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7 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Anatole Re NOSENKO

1. On 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, Anatole was consulted about the NOSENKO case as a follow-up to the late January 1969 meetings. He gave recommendations concerning the procedures and topics to be covered during the beginning phases of additional elicitation from NOSENKO which is to begin soon.

2. To provide a basis for discussion certain papers had been prepared for Anatole's review. (See Attachment A for list.) These papers were basically questionnaires about some of the unresolved or questionable aspects of the NOSENKO case based largely on the central themes Anatole had highlighted on 17 January 1969 when he commented after reviewing the October 1957-December 1968 interviews of NOSENKO. (See transcripts KY 1, 2, 3 and 4.) Other papers concerned topics related to the NOSENKO case, memoranda NOSENKO had written, summaries and questionnaires prepared from both collateral information and NOSENKO's information

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and summaries and questionnaires prepared exclusively on the basis of information obtained from NOSENKO during the 1967-68 interview period. Each of these papers was read by Anatole. Anatole's comment, our discussion, or any comment is detailed in Attachment B, which sets forth crucial questions in the NOSENKO case.

3. Anatole was told The Director had decided that the question of NOSENKO's bona fides had not been resolved and had directed that additional elicitation and questioning of NOSENKO would be undertaken immediately and expeditiously pursued. It was understood, of course, as Anatole knew, that he was to make a major contribution to the questioning of NOSENKO and that information to this end would be made available to him: there will be the closest coordination with him, including a timely review of future transcripts based on the new elicitation phase. It was understood his views, comments and recommendations will be transmitted and seriously considered if not explicitly implemented. Anatole emphasized the need for him to review in advance all topics, if not in all cases the specific questions, to be discussed with NOSENKO after the new elicitation phase begins. He understands the new elicitation phase will begin with Attachment C and that there will be no additional topics discussed

with NOSENKO until after Anatole has an opportunity to review them and comment.

4. The following summary points emerged during the course of our discussions as things which must be considered in the NOSENKO case information and as papers or questionnaires are outlined and topics selected for further elicitation from NOSENKO:

a. NOSENKO, as I understand the situation, has had full access to newspapers, magazines, radio and TV since approximately August 1968. Anatole was told I have no knowledge of the periodicals or books he has read.

b. NOSENKO has recently been afforded a controlled break from isolation and an opportunity to have feminine companionship.

c. Since December 1968 the FBI has been interviewing NOSENKO about topics previously discussed as well as other matters of interest to the FBI which do not originate with NOSENKO. Anatole noted that FBI access to NOSENKO must be controlled according to the new elicitation procedures.

d. That it is my opinion only that NOSENKO may think he is entering into or close to entering into a new relationship with the Agency on the basis that he has

satisfactorily answered all questions during the period 1967-68.

e. That it has not been possible and it may never be possible to isolate or pinpoint either the exact information or the point in time when NOSENKO was given new information or additional information which might be relevant upon analysis to the question of his bona fides or his mission.

f. To date there has been a concentration on preparing elicitation questions on the basis of information obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the information Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information has been considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his information and arriving at conclusions, since these interviews were designed to elicit information which would help resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements, and (c) at this time this information is better organized and in contrast to information from 1962, 1964, etc., is retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement.

g. That the summaries and questionnaires prepared to date may not include every comment or statement NOSENKO has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every

reference to a person or a topic. Anatole was told that the sorting or isolation process has been completed only through Memorandum N-188, from a total of approximately 260 memoranda. It was emphasized that most topics and persons were discussed with NOSENKO several times at varying intervals, and that the majority of topics were not covered to completion in one or two interviews. NOSENKO also wrote memoranda on topics which may not have been covered during interview or which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet been correlated with the interviews.

h. That research and analysis on most topics is incomplete, both with respect to collateral information and previous statements from NOSENKO.

i. That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral or related information such as information from the FBI concerning NOSENKO which has not been made available to him. Anatole realizes this type of information may be vital to any consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the possible if not probable relationship between FBI information and sources and the problem of penetration of American intelligence and Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will agree to release pertinent information to him and discuss

sources in the near future. He realizes any analysis or assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent information is withheld from him. Anatole understands the problem even though he obviously does not accept it as logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press the FBI to make appropriate information available to him.

j. That information we are dealing with in the transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not necessarily information previously known to or discussed with NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of information resulting from the 1967-68 information has been expanded considerably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and photographs provided him. It was also noted that it has not yet been possible to isolate topics new to NOSENKO about which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither have we been able to isolate or determine when in the past new topics or questions of possible significance were introduced to NOSENKO.

4. We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations and evolved an initial selection of Crucial Questions (Attachment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).

Anatole expects to review and comment and to frame additional questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first elicitations. He has requested and expects, as this can be accomplished, to review and comment about a summary of each Crucial Question. The summary is to set forth both collateral and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if necessary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photographs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatole insists that he review and assist in the framing of all questions to be asked of NOSENKO and he states that he will stipulate the order of questioning by both topic and specific question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed without his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted about each topic. He plans to carefully tailor the elicitation approach and, more importantly, to set down detailed guidelines to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes more direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will be a confrontation or hostile interrogation. He also foresees

another polygraph examination either before or after the period of confrontation. The method or approach to the elicitation from NOSENKO is elaborated in Attachment C. Anatole's recommendations about confrontation tactics will follow after the results of the elicitation phase have been analyzed. During the period NOSENKO is being asked to comment initially, work on additional elicitation topics will continue.

5. Anatole continues to express his concern about the problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. He emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the results of the elicitation from NOSENKO although he understands it will be necessary to provide the results to the FBI. He is concerned about the dissemination of his KY tapes and the possible implications since he now believes he may have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the context of considering NOSENKO's bona fides. Anatole was told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the

FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any proposal or decision to disseminate them.

6. In relation to the point about Anatole's concern about knowledge of his information I told Anatole that it would be necessary for him to comment in detail in the future as he had recently on certain items. He was told that, as he knew, we are at a stage in the NOSENKO case where details such as the organizational assignments of individuals and identifications and the number of leads provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions and divert our attention from the central problem of why NOSENKO would have been dispatched. I told Anatole quite frankly there was a feeling he had not been fully cooperative on the NOSENKO case. There was a belief that he should furnish the details of his knowledge about individuals, operations, the KGB, etc., so that others can try to judge the accuracy or inaccuracy of NOSENKO's information. Anatole was told that it would come as no surprise to him to learn that the fact he has not told everything he knows is still a problem and that there may be some misunderstandings since it is obvious his detailed knowledge has had and will have a direct bearing on the NOSENKO case. Anatole firmly

but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning cooperation on the NOSENKO case. He said (a) it was obvious that research to date and collateral information supports his position that NOSENKO is a dispatched agent; (b) that he will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has been an exchange of information; (c) that he would not give details now because to do so would result in a situation where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine information and the details are pertinent; (e) that it is unnecessary for him at this time to give additional details about personnel or the KGB organization except when these details reflect on major items -- overall these details are not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering small items and details. If, however, small details become a major point such as in connection with KOVSHUK, CHURANOV, GUK and GRYAZNOV then during the review he will pinpoint the specific and detailed contradictions. He reiterated his previous comments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in pursuing details and leads to recruitments or persons of interest to the KGB when there is nothing crucial or significant involved.

7. It was agreed I would meet with Anatole when the first elicitation results are ready or when additional pertinent research has been completed and there are papers or ideas to discuss.

N. SCOTT MILER
DC/CI/SIG

ATTACHMENT B

ANATOLE Re NOSENKO

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969 concerning his recommendations on how to proceed to elicit additional information from NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution. These CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with comment or notations which emerged during our discussions.

B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the implementation of the program he originally believed was to be followed before there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ANATOLE had been reviewing his file material and the transcripts of his comments in January 1969 (The KY transcripts) so he was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed. Each paper was read by ANATOLE, he

retained certain of the papers and, as set forth below, he commented about certain of the papers or related matters. After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we worked out an elicitation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as the beginning of the program. The elicitation guide is detailed separately.

C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation about how to proceed with NOSENKO:

1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENKO is to begin immediately and is to follow the procedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph examination. (ANATOLE believes another polygraph based on questions he will help frame will be essential. It is his opinion that it will be possible to make the polygraph meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the results of the elicitation and specifically on the basis of his knowledge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more adequately the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity

such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions and areas where there remains doubt. ANATOLE agreed there might be a question of when a polygraph examination should be administered since it might be more effective after the confrontation or hostile interrogation of NOSENKO.)

4. A hostile/confrontation interrogation phase at which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, inconsistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consideration of all possible problems. For example ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to NOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine

satisfactorily answered all questions during the period 1967-68.

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1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENKO is to begin immediately and is to follow the procedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph examination. (ANATOLE believes another polygraph based on questions he will help frame will be essential. It is his opinion that it will be possible to make the polygraph meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the results of the elicitation and specifically on the basis of his knowledge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more adequately the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity

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4. A hostile/confrontation interrogation phase at which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, inconsistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consideration of all possible problems. For example ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to NOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine

what influence that letter has had on NOSENKO during the 67-68 interviews.

D. It was necessary to emphasize to ANATOLE the fact that at this time it is not possible for me to assure him that everything NOSENKO has said on any topic has been recovered or is retrievable even for the interview period of 1967-1968 (and 69). Noting the papers we had prepared ANATOLE had to be told there was no assurance that everything NOSENKO has said was included or considered when attempting to extract or summarize his statements about a person or event. Specifically it was noted that with a few exceptions no topic or item is fully covered during one or two interviews. Even though ANATOLE recognized the problem based on his review of the transcripts of the 1967-68 interviews it was necessary to emphasize the fact that the validity of any given question we had framed might be challenged, reversed or modified as the process of indexing the transcripts continued. ANATOLE was told that as of 31 March 1969 we had been able to index and extract the transcripts and memoranda of the 1967-68 interviews only through N-188 of approximately 260 N-memoranda. ANATOLE also was told it is not possible to be certain that all previous information from NOSENKO can be accurately and fully recovered. For this reason it is difficult if not impossible to isolate what he might have said in 1964 and/or 1965 and compare that

statement with what he said in 1968. ANATOLE also acknowledged noting the possible significance of the interview techniques as these have varied over the years. Contrast in the technique and the approach to NOSENKO where, for example, he is provided information or asked only to confirm a leading question has tended to dilute if not obscure what NOSENKO actually has had to say about many subjects; at this stage it may be virtually impossible to distinguish NOSENKO's original information from subsequent statements modified as a result of questioning. This problem is an important consideration because the approach to the elicitation phase was developed with this in mind. Essentially it was agreed with ANATOLE that despite previous statements or information from NOSENKO the elicitation phase would be managed to attempt to obtain from NOSENKO everything he has to offer or say about each CRUCIAL QUESTION at this time without reference to any previous statement. It is ANATOLE's opinion that if NOSENKO provides a full statement without prompting that further questioning can be meaningful after analysis of his statement despite the possibility NOSENKO has modified or revised his information as he has learned or apparently learned what he thinks is wanted or he should say. ANATOLE believes the fundamental problem remains and that despite NOSENKO's twists and turns it will be possible to sort through the various stories to focus on the reason for NOSENKO's dispatch and determine the

key items of diversion.

E. In reply to ANATOLE's question he was told that the FBI continued to interview NOSENKO usually with Mr. Solie present but that I did not know in advance anything about the topics of any interviews. I told ANATOLE it was my opinion that once elicitation from NOSENKO began on the basis of his recommendations that other interviews would stop. We recognized and agreed that there might be a tactical and/or psychological problem with NOSENKO by shifting the interview technique to elicitation rather than consultation and a response to questioning. ANATOLE could not emphasize too strongly the need to let NOSENKO respond fully with minimal prodding or stimulation and without refreshing his memory. ANATOLE was told it was my understanding the elicitation phase would be conducted by Mr. Solie without FBI participation although I did tell ANATOLE that the elicitation transcript results would undoubtedly be given to the FBI just as have the results of all the 1967-69 interviews.

