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Folder 7

Background

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0002173

(SSC)

In April 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Presidential Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CIA and to some extent for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its ~~personal~~ attempts on the life of ~~the~~ premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~found~~ ^{discussed} on pages 6-7 of its Footnote but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P 7
Foot II
have

"Senior CIA officials who should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

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0002473 evidence of a foreign conspiracy?

Strung by the Senate criticism and the "reptiling effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CFA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Final Report. However even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CFA's ^{national} response to the Warren Commis's quest for all relevant information. ["Relevancy" is of course, the "buzzword" upon which the Senate and Agency each base their position of the ^{in the importance} anti-Castro plots to the Commis's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commis limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CFA, too could have considered in specific terms what most men in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement ^{in the} prosecution (GFC) because of ^{SECRET} fear of the terms. . . . The Agency should have

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P 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader in its terms, than,
as well."

Conflicting

to the work of
the Warren
Commission

It is not the purpose of
 this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the
 viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA
 with regard to the significance
 of the CIA's Castro ~~involvement~~
 attempts and to resolve ^{the parties} ~~their~~
 controversy as to ^{the operations} ~~their~~ importance.
~~Rather~~ I noted this paper seeks
 to present a comprehensive
 review of all the facts, drawn from
 a variety of sources, of organized
 Cuban involvement or potential
 involvement in CPTA operations
 against Cuba during 1960-63.
 Certain inferences and conclusions
~~to~~ will then be drawn upon
 the nature, scope, and motivation
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate
 participants in the operations.

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Involvement of Raymond Payne in
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the ^{utilization} ~~use~~ of the
United States ~~armed~~ ^{armed} syndicate of the CIA ~~to~~ ^{attempt}
to assassinate Castro is ^{found} in the 1967
Inspector General's Report as occurring
during a conversation between the
Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard
Bissell, and the Director of the Office of
Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.⁺

[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Interim Rpt p. 74; Secret.]
Edwards assigned the specific task
of locating the right party to
"eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to
James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was
the Chief of the Operational Support Division
of the Office of Security. Both men
agreed that Robert A. Mahon ^{was}
who had been previously utilized
by the Agency in several sensitive covert
operations, would be contacted to
recruit the necessary personnel.

⁺ [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell
are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report.]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ
to who initially brought up
John Rosselli's name for consideration
there was a meeting between Mahon
and Rosselli at the Brown Daily Restaurant
in Los Angeles in early September 1968
[Interim Report, p. 75]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on SA Morgan, Mahan attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while working for Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machine on the Strip! Mahan reasoned that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

Quoted?

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Comment

Confirmation of ~~the~~ earliest Mahan-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

Comment

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. [See Mahan's report, newspaper, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.]

data

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahon and Council to discuss further details.

[Defense Report p 76; Office of Security memo from Mangon file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Dujean's Periodic Report places the meeting at the Playa Hotel on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Varona admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at his time or [Festung of de Varona,] that his visit had an assassination motivation.

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahon) to a friend, 'Sam Bold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~varona~~ (Bold) and Traffante ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" side of the mob in the Castro assassination plot. Kennedy

to the 1907 I.G. Report, the ~~SSC~~ ^{SSC} Informant
of Germana took place during the
middle of 25 September 1950: ...
[1907 I.G. Report, p. 18]

In contact, the SSC Informant
Report at p. 76, there are not ~~any~~
for informant's initial response to
" (p. 70)) because of conflicting
evidence between the
1907 I.G. September 1950 and March

SSC testimony which not the informant
in November 1950. As a consequence, the
English Report assumed that German
had been interviewed by the Walker
prior to October 1950. However, the
on 1950 working account in October
30, 1950, and the DDP Board had
received an FBI memo dated October
1950 which revealed an FBI Star
giving source as discussing him
investive ment in an association
got agent (p. 74) FBI memo, dated
15 Oct 1950 from Arnold Bissell, Informant
Report, p. 745

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Comment: dual source listed in the
Inform Report on p. 77 are subject to
check on other return with the
draft with original ~~at the bottom~~
[Comment:]

Comment: Although the 1907 I.G. Report ~~and~~
[Comment:]

that "Mahon pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe", the Intern Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name "Tom J. Hs.", said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then very briefly
S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Rept p 70

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Comment
~~Comment~~

Conflicts appear also on several occasions in ~~a variety of~~ Miami's records surrounding the September 1988 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:
1) Did Rosselli know from the beginning that ~~Mahon~~ the operation was CIA?
a) O'Connell stated that Mahon told Rosselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosselli testified that Mahon told him that O'Connell was CIA (Intern Rept p 70)
Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Rosselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Bourson, that "I am not kidding, I know what you work for".

The importance of Rosselli's recognition of CIA ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{is} that it is doubtful if Bourson and Traffante

could have been entitled under
 they could be sure of government
 protection. This theme will be
 developed more fully below.
 (2) Rosell had an Indian partner
 that he was an "agent of some
 business interests of Wall Street that
 had... made contacts and papers
 toward Cuba... (Rosell: 12/21/75
 pp 9, 12)

cf. John Andrew Johnson
 of Jan. 19, 1971, which still
 could the pair against
 Cuba have trade against Russia
 Kennedy? ... Note of the mission
 team, however, had direct knowledge
 of the ETH investment. The ETH investor
 had agreements transferred to Johnson
against Center
 for his purpose of fill holding
 of Indian source for this
 article was Rosell and William
Kenny, who was not going to the ETH
Phase I, it is another ETH investor
 of several discrepancies in ETH investor
 in ETH, Smith, and Indian investor
 which all support to align in my
degree, upon Rosell.

3) The alleged ETH investor
known by Smith and ETH investor
 as the ETH investor of
 "Sam and De" is very
strange. That is although it is

...the year the ^{staff} committee
staff members the ^{staff} committee members

Sunday supplement (Laurie) which purport
greatly and influence. This ~~is~~ the
showing. Mohr and I would like to see the

nature of the people with whom
they are dealing, it is a matter
very matter to research ~~and~~
management for the month of ~~the~~
and members. It would appear
that ~~the~~ I would not wish

will making for an ~~important~~
fact reason for ~~concerning~~
the operation after the ~~introduction~~
of the top of the top ~~map~~ in the
of the state. I would ~~not~~ think that

has ~~been~~ was after "we
were up to our ears in it" which
is difficult to ~~find~~ in the ~~quarter~~
was in the ~~in~~ stage and ~~not~~
will ~~be~~ ~~discussed~~ ~~in~~ ~~terms~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~
and ~~agreements~~ Mohr 1941, ~~Richard~~ the

Reason, the ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~ it would not find the ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~
The ~~inserts~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~
the operation ~~with~~ ~~also~~ ~~inserts~~
we to the ~~note~~ ~~with~~ ~~note~~
be ~~played~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~
in ~~the~~ ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~ ~~the~~ ~~staff~~ ~~inserts~~
phase of the ~~operation~~.

known as playing a "key" role.
Although Mohr ~~inserts~~

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2/24/75
1/15

(Miami, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission". Roselli downplayed Brancosi's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75 p. 15) ~~All of the ^{intermittent} ~~also~~~~

Whether Roselli secured a message from Brancosi's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's characterization of Brancosi's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged ^{recruitment of} ~~description of~~ Brancosi's "knowledge of the Cuban word" used in the 19 Nov. 1970 memo ~~referred~~.

Senate
due to his

Trafficante's involvement in Phase I is even more justified by the available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~also~~ state that "bold" identified "Joe" to Mahon as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (Feb. Report p. 19; Interim Report, p. 775. To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 Feb. Report in stating that "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana in syndicate business."

1.1

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0002190 Comment

factually

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffante applied for a passport ^{in Havana} on October 4, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960.

(See Traffante File, State Dept). ~~None~~ ~~was~~ No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and State~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Traffante

recalled

~~remembered~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed those sojourns within two or three months after his release.

Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 1, 1978

in Havana

His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos were either closed or operating in the area by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in~~ during the pre-Prigo Bigo period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Traffante's role had diminished to a point

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ever below Biancanis. He had been reduced ^{from "courier"} to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ ^{communications} between Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Intently, Trafficante and Roselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances do not detail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as reported in 1973 of the principals.

they were being

Comment:

The Senate testimony of Roselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not require cross examination either man on this discredibility nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simpler, straight forward approach of shorting Castro but this plan was rejected

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by Bionca. In a Comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Bionca was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Bionca stated a preference for lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trappanese (Joe; the owner) was ~~in touch~~ in touch with a different Cuban official with access to Castro's guard post of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangster said that Orta had once been in a position to receive briefings from the gangster infants but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

Comment

The observations of the 1967 F.B. Report ~~are~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill ~~is~~ ^{is} prepared ^{by} Bionca, not the Agency; a point

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which is cited to the final
conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappante is identified
as ~~providing~~ ^{having access to, and}
providing the ^{probable} assassin in Cuba
which is in consistent with
his self-serving and description
of "infiltrator". His ability to
recruit ^{on a} ~~on a~~ ^{as} ~~as~~ ^{was}
directly tied to his former
gangster empire associations
which formed a constant pattern
for all his ~~conduct~~ ^{conduct} for Trappante both
during and after his Cuban days.
{ See Trappante profile }

Comment

note

Speculation concerning this
note arose during the Agency's 1977
Report when it was forced to
address a problem raised by
an April 23, 1975 article, Crucial
Front, Stamps, written by Paul
Merkill of the New York Daily News.
Stamps was quoted as saying,
"The third (assassination) scheme
involved planting a bomb in Castro's
office. I had access to the Prime
Minister's office," Stamps said, "I knew
Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ochoa.
I recruited him to work with the
Embassy. I ~~recruited~~ ^{recruited} ~~him~~ ^{him} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~embassy~~ ^{embassy} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Harlem~~ ^{Harlem}
What ~~was~~ ^{was} his ~~purpose~~ ^{purpose} for the

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writings of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Treppe and with a "gambling partner" of Treppe's, Norman Rothman (See Rothman's report). Coupled with Stugis' ~~other~~ relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~the~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Onta in running gambling "high roller".

A second aspect of Muskil's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Maura Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro who dove failed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum in ~~reference~~ electronically searched ~~document~~ in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' ~~SECRET~~ some drink or food of Castro's" (Memo, Havana to DCI, 10/18/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicates may well have had some independent activities of its own spanning prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency was CIA established Jan in 1962 April
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Ota in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Ota assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operator w/ Ota, it was not CIA; it could have been earlier operators of syndicate. Sturgis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Ota with him.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report
or the SSC Interim Report can

pinpoint the precise date on which
the Agency processed the poison pills
which O'Connell delivered to Roselli
{ Interim Report, p 83. The chain of
custody, according to the 1967 I-C
Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal
pills to be delivered from Roselli
to Truffante. Although the next
intervening steps remain a
mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell
that the pills had been delivered to
Dita in Cuba in late February - early
March 1961. { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported
the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~
~~story~~ whose memory was that the
money and pills for the operation were
delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau
Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by
"Mahan, Roselli, Truffante, and the
Cubans". { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's
~~memory~~ story is filled with
verid ~~extra~~ details which are documented
on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility
is subject to serious question as
his account is not shared by
anyone else connected with the plan
and nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Roselli, Biondani, or Truffante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for John Williams column of January 19, 1961, which fixed the date and the passage of the person at the Four Towers ^{by Roselli} as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Williams and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission lies on with the final thesis of this report. Ota "lost his position in Castro's office on 20 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington."

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [~~the~~ 1967 ~~to~~ Report p. 27]

What the failure of data to produce the desired results,

the report will be a standard. until, one again, sent forth in command. Recall the that "I returned below a certain looking figure in the Cuban exile movement and might be able to accomplish the mission."

2 Feb 1967 to Egr 10 29, Egr 10 29.

Comments:

The title under item of course try to show, the

it was the subject of special in an FBI memorandum of 11/2/67. necessarily have been necessary for and from American agencies for work-center activities.

At the time of the information the CIA met with, it was not clear the CIA would be through the remaining front and was already in other in CIA showing in the Bay of Pigs mission which was comment.

Print in volume was also found by public relations administration agency was ~~not~~ engaged in planning, volume made in collaboration with Wickham from

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0002260 "Chirri" or "Chillo" Mendezal Mendez
is described in Tupper's FBI files
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of
support for Varona in the promotion
efforts of the Dins and Eddie
Collini, McHenry and Harry Musenia,
associated, who were reportedly
working through a Washington DC,
public relations firm, Edward
& Moss and Associates. Moss had
previous CPTA associations and
was supposedly acting as a conduit
for funds supplied by the Collini
brothers with the understanding
that their group would have
"privileged treatment" in the
"Cuba of the Future". Attempts
to verify these reports were
unsuccessful [1967 FBI Report
p. 30]

The heavy influence
using the Collini brothers as a
"front" is particularly interesting
in light of Varona's admission
that Jorge Pujol arranged a
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~
1960 wherein ^{my} Varosa offered to
ferrociously "back" Varona's
efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate"
all Cuban people about Castro,
which may be a euphemism for
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ ^{and} other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, as an ^{provenly independent} individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ ^{various} multitudes of exile groups who were in a continual infernal feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicates to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors.

[See Vanna testimony -]

Although de Vanna has no memory of meeting Trappanese, the Tampa court has admitted that he acted as an "organizer" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Roselli, Casanova, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Jener, a Trappanese gambler partner from Havana who continued to serve Trappanese in Miami during the 1950s. Trappanese claimed that Roselli had primary contact with Jener but this appears unlikely in view of Trappanese's long-standing friendship with Jener on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~the~~ Trappanato would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Soto who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: Paralleling ~~the~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's depiction of Trappanato's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~that~~ his "counsel" character ~~to~~ in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trappanato's "interpreter" state ment, in the recent interview with Aener who spoke with Trappanato's Committee testimony ~~that~~ he was an ~~interpreter~~ ^{with de Vama} ~~for~~ Roselli. ~~the~~ the net result in both instances is to minimize Trappanato's exposure (See CF. Forgi interview with Aener, May? 1978 and Trappanato testimony, Oct? 1977)

~~However, the meeting with Vama came to pass, the~~

If ~~confusion~~ ^{ambiguity} exists as to the speaker of the introduction of de Vama into Phase one of the Castro assassination plot, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vama's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vama attempted a second jump run before the ~~Bay of Pigs~~ invasion that Roselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Orta) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~reports~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculation that only one pre-Pray of Pigs attempt was made, and that de Vanna was the contact in the United States who arranged for [Orta] to abandon the mission.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. [See Vanna transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while on Embassy's part on the Peruvian ground. However, "Steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective". [See I.C. Report, p 325]

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to condemn to pay to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 33. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous *de l'homme* was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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successes in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operable and the ability of the ~~source~~ ^{person} assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~the~~ Harry contacted Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the actual material was to be introduced into Castro's Ford [which involved] an visit of someone who had access to someone in a ^{restaurant} restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vaughn had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the goods into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vaughn had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit persons who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did believe
that Anderson had more than a
passing acquaintance with Meyer.
- Meyer also fought with
Pat Coyne of N 82

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their names or anything about them"
 [1967 DO. Report p 513]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "Favorite restaurant" personifying opportunity ~~was the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in "that Edwards had decided pieces of the same plan". The fact that Vauma related the exact modern equivalent to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960 - mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the plot had been underway since before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from a superior source.

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Second

The cost of unadvised

character changed. Army had insisted that Mahon and someone be dropped from the operation which "Roselli" readily accepted. Traffante's "infiltrator" role was assumed by "Marco", a neophyte "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Oscar Jones and today.

Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt ^{to check his background} to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently ^{with the} ~~blithely~~ ^{blithely} "to bed" ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~top~~ ^{top} ~~of~~ ^{of} the top brass in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the W.F.B. Report characterizes Marco as "Roselli's man," it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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2.

unidentified

termination of the CPA -
mafia ^{was} plots slow and unobtrusive
Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to
Hany that the plots and groups which
had been delivered to Varma in Miami
in April had arrived in Cuba, and a
three-man team had been reported
in June to repeat the plot [Interim Report
p845]

7.

supposedly

During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rosselli
related to Hany that de Varma ~~crossed~~
readying a second three-man team
who were "supposedly military men
whose assignment was to penetrate
Castro's body guard. During this period
the 'medicine' was reported as still in
place and the three men of the first
team safe [1967 I.O. Report, p51]
However, the second team never
made Cuba and a series of clinics
were constructed during December and
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma
supposedly collected \$2700 for the maintenance
of these individuals from Rosselli
who had received the payment from
Hany. [1967 I.O. Report p52]

In mid-July 1963 both
Hany and Rosselli agreed that "nothing
was happening and that there was
not much chance that anything would
happen in the future" [1967 I.O. Report p52]
Rosselli was instructed to ease
his way out of touch with
Varma ~~which~~ ~~did~~
The last meeting between Hany

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and Roselli occurred in Washington
D.C. in June 1963. when he was
Harvey's ~~host~~ overnight guest. Hence
their meeting ostensibly was not directly
related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

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in part,

the available evidence suggests ~~that~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate General's Report wherein it states that: "It is possible that CIA singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~sense~~ ^{sense}, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 DG Rpt p 20]

7.

