## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10147

**RECORD SERIES: National Security Files** 

**AGENCY FILE NUMBER:** 

.

ORIGINATOR: CIA

FROM:

TO:

**TITLE: CIA Information Report** 

DATE: 9/27/1963

PAGES: 4

**SUBJECTS:** 

DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTIONS:

**CURRENT STATUS:** 

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000

**OPENING CRITERIA:** 

COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA

Reports. Box 2

This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault




The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com** 

### WEERWALINFOR MATION REPURT

#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

(When Filled In)

NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM NORTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,927

SUBJECT

MEETING BETWEEN POLISH INTERNATIONAL

. . .

CONTROL COMMISSION DELEGATE AND White

DATE DISTR.

27 SEPTEMBER 1963

NGO DINH NHU

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.

2 AND 23 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES

28400

PLACE &

VIETNAM, SAIGON (23 SEPTEMBER 1963)

DATE ACO. APPRAISAL

SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9711

SOURCE

AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MANELI.

APPRAISAL: IN VIEW OF THE WIDELY DIVERGENT ACCOUNTS OF THE NHU/MANELL MEETING, MANELL'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE MEETING CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGED. HOWEVER, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT MANEL! DID OFFER TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN NHU AND THE DRY. MANELI'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING DRY ATTITUDES TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION AND THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS HIS JUDGEMENT CONCERNING PHAM VAN DONG MAY BE ACCURATE. PLEASE NOTE THE FIELD COMMENT IN PARAGRAPH 6.

ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1963 THE CHIEF OF THE POLISH 1 . ( .SUMMARY: DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (ICC) IN SAIGON. DR. M. MANELI, SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH NGO DINH NHU ON 2 SEPTEMBER NHU HAD DONE MOST OF THE TALKING. MANELI ASKED NHU FOR HIS VIEWS ON DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM TO WHICH NHU REPLIED THAT DE GANLLE WAS TRYING TO RETURN TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 1954 AGREEMENT. MANELI ALSO ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) HAD CONSIDERED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) PROPOSALS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CIB

GROUP I ingrading and declassificate

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY

KO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE

REPORT

AIR.

JCS

SECRET (When Filled In)

CI-ASSIFICATION. NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE UNIX

TDCS DB-3/656,927

FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR TRADE RELATIONS. NHU REPLIED NEGATIVEL ON BOTH COUNTS. SUBSEQUENTLY MANEL I DENIED THAT NHU HAD EVER HINTED THAT MANEL! SHOULD BE AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE GVN AND MANELI SAID THAT THE DRY COULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRALI-ZATION BECAUSE OF INTERNAL DRY CONDITIONS, THAT HIS DRY CONTACTS DID NOT BELIEVE THE VIET CONG WOULD WIN THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AND THAT DRV PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG WAS THE ACTUAL LEADER OF NORTH VIETNAM.)

- ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1963 MANELI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SOUGHT A MEETING WITH NHU AND WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT NHU'S INVITATION TO MEET ON 2 SEPTEMBER. MANEL! FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD HAD NO CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE MEETING.
- MANEL I SAID THAT NHU TALKED ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, MILITARY PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND HIS REASONS FOR BEING ANTI-COMMUNIST. MANELI SAD THAT NHU DID MOST OF THE TALKING WHILE MANEL! CONFINED HIS CONVERSATION TO SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE ICC. MANELI'S QUESTIONS AND HINHUTS ANSWERS FOLLOW:
- MANELI ASKED NHU FOR HIS VIEWS ON DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT NHU SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE OFFICIAL TEXT BUT ON VIETNAM. WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE PRESS ACCOUNT. HE SAID THAT DE GAULLE WAS SIMPLY CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVES

OF THE GENEVA ACCORD OF 1954 AND WAS STRESSING THE PROVISIONA

SECRET

NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROL

SECRET

### NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCSDB-3/656,927

N 28400 -

NATURE OF THE PRESENT UNNATURAL DIVISION OF VIETNAM.

- B. MANELI ASKED IF THE GVN HAD CONSIDERED THE DRV SUGGESTION
  THAT A CEASE-FIRE BE CONCLUDED. NHU REPLIED THAT A CEASE-FIRE WAS
  NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME.
- C. MANELI ASKED IF THE GVN HAD CONSIDERED HO CHI MINH'S PROPOSAL THAT TRADE RELATIONS BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE DRV WITHOUT REFERENCE TO POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. NHU REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.
- 4. MANELI DEPLORED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLUMN BY JOSEPH ALSOP WHICH ALLEGED THAT NHU HAD EXTENDED "EXTRAORDINARY COURTESIES" TO MANELI AND THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS INVOLVED IN FOSTERING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE DRV. MANELI DENIED THAT NHU HAD EVEN HINTED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO USE MANELI AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE DRV.
- 5. PASSING TO OTHER MATTERS, MANELI SAID THAT THE DRV COULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRALIZATION BECAUSE OF INTERNAL STRESSES AND IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS THERE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION WHETHER HIS DRV CONTACTS REALLY BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD WIN THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, MANELI PONDERED FOR A LONG TIME AND THEN SAID, "I DO NOT THINK SO." MANELI ALSO SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG HELD REAL POWER IN THE DRV AS HO CHI MINH WAS "GETTING QUITE OLD."
  - 6. (FIELD COMMENT: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) TALKED TO NHU ON

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKEROUND USE OFFI

LASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

NO FEREIGN DISSEM

TDCSon-3/656,927

IN 28400

6 SEPTEMBER AND OBTAINED A CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT VERSION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE NHU/MANEL MEETING: SAID THAT MANELI HAD MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO SEE HIM BUT THAT HE HAD REFUSED UNTIL ITALIAN AMBASSADOR D'ORLANDI AND THE INDIAN ICC. COMMISSIONER GOBURDHUN PERSUADED NHU TO CONSULT WITH MANELI. ACCORDING TO NHU. MANELI URGED NHU TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DRV; HE SAID THAT PHAM VAN DONG HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO ACT AS THE INTERMEDIARY FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. NHU REPLIED TO MANELI, THAT, WHILE DE GUALLE'S STATEMENT WAS INTERESTING, ONLY COMBATANTS IN THE WAR HAD THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND ACT, THAT THE GVN WAS ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IT WOULD BE AN "IMMORAL ACT" TO EXPLORE MATTERS WITH THE DRV WITHOUT AMERICAN KNOWLEDGE, AND THAT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE DRY WOULD ENTAIL INEVITABLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS AND LEAD TO A WEAKENING OF MORALE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NO "SECRET CHANNEL" TO THE DRV BUT COULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE DRY AT ANY TIME THROUGH GOBURDHUN OR MANELI. ACCORDING TO NHU, MANELI SAID THAT THE GYN WOULD SOON HAVE FOUR ENEMIES AGAINST IT, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING THE U.S. NHU SAID! THAT HE REPLIED THAT THE GVN WAS ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING MANY ENEMIES AND WOULD PREFER TO DIE FIGHTING RATHER THAN LIVE ON ITS KNEES

HARKINS) CINPAC PACELTEARPAC PACAF

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL

SECRET

NO FOREIGN-DISSEM
RO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY