and anticipate we will be able to comply with the designated deadlines with the following exceptions:

I. A. This request is to be handled by the Department of Justice.

D. and E. By agreement with SSC Staff, the deadline for these items has been deferred to August 15, 1975.

II. C. By agreement with SSC Staff, we will attempt to comply with this request by August 11, 1975; however, if we are unable, we will advise of the status of this request in the August 11 response.

D. Requests numbered 1 through 7 will be complied with by August 11. Requests numbered 8 through 11 will be complied with by August 15, 1975. An attempt will be made to comply with request number 12 by August 11, and if unsuccessful, status of the request will be reported on that date.

Assoc. Dir.  
 Dep. AD Adm.  
 Dep. AD  
 Asst. Dir.:  
 Admin.  
 Comp. Sys.  
 Ext. Affairs  
 Files & Com.  
 Gen. Inv.  
 Ident.  
 Inspection  
 Intell.  
 Laboratory  
 Plan. & Eval.  
 Spec. Inv.  
 Training  
 Legal Coun.  
 Telephone Rm.  
 Director Sec'y

EWL:1hb

(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

34 SEP 2 1975

The Attorney General

III. C. and D. It is our understanding that response to information requested concerning surreptitious entries will be deferred pending receipt of specific guidelines from the Department of Justice since this area is currently under special consideration by the Department.

E. The specific response to this request will be governed by arrangements to be made between SSC Staff and FBI Representatives.

II. Since it is not possible at this point to evaluate the difficulties represented in this request, an arrangement was agreed upon with SSC Staff to attempt to comply by the designated date (August 18, 1975), and if not possible to comply fully at that time, offer whatever material was then available.

It should be emphasized that the above exceptions are the result of a preliminary review of the request. It is possible that unforeseen problems might arise during our continuing research in the various areas of the request which will make it necessary to extend the deadlines; however, we do not anticipate such problems at this time and should they arise, you will be immediately advised. Also, we are mindful of the request by the SSC Staff for a partial proffer of materials and will attempt to comply whenever circumstances allow.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

Referred-to request is the most recent received from the SSC. Agreed-upon procedures dictate that Attorney General respond to Committee within 24 hours of the receipt of any request to identify any problem areas and exceptions. This communication will be delivered forthwith upon approval to Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1975

REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. The notebook or binder containing materials on FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.
- B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
- C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

- (8-15-75) - D. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:
- 1. Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
  - 2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
  - 3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
  - 4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
  - 5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
  - 6. Directives (60);
  - 7. Cook, Fred (52).

E. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access request).

F. G. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.

ENCLOSURE

II. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
- B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:
  - 1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
  - 2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
  - 3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
  - 4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970;
  - 5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21, 1970;
  - 6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
  - 7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;
  - 8. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
  - 9. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
  - 10. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
  - 11. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971;

12. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.
- E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.
- F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
- G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
- H. "The Standard Sub List".
- I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:
  1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.
  2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC Memorandum of December 26, 1972.
  - ~~3. Any materials pertaining to recommendations that the Project be terminated.~~
  4. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.
- J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.



III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:

1.

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.
3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.
6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.
7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:
  - a. Phil Claridge
  - b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.
2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.
3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.
4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.
5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;
2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;
3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;
4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of

the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

- D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.
- E. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees;
  - 1. George Berley
  - 2. Wilfred Bergeron
  - 3. William D. Campbell
  - 4. Richard Suter
  - 5. William Tucker
  - 6. Terry O'Connor
  - 7. Joseph English
- F. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in E. above.
- G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list:"
  - 1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
  - 2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;
4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.
- H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. (CIRCA 1969)
- I. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".
- J. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.
- K. Philadelphia FBI Field Office file number 100-51132 (Women's Liberation). (1970-72)

2 Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO SACS ALBANY  
BALTIMORE  
MIAMI  
PHILADELPHIA  
TAMPA

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

AUGUST 27, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

#mOR 16

(10-1)-00 SP2 ALM/ITB

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES.

SFP:1hb1hb  
(7)

REC 27

62 116395-575  
SEE NOTE PAGE 408 AUG 27 1975

EX-106

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec. \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 26 1975

TELETYPE

TELETYPE UNIT

PAGE TWO 62-116395

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE, INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

PAGE THREE 62-116395

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALBANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12309; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308.

BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014.

MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.

PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E. LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.

TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P.O. BOX 1418, SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.

BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND

PAGE FOUR 62-116395

SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.

NOTE:

SSC request dated 8/20/75 was for whereabouts of above former employees. We have separately responded to SSC with last available information from our files. Address on Cox taken from 1975 Directory of the Society of Former Special Agents. Supervisor S. F. Phillips of Senstudy 75 Project determined from a ~~mutual~~ acquaintance the information relating to Cox. Procedure for alerting former employees is being done in accordance with what we have been doing concerning many other former employees. The referenced 5/2/75 teletype furnished all offices background on SSC requests and Bureau's cooperation with the SSC.



August 12, 1975

Mr. Seymour Fred Phillips  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C. Room 4063

Dear Seymour:

Attached for your information is a memo on my staff interview in G-308 August 11, 1975 in accordance with our conversation.

While there was no indication as to recall, I would appreciate a return note from you to confirm that you received the memo and to suggest an a, b, c procedure in the event that I get a call to return for any additional staff type interview. Secondly, as you indicated, if the Executive committee or others send a formal subpoena, I need to know a definite a, b, c procedure with phone numbers to best represent all our interests. I look forward to this message.

The attached material is not in the order of the questions as asked. The questions were disconnected and left one with a feeling of incompleteness. I think the main thrust stands out clearly.

Since Mr. Hoover had publicly stated during those years that we were engaged in a certain amount of technical surveillance, I felt that I could elaborate properly on certain associated phases without encroaching on the records. I hope the material will be of interest to you. Please excuse the dubious typing.

Best to you,

Sincerely,

*Quick*  
R. L. Millen

EX-101  
REC-56

62-116395-574

9 AUG 27 1975

1 ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-23-81 BY SP4JML/ML  
6074

5-7118

UNREC COPY AND RECORDED FOR FILE

84 AUG 28 1975

MEMORANDUM

August 12, 1975

TO: SEYMOR F. PHILLIPS

FROM: R. L. MILLEN

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE on INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

I. BACKGROUND

Telephonic request was received 8:40 pm August 5, 1975 from Michael Epstein to appear in Room G-308 NSOB August 11 or 12 for a staff interview. Air travel was confirmed August 6. Appearance was made by the writer 11:45 am to 1:30 pm August 11, in the presence of Mr. Epstein and Mary DeOreo. Advised of staff interview rights.

II. INTERVIEW PROPER

A. Personal Background

1. Q. When did you leave the FBI?

A. December 30, 1965.

2. Q. How long in the FBI?

A. 1938 to December 30, 1965.

3. Where did you work in the field?

A. Worked in almost all the field divisions while personally constructing radio stations and travelling for months at a time, however, my office of assignment remained in Washington.

4. Q. Where did a non lawyer background fit?

A. Prior to WW II the Bureau began to need additional help to manage the placement of two way radios in cars, construct point to point emergency radio stations to handle communications in case of war, disaster or nationwide communications strike, engineer, design and construct voice communication systems for all the field offices as well as the writing of specifications, reviewing of bids, testing and installing the hardware in the field. This work fell outside the usual capabilities of law trained agents. In 1943, the individual efforts of the several engineers were solidified into a Radio Engineering Section placed under the FBI Laboratory for administrative purposes. From the beginning, the mission of this group was that of a service and support section rather than that of operations. Cases were worked by field agents under supervision of their office and the appropriate interested division supervisors at the headquarters. Field cases as such were only a section concern when equipment supply was inadequate or a breakdown occurred. In this event we would be called upon to move equipment about or correct the defective unit.

#MDR 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

## B. Personal Information

1. Q. Have you been in contact with the Bureau in this matter?  
A. No.
2. Have you regularly contacted the Bureau since leaving?  
A. No. After leaving, I was employed on a staff basis with IACP doing police management and communication consulting work all over the country.
3. Q. Do you still work for the IACP?  
A. Only on call as a consultant in communications. I am also on call with several other firms.
4. Q. Were you regularly, knowingly restricted from being privy to sensitive, classified information?  
A. No.
5. Q. Without mentioning any classified work, did you work in classified areas, Top Secret, etc?  
A. Yes, I was cleared Top Secret.
6. What would represent the longest time that you would be away from your office while section chief?  
A. Three weeks.

## C. Knowledge of other Persons

1. Q. Does the name William Campbell mean anything to you?  
A. Yes, I believe he was a specially trained agent of the Washington Field Office.
2. Q. Did he work in the section?  
A. Not while I was there.
3. Q. Did he work in the section for a long period of time on loan from somewhere else?  
A. No.
4. Q. Could he have worked in your section on special assignment without your knowledge?  
A. Unlikely that this would occur.
5. Who is R. F. Pfafman and how is it pronounced?  
A. Pfafman was an early scientist in the Laboratory from Purdue. He was initially hired as an electrical engineer. He retired during my tenure as section chief.
6. Q. Where does he live?  
A. I believe Seattle having retired from Boeing.
7. Q. Who is Seymor Phillips?  
A. I believe he was or is an agent. I am not familiar with his status.
8. Do you know John Matter?  
A. Yes. He was in the section.
9. Q. Did you socialize with him?  
A. No. The families did not visit back and forth.
10. Q. Did he discuss working on a "composite" tape on Martin Luther King or that the FBI was investigating Mr. King?  
A. Not in my presence.
11. Q. Did he mention a King investigation while in the car pool?  
A. Not in my presence. (Note: my car pool days in which he participated was in 1955, 1956 when I drove a 1955 Buick. From that time to 1965 I had my own space in Court E of the Justice Building with my irregular hours making car pooling an impossible situation.)

D. Relations with Others.

1. Q. What was your relationship with W. C. Sullivan?  
A. I knew of him as an Assistant Director in charge of Domestic Intelligence Division. As a section chief of another division I had no occasion to deal with him. His activities appeared to be along speech making and editorial lines.
2. Q. How many times did you go to his office?  
A. None.
3. Q. How many times did he come to your office?  
A. None.
4. Q. Didn't he disagree with Parsons as to the role or the adequacy of the Laboratory scientists?  
A. I believe that at one time he challenged the adequacy of the Laboratory's contact with outside concerns. If that is what you had in mind, all I can say is that I prepared an outline of the contacts which we had and they were most impressive. They ranged from all the military research establishments through the commercial radio and research companies such as Texas Instruments, etc. Our section actually excelled in this type of contact to "keep abreast" of a rapidly changing field. I heard no more from Parsons or others after submitting my list.
5. Q. Who assisted you during your tenure as section chief?  
A. A. J. Baker.

E. Training.

1. Q. Did your people furnish any training to field agents?  
A. Special training was furnished to selected agents so that they could serve as contacts in each field office, alerting the section to parts needs, checking the readiness of field equipment, advising of equipment needs, aiding in the input to the annual field budget preparation by the section as well as assisting in planning. These agents, in the main also carried their full case loads and were under the local Agent in Charge, not the section.

F. Recording Facility.

1. Q. Where was this facility physically located with regards to your office?  
A. Physically separated by being in another corridor across the Justice Building.
2. Q. Not in the 7114 corridor?  
A. Correct.
3. Q. Were agents offices attached thereto?  
A. Yes, a couple of bays.
4. Q. Who had access?  
A. Corridor doors were locked at all times but agents had access with keys. Facility doors were locked separately within that space.
5. Q. Was someone in that space at all times during the day?  
A. Most of the time. We tried to keep someone available

in the space in that neither Baker or myself were qualified to operate the patch panel and recording equipment and a Directors speech might have to be recorded on short notice. This was somewhat difficult in that the work assigned to these people in the form of security checks for government officials telephones and room security checks for such areas as hearing rooms necessitated that the work be done outside of the office space.