The relevant evidence is as follows

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Barreana ET SUR:

Barreana reportedly assured those present that Castro's announcement would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the mission to be on three occasions. ... Barreana claimed that everything has been perfected for the help of Castro, and that the mission had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'gift' in some hut or food of Castro. [1977 DG Rpt p 19]

Comment

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Although the reported meetings between Mahon, Pennington, and Barreana

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are subject to different interpretations,

it is clear that no plans were developed between the parties until sometime after October 1941. The date of the ^{FAPS} intercepted conversation of Bismarck.

The grim pills, prepared by the CPTA at Bismarck's request, were not ready for delivery until late February - early March 1941, so that it is difficult to see how Bismarck's November 1940 assassination plot could be a part of the CPTA operation. Rather, it appears that the plot had its own plan in progress, using a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CPTA fortuitously happened along to offer its support.

The plot was then in a perfect position. If their ~~present~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CPTA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their Government.

intrigue

Additional Comment

The notion of Bismarck's "hired hand", Richard Cain ~~was~~ not to raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~prisoner's~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to ~~obtain~~ ~~his~~ ~~services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~to be~~ a little more than coincidental, then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "buy" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-pudus Prio (second stay) the coincidence seems more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to ~~organize~~ ~~the~~ ~~prisoning~~ attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" when someone referred to in ~~the~~ ~~report~~ of OCT 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~writing~~ of Oct 30, 1960. Mahue needs to be questioned on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRP Student Directory in Chicago to the office of the Agency. In ~~Chicago~~ Cuba

0002213

was the former head of the Directorate
in Cuba when he was a major
in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported
to the Chicago office of the CIA that
DRE was in a deal to purchase
a large arms shipment. He was
told by the Agency to "get out
of the picture" ~~with~~ a disclosure
which is subject to several interpretations
including the fact that the CIA
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again on November 27, 1963, Cain
now the chief investigator for Cook
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency
some information that Oswald was
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and
had purchased the ~~massacre~~
rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~the potential~~ ^{the potential} assassins

In ~~describing~~ ^{describing} the ~~potential~~ ^{potential} poisoner,
Branca spoke of a "girl" who
was close to Castro while the
individual recruited for the CIA pills
was Juan Ota, a secretary in
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred
to by Branca can never be ascertained
but Traffante was clearly in the
best position to recruit ~~the potential~~
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to
his ~~multiple~~ ^{multiple} contacts in the
Cuban government and ~~potential~~ ^{potential} media

000221A

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Traffucante, Rothman, and Tourene were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to coming at the Macina Hotel (owned by Mike McManey) conversing on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Traffucante to have arranged for a young woman to serve Castro and to attempt to poison him.

L. Maria Loring is a compulsive worker, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupis has been previously discussed. However, one certainly point is that she was also Thelma Tourene's mistress and there could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourene is totally uncooperative and Loring was not asked about her relationship with Tourene in Cuba so that we do not know the other match.

Comment

— Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Traffucante, but to date former receipt of gangster "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's involvement in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. Records to the ~~SECRET~~ FBI Report ~~SECRET~~

Data "not his position in the Prime Minister's office in August 1945, which is the only one in the 'operation' was still going on in Moscow and in Washington. Account to the official version Data accepted for the file on the following - my translation out about the file for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 to Oct 275]

If the next wire were enough to Data to have the example in out out of Cuba, then they had to know that Data had not his position of necessity. The other party the that the file were left the long state and the new material to go to at some time the wire brought into the part

The question was where this, as to whether the next wire necessary to have open communication left and the CPA operation or what appears more likely, simply saying the long for the other matters going without.

Turning to Charles II of the operation which began in April 1942, ~~from which~~ the same possibilities exist. If Henry and Oswald are correct in saying that Henry had would not be an "organic" person, then ~~it~~ be assumed that the next wire would be with all these, which we think the CPA operation is the same as the CPA operation 21 Dec 1940, and is fairly far and somewhat inconsistent with the CPA operation 21 Dec 1940, and is fairly far and somewhat inconsistent with the CPA operation

the day of Operation with the necessary

it was

0002216

of the CFA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be referred to the Agency although de Vonne would continue to deal through his ~~not~~ contacts, Russell and "Maceo."

lack of intent

True to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassin, the complete reliance of Harry upon Russell and not that ~~which~~ was actually being turned out, the Agency's ~~ability~~ ^{willingness} to corroborate Russell's information, the ~~speculation~~ ^{speculation} arises that the syndicate was not serious enough to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being ~~solid~~ ^{solid} ~~rumor~~ ^{rumor} ~~troupe~~ ^{troupe} ~~band~~ ^{band} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~must~~ ^{must} ~~have~~ ^{have} ~~believed~~ ^{believed} that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortune would be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shows ^{strongly} ~~strongly~~ influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Tropicante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new apartment for ~~Robert~~ ^{Robert} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Florida~~ ^{Florida} with the ~~influence~~ ^{influence} of Cuban ~~whites~~ ^{whites}. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-tenure era of even if Castro ~~is~~ and all his Communist associates could be eliminated. SECRET

??

~~SECRET~~ Despite the ~~subverting~~

0002217 business sense in
 continuing the paramilitary attempts
 against Castro in a subterranean way.
 There still was a percentage in
 "stinging the Agency along." First, there
 was no expense to the syndicate
 because the Agency was providing full
 logistical support for the men. Second,
 there was the mounting pressure
 from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department
 which had to be blunted, if possible.
 No better weapon to accomplish their
 goal could be found than to use
 one agency (CIA) against another (FBI).
 A brief look at the record shows the
 employment of ~~this~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments
 of crisis for those who participated in
 the plots.

1. Robert Mahan

- Quarterly Long Committee subpoena
 in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; ^{Internal Edward} _{R Morgan}
- solidification of position with
 CIA and with Justice Department
 [Hughes was definitely told of the project by Mahan
 in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an
 alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred
 later when Mahan was Hughes' principal agent?]
 [Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahan Senate testimony?]
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971
 on office of security file on Edward P Morgan

2. John Rosselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern
 Report, p 85, note 4]
- use in ~~legal~~ memos in March 1971 to
 attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempt to delay deportation
 hearing with DWS which included

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With reference to general information with PR 5. (See Indian Department's file on Ronald P. Morgan's of South Africa re Ronald P. Morgan's)

3. Sam Johnson
- After 1900 working in the Dept. where Lincoln got Martin to take the lead for him by buying the top wire a month of the CTR plots.

- Early 1902, in connection with the Furlough of PR 5 in general department I see that C. Rendell CTR file, stating that my former SS Sam Johnson, Rosa, & Houston know attempts to ward off PR 5 evidence in 1903 & 1907 PR Report p 1225

- Conversation with Sam Burch on 3 May 1907, Sam comments that Rendell and Lawrence have a PR cover a hard "because" that operation; He said that he doubted that the PR would be able to do anything about the Rendell or Lawrence file of this known attempt in the year 1907 (1967 P.G. Opt p 137)

0002218

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Notes re Jack Anderson
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Russell is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients
(p 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Russell, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked
(p 120)

- Impact

The Russell-Burnham contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination or retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Burnham may also know this (p 121)

- Mahan

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does have good reasons for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his secretariat

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Chief, Saigon. There might be some value to be gained from indicating the suspicion that he appears to be a spy and perhaps Elliott and my associates.

The Saigon story, article in news columns so much as there, includes our detail that is not found in that I was the three-man team comment

Not unusual with Vietnam war involved in that one also, he may have begun the 3 man team initially and not Elliott. The concept in that was Elliott's just didn't mention the 3 man team to Moore or I would deny that I comment
"In figuring out whether reference for a link to Saigon, my my makes the bottom point -
If protection was what the source was seeking, he would be satisfied by getting it by a direct approach to CIA in July 1972 some Agency CIA figure on whether not, they think that Elliott is dumping in much and to my mind also during and to my mind necessary

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Comment

Don't know how not yet, in for an in hand, used part of the first garden; the story of the pills

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting,
GOC22222 P 1275
Comment

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See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson
claims to have a report that there
was a high-level meeting at the
Dept of State at which plans for the
assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is
falling about the 10 August meeting of
the Special Group (Seymour) which was
attended by Harvey. (p 112)
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Russell
was going to expose plots. He "decided
to ignore his threats and take a
calculated risk as to the consequences
that may occur with the disclosure
of his story. This was subsequently done
by Russell or someone in his belief
furnishing Jack Braden details of the
incident"

(Memo in office of security file re Major)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Exposed

Mr. ^{Ho} Chase (former CIA & now with Exposed)
said Mahon & Braden together on some
oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of
Braden re Mahon oil on the Carter
Administration was a deliberate exposure
instigated by Robert Mahon using
his son Peter, as an intermediary.

