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INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE MONTH
2-1-67-1-1

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO: TDCS DB-3/650,938

SUBJECT: MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE DURING THE NIGHT OF 1-5 AUGUST 1962

DATE OF INFO: 1 AUGUST 1962
INFO: TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP

DATE (C): LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT)

APPROX: (SOURCE COMMENT) (SOURCE COMMENT) (SOURCE COMMENT)

PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST (SOURCE COMMENT)

TO THE VC SAIGON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST (SOURCE COMMENT)

ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

1. MAJOR LONG STATED THAT THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP

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END OF MESSAGE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

85. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 12 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 12 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

FIELD COMMENT: [REDACTED]

WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME IN SO FAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.

GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

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SECRETARY AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA 11C.

13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPCS CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE OF CINCPAC ARPAC TO PACAF PAFET.

(SOURCE CORRECT) W/MS FORM DID NOT HAVE THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE
END OF MESSAGE

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