F. ANATOLE expects and recommends that the period of elicitation will be followed by the period of interrogation or confrontation to be conducted by a team of three persons - The security expert, Mr. Solie; a counterintelligence specialist who knows related cases and CI problems, and a Soviet specialist.

ANATOLE says this team approach will be necessary to implement a fast moving interrogation, based on the script he will help devise, which will not permit NOSENKO time to reflect or think about his answers. The tactic will be to insist on immediate and full answers and ANATOLE insists that once the new elicitation phase begins NOSENKO not be permitted to write any answers: He is not to be given any written assignments: every response and reply is to be oral and transcribed and NOSENKO must be encouraged and permitted to respond fully: he is not to be asked to confirm or deny any statement nor is he to be assisted in replying to any question with suggestions or reminders.

G. ANATOLE recognizes the problem of information from FBI sources and the release of this information to him. He respects the FBI need to protect its sources and understands the FBI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He believes that our failure to make relevant information available to him is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and our ability to decipher the NOSENKO puzzle faster. ANATOLE recalls that at the time NOSENKO defected in 1964 and there was discussion with the FBI about the SASHA lead and related matters he asked for FBI file and source information pertinent to the problems. ANATOLE continues to believe there probably

is a serious question about the possible significance of NOSENKO to penetration of the FBI and the bona fides of FBI sources in terms of misinformation (disinformation) in relation to both NOSENKO and other information. He is of the opinion that a FBI source(s) probably came to the FBI after his defection and perhaps after NOSENKO's contact if not dispatch in 1964. He suggests the possibility there may be a false arrest and show trial of a FBI source in order to further bolster NOSENKO's story. Although it has not been possible to discuss this aspect of the NOSENKO story with ANATOLE it seems clear that if we are to gain full measure from ANATOLE it will be necessary for the FBI to approve or conduct a briefing of ANATOLE appropriate to puting a porspective on the FBI sources so he can assess what they have said about NOSENKO and GOLITZYN.

H. The following are the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which are to form the basis for elicitation from NOSENKO. They are set forth in the order discussed.

1. Misinformation in the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) (This is an immediate topic for elicitation as set forth separately)

2. Leadership of the KGB

3. Leadership of the First Chief Directorate (FCD)

4. Leadership of the SCD

5. SHELEPIN's 1959 Report (This topic will be discussed

more thoroughly with ANATOLE before the question is raised with NOSENKO again. ANATOLE was emphatic in stating that it had been a mistake to raise the subject of the KGB policy and 1959 reorganization with NOSENKO. He read the paper with attachments but deferred comment except to note that NOSENKO had said very little of significance. It was at this time that ANATOLE first noted it was a mistake to permit NOSENKO to write memoranda. ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect of the NOSENKO case most important and a topic which requires his study particularly in view of the fact he now has extracts from the GOLENIEWSKI letters which relate to the 1959 KGB reorganization and disinformation. ANATOLE also did not recall the book so it will be necessary to make certain he has a copy.)

6. Penetration of the American Embassy Moscow

(ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires additional study and elicitation later after research will permit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically in this area that NOSENKO's reassurance of no KGB successes is most likely diversion. ANATOLE expressed his concern that in January he may have commented too extensively and theoretically about this problem. He now wants to re-examine this problem and refocus everyone back more precisely to NOSENKO and his story)

7. Penetration of CIA (This is a topic for later elicitation from NOSENKO.)

8. VASSALL Case (ANATOLE believes NOSENKO should be asked to reconstruct completely in detail everything he knows about the VASSALL case: times, sources, officers, etc., at one taped session. Simultaneously ANATOLE says we should construct a complete chronology of everything NOSENKO has said about the VASSALL case since June 1962, including the questions or comments put to NOSENKO about VASSALL. An analysis comparison of these two papers will follow.

ANATOLE proposes it may be possible to demonstrate how a possible penetration of CIA could have precluded NOSENKO's safety from 1962 to 1964. This may assist us to solve our problem and also be ultimately useful in confronting NOSENKO on the point of his dispatch and apparent immunity.

9. Boris BELITSKIY Case (ANATOLE approved elicitation and questioning on the basis of the summary and questionnaire. ANATOLE stresses the need to confine the questioning to the questionnaire and the fact that NOSENKO is not to be given additional information about the case, its origins, etc., either as we knew it or now know it from ANATOLE. There will be some tie-in to the elicitation about Vladimir Luovich ARTEMOV and Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV but other than the questions as set forth in the papers ANATOLE reviewed there should be no questions asked which brief NOSENKO or relate the three or any other persons.

ANATOLE needs a photograph of ARTEMOV to make certain of identification and he needs photos others in the delegation with BELITSKIY to try to determine if there were other KGB officers in the delegation who might have been in on the case or the disinformation aspect)

10. The 1960 period of NOSENKO's career.

This is to be an elicitation topic later after we have summarized what we can about NOSENKO's story of this period. In reply to ANATOLE's question based on his review of the paper NOSENKO Timetable and Associates I told ANATOLE the researcher had found it impossible to date to sort out and isolate NOSENKO's 1967-68 statements about his career during the period 1960 to 1962. ANATOLE was told this was obviously a priority job but that it just had been an impossible task without additional research and analysis. We will discuss this fully when the isolation is completed and in conjunction with other topics.

11. Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV 's November 1960 trip.

This item is for later elicitation after more research is completed about the code clerks, perhaps a reinvestigation to make positive identifications, etc. ANATOLE asked if KOSOLAPOV's trip to Copenhagen was confirmed (N-167 pg. 16) and I told him I thought it was under a different name. ANATOLE would like details.

12. The Robert Lee JOHNSON case.

ANATOLE considers this an important aspect of NOSENKO's throw-away material. He again questions why the SCD would lend technicians to the FCD and wants NOSENKO to explain this in detail as well as to fully detail again how, from whom, etc. NOSENKO learned of this case. ANATOLE is of the opinion new questions can be asked but agreed to defer elicitation on this case primarily because I pointed out that in 1965 a paper was written setting forth apparent inherent security weaknesses in the Johnson case some of which at least suggested strongly that, in addition to Johnson's lack of access at one time, the KGB could have anticipated a blow at any moment. I outlined some of the points I recall about the weaknesses of the principals and quite frankly I told ANATOLE that I doubted that anyone currently of the opinion NOSENKO is bona fide would be any more inclined to credit the 1965 paper today than he has in the past. I agreed that it might be useful to again attempt to get NOSENKO's story about the JOHNSON case when this story would be exclusively NOSENKO's.

13. Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBATENKO.

ANATOLE wants NOSENKO to tell in detail everything he knows about GORBATENKO. ANATOLE notes the 1955 promotion is a key element but stresses no mention of this is to be made to NOSENKO. Despite previous mentions of GORBATENKO, which should be collated, NOSENKO is to restate everything completely.

SECRET

14. Serafim Nikalayevich LYALIN

Elicitation about LYALIN is to follow later. All references to LYALIN by NOSENKO should be collated with collateral information about him. If there is a photograph of LYALIN, ANATOLE wants to see it to verify any NOSENKO identification.

15. Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK. ANATOLE considers NOSENKO's information about KOVSHUK most important as a later elicitation point. He does not want NOSENKO asked any questions about KOVSHUK which may relate to KOVSHUK's trip to the U.S.A. or KOVSHUK's association with KISLOV. If NOSENKO in connection with detailing the biographies of his friends includes any of this about KOVSHUK he is NOT to be questioned on this matter or about the woman trouble previously mentioned.

ANATOLE needs exact dates KOVSHUK was in the U.S. and any details of activities he can be given from FBI reporting. In connection with our discussion about KOVSHUK possibly working with and associating with journalists ANATOLE said he recalled an incident which he thinks took place in 1959 when he met KOVSHUK on the street not far from the KGB offices when KOVSHUK signalled him not to speak. ANATOLE did not and observed KOVSHUK meet a Soviet journalist in an apparent agent type meeting.

ANATOLE said he had forgotten this incident and he never spoke to KOVSHUK about it. ANATOLE cannot recall the name of the journalist but said he recalls knowing him slightly. He will try to recall the name. (Note for SM check: did KOVSHUK per NOSENKO work vs. Americans with journalists and specifically Ed Stevens?)

16. Eugene Peter SEREBRENNIKOV.

ANATOLE says what NOSENKO has said is clear but that this needs full research and analysis - what he said contrasted with what NOSENKO said and what SEREBRENNIKOV said - before asking NOSENKO about this again.

17. Adam BROCHES Case

ANATOLE was told this lead information was being reviewed in detail. That there was some apparent confusion and possibly misinterpretation or misunderstanding about his lead information.

ANATOLE reiterated his point that the KGB wanted to reestablish relations which had been broken after BROCHES left France. ANATOLE knows about this from reading ZARUBIN paper and he knows that the KGB wanted to talk to ZARUBIN about this.

ANATOLE said that he would leave the decision about when NOSENKO would be asked about BROCHES again to SM - it could be immediately when the review was completed or later. The review is in process and we will have to see what FBI may have asked recently.

18. Viktor KOPEYKIN. A later topic.

19. The CHEREPANOV Papers

ANATOLE stresses the importance of this case but says this must be a later topic for NOSENKO probably in interrogation although it may be useful to have NOSENKO review his knowledge again in detail before confrontation.

ANATOLE referred to the need to analyze the results of the BOWDEN investigation before proceeding too far with NOSENKO. In this connection ANATOLE was told State Security was securely organizing this investigation and that it was currently planned that interviews would commence with BOWDEN first including mention to BOWDEN about his mention in the CHEREPANOV papers. In response to ANATOLE's question he was told that to my knowledge the FBI did not yet know about the BOWDEN investigation since to date it was a State Department inquiry based on a need to clarify certain possible problems. ANATOLE said that he saw CHEREPANOV after CHEREPANOV had transferred to the American Embassy Section wearing a Lt. Col. military uniform. ANATOLE said this was unusual and it suggests to him that CHEREPANOV was engaged in an operation, perhaps a contact posing as a military beginning in 1959. He said CHEREPANOV had as a constant companion a young man in the American Department but ANATOLE cannot recall the young man's name. (ANATOLE suggests later NOSENKO be asked if CHEREPANOV wore a military uniform and who was his companion,

probably in operations.) I told ANATOLE I did not know if NOSENKO had named any friends of CHEREPANOV but would check for names. ANATOLE said he recalled also there was a big change in CHEREPANOV's attitude and demeanor between early 1959 to mid - 1960 or, more probably, Dec. 1960 when ANATOLE saw Cherepanov again. ANATOLE said he can only interpret that CHEREPANOV was in a better mood, more confident in personality because he may have had some operational success. ANATOLE is of the opinion that CHEREPANOV's change in demeanor and mood could only relate to American Embassy operations.

20. The [redacted] Case

ANATOLE says this is not really a crucial question although an important case which needs resolution eventually along lines set forth in the paper NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects but not on the basis of the homosexual angle (see separate discussion re homosexual aspects).

21. The TOPOV and PENKOVSKIY Cases

ANATOLE says both of these cases should be delayed until later. They require special consideration and more research and discussion. We are not ready now to delve into these and it is his opinion he may have tended to obscure some of the points about NOSENKO by drawing parallels with PENKOVSKIY in January. He believes there are parallels and a relationship

and we should continue to examine all aspects of the cases but he concedes a better base of understanding should be laid before it will be possible to make a meaningful tie to NOSENKO.

22. NOSENKO's Friendship with GUK, CHURANOV, KOVSHUK, etc.

ANATOLE emphasized the need to get from NOSENKO complete details about his friends or claimed friends. ANATOLE agreed with the line of inquiry outlined in the paper "Knowledge Because of Association with other KGB Officers" and said elicitation should include information sufficient to give us in one place a perspective on NOSENKO's associates and friends. This topic can be covered immediately. ANATOLE stresses real importance of Guk, Kovshuk and Churanov to NOSENKO. He notes Guk's wife was the daughter of a minister and asks if NOSENKO could have introduced them. He also points out CHURANOV in school with NOSENKO.