Believe' theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Fintel w/ a new CIA staff to influence Hughes)

-Magan makes points to caution Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA
 [Σ Memo in Security File re Magan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7
 7
 -Hany had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conversion.
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCF decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally."

5. 19 Dec. 1967

-Summary conversation instigated by Hany on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least discover how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Hany. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because Ed Magan told

Rosselli:

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Binocular (journal the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Rosselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Acting General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Binocular story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation due to Agency delaying on long committee subpoenas.

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the client "Sandy" Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity of his relationship with Hughes, with Rosselli.

- Mahan denied knowing latter phase of operation & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Reenspan in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Oswald in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~impression~~ impression that Rosselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances.

- Rosselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 49 yr old girl.

- Billard Morgan had done some

June 6th

15 Jun 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City
investigator for information on
B Cabani:

1. a. Ramon Don Pestervey
- b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
- c. Luciano Nuñez
- d. Jose de la Torreñte
- e. Jose Quintana
- f. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo
- g. Manuel Artimes
- h. MTKH

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a Dec
1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on
Roselli or Pancares

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect
between Roselli & Agency officials reported
approx. 1971.

vii. O'Connell has already been interviewed
by Dade City.

2. Office of Security has no such
evidence that Cuban Fulfiller Service may have
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area
during time of his death.

0002225

Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station
 - August 1965 entered US
 - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDD

Shuman

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shuman knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

30 August 1970 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FPO office.
 - Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficanik. Ota was reportedly solicited by Trafficanik to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Varona

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficanik suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. Varona was to use

SECRET

assets of his son to carry out the mission
 Varona also reportedly used his son's inlets
 to assist him in this effort but there is
 no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in
 Miami, known to Harry as "Maceo",
 who also used the names Garcia Gomez
 and Godoy. Harry was unable to
 identify Maceo, who was described as
 Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523

f. No info in regard to death or
 welfare parents agent Roselli or
 Cuban in G1 or Miami, Geneva - Traft,
 Sumner, or Mangan in C/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli
 intended to expose his participation in the
 plot should we not intervene on
 his behalf. The DCP decided to
 ignore his threats and take a calculated
 risk as to the consequences that might occur
 w/ the disclosure of his story. This was
 subsequently done by Roselli or someone
 on his behalf furnishing Jack & William
 details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Futer Tel

075

Magan had been engaged by Hughes Tool getting thru Mahan's efforts. H. Pearce from Army wants Futer Tel now, said Magan make noises to custom, Hughes officials, but they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement w/ CFT.

I got Southard - in 1962-64 was in touch w/ Mahan & simultaneously working out details of a [redacted] arrangement w/ Aircraft Div of Hughes Tool.

For past several years Magan had been paid well.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Mahan & Anderson are involved together in some oil rig deals. I would like to see this & all other such similar matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent exposure by Pearson & Mahan roll in the Citron Revolut was a deliberate exposure instigated by Bob Mahan using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pearce's theory is that Mahan prob. that such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Futer Tel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Mahan and Jack Anderson or a number of his staff.

19 Nov 1978

For: D C I
 Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1969, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Col. Sheffeld Edwards to determine if the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring guerrilla-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while working for the CIA. He did know him casually thru contacts, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and controlled all of the old money operations in the shop.

Mahan would know, if R was in fact a member of the club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family contacts.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a per spec. heavily financed foreign matter.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hahn Plaza. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd." No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan introduced to Sam Stagg at the Four Seasons. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was well known

SECRET

0002232

to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade 9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to ferreting but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-back payments from the guerrilla outfits, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was kicked out of the assignment. He recruited another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Hanna ... had become disinterested w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100,000 commission

secret says RPK in Vancouver may be
to make in court in order. At our court proceedings
17. May 1962 Harry told me as case
offer & it is not known by this office
whether R was used equitably from
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R received by Fugate

19. Harry reported to office of security his
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.
It was his belief that Johnny was in contact
the Agency for assistance in deportation
unless he actually faced deportation.
R expressed confidence that he would win
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahon called Council to advise
that Mahon's attorney, Ed Morgan, had
received a call from Tom Wadden who stated
appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.
If someone did interfere on R's
behalf, he would make a complete
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCF lawyer's direct
not to arrest R. Mahon was so
advised of Agency's position & he was in
complete accord w/ our stand. He further
advised that he was not concerned about
any publicity in it should be quickly.

London to field June 18, 1971

to set up a subcommittee; but turn on a

stop; last of Feb or first of March 1963
March 13, 1961 R delivered expects to see
contact at Fontainebleau

0602255

- a few weeks later contact will

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss
Sam Giancana to line up a contact.
The confidential files report that he had
"gambly interest and an interest in the
Shump Brennan in Cuba". However, the
Chi gangster took no direct part in the
massive plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The fact revealed Dir of Security
the subject of our last broken conversation
re. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case
against him; & whether or not the Agency plans
to consider any possible intervention on
his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the
policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,
but that he felt it would be a simple
matter for the Dir to see Howard personally
& determine on an individual case by case basis
what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculate Harry trying to
find out validity of case for purpose of Agency
(Harry to work for. Major)

11 Dec 1947

1. Harry reported luncheon meeting w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1947. R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Tom Byrd & Harry called R as "Mr. Redden."

3. 28 Nov spent 11 hours at Pittsburg County Club.
4. Harry to Harry, R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not named re which he brought.

- R said he had not seen anyone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R didn't state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

9. Goley told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1944 & long meeting of Council held w/ Maden & R in Cal when he returned from duty in France.

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "settled". If it is not a good case, Harry will tell Goley & he will settle it and.

10. Harry independent in opinion his intent was more than to protect Agency.

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0002237

He had my the highest regard for Harry
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but
Harry refused to discuss R's activity

- R wondered why Harry would not
do as much for him as it did for Mahan.
Ed Morgan knew what Harry did for Mahan
w/ Sen. Long & had told Harry about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re
Mahan in that Mahan would "sell anyone
down the river to protect his assets."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping
re use of banana. R said leak came
from Sen. Kennedy office when he was still in

Exp. of Mahan

28 April 67

Conrad - Morgan allegedly contacted some high level
officials in orbit indirectly he had a client
who had been involved in an operation against Mahan.
~~Morgan~~ ^{Mahan} would & said he had told Morgan
when Harry alleged on Long subpoena.

2 Mahan surely upset to find if he
had been identified as client source

SECRET

publicity on his relationship w/ Hayes.
 5. No knowledge of mission after April 1946
 & never discussed latter phases w/ R
 6. Mahan - R met Magan thru Pearson
 in 1950's when Magan doing legal work
 for Lai Vann Sun.

R & Magan in Vegas several times in
 March. Jim Garrison in town "it was Mahan's
 recollection that these individuals spent
 some time together. He was under the
 impression that they sought legal advice
 from Magan but did know nature of their
 conversation.

7. Claude R had daughter rapidly
 developing; 11 yr old girl & account of ^{Sheriff} ~~her~~ ^{her} ~~her~~
 for father to register. R putting pressure
 for Mahan to hire his funds.

8. Believed Magan had done some
 work for Pearson & did know that Friedman
 had more than a passing acquaintance w/
 Magan.

Magan fight w/ Pat Cayre for
NSA.

R knows only heavy portions of the
 FBI but has some details.

10. It is evident that Mahan is deeply
 concerned about possibility of being connected
 w/ Castro project but placed cooperation some
 to heavy involvement

002239

Sen Long Mahu

S. Shover, Long's personal staff, told me
that Mahu would be away.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is daily
w/ St Louis staff, a personal friend of Long,
re Mahu's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified some
names, etc by name to O'Connell &
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sen, Ed Dubois
& a couple of his technicians now aware
of Mahu's tie-in w/ Francina.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam Grant" was in
the unit

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he
knew Long's personal staff who exerts great
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald
wanted Mahu as his "go man the hell"
in that Mahu's contacts have great appeal
for T.V. Also that Mahu was not paid
enough to hold job. When Long says
no, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Mahu claims name of [unclear]

SECRET

Sam threw a series of questions
that were posed at our request.
The Hun RB. RFX was orally
briefed on the background that led up
to Mahui's involvement & a Top Secret
document furnished to Justice Dept
which served as a backup of the
supply

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P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban Regime

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug 1960, w/ one possible exception, were carried off at his readily stated prompt. by in flying his banner or by abiding his appearance

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; view of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime completely in BOP

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOP's removal pursuant to secret memo.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of ~~Montgomery~~

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After numerous collapses of Project MONTGOMERY, aggressive scheme begun Aug 60; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated early 1963

P6

Drew Pearson column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has notes:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

SECRET

5. If significant evidence is now
available, tends to reinforce thought
that details would have been
checked by direction or security despite
M-F Oct 1942 report.

per Ford Report requires that sub
plots have no relation in a present
Army

Riley - Traffante

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that
made reference to plans to kill Castro or
proposing such action. Three of the
messages related to the same operation
the other two relating to separate
proposals; there is no indication
that any of these proposals was the
result of CIPA initiative.