6. Q. Were these men fully occupied?

A. Yes.

7. Q. How did you know they were fully occupied?

A. By an administrative assignment system, kept one year and then destroyed after statistics were compiled. Also by closely following the work load and making adjustments to keep the 3 to 4 hour overtime on an equitable basis.

8. Q. How do you know that someone couldn't make a "composite" tape without your knowledge - and give a specific example of why not.

A. As pointed out earlier, I was not present 24 hours a day and therefore could not continuously monitor the displaced space. Within reason, however, for statistical purposes we needed to document our input. This was done by assignment slip as it came through the office by Baker or myself and in some instances the paper work was done confirmatory when the work was started on an urgent assignment orally. An effort was made early in the time period as section chief, in 1955, 1956, to clearly establish this procedure thereby avoiding persons bringing work of any kind directly to a section employee. The staff was repeatedly made aware of the desired procedure. The only specific instance I can recall occurred early in my tenure, possibly in '55 or '56 when it was necessary to personally challenge someone outside the section who was bringing work directly to a section employee. What the work was is not important. The bypass of procedure was. I was called by phone and went immediately to the studio area on the other side of the building and advised the person that the proper procedure was not being followed. The person departed and no further problem existed.

9. Q. Who was this person?

A. I believe it was Inspector Kemper.

10. Q. Who called you in this instance?

A. I can't recall that detail 20 years ago but it would probably have been someone normally assigned to that area, such as Matter or Corbett.

11. Q. Could it have been disc records or album material?

A. It could have been but the material was not the prime concern.. the procedure was.

12. Q. Was a memo written?

A. No. The immediate action corrected the problem.

13. Q. Would a "trained" field agent be able to operate filter equipment?

A. No.

14. Q. Would Matter be able to operate filter equipment?

A. Yes.

#### G. Procedures.

1. Q. If a request to handle material came from a field office would it have a case caption?

A. Yes, to identify it with files and with the divisions supervising the case.

2. Q. Would you ever receive recordings from an outside source?

A. Yes. Periodically from the military on crashes of test planes, as for example where the pilot was trying to tell what was wrong but the intelligence on the tape recording made on the ground was garbled by over riding noises. Filtering techniques could, at times, successfully bring out the message through time consuming procedures. In these instances, because of the excessive manpower demands it was necessary to borrow radio engineers and sometimes nearby trained Washington Field personnel to work on the separate small portions of the questioned tape to expedite the report back to the contributor.

3. Q. Did you have anything to do with codes and ciphers?

A. None, handled by another section.

4. Q. What about field recordings?

( Note: Since Mr. Hoover had announced in public that at one time some 98 technical surveillances were in operation, it follows that the Bureau had some training and operated some equipment in this area of operations.)

A. All offices were self sufficient with regard to playback and recording equipment. In Kidnapping cases, for example, the equipment would be needed on an immediate basis, hence, in my view it was unsatisfactory for an office to "borrow" when needed from another office or request that the headquarters in Washington send what they need. Accordingly no "stock" was held here. The field inventoried and maintained it.

#### H. Martin Luther King.

1. Q. Did you know in the period around 1961 that the Bureau was investigating Mr. King?

A. No, as a support or service facility we would not be involved in field work unless there were equipment or support problems. None were recalled.

2. Q. Did you instruct that a "composite" tape be made on Mr. King?

A. No.

3. Q. I have inferences that you did. Did you?

A. I did not.

4. Q. Is it possible that someone could make a tape without your knowledge?

- A. It is possible, but not a probable situation. As indicated, the section was in two separate parts with the voiceprint, filtering, recording and related test equipment located across the building away from my office. Possible, of course, but minimized by a need to keep close accounting of our work from an administrative and statistical standpoint to assist in justifying our existence and our programs to the satisfaction of the inspection staff.
5. Q. Have you since heard of investigations of Mr. King by the Bureau?
- A. Through media references recently.
6. Q. Did you see material coming through your office for handling captioned "Martin Luther King"?
- A. I did not.
7. Q. Did you see materials coming through your office for handling captioned "Civil Rights Investigations or Matters"?
- A. I did not.

#### I. Miscellaneous Items.

1. Q. Did Mr. Hoover have technical recorders?
- A. I recall none during my tenure of 1955-1965. He was basically opposed to technical things in that he tended to avoid those items which he did not fully understand. Accordingly, much administrative effort was expended in explaining technical things, such as the need for radio antennas, in laymans language which could be fully understood.
2. ITEM. A long list of names was observed. Some questions about people came from this list such as Pfafmans' reference.
3. ITEM. The period of interest appeared to be in the 1961 or thereabouts era. It is noted that the person being interviewed is being asked to recall details occurring 14 or 15 years in the past.

August 19, 1975

#MDR16

10-11-00 SP2ALM/STG

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your note of August 12, 1975, and the enclosed statement concerning a recent interview of you by the Senate Select Committee Staff.

This note is pursuant to your request for confirmation of my receipt of your statement.

As to your request that I suggest "an a, b, c procedure" in the event you get a call for additional interview of the nature already had or for testimony before the Committee, I can only suggest that in either event you might desire to contact the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division by collect call. They will be happy to give you any necessary help under the circumstances.

Again, thanks for the material you sent.

Sincerely,

Seymor Fred Phillips

Mr. Richard L. Millen  
405 Hermitage Drive  
Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701

File  
10-11-00



TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index				FROM: <b>FBI</b>			
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees							
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)						2. DATE PROVIDED	
DOCUMENT	BRIEFING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	INTERVIEW	TESTIMONY	OTHER	<b>8/21/75</b>	
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)							
SSC	<b>The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House</b>						
HSC							
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)							
<b>Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former FBI Special Agent Richard L. Millen.</b>							
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)						6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)	
<b>NA</b>						<b>U</b>	
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)							
<b>Organization and staffing</b> <b>Operating procedures</b>							
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)							
<b>Interviewed regarding Radio Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory, as to type of work handled.</b>  <b>62-116395</b> <b>FMK; fmk</b> <b>(4)</b>							
<b>ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75</b>							
<b>TREAT AS YELLOW</b>							

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. A. Mintz  
 1 - Mr. J. Cochran  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

August 21, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

2-2361

SP4 JRM/ML  
 6076

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with enclosure concerning an interview by a representative of the captioned Committee of former FBI Special Agent Richard L. Millen. Single copies of the memorandum and its enclosure are also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
 Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
 Special Counsel for  
 Intelligence Coordination

REC-56

EX-101

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
 1 - 67-115187 (Personnel File Former SA Richard L. Millen)

SFP:1hb/165  
 (11)

9 AUG 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

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UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCLOSURE IN

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. J. Cochran  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

August 21, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 2-23-87 BY SP4 JRM/ML  
6070

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI  
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) RICHARD L.  
MILLEN BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 11, 1975, former FBI SA Richard L. Millen voluntarily appeared at FBI Headquarters and advised an FBI representative that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, an SSC Staff Member, concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. Millen indicated that this was the first contact he had had with the FBI concerning this interview. He was asked if Epstein was aware that he, Millen, had not been in contact with the FBI prior to the interview. Millen indicated that questioning by Epstein developed the fact that Millen had not as yet been in contact with the FBI. Millen was then asked how, in light of this fact, he and Epstein had addressed themselves to Millen's obligations under his employment agreement with the FBI as relating to the area of confidentiality. Millen stated that this matter did not arise as an issue during the interview and that he, in effect, had given no consideration to the matter.

Millen indicated that he desired to furnish the FBI the details of the interview, and arrangements were made for Millen to mail to the FBI a statement containing the interview details. It should be noted that Millen resides in Florida and was in Washington, D. C., for the sole purpose of the interview, having arrived earlier that morning and intending to fly back to Florida shortly after

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
1 - 67-115187 (Personnel File Former SA Richard L. Millen)

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ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

the above contact with the FBI. Millen was advised by the FBI representative that although there was little he could now do relative to his employment agreement with the FBI as the interview of him was already completed, it was indicated to him that current and former employees of the FBI, who are regularly being contacted by the SSC for interview, are first contacting the FBI to resolve the matter of receiving FBI clearance for the interview. Millen was reminded that there was also an obligation to the Department of Justice and that in the event he was to be called back for additional interview, either subject to a subpoena and/or under oath, it would require a clearance from the Attorney General. It was suggested to him that he give this matter the appropriate consideration under those circumstances.

Attached hereto is a Xerox of a statement which Millen mailed to the FBI which details the results of the interview of him by Epstein.  
Enclosure

NOTE:

Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project was the FBI representative who saw Millen on 8/11/75. Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum, 8/13/75, "Senstudy," reported for information purposes the circumstances of the interview of Millen and it had taken place without prior advice by the SSC to the Bureau. Departmental officials were advised and subsequently John Elliff of the SSC Staff telephonically expressed his regrets to Supervisor P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division for the interview having taken place without prior notification to the Bureau. Millen's statement was received in the mail under cover of a personal note to Phillips, which note is attached; also attached hereto is a copy of a reply written to Millen by Phillips. It should be noted that Millen inquired as to what procedure he should

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

NOTE CONTINUED:

follow if he is again contacted by the SSC for further interview or testimony. Phillips' reply to him was that under such circumstances he might desire to contact the Legal Counsel Division by collect call.

Copies of all the current correspondence is being designated for Millen's personnel file with the suggestion that due cognizance be taken of this incident in any future Bureau consideration relative to Millen.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips  
August 14, 1975

The Attorney General

Director

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed for your information are the original of a memorandum and its attachment concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of FBI Special Agent Seymour Fred Phillips. A copy of the memorandum and its attachment are also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Seymour Fred Phillips)

SFP:mjg/dmt  
(11)

REC-56  
EX-101

9 AUG 27 1975

**ENCLOSURE**

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1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

02-116305

August 14, 1975

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
SEYMOR FRED PHILLIPS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS**

Set out below is information concerning an interview of FBI SA Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members. Phillips entered on duty in the FBI on October 20, 1940, and he served in a clerical capacity in the Identification Division until his appointment as an SA on March 13, 1946. He is currently assigned in the Intelligence Division (INR). Since April, 1975, Phillips has been assigned to a special task force devoted exclusively to the handling of requests from the SSC and, to a lesser degree, requests from the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Phillips was advised he was to be interviewed at 10:00 a.m., August 4, 1975, in the offices of the SSC. The following are the details of the interview of Phillips as furnished by him.

Interview on August 4, 1975, was in two sessions. The morning session lasted from 10:03 a.m. until 12:50 p.m., when it was recessed for lunch. The afternoon session was from 2:20 p.m. until 3:17 p.m. The morning session was in Room 003, former Carroll Arms Hotel; afternoon session in a small, second floor room of the SSC offices in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo conducted the interview with over 95 percent of the questions being asked by Epstein. Voluminous longhand notes were taken, mostly by DeOreo.

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Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Seymour Fred Phillips)

SFP:mjg  
(10)

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ENCLOSURE

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U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FDI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

At the very outset, Phillips was asked to sign a statement entitled "ADVICE OF RIGHTS" which he did and it was witnessed by Epstein in Phillips' presence. Epstein stated that he would check with the Committee concerning the securing of a copy to give to Phillips. Thereafter, Phillips made the following opening remarks to the SSC personnel. Phillips advised that in an effort to assist the SSC, he was informing them that his supervision of the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. at FBI Headquarters (HQ) was from roughly very late in 1963 to the Fall of 1965. His personal knowledge was confined to roughly that period. The interrogators were given to understand by Phillips that the discussion to ensue would concern a period of 10 to 12 years ago and that Phillips' replies must be considered in that context. Phillips indicated that he would to the best of his ability give his best recollections in response to questions. Phillips also stated that his interrogators should understand that during the intervening years Phillips had been indirectly exposed to much information relating to the King investigation. Phillips gave two examples to illustrate.

