

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

## Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10053  
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.  
TO : ICCCA

TITLE : ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION  
ACTIVITIES

DATE : 03/25/1963  
PAGES : 27

## SUBJECTS :

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE - OAS MEMBER STATES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : Secret  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/1997

## OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Zumwalt, Abrams, Wendt, Carpenter,  
and Elwood concerning a proposal for shared intelligence among OAS member states.

*JFK Review*

Department of the Army EO 13526

 Declassify  Exclude  Exempt

Authority \_\_\_\_\_

 Refer To \_\_\_\_\_Review Date KAUGIS By Walter G. Long

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO  
Op-605F/wm  
26 March 1963

**SECRET**

OSA 350.09  
*Cuba*  
3/26/63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities

1. Reference is made to your Memorandum number 22, subject as above, dated 25 March 1963.
2. The paper is satisfactory to the Navy subject to the following change:

Page 4, paragraph 3c, last line, change to read as follows:

~~"navies,--the-Mexican-Navy~~ and the US Navy."

REASON: Mexico has advised that the Navy-to-Navy program cannot be ratified in view of conflict with domestic law. It appears unlikely, therefore, that Mexico will contribute to the program on the level indicated.

FW 3/15/63

W F A WENDT  
Director, Strategic Plans Division

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

*if so  
smg*

**SECRET**  
**SECRET**

OSA, ASG Control No. 762A **FILE**



SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-255-63

28 MAR 1963

OSA: 350.09-CUBA

3/28/63

FW 3/15/63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Exchange of Intelligence Concerning  
Communist Subversive Activities (C)

1. This memorandum responds to CSAM 135-63, dated 25 March 1963, subject as above.

2. The paper attached to CSAM 135-63 concerning the exchange of intelligence on communist subversive activities has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is considered to be a satisfactory response to the specific problem of exchanging intelligence on communist subversive activities among nations of the Organization of American States, subject to the following modification:

Page 4, subparagraph II 3 c: Add the following to the end of the paragraph:

"The US Air Force, through its attaché system in Latin America, likewise has an exchange program. This is accomplished on an informal basis and is bilateral in nature."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED:

A. H. MANHART  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Copy 6 of 9 Copies each  
of          pages series "A"

SECRET

FILE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

OSA, ASG Control No. 786 E



SECRET

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE  
CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

SECRET

GROUP-1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSI-  
FICATION

SECRET

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE  
CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion throughout Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the US Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis.

SECRET

b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange of intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable.

c. Additional impediments to intelligence exchange are the generally low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the absence of adequate security systems, and the lack of security consciousness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be concluded, however that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence



gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise.

## 2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material under each:

a. Travel information - Unevaluated information devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements such as identification of the individual, point of departure, date and time of departure or arrival, destination, and carrier. When presented in an abbreviated form such information offers minimum security problems with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

b. Intelligence information reports - Unevaluated information derived from clandestine collection operations or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds; on shipping and air movements and on results of surveillance efforts. Because continued receipt of such information by the United States is dependent on careful protection of sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this information with other countries must be carefully controlled by the collecting department.

c. Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated intelligence in all of the above areas, prepared by an appropriate element of the US government in a form which is releaseable to other Latin American countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on

other countries particularly where such information is not freely available to security services, as in the case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in those Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, CIA received information reports from 26 services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and released reports to 35 recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

c. The US Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the US Navy.

d. Exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State.

e. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired.

f. United States experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange.

g. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II. 1. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to

counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting, the OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging intelligence regarding communist subversion. Annex 4 of the General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the American States to report information to the Board and to establish agreements among themselves for exchanging information of collective interest. The United States has approved the General Military Plan, but similar action has not been taken by all member countries.

i. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved.

### III. Existing Programs

Enumerated below are the principal programs now in progress. They are subject to continuing improvement.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US agencies with their Latin American counterparts in instances where it has been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activities directly to the countries concerned through the US Ambassador.

SECRET

3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Command by CIA and other elements of the US Embassies in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the US Government are now disseminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies and reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

5. US Government communications systems throughout Latin America are being expanded and improved upon on a high priority basis.

6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Additional programs could be established in other countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned.

7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing lists by name, by country, by point of travel, or sorted on various other bases.

#### IV. New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III. 1. by recommending that the US Ambassadors utilize the existing Country Team mechanisms as an intelligence advisory committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with the host governments.

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

3. Arrange for the electrical dissemination to appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of CIA.

SECRET

SECRET

4. Make available to as many countries as security permits, sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed by machine. (See paragraph III. 7.)

5. Increase, where feasible, emphasis on the provision of US intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. Discourage the employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the United States except in instances where the United States can arrange to provide for the training and control of any third country intelligence advisor.

6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be disseminated to selected Latin American governments.

7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries.

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

9. Undertake action in the OAS to establish a Security Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of senior representatives of the appropriate services of each government to deal with all major aspects of subversive activities in their respective countries, consider new coordinated plans of action to counter and neutralize subversion, and implement necessary actions to insure the most effective and timely exchange of information between the governments on subversive activities.

