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AGENCY INFORMATION

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The United States Senate R279

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental. Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

> Tuesday, March 9, 1976 1. 1. 6

> > Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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INTROPORT INVESTIGATION

Foreign & Military Subcommittee Meeting

Tuesday, March 9, 1976

United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to

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Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10.30 o'clock a.m. in Room S-407, the Capitol Senator Walter D. Huddleston (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

15Present: Senators Huddleston. presiding. Hart of16Colorado, and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: Joseph diGenova. Charles Kirbow. Ellict Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreth, Jan Orloff. William Bader Lynn Davis. Al Quanbeck, Charles Lombard. Rick Inderfurth. Bob Kelley. Greg Treverton. Jim Johnston and Britt Snider. Professional Staff Members.

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Senator Huddleston Lot's come to order.

Mr. Aaron. The agonda today is to proceed with the DCI section and in addition we would like to get the Subcommittee's if you will substantive approval of the paper on the production of intolligence so that it might go to the Agency and we could go through the process of clearing its details. I don't know which of those you wish to take up first

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Mr. Kirbow. We should really take up the paper first 30 because it already went out this morning. 11

12 Mr. Aaron. Well, they are reading it but we have not negotiated with them vet. 13

> Senator Huddleston. Anv/comment on that paper? Mr. Miller. Which paper?

Senator Huddleston. The production of intelligence. Mr. Aaron: It is in the larger book.

The concern that has been expressed by the serior

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I have some comments but I 18 defer to the Senators if they have some comments first 10 Hr. Aaron. It's at Tab DEL Co.

Senator Huddleston. Charley, no shead. 01

Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

withersed from the Brone and other parts of the community $\mathcal{O}(\Lambda)$ not only bafore this Caudifor But as a matter of record for $D \subseteq$ IOP SECRET

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the Senators I'm sure there know that the big of fight in \mathbb{C} the House last year was to avoid the excruciating details on Ξ, budget figures and I think we had kind of discussed perhaps publishing 3 on 4 major Teatures [I'd like to point out that in 5 this particular document, sucy oreat detail as that portion of the 5 CIN, the DDI which produced intelligence, we speak of an 7 authorized project to \$70.9 million with 2.269 employees, exact percentage of the Adency's induct and the exact percentage of the 2 Q personnel. That one page of this document is probably the most classified single compilation. 10 Senator Huddleston: What page is that? 11 Mr. Kirbow. Page 3. 12 Senator Huddleston. Of course it's out of the Agency. 17 t would assume they would have some comment on it. 7.4 Mr. Aaron. The point was not, the view was not to 15 produce these precise numbers but A, to have them for the 16 Subcommittee so that they could inderstand them and much as 17 in the case of the DCL's original paper to expect that these ЧQ things will be modified and to lay the basis for an appropriate 19 discussion with them as to how one might modify it and yet 20 capture the essence of the argument, and we'll just see how 21 far that does in trying to reach --22 Containly we have in intention of --Bonator Highlastow Could we say this Department 1.1 represents a substanti the anditure with a large number of

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employees?

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2 if I could tell you what my position Mr. Kirbow. Well on it is, in speaking to Beth Bloomfield last night I specificall . 5 4 asked her -- well, she save that's to give them something out there to take out so that we'll have enough left in here that would be a worthwhile document at the end.

457 1. 1

17 And I think that if we are kidding ourselves that we have either the time or -- and we should not have the inclination · P. in my opinion to waste the time of the people at the Agency Ω 10 or anything by "putting in things which will give Mr. Boldin something to gnaw on so he won't bother the rest of the thing," 11 I just didn't think that we were doing to get into that kind 12 of dealing with the Agency people. I thought we were going to 1.5 be forthright in what we thought we should put in and what we 74 would put in a document like this because the whole production IF of intelligence thing or the whole theme of the paper is when 16 this inadequate attention given to the analytical portion of 17 production. 1R

And if we are doing this and sending it out there in . 10 this classified form full wall knowing at the outset - she 20 says: well, that's not even material. If they want to take it 21 out, just take it out. 22

Mell, if it's not material, I would hope that we're not 27 wasting both our diverses wolder head shout 10,000 words in the 04

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last month.

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Senator Huddleston. I think it's probably material to also to have a firmer graph when we start discussing and defending the report maybe, even to the extent of having specific figures. I think it's highly unlikely that they will let that stay in there and we'll probably have to modify it. I see your point in a way that we might save ourselves time by scaling it down to begin with to what we think will be acceptable, but on the other hand, we may not guess right.

Mr. Kirbow. Well. for the record then, Senator, I do have exception to this type writing where we deliberately beef it up with known classified information full well knowing that it's going to be taken out and not get to the point that we are trying to make. But I won't dwell on it any further. Senator Huddleston. Do you have any comment on that aspect, Senator Hart?

Senator Hart. No.

Senator Huddleston. All right, that one's ready to go. Mr. Aaron. Thank you.

Now we left off vesterday on page 25. We had discussed two oral proposals by way of recommendations. The first was to set a tone for the DCI which was rejected and the second was to confirm the new community wide deputy for the DCI to have him subject to Senate confirmation to establish him as, in effect the first doputy of the DCI, the man who would succeed in his place.

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We also discussed briefly the recommendation number 16 and we agreed that we would make some change in the language relating to what in effect is the re-establishment of the board of national estimates to make clear that they weren't there just for the purpose of endorsing estimates but from the standpoint that they are there for the purpose of reviewing them.

5. S. J. K. A. BL B.

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So the next recommendation is recommendation 17, and it is long and complicated. Essentially what the recommendation does is spell out more precisely what the DCI's responsibilities will be for the overall allocation of resources and coordination of the community's activities apart from the production of finished intelligence, which is the purpose of recommendation 16.

Now what it does, the first paragraph summarizes the essential responsibilities along the lines of the President's Executive Order.

Now it is slightly different from the Executive Order in the following sense. The Executive Order establishes an NSC Committee, gives the Committee the responsibility of preparing a national intelligence budget, makes the DCI the Chairman of that Committee, and gives the DCI in his person, if you will, the responsibility for presenting that budget to the President

as not entitely clear allocation of authority to the DCL by simply

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New we say of cut block that somewhat complicated and

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naving he is responsible for preharing the community's budget, and he has this Committee for this purpose in trying to place responsibility squarely on him to do that.

Now this would not mean, however, that the Secretary of Defense be senior to him in the cabinet. I mean the National Security Council could not make a reclama and could not go over his head.

That situation will still exist and this Committee is in fact a committee of the Mational Security Council, so there is another layer at which inter-Agency disputes, if they continue beyond the level of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, where they could be resolved.

Now the first -- it also designates him as responsible for preparing the budget and providing guidance for operations brograms in general terms and puts him in as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee, and then we reference the CFI and then authorize the following specific responsibilities.

First of all, the establishment of national intelligence requirements for the entire community and it empowers him to draw upon representatives of the members of the intelligence community to help him in the task of establishing these requiremen Now this is an increase in his authority from his current posture. He has now the authority to issue auidance in the preparation of requirements but he can't really say do

this or do that. These are the things we want.

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Now as a practice! matter. I think it's fair to say that he goes pretty far in getting his way at the present time, but on some of these requirements on a national basis, this would give him the clear authority to ask them to do things.

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Now his requirements: the level of detail and so forth, would obviously be something that would have to be negotiated out in the course of his work.

Now that is the recommendation of the first paragraph 0 and paragraph A.

I might just say it also gives the DCI in connection with 10 the requirements process, it refers here to the fact that he 11. may determine the success of various agencies in fulfilling and 12 in fact what the caradraph sets up, is a system whereby the 13 DCI can establish requirements and then through the budget 11 process and in the process of evaluating requirements make . 15 some estimate of how well the community is doing and either add 16 to the budgets or take away in certain areas and so forth. 1.7 This provides some of the real system as opposed to a 13paper system which he has had in the past. 10

Faragraph B describes the preparation of the national intelligence budget and points out that he should prepare this hudget, "bresent it to the President and to the Congress who would make some reference here to the language in the President's Exacutive Order to this conside

TEmeted the full has coint that the definition of the

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ا_	elements to be included within a national intelligence budget
ŝ	in other words, what parts of the community would fit into that.
3	where you draw the line between technical and national intelli-
1	dence, between departmental and national intelligence.
5	This definition would be established by the Congress in
5	consultation with the Executive Branch.
7	It further points out that he should be involved early in
ัด	the process of preparing budgets in the budght cycle, and then
9 .	it makes come hortatory kind of statements about how he should
10	try to consider trade-offs between programs and between collection
	and production and so forth.
12	Senator Huddleston. I would suggest there that we use
1.3	another word besides trade-off. While it is common for us to
1.4	use it up here in committee work. I don't think it conveys the
1.5	best connotation to the public.
16	What we're saying is that he balances out or apportions
17 -	resources, whatever.
18	Mr. Aaron. Now T think the final sentence is this
.19	important one, and the Senators should note this. The proposal
SC	and perhaps this ought to be made somewhat more clear than it
51	is now as to who will do this, but the authority I'm sorry,
10	it is clear. But the authority of the DCI to reprogram funds
93	within the intelligence budget should be limited by statute.
	The Prosident: the Executive Order gives to the Countitee on
오토	Porsion Intelligence not all the authority to pressure the

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national intelligence budget, but to reprogram moneys within that budget.

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Now our estimate is that that budget would be on the order of \$3, 4, perhaps up to \$5 billion, depending on what is included in it, and I asked the White House, the NSC member of that Committee what the purpose of that particular provision was; and I asked him specifically did this mean that you would be able to, as in the case of Angola, reprogram money away From some other part of the hudget, NSA, NRO, some other major program, and put it into the covert military, para-military

11 action program?

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And he said yes, that is the reason that he is given is a sort of broad authority to reprogram money.

Senator Huddleston. Hell, they were doing some of that, is veren't they?

16 Mr. Aaron. To some extent I believe that's true, but 17 I personally don't know what that extent was.

Now to the extent we will see later that we place some or make some recommendations concerning limitations on the authority to draw upon different funds and to replenish certain funds for the purposes of covert action, this squares with that proposal by saving that there should be by statute certain limitations on the recrossing of funds.

25 thinking that the oversight committee would have to work out.

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Now the next paragraph. C --

Mr. Kirbow. Could be take these one at a time because these are rather critical?

Mr. Chairman, one of the things that came before this Committee when I guess it was Mr. Colby testifying and at each meeting that Mr. Miller and the staff had with the people from the White House and the CIA when we were preparing the oversight bill, we heard many good reasons why we should not deprive the DCI of this ability to sign certifying out of certain funds and being able to expend them without a great big red tape machine to hinder that type of operation.

12 If, as David says, his recommendation here is to prevent 13 reprogramming, except within very narrowly defined statutory 14 limits, is a first step toward restricting that further 15 activity. I would like to except on this and have it discussed 16 before the Full Committee, or in the absence of that, or 17 connected with it, have the record that we have that shows us 18 that we should restrict by legislation here --

Senator Huddleston. What is the major thrust there? 20 Is it to in fact limit or restrict or is it to actually have 21 it defined and specified in the statute as to what circumstances 22 might prevail?

Mr. Aaron. The thrust here is as follows. The DCI can now reprogram money within his own agency to some extent. That budget, depending on the parts he can reprogram. I don't

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believe beloan reprogram is within about \$750 million of his own appropriation.

Senator Huddleston. No can't take something out of the MSA now and put it over?

Mr. Aaron. No. we can't do that. But in his new responsibilities as DCI for preparing the budget of the entire national intelligence program, he will now be in a position to reprogram the entire budget and therefore it's a much larger kind of flexibility.

Now the thrust of this particular proposal is not really aimed, this particular one — later one we do have one which does place some constraints and the purpose is to make it clear where the money comes from and where it's going to go to make it clear to the Congress at least. But this particular one simply says that because this is a much wider reprogramming flexibility, that it ought to be subject to certain kinds of definitions and consider the limitations so that the Congress knows what is happening to the moneys that it appropriates for particular purposes.

Senator Huddleston. Well, for this particular paragraph, then, would define or specify, suffice the word limited, or not?

Mr. Aaron, It should be defined. That's correct.

Mr. Kirbon I do with to point out, Mr. Chairman, that that is a departure from the standard reprogramming process that

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has been adopted in the Shears over the last 10 or 15 years. for instance, with the Committee on Armed Services.

13

Senator Huddleston. For other departments?

Mr. Kirbow. Where there is an authorizing and an appropriations type action in the Congress, as Senator Hart will know from his experience on that committee, if they wish to reprogram missile money over to aircraft, for instance, it has to be approved by all four of those committees, both Arms Services and both appropriations committees with the exact transfer of the amounts of money and the justifications 10 aiven therefore. 11

My concern is not that the Convress should not have a 12 control of this or that you could make it so rigid by making 13 recommendations that leave the oversight committee and the 14 appropriations committee ho flexibility to do this. And I would 15 think that unless we have a very good record on this, we should 16 recommend that this should be a matter that the oversight 1 17 committee in its new role gives good consideration to. 18

Mr. Miller. The oversight committees and the appropriation 10 committees would have flexibility. Every appropriations act is 20 a statute, after all. 21

Mr. Kirbow. They pertainly would unless you restrict 22 thom by statute. 2B

Sonator Un Ilector. But we are suggesting a bratute 24

which the new oversight demnittee that has passed. OIS



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so far would have legislative authority over. So we're really just recommending here that in this statute they provide the framework under which these kinds of reprogramming can be done in view of the fact that we are extending the DCI from his own little bailiwick to the entire intelligence community. Mr. Kirbow. If that's the intent of the committee, I have no reservations about it.

Senator Huddleston: I don't think the military people. would object to that kind of language. They'd like to have ? some definite framework Edr a man to reach into his budget. 10 Mr. Kirbow. I think all the various agencies would like 11 to have that kind of protection. 12

> Senator Huidleston. Okay.

Mr. Davis. Number C, the DCI should have responsibility 1.4. to review all intelligence activities and intelligence resource 15 allocations, including tactical military intelligence in order 1B to carry out his more general responsibilities. 17

We've used the word "review" very carefully here. This 13 is not a responsibility to direct those operations but simply 10 to be able to look at the whole in order to sort of balance it 20 out 21

We're not saving that he's taking over responsibility. from the military commanders. If you read the Executive Order the Language is different and it says that the CFT and the DOI: will not have near neihilt to for tagtical militate $\mathbb{C}\overline{S}$

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intelligence. But then it uses the word guidance. That is that the DCI will provide guidance on the relationship between the two and that is ambiguous to us and so we wanted to make sure that the DCI would be able to look at the whole but not have responsibility for directing the tactical military intelligence programs.

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Mr. diGenova. The original drafting of that Section C, 7 I think it's actually clearer than the way it's drafted now. \mathcal{O} The original draft says, while the DCI shall not have responsibil Ċ, for directing tactical military operations, the DCI shall have 10 responsibility to review all intelligence activities, et getera. 17 I think the original one is better because it makes it 12 clearer what you are trying to say. 1.7Mr. Kirbow. If you're going to use that for Senate.

14 yoù have to sav tactical military intelligence operations. 1.6 Mr. diGenova. Yes. There's a word missing from the 1.6original formulation.

Mr. Davis. The reason it was taken out is because it 12 was a negative and there was the thought that this is saying what 10 he does do and leaving what he doesn't do not to be said. It's 20 up to the Committee how you want to ---21

Mr. didenova. But you don't want to do the same thing the President did and leave the thing ambiguous.

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Mr. Davis ... Thave no nychlem unking that first statement.

Senator Unddlarton of you want to be positive you can

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1	say while the responsibility for directing tactical military
2	operations resides with wheever it is, the DCI still shall have
R	the review.
4	Mr. Davis. Well, review is, I think, the right word
6	because he's going to try to look at the whole.
6	Senator Huddleston. I think Joe makes a point there
7	because that could lead to some misinterpretation.
8	Mr. Davis. Section D moes on to ask the Director of
9	Central Intelligence to establish a staff to support him in
<u>10</u>	these responsibilities and to draw a staff as widely and from
11	the best talent that he can.
18	Senator Hart. Is this another staff or is this the
13	staff that is in being?
14	Mr. Davis. This is the staff in being. He has always
15	had people to help him in this role.
16	Senator Hart. Why do we have to authorize him to do
17	scmething he's already doing?
18	Mr. Davis. We don't want him not to do that. I mean
19	we want him to have a special staff to carry out these
20	responsibilities.
81	Senator Huddleston, This is about the second or third
<u> 85</u> .	time we've referred to him having the staff.
1	

23 Senator Mathias. Why don't you say maintain instead of 21 establish?

Sonator Mart. Thy If he deesn't want the staff?



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Mr. Davis. He's outhorized. He doesn't have to. Mr. Kirbow. He's authorized to have a staff under the President's executive order or in any other normal course of business.

This appears to be divering down below the kind of statutory authority position that you have and telling them how t structure all of the organizations underneath.

That's my objection to that particular aspect of the recommendation. I kind of side with Senator Hart. He has the authority to do his business and I don't think anyone in their wildest imagination would think that the Congressional record or history in this would establish that he s-suprosed to do it by himself.

Senator Hart. You took the words right out of my mouth. Mr. Kirbow. And I once more say this is one of the recommendations that we recommend be taken out.

Senator Hart. Who's we?

Mr. Kirbow. The staff had had discussions at the staff 19 level where several recommendations that things like this be 20 taken out for that very teason be considered, and I think it

is inadvertent that they are back in the redraft.

Senator Huddleston. You have no strong feeling about that: pre Let's omit that paragraph.

but I'd like to back up because David sailed right by this

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<pre>18 18 1 name 24, recommendation 16. The Director also would be emp 2 to establish a board of senior advisors. 3 Now who is that? Who is that board?</pre>	
2 to establish a board of senior advisors.	
	pard
3 Now who is that? Who is that board?	bard
	bard
Mr. Davis. This would be something similar to the b	
5 of national estimates.	
6 Senator Hart. Is he empowered to do that now?	
7 Mr. Aaron. He is not empowered to do that now becau	se it
Pas abolished on him.	
9 Mr. Davis. But he could do it.	
10 Mr. Aaron. I don't think that's correct.	
Mr. Maxwell. He abolished it. It was not abolished	on
12. him.	
Senator Hart. Could Mr. Bush reconstitute it if he	
11 wants?	
Mr. Bader. Senator, this is in a way a call to the	
16 DCI. It is based, I think. on really extensive testimony we	2
bave taken here about the utility of the board of national	
18 estimates.	
19 Senator Huddleston. It may be more a recommendation	than
an authorization.	
	ıim
he had to because it is more or less up to him because if h	
Mr. havis. In the set they have been former senior	

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and comment on them for the director.

Senator Hart. Do they perform any function? Have they in the past?

5 Mr. Miller. Oh, yes Llewelyn Thompson, for example. 6 There are senior diplomate, senior military men from the outside, 7 people of distinction, people who have seen a lot and have 8 something to contribute.

Sepator Hart. Have they had something to contribute? Mr. Miller. Yes

Mr. Aaron. There are two functions they can perform.
 More or less, they can bring their windom to bear on the product.
 Senator Hart. I want to know what they have done in
 the past.

Mr. Miller. Soudet matters. Llewelyn Thompson's roles, 16 for example.

Mr. Aaron. And the second thing they have done was to provide some senior support for the DCT and the judgements he is making.

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Now the extent to which that support has been Franklated into borsebower is unclear, except it was sufficiently strong that it was of concern to the redvious administration and was one of the reasons that the board dwand others was discertablished. - Senator Hart. Have they prevented any problems in the

25 | cast that we know of?

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Mr. Inderfurth. T think that's in relation to helping to insulate the DCI from pressures to modify him, In the past the board of national estimates insulated the DCI from pressures.