He brought to attention the fact that he had been exposed over the years to many media accounts relating to the King investigation. A noteworthy one was a feature article which appeared in "The New York Times" in early 1975. A second example of Phillips' exposure to information concerning the King investigation related to Phillips' current FBI assignment of which both Epstein and DeOreo were fully cognizant. Phillips pointed out that this assignment has exposed him to a vast amount of information, both documentary and that being furnished orally to the SSC by various witnesses. As a consequence, Phillips pointed out the difficulty which he expected to encounter in answering questions because it would take very studied thought in many instances to differentiate in his mind information which he had acquired in the supervision of the King case and information which might have come to his attention during the subsequent years, particularly the past few months in connection with his current assignment.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Phillips then went on to point out what he understood to be the parameters of this interview, which were as follows. The interview was to concern the King investigation only. The interview was to exclude information which was the product or fruit of all electronic surveillances through which the FBI obtained information concerning King. In mentioning this privileged area, Phillips again emphasized the difficulty he would likely have in sorting out information he has in terms of how he first acquired it. He emphasized that if he recognized that his answer to a question would require divulging information from an electronic surveillance, he would not answer that question. Finally, Phillips pointed out what he considered the four privileged areas concerning which he did not intend to answer questions. These were as follows: (1) Information which identifies or could identify a confidential source. (2) Information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations. (3) Information obtained from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. (4) Information revealing sensitive investigative methods and techniques.

(The exclusion of discussing information from electronic surveillances is based upon current negotiations between the SSC, the Department of Justice and an attorney for the widow of King. It is the FBI's understanding that the King attorney agreed to the interview provided Phillips did not disclose information from electronic surveillances.)

Phillips indicated that he anticipated the interview to be prolonged and that he anticipated that it would be tiring because of the unusual factors involved as discussed above. He therefore requested that in order to avoid weariness on his part, which would be counterproductive to the SSC's obtaining maximum benefits from the interview, consideration be given to breaking up the interview on a general basis of two hours, a break for lunch, and then another two hours. He indicated that as the interview progressed, he would be flexible on this but felt that the interview, if more than one day long, should not exceed four and one-half hours on any one day. Epstein indicated agreement with this request and the basis for it.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

The following are the results of the interview which are set out generally in chronological order.

Phillips was asked for a detailed biography of his FBI career which he related to be the following. He started in the FBI on October 28, 1940, in a clerical capacity in the Identification Division. On March 18, 1946, he was appointed an SA and served in Field Offices (FO) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michigan; and Washington, D. C. (WFO). In the Spring of 1954, he was assigned to HQ and served in the General Investigative, Training and Inspection Divisions until the Summer of 1958. In the Summer of 1958, he was transferred to the Buffalo, New York, FO where he served until the Summer of 1961, when he was transferred back to HQ. Since then he has been continually assigned to the Intelligence Division (INTD). (INTD formerly, and during the time of the King investigation discussed herein, was known as the Domestic Intelligence Division /DID/.)

Detailed questions were asked and responses made by Phillips relating to the organizational makeup of the DID starting in 1961 and the various sections and units he had been assigned to over the years. He indicated that when he first joined the DID he was assigned to the Internal Security Section and specifically to the Communist Party Unit. It was while in this Unit that Phillips took on supervision of the King case and he continued that supervision while serving subsequently in a unit especially developed to concentrate on investigations relating to the communist influences in racial matters. It was his best recollection that the Unit actually might have been named Communist Influence in Racial Matters Unit (CIRM).

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Phillips was asked for and supplied the names of his work associates in the DID during the pertinent period of 1963-65. These included individuals at various levels within the DID as well as FBI officials of a still higher level. The following are the names of individuals given by Phillips and in those instances where he was aware of their current whereabouts, Phillips also gave that information on Epstein's request: Theodore Rosack, Richard Bates, William Shubatt, James Martin, (first name unrecalled) Corman, Charles Brennan, Inspector Joseph A. Sizoo, Robert Denz, Lawrence Gurley, Fred Fox, Wallace LaPrade, William Shaw, Inspector Donald E. Moore, Gordon Nease, Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, Section Chief Fred J. Baumgardner and Ian MacLennon (phonetic). All of these individuals either worked with, over, or under Phillips during the pertinent period, including the time he first was assigned to the DID in 1961.

Phillips pointed out in respect to Belmont that it was his understanding that Belmont is in an extremely ill condition and it was suggested that if the SSC had any intention to interview Belmont, it would be wise to first check with his physician. In the same context, Phillips pointed out the following in respect to Fred Fox. This individual was Phillips' Unit Chief when he was first assigned in the DID and it was believed by Phillips that Fox had already left the section when Phillips was first assigned the King case. Consequently, it was not believed that Fox would be knowledgeable in this matter. Moreover, Phillips pointed out that Fox was a personal friend and that Fox had suffered a very tragic loss of his spouse earlier this year. As a result, Fox has been in somewhat deep grief and it was suggested by Phillips that he might not be an ideal subject for interview.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

There was considerable discussion generated by questions concerning the organizational makeup in the various units in the Internal Security Section as well as concerning the routing of mail through the various levels. It was explained by Phillips how mail would be generated at a supervisory level up through a Unit Chief and then to the Section Front Office. At that point it might be handled by either or both the Section Chief and his Number One Man. If the mail was not "cut off," meaning approved for mailing, the mail would move to the Division Front Office where it would be seen by either one or both the Assistant Director and Number One Man. Important mail would, of course, move beyond that level to the office of the Assistant to the Director and thence, in some instances, to the Associate Director and the Director himself.

Phillips was asked to identify clerical personnel who worked for him when he headed up the Unit dealing with CIRM. He named one individual who he indicated had been Secretary to the Unit Chief in the Communist Party Unit and who, to the best of his recollection, also served for a time as Phillips' secretary. This individual was then named Kathleen Osborne, later married name Jensen; now divorced and remarried, last name unknown. Questioning was diverted before Phillips named any other clerical personnel.

The foregoing phase of the interview which covered organizational matters, routing of mail, identities of personnel, etc., covered about an hour and fifteen minutes. At this point, Epstein indicated that he would now proceed to discuss the investigation of King.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
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Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

His questioning elicited the following background in this investigation as best Phillips could recall it. It was explained that during the period in question, 1963-65, the Internal Security Section handled investigations primarily only in the domestic intelligence field. Investigations of some key leaders of subversive groups were also handled in that Section. There was then in existence in the DID a Section known as the Subversive Control Section which supervised basically the investigations of domestic subversive individuals. The King case was assigned in the Subversive Control Section when Phillips was first exposed to it and was assigned specifically to a Supervisor named William Forsyth (phonetic), now deceased. For a time, the case was jointly handled by both Forsyth and Phillips and eventually, for all practical purposes, it was supervised by Phillips alone. This was brought about by the nature of the emphasis being placed by the FBI on the communist influences in the racial movement which were coming to the FBI's attention by investigation and otherwise. Because of this, it was determined at a point in time that there be created within the Internal Security Section a CIRM Unit and that there be vested in it related investigations such as that concerning King.

It might be noted that at one point during the extensive organizational phase of the interview, Phillips reminded Epstein of his belief that he was furnishing Epstein considerably more information than required within the agreed parameters of the interview. Phillips indicated, however, that he was willing to do so as an exhibition of good faith and cooperativeness not only on his part, but as relating to the FBI.

Discussion turned to the character used in correspondence in the investigation of King and of the organization which King headed, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Phillips explained that to the best of his recollection, the character of the King case was SM-C (Security Matter - Communist) and the character of the SCLC case was IS-C (Internal Security - Communist). Epstein inquired as to whether there was a file

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
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Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

in the FBI concerning Mrs. King and was told that Phillips did not know. Epstein inquired as to whether there was more than one main file on King and the SCLC and was told that Phillips did not know of any more than one.

Inquiry was made as to whom the SCLC was assigned. Phillips explained that the case concerning the SCLC was of a Cominfil (communist infiltration) type. Consequently, this case was assigned in a unit specializing in communist infiltration-type cases. The Unit Chief was John Kleinkauf but to Phillips' best recollection, the case later was assigned in the CIRM Unit.

Epstein inquired as to when the King case was opened and what the date of the first piece of paper in that case bore. The same questions were asked concerning case on the SCLC and on Stanley David Levison. Phillips stated that he did not know the answers to these questions. As to the character of the Levison case, Phillips replied that he thought it was SM-C.

Inquiry was made as to whose idea it was to have a CIRM Unit and Phillips stated he did not recall.

Questions were asked about the FBI's analysis of the March on Washington which took place in August, 1963, and of any papers which were written about it. It was obvious that Epstein was aware that some "Brief" or similar analysis document about the racial situation at the time was prepared in the FBI. Phillips explained that after the March on Washington, some documents were prepared in the form of summary or analysis and that the March on Washington was also part of an extensive "Brief" which was prepared as an in-house document covering the whole subject of communist influences in the racial movement.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Inquiry was made as to when the first piece of paper either in the field or at HQ was written for technical surveillance of King and the SCLC. Phillips explained that his best recollection concerning a microphone surveillance (misur) concerning King was after the fact. He explained that there had been a misur on King at [REDACTED] and that after the operation had been terminated, Phillips was told by one of his superiors, probably either Sullivan, Sizoo or Baumgardner, to expect the receipt of some paper from WFO. Phillips was told that once received, Phillips would be expected to prepare a communication suitable for dissemination which would summarize the findings from the misur. Phillips was asked as to the form he had received the information from WFO and his best recollection was that there was possibly a cover communication such as an airtel with an enclosed letterhead memorandum (LHM). Epstein wanted to know if there were any enclosures to the LHM and Phillips said he had no recollection of same. In responding as to how Phillips acquired this material, he said he did not recall such but felt fairly certain that he did not receive it through routine mail channels. Phillips pointed out that this was a case receiving special handling and because of the sensitive nature of the information, the material may well have been handled by hand delivery to him by either someone from WFO or by one of his superiors such as any of the three mentioned above. Asked whether he had subsequently received actual tapes on this coverage, Phillips said that he had. Asked how soon afterwards the tapes were received, Phillips said he could not recall.

Questioning then turned to what Phillips prepared suitable for dissemination from the material which WFO had furnished. Phillips explained that his best recollection was that he took the LHM from WFO and rewrote it. In other words, he created an HQ-originated LHM. Asked why this was done rather than use the one prepared by WFO, Phillips explained that there may have been two or three reasons for doing so. For example, the one prepared by WFO may not have been written in sufficiently good



U. S. Senate Select Committee  
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Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

style for the type of dissemination that was intended. It might also have had typographical errors and the like. Asked to whom the LHM which Phillips prepared was disseminated, he responded to his best recollection it was disseminated only to The White House at that time. Asked if it was later disseminated to anyone else, he said he did not know that it was but that information in it was later incorporated into a second LHM, along with new-found information and that the second LHM was disseminated to both The White House and to the then Attorney General (AG) Robert Kennedy. Asked as to whom else it was disseminated, Phillips could not recall anyone else. Phillips was questioned about the procedure for disseminating to The White House and the AG and explained that it might possibly have been done by use of a single LHM prepared in sufficient number and then sent to The White House with one cover communication and simultaneously, another copy sent to the AG with another cover communication. It would have been common practice at the time to have included in each cover communication information indicating who else was receiving the same LHM.

Phillips was asked if any new information which prompted the second LHM had arisen from a misur. Phillips said that it had but at this point reminded Epstein that he would not be able to discuss content pursuant to the agreements and arrangements discussed earlier in this memorandum. Epstein wanted to know exactly which misur prompted the second LHM and Phillips said he could not pinpoint which misur. Epstein wanted to know how many misurs the FBI had had on King and Phillips said that he would only be able to give a rough estimate. Epstein wanted to know the number even if it was only a rough figure and he was told that it would possibly have been between [redacted] possibly toward the lower end of that scale.