MEMORANDUM Dated 29 May 1962
and was received 30 August 62. He has
been reported as never admitting that
he was a CIPA agent. His name not
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET

AMKASH

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inferre that AMKASH a custo agent
with the mean of providing a joint agent Castro
so that Castro had justification for release,

or

2) AMKASH so indicate the details could have
been known thru providing Castro

what should have been reported to us

Agony - The character of the relationship
between CIA and AMKASH, prior to Oswald
murder of Pres Kennedy, was so insubstantial
and inconclusive that it provided no basis for
AMKASH to feel that he had any tangible
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

... there was little for him to
report or leak.

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next
contacted by CIA. In terms of the
relationship that he had with CIA the
critical period, since is therefore between
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for hiatus is that
CIA report AMKASH in name Cuba; he was
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

Call on Sept 7th re: "mkas" with
detailly speak that will always
be a central problem.

... is not spread as a
single computer almost to network
has the efforts many from us
may then find even acceptable
to my distance and cost steps.

Clearly, at that point, with mkas,
was viewed as potentially important, he
was also viewed as a person of character
capable, requiring careful but long
range planning for what was
of action that might later prove

33-7 p 55C Summary and findings, present
mkas in an assessment for
influence in the section Sept 7th
would matter how some amount of that
by mkas

"The first name that whatever
was mkas#11 may have exposed, he
had no exposure from his CIA contacts
of any sign for his purpose at that time

Fitzgerald nothing still he reported
high-power right CIA intelligence reports
SECRET

14 Nov Am WHIP reported that [redacted] satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He also indicated why he had not been given "Cuban small piece of equipment which provided a final solution to the problem".

Comment

In essence he [redacted] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what [redacted] was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p 18) to the effect that it was not clear how [redacted] interpreted the part of a [redacted].

After July 1964 FBI Report states that [redacted] unhappy with CIA program and As. Kennedy had refused to support [redacted].

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling [redacted] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

could, if he requested it, include...
high-power rifles w/ scope...

19 Nov. MURKIN tells CIA he is
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him
to delay for 1 more meeting.

MURKIN agrees "if it is smug
intensity"

In 1955c speculate that this is fact
in which he might receive specific support
Army - at best a piece of highly
speculative analysis, not supported by
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ Plenty
Point

MURKIN

026

"A"

"unaware of MURKIN 1963 association
with CIA"

His info at least 1 1/2 years
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963
CIA ties w/ MURKIN what was
my inclination

c. CFA trace (sent in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied list of pills to US gambling syndicate members. . . . The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambling rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

25. . . . while the events described by DeWitt Deason did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, cumulative relationship among them is unproven.

218. During the week of 25 Sept 1962, O'Connell's Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Mahan to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan provided acct "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

219. At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba & Trujillo was making regular trips between Miami & Havana on regular flights.

SECRET

p. 24 Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

inside

Comment - Giamena was fully opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited for the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giamena stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Troy (Joe); the courier was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named then was Juan Ocho who was then Office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. The gangster said that Ocho had once been in a position to receive bulk orders from the gambling interests, had some hot tip source of income and needed the money.

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Troy. Reilly reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Ocho in Cuba. Ocho is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them. According to the gangster, Ocho got cold feet.

Comment Ocho lost his position in B.M.I.

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the
operation was still going on in Miami & Wash DC.

0002254 He took refuge on the Jungles of Panama
April, 1961...

... It would seem that, that the
gangster did know that Vita had already
set his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cubans' brother was believed to be
in touch with Vanna. Vanna Moss and were
reported to have offered Vanna large sums
of money for his operations against Castro, with
the understanding that they would receive
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Vanna and told her
that he had clients who wanted to do work with
Castro & that they would pay big money for the
commit.

Rosselli said as a loyal person he would
interview he could & would never divulge
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Rosselli gave the jills and money to Vanna, who
Rosselli dealt with under a pseudonym. Little
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

p. 32 [unclear] would identify about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by [unclear].

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) advised that there was a meeting going on between April 1941 and April 1942, that he would not, he agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was underway that they first saw a "gang operation".

p. 34 O'Connell advised he must have received the data, but he has no specific recollection of being

p. 49, Reule needed from [unclear] in the first place as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not read them in the second place because he had Wilson, Brown, [unclear] it would be naive to assume that Reule did not take the precaution of inquiring higher up in the organization that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the organization)

p. 50 June 1942 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit other men might be used in such a program. If an opportunity should arise to go to Cuba, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. [unclear] were using the girls.

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p 52 Harry says Riddle wasn't looking for anything and that there was nothing to be said with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was no need to search cause that anything would happen in the future.

John RFK - I fear that if you can help to do business with regard to some other projects you will let the Army know before you do it. Harry in question doesn't see anything that there was a reasonable argument.

p. 60. The Army General's copy of the memo is in the record of that meeting (May 12 by Senator Johnson) is in the records of the A's office.

p. 67. Harry says from Tom's notes of 16 August 1963 that the Army Dept. is asking that General's name be put in any report - may be put in to go along with the large that the General's name is put in behind Harry's name might be done at least effort. In his case of a - operation of 1 month past year "it will give his operation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - Army before the operation will discuss at the Army Dept on April 1961 report mentions Harry's name in incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent talking to man who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?
I'm one of you!

Person pictured as being approached by CIA but denying

0002258

AMLSH

- 879 - DR took Presidential Palace which they refused to surrender to Che; but did to Fidel
- Cuba believed to be one participant in assassination of Lt Col Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military in Havana
- DR quite apart from 24th of July but signed a treaty just

⇒ ... Agency was primarily concerned in helping Cuba's action in ~~PRON~~ PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, with receiving his plan for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuba's case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuba's attempts.

887 16 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tuzi - "I don't intend to see the inter SECRET your fund again!" whom you should tell them, "so they don't

make the trip: I want to get away from politics completely!

1992 Sandy says that, while Cuba was anxious to do away with Castro, Cuba was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cuba really wanted was high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cuba finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

a) Published Details

Robt. Kennedy may have copied an assassination plot

These facts as we know them

is not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not ~~briefed~~ briefed on Phase 2

b) Three (3) men arrested were caught in Havana; one still in prison

It tells Harry on 21 June 71 that I can say 3 men were. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disrupted. Most of the arrested captured and executed during this period of this year

Centro heard enough at ~~that~~ this report has come down
to Belmont (P.A. was ready to tell) in the Bureau. Investigation. It
was also started by Castillo in
the Philippines under secret
instructions. We have no
independent corroboration of any sort. (No
that Vansin met w/ Rosales
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beaubien apparently to be used as a person
by Hanson to show Oswald a CIA agent
& was to be used to account. Castro. Hanson
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps
or by Sen. RFK authorizing within mission
to work with Cubans for name of Castro.
This memo is intended to record that
such letter never existed & therefore could
not be in Hanson's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalpette
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not finding info
- 18 Jan 1961 identified individuals
- Identity of W1 ROCAF
- April 61 to April 62 ⁰⁰⁰ matters
- ~~some~~ "something going on"
independent of Agency
- RFT security called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already saw article
of 7 March 67
- 15 March 65
Bango in Madrid & claims group
in Cuba naty.
- Jailed in July 62
- 1 March 66 arrests in Cuba
Trial of some memos late fall 64 & early 65
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Paper" Brulli memo approach The White

SECRET

0002266

Demille interview of Mother in May 1968

- Admitted wife in S.T. Q.E. & SA
contained in material generally
advised for names on stamps

Chicago Tab

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Car

- Fall 1968, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961, Mother City

- April 1962, moved City

- 4 Jan 62, departed

- 19 Aug 63, Chicago

- 26-30 Aug 63, Int - re. Spent

Director, Miami

- 12 Sept 63, DRE arm purchase

- toll to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972, disappear

27 Nov 63

- Four Day mut in Feb 63 at 907

~~S.S.~~ S. Spending unit between World City

- 1th guard rifle March 63

- Strong support left in Aug 1963

SECRET

SECRET

0002267

1. Ramon Don Pesterey Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918
3. Lucio Navés
4. Jose de la Torre
5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replaced by name*
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 43

Edward Percipit Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St. Louis

SECRET

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Howard Ditt Studios & John Hopkin U.S.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects.
 ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resand

Resorts Int. #591 722

Wallace Groves OS file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp

w/ Robert Whisnant (#633 974) and

John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to DeMar, Cain in Mexico 1961 onto 1962

-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

0002269

7-Mar-35
St Pauli Minn
364r

Bradley Earl Ayers

Erwin H F From Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Class name? Donald B. Williams

Paragon Air Service

Zenith Technical Program - south

campus of Miami U.