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-Senator Hart. Chile, Angola, all these cases where the DCI comes in and says we don't really want to do that but the President made us, does he bring in the senior advisor to the President and say, Llevely Thompson doesn't want us to, either. Mr. Lombard. I think part of the problem here Senator, is that the office of estimates was created under the Eisenhower 10Administration and fitted very well into the formalistic way 11 in which foreign bolicy was evolved Juring that administration. 12 Perhaps as a matter of fact it's been criticized as being overly 13 formalistic and the board of estimates was viewed as being 14 somewhat too long-range and somewhat other world and not 1.5 geared to what the President perceived as being his day to 16 day needs on estimates. 17

Now I don't know where the equities lie in this thing, 18 but it seems as though these insitutions have changed according 19 to individual Presidents. 20

So really, beginning with the Kennedy administration, 27 you had the decline of the office of national estimates because 22 it no longer seemed to fit the fabric. Ω

When Mr. Aaron. I'm not sure that's really a fair nicture - $\mathbf{n}_{\mathcal{A}}$ of the history of the boards Ferhaps you could tell us since 11 E.

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8	Mr. Kirbow. I want to talk about the testimony that	
Ϋ́,	was given before the committee on this from two of the former	
4	DCIs. Mr. Colby, at both the breakfast briefings he gave and	2
5	in testimony, favored the use of individual intelligence offices	
Ģ	around in these various agancies, originating estimates and	•
7	everything else: whereas Mr. Helms, when he testified here,	
Ŕ	says I really don't know how that system is working right now.	
ņ	I didn't favor it when Mr. Colby established it, and I had the	
jo	other system and it worked well for me.	
11	So I think here again you are talking about a man's	
12	staffing requirements as they suit the particular times and	•
1.3	the individual as to how he wants to run the intelligence	
. <u>ą</u> .ą.	community and what apparently suited Mr. Helms fine didn't	ż
15	suit Mr. Colby and he used a different system which he says	
16	works great. And I say that that is, again, a step down thing.	. '
17	Unless you want to encourage him to do it in a recommendation	
18	and not mandate that he do it, it kind of makes him run his	<i>,</i>
19	business the way you want it run and to no apparent abuse	•
20	problems or anything like that.	
81	Senator Hart. Well, my only thought here is that some	та :
88	future oversight committee or select committee is going to be	
53	trying to binpoint responsibility, and there are so many boards	•
24	and committees and rocks to bide behind that a DCI has or	:
`n5	a President of anybody has that -	۰.

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1	Solagain, my intent have is not to be a know-nothing. It
S S	just to keep the structure as clean as possible to identify
, S	responsibility. That's all. And if this is important to do,
4	let's do it.
F .	Mr. Bader. The record, Senator, and I can only speak
6	from personal experience with the board of national estimates
7	I certainly know of at least four estimates with which I had
2	a part of which the board's tole was very important in shielding
9	both the PCI and indeed the analyst from the rayages in two
3.0	cases of the military who felt very strongly that the
11.	continuation of our bases in the Azores was much more important
1.0	than sav some hard political realities about the future of
13	Portugese Africa
<u>].</u> 1	And I could cite other cases where this kind of
15	insulating function was encomously important. It had a great
16	deal to do with the experience the background and the very
1,7	presence of some of these board members.
18.	They also play a role as the chairman of the coordinating
.19	sessions of these national estimates. There's not just an
20	advisory board that sits multe far from the process. Each
21	national intelligence estimate one of these board members
22	becomes the chairman.
27	So they do play a very active role in the preparation.
24.	Mr. Aaron. I might contion that in this connection your
. 25	concern about the accountability problem, which I think is a
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۰. ۱	fair one, we have testimony that Helms' disposition on this
. ?	was very clear. When he bigned the estimate it was his estimate
3	and it really wasn't the board's estimate.
4	Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps it might be useful because I think
5	it is clear that he is appowered to do it. Two, if the
6	committee desires to make clear that as a recommendation, on
. 7	the basis of the committee's examination of their record that
、 <u>৪</u>	this is a desirable thing rether than saving that it would be
9	ennowered by statute because he does have that power.
10	Mr. Kirbow. Is it the desire of the Committee though,
-11	to change the current system which the present director has
10	not seen fit to change wet, which he has full authority to
. 13	change if he wishes to do so and which the previous DCI
14	established and developed into a working mechanism?
15	Mr. Miller. The records show that the function of
16	the board had been official results. Then it seems to me we
17	should so state that it is a desirable structure.
18	Mr. Kirbow. I had one difference with Bill. I don't
19	know that it is desirable to insulate the DCI from the opinions
80	of the respective military departments if they have a vested
21	interest in the outcome of the decision being rendered.
22	Mr. Miller. The brand has distinguished members from
67	the military.
£4	Mr. Mirhow Then I has throw how it can be used to
<u>्</u> रुष	isolate.

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Mr. Miller. Insulate the political pressure. That's the point. Not the point of view of opinion. 2 5 Senator Hart. Mr: Chairman, I move that this paragraph stay in. that we move on . 4 Senator Huddleston. Yos. I think we discussed that -5 thoroughly yesterday, as a matter of fact. R Mr. Aaron. On E, this is the clause which, in effect, 7 makes clear that there is a definite limit to the DCI's authority 8 and the limit being the conduct of warfare, at which time there О should be a clear system and process whereby these activities 10of the intelligence community over which he has responsib flity 11 in some general sense here for budget and so forth, that these 12 basic activities come under the Secretary of Defense. It's 13 simply recognizing the fact that we really have two problems. 1.1. On the one hand, the conduct of intelligence in what is essential: 1.5 peacetime and the conduct of intelligence in wartime. 16

Mr. Inderfurth. David. could we get some examples of 18 what high tension means?

10 Mr. Kirbow. We recommended that that come out. Everyone 20 had agreed on that and I think it was but back in. It's something 21 that you can't define. The Secretary of Defense may feel there's 22 very high tension but the DCL may not be willing to give up 23 his control at that time and you wind up with a prestling 24 match.

Senator Hart. Wut there is a phrase of archere national

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emergency mavbe? 2 Mr. Aaron. Well. I think the way we came on it was to simply say if you have the process for a time of war, the 7 President may exercise it. and he may exercise it if he feels - 1 5 it's a crisis. The point was just to have a process and have it understopd 6. what happens. 7 8 Mr. diGenova. Is it good to have a system that is operating all right in peacetime and then when you come to the 0 time you really need, you give it to someone else to run? 10Mr. Aaron. Well, the requirements change in time of 11 12 war. Mr. Quanbeck. The collection would become almost 17 completely operational. The sites would be dedicated to 14 opeational purposes and there'd be no purpose to have direction 15 from the DCI. 16 In that case it would be a supporting military operation. 17 Similarly, the new satellite systems would be used to support 18 ongoing operations. 10 Nr. diGenova. In other words, you're saving there wouldn't 20 be very many national intelligence needs. $\mathcal{D}^{(1)}$ Mr. Ouanbeck. Well. aconomic intelligence would be 22 relatively unimportant. Verification of arms control agreements 25 would not be a matter of hourses. 24 Mr. dicenova. Toutra talking about the use of hardware. 95SECRET

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Mr. Quanbeck. Ynn

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Mr. Kirbow. There's no difference of opinion between. the former DCI's -- I don't know Mr. Bush's position -- or the former Secretaries of Defense. Everyone concedes that the control of intelligence should go for Defense's purposes in time of war, the principal control.

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Mr. Davis. The point is, too, the argument in the past has been the Secretary of Defense needs the control he has had in order to prepare for war and now you're saving the DCI's going to do more but you don't want to upset the 10 military commanders. And this is a way of saying that we 11 understand that in wartime it is going to go back. It is more 12 symbolic. 13

Mr. Kirbow. One of the recommendations in the military 14 area we'll come to later is on this same subject with the bulk 15 of the work I quess on the subject being done by that group. 16 Mr. Davis. This also happens with the clandestine 17 service today. In war the chandestine service comes under the 18 military commander in the field; 1.0

Mr. Aaron. There are some arrangements of this character 20 because of the expanded authority of the DCI that is granted 21 both in the order and our proposed statute, particularly in the 22 area of requirements. 27

It's important to have this caveat, if you will.

Now recommendation 11 really suggests that the oversight

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committee look at carrying the budget process a step further 9 and instead of appropriating or authorizing the appropriation funds to the different departments for intelligence purposes, 3 that in fact they are authorized to the DCI who would then 4 \mathbf{F}_{i} parcel them out, and it doesn't come down hard to say that this ought to be done but that; this is the next logical step in this 1process and it is something for the oversight committee's 17. agenda. \mathcal{O}

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Now number 19 ---

Mr. Kirbow. I would like to except on that until such 10 time as the whole subject of the budget and release of the 11 figures and everything else is considered, the whole budget 12 aspect at the same time. 13

Senator Hart. I don't understand this exception procedute. 1.1. How does that work? 15

Mr. Kirbow. Senator Tower has asked the Chairman that 1Kif there was anything that had not been in agreement among the 17 staff, that it could be brought before that it would certainly 18 come to the subcommittee. 19

Senator Hart. Well, the Subcommittee can go ahead 20 and vote on something, can't they? 21

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Senator Hart. I think every member of the Full Committee 23 reserves his rights when how matter comes before the Full 24 Committee. I don't think there need to be exceptions filed. γr

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It's all de novo when is gate up to the Full Committee anyway. Mr. Kirbow. I simply indicated to the Chairman earlier that I didn't want to have a reservation like that and not point it out to him because I didu't want the absent member to appear to be sandbagging the subcommittee.

Senator Huddleston. Ha's putting us on notice. Mr. Aaron. Option 19, this option steps up to the question of whether the DCI in his new capacity as the overall manager of the community, and by manager I don't mean down in the nuts and bolts but having the general management responsibilit 10 of interpreting the budget in terms of requirements, in terms 11 of general guidance for the whoadement of some of these 12 activities, whether that function should be separated from that 1.5 of running the CIA as an agency. 14

Now we have heard some testimony about the inconsistency 15 between those two responsibilities. I think the arguments, if 16 I can set them on the two sides; would be as follows. And 1 17 by the way, there's a difference of opinion in the staff as 1 12 to which of these is the right one to follow. The argument 10 in favor of going ahead new to separate them is that these 20 are inconsistent, that bue could have, you remove the DCI 12.1 from a conflict of interest "Ituation in which be is both running 99 one of the principal avencies responsible for not only clandestine 23 activities but for a mall commont of cirmals intelligence, the $\mathbb{C}4$ development of certain second and development programs that are 25

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1	of great interest to the community, and you take him out of the
2	position of having to judge other people's research and
	development programs and other people's SIGIN's programs, and
·1	other activities when he is the overall director of Central
5	Intelligence, and that therefore this separation, his removal
6	from that, would be a good idea.
2 7 °	The second argument is that you really want to place the
2	authority squarely on the new director of this agency who's
. p	going to be responsible for clandestine activities. If he
10	still has a boss above him who is kind of responsible but who
11	in fact because of his increased responsibilities won't be
18.	able to give the day to day attention to clandestine activities
13	that he might, if he didn't have these greater responsibilities.
14	one should make the lines of authority clear and place the
15.	responsibility for the head of this agency on that agency
Ĩ,Ŗ.	and leave it there.
1, 17	Now the argument against that is that well, there are
18	two kinds of arguments against. One is that the situation now
19	is justified and that this is a good thing and we don't need
2 0	to make any change and there are good reasons to believe that.
21	The second argument might follow in the middle and says,
22	well, there is some inconsistency potentially. There might
€) Z	be some advantages to reparating them as well as some costs,
হাবু	but we have now just instituted this new system whereby you have
25	broader responsibilities for the CL. Let's see how it works for
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	1	ashile before stepping up to the question of whether he can
	2	really adequately perform and wear both hats.
	- 3	Those are essentially. I think, the arguments. If there
		are others that ought to be offered in explanation of the choice-
	5	Mr. Bader. I would just underline that, Mr. Chairman,
,	6	the second point that David has made about recommending the
· * •	7	situation to stay the way it is today. That is, that the
	2	two hats would stay together.
T	0	I think some of us feel that the period in front of us
	1.0	will be a period of experimentation and testing where there are
	11	new responsibilities that will flow to the DCI. We'll see how
	19	they work, we'll see where his authority takes us. We'll see
	1.5	whether he really will in fact establish himself as the
	14	responsible director of, in a DCI sense, and we argued here that
	1.5	the oversight committee should be attentive to this to see how
	16	it works out and that if sometime in the future after we've had
	17.	a chance to see how these expanded responsibilities work in
	1.0	practice. that will be a time to see whether the DCI and the
	19 ¹	Director of CIA function should be sevarated.
	20	Mr. Aaron. I think that to argue the first case a little
	21	more strongly, if I could, there are two additional points to be
	22	made about it.
	127	One is that in fact browing the second half. Furning the
	- 74	adency sill be an lunodificant to him offectively running the
	<u>95</u>	overall community.
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So it isn't really just a guestion. I would argue, 2 of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry .5 and saving, in fact, this is going to be an impediment and it is my personal opinion and I think supported at least by some 5 testimony that that would be the case.

7 The second argument. I think, is a somewhat broader one, and I guess I'm not prepared to make it. But we've had an 8 induiry jute the CIA, some of its problems, some of its 0 accountability problems, some of its management problems, and 10 as a result of this inquiry there is, at least it strikes me 11 as being some inconsistency to be argued between having this .12 broad inquiry and ending up with a much stronger, larger, and \sim 13 more powerful Central Intelligence Agency in every respect 14 with greater authority over other elements of the intelligence 15 community. 16

Now you can only carry that so far but it seems to me 17 that there is a serious question here as to, and it is seen in 18 part by other elements of the intelligence community who really 10 are concerned that by wearing the two bats, the DCI will still 20 really be representing the Acency vis a vis their particular 21 agencies like NSA and the others. 22

That's the choice

Mr. didenoral, Mr. Chairman; if I could just note for 24 the record that of the witnesses the testified before the 25

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Committee. I believe the record reflects that Mr. Schlesinger was the only former DCL who was in favor of separating the Agency from the Director and all those who were still alive to testify who were former directors favored it, most notably Mr. McCone and also Mr. Helms, Mr. Helms characterizing the director as ending up with a disembodied spirit if he were deprived of this analytical vehicle.

So I think as far as the record goes. I think the record is against divesting the director of the Agency, although there is certainly evidence from those who fight that he should be.

Mr. Aaron. Let me see if I can clarify that record a121314ttle more.

First of all, the proposal is not to divest him from the analytical and production function. That we clearly provide for and that would not take place.

The second point is that I believe the record goes to 16 the question of sorting out or separating the director as he 17 has to this time existed in the sort of general kind of overseer 1.8 and the kind of jawbone authority that he has had. And the 12 questions that have been put to the witnesses generally have 20 been out in the context of what was / up until regently, his 21 authority in that capacity, and I might say personally I would 22 agree with that. 27

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: 	gravity that that gave him, then he would be a disembodied
2	spirit. But we're talking about a somewhat different situation
5	now where he has real authority over the budget.
4	Mr. Kirbow. But also presupposes. Mr. Chairman, that you
5	have decided already that you're going to separate the analytical
6	side of the house up there from the clandestine side of the
, ku	house and put them into separate agencies.
8	I don't believe the committee has decided that. The
ö	staff mav.bave.
1.0	Mr. Treverton. It doesn't necessarily presuppose that.
11	Mr. Kirbow. If he's going to put the analytical side
. I S	of the house over there with the DCI
17	Mr. Treverton. Well, in any situation we would leave
7.4	the DCI with his responsibility for estimates and a staff to
15	do that.
16	I grant that the argument for separating the DCI from
1.7	the CIA is stronger.
	Senator Huddleston. Well, he wouldn't be without authority
10	over the Central Intelligence Agency. He recommends the budget
50	and tasks them. He gives them the responsibility and apportions
21	the resources.
22	Mr. Lombard. I wonder it I could ask a question.
23	We have had providus DCEs who have testified that you
2.4	should not have the difference of the DAT from the avency but
25	that was based upon the construction as they then knew it.
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t	Now my question is this. Assuming that we were to achieve
2	all of the measures in the recommendations that we have here
5	for the DCI budget and all the rest, it seems to me that that
. 4.	is an awful lot of work without having to be concerned with the
5	day to day operations of the CIA.
19 L	I don't know. I just raise the question.
.,	Senator Huddleston. I think that's a good point.
c, i	Mr. Lombard. He first of all has to present the budget
0	to the Prosident. He has to defend the budget up on the hill,
to	and that's in at least four committees. And then he's got to
11	have an analytical base, and presumably the national estimate
12	function and on top of that, worrying about the day to day
17	overations of the Agency.
1.1	I don't know if that is more than one may should be
15	asked to do.
16	- Senator Huddleston. Mell, when we talk about major
	reorganization and re-assignment of functions, almost, and
1.8	we're probably confusing that by continuing to call the man
19	who is going to supervise all of the intelligence the DCI.
20	Mr. Bader. Senator, that we are entering into here is
21	a period of transition for the DCI where he has new responsibilition
22	which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented.
105	Part of our problem with this decision is, as how been
오슈	stated and untode most of the bestimons of former boir is
25.	against the hastground of the prefent situation. He must of
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	it is not really relevant to the mestion of what the DCI will
2	be doing if, and I underline the word if, these new responsibili
2 17 194	ties that are being thrust on him by both the Executive and
· 4	by the Congress, are in fact implemented.
. 5	The argument I would make here is that the oversight
ty'	committee should take some time and consider this, certainly
1 7	in light of how these reforms, if they are reforms, are
Ŗ	carried out.
: 2	Senator Huddleston fo that's option one.
30	Mr. Davis. The Executive Order is an attempt to look
-11	at the problem and to make one step which says there will be
12	two deputies, and therefore the OCI will have someone who is
	managing his operations and takes some of the burden off and
	that's why they did it. And in a sense, they recognized the
15	conflict of interest and this was a step in that direction
16	which we are accepting.
17.	And when you say who prepares the budget, you have to
7.3	be a little careful as to what that means. I mean the money
. 13	is still authorized to the departments. They will still have
20	their own budgetary process, and how exactly he gets control
21	over that at this point is unclear. We're giving him language
20	about how it's going to happen, and I think that's the
	the state of the state of the second between the second be

argument for waiting a short time to see whether or not he 23

Mr. Aaron. I might just my that we have to look at

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this recommendation as until, not simply in the context of the President's own proposals and own measures that he has taken but in terms of the measures which we propose be taken in statute. which of course the oversight committee or whatever responsible legislative committee will have the power to dispose of these proposals or recommendations.

.7 But in that context it's very clear that we do vive very unambiguous authority, very strong authority --- I think I've 2 noted a few other points there we actually strengthened the \odot thrust of the Executive Order. And so when we look at the 1:1 question of whether he should or should not, whether we should ΓΓ or should not recommend that in the context of this kind of S 12 authority there will also be development of a statute that 17. would separate these functions, it has to be seen against what 1.4 we propose and not what the President just proposed. 15

Senator Huddleston. The fact is that if everything is we have recommended so far should come to bass and the DCI should have the expanded responsibility and authority, he would be a more powerful man if he was separated from the operation of the Agency. He would be a more powerful man then than he is now as running the Agency and being the so-called coordinator, would be not?

Mr. Davis. That's correct. that's the runpose.

from other eacher heads, her blev would view this question?

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Senator Mathias. Mr. Chrisman. do ve have any testimony

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Mr. Lombard. No loss comp from the DIA.

