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
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The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments 1. of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Démocrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMMOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMMOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMMOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.

Roger E. MARCHBANE

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ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYL.

The following analysis has been prepared in WI Division and is transmitted to all WI Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FVI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOCEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering analternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class clements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which

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represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. <u>Parties of Current Significance</u>. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Markist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

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3. <u>Farties of Moderate Potential</u>. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemila -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

s. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three ency states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parlimentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. <u>Parties of Insignificance</u>. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argenting (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia

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(Remo di Ratale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmalds to the handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparitive figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political strips assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has carned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "bot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural relieving process will no longer produce the same magic.

S. <u>Need for Training</u>. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORNEU and various student training

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courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are epened up. Frei and Galdera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the German believe a massive program sust be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the GD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

III - THE IMPACT OF CLASE ON THE CHRISTIAN DECORATIC NOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement. A KUMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the . hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole <u>raison</u> d'erre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. <u>CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence</u>. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is cmulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. <u>Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely</u>. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the <u>Comite Relacionador Y</u> <u>Coordinator De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los</u> <u>Partidos Democrata Cristianos</u>. The Act appeals to the CD parties

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to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. <u>Notative CLASE Influence on Perty Youth Wings</u>. Closer CLASE identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASE has soom and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASE has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest-progress in Central America.

IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the <u>Organization Democrata</u> <u>Cristians</u> <u>de</u> <u>America</u> (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President	:	Rafael Caldera, Venezuela
Vice President	2	Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru
Vice President	1	Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala
Secretary General	:	Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) out :on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilcan, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogencity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and im negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

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continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for m least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foresecable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WDDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impluge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Nemocrata Cristiana de CentroAmerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems compon to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Nica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NZI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated \$300,000 to \$1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$450,000 for the 1968 election from FIS at the rate of \$160,000 per year commencing in 1965.

a. The <u>IIS</u>. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

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 the built of TIS's operating budget class from the Gorman Government. It's maintains several permanent representatives in Latin Asoriea and supports several CO activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget. 5. The Free-Free Literational Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CP-oriented groups in Latin America. The rise operates and a several contributes with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as: an arm of the CD of the normal Solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as: a nam of the CD of the Advances Schwift (President of the FIS, a Gorman nucleon, Adolf Harkmarth and Aquet Vanistendel (Secretary Central of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unloss CISC). 18. <u>Difference in Function of LIS and FIS</u>. From the start of its activities, the Gorman and TCAlions have contributed alloct the online Tis budget (in 1966, for example, Vanistendeal contributed only 15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS opecars to be the exclusive European CD clannel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tanden and could easily fund the Latin American Harvisch parties directly. Thus a Latin Marties directly, the FIS channel is proferred by the Gormans and has two major advantages: First, since TIS is a regional solidarity in the representation (but not contribution) from all the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin Marties part is down to the Strain part in competition with the Gorman destributed and the support to the Orbistian Demorratic movement in Latin America (See Attachment, Second, 15 is ensite to obtiste the magnitude of European C is collectively. Thus a Latin Marties aff the should through a militiparty organization. The Gormanis and the support to the Christian Demorr	·		SECRET	poert ansertreit 5361	
 Sensiliy Greation of Different 1964 to avoid duplication of dimension support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity for doindatted (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECUL, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS), a German actional actional and lease personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendnel (Secretary General of the International Federation of Circuitian Trade Unlows - CISO). 18. <u>Difference in Function of IIS and FIS</u>. From the start of its activities, the Germans and Ttalians have contributed alaost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only \$15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS oppears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American growther with representation (but not contribution) from all the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American Solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American fit is calsed to obluscate the magnitude of European organization. The German have limited IIS forming the also representation for organization, The Germans and that almost without of class control of second cals and the second contributed in American Support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.) CO's Challenge Commist Deminstion of the University. It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the wording institutes. (See Attachment A for so		the bulk of 113's Government. IIS in Latin America But it also contr	s operating budget co maintaing several po and supports several	interestion the German emanent representatives CD activities directly	
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20. CO Strength in University Po Indicator of CD Party Strength of Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university preseges a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (locking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the universitytrained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuels) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Cailtan victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1958 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle cohelod cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.