JFK Law 10(a)1

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Phillips reminded Epstein that he was asking from Phillips information which the SSC had already asked for in terms of documents and that when the King attorney would make the necessary agreement for the release of such information, the SSC would probably be getting the precise documentation which Phillips was now being asked to strain his memory for. This observation appeared to have no effect on Epstein who continued his questioning without comment on the observation itself.

Epstein asked if the [redacted]

[redacted] Epstein wanted to know when the last misur on King took place and Phillips said he did not know and that it was probably after he, Phillips, had left the supervision of the case. Epstein inquired as to whether all the misurs referred to [redacted] were put on by the FBI and Phillips responded that that was what Phillips had been referring to. Epstein then wanted to know if there were any put on by other agencies, local, Federal or state and Phillips said he knew of none. Epstein wanted to know the locales of the misurs and was told that the only one known of in [redacted] was at the [redacted] Phillips then named a number of cities [redacted]

[redacted] that he could recall where misurs were installed. In answer to whether they were all [redacted] Phillips said to his best recollection, they were all [redacted] Phillips also indicated that there could have been [redacted]

[redacted] and possibly some other cities. Epstein specifically asked whether there was one in [redacted] and Phillips responded that there possibly had been. Roughly at this point in the interview, Phillips again referred Epstein to the fact that he was asking for information which Phillips could not recall but

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
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Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

which was likely documented and that the SSC would get this documented information when agreements were perfected with the King attorney. On this occasion, Epstein reminded Phillips that notwithstanding any documentation the SSC receives, it nevertheless desires Phillips' recollection of events.

Inquiry was made as to whether there were any misurs on King outside of the country. Phillips said he knew of none and went on to remind Epstein that the FBI was nonoperational abroad and that if there was a misur on King abroad, it might have been put on by a foreign intelligence agency and that such an agency was a privileged area for discussion during the interview. In making this statement to Epstein, Phillips said he did not want Epstein to infer that there were misurs outside the United States concerning King that Phillips knew about.

Inquiry was made concerning photographic surveillance on King and Phillips said there had been some but it was very limited. Asked if any of it was in a motel or hotel room including through closed circuit TV, Phillips said he knew of none. Asked where the photographic surveillances were that Phillips knew of, Phillips said he remembered some pictures being taken in Los Angeles outside of a hotel and at the airport. Asked whether they were stills or movies, Phillips indicated they were of possibly both types.

Epstein inquired as to whether there were any photographic surveillances by other agencies, Federal, state or local as well as by any foreign agencies. Phillips said he knew of none. Phillips reminded Epstein, however, that the newspapers had many pictures of King leading marches and in other similar public activities and that as a consequence, local agencies might well have taken pictures of King but that it would be very questionable as to whether they could be justifiably categorized as pictures derived from photographic surveillances.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
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Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
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Phillips was asked as to what wiretaps or telephone surveillances he was aware of concerning King. He responded that there was a telephone surveillance (tesur) on King at his residence in Atlanta, Georgia, and that when the authority from the AG for this was obtained, the language of the communication was such as to permit a tesur in other places which might be considered "residences" inasmuch as King traveled around the country a good bit. Phillips was unable to answer as to how many such tesurs there were or exactly where they were.

Regarding the SCLC, Phillips indicated that the tesurs were at its offices in Atlanta and New York City.

Asked whether there were any mail covers or openings on King, Phillips said he knew of none.

Asked when the first wiretap on King was operative, Phillips indicated that it was after the FBI had secured the AG's approval but Phillips could not recall the date. Asked when the last wiretap was operative, Phillips said he did not know and that it could have been after the supervision of the case was no longer in his hands.

It was roughly at this point in the interview that the luncheon break occurred and what follows was in the afternoon session.

Epstein inquired as to whether all of the misurs were separately authorized by Director J. Edgar Hoover himself. Phillips said he did not think this was so. Asked whether there was some document at HQ on each misur which would show the authorization, Phillips said he felt that there was. He was asked what percentage of all the misurs was authorized by Hoover himself and Phillips said he could not even estimate such a percentage. Epstein asked who would authorize a misur

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if it was not authorized by Hoover himself. Phillips gave the names of Associate Director Clyde Tolson (deceased) and of the following previously mentioned above -- Belmont, Sullivan, Inspector Sizoo and Baumgardner -- as others who might have made the authorizations. Epstein wanted to know whether there was any letter of delegation by Hoover by which others would have taken the authority for such an action and Phillips said he knew of none.

Numerous questions were asked relating to the procedures for obtaining authority for a misur and whether those procedures were actually in some written document. Phillips explained that he had no recollection of any such procedure ever being in the Manual of Rules and Regulations or the Manual of Instructions but that the procedures might have been documented in some policy folder although Phillips had no definite recollection of the procedures being in writing. That is, Phillips could not recall at this time seeing the procedures in any specific document. It was explained that there were times when in-house procedures might be passed down by word of mouth specifically relative to very sensitive matters and that Phillips, as a Supervisor or Unit Chief, would accept the instructions of a superior as to the proper manner of proceeding in preparing documents for a matter of this nature.

Phillips was asked if any of the King misurs were authorized in advance by the AG. He explained that during the time of his supervision of the case, he could not recall any specifically pre-authorized by the AG but there may have been some of that nature. He was asked if the authorized communication relative to a wiretap is in clear language showing that it is for a wiretap and not for a misur. Phillips replied that he felt confident that the language would be clear and that when an AG gave his authority for a wiretap, the AG would know exactly what it was for.

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In discussing the authority for misurs, Phillips explained that in 1954, the then AG, Herbert Brownell, submitted a memorandum to the FBI which in effect gave AG authority into Hoover's hands in cases of this nature and that the procedures in effect provided within the Bureau for lesser officials to have the authority. This would have included down to the level of Section Chief Baumgardner in this case.

Phillips further explained that after a certain point in time, and the best he could place this would have been in 1965, a procedure went into effect to write a communication to the AG on each misur. The intention at the time was, to Phillips' best recollection, to get the AG's advance authority. However, as a practical matter, it was not feasible many times to get the AG's authority in advance. Some situations would be so fast moving and the sensitive and security aspects would be such that it would not be possible to get such authority in advance. In such a situation, an immediate communication would be written to the AG explaining to him that the installation was made without his advance authority because time was of the essence. Under such circumstances, it would not be uncommon for that communication advising the AG of the misur to also advise him of its discontinuance. For example, a misur might be installed one morning to cover a day's activities and the misur might be withdrawn the same night or next morning. In such a situation, one communication to the AG would advise of both the installation and withdrawal of the misur.

Epstein asked whether, when the procedure for advising the AG of all misurs went into effect, the AG was told of all prior misurs which had been in effect. Phillips stated he did not know the precise answer to this question but told Epstein that the AG at the time of the King misurs (Robert Kennedy) was aware of the misur coverage on King because he, Kennedy, had seen the product of the misurs. Phillips emphasized that the product was such that there should have been no doubt in the AG's mind but that a misur had been in effect on King. At a point

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in the questioning not long after this was explained to Epstein, Epstein again asked how the AG would know of the misurs if he had not been advised precisely in correspondence relating to misurs. Phillips explained once again that the AG had seen the product of the misurs not only in LHMg but also in monographs.

Phillips was asked if the AG was shown any logs or verbatim transcripts from the misurs or whether any of the tapes therefrom had been played back to him. Phillips said he did not know.

At a point in the questioning which was after what Phillips felt was a third time he had explained to Epstein that from information furnished to Kennedy, there should have been no doubt in Kennedy's mind that the FBI had misurs on King, Epstein asked if the AG might not have thought the product was the result of a tesur rather than a misur. At this point, Phillips displayed annoyance to Epstein and told him that he had answered the question three times and, therefore, refused to answer it any further. Epstein mumbled something to the effect that Phillips had not answered the question and Epstein made some note, apparently to that effect. Phillips told him that he, Phillips, thought he had answered the question regardless of what Epstein was recording in his notes.

Questioning turned to the preparation of memoranda concerning misurs and Phillips explained that he had participated in the preparation of some. Epstein asked when the first misur took place [redacted] Phillips said he could not remember. Many questions were asked concerning the various authorizations for the misurs and the related paper.

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Phillips explained the procedures as to the recording of such information in memoranda and who might actually prepare such memoranda. Phillips explained that he himself might have written such a memorandum but that they might also have been written by any of several individuals superior to Phillips in rank. Epstein asked if all memoranda recording authority for misurs included a predication or basis for the misur. Phillips indicated that such memoranda should have had such information in it and that the information forming the basis would have generally related to the security aspects which were the basis for the King investigation.

Epstein asked if there was anything in file which would show that Hoover was ever concerned that he was not personally making all of the authorizations for the misurs. Phillips said he did not know of any such information in file. Epstein asked whether the Inspection Division ever looked into the fact that authorizations were being made by other than Hoover himself. Phillips responded that he did not recall this ever being an issue during an inspection.

At this point in the interview, Phillips indicated that he was finding himself tiring, particularly because the morning session had been in a very warm room. Therefore, at approximately 3:17 p.m., Phillips asked that the interview be brought to an early conclusion for the day and Epstein said that he could stop at that point to resume at 10:00 a.m. the next day.

Phillips agreed to this and then reopened discussion concerning the "ADVICE OF RIGHTS" statement which Phillips had signed at the onset of the interview. Phillips told Epstein that he wanted a copy of the statement he had signed and desired to have it the next morning when the interview was to resume. Epstein said that the statement was now the property



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of the SSC and that he, Epstein, would have to get the Committee to agree to giving a copy to Phillips. Phillips asked if that meant Epstein would have to get the authority of a Senator or Senators and Epstein said that it did. Phillips observed that he, Phillips, could see no reason why he should not be given a copy of a statement which he himself had signed. Epstein agreed that he also could see no reason for a copy not being given to Phillips. Phillips then made it clear to Epstein that if a copy was not forthcoming the following morning, there would be some question as to whether the interview would resume.

The continuation of the August 4, 1975, interview proceeded on August 5, 1975, with the same two SSC Staff Members as interrogators. On the latter date, the interview was in the same room as the afternoon session on August 4, 1975. The August 5, 1975, interview was in two sessions, morning session from 10:00 a.m. until a break for lunch at 11:45 a.m.; and afternoon session from 1:05 p.m. until ending at 2:37 p.m., when Epstein indicated the interview was concluded and it would not be necessary for Phillips to return. Epstein did, however, leave the door open for possible further interview of Phillips at some later date.

At the very outset of the morning August 5, 1975, session, Epstein furnished Phillips a Xerox of the "ADVICE OF RIGHTS" statement which Phillips had signed the previous day. A Xerox of this statement is attached to this memorandum.

Following are the details of the interview as it took place on August 5, 1975.

Phillips was asked when he first learned of the first wiretap concerning King and he responded that he could not be sure. He was asked if he remembered any procedure about getting AG authority for wiretaps and of any time lapses between the securing of authority. Phillips' response was that he recalled

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vaguely that at one time, AG Kennedy asked the FBI to look into the matter for effecting electronic surveillance of King. The matter was looked into and the FBI asked for the AG's authority for an installation. However, the AG refused the request. Sometime later the FBI again asked for authority and this time the AG approved it.

Phillips was questioned concerning the predication or basis for an electronic surveillance which would be contained in the request document to the AG. Epstein specifically wanted to know what the predication, if any, contained and if such predications were always alike. Phillips responded that the predications addressed themselves in the area of national security but that he could not remember the specific language used. It was his recollection that they probably took up the matter of the communist influences on King. Phillips could not remember whether the predications were all alike but felt in a general context, they probably were. He was asked if, when a predication addressed itself to communist influences, it would actually name persons. Phillips said he thought so and that the predications would probably at least name one person. Asked who the persons might be, Phillips said that they would have possibly named Stanley David Levison.