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2 Senator Huddleston. The DIA would favor separating the Ξ. two. Mr. Miller. General Allen has also said that. Α Mr. Kirbow. General Allen at the meeting when this 5 was discussed, he indicated that this has not created any C_{i} problem for him, that he didn't see any favoritism being 7 displayed on the part of Mr. Colby and the people he dealt with. 52 Mr. Maxwell. I think blat's part of the reason why a 0 number of us had favored option number one, was that a great 10 deal of the trouble with the President's Executive Order and 11 our recommendations was to give the DUI more authority. But 12 for the period of time in which that has not been sorted out 13 and we don't have a record for, to take away or recommend taking 14 away essentially the troops that the DCI had used, which in 15 the future honefully he would not need if recommendations on 16 both sides come into being would be to weaken him at a crucial 17 time as people try to fill in the vacuum that is created. 13 Senator Huddleston, I think the question then is whether 1.9 or not what we are recommending actually comes to pass. If it 20 does dome to pass, then this is an issue that needs to be 21 addressed. 22 Now, the other avestion is should be remain sildnt on it 23 in the report or hould up as option row indicates here, leave 24

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	and the second se
ļ	would be advantageous to report them.
2	Is that what we're growing there?
	Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think there are really three options.
1	One is to leave the stuff out, and my own personal preference
5	would be to leave it out entirely if the committee did not
. (feel that, if it didn't want to recommend that. It's kind of
7	a half-hearted
ρ	Senator Hart. Has the Administration already taken a
o	step in this direction with the reorganization?
· to	Mr. Aaron. It has by charging the new deputy out there
ì.L	and saving he's going to have more authority.
12	Senator Hart. How dees one revister disagreement with
13	that? Vote for option one?
4	Mr. Aaron. If you thought that was inadequate, you
15	would vote for number one.
16	Senator Hart. I don't think it's inadequate, I think
ר ב	it's wrong. I vote for option one.
18	Mr. Inderfurth. This also comes up under part 5(d),
1.9	this whole discussion of options separating out.
80	Mr. Aaron. That's a severable question, the question
21	of the structure of the Agency ltself.
. 82	Mr. Davis. Under the Executive Order this new deputy
. 25	for the intelligence commutey is physically moving out of
24	Langley and coming docutions. That's supposed to be symbolic
25	as well of the separation of the two roles.
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Senator Huddleston, Could we solve it by just having a narrative statement at the and of all of these recommendations 2 . relating to the DCI to say that the foregoing, preceding recommendations would, if carried out, substantially strengthen 4 the role of the DCI or they are intended to do that? 5

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And this brings up the question as to whether or not in this expanded role he should also at the same time be essentially responsible for the operation of one of the agencies and that this matter, as his duties are excanded, this matter needs to be considered further and a determination made whether or not it's appropriate that he continue to hold that responsibility.

That's not a recommendation. It's just a commentary on 13 what we have done. 1.4

Mr. Kirbow. It highlights the problem and passes it 1.5 to the oversight committee, which would have time to conduct 16hearings on it after some history had been established on the .17 new role. 1.8

Senator Mathias . Could Senator Hart elaborate on his 10 brief statement of position? 20

Senator Mart. I think the division out there that 21 apparently the President has worked out is a bad one. and I 22 for one would like to go on modord somewhere or another as 23 onnosing it.

Mr. Miller. Do voi mean. Cenator, that

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I	Senator Hart. I don't think this little dotted line
<u>0</u>	means a damned thing, frankly. I've never seen an organization
	like that work in my life.
. A	This is the
Ê.	Ms. Culbreth. That's ours.
- C	Mr. Kirbow. At the present time. Senator, the Executive
. 7	Order leaves the DCI as head of the CIA with a strong kind of
<u>ņ</u>	executive deputy out there that does the day to day running of
0	that .
10	Senator Hart. Mell. I like that equally less well. That's
11	the same thing.
19	Mr. Aaron. Senator. do you have - is there another
12	solution that we haven't considered?
1.4	Senator Hart. Yes Deave it the way it is now.
- 15	Mr. Aaron. Make him run it but give him other
ļß	responsibilities in other greas?
	Senator Hart, Mell, I don't want to name any names but
лġ	some of the sort of nameless, faceless people that have been
13	out there running operations in effect with some vacue respon-
50	sibility to report unward.
Ω4	Senator Huddleston. Hell, we say that in brachice when
<u>e</u> 2-	these other, if indeed those other recommendations do into effect
- 93 - 93	and he does assume this additional authority over the total
11.1	commity, once that bacanel then is ought to be vorieved to
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he operating head,

:	You know, that can be a dissipation of his accountability.
	You have a man that is so involved in so many other things
	that some nameless person is under him calling the shots. But
	If we were to move him away from that, then that nameless person
	becomes the man that we're looking to as far as the operation
	of the CIA is concerned.

Mr. Kirbow. At that kime too wouldn't you expect that that person would be named as the Director of the CIA, would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate? 10 "Mr. Miller." What's wrong with having the DCI in charge ΤL of the community as long as the deput: is under his direct $j \mathfrak{D}$ control? 13

Senator Huddleston. Well, you have the community of the 3.4You don't call the director out there the director of the HSA. 15 DCI. 1.6

We should be consistent.

Mr. Aaron. Option 2 -- we'd have a clear debuty, we'd $\pm \Omega$ know who he was. He'd be confirmed by the Senate. He'd be a 19 man of stature and be wouldn't be anybody's deputy. He would 20 be responsible. 01

Mr. Kirbow. He wouldn't be a deputy at all. He'd be 22 the director of CIA. 213

Senting Huldleston. Wold just clevate the deputy for $\mathbb{C}A$ operations to be the divert

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Senator Mathias, . Isn't that in effoct today except for 2 the titles? Mr. Aaron. Not exactly because he still reports to the <u>ر</u>, Maybe part of your question goes to who that person ought DOI. 4 to be and what kind of requirements there ought to be on that, 5 whether you want to describe the kind of person you want out $t_{\rm J}$ r. thare. Senator Mathias. Action 2 is really the President's order 8 except for the semantics. $\cdot \circ$ Mr. Bader, Not really. Senator. 10 Mr. Ouanbeck, Option 2 actually separates. The DCI 11 would be different from the Director of CIA. 12.Mr: Aaron. The duy you would hold responsible under 1.7 the current system still has to be the DCI. Under option 2 14 the guv you would hold responsible would be the head of that 1.5 adency and not Mr. Bush, in effect. -16 Senator Huddleston. If we go to my narrativeparagraph -1.2 Senator Hart. Can we bays that written up and brought 13 back? 19 Senator Mathias. I think this could be a critical 20 recommendation. 21 Senator Huddleston. I was going to say we might add a 22 line in there that a reason to review it and possibly to change 23 it would be to also a better fix on reconsibility for the 2.1 actual prototions of the doutrol sutelligence Acoust. (1,1)TOP SECRET

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That would be the usin reason that I would think that you would move the DCI arey from that.

· * 1. 2. ·

Senator Mathias. But it does not appear to me that you exonerate your national intelligence officer, whatever you call him. just because you have someone else you can also point to.

I think you'd get two fish on the same book if something does wrond.

Mr. Maron. Is think that would be in part true depending upon what the particular problem was. 10

Senator Mathias. Mell, sure, if their checkwriter is 11 out of wack and they haven t called in the repairman, these 12 might confine the responsibility to --1.3

Senator Huddleston. Actually, you don't exonerate him. 1.1 As I see it for the operations of the Central Intelligence 15 Adency you have added to him the responsibility for the 16 operations of the other intelligence agencies, too, and he has . 17 to review authority and he in fact would be the focal point of $\gamma \rho$ any misdeed or wrong deed that may occur, whether it's in 10 MSA or CIA or whatever. 20

e 1 Mr. Aaron. It yould really be very similar to the role he would now have under the Precutive Order to the MSA. It's 20 much closer to that. 0.7

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Now the next section refers to the Central Intelligence Agency in general. Now hogence so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather long series of recommendations regarding it.

Now the sections are briefly these -- those dealing with the charter for the Agency for its conduct of espionage, counter-intelligence and covert action, and the question of covert action itself, how is might be conducted and what limitatic might specifically, or rules and regulations might apply to it.

The production of intelligence, which is on its way, but it's not in here, there is another section. Then the impact on the domestic world of these activities both intelligence collection and covert action and I believe you had a good discussion of that longer paper prepared by Mr. Bader the other day.

And then finally, some discussions of the inspection 12 system, the general coursel, the inspector general and so forth. 19 and some recommendations in regard to that.

20 Those are the central parts of it. It included of course, 21 such mathers as proprietation, cover and so forth. 22 Now if we could turn to the first set of recommondations, 23 let me just make sure that there are not disagreements in the 24 text that used to be brought to your attention.

DEC

25 D. Dr. Dowell. I think there are. There are there that

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t i	here agreed upon at the most devel that were left out
2	Mr. Aaron. I have one hore.
₹	Mr. Kirbow. Well, just for your information, there
1	appears to be several things which were not just an occasional
	one but several things that were agreed on at the staff level
С 17	that subsequently found their way back here in the exact
8	original language.
0	But Tiwon't dwell or the now
	Mr. Daron. I'd be backy to take that out to see what we
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	can do about it.
0	Now the first bracket that I find is on page 36. If
	there are ony others before that that people have, we can take
	that up.
1.6	Mr. Maxwell, There's one on 33. It's not a bracket but
16	i) was a statement that would have been included as to the
	committee's findings as to internal controls on espionage activities by the Central Labelligence Agency.
13	Mr. Aaron Yes. I revall that one.
rg	Mr. Maxwell. Also on that page there's no effective
S Ú	machinerv to make sure that those outside the clandestine
21	service. I think that was addressed to the CIA bocause unless
22	a finding is made at the CIA that the UCI at this point, the
. 33	Diructor
₽4.,	th. Anope I don't uplicastand
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	Mr. Maxwell, The mound Full paramaph on 33 the way
. 2	it reads. it assumes that the Director of the Central Intelligen
. 3	Agency who is outside the clandestine service is not able to
4	ensure
E.	Mr. Aaron. I understand. You're right. Okay, if these
ţ,	are agreed things and they have been dropped out, then let's
7	just get them back in. I don't know that we have to take the
Ŕ	subcommittee's time to do the
Ģ	But if we missed some that were disagreed and need
1, 1	to be brought to the subcommittee. I'd like to make sure we
17	get them out.
• 12	Senator Huddleston. Whithe boltom of the page on 33,
7 T	maybe it's just not coming through to me but the CIA angages
14	in both overt and clandeshive activity within the United States
: 5	for the nurpose of foreign intelligence collection by overt
1.6	means from American citizens.
1.7	Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. I think that foreign intelligence
	collection. period, and then the rest of that sentence comes
13	out.
20	And then it says the domestic vollection does the overt,
01	and the foreign resources, does the covert.
0.0	Okay, my first bracket is on page 36 and it is that the
97	Committee questions the practice of requiting for foreign
J	estimate purpase destinate destript Averican difisenship.
<. 15	The noise was code that three have in the past been
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instances in which those the nore immidrants to the United States who wished to have citizenchin were then approached by the intelligence agencies and either sent back as legal travellers and what have you and the question being the point of concern being that their vulnerable status of wanting to have permanent citizenship in the country made them more susceptible to either actual or implied or even imagined threats or imagined coercion.

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Mr. diGenova. Can Losk a question about that? I'm 10 totally unfamiliar with the subject and I'd like to know what 11 the evidence was on the record.

Mr. Aaron. It came up in two cases that I recall and It like for Bill to speak to one of them. One case involved the Chinese in which the Chinese were approached and used for this purpose. I am not aware of any testimony that there was in fact coercion involved. The question was the practice and whather it has within it elements of coercion or at least the potential for it.

Now the second case I think you can sneak to.

PO Mr. Bader. We have received testimony from a professor of from a university in the Conthwest that said that he had acted or was the middleman in an operation of recruitment of Jewish Fussian immigrants who gave to the United States she in particular users interested in some of the Mussian Jewish immigrants who as more quite count in bours that preduction after recruitment they

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1	would return to the United States. I mean the Soviet Union.
2	We did not take that testimony any further than receiving his
3	testimony. That is, we have not taken it to the point of
4	asking the agency whether in fact they have such a program
5	in the Southwest. So the testimony was limited to that one
6	charge which I personally gave some real credibility to.
. 7	Ms. Culbreth. Can you explain just what the charge is
8	here? What is the wrong that has been done?
9	Mr, Kirbow. What's wrong with that? That's the question
1.0	I had in the original suggestion at the staff level.
11	The only human collection we are getting from behind
18	the Iron Curtain in Russia today is principally either through
1.3	our cooperation with the community using
14	just this sort of individual and sending them back, or sending
15	this type of individual from the United States back inside.
16	We're not getting the other human intelligence.
17	Mr. Bader. I was only responding to the question of
1,8	what the testimony was.
18	To go on to the further issue which I think is going
sc	to be addressed by the Committee. it's not the question of
	whether we should, the Cantral Intelligence Agency should be
22	recruiting foreigners in this country for intelligence purposes,
23	people who may return to their country of origin.
24	The question is the ther the individual who is in the
85	process of seeking Ame loss ditizonship are in quotes "vulnerable
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to exploitation for such surposes and whether in that shading the Committee would want to take a position about recruitment of that particular group.

Mr. diGenova. My position is this, Bill. The first time I heard about this was when I read it in these findings and corclusions. I never saw a hearing on it, I never saw a document about it; I never had a chance to comment on it as a designee, and I never had a chance to bring it up with my Senator.

10 I'm not sure that we want to say this, ask the Senators 11 to say this, without having something in a report about what 12 the practice is, how it's been conducted, who has objected to 13 it. what's the extent of it. before we start making a 14 recommendation.

We're saying we question the practice of recruiting. I have no objection to the Committee ultimately making a statement like this. I just don't know what the record is. This is the first time I've ever seen this.

Mr. Bader. That's why I wanted it bracketed so it could 20 be so discussed.

Senator Hart. What if we said we urge the permanent 22 oversight committee to look into this question?

Mr. Aaron. T think it would make some sense to have gaugetten the Agency on the record that in fact this is a practice or something that happens.

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1.	Senator Hart. If it's happening, I don't think it should	,
. 2	If we have to sacrifice some human intelligence, I don't think	
. 5	we ought to have a CIA guy tugging on somebody's sleeve who's	
4	filling out his immigration forms because it is a very subtle	
5	and very powerful form of coercion.	
6	I don't think it should go on if it is going on but	•
7	I think the oversight committee should find out.	• •
8	Mr. Bader. It's my versonal position on this that	
9	we don't have the evidence. We have not taken it through to	
10	come to a conclusion on this :	
1.1	I personally think that it's a problem that should be	
12	pointed out, and I think perhaps my own view is that the	
13	formulation of a recommenation to look into this as a possible,	
14	as a problem would be my recommendation.	
15	I don't believe that is David's recommendation.	
16	Senator Mathias. I would think that you might as you	,
17.	contemplate this thing, there are all types of opportunities	-
1.8	for this and I don't have any idea whether it's been done or not,	. •
19	but I would think an illegal alien, for example, would be a	
20	tremendous target.	
-21	Mr. Aaron. I might just sav	•
88	Senator Mathias. It's a different problem,	,* - 1 - 4
- 23	Mr. Aaron. It's a subtle problem because abroad I personal	1
24	was involved in a case in which someone seeking to emidrate to	
25	the United States, his desize to fo that was exploited abroad	
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1	for the purpose of getting him into the Agency.
8	Senator Mathias. This is the kind of situation I'm
3	thinking of, perhaps not an illegal alien. but someone who is
4	in this country in some sort of legal status but which is of
5	temporary duration and he wants to change his status.
6	Senator Huddleston I can see that. Of course you're
- 7	not going to get one unless there's something he wants. Most
8	of them, it's either money or some change in his status.
<u>a</u>	Mr. Aaron. We drafted this language to make clear that
10	they were really immigrants and they were not illegal aliens
.11	or people here changing their status or people outside trying
12	to get in, but people who are inside applying for their
13	citizenship.
14	Senator Hart. We could offer an option to have the
15.	Statue of Liberty say give us your huddled masses if you work
16	for the CIA.
17	Senator Huddleston. I think there's a legitimate concern
18	and that exploiting people who legitimately want to be United
19	States citizens.
20	I also believe that, particularly anyone from the Soviet
ST .	Union over here trying to become an American citizen, it's
88	going to pretty well diminish his changes if he does go back
23	to the Soviet Union that he's going to be taken into the
ક્ષ	confidence of very many people over there.
85	Mr. Kirbow. This is not an uncommon practice for the
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United States. We've back doing it in the United States 1 2 military for generations in giving earlier consideration for 3 citizenship if he serves on active duty as an alien in the United States armed forces. 4 5 It's been done as long as I can remember and I was in the military over 25 years. 6 Mr. Maxwell. I think the only question is if we m 7 recommend against this practice if we don't oven know --8 Senator Huddleston. It bothers me that we would indict Q the Agency with such scant evidence we have. 10Mr. Aaron. My recommendation is that we get the Agency 11 on record as to whether this is the practice or not. 12 Mr. Kirbow. I recommend it be dropped from this if 13 we had only one witness and we've not heard the Agency or 14 that we develop a record to support both that and the same 15 part of that first paragraph, which I don't think we have a 16 record on either. 17 Mr. Maron. We do have a record on that. It's an 18 interview record, it's not a sworn testimony record. But the 19 first sentence, there is an interview to support that. 20 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think the subcommittee then 21 should carefully consider whether or not it is concerned about 22 the use of American companies in the pursuit of foreign 23 intelligence and if so, how this impacts on anybody's rights 24 or otherwise. 25 TOP SECRET

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ī	We just went through this the other day with the labor
2	unions. The whole paragraph.
3	Senator Huddleston. I have some concern with that too.
. 4	When we talk about expressly prohibiting penetration of
5	American companies, it seems to me that the question is whether
6	or not we're penetrating those companies with company executives
: 7	being unwitting or whether
8	Mr. Aaron. That's the point.
9	Sevator Huddleston. It seems to me the real problem is
10	when we were doing it secretly.
1.	Mr. Aaron. And that's the point.
12	Senator Huddleston, The company ought to have the
1.5	right to make a determination as to whether or not its interest
1/	would be severely jeopardized if this were to happen.
. 1.5	Mr. Treverton. I think this language probably isn't
16	clear enough. If we did human penetration without the
]_7	knowledge of the company on the operation of the company
18	primarily
19	Mr. Kirbow. We're talking about a corporate operation
S	against a U.S. company in the United States?
2	Mr. Treverton. Presumably it would not be in the U.S.
22	Mr. Kirbow. If that's what's intended, it does not
23	convey it to even an informed reader:
2	Senator Huddlestor. Pell, we say foreign intelligence
2	collection.
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	Mr. diGenova. May I ask in this regard, it ends up
2	by saying, although according to CIA officials such activity
3	has not taken place what's the other evidence that it has
4	which created the sentence?
Find 2A. b 235	Mr. Aaron. In looking at what the foreign resources
6	division does in the way of penetration of businesses as
	opposed to collecting agents on campuses or in some other
8	walk of life, we found that the FRD actually runs agents in
. 9	only a few cases.
10	The cases are Americans employed by local industries in
1.1.	the United States or consulates.
ie	In other words, in dislomat consulate establishments
13	in which there are few cases in which indeed the Americans
14	working for those diplomatic establishments are agents of the
1.5	CIA through the foreign resources division; and the Americans
16	are not officers of the CIA but they were agents of the CIA
17	in that respect.
18	Mr. Kirbow. They work in the embassies as you say?
19	Mr. Aaron. Yes, hare in the United States, and this
20	is talking about domestic impact. This is not the foreign
21.	situation.
22	There has been at least one case and I belive there are
23	two but only one I can specify: in which the FRD had an
24	American agent in a foreign company. a foreign-based company.
25	It was very unambiguous that the company was a foreign company
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because in effect it was a public company of a country whose most business enterprises are owned by the government. But it's a company and it's business and it was a foreign company and the question was, and it related to --

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5 Mr. Kirbow. And this agent was apparently here in the 6 United States?