Revol; Harry, Robinson (Wp) Big Jaden

Tracing sites

Palo Alto Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of envelope

Date 10 Aug 1964
Secrets Approval

Refined 23826 (DDP) (WH) (SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Personal Return

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organizational Disruptors;
DDP / SHS
US Field Office
Forward operator Station - JM WHV
Paranoid Branch Section III
Resistor C R C Indip Pol groups

SECRET

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 1502 L Bldg only

- Personally approved by DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Div. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATUM for ZR/RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & by your certificate

2. Salary \$500 per yr; 750 in addition to salary

3. Memo to be considered in lieu of project & constitute authorization for all travel per diem; operations & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gannon

Mackin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

1) Prior to Aug 60

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOP)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) late 61 to late 62 (Custom misste error)

5) late 62 to mid 63

SECRET

Roselli of started in Sept 66
 (Mahn to Roselli to Oranena)
 to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became Chairman of FCS
 on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,
 Ottowen, Gilpatrick, Lammell,
 Murren, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed
 to FO on 23 March 67

The one stapled brown copy (FO-1)
 all notes, & other derived source material
 destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: copy WTT (Durren)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Project)

Final account of names reported on
 a sensitive paper of interest to DDIP; copy WTT
 & Dir of Security

Destruction:

25 Sept 1968 May 1969
 6 Feb 1961

SECRET

TO Contact

0901.

11 Feb 1961 TO Principal Agent 1000
 31 Jan 1961
 14 Feb 61 CMMW Espion 14045
 26 Sept 1961
 Hry
 12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3
IO Rpt

e. late 1962 until well into 1963

After morale crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MOWOODS, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1961; covered in April 1962, was finally ~~unleashed~~ in 1963

Two other plots were disrupted in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 7

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Argonauts) wherein McNamara broached subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MOWOODS name of Lansdale

31 July 64

Discussion at Special Group of a clandestine source means of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. source had no money.

and Ossetian

P 2 Gonzalez Callanetta

Press Release
9 March 1966

Missing page

- program of ~~secret~~ for intelligence; not

truth to ~~no~~ program

- Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramirez and Taped

now in ~~with~~ with own history.

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bessell of James
Burgoyne; Edwards then brief
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Maher called O'Connell & pointed out
Paradise section showing Gold & Joe
(Presumably last time, Maher & O'Connell
know names)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make
arrangements there re entry to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana
7 Jan 59 - casino closed
13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re opening
17 Feb 59 - Cabell announces opening
30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23

Technical Chief TSD
4 approaches: (1) high force like shellfish
poison to be admitted via pin (Collect's Condensed
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
or handkerchief

P 29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Toff was a
man high up in exil movement. (Vanna)
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest ~~him~~ Toff.

From Valence:

- a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re Yangtze financing Cuban activities to William Castro.
- b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to [unclear] with [unclear] Scherer: Had hired Moss as a fund-raiser.

CIA had contact in Moscow but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

March (1959) for use in (WR) [unclear] as consultant to Indian Embassy.

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under [unclear] MAJOR a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselle to deliver \$ to H.V. Estimate vary but Esterline says 10,000 + 100 of commission as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in [unclear].
 Frank's main involvement in [unclear]. Steps taken to end his participation in [unclear] plan but [unclear] unexpected.

People who knew:

1. O. O - original man to go in
2. A. V -
3. son-in-law of H.V.

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem
w/ ⁰⁵Arnold Silver & Sidney both of whom
took parties probably cut in to Cuba
project

Helmus briefed on general concept but
not on ongoing Cuba plot ⁰⁵

AS WIN records of ^(mark) Silver to use
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell omitted out

ZRRIFLE covered as a FIELD operation
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safes
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses applicability of
ZRRIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- Mueller Harry takes over Castro
- Harry views

came to thought of Castro operations &
ZRRIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Adm is synonymous w/ ASWIN
- ZRRIFLE ~~SECRET~~ used to Exec Adm
- ZRRIFLE done meant Castro

Adm's
in operation

0002277

April 8th Agony

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- ! Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry went to Berlin.
- Edwards, ^{deliberately} _{by} ^{Harry} did not mention Mahan when he first

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47

18 April 62
O'Connell gets calls for Russell weekly w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he could remember when it was started

Harry specified that bean not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Roubli bound upon.

Roubli right that bean asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" bean - "too bad"

p48

Macco - whether a Venocato named Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 15th clear Macco was "Roubli man"

Roubli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Vienna.

p 49. When the jobs were given to [unclear] from [unclear].
Vanna reported arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifles
- d) 20 45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V reported arms & support to Rosell
passed word to Harry. With help
of Shady, chief of TMDAHS,
about 5M of weapons & equipment.

Harry & Shady went to haul
& put truck in parking lot for
delivery to Maco, U, or via sea route.
Harry & Shady set up watch on
do Rosell & Council.

Shady not aware of plan.

250

May 62 - Rosell reported that the job was in Cuba & at the
Jamaica restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

V had ~~sent~~ ^{dispatched} 3 men team to Cuba
Sept 1962

Harry saw Rosell in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team
of military men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a team
saw Rosell & Maco several times. Dave
Rosell 27 Dec to V for return of 3 military
men who never left (in Fla keys)

Feb 63

Harry left word for Maco in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this
word for Maco is not clear)

SECRET

251
Military men
used to
take off

Delay due to
ad conditions
of [unclear] Miami

April May 63

Helmus approved a last meeting
w/ Harry & Roselli before Harry left
for Rome.

055 People who knew
Bruce Chiver (Harry's agent 1962)
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in
Reno in winter of 62

May 62

Shuf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to
prosecute writing case but wanted to be
informed of Army's new draft w/ "gangster" again.
RFK asked for a memo of
the meeting via a phone call. Memo
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McLean, ^{General} Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had
begun; that V had pille & arrived late.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;
advises against briefing McLean & General
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli
is not going to be used.

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

of Pearson article of 7 March 47 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helmus had been with RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

1954-55 Makou Invid by Neardros to offset Onassis control of Soviet oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Makou stated he might buy his attorney to represent in past activities.

10-11 August 42 ^{SECRET}

⁰³ (Wainwright) Tegeduro & Cuba in
Copenhagen (Wainwright) used "Massachusetts"
& Cuba in sight of "Columbus"

14-23 Sept 42

⁰³ Cuba, Tegeduro, (Wainwright) &
Earle Williams from Madrid; met in Paris.
Cuba given S/W training &
supplies; shown a letter from Washington.
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams)⁰³ cables that no physical
elimination missions be given in a
report but he might do it on his
own initiative. Headquarters strongly advise that
no physical elimination missions be given Cuba.

5-8 Sept 43

Brazil - met by (Wainwright)
Tegeduro & Nestor Sanchez who became
case officer.

Cuba allowed 2 S/W messages but
only 1 rec'd. afraid of postal censorship.
That report of Ramon Bana Diaz
AMTRANK-10 who was being moved
DIAZ Isalyne (AMICE-14) who had
been sent to recruit PUIN

^{SECRET}

14 Sept 43

From Brazil Cuba flew to Paris
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City Station

P28

(Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedino Amador (1), a long-time friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR are like group of leftist students signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cole wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off on report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans. Comment:

Foot of 3 rumormongers w/ AMT; but unknown if Cubela aware of report in Cuba! Other two links are even more nebulous ~~from 14 Regt 61~~

Message from aviation station (good friend) Tepedino that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk ^{under a friend of Stewart's} to AMT in connection of my mission.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

Lucia F. Chevarria Bianchi told an asset (AMT contact-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Teydus

0002283

27 June 1962

Teydus approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cabelo wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Teydus to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Teydus dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cabelo's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on rumors for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - 2 August 62 '63

Erin Wainwright met w/ Teydus a jeweler in NYC & took him to Helsinki, Cuba. Told him they were "in place" & not defecting.