Epstein asked if Phillips became knowledgeable of Levison and the response was that he did. He was asked how he had learned about Levison and Phillips said he did not remember precisely how. He was asked if he had seen communications concerning Levison and he acknowledged that he had. He was asked if the investigation of Levison reflected his travels and Phillips said that it did to an extent.

At this point, after a series of questions concerning Levison, Phillips reminded Epstein of the following. First, the subject of Levison as such was outside the parameters of the interview. Second, in discussing Levison, Epstein was getting close to details concerning Levison and Phillips wanted to advise him that he, Phillips, would not be able to respond on details because of the privileged area relating to the protection of FBI informants.

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Phillips was asked if he knew of all of Levison's travel and he said that he did not think so.

In handling correspondence on misurs, Phillips was asked if the belief that Levison would be in the same city as King would serve as a predication. Phillips responded that if the FBI had such information, it would likely have been used.

Epstein's next questions concerned misurs generally and again emphasized the matter of predications in correspondence. Epstein wanted to know whether all such correspondence justifying misurs would have predications and Phillips said that to the best of his recollection they would. Epstein then launched a theoretical discussion about the possible use of "blanket" authorizations by having one memorandum cover many situations. Phillips told him he did not remember there being any such "blanket" authorizations and that to his best recollection, there would have been prepared separate paper for separate misurs.

Question was asked as to whether any physical surveillances (fisur) were instituted in connection with the misurs and Phillips thought that there would have been on some occasion. He was asked if the fisurs revealed any King-Levison meetings when the fisurs were in connection with misurs. Phillips said he did not remember any which were connected with a misur but that he recalled at least one fisur which was on either King or Levison, or otherwise, and that King and Levison were observed together. Phillips emphasized that in this instance, it was his recollection it was not in connection with a misur.

Epstein inquired as to the reason for the transfer of Phillips from the King case to another section and another branch in the DID. (It should be noted that during the earliest portion of the interview on August 4, 1975, when Phillips

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furnished biographical data concerning his career in the DID, he had indicated that in the Fall of 1965, his assignment was changed. He was then transferred out of the Internal Security Section where he had been handling the King case to the branch in the DID which handled foreign intelligence matters. Phillips' specific assignment was to the section he best recalled as the Research-Satellite Section and he assumed the responsibilities of Unit Chief in a Unit specializing in investigations relating to Soviet-bloc countries, particularly as to Hungarian-type cases which were assigned to Phillips.) In answer to Epstein's question as to reason for transfer, Phillips told him that his question was not germane to the King investigation. Phillips also told him that he, Phillips, had no specific reason to not tell Epstein the circumstances of the transfer but that Phillips would just not discuss it with him because it did not pertain to the King investigation.

Phillips was asked if he had received the tapes relating to King misurs and he said that he had. He was asked why they were sent to him. He responded that at a point in time, it was believed that for security reasons, if for no other, all the tapes from the misurs should be assembled at one place at HQ and that as a consequence, the appropriate field offices were instructed to send them in. These tapes were retained under the control of and charged to Assistant Director Sullivan although they were maintained in Phillips' office which was across the hall from Sullivan's. The reasons for this method of handling were the following. First, the tapes would thus be more accessible to Phillips who was the supervisor of the King case. Second, there was the matter of space considerations. Sullivan's office had little extra space whereas Phillips' office had the necessary space as well as a safe-type cabinet in which to retain the tapes.

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Phillips was asked how soon after the decision was made to have all the tapes assembled at HQ that they were so assembled. Phillips was not sure other than to say that it was soon after a number of the misurs had already been in effect that the field was instructed as above. This instruction then carried forward for those misurs which were subsequently effected. Asked if there was a written record concerning the sending of the tapes to HQ, Phillips responded that there probably was, but not necessarily for all.

Phillips was asked when the decision was made to have the tapes sent in and he said he could not recall. Epstein asked whether, when the decision was made to send in the tapes, he had reviewed logs or transcripts relating to the tapes. He responded that he believed he had seen parts of some. Asked if any of the tapes were sent to HQ prior to the decision to get all of them in, his answer was that he thought possibly yes.

He was asked if he had listened to any of the tapes and he said that he had. Asked as to who else had listened to them, he said he did not recall. Asked as to who was present when he listened, he said he could not recall.

Epstein asked Phillips to further spell out the security consideration concerning having the tapes sent to HQ. Phillips pointed out that this was a special case with a special sensitivity, much of the information was then classified "Top Secret" and handled on a need-to-know basis. It therefore behooved the FBI to keep the material relating to it very close. Further, it was believed to be a good administrative control to have all the tapes in one place.

Phillips was asked whether the same instructions about sending misur tapes to HQ were given to the Atlanta FO relative to wiretap tapes. Phillips said he had no recollection of this. He also pointed out that the content of tapes from misurs begged extraordinary security, a fact not particularly relevant to most wiretap tapes.

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Phillips was asked whether the security consideration concerned actual contents of the misur tapes as distinguished from the physical objects, namely the tapes. Phillips responded that both considerations were prevalent.

Phillips was asked where the tapes were retained in HQ and he said that at different periods of time some of the tapes were in the Laboratory while they were being worked on; some in the Records Section of the Files and Communications Division where they were maintained in the Special File Room; and some retained in the safe-type cabinet in Phillips' office. Eventually, all the misur tapes were gathered together in one place, namely, Phillips' office.

Asked how many misur tapes were in his office, Phillips said he could not even make a guess.

Asked concerning the decision-making in getting the tapes into HQ, Phillips said he had no recollection of this.

Phillips was next asked when he first learned of a decision to make a composite tape. He replied that he learned of it after the fact and consequently, had nothing to do with the decision. He was asked when he first learned of it and he said he could not place the time and as a matter of fact, the existence of a composite tape came as a complete surprise to him. DeOreo asked if Phillips had learned of it within the past couple of months and his answer was "No." He was asked if he was ever asked to transmit all the tapes to the Laboratory and he replied, "No." He was asked if he was instructed to transmit some of the tapes to the Laboratory and he said he had been so instructed. He was asked how he identified the tapes to send to the Laboratory and answered that he could not recall.

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Phillips was asked who had told him to send the tapes to the Laboratory and he said he could not remember. Asked why he had sent them to the Laboratory, he said he had not been told the reason but he had been merely instructed to send them to the Laboratory. There was extensive questioning of Phillips concerning the selective process, that is, why or how certain of the tapes were picked to send to the Laboratory. Epstein wanted to know if the selection was based on content, places involved or other criteria. Phillips said he could not recall the selective process or in what words the instructions came to him to physically remove certain tapes from the cabinet and send them to the Laboratory. He was asked about the actual procedure of sending them to the Laboratory and he pointed out that they were undoubtedly not sent through the mail routinely. It was his best recollection that they probably were hand carried and that this could have been accomplished by any of several people, either individuals working with Phillips or working in the Laboratory.

Phillips was asked if he was told or he later asked the purpose of sending the tapes to the Laboratory and his answer was "No." Phillips was next asked when he had learned the purpose of sending the tapes was to make a composite and he said he did not recall. He was asked how he had learned of the composite. Phillips explained that when the tapes were returned to him, there were one or more than the number he had sent to the Laboratory. This fact concerning extra tapes was further underscored to him when he noted that on the one or more extra tapes the word "composite" appeared on the box or boxes along with perhaps some other verbiage.

Asked if he had ever listened to a composite tape, Phillips said he had no distinct recollection that he had. He was asked if he had ever learned whether a composite was made by using all or only some of the tapes and whether the composite was of only some portions or the entire tapes. In other words,

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in making the composite, were all or only some of the tapes used; and of tapes used, were all or only portions used. His answer was to the best of his recollection, the composite was only of portions of some of the tapes. He was asked the number of composites made and he said he believed only one was made but that there was more than one copy of it made. He was asked what he did with the composite (s) and said it or they would have been put away with the others in the safe-type cabinet.

Phillips was asked if he ever told anyone about having seen a composite and he said that he had. Asked who he had told, he said he could not recall but it would have been logical for him to have told one or more of the following of his superiors: Section Chief Baumgardner, Inspector Sizoo, Assistant Director Sullivan.

Phillips was asked if he had inquired of anyone concerning the composite and he said that he had probably asked a Laboratory SA, John Matter, about it. He chose Matter because it was from Matter that he had received the tapes on their return to Phillips. At that point, when Phillips received more than he had sent, he felt the one to ask would be the one who had returned the tapes to him. This inquiry by Phillips of Matter gained little information for Phillips. It was Phillips' best recollection that Matter indicated he had been given an assignment relative to the tapes and the preparation of a composite from a high ranking superior, unnamed by Matter, and that Matter was thus sworn to secrecy. Phillips pressed Matter no further. Asked how long Phillips had kept the composite (s), Phillips said retention was for as long as he had had the case assigned to him and the composite (s) remained in the cabinet at the time Phillips left this case. Phillips was asked if the tapes were ever removed while they were in his cabinet and he said he could not recall any such removal other than as discussed above.



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As to the composite specifically, Phillips was asked whether it ever left the cabinet and he said that to his best recollection, it had not. He was asked if he had ever again at some later date come in contact with the tapes. Phillips responded that in early 1975, he had been assigned to update an inventory of sensitive material relating to King, including the tapes, and that he would have had come in contact with them under these circumstances.

At this point in the interview, Phillips indicated to Epstein that if Epstein would be a bit more candid, Phillips felt he could be more helpful to him. Epstein's response was that he would just keep asking questions.

In connection with the 1975 inventory, Phillips was asked whether he felt any tapes were missing and he said that he did not recall that to be the case. He was asked when the last previous inventory (previous to 1975) was taken and he said he did not know.

Epstein asked when Phillips first learned the purpose for making the composite. Phillips responded, "Did I ever say I knew the purpose?" Epstein then said, "OK, did you ever learn the purpose?" Phillips responded, "Don't ask me when I stopped beating my wife."

Epstein then again asked if Phillips had ever learned the purpose and Phillips responded that he had not. He was asked if anyone had ever told him the purpose and he answered in the negative. He was asked what was done with the composite and Phillips said he had no firsthand knowledge.

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Epstein asked if Phillips had any knowledge concerning the use of the composite other than what Phillips might have learned through the media. Phillips told Epstein that he had no such knowledge but that in giving this answer, Phillips also pointed out that he was excluding information which he had acquired in connection with his current assignment. Phillips pointed out that it was at a certain point in time that he came to realize that a tape had come into the possession of the King family and that he learned of this a long time ago -- while he was still assigned the King case. Epstein asked whether Phillips had learned this from an SA at HQ and he responded in the negative. He was asked if he learned this from a document and he responded in the negative. At this point, Phillips stressed to Epstein their joint commitment to not discuss the product of electronic surveillances.

Luncheon break was then taken at 11:45 a.m. with resumption of interview at 1:05 p.m.

Epstein asked if Phillips first learned of a mailing of a tape to the King family through a conversation with an SA and he responded that he could have. He was asked if he had learned it from a communication from the Atlanta FO or from an Atlanta SA and Phillips said he could not recall. He was asked if he first learned of it before or after the tape was allegedly mailed and he said, "After." He was asked how long after and responded that he did not know.

At this point, Phillips questioned Epstein concerning the pertinence of this line of inquiry. Phillips told Epstein that he felt his questions very tiresome because he could see no relevance to them and it was difficult to be motivated in his thought process in such an atmosphere. The reference in this

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observation to Epstein related back to Phillips' remarks at the very start of the interview on August 4, 1975, when Phillips pointed out the great difficulty that would be encountered in his having to sort out information he had as to when and how he had acquired the information. It was obvious to Phillips, as reported by him, that his comments in effect fell on deaf ears as far as Phillips was concerned.

Phillips was asked if he was aware of any King tape being mailed to anyone and he said that he was not. He was asked if he was aware of any King tape being played to anyone outside the FBI and he responded that he was not so aware.