23 [redacted] Lead.

ANATOLE agreed elicitation on this topic should begin immediately and was most interested in the possible significance of this case vis a vis disinformation. He noted, of course, the different perspective on the case and that apparently when this case was considered in the context of support to NOSENKO's bona fides analysis had not taken into account the actual origins and development of the case. ANATOLE immediately connected the SLAVACHENSKAYA angle to the PENKOVSKIY case and speculated that the KGB may have been attempting to establish a separate ostensibly confirmatory source to the FBI to bolster PENKOVSKIY

who was in contact with the British and CIA. ANATOLE emphasized his view that NOSENKO should not be given a hint about the actual beginnings of the case to prevent NOSENKO from modifying his story or being led to explanations. NOSENKO should retell his account of the [redacted] case and then be asked the questions listed without confrontation or explanation.

24. [redacted]

(See N-24 - This a later topic) ANATOLE requests everything available about GINSBURG and specifically everything NOSENKO has ever said. After the research ANATOLE thinks he can spot something in connection with GINSBURG which is significant but which he says eludes him at this time.

25. The Military Attache Incident. ([redacted])

ANATOLE stresses importance again as he did in KY transcripts. He persists in thinking there may be more here than we have covered - that one of the MA's may have been recruited or someone else was recruited and advised about the trip. He refers to N-32, and maintains this incident needs reexamination and that probably after research the Attaches should be questioned again. ANATOLE says it his recollection that the KGB knew exactly the device they were looking for; that the KGB did not have a detection device which could have been effective and that the use of a box which looked like a detection machine was staged

to cover up fact KGB knew exactly where to find the device and what it was. He says his recollection is that KGB knew where to look and there was no search or monitoring. They just went to the right place. This means to ANATOLE a human not a machine source. He says questioning NOSENKO about this can only follow research.

(ANATOLE asked if the information about the Japanese Colonel in intelligence had been reported to the Japanese and what was the outcome. ANATOLE was told I did not know - would check.)

26. [redacted]

ANATOLE was interested in this but we did not dwell on this subject. ANATOLE believe it a give away diversion although probably true. Decision re additional elicitation to be made by SM on basis time and framing questions.

27. Microphones in American Embassy

ANATOLE still suggests review this information from NOSENKO and requestioning particularly to establish exactly what NOSENKO said when and if he said anything about NO[illegible] (?) Wing. Decision re timing of questioning by SM.

28. WATKINS - Canadian Ambassador Case.

ANATOLE thinks it necessary NOSENKO retell in detail everything he knows about WATKINS in same way he to be asked about Vassall. Then it will be necessary line out and compare

exactly what ANATOLE said and what NOSENKO said. ANATOLE points out importance of early information from NOSENKO before he was given background information or leading questions. ANATOLE thinks this can begin early in elicitation or be done later. Decision re timing by SM.

(ANATOLE thinks it might be helpful for him to review what NOSENKO has said about Svetlana STALINA ALLILUEVA. This is speculative but ANATOLE recalls or was told NOSENKO should or did know something and he thinks there may be some clue here about NOSENKO's associates, friends, etc., possibly of importance.)

29. Code Clerks - 59-62

ANATOLE again emphasizes his need to see a full review of results of investigation of all the code clerk cases. He is convinced there may be a case here and that the clues have been missed or overlooked. He says he cannot recall the necessary detail and that it is only when he can be stimulated with names, dates, etc., that he may be able to pinpoint some angle of significance. ANATOLE was told we were also bothered about these cases - that much work had been done but that, quite frankly, I could not estimate how long it would take to assemble the information for orderly review. ANATOLE was told this is on the agenda - it is a matter of time and people. Any questioning of NOSENKO about these cases can only be done later.

30. CIA Complex Moscow

ANATOLE said it would be necessary to research and collate all the information about CIA officers and operations in Moscow including visitors, i.e., TDYers, to get a picture of their activities, associates, KGB officers they met and operational activities which might have made them vulnerable. ANATOLE opines NOSENKO should know more specifics about this and that later it will be necessary to question him with specifics during the confrontation stage after comparing late elicitation results with collateral details.

31. A Code Clerk in American Embassy with Spanish Language or Spanish Background.

ANATOLE noted the reference in the paper re Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV to NOSENKO's information that ARTEMOV knew Spanish and said there might be a connection to something he vaguely recalled about an interest in or a case against an American code clerk of Spanish background or who spoke Spanish. ANATOLE said the period was 1957-60. He could not recall details. He said this should be considered a special case for him to work on now for later questioning of NOSENKO if research indicated this necessary. ANATOLE requested for review any information available re code clerks, civilian or military, in Moscow 57-60 with Spanish language or background.

32. Vladimir SUSLOV and Vasiliy V. VAKHRUSHEV

ANATOLE agreed that the questions re VAKHRUSHEV should be asked of NOSENKO during the first elicitation stages. ANATOLE was concerned that NOSENKO not be given any indication of our current special interest in VAKHRUSHEV. (SM NOTE: Question re [redacted] deleted from paragraph 11 by SM on basis unnecessary when reviewing paper with ANATOLE. He, of course, asked about [redacted] and was told [redacted] was on same ship once with VAKHRUSHEV and researcher had included question because [redacted] had high US Government contacts including some early 1950 work on U.S. intelligence community reviews.)

A specific question ANATOLE asked was about any collateral or documentary information that VAKHRUSHEV attended the Institute of Foreign Relations. He also asked if there were photographs of VAKHRUSHEV's wife(s) available and if NOSENKO had identified them. He would like to see them too. (SM NOTE: See 12 August 1964 interview).

ANATOLE thinks there may be a significant aspect about NOSENKO's schooling and VAKHRUSHEV's schooling which needs checking. ANATOLE is speculating on possibility NOSENKO was in Military Institute of Foreign Languages. I had to answer ANATOLE that I did not know if there was any collateral proof that NOSENKO was a student at the Institute of Foreign/International Relations but would check. ANATOLE projects this point on the logical

progression of NOSENKO's schooling in the military and probability that higher education would have been under military unless some special family or other influence permitted change. He also notes NOSENKO's continuation in Naval Service and confirms he saw NOSENKO in Navy uniform in March 1953 in KGB Hdqs.

ANATOLE suggests this aspect be reexamined after elicitation in light of NOSENKO's answers and information about VAKHRUSHEV and SUSLOV, who was in Institute of Foreign Relations. ANATOLE says CHURANOV was in Foreign Relations Institute and that Guk was in Military Institute. ANATOLE speculates this may be area where NOSENKO is hiding his close relationship with Guk - that he might have first known Guk in the Military Institute although GUK a couple of years older than NOSENKO. Guk worked in GRU but ANATOLE does not remember if Navy. ANATOLE says he will consider further elicitation later and also a surprise question on new polygraph about NOSENKO's attendance at the Military Institute.

A. The paper NOSENKO's Defection was read by ANATOLE with interest. I did not have 2 copies of this paper. ANATOLE was told a copy would be furnished him at next meeting. Certain comments which follow are based on information from this paper but a specific comment by ANATOLE was (see para 2 page 2 of paper):

It is true TSYMBAL was a former member of Department 4. It is illogical that TSYMBAL was transferred to the Illegal Directorate and more illogical he would travel with the delegation if he were head of the Illegals Directorate. As head of the 4th

Department he would go with the delegation but normally and logically there would be no mixing of legal and illegal elements. The KGB would not permit any publicity or identification of TSYMBAL if he were head of the Illegals. ANATOLE can only conclude this information is to create the impression of reorganization after his defection.

B. ANATOLE also points out the illogic aspect of a Tourist Department officer as security officer to such a delegation. He also notes that when senior officials such as GROMYKO travel there are specially assigned expert security officers with their delegations if any are sent at all. He notes that for the most part the senior officials travel without security officers except protective experts assigned such as would be the situation NOSENKO describes.

ANATOLE says a basic question for confrontation will be about the inclusion of a "special security officer" in a delegation such as one headed by the Foreign Minister. He says the inclusion of a person such as NOSENKO is very unusual. The Foreign Minister and his aides, etc., are trusted men who go abroad regularly. These are always experienced KGB officers on the operations in support of the delegations and the planning is well in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a later date ANATOLE says we can confront NOSENKO with this opposite position from ANATOLE.

SECRET

C. ANATOLE said the story about NOSENKO's role with SHAKHOV just gives a reason to us about why NOSENKO was in Geneva. There would be no reason for any special interest by NOSENKO. The residentura could and would handle any technical devices and operations such as NOSENKO describes.

D. VALERIY KREPKOGORSKIY.

ANATOLE found this connection and final drinking bout interesting and said both Guk and KREPKOGORSKIY would know what NOSENKO's mission was in 1962. I could provide no information about KREPKOGORSKIY and ANATOLE asked to see photo of KREPKOGORSKIY, nothing he could not recall name.

E. [redacted]

ANATOLE asked for information about [redacted] (SM NOTE: SM needs check significance - where in "NOSENKO - Defection" paper. What NOSENKO say, etc.).

F. ANATOLE says a later question NOSENKO should be asked is why in 1962 he rejected the idea of using his position in the Tourist Department as the logical position from which he could keep in contact with AIS, i.e., a tourist sent to be recruited by NOSENKO, etc.

33. Personnel of 1st Section, 1st Dept. 1959 - 61

ANATOLE believes this will be important area for later elicitation and, perhaps, confrontation after we have opportunity to analyze everything NOSENKO says vs the collateral and ANATOLE's information. It will be necessary to research this.

ANATOLE suggests we double check the debriefing of [redacted] about NOSENKO's approach and reexamine [redacted] background and what he has been doing to see if there is anything which looks significant now, i.e., anything important given hindsight and more information.

34. The Maurice De Jean Case

ANATOLE said it was important to line out in quotes by date everything that NOSENKO said about De Jean and do the same for the information from Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV. These should then be lined out and chronologically compared with what ANATOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the time sequence we should then examine the problem of the leakage of lead information to try to get indications at least of how, why and where ANATOLE's information leaked. ANATOLE said we should also consider the possible problem of leakage in connection with the WATKIN's Case and the RCMP in this. He also notes that GRIBANOV's role and visit to Paris may be important so when NOSENKO responds to questions about GRIBANOV we should examine this aspect also. Specifically, NOSENKO should comment about why GRIBANOV went to Paris.

35. BUSHEK and GRIBANOV

In connection with discussions about GRIBANOV and his trip in 1964, we discussed the BUSHEK case and ANATOLE was told the following re chronology:

18 January NOSENKO to Geneva from Paris.

1 Feb (CM believes) GRIBANOV arrives Paris from Vienna - NOSENKO defects.

7 Feb. GRIBANOV departs Paris for Vienna (GRIBANOV uses name GORSHKOV in Vienna and with BUSHEK.)

12 Feb Soviets in Switzerland strongly protest to Swiss about NOSENKO's defection.

14 Feb (maybe 13 Feb.) GRIBANOV, according to BUSHEK, relaxed about NOSENKO defection when BUSHEK raised question. ANATOLE suggests questions re BUSHEK come later.

36. Recall Telegram

It is apparent to ANATOLE there is significant information about this aspect of the NOSENKO case from the FBI. This goes to the basic question of cooperation with the FBI and his knowledge which he concedes is a basic FBI decision about what he sees of the recall telegram information. ANATOLE has seen only NOSENKO's information (transcripts, etc.). The significance of this may bear on the question of rank discussed separately but even without being able to discuss all aspects of the recall telegram with ANATOLE he suggests we should examine if we have not done this the details of NOSENKO's admissions he lied about his rank and the recall telegram. ANATOLE says it is necessary to determine: the exact date NOSENKO broke on each story; who was involved; who knew he was being pressured; was there coordination with the FBI about the pressure on the recall telegram;

what and who led us to conclude the stories were false: what were the dates involved between NOSENKO's story of the telegram and the information from another source(s); was there time for NOSENKO to confirm his use of the recall telegram story; could the message from NOSENKO have gotten to another source or would it appear the telegram story had to be planned in advance and not triggered by confirmation from NOSENKO; after NOSENKO broke was the other source(s) confronted; was there any change in the relations with the other source(s); has there been any collateral information reflecting KGB knowledge he has broken on rank or the telegram stories. ANATOLE suggests this aspect of the question of bona fides come later in confrontation and he assumes SM will be covering this fully even though he hopes there will be permission for him to be fully read into this. He was told, for the record since he obviously understood the implications, I could promise nothing since any discussion about the recall telegram and any other source would mean opening to him full information about any source since everyone, including the FBI, knew he would never be satisfied with partial limited information. He laughingly agreed he would press for full information but did concede he might (temporarily?) settle for less than the full source information if the context of the information about NOSENKO was complete and he could understand the significance of the source's position, etc.

