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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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SECRET
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APPRaisal: NCO DINH NHUIS, PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP; HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN. ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLEMAKERS.
 DECISION (SUMMARY) REGARDING NHUI PROPOSED TO ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THE STAGED COUPD'ETAT WAS SOON AS MEDIAL
 POSSIBLE. THIS COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THE ARMY MUST
 SHOULD TURN OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANSE ON THE NEXT DAY.
 ONZ: JNGO DINH NHUIS TO DA GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THE WAR
 AGAINST THE WYET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND THAT TO THE GENERAL
 OFFICERS MUST PROVE IDEAS TO THE CONG ON BEGET THE GENERAL OFFICERS
 HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED IN THE REYES OF THE REBELS AND IN
 ORDER TO REGAIN POPULARITY, THEY MUST ENGAGE IN A COUPD'ETAT

SOURCE

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

APPRaisal: SEE BELOW
 DATE: 11-12 JULY 1963
 INFO: 78592
 SUBJECT: COUP D'ETAT PLAN OF NCO DINH NHUIS. ON THE DATE DISTR 112 JULY 1963.
 COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM. REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,517

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C. SECT. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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 UVA-81-269, NR-89-15+

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NHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY.
 NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.
 NHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL. ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION. ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, IN FACT, HAS HE HAD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION, AS DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

NHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES AND THAT FAST ACTION WAS NECESSARY. IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IF THE COUP IS TO OCCUR. THIS WAS THE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE-MAKERS

FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT MUST BE QUELLED. NHU QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE BUT THE FIVE RING LEADERS, WHO WERE TO BE BLAMED BECAUSE THEY HAD USED THEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.

5. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIANS

IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LE, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED

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MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.

6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE NHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALL OF THE NHU'S CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)

8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.

9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS

GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD

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ATTENDED THE 117707Z WEETING... BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY. VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, III CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS; BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS. VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACING HUEI PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS. VIEN SAID THAT SHE HAD BEEN ADVISED BY THE GENERAL OFFICERS THAT SHE SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE AND BELIEVED HIS COMMENTS WOULD BE ACCEPTED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE... SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS... THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE RIGHT WAY ATTEMPT AND THAT... THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE DECISIONS MADE AND COMMENTED... VIEN SAID THAT HE HAD HIS WIFE AND

END OF MESSAGE

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