Phillips was asked if he was aware of any log, transcript or summary displayed, given or sent to anyone outside the Federal Government. Phillips responded that there was some very limited dissemination of information which would fall into the category of "summary" outside the Federal Government. He was asked to whom and said he could not precisely recall at the time. He was asked to define "very limited" and he said it probably was less than ten instances. He was asked if there were any recipients who were not employees or agents of Federal, state, or local agencies. He said he could not recall who the recipients were. He was asked if any King electronic surveillance information was orally disseminated outside the Federal Government. He responded he had no firsthand knowledge of this. He was asked if he had any knowledge other than firsthand knowledge of dissemination outside the Federal Government. Phillips said that he chose not to answer that question. Epstein asked, "Why?" Phillips responded that he chose not to answer the second question, namely as to why.

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Epstein asked if the JFK Law 10(a)1 tapes were sent to the Laboratory and he said that they were. He was asked if he was the one who sent them and he said he believed that he was.

Many questions were asked concerning the sending of misur tapes to the Laboratory. They concerned how they were sent, which ones were sent, to whom they were sent and how many times they were sent. Phillips said that they were given special handling and were probably hand carried and that he did not precisely recall which ones other than the WFO tapes. Phillips recalled sending to the Laboratory for use by SA William Campbell certain tapes. At the time, Campbell was assigned to WFO. Phillips did not recall how many times he had sent tapes to the Laboratory.

Epstein asked concerning the decision to make transcripts of all the tapes after Phillips had indicated that tapes had been sent to the Laboratory for two purposes. One purpose was possibly for the preparation of the composite and the other was to have a written transcript available of all misur tapes. Phillips indicated that he could not recall anything about the decision to make transcripts of all the tapes. He was asked if there was any written record about sending the tapes to the Laboratory and he said he did not recall. He was asked who prepared the transcripts and he said it was Campbell for the WFO tapes as well as for some others, specific ones unrecalled.

Phillips was asked to exclude information he had from the media or through his current assignment and to then respond as to whether he was aware of any COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program)-type activities against King or the SCLC. Phillips responded that he could not answer this question because he did not think that he and Epstein could ever have a meeting of the minds as to what was encompassed in COINTELPRO-type activities.

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Epstein asked if Phillips knew of any activities with respect to King that the FBI conducted other than intelligence activities and Phillips said that it was not clear as to what Epstein meant by other activities, but that if dissemination was another activity, the FBI did disseminate information about King. He was asked if any information about King was disseminated outside the Federal Government and at this point, Phillips chose to not answer the question.

Phillips was asked what activities the FBI engaged in regarding King and the SCLC other than the collection of and dissemination of intelligence. Phillips' response was that insofar as the SCLC was concerned, this subject was outside the parameters of the interview. As for the King case, Phillips felt that the question was too general to be answered by him.

Epstein asked if Phillips recalled a meeting at HQ where there was present at least one SA from Atlanta and Assistant Director Sullivan. Phillips answered that there had been such a meeting or conference but that he did not attend and therefore had no firsthand knowledge. Phillips explained that in late 1963, he had taken practically all of his annual leave for the year in two separate segments. One was over the Thanksgiving holiday and the other over the Christmas holidays. It was Phillips' recollection that a conference was held and it likely had been in either November or December of 1963 while Phillips was out of the city. He was asked the purpose of the conference or meeting and responded that it was his understanding that it was to explore means of improving the intelligence coverage and investigation of King. Asked as to who decided to have such a conference, Phillips said he could not recall. He was asked if a memorandum was prepared with the decision spelled out concerning the conference and he said he did not know. He was asked if any change in the approach of the King

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investigation resulted from the conference and Phillips said that nothing stands out in his mind along this line. He was asked if investigation of King was intensified as a result of the conference. Phillips' response was that in the period following the conference, say for one or two years, there was more investigation of King than in the like period preceeding the conference. However, Phillips noted that he could not say it was as a result of the conference.

Epstein asked concerning the wiretaps on the SCLC and Phillips responded that this was outside the scope of the interview but Phillips was willing to tell him that the FBI had had wiretaps on the SCLC in its offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and New York City. Asked if there were any wiretaps on the SCLC elsewhere, Phillips said he knew of none and again reminded Epstein that Phillips desired to get away from being interviewed about the SCLC as it was outside the parameters of the authorized interview.

Epstein asked concerning authorizations for wiretaps on King and the SCLC. He wanted to know if they were in similar or separate documents and Phillips advised that they were handled through separate communications. One communication would deal with King's residence whereas another would deal with SCLC offices.

Epstein asked whether the original authorization prepared for a wiretap on King referred to installing it on both King's residence and office. Phillips said he could not give a positive answer to this. He was asked how long wiretaps remained on King's residence and responded that he could not say because it was his best recollection such coverage was still in effect when he left supervision of this case in 1965.

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Epstein asked if Phillips remembered anything about the authorization for the wiretap on King such as having to renew it at six-month intervals or other intervals. Phillips said he could not recall. He was asked if there were any actually on King other than at hotels and motels and Phillips said he could recall none.

Epstein asked about the authority for the wiretap on King at [redacted]

[redacted] Phillips responded that to the best of his recollection there was one type of electronic coverage on King in [redacted]. There was either a misur or a wiretap but he, Phillips, could not recall which one. He said that if there was a wiretap, authority for it would have been included in the original wiretap authority which covered King's residence in Atlanta and in other cities that King visited.

Epstein asked if Phillips was involved in decisions relating to coverage of King in [redacted] and he said that he was not. He was asked if there was any DID involvement in the [redacted] coverage and Phillips said that he personally had no involvement but that there may have been some DID involvement, and that if there was, it would have been under the personal direction of Assistant Director Sullivan.

Phillips was asked whether the Levison case was ever assigned to him and he said it had not been. He was asked if Levison participated in the March on Washington. Phillips said that Levison may not have been actually present in Washington at the time [redacted]



U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Discussion next turned to monographs prepared by the FBI and Phillips was asked as to who decided to prepare the original monograph. Phillips said he did not recall. He was asked who had determined to whom dissemination should be made and Phillips said he could not recall who made the decision. He was asked if the first monograph prepared was disseminated outside the Executive Branch of the Government and he said he believed that it had not been.

Epstein next displayed to Phillips a Xerox of an FBI memorandum from William C. Sullivan to A. M. Belmont dated November 22, 1964, concerning dissemination of the second monograph prepared by the FBI. At one point in this memorandum, mention was made of appropriate dissemination. At this point, an asterisk was inked or penciled in and at the bottom of the page there appeared an asterisk and after it: White House, Department, State and the names of some other Federal agencies. This was an apparent means of indicating exactly to whom dissemination was to be made. Epstein asked who entered this information with the asterisk and Phillips said he did not know but that the printing did not appear to be that of Phillips.

In the above-mentioned memorandum, there was an indication of the information appearing in the monograph which was discussed in the memorandum. One type of information included in the monograph was that shown as number (2) followed with a statement about facts relating to the moral degeneracy of King. The memorandum also referred to the fact that the second monograph was an update of an earlier monograph. Phillips was asked if the update included materials relating to (2). Phillips said he would have thought so. Epstein then asked whether the original monograph which was prepared in October, 1963, had information along the lines of (2). Phillips responded that now that Epstein had directed Phillips' thinking to the time frame, Phillips doubted that the November, 1964, (second monograph) updated anything relating to (2) inasmuch as it was Phillips' best recollection that the FBI did not have such information to include in the original monograph in October, 1963.

U. S. Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)  
Seymour Fred Phillips by SSC Staff Members

Phillips was asked who decided to include information about moral degeneracy and he said he did not know. He was asked who had written that portion of the monograph and responded that he himself may have. He was asked who decided to put such information in the monograph. It was Phillips' best recollection that this was a decision of not any specific person but that there was a general consensus that it should be in the monograph. Epstein asked whether anyone came forward and voiced an opinion that such information should not be included in the monograph. Phillips responded that he did not recall anyone taking such a position.

At this point, Epstein inquired as to why the FBI included information on moral degeneracy in a monograph which supposedly related to the communist influences on King. Phillips told Epstein that Epstein was now entering into an area which called for opinion and conclusion on the part of Phillips. Phillips pointed out that this was also an area that involved moral and philosophical considerations. For all of these reasons, Phillips told Epstein that he chose to not discuss the matter with him. Phillips was asked if he was aware of any other dissemination of the November, 1964, monograph to any Senator other than Senator Hubert Humphrey. At this point, Epstein displayed a Xerox of an FBI letter to Humphrey furnishing him a copy of the monograph. Phillips said he did not have any such information. He was asked who decided to give a copy to Humphrey and Phillips said he did not know.

Epstein asked whether COINTELPRO-Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) was handled in the same section where Phillips handled the King case. The response was in the affirmative. Epstein asked if there was any COINTELPRO-CPUSA against King and Phillips said he knew of none.

The interview concluded at 2:37 p.m. with Epstein indicating that it was complete although the door was open for some possible further questions at a later date.

Enclosure

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., IND.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCQ. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

### ADVICE OF RIGHTS

Before you answer any questions, we would like to advise you of your rights.

This interview is completely voluntary and you have a right to leave without being interviewed, or to terminate the interview at any time.

You have the right to remain silent.

Although the Senate Select Committee is not a prosecutive body, it is possible that anything you say might become available to a prosecutive body and could be used against you in court.

You have the right to consult with an attorney before any questions are asked, and you may have an attorney here with you during questioning.

If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before questioning if you wish.

If you decide to answer questions without an attorney present, you still have the right to stop answering questions any time; or you may defer your answer until you consult with an attorney.

### WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I have read this statement of rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to be interviewed and to answer questions without a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Witness: [Signature]

Witness: [Signature]

Signed [Signature]

Date Aug. 4, 1975

#MDR 16

SP-2 ALM/116

10/27/00

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

☒

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

**8/14/75**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

**The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to  
the White House**

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff  
Members of incumbent Special Agent of the FBI Seymour Fred  
Phillips**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

**NA**6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)**U**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Surveillance, electronic**

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 16-11-00 BY SP2ALM/STG

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

**Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.****62-116395****FMK:fmk****(4)**

**ORIGINAL VIA L. ISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75**

**TREAT AS YELLOW****5-wap**

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

August 15, 1975

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

DOWNGRADED TO

**SECRET**

Per

Date

287 729711  
11/9/2016

Reference is made to the August 5, 1975, request of the SSC for FBI materials.

Enclosed is a memorandum for your approval and forwarding to the Committee in response to Item II in referenced request, on which a deadline for delivery of materials was set for August 15, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

JPT:lhb/lhb  
(10)

NOTE:

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

The material being furnished to the SSC with the enclosed LHM relates to the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, designated "non-derogatory," which have previously been examined by the SSC Staff, and to records of interviews conducted by the Inspection Division of individuals considered by the SSC to possibly have information regarding the handling of the O & C

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

CONFIDENTIAL

files following the death of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover. Exact copies of the materials being furnished to the SSC are being maintained in the office of the Senstudy Project and a detailed record has been made of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum, as well as the materials, to the Committee on 8/15/75. In the material being furnished to the SSC is a memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, dated 3/25/71 entitled "Director's Meeting 3/31/71, With Attorney General, Mr. Richard Helms and Admiral Noel Gayler," originally marked "June" but not classified under the existing regulations. In this memorandum reference is made to a NSA operation, code name "Minaret." On 8/15/75, Ken Harris, NSA, informed Liaison Officer V. Weimar that the code name "Minaret" is classified "Confidential, XGDS 2, Indefinite," and any narrative concerning "Minaret" is classified "Top Secret." The code word has been excised from the copy of the memorandum being furnished to the SSC and the memorandum has been stamped "Top Secret."

Classified by 6875, XGDS 2, Indefinite.

CONFIDENTIAL

62-116395

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
    (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas  
    August 15, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the August 5, 1975, request  
by the SSC for FBI materials.