I said we would think about what could be done but that optimism was not in order.

37. NOSENKO Statement Condemning Soviet Regime

ANATOLE outlined the steps to be taken to obtain from NOSENKO a statement which in its ultimate written form may serve both as a control and a propaganda instrument. ANATOLE believes that leading NOSENKO to a final absolute written and documented statement against the Soviets will not only permit us to judge NOSENKO more accurately by observing his reactions but also provide additional psychological pressure useful in the final stages of dealing with NOSENKO when we confront him with the evidence we know he was on a mission. ANATOLE believes the final denunciatory statement may help tip the balance in gaining NOSENKO's cooperation/confession.

The steps to be taken are as follows:

A. Elicit from NOSENKO statements as detailed and specific as possible condemning the Soviet regime, the KGB, the party, individuals, etc. This should be at a fast tempo. (This can begin immediately.)

B. After reviewing these statements elicit from NOSENKO increasingly detailed condemnatory statements by having him add details about persons and activities.

C. Concurrent with 37A above NOSENKO should be asked to enumerate in detail each example of those things he did, saw or heard about which brought him to the point of defection. If he does not mention the KGB then at later stage in the elicitation process he is to be pressed for reasons he dislikes

the KGB. He should be led to make statements about repugnant KGB techniques such as blackmail, hetero-sexual and homosexual entrapments against diplomats, tourists prominent Western scientists, etc. He should be led to express his disgust at every stage about the intimidation practiced and should include Russian youth and the spying on intellectuals.

D. After NOSENKO has enumerated and elaborated his denunciation and condemnation of the Soviets, orally and at length he should be asked to write in his own words a statement which he will agree can be published. He should be asked at this point, although it may be necessary to ask him earlier, if he is prepared to make an official statement condemning the Soviet regime and specific people. He will be told that with his cooperation we want to expose the Soviet regime on the basis of real knowledge. This first statement will be revised by us to include specifics and which will include statements such as "I condemn SHELEPIN, GRIBANOV, etc. for - 0 - - -"; "I condemn GRIBANOV for forcing me to engage in reprehensible homosexual entrapments - - "; "I condemn a system which deals in misinformation and confusion such as that led by AGAYANTS - - ".

E. At a later stage after review of his other statements about personnel, the KGB organization, etc: as follow-up he should in interview only detail what steps were taken to counteract the damage from GOLITZYN's defection and the KGB reorganization. He should list all personnel structural and

particularly the functional changes in the KGB. He should be asked the specific question of when was a conference held to consider the impact of GOLITZYN's knowledge about tourists and the loss of documents. He should relate this to the 1964 Tourist Conference he says was scheduled.

F. The final written condemnatory statement will be considered for publication with or without NOSENKO's approval or agreement. The statement should be a key element in assessing his reaction at the point where his confession/cooperation is solicited and he is told it will be published.

38. NOSENKO's "SASHA" Case

There was little discussion of this except to consider need to review more and consider this a topic for later questioning.

39. PREISFREUND

ANATOLE considers this a topic worth more study and review on the basis that something may have been overlooked which relates to misinformation about the American Embassy or American personnel. We should not consider this case closed and more research is needed.

(ANATOLE sees no relevancy to the questions re GOLITZYN. If we have some operationally significant angle he can approve questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question 15 especially unnecessary. ANATOLE

ANATOLE pointed out the basic and only question with respect to NOSENKO is misinformation and he sees no advantage or assistance resulting from questions about GOLITZYN. However, he said this was not his decision. He was told the paper about the GOLITZYN question was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively at this time on the 1967-1968 materials and the researcher responded to a general requirement to extract information and frame questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested against known information. The researcher obviously believes that if NOSENKO were to make a false or misleading statement which GOLITZYN has or could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that compartmentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on larger issues means that we will review a few papers which are useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who has a narrow view the concern is real.)

40. Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV.

ANATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they will not accomplish much of significance re GRYAZNOV since he thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clerk cases which can only be determined after that research and analysis of information about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could be used later during elicitation as time fillers and preliminary to hard questions but not much will come because the questions are not to the point, which he did not explain fully.

ANATOLE did specifically challenge NOSENKO's story of his close relationship with GRYAZNOV as a lie. ANATOLE notes the possibility there was leakage of his identification to the FBI and CIA of GRYAZNOV as a source. Particularly ANATOLE says NOSENKO's story of a close relationship with GRYAZNOV in 1962 is probably false because there was no previous relationship leading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GRYAZNOV would have been punished if the KGB knew he was identified as a source to GOLITZYN.

ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with NOSENKO trying to build up his relationship with GRYAZNOV and down-play or, more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with CHURANOV and GUK. ANATOLE believes it was a deliberate part of NOSENKO's legend to set him close to GRYAZNOV since GRYAZNOV was an ackrowledged source of some of GOLITZYN's information. The NOSENKO-GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element in future questioning.

A. "Comment on NOSENKO Family Relations" was a paper in which ANATOLE found little of importance or significance as a crucial point except that as the discussions progressed he developed the idea that the 1945-50 period may be crucial after all. ANATOLE sees little question about most of his life and specifically ANATOLE says the homosexual question is not "in line with available evidence". ANATOLE thought these questions would give NOSENKO the impression we are "unprofessional" but

immediately conceded this is really not a problem since NOSENKO has not been handled very professionally in the past.

B. "NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects"

ANATOLE questions any assumption that NOSENKO had any "expertise" on homo operations. He just does not think NOSENKO was an "expert" or a "specialist" and points out he can run then at level he has described with very little knowledge. ANATOLE says he knows NOSENKO was not a homosexual before and doubts he would have been consulted by anyone as a "specialist". In view basic doubts if any questions to be used should be woven into other topics and not treated as separate subject.

41. RUMYANTSEV

After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing to ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE maintains this will be a special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV case to what he considers was the serious mistake of asking NOSENKO about the May 1959 conference. (See N-228) He also thinks further questions on the conference should only come later. ANATOLE saw clearly why no questions should have been asked about RUMYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after mistake made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might gain by some questions during elicitation or if touching on this

point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSENKO. This matter will be discussed further after ANATOLE reads the papers carefully. ANATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the May 59 meeting was known through GOLIENEWSKI and there was some indication from this source also of wide scale misinformation programs. It was also noted that in my opinion the questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and my knowledge of how seriously GOLITZYN's information about this conference has been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions which NOSENKO could expect based on the overt information made available. Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact that they indeed were different from other questions asked of NOSENKO because they touched on political matters. To the extent that N-228 showed NOSENKO someone at a late date was interested in political matters NOSENKO may have been alerted. Certainly it would seem those questions were completely out of context - out of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up NOSENKO may feel there is no real interest because there has been no real interest in matters political with him.

A. "NOSENKO - Use of Alias by KGB Officers"

ANATOLE commented these were very good questions. They could be asked during elicitation or later during the crucial or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up questioning.

B. "NOSENKO - Knowledge Because of Association with other KBG Officers".

ANATOLE thought this was excellent approach. He

commented in connection with paras 9 and 11 and using this paper stressed need to elicit all possible from NOSENKO orally during interview and no written memorandum. ANATOLE outlined need for NOSENKO to list exact dates of all his service assignments; when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each officer, etc. He retained without comment the 28 March 1969 addendum re RANOVSKIY, KUTYREV, and SUROV.

42. Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Vladimir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY

ANATOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB officers of special significance as part of the enumeration of CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are not only prominent in NOSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work against Americans. They are important even without NOSENKO. In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation about them from NOSENKO. Then NOSENKO's previous information will be collated and compared with collateral information, including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANATOLE will review, comment with new information, if any, and frame pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist operations 1955-59 is nonsense. SKVORTSOV was in Germany until 1959. NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations, etc.

43. Nikolay Grigoryevich BAGRICHEV

44. GRIBANOV (GORBUNOV)

ANATOLE stresses the importance of collating all information about the activities of GRIBANOV and separate the sourcing.

45. NOSENKO-Asen GEORGIEV Case

ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has said about Anatoliy S. KOZLOV and view any photos. I could not confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the [redacted] case. ANATOLE asks if we can confirm KOZLOV was Chief of the American Section when NOSENKO left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO said about early relations including precise dates when NOSENKO says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that NOSENKO says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page 1 of paper) then Deputy Chief of Dept 7 (page 4). ANATOLE says as elicitation question NOSENKO should be asked why the demotion and also what happened to GORBATENKO.

Not unexpectedly, ANATOLE said he would eventually want to see the file on the GEORGIEV case to see what the tie-in to the Soviets may have been.

46. Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV

ANATOLE would like photograph and travel record for ARTEMOV.

47. Mikhail Stepanovich BANNIKOV

ANATOLE wants background info and photo.

48. Fedor Alekseyevich SHCHERBAK

See 47

49. FNU GOLOVKOV.

A. Nikolay Dmitrievich ARKHIPOV

ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should fully explain how and why he became involved with a journalist and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc. SUNDAR's targets should be described fully and NOSENKO should explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations.

B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL case but I could not answer with complete assurance the details of his recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. ANATOLE was told, however, everyone satisfied about this apparently but would check.

C. ANATOLE suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY, and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the recruitment of the British tourist Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship to the Johnson case.

50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV

ANATOLE wants photo and travel record.

A. In connection with this also, ANATOLE requested a list of all CIA personnel in contact with Soviets in Berlin. (Page 2) He said he had originally or earlier asked for this

several times and he related this request to the larger question of his analysis which he raised with Mr. Solie and which has gone unanswered - he asked for and wants a list of all CIA people in overt contact with Soviets world-wide. My only comment was to the point that compilation of such lists was difficult if not impossible.

51. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO

See 50.

52. PIVNEV

ANATOLE says this topic is definitely a confrontation topic. Specifically he noted para 7 in this connection.

ANATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up and results of the [redacted] case to frame questions re PIVNEV but he also makes the point he considers the [redacted] case important separately from considerations of NOSENKO. He recalled Mr. O'NEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview of [redacted] but he has heard nothing. On the basis of short discussion ANATOLE believes there are unexplored aspects to this case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far as NOSENKO is concerned which may go to penetration in the AM EMB, Moscow or even to Germany. The timing is important.

A. Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV

ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSHUK as well as to the BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about KGB officers. He wants to review the FBI information about

KISLOV's U.S. activities and surveillance reports of his association with KOVSHUK. All the questions re KISLOV should be used in elicitation.

B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE would like to review all verified info against NOSENKO's statements. For example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc.

C. ANATOLE would like to review the lists of other members of the delegations of which he was a member as well as the lists of other delegations there at the same time.

(SM NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of Chairman on POPOV case. Compare with other info re POPOV case from NOSENKO. Why would he have orders on POPOV case in his safe in 1964? The order was put out in 1959 (58-60). NOSENKO would know this in 1962 - immediately after American Section duty. He would have it or access to it but why as late as 1964 in Tourist Dept.)

D. After considerable reflection ANATOLE thinks it is quite possible that NOSENKO held the rank of Lt. Col. but that when he saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history and his assignments as he described them did not warrant the Lt. Col. rank [redacted] to cover his dispatch/mission and the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his

importance. He had to accede to his interviewers to avoid more questions about why and how he became a Lt. Col. ANATOLE thinks he may have been rewarded (promoted) quietly with only a very few persons knowledgable. (SM NOTE: Check all reports.)

ANATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which began in June 1962 in Geneva?

In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions in one year (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then Deputy Chief of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this when he was not in his first job even three months and he had no major successes in Geneva (except contact with CIA?) - What were the cases he handled and the recruitments he made in 1962?

53. American Ambassadors

ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors.

However, as an elicitation question ANATOLE thinks he should be asked if he knew of any American Ambassador who was recruited at any time by SCD?

Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be asked if he knew about an important high level SCD American agent who was recontacted and reactivated when he visited Moscow in 1959. Other questions to follow from the team of interrogators such as who did or would have handled this agent, etc.

54. Yuriy GUK's Agent in Washington

ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even though it may not bear on the NOSENKO case. He says it needs analysis and future research on the basis of what action the FBI took. If there is something pertinent to NOSENKO we can consider for later use.

55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV

ANATOLE says we should extract and review what NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels in the info. ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov - Nov 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame questions to include KROTKOV in our considerations. He recalls KROTKOV promised an exposé of the KGB and this never came about.

CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of ATTACHMENT B TO MEMO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969, SUBJECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO:

2 - 11 Jan 64	GRIBANOV applied for Austrian, French, (8 Jan) and Swiss visas.
18 Jan	NOSENKO arrives in Geneva from Paris.
19 Jan	Mikhail S. ROGOV arrives Switzerland.
24 - 25 Jan	ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern
25 - 28 Jan	ROGOV registered Hotel Krebs, Bern
28 Jan	ROGOV to Rome
3 Jan - 3 Feb	GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV and NOVIK at Winter Olympics, Innsbruck.
4 Feb	GRIBANOV in Vienna
4 Feb	NOSENKO defects
6 Feb	Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation Disarmament Conference NOSENKO disappeared 4 Feb.

7 Feb	GRIBANOV arrives Paris. KOVSHUK was in Paris.
8 Feb	Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss police NOSENKO missing.
8 Feb	ROGOV returned to Bern
9 Feb	Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had defected.
10 Feb	GRIBANOV left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK claims to have seen him 10 Feb.
12 Feb	TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland, holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting NOSENKO's kidnapping. Swiss called Soviet Ambassador Bern and strongly protested TSARAPUIN action.
14 Feb	GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKO.
14 Feb	ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria.
18 Feb	KOVSHUK left Paris as member of the RUDNEV Delegation.

ATTACHMENT C

ANATOLE Re NOSENKO

Elicitation

A. As a result of consultations with ANATOLE 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, it was concluded the following topics or items were to be used to begin the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO. The following outline notes of the topics are arranged in the order they are to be discussed with NOSENKO although it is important only to begin with the topics listed 1 and 2. Additional elicitation topics to be added by SM in consonance with discussion set forth in Crucial Questions.

B. ANATOLE emphasizes that it is necessary that NOSENKO be permitted to respond fully and completely about each topic with all possible details. NOSENKO should not be reminded of any previous statements or comments nor should he be corrected about dates, places or persons. He is not to be given any written assignments and each topic is to be covered as completely as possible in one interview without digression into other topics except, of course, where NOSENKO may take the initiative in the digression. He should, however, be brought back to the main topic as soon as possible without losing value of digression.

C. Topics:

1. Defection Motivation -

Most serious to set stage progressive elicitation.

A. Retell Motivation -

(1) Why he hates regime.

(2) Can he give particulars and specifics - concrete examples why he hates regime.

(3) Concrete examples of actions, operations of KGB (security). why he developed negative attitude vs KGB and regime.

(4) Concrete examples of this re Party.

(5) Concrete examples of actions, attitudes, etc., of party leaders, the elite, the hierarchy which caused him to take negative attitude.

The above must be special session - then to be reviewed for further consideration re statement.

2. Detail career

All assignments, month, year, naming head of departments and sections 1953 - highlighting major assignments accomplishments.

3. General question to have NOSENKO describe and detail with examples how misinformation handled in SCD - give cases - name personnel - what kind of games - relations with FCD - entire KGB - everything he knows without suggesting anything to him.

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4. Leadership of KGB.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each.

5. Leadership of FCD.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each.

6. Leadership of SCD.

Chairman, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detailed biography of each. (do not go to Heads of Departments)

7. Vassall

8. BELITSKIY - go ahead on basis questionnaire.

9. All heads of American Department and deputies 1953, on yearly basis, with complete details re biography - ask questions on each - oral.

10. GUK, CHURANOV, etc. - explore in detail as with questions.

11. VAKHRUSHEV

1st years in Institute Foreign Policy.

2nd question list of friends, classmates with biography when/if mentions VAKHRUSHEV and SUSLOV - then ask questions outlined.

12. GRIBANOV Trip.

13. SEVORTSOV (with friends).

14. BAGRICHEV (with friends).

15. KOZLOV.

16. ARTEMOV.

17. YEROFEYEV.

18. PANASENKO.

19. KISLOV.

20. Documentation -

Explain again how, when received documentation, why discrepancies, how can you travel - identity card one rank order another rank.

21. Travel abroad, cover, etc.

22. Use of alias, questionnaire.

23. Yuriy V. KROTKOV -

(probably nothing yet)

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MR's E. —

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 14 May 69

SUBJECT: ANATOLE [illegible] NOSENKO

FILE NUMBER:

C/CI was given a copy of the following for delivery to Anatole today:

A. Memo for Director Security "Solicitation Topics for Yuri Nosenko"

(A copy of the Draft was given to C/CI on which I annotated final was dated 22 April.)

B. A carbon of the Memo for the Record dated 7 April 69, Subject: Anatole [illegible] Nosenko with atts A B & C.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

[illegible] Scott Miller

FORM 7-62 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 16 JANUARY '69

SUBJECT: ANITOLE RE Sdic Assenic Paper

FILE NUMBER:

A Questions if he stated in re his Dec '60 talk with Kostikov that it was a military code clerk which was recruited — more likely he stated important recruitment code clerk may be military —

(Check ref in Sdic papers — This memo Oct-54 — info from FBI-not transcript (?) Kostikov in Dec 60).

OFFICE AND TITLE: 1 + cl

SIGNATURE:

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 16 January 61

SUBJECT: 60-61 Nosenko's position

FILE NUMBER:

(Anatole Reviewing Soviet Nosenko file)

2 points of "misinformation" from Nosenko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61 and he could not be Deputy Chief - (N says he was)
2. There were no recruitment of AmEmb personnel during this period.

If N is established as in American Section then point 2 i.e., Nosenko's claim, follows but this is not the case.

Dec 60 - Jan 61 - in offices V. PETROV's Section. Petrov told personnel he could not find suitable reports and must look for it

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE:

SUBJECT: (2) 60-61 Nosenko -

FILE NUMBER:

If Petrov not responsible for Tulbany why would he have "milked" reports in his Section? A overheard him ask for reports.

A says he is sure that before his defection N would have no problem learning about recruitments and operations. Gribanov announced successes - rewards followed in few days - thus known. Point A makes is that N would know - he could analyze who doing what and piece together with announcements & rewards to cases and targets.

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FORM 1958 1101

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January '69

SUBJECT: Nosenko trip to Cuba - Nov - Dec 60

FILE NUMBER:

Anatoli says only photographs will substantiate Nosenko, Yuri Nikolaevich, did travel from Amsterdam — RR to Berlin —, name alone on travelers or manifests, travel orders, etc, not substantiation.

Requests to be shown documentation to substantiate actually was Nosenko.

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H. S. Hunt

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January '69

SUBJECT: Nosenko attitude re Surfacing

FILE NUMBER:

Anatoli suggests consideration about asking N if he would agree to have intel information published under his name, such as political info, sketch of Gribanov from what he has provided this to be test see N's reaction — suggest this and see what he would say about writing article about Gribanov. Set stage see what might be done.

Solie opinion he (N) would agree.

A had asked and been told by Solie that N feared for his safety with respect to surfacing or living openly.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE 15 Jan '69

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

Klippen - Gitano relations -

Anatole says [illegible] back together re hunting or fishing - something re appointment [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] says he [illegible] not higher.

Did not understand point!

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[illegible]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January 69

SUBJECT: Nosenko Notes

FILE NUMBER:

Anatoli categorically states it would have been impossible for N to transfer any notes or papers with him when transferring to another Department. Check out safes and material constant. A same if he had been told N kept notes in his apartment A would say "madness" but believable. He cannot accept transfer notes with N.

A questions N's notes dealing with military training. How would he have. A says flatly military not under Kovshuk. Possible Petrov in section (sub) separate from Kovshuk.

Giorgi Zukov - ? demotion 58 A agrees (ZHUKOV) Cherchanov papers show Chief Section. Used to check "C papers" re Kovshuk status.

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[signature]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 January '69

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

CHEREPANOV write-up from British
(caption: Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV - 5 pages only)

Solie read. Copy to Rein - today.

JA read.

Anatole

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 Jan '69

SUBJECT: Kovshuk - in U.S. - detention.

FILE NUMBER:

Anatoli says that Kovshuk got in trouble while he was in the US on a mission. He was recalled and detained. He was a SCD officer not FCD. He was only in US 10 months.

Anatoli does not accept Rocque's explanation of reason for Kovshuk's detention.

Anatoli says, referring to Solie, he does not recall any kid problem in US was girls. Solie said N indicated kids involved girls in US.

However, Anatoli says recall not because of girls, according his information but did indicate recall investigation. Relates to cases he studying.

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H. S. Hulse

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE 15 Jan 69
SUBJECT TAMARA MAMEDOVA	FILE NUMBER

Anatole, noting in transcript N's statement Sayi add, mbr KGB suggests This be investigated. He is of opinion she might be KGB. Sayi noted she traveled and active while in US - was in Washington.

A Sayi he thinks she fits into case he studying - encompassing but in response to mild question which case Said he had not previously mentioned but will when ready. A confirmed mbr case previously mentioned when Miles said he thought might be case to be reviewed.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
	U.S. Miles

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January 69

SUBJECT: Nosenko - Obsenkov - Golz

FILE NUMBER:

Author says N-C-G closest of friends, N/would know acc C & G pol & agents and vice versa. Points! N could identify Vassal by name; would know C's agents.

A also communicated that Golz in Swiss would have been targetted vs. Americans not concerned with jurisdiction Swiss police.

A in answer to JA question said he knew for fact that N-C-G closest friends - professional, social - talk about women, etc., and he had been present when N & C talking about operations using language, i.e, doubletalk, so he, A, did not know what they really talking about but indicating to A they situate re operations.

OFFICE AND TITLE

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U S. Ruder

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE
15 January 69

SUBJECT
Y. Nosenko Defects American Section

FILE NUMBER

Guatole returned to point that he sees no substantiation for evidence that N was actually involved and working against Americans - in two years he should have been in "10 cases" as participate - Shelepin would not tolerate "blaming" on part of appointed lawyer. "Even as a conservative" by A that N was "deputy" he would be directly involved - in contact. Anotes Kovshuk, higher rank.

Kryazenov did not know language, Kosalopov and N should have worked and participated together.

Kovshuk and Churakov active - no cover.

Unbelievable he served 5 yrs without involvement and direct contact.

The response to Solie note re N at meeting w/ Kryazenov at airport, which Solie noted Kryazenov could not confirm, A says was confirmation - cover.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

(2) N's Duties American Section

FILE NUMBER

A very positive weak point in N's story is American Section duty — N can substantiate — no culmination — not normal — a reconstruction not actual role at time.

OFFICE AND TITLE

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U. S. Miler

FORM 7-67 1954

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 Jan '69

SUBJECT: Y. NOSENKO

FILE NUMBER:

HUNTER emphasized point that Nosenko should have directly participated in approach to American Embassy personnel or else an actual contact with Americans during the period Jan 60 - Dec 61 when he in Dept I Section T. A matter point N's good language, experience, etc., according to A's knowledge, means that N should have followed American Section officer and been directly

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

involved. In reply to his question Solis said only direct confrontation N had with [redacted] was in hallway when [redacted] pistol butt [redacted] had not identified N. Solis said N had attended a Cone ? / 4th July celebration at AMEMB, MASERU.