7 Mr. Aaron. Collecting intelligence on the activities of 8 that company because that company had foreign policy implications 9 for us.

The next question that was put to, I believe, the chief of the FRD was do you have any regulations that prohibited you from doing the same thing with an American company? And the answer was no, we don't, although we don't do that or we haven't done that or something to that effect.

That is essentially the story and how it came to pass.

Mr. Maxwell. There's some question on both of these whether there are ways of saying things that are important as recommendations without implying that A, these had gone on and B, that we have a record to support that.

There's also. I guess, a slight question in my mind as to the order of magnitude of the recommendations that flow 22 from this in the promulgation of a specific directive.

That's slightly out of synch with the order of some of the other recommendations. The Committee might want to choose to drop that to a footnote or to do it in some other way.

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1	Mr. Aaron. The mocommandation that relates to that is
2	where?
3	Mr. Maxwell. I thought that we had made a finding. It
4	was number 25 on 39. That's a somewhat different order.
5	Mr. Aaron. Do I take it that
6	Senator Huddleston. Is this penetration always in the
- 7	context that it's unwitting?
8	Mr. Aaron. Yes. If it's witting, it's really collaboratic
9	which is another matter.
10	Senator Huddleston, Sp although you could be witting
1.1.	Mr. Aaron. Well. the penetrating also applies and
12	maybe we should also make this clear, but for the purposes of
13	conducting some operation with regard to the organization,
]4	whether to make it do something in the covert action sense
15	which collect information on it.
16	If it were simply unwitting cover, that's a different
17	thing.
1.8	Mr. Maxwell. I don't think, David, that penetration was
19	used in a context in the agency in the NH/BOUND
80	Mr. diGenova. Penetration was for security purposes.
21	It's to discover whether or not there is in fact a fly in the
88	ointment with regard to the security of an American company.
23	That's the way it was used in MH/BOUND.
24	Senator Huddleston. That's putting a spy in the
25	organization.
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1.	Mr. diGenova. Well, ves. In this case they penetrated
2	Burbank, California and other companies, mostly defense
3	contractors building planes in order to find out they had
4	security risks, a laborer or an executive inside.
5	Mr. Maxwell. It was witting to a certain extent.
6	Mr. Bader. I think one of the problems we have here is
7	this question of whether in our formal recommendations that we
8	should enjoin the agency from doing things that they don't do.
9	And where there's no evidence they have any intention
10	Mr. Kirbow. The '47 Act prohibits this kind of conduct
11	within the United States.
12	Mr. Bader. And I think that that should be carefully
13	considered. We have no evidence that the Central Intelligence
1.4	Agency penetrates Congressional staff, but we have not put it
15	in as a recommendation that they should not penetrate
16	Congressional staffs.
17	I think the other matter that has been raised about the
18	operational exploitation of recruiting individuals who are in a
19	an immigrant status and seeking a change a change in status,
	we do at least have what I hold to be a responsible source
81	saying that this practice, he has seen this in practice.
22	I think we should separate the two issues and on the
23	second one it seems to me that if we could frame some language.
24.	that is language of caution and concern, or we should move very
25	quickly, it seems to me, to take come testimony from the Agency
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090 - 7 . 1 on that matter before we can talk about the matter of the practice of recruiting because I don't think we can use the 2 word practice until such time as we have --3

Mr. diGenova. I didn't mean to impugn the integrity 4 5 of your source.

The question is if the Committee gets asked a question 6 7 about it later on and someone comes back and reviews these records and sees one merson was spoken to or something. I 8 don't really think that's much of a record to go around making Q findings and conclusions in a final report. 10

It has nothing to do with the integrity of the man from. 11 whom the information came. He's probably right. 12

Mr. Aaron. I'd like to recommend that on that particular 1.3 coint we tried to nail down with the Agency a little more 14 carefully what the current policy or practice is and on the 15 question --- but I still stand with the view, I might say, on 16 the second one of expressing concern if indeed there is a 17 practice and we do know that some of it has taken place in the 1.8 past, if there's still no guard against it, then I think perhaps 19 Senator Hart's recommendation about how the oversight committee 20 should pursue this question further would be sufficient. 21

Senator Huddleston. Well, paragraph 22 over on 39. 22 if applied to the FRD, would be a pretty good approach, I think. 23 Mr. Aaron. That would not necessarily rule out -- it 24 would not step up to this mestion. This really is aimed abroad

at the question of duplication with overt reporting by the military attaches or by the foreign service or whomever.

> In other words, it's trying to establish a standard. Senator Huddleston. Okay, so where are we?

Mr. Aaron. I think we're at the following point that 5 as far as the bracketed sentence is concerned, we'll go back to the Agency and establish what the practice is when review is necessary of including the paragraph along the lines 8 suggested by Senator Hart saying the oversight committee should look into this particular practice if indeed it is a practice 1.0with the absence of policy on this point. 71

As to the question of American companies, I think I 12 still need to be directed as to how to deal with that. I 13 think when in doubt, delete. 11

Senator Hart: Can we just commend them for that? Can <u>15</u> we say it's a good practice? 16

Mr. Aaron. Well, the Committee notes that it's been 17 the practice not to do this and that that should continue as 13.a part of their standard procedures. 19

Senator Mathias. Have we ever commended them? 20 Mr. Bader. There is much text here which talks about 21 sensible, responsible practices, 22

Senator Mathias. I do think you should mention that we'te 23 talking about their domestic operations of American companies. 24 Yes. FRD is supposed to tell you that but; Mr. Aaron. 25

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Senator Mathias. I think on page 36 and 39 it ought to refer to domestic operations.

1 Mr. Kirbow. I think we might want to consider too that 5 there's an extensive section of the domestic activities of the 6 CIA coming into the domestic task force report, the subcommittee's , († report. And if don't put in a comment like this, it'll 8 probably 'all go in that other section. Whereas here we're 9 dealing with an apparent possibility that sometime in the 10remote future there could be an abuse and there dealing with, the abuse section and this kind of departs from what you've 11 72 done otherwise.

13 Mr. Bader. I would say on that score that this is a 14 foreign intelligence matter. That is the objective. And I 15 think if it's going to be mentioned, it should be mentioned 16 here.

Mr. Kirbow. It is on the immigrants, but I don't think, 17 whether or not you're penetrating an American company to, Real 18 illegally or anything else, if there's any way you can get around 10 the 1947 Act which prohibits that kind of activity by the 20 CIA in the United States for whatever purpose, to penetrate 21 them other than security of your own facility: 22 Mr: Maxwell. One thing that might make this easier is I 23 think that if weeppressed any concern in that direction exists 24 in regard to this practice, we would get one promulgated quite 25

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Mr. Aaron.	I would re	commend t	nat we acc	ept the	1
 suggestion that we	put this i	n a p osi t:	ive sense	and proc	eed
 on that basis and	clarify	the word	penetrate	and the	fact
that it is the dome	estic aspec	:t.		· · · · ·	

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Mr. Kirbow. Could we ask the Agency to comment in some way so that at least we don't recommend to you that you

> I'd be happy to do that again. Mr. Aaron.

Senator Huddleston. Well, now it's 12:00. I hope there's some way we can get through this today, which would include 10of course a night session which Senator Mathias and I are 11 available for. 12

We've done 38 pages out of 160.

I think it will give focus essentially on Mr. Aaron. the recommendations and the bracketed portions that that should prove possible to at least break the back of it. We can at least try. Senator Huddleston.

Mr. Aaron: If we come back at 2:00, I think we could 18probably have cleared away a couple of the other sections and 15then we will be really ready. We will have the full book here 20 and we can go at it: 21


2.00, I think, would be better for me. Senator Mathias. 22 Let's sav 2:00. 23

Senator Huddleston. Me'll adjourn until 2:00.

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(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the hearing in



AFTERNOON SESSION

(2:20 p.m.) Mr. BAder. Mr. Chairman, before you begin I might 2 mention that tomorrow morning at either 9 or 10:00, depending 3 upon whether this subcommittee meets tomorrow morning, we've .1. arranged for representatives of the FRD, the Foreign REsources 5 Division of the Central Intelligence Agency, to give us R testimony on some of these issues that have been raised, such as 7 the use of immigrants; some of the figures that they've given us, 8 and this guestion of penetration of American businesses. That will be scheduled, as I say, at either 9 or 10:00 10 depending on whether the subcommittee meets tomorrow morning, 11 We would like to have a Senator swear those witness 12 and then obviously any Senator who would like to attend is 13 invited. 14 15 1.6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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2	Senator Huddleston. My thinking now is that we would
.5	meet probably at 10:00.
4	Mr. Bader. We could certainly do it in an hour's time.
5	Senator Huddleston. I would like to attend that session.
6	Mr. Bader. So we'll start at 9:00 promptly:
.7	Senator Huddleston. Senator Mathias had the suggestion
8	that in view of the fact that there is specific legislation
<u>9</u>	relating to that subject and that's in the Immigration Act
10	Mr. Bader. I've asked them to be prepared to speak to
ī.].	their interpretation of the provisions and restrictions in the
15	Immigration Act.
13	Senator Huddleston. But our recommendation is that
14	we would review the act and the practices.
15	Mr. Bader. If we have this room, as I hope we do, we
.16	would take the testimony right here and if need be, move it
17	to another room.
18	Senator Mathias. In the event that I should not be
19	able to be here, and I hope I will, I think we ought to look
20	at this thing pretty closely.
21	As Senator Huddleston said earlier, you don't recruit
. 33	these people just out of the blue unless there's some reason
នទ	for them to sign up, and I don't think we want to be too
24	critical of recruiting procedures; to revert to the phrase that
25	we used yesterday, these are consenting adults.

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-	I think what we have to look at is the degree of coercion
8	which is implied here, the kind of bind that you get these
3	people in where they really are perhaps totally alienated from
2	wherever they came from and what sort of a crack do you put
5	them in and that not only goes to the humanitarian aspect of it
6	but to questions over liability and the rest.
.7	Senator Huddleston. I think they could be very helpful
8	to us.
9	Mr. Bader. Senator. I could also try to adjust the time
10	Senator Mathias. It could be before or after our afternoon
. 11	meeting, if that would be more in your reach.
12	Senator Mathias. Well, I haven't gotten my walking papers
13	for the morning yst.
1.4	Mr. Inderfurth. It's interesting in this respect to th
L5	about Lee Harvey Oswald, about his being over there, and we're
16	talking about immigrants coming here and defectors and so on.
17	Senator Mathias. It's the other side of the coin.
18	Senator Huddleston. There's a question of how many doors
19	we ought to close.
20	Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman. I regret to raise a
ź1	further complication. There's a meeting that I had for 6:00
2,2	that's now been postponed to 6:30. So it would probably mean
23	I can't get here until 7:30.
84	Senator Huddleston. Maybe 7:30 would be a better time:
25	I don't know. These people need to get out and get some fresh
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air too, I would expect.

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2	Before we get into the substance here, I understand that	
5	our new mandate is if possible to complete ours no later than	
1	Friday. So we're going to try to shoot for tomorrow.	
£5	What the Chairman would like to do would be for us to	÷.
6	have our report in some kind of form that we can give to the	. .
.7	Full Committee by Friday so that they can review it over the	
5	weekend and the Full Committee can start on it on Monday.	
9	Now how do you think you would stand on that proposition?	
1.0	Mr. Bader. This is the principle findings, conclusions	<u>.</u>
11	and recommendations?	
12	Senator Huddleston. Yes, which would mean that whatever	
13	changes we are making here in phraseology and so forth, should	
1.4	be incorporated and retyped.	:
1.5	We have that problem.	
16	Mr. Aaron. I would think that that's do-able. I mean	
	it remains to be seen how extensively you would want to	
18	debate some issues and the extent to which you will simply want	
19.	to bracket them or identify them and have the principal	т. т
i so	discussion take place in the Full Committee.	
21	But I would think that that's feasible.	
22	Senator Huddleston. To delay it past Friday, of course,	•
23	would delay the time that the Full Committee could consider it	
24	because they need to have it in their bands at least one day.	
. 25	It might do fast in the Full Committee. I have no way of	• •
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	knowing.
2	Mr. Kirbow. Bill, because you and I both know Senator
3	Mathias's previous intentions stated in the letter to the
4	Chairman, was there somewhere a discussion about releasing
5	this piecemeal ahead of time that might. that should go on the
6	record here?
7	Mr. Miller. If it's agreeable to the Subcommittee to
8	get it done by the weekend, he proposes that they take up
9	in Full Committee the findings and recommendations of the
16	foreign group.
11	The domestic group is much further behind, so they
1.8	would not take it up until about the 24th.
13	The question of whether to release any information or
14	any report that may be decided by the Committee
1.5	Senator Huddleston. We'll let the Full Committee decide
.16	that when they get the report.
17	Now where are we then on the report part?
1.8	Mr. Aaron. We have, we're in an extensive program of
19	trying to get the Agency's views as to what information is
20	sources and methods and what is classified for other reasons
21	and what have you.
22	We have. I believe, all but four papers have been read
23	by the Agency in one form or another and are in the process
24	of going out there. The four that are not are the Congression
25	oversight and the CIA budget paper, although the budget section TOP SECRET

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•	1	of the defense report, which is the substance of that has been
	2	discussed at great length with the Defense Department and they
	3	are happy with it except well, happy with it may be an
•	. 1	exaggeration but they have no problems with it except for the
	5	numbers and the Committee itself will have to step up to the
ه یو و ه	6	question of whether the large number or any subsets of numbers
•	. 7	will be released.
	8	The internal oversight, the Office of General Counsel
	ò	and Inspector General has not been.
	10	Is that right?
	11	Mr. Maxwell. That's right. No material that was wed
	15	there was derived from classified material.
	13	Mr. Aaron. So that shouldn't be a problem. The
	14	general papers on covert action and espionage have not been
•	15	given to them. They are just being completed by the staff
	16	essentially. All the others, and the chemical and biological
•	17	one has not been shared with them.
	18	Now beyond that all the others, I believe, have now
	10	gone out to the Agency in one form or another. The only one
	20	that seems to be approved, or at least we've gotten the go-
	21	ahead on. is the Department of State's paper and the Department
·	22	requested one deletion, which we are prepared to make.
ж. -	23	Serator Huddleston. All right, then. As I understand
	24	it. the Chairman. if we are able to get ours to him so the
	25	Full Committee can begin on findings and recommendations on
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Ĭ,	Monday or Tuesday, even his hope is that during the course
2	of the next week the Full Committee will finish that.
3	In the meantime, of course, we can still be working on
. 4	these reports looking toward hopefully, if we could have those
5	by the end of next week, too, then the Full Committee would
6	be in a position of at least having the material available to
	them if we decided to release everything at one time or if
8	we needed a few more days to refine the reports themselves.
. <u>9</u>	That's about as much as we can hope for.
, jo	Mr. Aaron. Okay, I think that to be realistic about the
11	longer material, it is a lot longer and I think to be at 11
18	proud of the material we will want to be sure that we have
13	gone through it.
14	So therefore I think the end of next week is probably
16	not realistic of having it in shape for the Full Committee to
1.6	bless it.
1.17	On the other hand, I think that before the end of the
18	month it would be possible to have a product, unless we run
79	into some enormous snag.
20	Senator Mathias. But that does not contemplate the
21	executive review.
22	Mr. Aaron. No, I'm sorry, that is including executive
23	review.
24	Mr. Miller But it does not contemplate printing.
25	Mr. Aaron. That is correct. TOP SECRET
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ļ	Mr. diGenova. Yesterday, Mr. Bolton indicated to me
2	when I was there that there was no way that they could complete
- 5	sources and methods review by the 15th of March, and I said
1	I didn't see how they could either, since they had just really
5	begun having access a week or so ago or whatever it was.
6	And they seem to think that the end of the month is probably,
.7	considering the rewrites and a chance to look at the rewrites
8	Senator Mathias. I have been independently advised of
Э	the same thing, that the end of the month is maybe a little
10	optimistic.
<u>,</u> 1 - 1 -	Mr. Miller. Senator Church just talked to Director Bush
1.8	and I talked to Mitch Regovin just prior and worked out an
13	arrangement on the question of clearances of sensitive material
14	and the Chairman told Mr. Bush that he will take whatever time
5	is required, he asked for expeditious effort on their part.
16	Mr. Bush said that he would urge his troops onward, and he
17	recognized that there had been snags and difficulties. The
18	Chairman said that he was not going to press beyond the
19	capability of either side. He wants to do the proper job
20	and whatever time is required.
\$1	He said that he hoped that we could cooperate and work

He said that he hoped that we could cooperate and work it out so that we could finish by the end of the month. And Mr. Bush said that he would make every effort to do that. So that seems amicable between the Chairman and the

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		Then the question arose about the deadline on the 15th
	2	and the Chairman is going to ask that this deadline be set
,	3	aside because of the problems of not being able to finish
·.	4	security and those other matters.
	5	So he is taking steps to do that now.
• •	6	Senator Huddleston. But I think it's still encumbent
	7	on us to make a special effort to move as fast as we can, and
	8	we plan to go ahead tonight.
	9	Okay, now we get back.
-	10	Mr. Aaron. We're on page 37 and the procedure we're
	11	trying to follow to expedite things is to look particulari
	12	at the recommendations and at the bracketed language.
-	1.3	Now recommendation 20
-	14	Senator Huddleston. Before we get to 20, there's a
	15	problem in wording. "The last paragraph before 20, the
-	16	Committee also found that there's no established inter-Agency
-	171	mechanisms for establishing the bona fides of defectors.
-	18	You've used established twice there.
-	19	Mr. Aaron. I think we can take the first one out.
	ao	Ms. Culbreth. We might say, David, that the staff hopes
	èi	to take a real editorial shot at this before it gets published,
1	22	anyway, and maybe even before it gets to everybody next week,
	23	and we would hope that we can get a lot of these thinds.
· · ·	24	But certainly, any that you see that you want us to
•	25	he sure that we get to, point out.
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Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on that particular thing, at the staff level I had bracketed that entire paragraph because I'm not sure what we're trying to accomplish by what you say there.

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This is probably the most difficult task that faces a counter-intelligence organization any place in the world is to establish whether or not a defector that you have just picked up is a double agent or not.

9 I listened to the man who has done this all his adult 10 life at the Agency, Mr. Angleton, and he never made it clear 11 just how you ever are sure that you have a bona fide. 12 And then his follow-on said basically the same think.

What do we intend to do with this finding? Do we intend then 13 to legislate something? What are we going to do with it? 14 Mr. Aaron. The finding goes to the recommendation later 15 that there be essentially for other purposes. But a 1.6 subcommittee of the National Security Council on the subject 17 of counter-intelligence which would look at other matters and 18 we will get to that in a moment, but among its tasks is that 10 it would be a forum in which differences of opinion as to the 20 bona fides of a defector could be discussed and potentially 21 reconciled. 22

Mr. Angleton testified and spoke at length in other torums with us about the fact that when -- that at present there really is no way that there's a difference between the FBI and

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CIA as to the bona fides of a defector and there's no way for the government to come to a decision about it.

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And this really makes that point and leads to the further 3 1 boint that we believe there ought to be some mechanism whereby some decision can be reached. Now people may still have reservations, as they do about this particular individual we 17 refer to here. But in the end one has to make a decision and simply keeping him in a jail some place is probably not a B useful way to proceed, and in fact, this is the kind of 9 recommendation that comes from Mr. Angleton and seems to be 10 supported by other people, even his successor at the Agence.]] Mr. Kirbow. Do we have any place in our findings that 12 discusses the so-called, this single case of some sort here? 13 Is there some evidence? 1.1

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Mr. Aaron. Yes.