Item II., A., requested delivery of materials  
contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files,  
designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by the SSC  
Staff, under the following seven headings:

1. Agreement between FBI and Secret Service;
2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by  
FBI;
3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence  
Coverage;
5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and  
Foreign;
6. Directives (60);
7. Cook, Fred (52).

Processing of the requested material has been  
completed and will be delivered to the Committee on August 15,  
1975, with this communication.

JPT:1hb llb  
(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

# MDR 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/15/00 BY SP-2 HMM/LLG

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Item II., B., requested "summaries or notes" on interviews conducted by the FBI Inspection Division regarding handling of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files. Forty-three forms FD-302 and one "insert" relating to interviews of 36 individuals, responsive to this request, have been assembled and will be delivered to the Committee on August 15, 1975, with this communication.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/15/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee.  
Caption of Document:

8/5/75 request: Item II, A & B

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Daly Date: 8/15/75

Received by: John E. Ellery  
SSC

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR 16  
10-11-00 SP2 ALM/JTG

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available  
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

8/15/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC☐ HSC4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,  
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and encls

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-  
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 8/5/75 Item II, A+B

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

TS

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are  
used underline for emphasis)

Information handling

#MDR16

A. CONFIDENTIAL

B. SECRET

C. TOP SECRET

10-11-00 SP-2 ALM/786

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Materials delivered to the SSC of the so-called  
"Official and Confidential" files designated "non-derogatory".

62-116395  
(FMK:Fmk  
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SEMSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
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- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. W. H. Hannall  
1 - Mr. C. O. Carter  
1 - Mr. J. L. Deegan  
1 - Mr. L. D. Shackelford

Mr. W. H. Hannall

7/30/75

Mr. A. J. Fulton

1 - Mr. A. J. Fulton  
1 - Mr. D. Ryan  
1 - Mr. D. L. Tethus

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This is to identify Cointelpro documents referred to staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) for review only in the JHM Building on 7/23, 25, 28/75. Commencing 7/17/75 SSC staff members were permitted to review unexcised Exhibits A-1 of the Peterson report on FBI Cointelpros. These exhibits are highly sanitized individual write ups of proposals for actions submitted under the Black Extremist, New Left, White Hate, Socialist Workers Party and Communist Party Cointelpros. In accordance with a prior agreement between the Department and SSC, these staff members were furnished xerox copies of original serials in the various Cointelpros that they deemed necessary for their review in room 4171, JHM. These copies of original FBI serials were excised to protect sensitive sources and information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Attached for the file are 36 copies of excised serials as they were made available to the SSC on 7/23/75 relating to the Black Extremist and New Left Cointelpros, 23 copies relating to the Communist Party, USA, Cointelpro which were made available 7/25/75, and 26 copies of excised serials regarding the Black Extremist Cointelpro which were made available to the SSC for review in the JHM Building on 7/28/75.

62-116000 (Enclosures - 3)

①-62-116395 (Sensitivity) - 75  
1 - 100-440000 (Black Extremist)  
1 - 100-440034 (New Left)  
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)

OT:11  
(12)

#MDR16

10113100-SP2ALM/ATG

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-  
RECORDED

AUG 26 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN

84 AUG 29 1975

Memorandum to : J. W. F. Wannall  
Re: Comtelpros  
62-116009

For record purposes, the following SEC staff members reviewed the above documents on the dates noted: Barbara Janoff, Lester Sidell, Mary Deoreo and Arthur L. Jefferson. In each instance prior to the review of a document by the SEC, it was approved for review by the SEC by the appropriate responsible Section Chief.

ACTION:

None. For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

July 30, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of former FBI Special Agent Jerry D. Roseberry. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

62-116395

DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRM/LL

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
1 - 67-564783 (Personnel File Former SA Jerry D. Roseberry)

SFP:1hb/116  
(11)

REC-56

EX-104

9 AUG 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

62-116395

July 30, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI  
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JERRY D.  
ROSEBERRY BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JRM/6076

Set out below is information concerning an interview of former FBI SA Jerry D. Roseberry by SSC Staff Members. Roseberry served in the FBI from May 4, 1959, until his resignation on February 20, 1970. He entered the FBI in a clerical capacity but was an SA at the time of his resignation. His FBI service was interrupted by his resignation February 23, 1962; he was reinstated July 2, 1962.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC Staff Member, Roseberry was advised that he was to be interviewed at 10:30 a.m., July 15, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge, 275 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30301. Roseberry was informed by the FBI that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr., Stanley David Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). It was explained to Roseberry that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. Roseberry was also told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques;

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

1 - 67-564783 (Personnel File Former SA Jerry D. Roseberry)

SFP:lhb/lhb

(10)

MAIL ROOM ☐

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

GPO 954-546

ENCLOSURE



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Roseberry was informed that if he desired the presence of an FBI representative in Atlanta for consultation purposes, one would be supplied on his request. He then made a request for such assistance.

An FBI representative met with Roseberry in Atlanta on July 14, 1975, at which time Roseberry was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of the areas set out above, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with the FBI representative, who would not accompany him to the interview but who would be available in the FBI Atlanta Field Office located in the same building where the interview was to take place.

The details of the interview, as voluntarily furnished by Roseberry, are as follows.

Roseberry was interviewed in Senator Talmadge's office for the approximate period 11:30 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., July 15, 1975, by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo. Roseberry was advised that he was entitled to an attorney if he desired one and that whatever he said might be used against him. He told Epstein that he was not interested in having an attorney. The following details are not necessarily in chronological order.

Roseberry was asked his current employment which he gave as follows. He has been employed since 1970 as a Security Supervisor for the Southern Bell Telephone Company in Atlanta. On request, Roseberry furnished the name of his current superior as Theodore A. King, General Security Manager. Asked how long King has been in this position,

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

Roseberry advised that it has been for about 15 years. Asked if Theodore A. King had anything to do with the wiretap concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., Roseberry advised that he did not know. It was indicated to Roseberry that the SSC might want to talk to Theodore A. King.

Roseberry was asked when he started in the FBI and he said it was in 1959. On request, he advised that his initial assignment was a clerk at FBI Headquarters; that he resigned in 1962 to return to Atlanta; and later in 1962 was reinstated in the Atlanta Field Office. He later served as an Investigative Clerk and as a Complaint Clerk. He was asked when he worked on the Martin Luther King, Jr., technical surveillance and he said it was in 1964 and 1965. Asked if he did this work in the office, he said that he did not. Asked where the work took place, he said it was in a building across the street from the Atlanta Field Office. Roseberry was asked if the FBI had any monitoring plants in the Atlanta Field Office and he said he did not know. He was asked who in the FBI installed the technical surveillance and he said he did not know. Roseberry was asked who the technicians in the Atlanta Field Office were at the time of the King investigation. He said there were two Radio Operators named Ray Stenger (phonetic) and Jerry Hedrick (phonetic), but that all their work encompassed radio repair.

Roseberry was questioned as to where King resided when the electronic surveillance was in effect on him and he said he did not know. He was asked what other technical surveillances the FBI had in effect at the time besides those on King and the SCLC. Roseberry replied that there was a technical surveillance on the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Roseberry told his interrogators that he had appeared in Federal Court in Atlanta on one occasion in the past in connection with a Selective Service Act case with ramifications relating to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

Roseberry was asked if he had discussed his current interview with anyone in the FBI. He advised that on the evening of July 11, 1975, he had been given some procedural information relating to the interview by Mr. DeBruler, the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Field Office. He was then told that he could receive additional information from the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI in the event he was contacted for interview by the SSC. On July 12, 1975, Roseberry spoke to an SA in the Legal Counsel Division preparatory to making himself available for the interview. This conversation was telephonic and procedural in nature. Epstein inquired as to whether Roseberry had asked for assistance and advised that he had and was given the name of an FBI representative who would likely be the person who would be available for consultation at the time of the interview, in the event Roseberry desired such consultation help. Subsequently, on July 14, 1975, Roseberry talked briefly with the FBI representative available in Atlanta for this purpose, SA Seymor Fred Phillips. Roseberry was asked whether he had discussed with Phillips the facts relating to the King investigation. Roseberry said that the case itself had not been discussed and that they had talked only about the parameters of the forthcoming interview and the privileged areas Roseberry was not required to respond to questions.

Roseberry was questioned as to whether he had taken any equipment to the monitoring plant when he worked on the King case and he said that he had not. Asked whether the tapes utilized were new or used tapes, he said that he did not know. Asked whether the monitoring installation was ever inspected by FBI Headquarters personnel, he said that he did not know. Roseberry was asked who he had reported to when he worked on this case, and he said that it was to the Agent

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

who was in charge of the case at the time, Al Sentinella. He was asked if there were any monitoring installations in the Atlanta Field Office, and he said he did not know.

Roseberry was asked if he knew why the Bureau had a wiretap on King. Roseberry advised the purpose of the wiretap was to determine King's contacts and movements because of a concern about some of the people who were the advisors to King and also out of a concern for King's personal safety. Concerning King's personal safety, Roseberry was asked if the Bureau ever told King his life had been threatened. Roseberry responded that he did not know but assumed that the FBI would have advised King because it was the FBI practice to advise individuals who might be the targets of such threats. He was asked who had told him the reasons for the King investigation, and he stated that he did not remember. He was asked if the electronic coverage of King's residence was a telephone tap or a bug, and he responded that he knew only of a telephone tap; he did not know of any bug.

Roseberry was asked what the policy of wiretapping was of the Southern Bell Telephone Company. Roseberry responded that the only matters he is involved in in his employment relates to court-ordered wiretaps. He was next asked about national security wiretaps made without court order. He responded that he never handled any of this nature. He was asked as to his company's policy on court-ordered wiretaps, and he referred Epstein to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in New York City.

NOTE:

Debriefing of Roseberry as reported herein was by S. F. Phillips of INTD who, on prior approval, traveled to Atlanta to be available for consultation purposes. Phillips was not called upon by Roseberry during the interview.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index		FROM: <b>FBI</b>	
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees			
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)		2. DATE PROVIDED	
DOCUMENT	BRIEFING <b>X</b>	INTERVIEW	TESTIMONY
		OTHER	
		<b>7/30/75</b>	
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)			
SSC	<b>The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House</b>		
HSC			
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)			
<b>Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former Special Agent of the FBI Jerry D. Roseberry.</b>			
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)		6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)	
<b>NA</b>		<b>U</b>	
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)			
<b>Surveillance, electronic</b>			
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)			
<b>Former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King Jr., Stanley David Levison and Southern Christian Leadership Conference.</b>			
<b>62-116395</b>			
<b>FMK:fmk</b>			
<b>(4)</b>			
<b>ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENTUDY 75</b>			
<b>TREAT AS YELLOW</b>			

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

August 19, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with enclosure concerning an interview by a representative of the captioned Committee of former FBI Special Agent George C. Moore. Single copies of the memorandum and its enclosure are also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 4

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-14-81 BY SP2 JH/c

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA George C. Moore)

LFS:1hb  
(10)

REC-56

EX-101

9 AUG 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-346

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

62-116395

August 19, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI  
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) GEORGE C.  
MOORE BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-14-81 BY SP-2 JH/12

This memorandum and its enclosure contain information concerning an interview on July 28, 1975, of former FBI SA George C. Moore by Mr. Loch Johnson, SSC Staff Member. Mr. Moore entered on duty with the FBI in a clerical capacity on November 3, 1941, and was appointed an SA October 18, 1943. With the exception of a period of military leave between July 22, 1944, and October 1, 1946, Moore served continuously with the Bureau until his retirement on July 31, 1974.

On advance notice from Mr. Johnson, Mr. Moore was advised that Mr. Johnson desired to interview him at Mr. Moore's convenience relative to his knowledge of the Huston Report. Mr. Moore was advised that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the Huston Report. It was explained to him that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI would be unable to provide private counsel. He was also advised that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information originating with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies.