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U. E. Hiss.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January '69

SUBJECT: Nosenko Bona Fides

FILE NUMBER:

No doubt, not even 1% doubt, that Nosenko is not a provocateur(sic). A statement Angleton reiterated to J. Angleton, B. Solie and S. Miler.

Angleton's concern is to point out the contradictions, major areas, necessary to protect our security.

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SIGNATURE: U.S. Miler

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 17 Jan '69

SUBJECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO

FILE NUMBER: TAPE - 1

Anatole read thru several volumes of transcripts of Solie interviews with Nosenko, the Cherepanov papers including the Russian and Solie's paper re Nosenko from files; He recorded ~~the~~ his comments.

Re Nos — Cherepanov papers —
Met Bagley after and Dept SC Directorate
Didn't get into the review but
A made clear to Bagley double agent
Newspaper account made it clear to
A same source as discussed with
Bagley 1962. Went to McCone
1964 rec'd file from Murphy re N
June 64 - analysis provocateur
Analysis limited to 60-61 KGB
service background - no deep
analysis of whole case but notes
misinformation, etc.
A position was - had to have all
info he would need [illegible] but
want to [illegible] information - puzzle

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

Warned N re position - at time could not do research [illegible] - with [illegible] re [illegible] to elicit entire story and then he (A) would review material and analyze - see what do.

Mr. Solie did good job - did what SB failed to do. fill many [illegible] - abundant info - touched important aspects of N background - After analysis thinks many things to discuss and N can be really assessed as bona fide or provocateur on a mission.

Case state Conclusion: 8-9 vols of info Solie elicited [illegible] (good) for conclusion -

Final vol conclusion - analysis of evidence - mistakes made - analysis & conclusions not supported by previous vols of N's information.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

Nosenko type calls defector from KGB used to assess timing and meaning account for what happened before
Penkovsky Case - relevant re walk-in - agents -
Popov genuine agent in GRU - info re ops - agents - military - personnel
After Popov arrest within 1½ yrs another GRU walk-in - need analyze Penkovsky light Popov. parallel - up-dated info. look at Penkovsky from Popov
∴ Nosenko background against what went before - difference Penk 2 yrs key to Penkovsky was missile info which took more than year to prepare Penk go to Rocket School 59 - gave him basic
Similar to Nosenko what before
Golitzyn came Dec 61 - info re KGB structure - major reorganization, new tasks personnel operations, agents - some FCD + some SCD - G. info indicated some recruitments preparation AMEMB Moscow

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6 weeks after Golitsyn - Nosenko contacts CIA in Geneva. "Later gave vast info KGB, structure, personnel operations - Speaks impressively freely - Such like Penkovsky - ~~Don't~~ ever (A) you question bona fides because he gave freely - Cooperation not criteria to assess defector - if defector suspects himself he may not cooperate all time.

The more cooperative the more suspect because he has to tell story - do mission. Free response does not increase A -

If Popov gave vast info then Penkovsky had green light - parallel to Golitsyn.

If KGB knows that Golitsyn made SCD info available to CIA then Nosenko gets green light - difference in detail.

☆ 2nd rule assessment — background - personal = pre-source bio = character = ops/professional bio. not speak about Penkovsky - speak of Nosenko

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I Bie the KGB - not important doubt on this to Resolve - one of minute - no question against Anniego why SB included not N, etc. Especially see if any Committee to function of CIA not especially if basic interrogation involves a deliberate but over wording to N, SB an made mistake or calculated -

~~[illegible]~~ If CIA accepted decision (which A had made) then N would [illegible] a.c. if decision results not getting desir info.

II Personal character - different opinion which not discuss - two sides - could be important but not major - [illegible] N's bragging - boasting - boasting not that which key - exaggerated - if consider bona fide then important but if still questioning then [illegible] difficulty - Open Question -

III Service in KGB - [illegible]

details of service accurate as given to CIA

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If we do not [illegible] in source and years of [illegible] in near future is significantly lacking but [illegible]. Then we cannot [illegible] have done in analysis that positions, salaries, etc. acceptable on basis of speculation. Examine N info vs other evidence - cannot discount evidence if contrary what he says.

1 Dep't 1 Section Dec 60 - Jan 62 (61 Dec) importance in coincides last 2 (N says) yrs of G - important info.

Not true according to G's - G knows for fact N did not serve I!
G told Bagley 62 - among list he saw Nosenko name - G did not pinpoint N - but said list wrong because G knew N not in American Section.

Based on fact - not theory even though many [illegible] things this still valid. Still fact.
Crucial

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A. [illegible] to his [illegible] in this light - to give authoritative grounds. Speak about [illegible] in this period.

B. Evidence against N

Here A speculate - maybe G [illegible] to see if he [illegible] in T I. See [illegible] reaction - [illegible] about sensation. G did not react as they might have expected. Only [illegible] wanted analyse whole - did not exclude disinformation.

What is false about background is that he worked in T I and he held position Deputy - false as fact - '59 position abolished. In '60 was there and no N -

GRYAZNOV was Deputy T I in '59 - when deputies abolished he became senior case officer - if there were deputies would be GRYAZNOV in [illegible] in T I not NOSENKO

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Assessment of info to judge sincerity - foreign operations and political (policy connection KGB in govt) 1959 Skolopin - conf - etc.
He has provided VAST info KGB personnel, agents & operations - what significance
875 KGB officers (Sol's list - probably 2000) 2000 + 300 agents
250 current FCD + SCD officers

(tape off - Zenkin. Mikhael
[illegible] photo. Brussels - connection B.clitsky
not Yuri - before KGB [illegible])

Assessment N info - repeat identities KGB?
Penkovskiy did this.
Golitzyn did even less -
Substance - what this mean.
How many known CIA or others services
subtract this from N's figures -
~~[illegible]~~ minus retirees - teachers -
evaluate ops value remaining -
extent (what he gave) info about each

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how does he characterize them -
categorize them - questionnaires - willing to do.

TRICHARDS/ [illegible] - Suspicious
How N's info fits into what G told [illegible]
Necessary reduce N info vs what G's identification
Not analysis - as in paper. explain which ones
[illegible] - how explain confirm other sources?
Analysis of what 300 agents means -
may be very superficial. lacking significance of
agents - 100 310 countries - some cases leads not agents
agents in tourist field. ? of value.
G says only 5% tourists cooperative per KGB policy
How many real agents did he identify?
- Johnson defense ministry [illegible]
Analyze overall - then [illegible] particular cases.
Vassall - analyze in depth

Operations - value & significance
[illegible] in Embassy - Soviet mistake
means American -

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in sec'd arrange later that he identified Belitsky —

Importance his info allegedly Soviet until recognized in '62

Suslov + YAKRUSHEV leads to recruitment — what significance — analyze. Solie questions if chance S + V led to Nos volunteering — (check this important re CIA penetration in SB) Solie hazards guess Nos did not volunteer value.

Coincide strange example same time as defection V gives evidence likes to drink. Vakrushev's actions supported validity Nos' statement.

Value of his political info — only one [illegible] mentioned (by Solie) OSWALD —

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If genuine defector wouldn't have inconsistency on line about KGB policies - May 59 meeting - Shelepin app't - obligatory read report. did not come - only relevant one sent back KGB -

RUMANTSEV - SR-7 in '59 for contact with Americans -
tried to give secret report of Shelepin
order report everyone read - SCD
didn't explain how Rumantsev exposed
who agent who exposed -
Sokolovski

Judgment - errors, inconsistencies - omissions
conclusions info

62-64
JA One fact kept from SR was info
re May 59 - Shelepin to see if
defector would disclose - important

McCone - Khrushchev dismissal act 64
Cr explained -

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Towards new [illegible] CIA - FBI
3rd countries efficiency - new measures
results from ex [illegible] investigation

A - Analysis - evidence NOS not bona fide
defector but sent special mission
1st - mistake made interviewing NOS by one
man - wider experience - specialists -
special sessions - impossible [illegible].

2nd Dissemination question - can be no
broad dissemination - mistake to send
all NOS info to FBI & 3rd countries -
before giving all this work should be
no question raised - only individual cases

3rd - question of efficiency of polygraph
in general -

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Major point. When [illegible] of info -

1. Info re SCD agents in American Embassy
53 - 64 -
Andrey - identical w Smith repair when -
Howard -
[illegible]
Annual [illegible] Depts - Directorates - [illegible].
SCD wasn't open. FCD tried to [illegible] -

Chuvanov, Gak, Kovshuk

2. Factual basic disagreement re success
vs AMERB - Biggest in Dept SCD Success 54-55 [illegible]
case completed. no details — new info
success official promotion Col* { Kurbatkov / Gurbatenka - / GABATENKA } Gabatenko
NOT Andrey - (dismissed)
KGB college text re KGB Ops. 1st time general theoretical
discussion about definition of agent - book about agent. noted * to give full information

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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3. G not able make assessment re who in re Col.* recruited 55-56 – seems both a) [illegible] of op. [illegible] 55 – 56 3 [illegible] 5 – [illegible] this may been [illegible] all aspects b) recruited [illegible] – higher [illegible] c) someone CIA [illegible] paid – or able deal with big production.

4. Indication some [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by 57 – may be same or not – which was [illegible] by Kovshuk in Wash. leaving [illegible] ANDREY –

mentioned by (Kovshuk) [illegible] with agent in D.C. + Drinking – Former agent in State or agent [illegible] [illegible] –

Venereal (venerike) disease

[illegible] (Valentinova) actress w/ Kovshuk – [illegible] LAPUHOV (?)

(Review FBI surveillance reports – [illegible] –) doesn't exclude or reject Andrey – could be.

Coincidence [illegible] Kovshuk + [illegible] return Moscow.

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(check tape A told me Langelle went down in advance etc to handle one agent — when told - who - etc (for JA) ☆☆)

ZHUKOV was military field - GO Des Zhukov still in 1st Dept Mil.

5, 58-59 — important recruitment involving Popov case - areas Berlin Paris Bern (Suisse) Moscow re CIA.

read Cherepanov papers

BOWDEN 1

WINTERS 2

Langelle 1 sequence.

Dulacki 3

Popov not compromised Winters letter.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (Break in tape - telephone call)

FILE NUMBER: Langelle NOS [illegible]

1. [illegible] to recruit him to [illegible] - every CIA man -

needed coverage for Popov - now covers those in their [illegible] - (This [illegible] [illegible] against 53-57 compromise theory.)

KOTOV from Vienna - went returned to Berlin in 58

High level penetration CIA not solved

Surveillance (?) of Langelle, significant. paper to read -

6. Significant [illegible] per A's info 60-61 which now controversial - A vs NOS - comparison -

Crucial question - do you accept what NOS say.

Deputy position, etc. requires reanalysis

Way to resolve controversy / conflict reanalyze

Time to [illegible] re penetration

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7. Koschayev trip to Helsinki — conference — direct opposite data names, etc. supplied — independent info with facing NOS — (details - check significance Sofia?)

8. Mission not to place NOS in station but to confuse & mislead after defection. He influenced investigation —

Completely inaccurate he worked Dep't I | Section

Absolute statement he was not and NOS Deputy — a fact —

TAPE II = [ ] —

9. Code Clerks case need to be reexamined —

NOS June 62 2 pieces
Balitskii
Vassall

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Vassall info given by Golitsyn in April 62 - :
Enough from Golitsyn so that Vassall case would be solved irrespective of NK and UCB -
known to CIA -

(JA - when came Geneva 1st time he warned not to go out with British girl because of penetration BIS — doubts to CIA about security of Brits basis G leads)

Cannot accept 6 months too short
Socio says not 6 only 3
Anatoli but can you discount important when contact made
JA - contact at point of departure from Geneva - only four meetings

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[illegible] - and Belitskiy case which answered on Z [illegible] bona fides because code (comm) [illegible] our [illegible] - also [illegible] [illegible] KGB officer who handling from Dept D - disinformation -

ZENKIN - after Brussels letters KGB college '59 - A's analysis B case confirmed this what Z said -

New info in NOS (Soviet) paper - :

Belitskiy info could have led to Blake

LAVINIA - Golienewskiy - A concluded KGB - UB op. - whose info led to Blake - this together with Belitskiy now known KGB - evidence KGB supporting reliability of Golienewski -

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Rocca questions why Golieniewski started why [illegible] - possible implication to MI-5 - why motivations - why giving away Blake.