Mr. Kirbow. It's going to be in the report when somebody 1.6 else reads this? They'll be able to go some place else and j 🖓 see what you're talking about? 18

That's correct. It will be in, I believe it's Mr. Aaron. 19 in the paper on counter-intelligence. It's also addressed 20 in the Pockefeller Commission report. 21

Now as the first recommendation. I think that we have. 22 acreed at the staff level to take out the brackets and put a 23 footnote which would make it clear that while the primary 24 mission of the CIA would be to collect denied or protected foreign 25

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1	intelligence information, that this would not, you know, that
2	at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform such
. 3	other collection tasks as directed by the NSC.
А,	In other words, the point is that certainly they do
5	some overt collection. For example, foreign broadcast information
6	service is done by them as a service and so forth. But at the
. 7	same time the point of giving the CIA a charter is to give it
8	a charter for its primary mission and as set forth NSCID 5,
Ö	for example, that mission is to conduct espionage.
10	Senator Mathias. What about the role of statistical
11	analysis? That kind of analysis that can be deduced from
12	study of voluminous quantity of economic information much
13	of which is public?
1.4	I'll go back to the ball bearings, the ball bearing
1.5	factory.
16	Mr. Aaron. Well, this goes to the point really of
17	the organization of this section. There's a separate section
18	on the production of intelligence which would authorize the
i9	CIA to produce national intelligence. That kind of thing. The
20	Central Intelligence Agency as the producer of national
21	intelligence must be the recipient of all intelligence flowing
22	into our overall national intelligence effort, and that
23.	intelligence includes overt intelligence as collected from
24	the Treasury Department, from Commerce, from Labor attaches
25	abroad, the full score of information collecting, most of which
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. 1,	is not secret or clandestine and is available to the CIA and it
2	would be their job to compile it.
3	And that does not exclude other functions. For example,
4	the analytical function is not mentioned here. This is simply
F.	to give it the collection function and that is because the
6	paper is simply organized in that fashion. It doesn't try to
.7	step up to the whole charter, every aspect of it. We just try
ß	to break it down.
a	Mr. Maxwell. Should there be a kind of overt foreign
1.0	intelligence which the NSC with the mechanism for allocating
11	priorities within the intelligence community should even a
1.2	done by the CIA?
12	It could under the formulation now do that.
14	Mr. Aaron. That's why for example there's one thing that
ù 5	they do that's overt. Even their clandestine people abroad
16	do an overt collection job and that is biographic information
- 1.7	and that, while it was once in the State Department, was
18	transferred to the CIA because they have a lot of clandestine
19	biographic information and as a matter of centralizing and
20	difficiency the decision was made to move it over there.
2i	That kind of thing would not be precluded and would still
22	exist.
23	Now it goes on to state that in doing this we would also
24	recommend authorizing the CIA to carry out the recruitment of
25	agents within the United States for this purpose. And it goes
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1	further to say that there would be an annual review of this
2	activity by the Senate oversight committee and by the
3	counter-intelligence committee which we proposed be established
A,	and has been agreed here as a recommendation of the National
5	Security Council.
6	Now the further sentence that is in brackets calls upon
	the Attorney General to certify to the President and to
8	the oversight committee that these actions are being taken in
Q	a manner that does not violate the Constitutional rights of
10	American citizens or any other provision of law.
11	Trying to keep track of the domestic intelligence
12	recommendations is a little bit like painting a moving train,
13	but this tends to coincide with their recommendation, and the
14	purpose of this is obviously to place a little tighter
·	restriction and more authority in the hands of the Attorney
16	General to ensure that these domestic espionage-related actions
- 17	that are conducted on a covert or clandestine basis are in
18	fact not infringing on Constitutional rights or attempting to
19	break the law in any way.
\$ 0	Mr. Kirbow. You're really talking about recruitments
. 81	now. You're not talking about other clandestine and covert
221	activities and operations?
23	Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It's not, for example, if
24	you were to establish a base in Floride for the purposes of
- 25	harassing Cuban shipping. That would not come up here.
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١.	Mr. Kirbow. And the bracketed information, Mr. Chairman,
2	was that I didn't feel at the time we considered this and I
õ	asked that it be bracketed, that the Attorney General who is
4.	never going to operate in this area alone, he is not going
. 5	to make these decisions without staff support of some description,
6	and if he's going to do that with people in the Department of
7	Justice, which is where he gets the staff, the concern of the
8	people in the Agency about broadening even within their own
9	agency these people that know about the agent procurements and
10	where they are and whom they are is of vital concern. It's
11	probably one of the most carefully guarded secrets. Even the
12	extent that Mr. Colby testified before this Committee under
13	oath. he said, I don't want to know the names of the agents
14	because someone may want to decide some day to wrassle it
15	out of me.
.16	I don't know what the Attorney General certifying here
1.12	does for you if on the same subcommittee you have the DCI,

does for you if on the same subcommittee you have the DCI, who is the President's principal man, you have the secretaries of state and all these other people apparently at the beck and call in intelligence matters to put the Attorney General and his staff into the agent procurement business.

Senator Hart. Not in the agent procurement business. Mr. Kirbow. I mean with knowledge of agent procurement. Senator Hart. Nell, the Attorney General is in the business of upholding and defending the laws of this country 77

Ţ and he can't do that if he doesn't know when one of the agencies 2 of the Federal government might be breaking them. It's a chicken and egg situation. 5 4 Mr. Kirbow. You think he should approve the policies or 5 the actual procurement of the agent. S. Senator Hart. The procedures. Nothing in here. I mean .7 we have argued this thing for 13 months, there's nothing here that requires the Agency to burn over names of their sources 8 9 or anything like that. The Attorney General doesn't need to know the names 10 even more than Bill Colby does, or less. Just to find out that 11 the procedures of violating the laws of this country, that is 12 all. 13 Ms. Culbreth. Could I raise another point, Mr. 14 Chairman? 15 It seems to me that one of the concerns that you have 16 with having the Attorney General certify in this specific. $1\ddot{7}$ case to the President and also to the oversight' committee 1.8 is a consistent problem that I think runs throughout our 19 recommendations. 20 On the one hand, we are describing for accountability 21 within the Executive Branch of the proper people, and on the 22 other hand we are afraid that if we make him accountable, we're 23 giving him so much power that they are going to disregard the 24 Constitutional obligations. 25 TOP SECRET

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In this specific situation, for example, we've already dot the Attorney General being involved with the oversight responsibilities. When he takes office he already has the obligation to see that all the laws and activities of agencies are carried out as they're supposed to be.

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And in addition to that, we are proposing in another part of our recommendations that the general counsel and the inspector general of the CIA be subject to Senate confirmation so that there are lots of other kinds of checks, and I would just hope that as the Senators consider additional proposals like this, that we don't get to the point that the Congress is hamstringing them inside the agencies on how they carry out the responsibilities:

Each one of these standing by itself may look like, well, this is a good idea and we should have this additional certification or this addition chain of reporting and making we vou get it authorized.

But I have a fear after having looked through a good 18 bit of this, that we are getting too many layers in there, and 19 I would just urge a caution if there are situations where we 🎡 20 maybe have it pretty well covered until we get some opportunity 21 to see how this new set-up is going to work, whether we're 22 going to have the kind of abuses we had before . Maybe we don't 23 need each of these details of Congress going down into the 24 acencies and saving how they do about their day to day business. 25

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Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, I would add in that regard that with regard to the specific recommendation, this is not going down into the Agency. This is talking about the Attorney General who is the head of an agency, first of all, and the history has shown that other Attorneys General who took the same oath that this man did didn't do their jobs and one of the reasons was that they didn't know about certain things.

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9 And the purpose of this provision is to make them aware 16 of what is going on, to make legal judgements and to advise 11 the President about the legality of procedures attending the 12 fectuitment of agents and other activities within the confines 13 of the United States.

The provision for confirming the inspector general and general counsel is a wholly unrelated thing to this although it doesn't go to the problem of reaching down into the Agency. I don't see how that does that because he's going to be dealing with the DCI.

Senator Huddleston. Contrary to many of the things that we do, we provide ways to correct abuses once they've happened and it seems to me this is a principal way of trying to avoid abuses to start with:

23 If I were on the oversight committee I would certainly, 24 and if were getting the information that we contemplate the 25 committee would get, then that is we would know about these things

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1.	I would certainly want to know whether or not the chief	
2	law enforcement officer of the country thought they were	
	legal or illegal, or if there was a question about it.	
4	Senator Mathias. I have a real question if I w	ere
5	Attorney General whether I would sign what we would call	for
6	here.	
- 1	Senator Huddleston. The certification bothers me	a
. 8	little bit.	
Ĝ	Senator Mathias. How could I as Attorney General	say
10	that I certify that all the actions in this area do not	violate
11	Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other	provision
1.Ż	of law?	
1 3A 5 303	I have worked in a state law department and had t	0
14.	sign some certifications much simpler than this, and I a	gonizeđ
i. 5	over them. And this is so far beyond the personal knowl	edge
16	of the Attorney General for him to make any kind of cert	ification,
17	I think we should get him involved but I guestion whethe	r it
18	should be a certifying.	
1.9	Senator Huddleston. What's the step just under a	ctually
. 20	certifying?	
21	He could review. He could certainly taise a red	flag.
55	His oath would require that he do something.	
23	Senator Mathias. If you force him to certify, I	think
24	you're doing to get such a wishy-washy thing that to his	
25	knowledge and he was not advised to the contrary and stu	ff like
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that.

S	Mr. Aaron. I think that's a fair point. The question,
5	I guess, the case at which the certification would run most would
1	add to what already is in the sentence preceeding it which here
5.	is review by the Committee which the Attorney General is
6	to chair, would be the case in which the Attorney General is
. 7	aware of a particular activity, is aware that it is illegal
8	but just doesn't do anything about it on the theory that it
ġ	is somebody else's business. And he doesn't really, he doesn't
1.0	have an obligation in this category of matters to render
iı	a judgment and bring it to the attention of the President or
12	the Congress.
13	Senator Mathias. Why don't we say this, that the
14	Attorney General be required to advise the President and the
15	oversight committee that he is familiar with the procedures

established to accomplish this purpose and that he is not :16 aware of any violation of the Constitution or other law in 17 the execution of the action. 18

I think you can lay that kind of a burden on the Attorney 19 Genéral . 20

Would it he possible to just make it sort; Mr. Aaron. 21 of a reporting function in which he said, and this is in the 22 same direction, the Attorney General will be required to 23 advise the President and the oversight committee of he finds 24 that these options are being taken in a manner that violates? 25

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Senator Huddleston. Yes. First he must review them. Mr. Aaron. And if he finds a violation, evidence of violation, then he must report to the President and the oversight committee. Just place the responsibility there.

Senator Huddleston. If in his opinion.

Senator Mathias: I wouldn't have any trouble with that. Mr. Maxwell. I have one other point on that paragraph and that is it provides for annual review by the counterintelligence committee of the National Security Council. I had understood we were dealing with the recruitment -10 of agents for the United States foreign intelligence purposes, 11 and the question is whether the counter intelligence committee 12 which was to focus on resolving issues involving the bona 13 fides of defectors, issues between the FBI and CIA; would be 14 the body which would have the appropriate knowledge in the 15 positive intelligence value, or whether it should be assigned 16to a counter-intelligence function. 17

It's simply a guestion of where the responsibility 18 should be allocated for reviewing those within the National 19 Security Council structure, and I wasn't clear whether the 20 counter-intelligence committee was the appropriate one. 21

Mr. Aaron. Well, on that point, the purpose of setting 22 up the counter-intelligence dommittee is essentially to look 23 at the domestic impact of our intelligence activities, the 24 primary ones being in the counter intelligence field but also 25

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in the positive intelligence field.

In fact, the resolution of the bona fides problem is a much smaller aspect of those two problems but the existence of the committee with some knowledge of the problem of. counter-intelligence makes it possible to have a forum at the National Security Council level to address it. Mr. Kirbow. What abuse that has been brought up in the past either in the press or accusations about a committee is

this aimed at? Has there been abuses that we have documented or 10 reported that indicate that this has violated the Constitutional 11 1.0 rights of anybody, including these forgioners for this purnose? 12

We must be aiming this at something other than just kind of bulling it out of the air?

Mr. Aaron. I think it really comes more in the category of questionable practices and I wish I had the domestic fellow here but it's really a question of, for example, when you're in the process of trying to redruit foreign assets or even Americans to perform foreign intelligence missions where you may begin collecting information on Americans for the purposes of assessing whether they are helpful to you in approaching the particular verson or whether the would be a dood pacess adout or whother you might conduct some other kinds of surveillances of a more of a safequard. I think.

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I don't think we're reall necessarily closing the barn door to some enormous abuse.

Mr. Kirbow. I had never heard of one in that area.

Mr. Aaron. I think by and large the FRD's quite clear. In other words, when we went through the CHAOS and some of these other programs that were questionable, there were some cases in which some of the reporting that took place as a result of the foreign resources division got into the CHAOS net. But the foreign resources division managed to stay clear of in general and resisted in fact the effort on the part of the CHAOS team to go out and actively recruit in this area on a clandestine basis.

This is really sort of more in the category of A. 1.3 insuring that that doesn't take place and B. giving them help 1.1 that they can say no, giving them a place to go if pressures 1.5 such as the Huston Plan type pressures are brought to bear. 16 Senator Huddleston. Well, there are several places in 17 our report findings, several cases indicated in the tastimony 18 we've taken that the Attorney General ought to review and 12 recommend. 20

And I'm wondering whether or not rather than just spotting it at these various places, whether we couldn't make a general recommendation. We've already got the Attorney General on the Committee and that he resider. If not all practices but at least whatever proctices; the same language we were just toiling about

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	for this paragraph, that he review and that he advise the
Ď	President and the committee if in his opinion any of these
7	practices violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens
• .3	or any other laws.
5	Mr. Kirbow. (I would feel much better about this since
6	it hasn't been an apparent abuse but to see that go in the
1 - 1	general recommendation that all of the activities of the
8.	intelligence community be reviewed by him or be examined in
	whatever yow you think it should be done for that purpose.
10	But it would seem that it cuts then to a general preventive
<u>.</u>	type mechanism instead of being here kind of put in against the
10	FRD: which as we say apparently has been doing it properly
13	all along and not in violation of the law.
1	We don't appear to be accusing them of it here although
	the language may not be quite so specific.
16	Mr. Aaron. I might just say that there is a further
17	recommendation that involves the Attorney General on page 40,
18	which is number 27 dealing with the same committee, a different
10	asnect of it.
20	What this does is it elaborates with the recommendation
2]	number 17. which establishes the counter intelligence committee
28	and it deals with the two aldes of these activities. On the
25	one hand it's going to review program for positive foreign
24	intelligence collection: cloudestine within the United States
25	and on the other hand it's going to review the counter intelligne
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brograms of the CIA and int that are conducted inside the United States both from the standmoint of their legality. Now I think it's possible to consolidate those recommendations so that we don't say it twice, and I also think it's cossible to take out any implication that these programs were not necessarily conducted properly in the past.

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But I would hate to sort of just have; and my personal Eveling is that I would have a general kind of thing \mathcal{O}_{i} that the Attorney General ought to do this because he ought 2 to do this already. And what we're trying to do is make some 1011 recommendations that are more specifically targeted on the -12 subject matter that we have reviewed and give him, in effect, 13 specific charge.

Senator Huddleston. Mell, we are giving him the 1.1 specific charge of reviewing it, which apparently he didn't ...5 have before. Now before when something came to his attention 16 he certainly had the responsibility to move on it if in his 1 1 opinion it was contrary to Constitutional rights. 48

Mr. Aaron. So I see you're discussing the last sentence 1.9still, is that right. not the review noint?" 20

1. Mr. Kirbow. He globtfully assumes, as the common law 23. docs, that all government officials in an official position 22 are performing their duties properly. 23

We want him to know what they're doing 25

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Senator In diston! ... to want to do beyond that, though.

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Mr. Firbow. And then you way be should review it in kind of a general recommendation, then you talk about all of the intelligence functions having any possibility of affecting the laws of the United States?

I really would like to see that kind of requirement placed on the Attorney Canadal as a general requirement instead of trying to just pick out little specifics unless we have an abuse connected with it.

Noy in the domestic tech force they have specific abuses and they make specific recommendations of corrective 10 action. but that doesn't appear to be the case in either of these here, either the true covert operations

Mr. Aaron. I might make a suggestion along those lines 17. just in terms of simplifying some of this. It might be possible 1.1 to take the first part of the review section here, follow it - 5 with the recommendation on the top of 27 saving the domestic 16 counter-intelligence activities of the CIA would be subject to 17 this review and then follow that with a third recommendation 18. that the Attorney General would be required to advise the 1.9President and the oversight committee if he found any irregular 20 ities in either one of these programs. - 21

Senator Mathias. I think that's more reasonable and it does what you want to do which is to force the Attorney General's attention to it.

Mr. Maron. All right. Could we turn for a moment to



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number 27 because it has a bracheted nortion that we might considerably do away with.

That's page 40.

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The bracketed portion gave that the NSC would approve all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United States and it spells out a kind of procedure there.

Now the net effect of this kind of procedure really is to establish that the PBT is without question. I mean the practical offect is that the PBI is without question the counter-intelligence agency and you've not to get the President to approve anything that the CIA is going to do in this field. And that is really it inside the United States. That's $\{ \cdot, \cdot \}$ the net effect of this paragraph. 13

Now my own personal wlew of this paragraph is that it's 1.1 probably not necessary. We have the NSC dommittee. It is · 5 supposed to resolve the question of where the FBI lets off 16 and the CIA begins and it is an MSC committe that can report 1.12 to the President if they have a disagreement. 18

I'm not sure I feal strongly about it. 1.9 Mr. diGenova. I would only add that I spoke to John 20 Elliff about this paragraph and he also feels that it's 21 unnecessary to do this. Up thinks that this consolidation 22 would be had, first of all, had it's unnecessary second 23 of all. \mathbb{S} if

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Mr. Hiller. Which a mentication?,

25.

Mr. diGenova. Area to you talking about the consolidation? Mr. Aaron. No, we we talking about the paragraph that just precedes it. I'm source, this is the bracketed portion. L'11 read it out.

"The CIA should receive MSC approval of all counterintelligence activities within the United States. This approval should be given by the President and be supported by the recommendation of the MSC counter-intelligence counittee, Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. All such projects should be reported unnually to the oversight committee." Mr. Maxwell. I would move that we just strike that

Senator Huddleston. That's a vote. We'll be right to back.

(A brief recess was taken)

Senator Huddleston. Mell, it's 3.30. Let's see if we can resolve anything.

Mr. Aaron. Now the next recommendation, which is number 19 21 goes to the establishment of a special committee of the 20 Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which would review human 21 intelligence collection problems.

This is an area where there has been some effort institutionally to try to get a handle on it but it is essentially solid about as widely in the government as you as can do it. You have a State Department that product at least

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in volume the most material and according to CIA analysts most of that information. A large proportion of that is keyed to their report and yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carried out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a significant amount of collection, some of which is extremely important in countries with military governments.

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The issue then becomes whether there bouldn't be a 8 particular mechanism to deal with it and the proposal here is \odot to create a subcommittee of the CFI for that purpose, or a ЭÖ. special committee of the CFI. And the reason for that is to 17 out in the chair the Department of State or the Secretary of 12 State's designee and representatives of the Secretary of State 13 and it would a committee essentially of the CUA, the Department 14 of State and the Department of Defense trying to bring some 15 focus into those programs and making some choices and so forth. 16I might have Bill Bader speak to it. I think the 17 recommendation originates with him. 18

Mr. Bader. This recommendation is part of two basic 20 recommendations that deal with the question of human intelligence 21 collection.

First is the question of the approval mechanism. As you'll see when we get into the latter nart of the paper, one of these very strong recommendations that we have as the committee, or is being offered to the committee as a possible recommendation

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is that human collection woolects would do to the operations advisory group for approval. That is, for operational approval. As you know from our testimony these kinds of projects do not go to the 40 Committee type organizations where they deal with covert action projects.