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23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear resote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commoniground. despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (c.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

Meed for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The 24. ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great onthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "viscoral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-bycountry basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

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WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report

Christian Democracy in Latin America

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

Current Balance Sheet

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The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

In only one of these--Chile-is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weaken-


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ing Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

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Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary Géneral Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expe-dient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the centerright of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC),

led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest -- in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

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1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of The former PDC has made parties. no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Bel-gium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaraguá, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

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Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth. groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriguet "the Astronauts." Chilean Presider Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differ-entiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

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The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

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Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and

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the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

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The plan has not yet been. implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties -- have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

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EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)

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KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

Christian Democratic International Union European Christian Democratic Political Eichholz Student Union of Central Europe Christian Democratic Union Organization of Latin America Leadership - of Institute Young Christian Democrats Academy Academy (ECDU) (0004) (UCDEC) (UUDC) Institute for International Solidarity International, Solidarity .1iS) Foundation (FIS) DIRECTOR -Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT Johannes Schauff SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT Support To: Organizational Support To: Political Parties **Political Training Institutes** Training Institutes of CLASC (Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

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CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

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The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they vill contribute an estimated \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadershir of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its

Creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have

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any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership

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abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 7 FEB 1967 - Micri 198 - MDC BECTRE

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	reports since 1961.	
1. Summ	mary: Laureano Batista Mala, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano stian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami from the blic, where he allegedly obtained to Miami in late June 1966x from the Out, the Chief of the Air Formation pledges of "upper the 1966x from the Democratic	.
Repu	stian Democratic Kovement), returned to Miami from the Average of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano blic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro (MDC, the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Kepublic, pending approximate the Dominican ment in which it voiced its formulation with the military department of the Air source the Air sou	
from of P	blic, where he allegedly obtained to Miami in late June 1966x from the Dominica the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending approximation undertakin ment in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily definition for the MDC Scently issued a	
docun	the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending approximation (MDC, resident Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC restriction of the MDC approximation though representatives of the MDC have discussed the signific of funds, sentatives of the Students' new publichary Directorate (MDC) agreements with	n a a
IRN AL	though representatives at discouragement, prime of the MUC representatives the apro	5 Val
Repre	though representatives of the Mic have discussed the signific discrements with sentatives at the Students' nevelutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban with representatives of the Mic have discussed the signific discrements with sentatives at the Students' nevelutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban	1
	sentatives of the Students' nevelutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban Representation in Exile, (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.	
,	(DRE) and the Cuban Representation	
	alliances have been made.	
2.	Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National	
•	Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami	
	on 26 Junet On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC	
	to inform them of the results of his trip?	
3. Br Perez.	Atista said that during thereast discussions held with General Juan N. Folch	
NEALIS	unxnitkxingxhirthet Folch deresto it that unce he had requested faithtuxzzz-	
W 71-4	tuna located at Estero Bales, nor the town of Pepillo Sing Saleedo (N 19-43, According and the Bales, for indexing the low of Second Sing Saleedo (N 19-43, indicated his Willingness to Cooperate	
•	offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:	ĺ
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UTG-8973

The use of five islets facing Santiago de los Caballeros City for a military base. (SIC.).

b. Authorization for MDC personnel to move into-and out of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.

c. Transportation of MDC war material from Miami aboard Dominican Air Force planes.

2. Exist Batista light that he had, visited Fase Luna and on several occasions in talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Guban akexiiwaxix realding in Santiago de los Guballeros, A talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Guban akexiiwaxix realding in Santiago de los Guballeros, A talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Guban akexiiwaxix realding in Santiago de los Guballeros, A talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Guban akexiiwaxix realding in Santiago de los Guballeros de los d

are in charge of Base Luna?

Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in-ordar that the necessary money can be obtained.