Cabelo wanted to blow up oil refineries, kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet planes.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki for safety. Cabelo stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Teydus in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written Tejedero on NY that he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell [French Govt] 24 [that contacts were for purposes of deflection, French unilaterally keeping Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy calls that Cubela insists on meeting w/ RFT; announced Cubela going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out U.S. support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgibbon, Urey, SAs, go to Paris & get approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that U.S. would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Walters went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cubela would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting OK w/ ~~State Dept~~ ~~as given~~

Sandy says Cubela accepted OK but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is L2 high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 20000 rounds. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he received an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that briefly is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela will take SW with him to Prague

1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba 19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to meet Carlos Jorge ROBERTO, messenger who has message from Cubela.

3 May 64 - Roberts says Cubela wanted a silencer
30 August 64

Artome record info thru Madrid that a group of doubtful members of Castro regime wanted to ~~have~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artome sees

Alberto BLANCO Romario.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artome agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artome

Think if AM288#-1 is chief of ~~insider~~
group we can forget about operation
4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for 6570 for
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ dissident
groups' reps in Bay. Arteme does
6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was
~~not~~ going to continue his plans
Told US. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.

Arteme did know not Cubela
that CIA in direct contact with ~~him~~
Rather STS continued to put both
men together.

CIA did want to get silver
weapons on ~~the~~ Cubela's hands ~~anyway~~
but could do it thru Arteme
27 Dec; 30 Dec (initial)

Cubela & Arteme meet in ^{Paris} Madrid.
Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela
had requested a subversive for FAT rifle
but Americans w/n gave him one.

Arteme to come up w/ subversive
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ subversive
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ subversive from
Arteme's ~~secret~~ **SECRET** ~~reps~~ weapons come
from ~~the~~ US. & are now in Madrid.

Congress

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source
is friend of Tepedino's who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia Bango Director
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & informed
to a station officer.

Publicly close friend of Cubela; & claims
to be in touch w/ group of wealthy leaders
planning to overthrow Castro.

Spoke in July 62 for exp. Traff.
as lawyer for Cypri Kell. Traff. - 4 months
! Another name - Luis

June 1965

Vicente ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former
PRM trustee who was arrested as a militant
on 20 March 1961, contacted FIA's new lawyer
FBT on 3 June 65.

Esposito stated he had received letter
from a friend in Paris urging him
to meet w/ Alberto Placer who had a
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered
to CIA

Message - Cubela in a gesture to help Castro
& would CIA & US Gov be willing to support them
by "yes"; give details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris
on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave hints.

0002290 Tepeduro 7:00 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable
Annually contact. 'convincing proof that evidence
from [redacted] group measure', Fernando A. [redacted]
1 March 66 - Cubela's brain arrested for
activities w/ CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarreta, Alberto Blanco Romany,
Juan Alena Navarro. Confirmed
Also appearing - Guillermo Cuenca
Alvarez, Angel Herminio Udey

Gonzalez Ballarreta⁰³ attempts in Spain
contact of (Fernando Noel ~~officer~~ ^{former "owner"} officer)
at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cubela met w/ Arteme in Spain
in Feb. 1965.

Arteme sent Ballego to US to get
Telencop's sign & silencer. Delivered to
Blanco Romany who delivered it to
Gonzalez Ballarreta then to Cubela the
day before he left Madrid.

Tasco

Said in Cubela's residence were
Telencop's sign, F&H rifle +
9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that
death sentence not be asked.
10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencer did not work; I threw it
away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

0002291 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened
the door to me ^{SECRET} but I did not have
the courage to tell him

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to
Europe in late 64 & early 65 to meet
w/ At home. No mention of March 61 thru
Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,
Castro would have little to excepted during
8 months in prison & executed someone in inner circle.

2 high-level
intelligence meetings
where Castro
was usually
discussed

Special Group (Assignment)

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alesci Johnson, Edwin
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwicz
which have

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFK absent)

Deputy:

- McNaman, Belmont, Tenenbayer, Farnhall
- CIA - McCone Henry
- USIA - Edward Murren, Donald Wilson
- Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrotts notes & in main agreement
but McNam & Henry would not discuss ~~parrotts~~
reading it & Murren's comment.

No one raised question of McNamara
"healthy agent" ^{SECRET}

Farnhall wrote memo on 13 August
to Henry, Hurwicz, Harris, & Wilson which

Probably Pearson's info re a high-level meeting was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67 & wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phoenix
- 2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli or anyone

0002293

- 3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenspan
- 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in contact of Morgan
- 5 - Roselli definitely heard; Morgan in Vegas recently "in contact"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. ^{Summer} In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is our impression that Greenspan also involved in the conversation.

and to confirm

Point finger to Roselli as source of info & Morgan as Pearson's source.

Re: Roselli Mahan relations non DA participants with immediate knowledge of the subject Kennedy subject

Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he in front of RFK of Roselli's confidence.

Pearson's story seems to rely on ref. above. Could be Harry if ref. source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + not accurate re Roselli's chief suspect.

Inference: Roselli definitely had lunch & Morgan definitely talked to a newspaperman friend (Morgan)

SECRET

Lunsdale memo argued staffing papers
for various subjects related to Cuban
operation. A portion excerpted from CIA
copy of memo was "evidently elimination
of leaders? Lunsdale repeatedly failed to
raise assumption of Castro in Hong Kong over
next several weeks but Hong did not

0002292

It met 5 people in Lunsdale office
Sun 11/10/64 to Lunsdale in fact in
discussion as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, Melson, Thomas
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion
of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DDP to Don
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 of press.
Cuban exile; Jose Maria "Pepin" Bosch,
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCI (McConnell) to Bundy - re
FBI interest in all participants

SECRET

6002294

Publicity has not been its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly supplied when he does
- c) P wants McCain in custody & will be reported

Pearson stay in detail & detail found only in phone to the 3 man team.

q126. Put in it but left - that there is no other note in Speedy's story.

q127. We do not know that Carter actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Carter. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this.

q129. Wilson reports that Taffin is in Tampa. Powell is prima non grata in Los Vegas, being refused register ^{with police} form he is in town. None of them would have connections about digging in his CIA connections when he was pulled by law enforcement author. Because he has already done it when the FBI was ready him in 1963, Powell appears to be doing it in his conversation with Morgan & Baum.

P. 131. Search - 3 May 1967

Comments Red base CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Sarita Tropp

4. ST debrief person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested another candidate (cancelled re BOP)

- Mahan former contact subject w/ Office of Security

- Russell's convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fugitive

Serrano Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(make on containing the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROU's operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROU DDO

- want to know John Stein's all WIRROU file by Walt P. Lee

SECRET

1/1

Missed
 1. ~~Henry~~ contact Capron to report to Capron some contact he had with "gangster" and offer him copy to FBI. He referred to Capron.

16 May 67

Also
 Attention from ^{is this copy} ~~Capron~~ 7 April 67
 Morgan reported w/ report circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of contact to DDO.

Stewart Robert Morgan
 DDO 2x May 1913 St Louis

Richard Sally Ann
 HCA - Richard Saltye SS 357-22-333
 1969 Tarkenton (Reg No. 17169-7T)

In May 1964 Boston separate to try before US court in address of record (George Howard)

SECRET

Chicago Museum for 26 Nov 1963
 in column Daily Daily Progress Daily -
 name that ~~examined~~ ^{planned} ~~work~~ ^{group}

Missed
 5 May 1967
 Bill
 Guy K. Henry
 0002296

SECRET

SECRET

1 Sept 27 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marini,
a henchman of Marcella, at Fair Play for
Cuba denied knowledge of Marini's contact
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAB
B

Info re meeting of Fair Play
under Richard Criley (A 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBOR
who was 'int' of Horace Speeds (SAS)
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44426
Speed WFC 199499)

WSCOBOR recruiting Cubans for Communist
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1970 VCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Julius

9 August 1976

SECRET

Brief memo 'Sally' July 1976

0002298

Tab B & C

Additional info re Traff, Ruselli, & Brewer contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bradenidge re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hume agent

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo to FBI re recommend DuBris for ant A atty whom he will disclose

2. A Hays is James Connelley per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. P Swain who said he contacted Mahon in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Havana. Havana gave any indication to Mahon he would attempt to accomplish some clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramanna & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DPO Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accused
Lohman.
a F.I. firm

CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960

SECRET

0002299

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office
& volunteered info on Cuban cell groups in
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field office
re a Mr. Kroug^{an} who was report w/
President of Panama to investigate Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Agency
reps. William Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City
says he had an investigative agency w/
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to
provide training to Mexican Secret Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for lead re: orders
has handles & impersonates Mexican officials
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic
Club & Dolphin Club of Grace Speed with
Dev. Staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCI office.