So on the one hand we're hoping to deal with the question of operational approval. In this particular subcommittee we do to the question of overall management and direction of tasking, what should we be doing, what should the United States be doing in the human collection field? Where should we be in x number of years? What should the principal objectives of human collection be?

And in this way we have to bring the diversity that now exists in the community from the CIA to the military services and bring it together under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State who would help provide this kind of overall direction and management guidance.

It is not an important elaboration of the committee on foreign intelligence. It should be there in any event because it's a management problem. This gives it focus, this gives the Secretary of State the chairmanship of a committee and I think properly so, that deals with this larger problem of whither human intelligence collection.

24 the Maxwell, It's unclear here whether it's chaired 85 by a representative of the Secretary of State and the DCI and

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1	Secretary of Defense are connected to attend or whether they're
2	all supposed to be designed a
л.	I don't know what the protocol is but is it likely that
71	the Secretary of Defense would attend it it were a designee
5	of the Secretary of State?
6	Mr. Miller. Sometimes. sure.
7	Mr. Bader. They certainly did on these other committees.
8	But what would you propose?
0	Mr. diGenova. The Language is a little unclear.
10	Mr. Bader. Perhaps it should say that the Secretary of
	State is chairman and be presumably then could designate whomever
12	he pleased.
13	Mr. Kirboy. As a mather of practicality, if the
7.4	Secretary of State doesn't show up and the Secretary of
1.5	Defense is there, who's going to chair the meeting?
16	Mr. Aaron. As a matter of practicality if the Secretary
: 17	of State doesn't show up, the Secretary of Defense won't be
18	there.
19	Mr. Kirbow. And you diaress down because he's never.
20	going to go to this kind of meeting where he takes up the
21	day to day operations.
33	Aren't you really tolking here. don't you leave the
0.3	language so vague that you fail to imply that whit you want is
24	a rouley of the polities and not the day to day, we need one work
25	agent in Amsterdam and two more in Brussels?
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Mr. Aaron. That is not what we want to convey and so you are correct.

They should review the policies and goals Mr. Kirbow. and requirements, really.


Mr. diGenova. Now about policy at the end of the first sentence?

Mr. Aaron. Human intelligence collection policy. Senator Huddleston. and climinate the part about size. Mr. Bader. Beview and make recommendations with regard to policies and priorities, and then there's a misprint here. 10 Meldon't need American M.S. clandestine.

Mr. Kirbow. Down through the yord, the two words, human collection before the last sentence, you get into kind of a 13 great deal of detail shout what they're supposed to consider, 1,1 whereas if you said they should consider the policies of human 15 intelligence, human collection and the trade-offs between 1.6 covert and overt collection and the sorts of things you have brought to a committee a consideration of this problem which 18 they have never taken before.

Hr. Bader. J think we could add the word bolicy bere 20 and policies and we will underline that. 21

Recommend the ostal ishment of a special committee of 50 the CPT to review all foreign bunan intelligence collection 23 nothereast through a color and second adte second attent with regard 94to the priorities and strikes of U.S. claudesting human collectic 95



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operations and choices between overt and clandestine human collection.

Mr. Kirbow. And Ur. Chairman, without going back and
belaboring one of the other recommendations, I think that the
 staff should do that in each instance where we may have given
 a task to a committee to do a great deal more detail because
even on this domestic counter intelligence activities my
earlier recommendation was that by statute the policies governing
domestic counter-intelligence should be considered.

You don't want them to consider the day to day operation 10 I don't believe. 11

Mr. Aaron, But I do think that we shouldn't lose sight 100 of the fact that we are interested particularly in the latter 17 case and I think in this case that you're interested in the 14 program. 1.5

I mean you just don't want to say it will be the policy 16of the U.S. to do some of it would be the policy -- I mean . 19 you really want to have an opportunity in a management sense to 13 look at the overall program -- is the program achieving what 1,9 it's supposed to achieve, is the scale of the program here 20 as opposed to there in the right balance to reflect our 21 priorities?

In other words . T think that .--

It's not a cubber "tamp, you're saving. Mr. Hiller

Mr. Aaron. That's right and it isn't dust to what with

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words on paper. It tries to get at the problem of what are the 2 programs and are they doing their job? 5 Mr. diGenova. Who do they make the recommendations to?

The CFI?

Mr. Aaron. Yes. or the President.

Mr. Maxwell. One romark in connection with ---Mr. diGenova. Let's make that clear. It just says make recommendations.

Mr. Maxwell. In Bill's Eix, to specify, I think it was intended that it's all human intelligence collection abroad. Mr. Naton. Yes, that's right.

12 All right, perhaps we can do on to the next recommendation. Now this is bracketed. I think it might be better first before 13 1.1 we take up the bracket let's take up what is not bracketed and just indicate that this is in effect hortatory, if you will. - 5 It urges the oversight committee to examine the question of 16 clandestine collection to ensure that it's really focused on 1.7 things that need clandestine collection that are of high 19 priority, not only the highest, but certainly deserve that kind 19 of risk and effort and areas in which clandestine collection 20 are the only means available so as to emphasize something of the extraordinary nature of espionage. 22

Now beyond that there's the recommendation that the clandesting services like the military services and the foreign service, he subject to a manpower celling

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I think this would not suggest that that cailing be a public figure but that the Congress establish a manpower ceiling for that, just as it has these other services that serve in the field of national security.

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Now I know Charley has some reservations about that. Mr. Kirbow. Yes, But to put it in the proper context and I didn't bring it up at that point, nor did Elliot, if you look at the bottom of page 32, we in our findings section discuss a point on the fact that we don't know whether the size of the clandestine service is the right size.

We also indicate that over the past decade the size has been reduced significantly, perticularly in the field. Then we dome over here and recommend that there be a mannower ceiling for the claudestine services only of the Today there is a hudget colling on the number of CIN. 15 people in the CIA that is governed by the amount of money that they get and the amount of money that they put forward to ; support that kind complement. 18

I objected to kind of the dipping down process of going into a segment of an agency and limiting its mappover because 20 if we had a crystal ball, we could do that very carefully and properly, T think. But I gap t see into the future and two 22 veats from now we may need the largest clandesting service we've 23 ever bad because of the problems that would confront the nation. 24 and I think that since it is marefully controlled by the Congress 25

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through its budget devels and mannower levels, let's let the agency decide how many people it takes to run a segment of its own organization.

Mr. Inderfurth. A very special segment, though. Mr. Kirbow. Well, special only because we have concerned ourselves with the abuse accedts of it under the assassination type thing. Of more concern to us should be the fact that the analytical section out there probably needs strengthening instead of worrying about regulating the size of the clandestine service.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, that comes up later as well. Mr. Kirbow., Do vou think that size in any way contributed to the plot against Castro or some of these other people? Mr. Inderfurth. I think it has in covert action throughout Gatin America.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, I would support Mr. Kirbow on] 6 this one. 17

My own view is unless you're going to go to the full extent of addressing the question of establishing mannower ceilings throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, to single out one directorate at this point doesn't really make much sense to me, though I understand the principle behind it. Senator Huddleston, Well, I do too, I think we can make End 3B. b sta a flat statement that you could get too big that there may -24

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situation. But I don't think we have determined that any 2 specific size has yet been shown to be so detrimental and we $\overline{}$ could say that there ought to be a specific level. I think the rest of that paragraph certainly ought to -1 5 be continuously examined. Mr. diGenova. The second part of that paragraph really .6 7 assumes that that kind of review would go on and if necessary, 8 the committee could make a recommendation at the appropriate time. Q. 10 Mr. Aaron. It proposes that kind of a review. The purpose of having a manpower ceiling as it exists, as I say 11in other agencies where one could argue that you would have the 1.2 same problem, the military might have an emergency next 13 week which would require an enormous expansion of military 1,1 services. 1.5 Now the point of it is to give really, simply to give or 15 suggest that the oversight committee put in its arsenal of 1.7 controls over the clandestine activities that the CIA: some 1.8 handle on the clandestine services number because it makes a -1.0 difference. I mean they could put their money elsewhere. 20 Senator Mathias. Now about saying establish and annually 21 adjust, or from time to time adjust? 22.

Mr. Maron. The moint is not just to set a higher limit p_A but rather to say, to have this tool, and even ask the Agency to tell us what that deiling -- you know, they might woll be

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Under their authorized strongth.

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Mr. Inderfurth. Another alternative is to say should consider establishing a mannower ceiling.

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Mr. Kirbow. Could I make the point that oversight of any agency necessarily entails looking at the number of people it has every year because you have to determine how much money they ve got to support and they have to come tell you that.

It we're doing to have an oversight committee, that is no one of the functions that it performs. We do it with our military services, but we don't tell them that we can't put them all over in, that they can't put all the Navy people in destroyers.

Senator Huddleston. That's right, but I don't think you to exactly equate clandestine operation with other types of agency operations.

I think there's a difference here in the potential immact. It's a secret operation.

19 Mr. Aaron. Should consider establishing?

Senator Huddleston. I think that it ought to follow the paragraph. Leave the paragraph as it was and say the committee should also consider the advisability of establishing a manpower ceiling.

Sepator Mathlas. Adjustable ceiling.

Mr. Kirbow. I won't really know what such a recommendation

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maybe they ought to do something but I quess it's all right.

Mr. Aaron. I'm a wald we do that duite a bit.

Mr. Miller. We're just laving out the agenda. Mr. Kirbow. Which is not binding on them.

Mr. Miller. In the Government Operations Committee one of the provisions of the bill. as you know, is an agenda, and many of the items that are in that arend: are subsumed in this.

Mr. Kirbow. Doesn't it do to the make-up of the individual $\pm \Omega$ divisions? Overall size of the intelligence community is the 11 way they recommended it. and I think that's a reasonable approach. 12 Mr. Aaron. Turning to the question of the Agency itself 13 number 23, this again is not in the category of statutory 1.4 proposals but in the category of urging the Agency to ensure : 5 that the skills of intelligence collection are the primary 16 criteria for advancement within the clandestine services. 17

Senator Mathias. Marsus management?

Mr. Naron. Versus dovert operations.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on this one I can conceive of nothing that would do more harm to either side of this question than to say to a man who wants to devote his life and make a carper in the claudestine service that you can't get bromoted on being mode at what you're supposed to be doing. So You get promoted on being good at this other aspect of it, and

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think it's just totally cut of keeping with what you want. If you want a good clandestine operation, you want the best you can find, and I think that he should get the same amount of credit for being good at whatever he's assigned to as being in this other intelligence business.

Mr. Aaron. The intelligence business, of course, is their primary mission.

8 Mr. Kirbow. Not if La's a clandestine operator. That's 9 his primary business and he doesn't have any choice over whether 10 or not he gets assigned when he goes in _____ out there as 11 a junior executive to the clandestine side of the day to day 18 operation.

Senator Huddleston. What does this address?

Mr. Aaron. This addresses the problem of the clandesting 1.4 service which goes to the several things. Primarily it 1.5 collects intelligence. But it is in the nature of, or at least 16 the past history of the Agency, which Bill can speak more 17 directly to than I, that the covert operations people get the 18 better advancement. It's in part built into the system in 19 that you can measure the effect of the covert action operation 20 easter than this endless affort to recruit a good agent many 21 times which will fall through through no fault of the agent 22 himself. 23

higher level aftention caster than somebody who's a good agent

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Furthermore, covert action operatives simply come to



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1 handler but who is really operating off in a very secure and 2 remote environment.

So in an effort to try to suggest that they make a real effort to compensate for what we have found in this area, this particular thing is designed to use them to do their best to try to overcome that problem.

Now we wanted to put it in a way that was not pejorative and that did not exclude the advancement of cood covert operators. If you want to keep coverf charations - I agree with Charley, you have to have good ones and you've got to reward them. 10

I don't think that this particular recommendation which. 11 is to the Agency and not to statute does what perhaps Charley -12 foars it would do. It sholy urges that they give the proper 1.5 weight to what for the clandestine services is their primary 14 mission. 1

Mr. Bader. The problem of it is we're not after this 1.6 really and perhaps it's a language problem. We're not trying 1 İ 7 to suggest here that the intelligence collectors in the career 13 catters should be favored over the operator. What we were 15 after really was that we have noticed over the years and in 20 the record that the intelligence operator has tended to move 21 20 along much faster.

What he has done. his crojects are very quickly visible 23 while intelligence collection can be something that runs over 1 years and it's hard wor'to in the trenches. And I think the 25

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Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry. I don't believe that that's 15 the case. What I'm really saving is this. Over the years 1.6 from about 1947 on through the '69s. claudestine operations 17 of life in the CIA. Whether it is in Favor or not is probably on the side of no. it's not in favor at 19 the CIA because there are only 165 versus some 500 or 600. 20 Senator Huddleston . I really don't see that as being 21 relevant. 22 As Tese this it's not a question of whether wo like 27 diandestine operations or not. This shaws to me the constion 24 is whether or not those individuals who serve are costing undue 25 TOP SECRET

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creferential treatment and advancement within the Adepoy. 2 Is that what we've bruing to get to here? 5 Mr. Kirbow. They say it's within the clandestine services. 1 that the covert operator gets more advancement within the 5 clandestine services side of the house than the other people, and I don't think our record supports that. ĥ. ~ It may be that you have found more of the directors being from the covert side of the house but that is not what the 8 attack is here. 0 Senator Huddleston. Can't we may that within the 10clandestine services our induiry indicates that those in the 11 covert section have advanced in great r numbers more rapiday? 12 Mr. Bader. Mes. II think the record is clear on that 1.7 within the clandestine services. **1** 4. Sanator Huddleston. And the Committee believes that : 5 the Agency bught to ensure that all employees, whatever side, 16 he given the opportunity based on their actual skills. 17 Mr. Aaron. That's the thrust of what we're trying to 18 10 express here. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman. I would like to reserve for 20) Senator Tower on this and because I den't think the record of 21 the Committee supports that. 22 Mr. diGenova. Now about if we said this - the Wentrel $\mathfrak{O}[\mathbb{Z})$ Intelligence should ensure that the stills of intelligence 24 collection are given crunt considuration as a criterion for 25 TOP SECRET

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1	advancement within the condestine services .
2	Ms. Culbreth. Then you get back in to what we struck
5	out from the original. Which was as opposed to covert action
1,	operations. We deleted that from the earlier thing to try
5	to avoid
61	Mr. diGenova. I'm trying to just paraphrase what the
ŗ	Senator just said, what they said was the thrust, which was
3	that intelligence collection capabilities are put on an equal
- o	forting with operations.
10	Mr. Aaron. What I think is a better way to put the
11	point, and it's along that some line, might be to simply say,
1.2	to urge that the Agency ensure that the skills of intelligence
13	collection are given importance in advancement within the
14	clandestine services of that mission for the clandestine
+5	services. if you will.
16	In other words, the great bulk of the people in the
77	clandestine services, as Charley pointed out, are in fact
18	intelligence collectors. They are case officers for trying
10	to acquire information, and T think that what we're trying to
B O	arrive at here is that it should be given an importance. that
: PT	this skill should be given on importance and significance in
25	proportion to the significance that the Agency accords to that
23	particular task.
21	Senator Matilian. ["Mationil are we trying to get at here?
25	Are we getting at the fact that you get some stars who, because
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of their clandestine shills see untall the available promotions. most of them, that they only ahead and I think that that is a 3 problem. You see it in the armed services all the time. I remember Commander Buckley who, because he was a big PT 内 boat man, and he just bannened to be called on to take MacArthur off Corrigedor, ended up an Admiral, and I won't comment further. Now I think there is such a human response to courage 13 and daring and unusual skill what it's going to be very hard 0 to deflect. What from having its natural outlet in recognition. 10 Mr. Zaron. As I say, a lot of the problem is in the nature of things and the pedocmendation goes howen effort to 11 12 but us on record as trying to compensate for what I thenk 1.5 vou mightly vav. . 14 Covert action drawd attention to the operator. Clandestine collection, you do not draw attention to yoursalf. 1.6 Mr. Kirbow. There is a more basic problem to this at the 18 Magnay. I did spend some uponsiderable time in this business. 1.7 19 The excellent people, the decode who turn out to be excellent in the Agendy and get the build promotions are not necessarily 10 promoted because they are covert operators alone. 20 Most of the very find readle that they liave for that they S I 9.9 had in the early years wanted to be in that business because

23 that's what being a spy was and they will end up with a

SI majority of the good brooks.

Why shouldn't they be provided? That's exactly the



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decision.

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2	Senator Huddleston Mell, there are too many elements
1	bare involved in who ought to be promoted. There are too many
1	buman elements and somehody has to make a decision.
5	I just don't know how we can advise them on that. I
65	think I would strike that. I would favor taking it out.
7	Mr. Aaron. Okav. Number 24 does to the question of
8	the relationship between the domestic contac' division and
<u>с</u> .	the directorate of operations, or what is otherwise known as
10	the clandestine services.
11	In 1972. I believe if was, when Mr. Schlesinger went
f S	to the CIA, this directorate whose primary responsibility is
13	for collecting overt intelligence but which has a support
14	function for the clandestine collection or the clandestine
15	recruitment of agents within the United States was then moved
16	into the directorate of operations.
17	The Committee's own hearings and testimony on the
18	subject indicated that a reasonably large portion of their
16	activity and their contacts are used for the initial stages
80	of trying to spot, assess, and get people close to foreign
21	intelligence agent recruitment targets.
22	Now there are, one concern about that is that unlike
23	the foreign resources division whose mission is dearly clandestir
24	the domestic content division secretaches their becale on an
25	open basis, it save, not a spy. fim not doing any
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soving. I am an overt doon person. I belond to the CIA. I would like you to tell me about your travels or advise us on some subject or what have you on an open basis, and that this relationship is completely above board in every way.

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And you don't have to worry that this relationship is going to be used for any event purpose.

Novever, it turns out that some of those relationships are or do or are brought to cvolve into support for clandestine activities in which information is gathered on people who might be beloful in all the ways and I think we had a pretty good 16 attendance at that session when this was discussed. 11 So the question comes down to this -- this blurring of 12 the line between an ordedization as to whether its mission really 13 is overt or not in every respect, should this be a concern to 14 the Committee? And if it is of concern to the Committee, should 15 we take some steps to try to reinforce its overt character 16 and separate it out from the clandestine services where it is 17 now located and where at least a few of the people in the DCD 1phave expressed some concern that they will now become ropulated . 10 with real clandestine operators and that they will really sort 20 of become another arm of that organization. 21

Now Bill Bader would like to talk to this point. It formerly was part of the directorate of intelligence which is the more evert are of the Adence to back with and collected that. information.

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In other governments this same function is done, for example, in Britain it's done by the board of trade because a lot of the information is technical, economic, or scientific in nature, which is also true for the DCD, as a matter of fact.

And so the question that is presented to the Committee 14 is do we want to leave the DCD where it is in the Director of $T_{ij}^{\rm e}$ Clandestine Operations? Do yo want to have the clandestine R $(\mathbf{0})$ service, if you will, have a quasi-overt arm within the United States widely spread out throughout the United States? Would 10 we want to confine the clandestine activities to the clandestine 11 service and the overt activities to some overt organization, 12 be that back in the directorate of intelligence in the Agency 1.3 or moved out to the State Department or some other organization 1.1 which does overate openly as a matter of course? 1.5

Mr. Inderfurth. What would that mean in terms of numbers? Now large is the DCD?

Mr. Aaron. I believe it is about 150 or 200. Mr. Bader. There are 38 offices.

