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ALPHA 66 PROGRAM

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5 November 1962

SUBJECT: Alpha 66 Frogmen (C)

1. (S) Capt Hubbard called undersigned at 1000, 3 November. He said he had spent a great deal of time talking with Veciana and Veciana had agreed to try and get the two men to Miami for Hubbard to meet. Veciana had asked if we would pay the expense of the boat, since it was not in their budget. Although Veciana specified that only Hubbard could see the men, Hubbard said he was going to "turn them over" to him and he thought we could inject the Navy man into the debriefing.
2. (S) Hubbard had tentatively agreed to this arrangement. The boat cost is estimated at \$300. Veciana was to proceed to Miami as planned on 3 November. From there he was to arrange for the exit of the two frogmen. Hubbard asked if we could provide assistance through INS if it became necessary. I said we would try. I suggested that Hubbard wait in Puerto Rico for Veciana to call from Miami, saying he had the two men there, before he proceeded to Miami. He also said that Veciana had offered to take him to the island base of Alpha 66 to look around. Hubbard noted that while he was talking with Veciana, he had turned down a \$5000 offer by CBS to send a camera crew to the island. Hubbard strongly recommended that he be permitted to go. He asked that if he was permitted to go that we obtain for him a life jacket with dye markers and shark repellent.
3. (S) Undersigned discussed these developments with Maj Swafford and Maj Drashpil. Our consensus of opinion was that Hubbard should be allowed to go ahead, that the Navy not be notified until the men were in Miami. Hubbard was notified of this about 1100, 3 November, prior to seeing Veciana off on the plane.
4. (S) Col Boyt directed that a letter be written to Operations Branch requesting a policy decision on Capt Hubbard's trip to the base. Subsequently Capt Hubbard called at 1500 hours, 7 November to say he had had a call from Veciana saying he and the two frogmen would arrive by boat in Miami about 1000, 8 Nov. Hubbard is going to Miami early 8 Nov (EAL Flight 150, 0917 arrival Miami). He will meet the boat. Maj Watlington was notified of these developments and he will meet Hubbard at the plane. It was suggested to Maj Watlington that Lt Stein accompany Hubbard to meet the boat if feasible. Hubbard will call us when the men are in his custody, at which time we will notify Navy. This course of action agreed upon by Lt Col Daugherty.
5. (S) Veciana was contacted as scheduled. The boat with the frogmen was supposedly 70 miles offshore. Hubbard did not go out to meet the boat and instructed Veciana to try and get the frogmen to shore. Veciana promised to be back in Miami late 9 November.

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8. (S) Hubbard called at 0700, 10 Nov and reported that he and Lt Stein had just finished debriefing the leader of the attack on that date. A full report was being prepared and placed in the mail to us that date. The leader reported that he possibly could get the two frogmen in three or four days - they were out on "another mission" at present. Hubbard said that he would call Lt Col King later in the day to give him a full report. As to guidance whether he should stay on in hopes of meeting him, I referred him to King, saying it was all right if King approved.

7. (S) About 1430 hours, 10 Nov I contacted King in PR. He had just returned from his survey trip of the Caribbean. I filled him in on the developments with Alpha 66 and gave him a full briefing on the policy and thinking here as we knew it at that time. King said he understood perfectly, was interested in exploiting this opportunity and would proceed as he saw fit.

8. (S) On 13 Nov a cable from CIA was received outlining purported differences between Alpha 66 and SFDE. (Filed in Pfutner SD). Based on this there seemed little point in working with Alpha 66 or Veciana. Therefore I talked with DeGagne (King being absent) and explained the situation to him, then spoke with Hubbard in Miami. Hubbard stated he was aware of all this information and that it was his opinion that Veciana enjoyed a position equally as high as Menoyo in the SFDE movement now. Further he had talked with Menoyo.

9. (S) With these additional facts, matter was again discussed with Lt Col Daugherty as it now appeared we were working with SFDE and with an organization with the capability to assist in emplacing agents should we be allowed to proceed with such actions. A file check was conducted revealing a 1961 ISR on Menoyo. An ISR check (priority) was submitted on Veciana (although we have no present dealing with him). Veciana, of course, was initially contacted to assist in obtaining the frogmen and not for a clandestine purpose.

10. (S) The debriefing of Menoyo was received on 14 Nov. Pending a resolution of the case, Hubbard returned to Puerto Rico on 14 Nov at 1230 hours from Miami.

11. (S) Maj Watlington received contact instructions from the SFDE contact at 1630 hours, 15 Nov 62. He called undersigned at home at 1800 hours, 15 Nov and passed on the message. Grover and Pat were called in Puerto Rico about 1930 hours. The message was passed on with word that if there were any change in plans, the Miami contact must know by 0830 hours 16 Nov. Grover was told that he still had not received permission for the trip.

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12. (S) On 15 Nov about 1630 hours, ISR reply on VECIANA was received

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from CIA. There is an OI. In verbal conversation between Lt Col Daugherty and Mr Sherwood on 15 Nov it was firmly established in Sherwood's mind that we have a priority of interest on Menoyo and are contacting him in the U.S. Further, Sherwood reported that the PM people were the ones with an OI on VECIANA and he promised to look into the matter to see if there might be the possibility of some modus vivendi for his use.

6. (U) On 16 Nov Maj Watlington informed this office that Lt Col King and Capt Hubbard were in Miami. On 19 Nov, Major Watlington informed us that they had both departed on 17 Nov. (see attached Memo).

7. (C) On 19 Nov Mrs Taylor received a call from Marie (CIA-ISR rep) saying the OI on VECIANA had been dropped. We picked it up.

8. (U) On 22 Nov I received a phone call from Lt Col King in Miami. He said both he and Capt Hubbard had just returned and would leave for Puerto Rico that day. He was sending two rolls of colored film that date from Miami to us for processing. He would prepare his report as soon as he reached Puerto Rico. He reported no unusual occurrences and he had not been further than the base. They did not bring back any material.

W.C. ARMS
Capt
LA Desk Officer

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