Rocca supports to a theory Golieniewski introduced by [illegible].

JA - What I have to say [illegible]

members MI-5 believe Blake Lit. type agent who ideologically would be give away - no recruitment, no spitting - Gave away names, airlines, etc. Opposed our view when in prison - escape changed MI-5. Dick Ellis controller for Blake in Korea - DE German agent admits - to 1 OSS liaison in NYC. DE controller Philby -

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JA - Point on record - detailed assessment by British [illegible] connection - [illegible] in Paris - long statement - [illegible] - convincing [illegible] said to make contact This said to SR - [illegible] Brits who turned down then [illegible] to CIA.

What exact info [illegible] gave Substance re Blake or lead to Blake - something known only to small group - (Scientist traveler -)

NDS info not commensurate claims he was position 60-61

Robinson Case - Paris -
Importance or Give-away.

Pouches
FCD would not need help from SCD to open pouches - This strange -
Could be GRU agent.

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HOWARD —

John Serene Smith — Secret announcement interview took place fall 67 — KGB worried if not informed about Nosenko —

Mike (audio) case —
Question when NOS gave Sobie says June 62 - when details - 64?
JA → Golitsyn info unless to Dept May 62
→ gave enough to unpack.
Question how NOS could get detailed plan he had — Gribanov would know not lower level —
PETROV —
Major info afisted Therefore been give away by NOS

Important info NOS avail —
Sakharov - "new Political Task of KGB"
Aleksandrov - " " " "SCD"
JA - one first of all 1st thing when defected would be NOS or Sheltering paper vital National Security —

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[illegible] VAKRUSHEV Jan [illegible] 1974 Paris.

V a Kovshuk acquaintance Nixon –

no [illegible] [illegible]

Kovshuk – Andrey Case –

Possible Agent Guk 53-54 in U.S.

if he Andrey's [illegible] case

40% –

Query by Solie –

Talk Guk + Nosenko closest friends

closer than Golitsyn + Guk

add Churanov – no secrets –

Andrey good friend

Solie Did Guk talk about Nosenko – yes

some –

Churanov recommended NOS, i.e.,

from American dept not from top

down – NOS knew what asked when

went [illegible]

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LYALIN -

'71 [illegible] of Defectors
Activity 2nd CD

electronic equipment recruitment - [illegible] claim.
letter re AIS research from Source?
Backgrounds in Moscow - Poland 57-59

BAGRICHEV may have been case officer
for US in London.

Penkovskiy investigation -
unclear ? if [illegible] knew Pen.

Suggested VIADUCT.
Maurice De Jean -

Dinosaur - Valirushar

SASHA acted - did not report
KOPEIKIN - special status under Gribanov
[illegible] - important - no details
56-59 - 60 A [illegible] K was.

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SASHA — [illegible]

Pictures travel Germany Kuchin — Nosenko

SASHA (Orlov) him sending
pictures from Europe upsets A.

Victor Koslov — Case —

Article about recruitment CIA of KGB —
whose alert — Pearson how came about
timing — ref by Nosenko —

Mamedova Tamara —
analysis FBI reporting —
overlap similarities NOS & G info —

Preisfreund —

his case was allegedly [illegible]

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Seen with [illegible] name

[illegible] — public contact
May 60 — [illegible]

Morone (moron)
It appears Stanley [illegible] missed -

Kostrick Dec 60 - Jan 61
2 cases cannot be connected -

[redacted] info in 1959 —
no recruitment
60 recruitment [illegible] not explained -

45 minutes - ruled out

[redacted]

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Try's approached later outside —
NOS' explanation -

Dwelling -
most crucial point - see himself
not others -/
Morell - GARBLER

TAPE 3
Garbler
HORBALLY (HorBAly)

Popov case indication that KGB
learned he warned CIA he under
control. Clear up - penetration CIA -

KOVSHUK arrival - connected
Langelle - cyanide -

Recruited CIA man Moscow
before Langelle Kovshuk would work
in Wash.

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Tip of [illegible] sleeping [illegible]
[illegible] may be [illegible]-up.

Will not analyze Cherepanov
papers —
dis (mis) information - major by
itself.
also support Nosenko -
Ground work for new operations
Cherepanov heads of Section -

Harmstone paper. cited head of
Section ZHUKOV in 58 — aug -
worked against diplomats l.
inconsistent — against
military - clear (to Nosenko —

Analysis info not convincing
mission
misinformation fits Counter
intelligence

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On evidence on double [illegible] - [illegible]

60-61 [illegible] chosen to give him status access to leads -

Reinvestigation suggestions to come later -

CIA - code name 60-61
Penkovskiy case -
CIA complex 55 - to
Penkovskiy —

JA - may not want comment -

OSwald - nothing to state
First polygraph - had heard nothing before assassination

French leads - we have not an [illegible]

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Do [illegible] French [illegible] don't work w/ N—

Viaduct - British results along lines French -

Activation - not [illegible]

Barghoorn - case figured prominently to come to our attention

Coordinating Committee FCD & SCD / - not exactly Coordinating Section within FCD - not 2 Directorates mainly coordinating intelligence and work against American intelligence -

Not for purpose of coordinating FCD & SCD influential but -

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main time came up was with Bureau
FBI re Sasha —

French leads
De Jean — [illegible] confirmed
by Viaduct + Nesalko [illegible]
in interrogation - (compromised)
De Jean said he approached
& gave some info to Gribanov
Chalet said per A —
(A) → GORBUNOV (Gribanov)

Giving away of De Jean —

DST says no recruitment
agreed to an agent

(Canadian case) RockBottom — Canadian [illegible] —
no leads [illegible]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

16 January 69

SUBJECT: 60-61 Nosenko's position

(Anatole Reviewing Soviet Recruiter files)

2 points of "misinformation" from Nosenko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61 and he could not be Deputy Chief - (N says he was)
2. There were no recruitments of AmEmb personnel during this period.

If N is established as in American Section then point 2, i.e., Nosenko's claim, follows but this is not the case.

Dec 60 - Jan 61 - in office 7, PETROV's Section. Petrov told personnel he could not find [illegible] AmEmb look for [illegible]

OFFICE AND TITLE: [illegible]

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SUBJECT: (2) 60-61 Moscow

FILE NUMBER

If Petrov not responsible for Turkey why would he have "ruled" reports in his Section? A overheard him ask for reports.

A says he is sure that before his defection N would have no problems learning about recruitments and operations, Ivanov announced successes — rewards followed in few days — this is common. Point A makes is that N would know - he could analyze who doing what and piece together with announcements & rewards to cases and target.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 15 January 69

SUBJECT: SKVORTSOV – Storsberg Case
America House

FILE NUMBER:

A [illegible] [illegible] that SKVORTSOV could pose as French businessman. A [illegible] [illegible] S does not know [illegible] French [illegible] – [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] – [illegible] [illegible] Question Storsberg identification – question [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] Storsberg and Moore identification and that SKVORTSOV used English and went to America House with Finnish party & [illegible] cover [illegible] break [illegible].

In Vienna SKVORTSOV did not know French – A could be wrong – maybe SKVORTSOV started learning in Germany after '55.

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	[illegible signature]

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM: Chief, SR Division	EXTENSION	NO
		DATE 5 August 1964

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CI	[illegible]			SECRET - EYES ONLY - BY HAND
2. [illegible]		[illegible]		
3.				
4. [illegible]				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

OPM 62-610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

5 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT: GOLITSYN's comments on the NOSENKO Case

Introduction and General Assessment

1. In reviewing the value and validity of GOLITSYN's comments on the NOSENKO case, it must be borne in mind that although his current comments do not provide much that is new GOLITSYN himself has always been a key to our understanding of the NOSENKO case. In 1962 NOSENKO's information was closely keyed to what we could presume to be a KGB damage assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, a fact which we only noticed on comparison of NOSENKO's information with GOLITSYN's. Similarly, what GOLITSYN had told us about Department "D" enabled us to see how such a high-level provocation could be run. Furthermore, his most recent comments do in fact provide useful support to our analysis which had already been completed. We do need now to assess how much GOLITSYN may be in a position to help in our assessment and future handling of NOSENKO and other ramifications of this KGB provocation. His value and future contribution can be assessed on several levels:

a. How much new hard information can he contribute?

b. How much new insight can he provide us through his own knowledge of KGB procedures and personnel applied to the materials of this case?

c. How much guidance can he provide in our future manipulation of these operations and in breaking KROTKOV and NOSENKO?

2. Point "a" is discussed in paragraph 5 below. While there are several useful items, the total of new hard facts is not great. On point "b", his insight, as reflected in his oral comments and analysis, is disappointing as one would have expected him to provide a more penetrating analysis than that which we completed earlier. And in point "c" he himself admits to having no idea about how to break

NOSENKO and KROTKOV, other than to point out that it will be most difficult, that we need to do some more groundwork and preparation before proceeding to an active attempt to do so (including perhaps uncovering a penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow first), and that we should use well qualified interrogators.

3. We are faced at this point with the eminently complicated task of breaking NOSENKO. (While preparing to do so we are keeping him productive and examining the ramifications of the operation.) Our great need now is for hard, incontrovertible facts with which we can confront NOSENKO, to prove to him that our conviction about his guilt is based on something more than analysis, which is what he now evidently thinks it is. For this, our only immediate asset is GOLITSYN, who looms so importantly as a factor in this operation. We therefore hope, despite GOLITSYN's relative lack of contribution thus far, to exhaust all possibilities and get from him every possible detail. Therefore, since there are many loose ends and unclear bits from his 29 June report, we are preparing followup questions for GOLITSYN which might assist our task. Some of these questions are attached hereto as Attachment A.

4. GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENKO case was contained in the oral presentation of 28 June 1964. As background for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was given a wide range of materials on NOSENKO including 113 pages of responses to specific questions GOLITSYN wanted put to NOSENKO (see attachment B for a listing of all materials pertaining to NOSENKO which were shown to GOLITSYN). In addition, GOLITSYN was given the CHEREPANOV papers with supporting documentation, as well as the KROTKOV case and manuscript, the BELITSKIY, the UNACUTE and POPOV cases. In general, this was nearly everything available to us in our analysis of 25 March, 11 May and 8 July, with the exception of the SCOTCH case.

What GOLITSYN said

5. Statements of fact: What GOLITSYN could contribute in the form of personal knowledge, as against supposition, is summarized in the subparagraphs below. Comments on each point are appended where appropriate. Several of these points are of real assistance, but certain aspects of their content or presentation weakens their impact or opens them and the source's accuracy to some question.

a. This man is the person he says he is, Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of former Minister NOSENKO, and he really was a KGB officer.

Comments:

(1) GOLITSYN knows this because he says he knew NOSENKO personally, having met him two or three times in II/1/1 in 1953 when GOLITSYN was there on other business. GOLITSYN also met NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1958-1959. In 1959, GOLITSYN asked NOSENKO where he worked, and NOSENKO said in the Tourist Department. GOLITSYN asked him about CHURANOV. In addition, NOSENKO and GOLITSYN know one another indirectly through their common friends CHURANOV, GUK, KASHEYEV, etc.

(2) NOSENKO, however, could not identify the photo of GOLITSYN and, when told who it was, repeated his earlier statements that he had never met GOLITSYN and would of course remember if he had. He had once been shown a group photo of him. (It is difficult to see why NOSENKO would lie about this, since we clearly could check through GOLITSYN and a contrary statement would throw immediate doubt on NOSENKO's bona fides, and there would apparently be nothing for him to lose merely admitting it. This raises the question of why GOLITSYN might lie about this point, similarly not very easy to answer.)

b. NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible during the period 1953-54 for American military personnel in the Embassy. In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same responsibilities, or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was definitely in II/1/1.