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Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA George C. Moore)

LFS:1hb 1hb

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MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-346



**SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC**

Mr. Moore was advised that if he desired an FBI representative to be available for consultation at the time and place of the interview, one would be supplied. Mr. Moore advised that he would appreciate having a Bureau representative available at the time of his interview. Arrangements were made whereby the interview was subsequently conducted by Mr. Johnson in an office provided by the SSC on July 28, 1975. SA Leon F. Schwartz accompanied Mr. Moore to the interview but was not present during the interview.

On August 15, 1975, Mr. Moore voluntarily furnished the attached memorandum which he prepared subsequent to his interview with Mr. Johnson.

**Enclosure**

**NOTE:**

Former SA Moore's memorandum concerning the interview was voluntarily furnished to SA Schwartz.

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SP-2 ADM/716  
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4-14-81  
CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-2 JAP/ci  
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW 8-12-95

For purposes of identification in this memorandum, my name is George C. Moore, former Special Agent of the FBI having retired July 31, 1974. My address is 6715 North 27th Street, Arlington, Virginia, telephone number 533-8288. In view of the fact that I have been interviewed by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) concerning matters involving my activities while an FBI employee, I am making this interview a matter of record for the information of the FBI by my own volition.

On July 28, 1975, I appeared at the new Senate Office Building for a 2:00 p.m. interview with Mr. Loch Johnson, a Staff Member of the Senate Select Committee, concerning the Huston paper.

Although the interview was originally set up for 2:00 p.m., we spent a total of 45 minutes looking for an office space in which to hold the interview. Mr. Johnson was considerably embarrassed with the snafu of his clerical staff not providing him with room keys in the former Carroll Arms Hotel already occupied by other Staff personnel. After approximately 30 minutes, I suggested that perhaps we would save alot of time

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) OF Class  
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if he conducted the interview in the park across the street. He seemed receptive to this suggestion; however, we could not find a park bench. We proceeded to Senator Church's office and arrangements were made to use the Senator's personal office located in the Capitol building itself.

At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Johnson did not place me under oath or indicate that I was under subpoena. He also did not advise me of my rights and right to counsel, although he was aware that a representative of the Bureau (Supervisor L. F. Schwartz) was standing by in the Senate Office Building for consultation if needed by me.

The following were key points which I recall covered during the interview.

Initially, he asked me for a brief statement of my background which I provided. He was very much interested in knowing the extent of my acquaintanceship with Mr. Huston prior to the June 8, 1970, (a Monday morning) meeting in the Director's office. I informed him that I had met Huston no more than two times prior to that meeting and possibly once when I had briefed him at Mr. Sullivan's suggestion in Division 5 concerning extremist activities covered by the

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section under my supervision. Such briefing was not a long briefing and I did not recall any further details including who might have accompanied Mr. Huston. Next, he desired to know if I had ever prepared a paper for Mr. Huston which indicated the extent of the extremist threat in the United States. I did not recall preparation of any such paper at this time other than the overall paper prepared at the Director's (and President's) instructions in the Summer of 1970, known as the "Huston Plan."

He asked me what I considered to be a true assessment of the extremist threat at that time and I informed him the paper which was written was an accurate statement of the threat as known to the FBI together with the input from other intelligence agencies.

He seemed interested in the foreign aspects to this threat and asked for my assessment in that regard and endeavored to have me label it as significant, nonsignificant, moderate and similar adjectives. I refused to label it and stated that the threats spoke for themselves and it was for others to interpret in that regard although I did point out that there was and has been and possibly still remains a degree of varying

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proportions of foreign influence in these movements. I emphasized that the word was "influence" and not knowledge of any control.

He asked whether I felt the President was correct in believing that the quality of FBI intelligence in this area was low.

I informed that it was my recollection that President Johnson likewise had been critical of the overall data of FBI intelligence in this area and we in the FBI who collected such intelligence knew fully well that our intelligence product, although good in some respects, left much to be desired. In other words, there were definite intelligence gaps.

Next overall point covered was the meeting in the Director's office on Monday, June 8, and his desire to receive from me a feel of the tenor of the meeting since I was one of the participants.

I informed him of the nature of my attendance which was a last minute notification by Mr. W. C. Sullivan who stopped by Branch Chief Joseph A. Sizoo's desk (which I was manning at the time) and asked me to go with him across the street to the Director's office. He did not tell me why and did not brief me ahead of time. After getting there, it was

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obvious I was taken in order to prepare a memorandum of the event. (This was obvious to me since I was much the junior man in attendance.)

Mr. Johnson was interested in a rundown of the meeting itself to the best of my recollection and I provided him a few of the details including the fact that Admiral Noel Gayler (phonetic) of the National Security Agency (NSA) was about five minutes late and the Director started the meeting on time without him. Also, during the meeting the Director gave a very brief rundown on the mandate of the President, which was to identify intelligence gaps through a cooperative effort letting the chips fall where they may and affording the President a good hard-hitting report which would allow him an opportunity to make some hard decisions. Somewhere in this meeting the comment was made about a lack of cooperation on the part of the agencies, and the Director looked Mr. Helms in the eye and said that he was not aware of any lack of cooperation on the part of any of the agencies and Mr. Helms agreed with the Director in spite of the fact that liaison had been curtailed a short time prior to the meeting by the Director with CIA.

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One other item of interest furnished was the fact that Admiral Gayler used this meeting as an opportunity to make a request of the Director that he hoped the FBI would help NSA out by engaging in surreptitious entries regarding embassies. The Director gave him no hope in this regard pointing out the risks involved and the climate of the times dictated that this matter be given very careful study before any hasty decisions would be arrived at. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Johnson asked if I was aware of a flap which occurred at this meeting in which Mr. Huston allegedly informed the Director that the guidelines for the study were broader than announced by the Director in his presence. I recalled no such flap and informed Mr. Johnson that a memo was written by me of the meeting which was sent to the Director which hit the highlights of the meeting. He asked if this was available in Bureau files and I answered that I assumed so.

Mr. Johnson was very much interested in the meetings and discussions which took place at Langley, Virginia (CIA's home), and wanted to know who desired meetings to be held there. I emphasized to him that I was not privy to any plans of that sort and only functioned from that time on as a member of the

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working committee primarily because the Section I headed was involved in domestic extremist activities.

He desired to know of Huston's input into these meetings and of any flaps which occurred and in particular, he mentioned someone told him of a flap involving Army. I informed him that Huston did not seem to be running the meeting as Sullivan seemed to be doing that in his position as Chairman and I knew of no flaps that occurred with any members.

I also mentioned in response to a question that Mr. Helms did attend the first meeting at CIA Headquarters and merely welcomed us to their space and offered any assistance. He left and never returned after a few remarks.

Johnson asked several questions involving the format of the report utilizing options for the President and asked for my knowledge of how such a report was decided upon. I told him I had no knowledge; he was asking the wrong person.

He commented about Part 3 being only one recommendation and wanted to know if that was unusual and I responded that I had never been involved in a paper for the President before and I did not know whether such was unusual or not. I also commented that I felt that the options in and of themselves

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were in the nature of recommendations at the President's pleasure.

Johnson was especially interested in whether other agencies were desirous of using this whole operation as a means of utilizing illegal techniques which were at that time denied and also if the FBI representatives likewise approached this task with more than usual enthusiasm with the expectance that they too would be allowed to use techniques some of which were obviously illegal.

I told him that I could not speak for other agencies and that there were better people to speak with on that score but as far as my feelings as a representative of the FBI were concerned, we all approached it as a difficult task involving hard work, in view of a short deadline, and a project on which the President, the Director and Assistant Director Sullivan were riding herd. At the same time, from a personal standpoint I felt that "hope always springs eternal" and that maybe, in view of the high-level interest involved here, from an overall standpoint we might be provided with some investigative tools which would allow us to do a better job. At no time

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was there any discussion to my recollection as to whether any technique was legal or illegal bearing in mind that everybody at the table was a professional from an intelligence point of view who made up a working committee and the matters of that nature would be policy matters involving officials on a cabinet level or higher.

I was asked the question as to whether or not extremist field personnel ever utilized covert mail examination techniques. I told Johnson I felt he was getting beyond the scope of my clearance from the Bureau for this interview and he stated that he did not think so since one of the options involved had to do with this matter. I informed him rather than belabor the point that we in our Section's work did not engage in this technique but I would refuse to go any further with respect to my knowledge.

He asked me if I had any knowledge of what developed after the report was prepared, apparently approved by the President, and then later recalled. I told him that I had no knowledge of a personal nature and very poor hearsay, which was gathered through rumor, and later accounts from the press that the Director allegedly took the letter to the Attorney General who had it recalled.

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He also asked me for my knowledge of how the Director made his footnote decisions. I told him I did not know but felt that Mr. Sullivan was the person who would know and have first-hand knowledge. He asked me if the Director discussed it with Mr. Tolson. I told him I did not know but that he may have in view of the relationship.

He also was interested whether I had knowledge of a difficult situation which Mr. Sullivan might have been in at this time as chairman of a committee acknowledging intelligence gaps on the part of the FBI and also occupying a position which would entail loyalty to the Director. I agreed that Mr. Sullivan was in a delicate position.

He also asked me for my opinion as to what lesson could be learned from the Huston papers and I stated that very little, if any, good could be learned from the papers themselves but I did hope that after Congress was finished with its investigation brought about by the Watergate syndrome that the best interest of the country would be preserved in the sense that we don't lose sight of the fact that there are legitimate national security interests which need to be protected and that there will come a time in the future when

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the people who are in power, whether it is Executive Branch, Congress or both, will be asking the same questions with respect to intelligence gaps and will have to make some hard decisions.

He also asked me if there was any advice I could give as to reforms which could be initiated and I responded that they were talking to the wrong person about reforms. It seemed to me as if they had enough reformers in Congress today.

He did not ask me who was present at the meetings in Langley as he said he had full knowledge of those who were present but he did name to me those he felt were present and at that time asked me if there were any individuals in addition. I mentioned that I was not sure whether T. J. Smith was present or not. He mentioned D. E. Moore, W. C. Sullivan, C. D. Brennan, R. D. Cotter, W. O. Cregar and F. J. Cassidy, as well as myself.

He also mentioned that he had heard that the report consisted of 90 percent Bureau information and asked me if that was correct. I said I had never put a percentage figure on the information but knew that the report was top heavy on Bureau intelligence which indicated intelligence gaps on

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the parts of CIA and others. He asked me if I felt that there was a need for an evaluation type of committee to overlook domestic intelligence in the future. I said "yes" I felt that there was a need but felt that such a committee should be set up with Congress as a joint committee with the Executive Branch. He asked why and I replied that if such a committee had been set up, I wouldn't be in Washington, D. C., today giving an interview at this time and I thought for the good of the country there should be in the future such a plan instituted.

Finally, he asked me for my opinion as to whether security work should be taken out of the hands of the FBI and put somewhere else. I said that this was going a little far from the scope but maybe it did bear on the "Huston Plan." My reply was that I felt from a historical viewpoint the FBI's record in the security and intelligence field has withstood the test of time and was an outstanding record under the direction of Mr. Hoover and felt that if their reputation was not unduly damaged by Congress the security work definitely should remain under the confines of the FBI. He said my comments were interesting since I was the first retired person

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to leave FBI with these feelings and I replied that I did not know who he talked with and certainly felt that Mr. Kelley would take the same stand if he was called for interview. I further stated that there is a definite relationship between security investigations and criminal violation responsibilities, many of which go hand in hand and as the terrorist threat continues in this country and possibly explodes, we will see more of a reason for security and criminal divisions to work closely together.

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TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

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INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

8/19/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to  
the White House

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff  
Member of former Special Agent of the FBI George C. Moore

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

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7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Intelligence collection

#MDR 16  
10-11-00-SP2 ALM/JAG

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Concerning the FBI and the so-called Huston Report

62-116395

(FMK: fmk  
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ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

51 wol

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