Mr. Aaron. And they are about two or three man offices. A lot of the personnel in the DCD are in fact succunded from the military services or ERDA. You know there are different areas of the country that have different kinds. You know, or agriculture, for example, if they're interested in

ariculture intelligence of lot of these sepula come out of

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ł.	agriculture. I mean it's a funny kind of mixture of people.
-2	The CIA sort of doma thus in part as a service of
5	common concern to the inhelligence community and in part at
· .1	least heretofore it does the overt collection function as a
5	service to its own analysts.
6	This was particularly in the early days when we had
17	less access to information in the denied areas of the world.
8	It was a very rich source of information for us. It still is
e (quite a good and important and economical source, and it's
1.0	a good program. The question is how much it should be involved
1.1	in clandestine support and if you want to find a way to
12	encourage it, to. if you will, emphasize its overt mission
13	over its covert mission or do you want to put it back into
14	some overt side of the Agenay or the government?
15	Mr. Maxwell. I have some very mixed feelings about this
. 16	recommendation and the problem might be described better by
17	looking at the flow of information from the end point.
1.8	The FRD now is involved in the recruitment of agents
1.9	for foreign intelligence gathering within the United States.
20	A number of times they need, and I think they have indicated
- 19 1	to the Committee that they need some help in determining whether
22.	they should go to an individual and say, can you introduce
23	me to this potential agent of influence in a country, can
21	you introduce may o the student without that blowing up in
25	their "aces?

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The question then is how can they be provided with the information that they need to allow them to make a recruitment 2 that the Committee may find is valuable.

If it is from the DCD, it has all the problems that David articulated, and I appreciate those problems. The 15 question the Committee has to face is where they are going to 6 ry. get that information, whether it should be for the DCD, whether it's located in DDO, from the DCD, whether it's located in the [2]DDI or from the DCD, or located in the State Department or under State Department control. 10

My own sense of that is that the decision that was made 11 by Director Schlesinger in moving it from the DPI to the DDO 12 did raise the potential of compromising the overt obscacter, 1.3 but it also made the liaison which we find important more 14 efficient and easier to manage and potentially easier to 15 control if both elements are under the same set of guidelines 16 and regulations which would govern the DDO as a whole as to 17 who may be apporoached, who may be used operationally. 12 If it's put in another directorate or outside. I think 10 there's a difficulty in that kind of control and I think it's 20 also, it obviously raises the muestion of whether the FRD 21 was going to get the information that it needed for a valuable 22 function of recruiting forefamors while they're in the United 23 States. 24

I think the Committee can an any number of wave but I

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2 Phink that the end product has to be looked at in the recruitment
2 of spies, and secondly were have to look at what kinds of
3 approach and be made in any branch of the government if
4 overt collection is being done as to whether that information
5 could be used by another branch of the government.

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If DCD were entirely overt and a promise were made to 6 Mr. Bader that this would never be used for an operational 17 ${\Omega}_{i}$ purpose or you would never be asked as a concenting adult to ald in an operational purpose, then the end ruduction might well \mathbf{C} be that the FRD is going to be sending people out covertly 40 within the United States to covertly obtain information to: 11 determine if they are going to make a covert approach to a 12 forcign spy, and I think that I have real besitation about. 13 rather than the information being available from consenting 1.4individuals on an open basis. 15

Mr. Aaron. If I could add to that. I agree, I think the duestion is if you're going to allow the conduct of recruitments to take place and you're going to allow information to be collected on these people. somebody has to do it and so you're not going to avoid any of those questions by this.

The issue does in part to whether the people who will prinitially begin developing that information will be people with every incentive to been it within certain bounds of whether there will be incentions that such at cross purposes to that. I thigh that is such as situation in which the

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numbers of people who otherwise if our other recommendations
in here are accepted and even some of the internal regulations
of the CIA are written into law people would be kind of off
bounds for operational use.

Now the DCD, however, because it is overt, is allowed to deal with these people, and the question is, well, the incentives to be scrubulous in their activities, keeping them event and not trying to use people sort of for operational support and so forth, the question is would those incentives the better outside the DDC or inside the DDC or would it make a difference.

The second point is, and this is a somewhat different 14 point the DCD is having an increasing problem, with frankly, 15 and we have had testimony from Mr. Melson and others, he's 16 having a problem because it is associated with the CGA.

Now people are reluctant to cooperate with them because 17 of concern about being associated with the CIA. The fact that 18 they actually do engage in operational support doesn'' help 20 that very much.

And so the question is if you teally want the fullest exploitation of the foreign intelligence, open foreign intelligence potential of the American people wip are filling by to dooperate openia, chouldn't that he does by some creanization as which does not have this ages of clandsching activity.

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associated with it?

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8	That is somewhat scharate but relevant.
3	Mr. Kirbow! Mr. Chairman, apparently they're not talking
4	about doing it with any fewer people or any different people,
r,	but you're talking about calling it something else.

In discussing this with Mr. Nelson, under whom it comes ñ now, and with Mr. Proctor, under whom it previously came, they do not distinguish any of the problems, that they are 2 having any broblems in maintaining contact with over 100,000 ģ. American citizens, who are kind of returning travellers and 10 that they are getting the type of information that these :11 12 loval citizens are willing to give to them. These people advertize their address and probably put 1.5 their telephone number in the public telephones in each of these 1.1 38 offices, and all you have to do is look it up and say that's

a CIA function there. 16

It is probably as overt as anything they do except 17 testify on the Hill, which has become very overt in the past 1.8 year or two. But just to talk about moving it hack into a 10 place where they just moved it out of on the lack of some kind. 20 of record that is not working properly new or more properly 21 there. I don't think we're in a position to decide that. To: 22 decide that you want to wove it out of the CIA and into the 27 Department of State. I think the record is totally would on 9.1

that subjects 25

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I just hate to see us recommend taking away Erem one place and putting it some place else without a record.

Senator Hart. Can't we recommend that we put it back in intelligence and the oversight committee consider that after it's created and so on.

6 Senator Huddleston. Why was it taken out of intelligence? 7 Mr. Bader. It was a question of consolidation of 8 collection in one directorate.

End day, h. \$B

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You see, while the demestic contract service was under to the DDL it was a collection service. It was in an analytical branch and Schlesinger, as I understand it, felt that it was the tidy thing to do to put all collectors under the same to Senator Huddleston. Overt and covert?

14Mr. Bader. Yes. And I think the issues have been15very well articulated.

I had very little to add to them. I think it is an issue. I have a personal concern that we have not taken the responsible officials at any length on the record on this question of the relative advantages or disadvantages.

My own personal view with some experience is that it seems to me it would make a great deal of sense for this function to be under the DDI to emphasize and underline its overtness and that the individuals who are in this particular service or office then would flow naturally from the analytical side and it would be very different kinds of people as they tended

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I to be before 1971, 1972.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any chance that anybody
3 would be denied the product of this investigation if we changed
4 it?

Mr. Bader. One of the things we should bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, is that if you do down the road and talk about these various reforms or changes in the intelligence structure, that moving the DCI function and enhancing his powers and then perhaps eventually separation the Director of CIA from the DCI, that at this point it would seem logical for an overt collection side of an intelligence agency to be with the DCI.

But that is down the road as well and perhaps what we want to do with something like this is -- you don't understand that point?

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Mr. Maxwell, No. I don't.

Mr. Kirbow. What he's really saying is that if you move all of this overt side out of the DCL you leave the covert is side out there without any of the support function, which this go group furnishes to them. Mr. Bader. Down the road when you have a DCL Mr. Maxwell. If you assume that the DCL is going to

22 Mr. Maxwell. If you assume that the C 25 take the outire DDI ...

24 Senator Huidleaken Could we have a situation where an 85 acout might be both commut and overthe

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	Mr. Kirbow. These second out there are not agents.
2	These are employees. And most of them, by the way, are former
	exployees. They are retired CIA officers.
	Senator Huddleston. They are not mixing the assignments?
5	Mr. Kirbow. No. They, for example. I don't mind putting
6	this on the record.
Ç.	We had a large international organization in the company
8	I was with before I returned to the Senate. Before we departed
0	we could get a briefing on the place where we were going to
0	kind of safequard against making defense mistakes, and when we
1.1	came back, they came and had lunch with you and asked you to
12	kind of reveal or when you were dealing with the director
13	of whatever it was in Singapore, what was the situation? What
11	was the atmosphere? What's going out there because you were
1.5	in a business atmosphere and rubbad elbows and they came and
16	met with you and did this. Or occasionally you would stop
17	by the San Francisco office and you'd do this.
18	That's the business these people are in, principally.
19	Isn't that correct?
20	Senator Huddleston. Mac. do you have any thoughts on
21	this?
22	Senator Mathias. Frien't think anyone has discussed
- 23 23	option number 2 while the break sitting here, and I haven't
24	been sitting here consistential. But is there any value to
25	cutting it out and so lies it of an to State?
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Just to be the double advocate, one of the values that occurs to me is to bring the State Department in touch with 2 reality. Ξ, Mr. Kirbow. Nell you'll never get me to tell a member .1 of the Department of State personal business that I was conducting 5 for my company in Singapore because I don't think that it R would be --7 I'll out it personally. I don't thin that I would R have trusted them with the secrets of what my company's operations Ð. were versus an intelligence organization. Not an open 10organization like the Department of State. 11 Mr. Aaron. The information collected by the DCD is: 12 fully available to every agency of the government. It's not 1.2 considered classified or secret or anything else. 1.1 Mr. Kirbow. They ask you a lot of questions. --ES. Senator Hart. The orincipal argument, Mad. is that there's 16 no record on this and for us just to haphazardly make this $1''_{7}$ recommendation without our record -- --1.8 The compromise I suggested was a recommended option 1-19: and that the new committee look at option 2 when it is in 20 existence and has made a record. 21 Senator Huddleston I'm inclined to go with oution 1. 22 I have a question, je says the Committee recommends the permanent 23 oversight committee - report --24

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Mr. Aaron. I just think that in drafting the charter -actually you can just say you accommend by statute or you could 2 say that the Committee recommends that it be removed or moved 5 back, and you can leave it to the DCL to do it. Senator Huddleston. Just recommend that it be done. 5 Mr. Kirbow. May I respectfully reserve on that? 16 Mr. Aaron. All right. Now 25. we're going to get some testimony tomorrow morning on 25 and 26 as to what they Ω actually do and we will have that on the record. 0 And 21 will be moved up, as we have talked about it 1.0 earlier. And 28, then, was the order of business, and that is 11 the proposal that in fact we ought to consider a model rather 12 liky the Oritish, which is that counter intelligence by the - 175 CIA and by -- I'm sorry the author of this is not be a -- by 1.4 the counter intelligence, by the CIA, and the TRT, be consoli- $\{\beta\}$ dated into one organization along the lines of NT 5 or 6. 16 I can never Keep them straight, 1.7 Mr. Inderfurth. Five. This would ---1.8 Senator Huddleston. There would that agoncy be in the 12 structure? 20 Hr. diGenova. This is the point I was astfind at before 21 that the domestic task forms and John Elliff has some problems 22 with these recommendations that Tim just spotlighting this 23 nors. No deasn't understand the advisability of this. Us doesn $\mathcal{O}(1)$ son the data a cood correct. 26

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Mr. Hiller. That's because he hasn't heard the 2 recommendations that this be done by others. It's just an 31 liea to be considered. Mr. Kirbow: He's read it I reserve on this. .1 5 Mr. diGenova. I'm not sure that's ---Mr. Inderfurth. Mclls the military intelligence services 6 7 should be added to this FAT. CIA and military intelligence. Mr. Aaron. If you'r going to consolidate that function. 8 it ought to be consolidated all the way around. Õ. Mr. Miller. They're alightly different activities on 10 the part of the military because they're involved in base 🔓 11 12 protection. Isn't that correct? 13 Mr. Snider. Well, that counter-espicade operation 14 involves their own personnel world-wide. 15 Mr. Miller. But in connection with bases', that's their 16 connection. 1.17 Mr. Snider. Not necessarily bases, but information, 1.8 military information. As long as you are consolidating that 19 function. I don't see why you shouldn't include the military 20 services. It's just a small point. 21 Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I certainly favor the 22 concept that if there's any one area where we say even a little 23 from clomonts. Env were in the counter-intelligence areas. 24 And I am, as you know, proposed to further complication of OF. SECRET

the hiding places for requires Dility or accountability But 2 I think creation of a separate unit here and consolidation would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult. We have found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination and I think in a number of other instances, COINTELPRO and so 5 on there was duplication and overlap and abuse and poor 15 performance and misperformance and about everything you can think of going on here buty on the FBL and the CIA and maybe even the military.


So I think we have to look at somethind and not just a mandate on counter-intelligence. I think this is a sound recommendation to make ...

Mr. Miller. It doesn't have to be into a new agency. It may be a relationship that is less than an agency.

Nr. Aaron: Is it the concept here that this organization would conduct all the counter-intelligence activities abroad? I mean in other words, the counter-intelligence functions that every station has to, in effect, conduct, for example that establishes perhaps nuts an agent in a local security service to make sure that local security service is cooperating with us and not cooperating with the Soviets.

That is the counter intelligence action. Is that something this organization would do as well, or would there be departmental courter dutelligence permitted? (

Hr. Richow. IF we're talbing about duplicating in mainr



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proportions, major aspects of the FBI because they use their 1 \mathbb{C} agents for dual purposes - if he isn't out here law enforcing 5 on a Friday afternoon, then he's doing whatever else he's qualified to do in this field. .1

man and they will be a

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5 Mr. Miller. That's part of the reason perhaps that some of the abuses have occurred. The grev area becomes very murky indeed because of the dual nature of the agent's activities, whereas the pursuit of foreign enemies, and tather than having the band-offs of the situation that we've had in the past. that consolidation might remove that problem and it wight upon 10 examination lead to clarification of role and remove the 11 kinds of grev areas that existed in the past. But it's only 12 a suggestion to look into more thoroughly. It's nothing more than that and I think it has merit to at least look into 14 it thoroughly. 1.5

Mr. diGenova. That's a specific recommendation that the 16 new oversight committee consider that question. 1 17 Mr. Kirbow. I was just reminded by my colleagues that 10

that recommendation is rather innocuous. They can do anything 10 or not do anything. 20

I do think here again, as we suggested earlier we should 21 remove the words during the pert year because if they do 22 everything that we have recommended. they won't have time to 23 to lunch the way things are going. Why don't we say that 24 the oversider committee through consider this? I think that OR:

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you're now directing another committee to do many things within. a short perid of time and they may have more important r commendations that they consider too.

Mr. Aaron. Now Senator Huddleston. I would like for our recommendations Ę. 6 to be more specific, but I recognize that there are times when 7 we can't. The natural question is going to be to us as members $\Omega_{\rm c}$ what about recommending this study? Are you for it? Do you Q recommend it's a good thing or a had thing? And our only Li response can be, well, we don't know. We just think we ought 11 to look at it. 1.2

٦. Mr. Boron'. Well. I think in some cases we're really . talking about some ideas that deserve a measure of logitimacy 14 to be seriously considered. I mean, for example, we were 15 talking earlier about the DCT being separated from the Agency. 16 I think the way the Committee came out it was essentially to 17 give leditimacy to the idea and its practicality or wisdom 18 one might well question and look at further with the oversight 10 committee. 20

I think that sort of fails in that same caregory. 21: Senator Huddleston: Month it help any to say that 22 because of the nature of thic kind of activity or the fact that 23 it does that iten's to specific abuses, that they realize to 1 do this? pp

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ţ	Mr. Kirbow. Sension the individuals, we don't have any
2	great big record that there were roque agents out there in the
3	FUI doing this. There ware roome policies down at the headquarter
4	Now if you have the same kind of roque policy in a new
5	agency, you'll have the same and result.
· •	So it doesn't accomplish anything for us to do this and
7	point at the individuals because it was a principal.
8	Senator Huddleston. I didn't specify individuals. I
9	just said it has happened and it's the area where it is
30	susceptible.
11	Mr. Kirbow. Certainly the potential for abuse is great
] 2	in this area and it should be studied carefully and probably
北亞	urgently by the Subcommittee. I mean the new oversight
11	committee.
: [문] ·	Senator Hart. It wasn't potential it was actual. I'd
1 F.	like to see the committee recommend strongly that they go in
1.7	this direction on the basis of our 13 months of looking at the
1.8	damn thing.
19	I don't know how long you have to study some problem
20	before you do something about it.
21	Senator Huddleston: Mall. I'm content to leave it as
22	it is, taking out during the next year.
27	Ms. Culbreth, Did we add military services?
<u>8</u> -1	The Miller Phatis a conduction t
25	Mr. Mirbow. All counter detailligence functions and leave
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ļ	out the agencies individually: Leave out the FBI and the CIA.
2	Mr. Miller. I think naming them is a good idea.
· · ·	Senator Huddleston. I quess this gets into the domestic
4	task force also.
- 5	Mr. Aaron. Yes. The Committee will want to look at that.
f)	Now if we go on to our next set of recommendations for
7.	covert action we can be halfway through the report. That
p, -	would be moving to page 48. where we will take up a number of
9	recommendations related to covert action and paramilitary
10	activities, which relate to what the stated purpose in law
1,1	of these activities ought to be, what restrictions might be
12	placed upon them, what review and accountability procedures
13	might apply to them and what kind of controls from the Congress's
14	standpoint might be placed on them from the standpoint of
15	either the budget or some other aspects, particularly the
16	paramilitary activities.
]	

If we start with the first one on page 48 --Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, don't vou think we ought to skim lightly. Much as we are all desirous to get to that halfway mark. I think we had better look at the text vory lightly beginning on page 42. It wouldn't take very long to do that. (Pause)

23 Senator Mathias. Prv problem with the Angola 24 reference: What find of confinences, and fo coding to caise? 25 No up have a record to support the

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Indonesian reference?

Mr. Bader. Yes we have a major study to support that. In fact, one of our biggest studies.

Mr. diGenova. That raises the issue, if I might say, 5 of a question that I just want to know as a matter of

6 information.

Have we resolved the question of whether or not the Adency agrees to the releast of a second covert action paper. When there was an agreement apparently reached before that there would be only one covert action maper and that was on Chile? What's the status of negotiations now to release the Indonesia paper? The one you're failting about.

Wasn't there another detailed mener on a covert action 14 mener that we were considering?

Mr. Aaron. There was a paramilitary paper on taos how which the Agency would like us to release and they are now reviewing with the view toward parmitting us to do so. Senator Mathias. What about the Indonesian?

Mr. Miller, That's classified.

Mr. Eirbow. And the one on Greece?

Mr. Miller. That's classified, too.

22 Mr. Kirbow. There is a classified record that will 23 support this comment. There will not be a public record, but 24 if you read this there, you could go high at it is our other

25 ronat.

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Senafor Muddleston ; Could we make some kind of a footnote 2 Mr. Bader. Senator, on the result of the Indonesian operation, the '57 operation is widely known but it was a <u>,</u>7 failure. We want to support the Sumatra rebels and they failed -1 and so did we. 5 This was when a concerned shot down. 6 Senator Huddleston, Pack on page 44, this term sheep Ŋ din is that sufficient? \mathcal{P}_{i} Mr. Aaron. We had a love discussion of that, as a matter \circ of fact. Wolll be guided by the Committee. 10 Senator Huddleston, Sterilized equipment, What does]] that.mean? 12 Mr. Maron. That's suminant whose origin tanpot be 13 braced. 14 Serator Mathias. Phoseer is the editor, I bore that 1.5some of these howevers that are used to begin sentences with 16 will be put following the first verb instead of at the beginning 17 of the sentence. 19 At the top of page 48 I think you should wake that a Тò little stronger, effective Congressional oversight, too, if 20 they have the guts to use it. I mean if they don't use it, 51 it isn't worth anything. 22 Mr. diCenova., Scenter, yould you move to but that 27 Janquarr in there? 24 Senator Mathing . " 'I The serious about it. although ŹБ.

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I would like to be a little bit more literary.

