157-10014-10109 2023 RELEASE	UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Date: 7/8/2015 Identification Form					
	Agency Information					
AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER :	SSCIA 157-10014-10109					
RECORD SERIES :	MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE					
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	07-M-15					
Document Information						
ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO :	SSCIA					
TITLE :						
DATE : PAGES :	06/25/1975 19					
SUBJECTS :	HARVEY, WILLIAM ZRRIFLE OPERATION MONGOOSE					
DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	REPORT Declassified 1B; 1C Redact 03/08/2000					
OPENING CRITERIA :						
COMMENTS :	CCBOX 418					

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Date : 08/06/95 Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION


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OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE	: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION	
RESTRICTIONS	: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS	: POSTPONED IN FULL
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OPENING CRITERIA	•
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED



AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

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WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology#

Biographical	
1940-47	Counterespionage work as FBI agent
1947	Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
1948	Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP)
1952	Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
1959	Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (<u>e.g.</u> , surreptitious entries)
1960	
August 16	DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)
<u>1961</u>	
Late January (approx.)	EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24)
February (approx.)	BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)

HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38)

Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

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1961 (cont'd)

Early Feb.

According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)

Late Feb.

Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)

O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)

Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor

Mid-April

March-Early April

November 15

Committee. Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to

apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39)

November 29

1962

February

February 7

February 19

April 8-9

April 14

April 18-19

MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)

EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)

HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains <u>Helm's approval not to</u> <u>brief MC CONE</u> (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46) Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

TOP SECRET

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1962 (cont'd)

April 21

Late April

May 7

May 14

Throughout May

HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)

HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for

use them. (50)

Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that <u>pills are in Cuba</u> at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to

Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)

EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*

Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)

ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)

Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.

General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, <u>including liquida-</u> tion of leaders".

* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

June 21

August 10

August 13

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd)

August 14

HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.

September

Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

October

<u>1963</u>

February

June

August 16

HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)

HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and <u>Helms</u> <u>agrees not to brief McCone</u> unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)

Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

Edwards EXI 5/30/75 1 per.

14 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT: John Rosselli

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INVENTORIED: DN MAR BY

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

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2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

Director of Security

- - -: --:00:007 0000



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE CEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sa

Subject: Alternate Course B

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In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course E for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed. I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tweeday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,), Decommic (caborage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the layer.

Mr. Hurwitch: Sintement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any supportions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

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14 August 1962

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HELMIS EX2.

6/13/75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.




5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

lusit

WILLIAM K. HARVEY Chief, Task Force W

ATES UNIT

Attachment Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62



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Project ZRRIFLE

1. <u>Identification</u>: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. <u>Objectives</u>: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. <u>Background</u>: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

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declassification schedule of E.O. 11852

exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on

Date Impossible to Determine

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions. control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

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4. Operational Assets:

(1) <u>Personnel</u>: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the ______ by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960,

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	· ·
QJWIN annual salary:	\$7,200
Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	$\frac{1,000}{$14,700}$

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.
Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with
KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional,
proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, <u>CE-experienced</u> ops
officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to
pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high
regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

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3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, <u>training</u> case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point <u>mandat</u> **PECEIVED** FROM

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DCI officially advised?

c. <u>Max. security</u> cable commo for <u>innocuous</u> cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; <u>rigid</u> caseofficering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency. Training by opposition would _____.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube / D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4) Blackmail:

a. <u>No</u> American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record

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of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

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e. Staffers ____-selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Use kinks and nobody who has ever dealt with criminals;

otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

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Khokhlov case. Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems. 1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough. 2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA selection. Complete RDP authority in this focal/point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo. 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's. 4) Non-attributability: No American vitizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach/to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners -- and limited official reference. 5) No chain of connections/permitting blackmail. 6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory. 7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined. 8) Planning should include provision for blaming Solviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. /4 above essential. 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those

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who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)


12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for eack selectee.

13) All Kubark personnel mvolved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.



Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Bureau

"for a living" RIS 201 cover

caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes - Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2 Not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor -- assumptions Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford Ehut R&D - memo.

"Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project. pherious - (V with CB)

comment - Gear

Anathesia --

26/1 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter No file Never mentions word assassination. 1. Select proper oern to run --Max as 3 2. Place a cover B - WKH - AS-3. Security Rules Sid - Reserv. 4. Guide leves 5. Last Resort - Brakes -Substitute - What next 6. No other agencies RECEIVED FROM 7. No projects or papers except per cover. 8. Principal agent - (Mankel)? AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB. JUN 24 1975 Mask spat rqm. stall AF project - cler Dbieke CIA SECRET

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9. Disposal --

- ll. Case officering
- 12. Cover file create to provide RIS or akbestobel it. non Sov

13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed -

Fd J list - Remember

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