Comments:

(1) NOSENKO says he was in II/1/1, working first against correspondents and then against military personnel, from March 1953 until mid-1955, and claims then to have transferred to the 7th

(Tourist) Department of the Second Chief Directorate (II/7).

(2) In our own analysis of NOSENKO's story (11 May report) we had expressed doubts that NOSENKO actually even served in the American Department at all, since he was so vague about details he should have known, since he was suspiciously self-contradictory about when he entered and what he did, and since his later period in that Department (1960-62) is clearly a complete fabrication.

c. NOSENKO served from 1957 or 1958 in the Tourist Department (II/7), where in 1959 he was a senior case officer.

Comments:

(1) As noted above, this contradicts NOSENKO's story of having made this transfer in mid-1955, thus creating a period of two to three years which NOSENKO's legend is trying to cover up. This suggests to GOLITSYN that there was some success in the Embassy during this period, which is supported by other observations (see below).

(2) There is reason to doubt the validity of GOLITSYN's statement, since NOSENKO is independently known to have been involved in at least one, and perhaps two, strictly tourist-type operations involving U. S. citizens in the period 1956-1958. One was Richard BURGI, whom NOSENKO recruited in June 1956 in the company of Anatoliy KOZLOV, Chief of II/7, who has confirmed NOSENKO's story and identified his picture. There was possibly one other American, Gisella Harris, in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly identified his photo) and he claims to have worked on three foreigners, one of whom, Sir Alan Lane, British, has confirmed the story and recognized NOSENKO's photo. The two others (Hans GERKENS, a German and fnu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not yet been identified.

(3) Supporting GOLITSYN's statement, however, are the following points:

(a) DERIABIN considers it quite possible that an American Department man might be used in a Tourist Department operation, if he had qualifications needed and others were not available at the time. There is an outside chance that this is what happened here.

(b) In the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the recruitment operation in 1956 against U. S. Embassy security officer, Edward Smith. When confronted in 1964 with this earlier statement, NOSENKO vigorously denied it. His earlier claim could thus have been a slip, or perhaps merely a gratuitous boast (paralleling his 1962 claim to have been involved in the October 1959 attempt against Russ Langelle).

(c) NOSENKO has reported personal participation in only a few checkable tourist-line activities during the years 1955-58 although his year 1959 is replete with them, almost all confirmed independently.

(d) The only other independently known activity of NOSENKO during this period was two trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958. These, he claims, were merely to serve as watchdog for two Soviet sporting groups (and to give him some flavor of the West). They could presumably have taken him from II/1 just as well as from II/7.

d. NOSENKO did not work in II/1 at any time in 1960, and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there for the one year 1961 either.

Comments:

(1) This confirms our finding, as reported in 11 May report.

(2) GOLITSYN claims to know this because he was

aware in detail of who served in II/1/1 until his departure for Helsinki in July 1960, and because he visited Moscow and II/1 in December 1960 and talked with the then head of II/1/1, KOVSHUK. He would have known if NOSENKO were in the section then at all, much less as deputy chief.

However:

- NOSENKO was away in Cuba until 13 December 1960 and thus may not have been there at the time. Nonetheless, the fact that he had become Deputy would presumably have come out of GOLITSYN's talks with KOVSHUK, anyway.

- GOLITSYN had earlier said that PETROV was chief of II/1/1, GRYAZNOV the deputy. Insofar as SR records show, GOLITSYN had never named KOVSHUK in this position, as far as we know, until he saw the NOSENKO materials. KOVSHUK was, of course, named by GOLITSYN many times as an active case officer in II/1/1.

e. Contrary to NOSENKO's statement that GORBATENKO remained as chief of II/1 until 1959, GOLITSYN knew that GORBATENKO was sent as senior KGB advisor to Hungary shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, probably about January 1957.

Comments:

(1) Since this is a high-powered job and represented a promotion, GOLITSYN thinks it may well have been given to GORBATENKO as a result of success in operations against the American Embassy, specifically a recruitment. GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO may be covering this up by changing the dates of GORBATENKO's transfer, and associates this with KOVSHUK's trip to the U. S. in early 1957, presumably to follow up or complete a Moscow Embassy recruitment (about which trip NOSENKO also gave apparent disinformation, linking it to the "ANDREY" case, which we all agree is unlikely, especially since "ANDREY" left Moscow in the spring of 1954).

Since the period involved here is the same one GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO is covering up in his own biography (1955-[illegible], this might indeed be a clue to an important penetration.

(2) We are examining U. S. Embassy departees from Moscow during 1956, and are preparing a paper presenting the circumstances of one possible theory.

f. NOSENKO did, in fact, have the woman trouble he claims, but GOLITSYN "recalls" that this took place in 1957 or 1958, not in 1954, and this was the reason he was transferred out of the more sensitive American Department to the Tourist Department.

Comment:

(1) GOLITSYN also said that the events "must have happened" after NOSENKO became a CP member (in 1956-57), suggesting GOLITSYN is not stating a fact but making a supposition. It is not clear, in fact, whether GOLITSYN knows or supposes that this caused NOSENKO's transfer out of II/1 into II/7.

g. The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which GOLITSYN says NOSENKO claimed to occupy in 1960-62 -- was abolished in 1959, those holding this title being made senior case officers.

Note: GOLITSYN is apparently confusing POMNACH (Assistant to the Chief) with ZAMNACH (Deputy Chief). NOSENKO also reported that Pomnaches were abolished and made senior case officers, while Zamnaches continue to this day. GOLITSYN must also believe this, since he has reported GRYAZNOV as Zamnach II/1/1.

6. Statements of opinion: In addition to the opinions connected with the facts summarized above, GOLITSYN provided a number of opinions, theories and suppositions on various detailed aspects of this case. By and large, these merely provide additional support for opinions already presented

in our earlier reports on this operation. GOLITSYN concluded without doubt that NOSENKO is a KGB provocateur, that the operation could only have been run with KHRUSHCHEV's personal approval, and that it is designed among other things to hide various penetrations, one perhaps related to the POPOV compromise, and some of them threatened by leads provided by GOLITSYN. He considered that the NOSENKO operation is being run in close coordination with the KROTKOV and CHEREPANOV provocations, and that in order to carry out his mission properly NOSENKO must know many of the significant truths the KGB is trying to hide or protect. He believes that much of what NOSENKO has said is keyed to KGB knowledge, rather than supposition, about what GOLITSYN had reported to Western intelligence authorities. Since all of this has already been dealt with in detail in our earlier analysis, it is not repeated in the body of this memorandum.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

Attachments A and B

Questions for GOLITSYN based on 29 June Interview

What is your opinion of the general accuracy of what NOSENKO has reported on KGB organization and personnel assignments? (Aside from ops and special incidents connected with provocation)

Any contradictions between your present knowledge and the information he provided re who was where when? (Aside from GORBATENKO's departure date)

In your opinion, would the KGB give NOSENKO carte blanche to tell the truth re organization, personnel (including photo idens) and procedures? Would it feel safe enough to permit him to make major lies on this, especially general organization (such as Sluzhba, Directorate of II, etc.)?

What are the specific points you think NOSENKO is lying about re personnel?

You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the 1st (Embassy) Section of the American Department, and GRYAZNOV the deputy, as of 1960. NOSENKO reports KOVSHUK had long been the chief, PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only became deputy after NOSENKO left in January 1962. How do you explain NOSENKO's statement?

What is your opinion about the general information NOSENKO gave on Tourist Department ops, i. e., the totals he reported (about 34 tourist agency owners and employees, about 25 non-American tourists recruited, and a few miscellaneous others), plus about 19 American tourists - practically all already identified, known or useless - and 5 American tourist company personnel?

Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting tourists prior to 1961? Any considered solid or important?

Did you have direct, earlier, knowledge of NOSENKO's career and activity? Had you heard about his trouble with women, the flaple reports as having occurred in 1954? (The transcript leaves it unclear whether it was your belief that it happened in 1957-58 or whether it was hard fact.)

Could you provide details of the approximate date, location, circumstances under which you met NOSENKO each time?

Do you know for a fact (or did you hear from KGB personnel) that NOSENKO entered the KGB in 1953? Or is that merely the first year you personally saw or heard about him? Had you ever heard of him before 1953?

Did you ever hear anything about Nosenko's background other than his father, i. e., his GRU service, schooling (especially Institute of Foreign Relations), residences (including dacha), neighbors?

Can you describe the Obzor you saw on the POPOV case, particularly its format and length? (NOSENKO has described it as hard-cardboard covered, only about five inches wide by eight high, and about 20-25 pages long.) Are all obzors produced in this or other standard format?

You have reported that a KGB officer named KOTOV, formerly in Yugoslav ops in Austria, suspected POPOV and was sent in 1958 to Germany on the POPOV investigation. We know of no KOTOV in Vienna in the period concerned. Did you mean Mikhail ZHUKOV? Another? Could you give us more details on KOTOV, such as full name, description, career?

Do you have any knowledge of direct contact between NOSENKO and PREISFREUND? NOSENKO claims not only to have been a case officer for PREISFREUND, but to have been his close friend, even prior to the time you left Helsinki. Can you comment?

What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958? Would this be likely for Tourist or American Department officer? How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961?

Why, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling" name from Nikolayev, which he used in England trips, to NOSENKO, which he used for Cuba trip and for application for U. S. visa earlier in 1960?

Materials made available to GOLITSYN listed in chronological order of passing to GOLITSYN, with dates passed.

1. Copies of first four substantive cables from Geneva relating circumstances of his contact with us in June 1962, including first meeting with MARK and first meeting with BAGLEY. (2 March 1964)

2. Copies of transcripts of all meetings between CIA and NOSENKO in 1962 (3 March 1964)

3. Copies of all transcripts of Geneva meetings, January-February 1964. (All passed to GOLITSYN by 13 March 1964)

4. Report of biographic information provided prior to hostile interrogation. (17 April 1964)

5. Final chronology, with our notations, of NOSENKO's life and KGB career, prepared after hostile interrogation. (Attachment A to 11 May 1964 report) (Passed 11 May 1964)

6. Copy of NOSENKO's handwritten notes and documents he brought out with him in 1964. (Passed in mid-April)

7. Resume of first week's hostile interrogation.

8. NOSENKO's comments on KROTKOV's manuscript "Fear". (Passed in mid-April)

9. Complete collection of photo identifications made by NOSENKO to date, with explanatory note re method of notation.

10. Questions re NOSENKO for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April). Special questions passed on 15 June and 22 June.

11. CHEREPANOV papers. (22 April 1964)

12. Information on American personnel named in CHEREPANOV papers and otherwise of interest re Moscow Embassy security (WINTERS, including his ops activity; BOWDEN; LANGELLE; LIEBERMAN; Edward SMITH; NASHENKO; Leonid GRAN). 4 May 1964.

13. List of questions KROTKOV suggested be put to NOSENKO in order to confirm and clarify info given by KROTKOV.

14. Copies of two reports prepared on KGB audio technical operations, one prepared on basis of GOLITSYN information in 1962, another based on NOSENKO information 1964.

15. KOZLOV case (ASPOSDICK) 4 May.

16. Case summaries: REPNIKOV, SIDOROVICH, AGAFONOV, IZMAYLOVA, RAFALOVICH, REPNIKOV, MARYUTIN (4 and 11 May). JUNG, PRIBYTKOVA (15 June).

17. Transcripts and chronology with background sketch on BELITSKIY.

18. File summary on FEDOROV aka RAZIN. (11 May and 12 June)

19. Charts re NOSENKO CI production (leads). (11 May)

20. Chronologies on KOVSHUK, GUK, FOMIN and IVANOV.

21. Outline of information on KGB structure and personnel assignments as reported by NOSENKO. (11 May)

22. ARTAMONOV case. (November 1963)

23. PENKOVSKIY case. (November 1963)

24. POPOV case. (November 1963)

25. Answers to special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked of NOSENKO in interrogations in May 1964. Total 113 pages; all questions answered and passed by 12 June.