He would like to work overseas
for CIA

Cain worked for Cook by Shuff
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago
area & would provide info on undercover
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra
H. 26-30 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Directory,
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyos informant in
purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. TRP people who had questioned
arms. (Goran Speed) via Wallyton Chicago
told Cain to get out of the picture
H. 1967

FBI investigation Cain's name with
& returned CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico
City; then departed May 1972 saying he
was going to Santa Ana. Involved
in illegal arms deals (international) &
on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City used
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain
Eastern Airlines got ed. Cain on
Day earlier who flew from Honduras. 5 May 1972

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Bailey, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Rev. Kennedy
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not established LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officer of UPT
4. Shuff advised in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~Could not read!~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago group over again in US for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call CIA re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Putnam but to someone in Putnam's office (justified)

Breckenridge memo to Dad of requests

1. Photos in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one of volumes of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in custo operation

Detectives have already interviewed several who is related.

TAD C

1. Ramon Don Estevan Dimonquez (shortly) DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de La Torrento (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
spotted a nephew by name to Rueda
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Meeting w/ Terry Dempsey

Frank O'Mally referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Mally knew Hughes is client of Mullen's, this information picked up in course of a critical relationship between O'Mally & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met on Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen doubted that Hunt possible interest in some placements caused consternation.

- Hunt approached O'Mally for an individual having access to information only staff.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul or intervened w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible departure of Brennan.

- ref. people who know well P. Swann, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use simplified journal in armed forces in Cuba.

Bay 63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Fernando Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ George Volshy; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Presumably USSR ^{1940s} & then in Polish Ar Force under British Command. Married Cuban & moved in Miami May 61.

Bay 63

Volshy contacts Ted Sygula & met with Goodwin & Herwitch (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK.

Neville proposed pay for & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including Guin.

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was guilty to appeal to JFK thru Volshy & Sygula.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In 65 Guin & Peay arrested.

Sygula & Volshy both Polish & met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo RABET Nurey
suspected agent who defected Dec 62 on joint AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

x in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested
 & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RABBIT a Cuban agent
 as early as July 1963.

Possibly -

It might have been an important
 Cuban plan from the beginning. Prof action was
 buying Cuban & some info's infiltrator.

M.B.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Maskey,
 - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts
 including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I
 recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of Vita, prior to its disclosure
 by external investigator, raised question as to what he knew.

Office of SecInt memo dated 1975
 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1962
 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News strand

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960
 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be
 & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961,
 seems that not had their own plan

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

V Mona

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for Mike

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Stungis could have learned of Mike's role after Mike settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a person jailed in Cuba by Troops.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a contact employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a memo to kill Castro.

Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Havana) he proposed to CIA. He was assisting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved some group of agents

so probably same plan

1. 27 March 1961 AMBRONE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with offensive
arrived on 30 March but no commitment
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only room for 50 men; would try
9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBRONE infiltrated several times
to find ex-convict 38 Regent 62 after May
62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was
CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) AMCOAX 11 ^{the} ~~both~~ persons in

c) AMPUB 11 touch w/ AMBRONE

d) AM PANIC 1? mentioned in McBrown book, Doug
38 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P-8
none had assassination mission. Only
AMBRONE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]

claimed he had plans for program w/in
30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was
untrue & (Moratori) condemned.

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary
Recovery Movement saying they would try to
kill Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"
- Maybe from Pub 1

Tab D

AMLAASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and
Sept 1963

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that
AMLAASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intel
performer; but approach in chief com speaker
allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

p 3-4
Summary Findings

Book V leaves inference that Castro's
speech to Dan Horter after AMLASH leak
hit CIA had not probed anything at that
time. In fact met until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov
he was reported as being under Federal Agents
"of something untoward" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a
Headquarters request for names of known
contacts of certain Smith personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But AMLAH/1 name was included
in reference to contact between a member
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural
attache. NOT a report of a contact between
AMLAH/1 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of
AMLAH 1963 association w/ CIA

Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Recenter following
Assassination of Pen Kennedy

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FTP report, Agency reports Almeida
be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCT-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj: Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCT-3/779,814 (CI/Sec)
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCT-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)
Photos of individual Chief recently LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (C/I/R&A)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316/01446-64
VIA DUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~705~~

WC Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates -

0002311

SECRET

A central feature of the evidence in the
various parts of the report is the
evidence that it would have been
attributed to the Navy, the
fact that it has been
this that they should have been
not accepted at the time of the
agreed not to mention in the
review of the 2000-2001 program
it set out if it might be

They were in possession of the
the fact that a pair from of the

The evidence of the CIA are there
own of information of how
fact will be made, and in the
of down having significant
see that report that have been
to the women common inquiry.
2. It stated that in the
The extent of the evidence
around a major influence on the
their support for the
"It was noted ... 22
They should have ... 27
Certainty ... 27

0002312

SECRET

1. Comments on Page 2

1977 D.E. Report

June 21/1977

result of an evolution in perception.
 is Provocative ~~document~~ in '63 from
 both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs,
 Mendelzins, "along with the army of US
 Cuban program.

"The SSC Field Report has shifted to
 emphasize instead CIA operational activities
 against Cuba requiring specific attention.

Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ ^{very} know details of 1963
 & 1964 operations for the most part are no
 longer available. Primary reliance on review.

CIA has now conducted such a
 review - looking at "the other end"
 of a possible chain of evidence, which they
 theoretically could have started. This has
 produced no new evidence bearing on the
 assassination, altho' it has produced the basis
 for new lines of speculation. In fact, the
 review sometimes seemed to become
 a futile exercise in trying to get
 back to the provocation they
 rather than being able to identify
 evidence actually bearing on the
 assassination of Pres. Kennedy. The emphasis
 sometimes became one of asking if this
 Agency (which was under review)
 could have provided Castro to order
 the assassination ~~SECRET~~ ^{SECRET} Kennedy had

In a cover by State by Paul Marshall on
the New York Daily News, of April 25, 1975
at 1000 St. James in London.
Thinking a ~~broader~~ ~~cover~~ ~~offer~~. I had
think (misspelled) ~~misspelled~~

New construction on the separate system Pic

The Agency had only a tentative ~~intention~~
with this man during Dan Kennedy's life.
also the SSC ~~trial~~ ~~report~~ - ~~entry~~ to ~~prove~~
to these -- ~~has~~ ~~attempted~~ to ~~prevent~~
difficult. Because the way is ~~dividing~~
not ~~intentionally~~ in the SSC ~~trial~~ ~~report~~.
it is ~~hidden~~ in a ~~separate~~ ~~entry~~ in the
paper at Tab D. The key point is that
prior to Dan Kennedy's death the ~~intention~~
was with KIMBLE was ~~intentionally~~ ~~not~~
without substance. Had ~~been~~ ~~known~~ ~~at~~
he would ~~not~~ ~~know~~ ~~only~~ that there was a
control that had not developed to the point
of an ~~intentionally~~.

Tab e

Red (Central) Bureau of H. The SSC, in its
trial report, followed the very ~~long~~, ~~trying~~ to
make the KIMBLE operation ~~actually~~
if the thing for which the SSC ~~intentionally~~
seemed to be ~~intentionally~~.

account to the Prime Minister's office, Stuyvesant said. It shows Fidel's pursuit security from Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (mission embassy in Havana).

"He (Stuyvesant) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him ^{access} ~~access~~ that would make it possible for him to perform his job. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this operation was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974
 Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Stuyvesant and Trappanese, also mentioning a possible relationship as a family partner of Trappanese. Office of Security wrote memorandum in 1975; not by

a connection between Sturgis and others in 1960, citing FBI reports. Informant that Sturgis reports there had a tie in generally was in his capacity due to his "hot spots" one could make that Sturgis and others would have known one another because of their connection with the generally activities as well as having contacts with the man leading the generally reports.

From 1974 Sturgis was known by Mantz (Mantz) saying that she said in history of Sturgis in 1960 as informant on party that same.

Quoted - FBI memo on [redacted]

"This seems to confirm some of the activity a woman had had with [redacted] known, the history of events doesn't fit the time from him to CIA, which could have been given to various persons, there were no CIA gifts in [redacted] until February 1961. It suggests that the informant may have been wrong about CIA in 1960."

SECRET

In fact it is possible that [redacted] already was involved in [redacted]

agitation with the central syndicate when first appeared prior to 13 of July in Medical to carry out the United States. The 1947 DO Report refers to two FTD reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates support by the central syndicate for some of the Cuban spies. The other report, on 18 Jan. 1941, suggests that Varna was one of those receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... to late in June 64 another major plot in Maricao for 150,000.

I speculate that when mentioned in April 1942 can appear felt "there was something already 'ongoing'."

It is possible that CFT simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way.

In a sense CFT may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.