Mr. Aaron. If there is the will to exercise it.

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Senator Mathias. Because you know, you head into the Executive Branch and there's an emotional appeal with the flag 4 waving and the Star Spangled Panner bring played on the Capitol ŗ. stops and all that kind of thing. It takes some courage, and £ 7 I don't think we ought to downplay the fact that, just the mare fact that you hold the power of the purch. that it makes £1 it an easy nower to exercise: \odot Sepator Huddleston. All right, we're ready for 10 recommendation number 1 on page 49. 11 Mr. Maron. I'm going to ask Bill Mader to speak tog these 12 recommendations. He has done the major work on this. I'll 15 just simply make one point with regard to the first one, and 1.4that is that in giving the Abency a charter and writing down 15 some of the things that it is to do, including the conduct of 16 covert operations, the concept would be to use the Title I 111

these missions that the Record would be given and in that so context the general indunctions of ---

device of trying to also set forth some of the rurposes of

The first recommendation would arise to be supplemented by the specifics that follow.

23 Mr. Bader. T trust the language is clear here. It is pA intended in the first instance to underline the visions the ph Committee that the use of coverts offen should be an exceptional

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act and not a routine procedure. It is also intended to underline the Committee resition that covert action again in the exceptional nature should be used only when other means will not do.

And then it goes on to talk about that there should be procedures for seeing that there is both careful and thoughtful and thorough consideration of the general policies governing covert action and that these procedures include participation of policy,makers at the highest layed and be marked by accountability.

What we're intending to do here is to underline these various points. the exceptional nature full accountability, thorough systematic review.

Mr. Inderfurth. The first is legislation authorizing the conduct of covert actions makes clear. That seems to be sort of present legislation. There is none.

Mr. Aaron. It should say, recommendation 1, that the pa legislation authorizing the conduct of covert actions make to clear that its purpose is to respond.

Nr. Maxwell. The problem is there isn't following from the charter section in the first set of recommendations the recommendation other than the very early one about MSC that a charter for the CIA authorizing the following functions should be drawn and that because there is not that recommendation in this section. I thick "ich's comment is approxiate.

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Mr. Inderfurth. Mucho dust add a line that that charter 2 should state that and then no into this.

1.31.

5 Mr. Kirbow. Are you recommending a revision of the 1947 Act to change the charter of the CIA or to make it clearer or more specific. or do you want to simply indicate here that the Committee recommends that by statute, covert operations or covert action be authorized? Mr. Inderfurth. I thin it should all be in one piece

in the omnibus legislation. O

Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think that in fact in the beginning 111 and also in the section it simply says that the CIA is 11 authorized to conduct, if you will, employage and that it also 12 ought to anthorize. It also suggests that they're authorized 13 to conduct a certain amount of counter-inVelligence. 14

Mr. Rader. We can do now to bade 49 where we have 1.5 attempted here to lay out for the Subcommittee's consideration. 16 Mr. Maxwell. Just one comment on 48. The first clause 1.7 after the semicolon, there may be a more artful way of saying 1.0 that legislation should make sure that procedures be developed 1.9 within the Executive Branch ... 261

Is that designed to do that by legislation or is that 21 a recommendation? We made some recommendations by statute to 22 set up a machanism, and there may be a more artful way of 23 saving that. 24

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Mr. Bader. Forley a we can just an from that procedures

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be developed within the Produtive Branch. 1 5 Mr. Miller. You can do this in various ways by requirement of reporting to the Congress. 5 Mr. Bader. On page 49, top of the page, we come to the 4 hard problems here, and this section is addressed to the question 5 of specific prohibitions on varieties of covert action. It 6 notes that the Committee has after its investigation of alleged 17 assassination attempts has recommended a statute to forbid 8 such activities. Ω What we put before the Committee for consideration is <u>. 10</u> a staff list of other possible recommendations. You can see 11 the first bracketed one where there is some dispute as to ϕ 12 whether that should be so included is all collitical assassinations 13 That is to move from foreign leaders to all political 1.4assassinations, and we can come back to that. The others you 15 can see are clear, and we would welcome comment. TR Senator Mathias. What about religious assassiations? 17 Mr. Bader. That seems to be part of the problem, Senator, 18 with using all political assassinations. It becomes a bit 1.0 hard at that stage to be limited. 20 Mr. Davis: The Executive Order has all political 21 assassinations. They are aboad of us. 22 Sepator Huddleston. In the bill that we have propared 23 and introduced whit does it save 24 Mr. Råder. It does note that the Executive Order does 25 SECRET OF

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Senator Huddleston. Ho. we introduced an anti-assassination bill, didn't we?

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Mr. Bader. Yes. That spoke to foreign leaders.

Mr. Maxwell. The bill itself, I think, would have covered foreign individuals as well as, because leadership was so broadly defined.

Part of the problem in the recommendation that came out $\cdot \Omega$ at the staff level was that anything that we say about non-Ĵ foreign leaders or domestic assassinations or the like implied 10 that the Committee had investigated allegations about that and 11 might imply that some credence should be given to charges that 10 the Agency had been involved in attempts to assaughtate people 1.5 in the United States, and that was the problem of trying 14 to word some prohibition that went beyond the bill that has 15 already been introduced by the Senators. 16

Mr. Kirbow. Or of some lesser military-type individual in a foreign country. You know, assassinating a sargeant is pratty had as far as he is concerned but it would not necessarily be political.

21 Senator Huddleston. What about meace time? Should that 22 be in there?

23 Mr. Kirbow. T Heine our bill distinguished between peace 24 time and war time Dr. Chairman.

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0 onlitical assassinations used to be discussed forther as a
2 orohibition at all.
3 Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps if the Senators think it is

desirable to say something, the staff could get language which would not imply in any way that the Committee has found credible evidence that the CIA was engaged in activities beyond this, but which would reflect their desire not to: their desire to make clear that the CIA could not do that.

9 Mr. Kirbow. It's a moral finding that it isn't 10 necessarily based on wrongdoing in the past.

1) Senator Mathias. It's repetitive but that's all right.
(2) For emphasis.

13 Mr. Kirbow. We could work on the language and show it 14 to you again.

Senator Mathias, What about the second one?

I'm not guite clear on this first one. Mr. Aaron. We 16 will draft some language that makes clear that we did not 17 find any evidence of anything other than what we've found? 12 Mr. Kirbow. That we didn't find any evidence that would 19 indicate that they had engaged in these other types of 20 assassingtion activities but that we bould prohibit it anyway, 21 other than political leaders. In that, though, we considered 22 that major or colonel over in one of; in the health elteration 23 domnittee, thing. We considered (that. We can make this clear 24

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as and show you, the additional language because I thick that the s

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was denoted that it not indicate that we had found some evidence that we had just not revealed. 2 Mr. Bader. Perhaps it would be helpful. Senator, but 5 at the same time the Administration has come forward with Λ language of all political assassinations. Which seems to me 5 would indicate that it's not a question of a finding. 6 Senator Huddleston. He ought to recommend passage of 77 the bill that we have submitted. if nothing (ise) R Mr. Kirbow. And continue to support that ledislation. 91 I think you could just add right on to this. We recommended it 10 then and the Committee continues to support enactment of such 11 legislation. 12 Mr. Aaron. Number 2 bering the Coumittee has already 1.5 recommended following its investigation of allegal assessination 1.4 attempts, a statute to forbid such activities. The Committee 15 continues to endorse that. 16Mr. Maxwell. It could say the Committee also endorses 1 17 or recommends that by statute the present Executive Order in 12 regard to permitting any political assassination be enacted in 19 peage time. 20 Senator Huddleston. That about democratically elected 81 rovernments? 22 Schator Mathias. The don't we do both? The den t ve 23 gay the Compilture raiterater its unmort of that position and OAthe Presidential directive? They may not be exactly porallal phut 25 16)0 WARD PAUL

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	an support both.
2	Mr. Aaron. Would that include supporting the Uxecutive
-5	Order provision being in the law or just supporting?
1	Senator Mathias. And the Presidential why don't
5	we he ambiguous?
6	Mr. Kirbow. We endorse the concept.
7	Mr. Davis. If they're not different.
р.] 	Mr. diGenova. There is a recommendation here that other
Ô	times of covert action which should be hanned, and since we're
ιe	talking about a statute which we have subwitted which bans.
].].	it we would then ban by statute, recommond banning by statute
12	all political assassinations which would enlarge the President's
13	Executive Order into a law and then the rest of these, just
14	assuming for the sake of argument that the Committee wanted to
15	do that, it would be a recommendation for legislation which
1.6	would ban all peacetime political assassinations.
17	Mr. Kirbow. The staff could work on that language a
18	little and get it back to you.
10	I think we know what you want to do here, don't you.
80	David?
21	Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think we can make a fix, just make
22	the point that the political assassinations point is putting
25	in haw what the Executive Order is as proposed by the Duecutive
24	Order or as provided by the Executive Order.
25	Senator Huddlecton. All right. It's then to prerthrow
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. 1	democratically elected generations.
8	Mr. Inderfurth. I might montion that Cyrus Vance went
	beyond this. He said all interference in the electoral processes
1	of a country should be banned. which does beyond this.
5	Senator Mathias. Perhaps that was some subliminal
6	influence on me. but I've written down efforts to subvert a
e Maria J	valid electoral process.
8	It seems to me that that is better because when you
· · · · · 9	talk about overthrowing a democratically elected government,
10	Ged knows what that is. And I don't know that you're really
]]	going to know what a valid electoral process is The Republic
12	of Venice, where they have a very limited electorate, elected
13	those. But nonetheless, it was their constitution and it
1.1	wasn't very democratic. But whatever it is, and this would be
1.5	in line with George Cannon's testimony also.
16	We finally have acknowledged that the Soviet Union has
17	a legislature of sorts and we acknowledge their electoral
-1,8	process although we don't think much of it.
10	Ms. Culbreth. Hould your use of the term subvert, would
20	you intend to include within that preventing the CIA from
51	any kind of political or propaganda in connection with the
2.0	elections in another country or any kind of support to one of
23	the candidates that we might think was a better conducate?
24.	Mr Kirbow Poll www.said.results.of
	Mr. Culbreth. But could you not subvert the results by
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influencing the carrying out of the election?

Senator Huddleston. Well, we subvert our own elections every time we run.

Senator Mathias. The original suggestion was efforts -] to overthrow democratically elected governments. I mean both \mathbf{F}_{i} of these -- efforts to subvert the results of a valid electoral 6 17 process.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's all right.

Mr. Inderfurth. In a sense what is a democratically 9 elected government? 70

Movnihan says that in the U.N. there are 24, so in a sense we could actually list them, Mr. diGenova. What about, what is a valid electoral

process? Whatever it is in each country? I mean the communists 11 have one party and that's a valid electoral process in that, 15 country.

Senator Mathias. This would be Cannon's advice. 77 Senator Huddleston. Well, T think we have to recognize 1.9 the right of another country to have their electoral process 10 and it would be valid if someone in that country were attempting 20 to circumvent their established constitutional processes. 21

Mr. Maxwell. The qualifier in the Senator's proposal was democratic, so that of least in some way it restricts the notion of a dictator.

Senator Huddle ton - Salf determination methe should be

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in there.

Mr. Miller. What coars would this prohibit? In our actions in the past it would prohibit Chile. Itan --

Mr. Kirbow. That stars of the Chile oreration.

Mr. Miller. Guatemala.

Senator Huddleston. The would not prohibit Angola. Mr. Aaron. It would prohibit some thinks that transpired in Each.

Wei Miller. It would prohibit the actions in Italy, wouldn't it and France?

12 Separar Huddleston. It depends on the form subversion. 12 Do ware just assisting one (14s.

17 Mr. Nichow. Assisting the head of an election during 14 the election process does not appear to be the intert of 15 the Committee.

Mr. Maron. I wouldn't think that what is going on in Portugal insofar as we know that that is would come under this rephibition.

Mr. Miller. So it would really affect the cases like.

Constant Realization of think waited a state

Mr. Aaron. And Independent Senator Huddleston: Cubar

Mr. Maron. He.

a little bit but I think that's protty close

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Mr. Enderfurth. But just to be a devil's advocate for 2 a moment, we don't want to insert then, using your language, Senator, the efforts to influence or subvert the results of 4 a valid electoral process? Senator Mathias. That may be too short a leash. 5 Mr. Inderfurth. But I think that's a question the 6 7 Committee has to address. It would be a very short leash. Senator Huddleston. Hell, there are different ways to Ω influence and there may be a proper way to influence. 0 Mr. Inderfurth. If there were a proper, then berhaps 10 one could define the improper way, influencing by passing money, 11 covert propaganda, and that type of thing, 1.2 Mr. Kirbow. If the Committee's intention is after 13 the person is elected and you don't want to prevent that kind 1.1 of person being put into office by any means, then you do it 15 here. 16 If you do not intend as a committee to preclude using 17 the press or using other things to influence the butcome of 1.13the election, then we should be solid on that and stay out 10 of that area. But it's up to the committee to decide. 20 Mr. Bader. This lauguage speaks to subverting the 21 results, not influencing the outcome. 22 Mr. Kirbow. And he says that was his intent. 23 Squater Hu Hesten. This does not predlude up from 24 cotting involved as we did in Italy. 25

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Mr. Bader. Or to Fortural

Senator Huddleston, That's not a subversion of the process, that's an assistance.

Senator Mathias. That's participation in the process. Mr. Inderfurth. What about after an election but prior to the formation of a coalition government?

Senator Mathias. I would think that would be subverting. 8 if you get in there and say well we are workied about who 9 these people have elected.

I didn't know it was General Haid until this afternoon but I was aware that some American official had made a threat to Mitterand that he would be in trouble if he were all all defended Frime Minister and attempted to bring some radical leftists into the French Cabinet.

Now it seems to be that that is a threat to subvert the
French electoral process and if in fact we carried out that
threat I think that that would be prohibited by this language.
Mr. Aaron. I take it the word subvert goes to covert
activities. In other words, if General Haig said that privately
but didn't mean it in terms of covert action, he just said the
United States government will ---

Senator Mathias. I think the President of the United 23 States or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense 24 might very well shard up in Front of the Felevision comeras and 25 might say. Look, if you put a communist in the Example Cabinet

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2 and under the parliament of statem vou give him access to 2 HATO's secrets, then there's going to be hell to pay, and we're 3 telling you right now. 4 T don't think that's prohibited.

I don't think that's prohibited.

But if we shadow man around and catch him in some 6 compromising personal position and use the photographs to 7 blackmail him. or anything of that sort --

Mr. Bader. That's a covart action project.

Sevator Huddleston. There's no duration that this
whole matter of internal intervation in another country -Mr. Kirbow, Senator, whatever you say here is going
to be one of the highest considerations diven by the Full
Constitue.

Senator Huddleston I feel there ought to be some 15 restrictions and constraint on our interference in the 16 internal operation of the government.

Mr. Aaron. The next one support for his beliefs or 19 other internal security -- other security groups which engage 19 in torture.

Senator Huddleston. Popht we have some locislation to 21 that offect? 22 Mr. Maron: There are amendments regarding forsign

ez aid. Now this is open foreign aid. We're talking about covert



Mr. diconova. This doesn't make consecto we

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Mr. Wirbow. Which speads in forture. Senator Mathias. Con E-make a semantic suggestion here. That we try to bring this in line with the language in the

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4 Constitution, cruel and present runishment, because I think 5 this really reflects. if it's going to mean anything, we ought 6 to be reflecting our national othic in both of these, both 7 in subverting the results of a valid electoral process--8 Senator Huddleston. Excent you get into the question 9 of capital punishment.

10 Mr. Maxwell. There's another problem and that is one 11 of the things that the forture is encoded in is before a 12 person has been judged to be cullty of a crime, someone who 13 is being fortured in an interrogation, that person would not 14 be subject to cruel and penaul munishment but the systematic 15 violation of human rights or some other .

16 Senator Mathias. That's a phrase, though, with which 17 Americans have been familiar since 1787, and it seems to me 18 it has some value.

Sepator Hart. The problem is we don't give serious thought to the way we treat arisoners in this country.

Senator Mathias. Yes. I think that's a problem. I think that's a problem. I think that's a problem in this whole thing.

Someone once said at the time that the Italian nayments by were exposed, you the the functions do this all the time and nobody blinks at it. . . . of course the difference is ye go

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i i i	around and dreaching all door the world about our high ethical
2	standards and then when in are shown that we don't live up to
	our own standards, that's what brings us the retribution.
1	But I still think that we ought to notwithstanding that
5	this is an opportunity for some linkage with the Constitution.
5	But I don't press the point. I just offer it.
r.,	Sepator Huddleston. Well, I think this is something
8	we should all give some thought to in the next few hours.
?	Mr. Kirbow. If we are doing to do that, way I suggest
1.0	that here we talk about support for police or internal security
<u>[]</u>]	forces.
1.9	The remainder of that sentence shouldn't we apply it
1,7	so that it is the policy of the country involved? Otherwise
14	you're talking about aid in a rovert mann's governed by maybe
1.5	an inadvertent, without authority type series of exposures
LG	of torture and whatnot, and son out off the aid to a country.
1.7	Mr. Aaron. Can I speak to that point?
18	I think that Charley raises an interesting example and
1.3	we have sort of that kind of situation beday in Prazil where
20	it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the policy of the
21	government or whether the informal security forces which are
223	very fragmented among the millitury and the states and what
22	have you, whether these internal security forces and relice are
24	just on their own
	Mr. diffenove. About this patter?
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Mr. Aaron. I think this is the question. It goes to 2 the point not of assistance to the government in general or 3 even covertly, but assistance to these particular forces, and that I think does narrow it down to the problem. 4 Senator Huddleston. What kind of support do we give the 5 security forces? Fi Mr. Kirbow. Training. 17 Mr. Aaron. We have justhe pasts we can give them 8 technical training, electronic devices. 0 Mr. Kirbow. A whole spectrum except for U.S. military 10support. 11 Mr. diGenova. Some of the proprietaries were used 12 for exactly that surpose, to provide training and secure 13 procurement and sale and loan of devices which ultimately 1.4 found their way into the hands of foreign torturers. 15 We certainly don't deprive the Agency of any legitimate 16 source of intelligence because they themselves claim that they 7.17 have never engaged in this activity knowingly and don't want 18 to. 1.9 They say they don't want anything to do with this type 20 of activity and they say they don't want to be involved with 21 internal police forces that conduct this type of activity. 22 They have said recently that they have discontinued 23. those sorts of li isons, so to orchibit them by banning it 24 seems to way to say find, we have with you and we will do it. 25 SECREI

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Mr. Aaron. What occurs to me is that it would be helpful to have a finding on this point.

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Mr. diGenova. That's the next issue I was going to raise. We don't write anything about this any place in the report.

6 Senator Huddleston. Does the Agency have a directive to that effect that they have discontinued or are discontinuing 7 that we can refer to and say we approve of it? 9 Mr. Inderfurth. As well as in the Chile covert action 9 study there is discussion of liaison with the current Chilean 10 internal security forces and that the CIA was saving, welk 11 we want to talk to them but we don't want to be involved in 12 what they're doing and we want to try to stop them from their 13 practices of torture and the rest. 74

So I mean that's something we can look to as a basis 16 for our findings.

Mr. diGenova. There's also a parallel with the drug thing.

Mr. Aaron. Senator, shall we try to see if we can come back with some language that tries to work in the Constitutional point? I must say I personally have a little difficulty figuring out how you turn this around to try to apply to what the police do?

Senator Matilas. Letis think about it.

Senator Huddleston. Let's get back at 7:30: That's a

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ţ	whole two hours and a half.
s`	Whereupon, at 5.00 p.m. the hearing in the above
3	mentioned matter was recessed, to reconvene at 7:30 o'clock
4.1	p.m. of the same day.)
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