6 Although Barbeite agreed with Batista & regarding the need for preparation of operational plans and an estimate of the cost, xfxixplanxatingxikemax he basically waxxspaxaixts Katikix opposed Satista's advocation of initiating immediate action. He felt that it was inadvisable to attempt the implementation of the plans until Balaguer's reaction is known. Hernander' views coincided with those of Barbeite. Na maintimation to the disagreement.

7. At the meeting Batista peported that dissension within exists batwarxian within the MDC in Puerto Rico, particularly between Armando Palacios anizinx San Juan and Sumberto Perca Marzanna Herrera, president and military chief respectively. Recommendation of the second state of the second se

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plans and activities. However, Barbeite defended Perez' action with the argument that RARREXXIEXTISTICTURE TRANSFORMETER DEFINITION of the president on military within the scope of responsibilities of the president. president.

8. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a document dated 29 May. This document included the following points:

a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds. The sum mentioned is \$10,000.5

b. No change in United States policy regarding action against Cuba from the U-O: is anticipated. A base of operations outside of the United States is considered to be so vitally important that the military department would be willing to operate an illegal base if the resources were made available.

The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no sea transportation. The bcats are described as follows:

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9.

UFG-8473

The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard (1) at Stock Island, Florida.⁶ The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts togmake commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This bost is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.

- (2) The KYA-ORA? which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.
- (3) The LANCHA AZUL⁸ is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.
- Informal discussions have been held with representatives of
 the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students³
 Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in
 principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political
 commitment.
- In July JorgeMas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacrion Cuban en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC will be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.

10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saumell' is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MiC and EECE xgax which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbelte in a less important position than that which he currently

occupies. position in the department. which is present position to an unimportant

11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez¹⁰ expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

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UFG-8473

Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf.

3. <u>Headquarters Comment</u>: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican xidxiox Armed Forces and in a x@ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. In TPCSDE 915/00798-66. Another source reported that in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46) Au training at a camp near Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46) Au

- 4. The location of the house was not given.
- 5. <u>Source Comment</u>. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to \$10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that \$75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327)

Field Comments.

- 6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.
- 7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.

8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. UFG_0327). Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the FUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II. 07/21-(())

Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) 2508 312/03202-64),

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Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

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Chief of Station, JHWAVE

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Chief, VHD ADMIN/TYPIC Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

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REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1966

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Readquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Readquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey these files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JAWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

XX.

Attachment: 1. Identity, u/s/c 2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution: S-COS/JNWAYB, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

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NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA

STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

С/ЖН/С/МО

IDENTITY

Paul Loob

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SEPANATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UTG8-8398

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
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1. ANCHIE-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, MHO TRAVELED THROUGH JMWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LEITER TO AMORIE-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED AMORIE-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO FE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DONREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH S1462 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTE OF CARS.

2. ANCHIP-1 TELEPHONED RESARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIFM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCUPING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED ANCHIE-1 THAT NE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMI-NATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMELY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE MOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMPERS.

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TO WH C U/sc att #A to UFGA-24893

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IDENTITIES: A.

Christian Democratic Party

B. Alfredo Lorca

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Marzo 15 de 1966

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Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr.Hum berto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria: debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incomprensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creido que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creido que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvacor donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccio nario Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano lirme, sinó un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,.....

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Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sinó una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrendan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino tambien ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochornosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, sí está realizando una revolución en libertad, sí ha defendido en todo momen to el sano nacionalismo, sí se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,

Ernesto Rodriguez Sec. de Relaciones/Internacionales del MDC de Cuba

JUYERTUS SEESCRATA-CRÍSTIANA DE CUBA. 1732 H.R. 7th St. Ulaul, Fla. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

Cota del mañana.

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La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol José Martí que dice:"ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándo al Pr<u>e</u> sidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario", "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chileetc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos dias atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añació Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se . tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda más armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

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radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han resorrido todo el país sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

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No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un despota como Fidel Castro afirma - adadió Lorca-. En cambio él está resquardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón lo buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 300 000 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y me atrevo a penzer que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín."Es un hombre integro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que núnca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, integro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentas, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que núnca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristia no de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición

And Congrels Jesús Angulo

Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

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
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
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