SECRET

SECRET



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

25 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Intelligence Paper on Cuba

1. Attached is a copy of the final paper prepared by my committee on the exchange of intelligence. It reflects the changes proposed by CIA in our earlier agreed paper, as well as amendments to the CIA proposals arising from the meeting of my committee last Saturday.

2. The only change of significance proposed by CIA is found on page 3, paragraph 2, "Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence." This paragraph, as submitted by CIA, would have seriously limited the kinds of intelligence which we would exchange with our Latin friends, so much so as to make the paper relatively insignificant.

At my meeting last Saturday we made the additions which are underlined in red on page 3. Those additions are designed to vitiate the adverse restrictions involved in the CIA proposal. As you will see, the additions characterize the categories of exchangeable intelligence only as examples, and add, specifically, all of the intelligence areas in which we are interested.

3. The remaining changes proposed by CIA were relatively insignificant - removal from the action category of certain on-going programs and the addition of CIA's IBM computer capability among the actions.

4. This paper, as you see it, was fully concurred in by my committee, including the CIA man who, to my surprise, agreed in the changes which broadened greatly the CIA contribution. I have forwarded the paper to Cottrell.

*Respectfully,*

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

Attachment

OSA, ASG Control No. 749A FILE SECRET

OSA 350.09 (3/25/63) J.W. 3/15/63  
*ok*

SECRET

15 MAR 1963

OSA 350.09-CUBA

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

SUBJECT: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion Report of the Exchange of Intelligence (U)

1. Reference is made to the Second Working Draft, Cuba, The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities.

2. The Army Staff has reviewed referenced paper and although it is felt that Section II is too long, it concurs in general with the recommended actions. However, the following changes should be made:

a. Page 2, change last sentence to read:

"A completely . . . cannot be expected."

b. Page 3, omit second paragraph as superfluous.

c. Page 6, second paragraph:

This entire paragraph should be deleted or the statement proved since Army knows of no approved exchange of information program between CINCARIBCOM and Latin American countries.

d. Page 7, first sentence second paragraph, change to read:

"The concept . . . meetings, but has not been fully implemented although this subject has been included in intelligence briefings presented at the regular meetings of the IADB Council of Delegates."

3/15/63

FM 3/15/63

CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, JR.  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Deputy Chief of  
Staff for Military Operations

SEE CHIEF OF STAFF

*fb (m)*

OSA, ASG Control No. 1697A

FILE

DEC 12 1963

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

SECRET

ACSI CCS 54-63



**SECRET**

Mar 15 1963

**MEMORANDUM NO. 19 FOR GENERAL EABLE C. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN(OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL C. W. ABRAMS, JR., USA  
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USA  
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC**

**SUBJECT: Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Exchange of Intelligence**

Attached is the final draft of the paper on Exchange of Intelligence concerning communist subversive activities prepared by the Subcommittee on Subversion of the subject committee.

As indicated in Memorandum No. 15, it is requested that your comments on this paper be submitted to me not later than 1500 hours on March 15, 1963. This will be the last opportunity to comment on this paper before it is presented to The President.

Signed

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
as stated

cc: Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky  
Colonel Patchell  
Colonel Freda  
Mr. Califano  
ASG

OSA, ASG Control No. 6794

**SECRET**

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

OSA 350.09 CUBA

3-15-63

KM

SECRET

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

15 March 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS:

This is our final effort on the paper for exchange of intelligence. Please give me your views on the manuscript by 1500 today.

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

SECRET

GROUP-1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

OSA, ASG Control No. 679H

SECRET

SECOND WORKING DRAFT

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion throughout Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it.

SECRET

SECRET

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis.

Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable.

SECRET

An additional impediment to intelligence exchange is the low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, and the absence of adequate security systems and the lack of security consciousness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection.

This defect promises to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government.

These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be

SECRET

concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of trainees, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, and the movement of arms, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise.

## 2. Current Exchange Arrangements

At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter.

SECRET

SECRET

The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in some Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passage of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, for example, CIA received information reports from 26 services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and released reports to 35 recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned

SECRET

SECRET

with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the U.S. Navy.

Some information has been released from time to time to Latin American countries by the Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the Military Groups, and exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State.

As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired.



SECRET

United States experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange.

The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating

SECRET

SECRET

to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them. Since the Punta del Esta meeting, the OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved.

SECRET

SECRET

III. Actions Recommended

1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of intelligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies, where it is found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for the exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements.

2. Establish military intelligence centers at the headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through the American Embassies therein.

3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of intelligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassified studies, reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

SECRET

SECRET

5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S. communications in Latin America.

7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. Discourage their employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the U.S.

8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such programs in additional countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned.

9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries.

10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

SECRET

SECRET

11. Take action to cause the IADB to be designated as the agency to provide advice and assistance to the Council of the OAS in regard to the exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities.

12. Arrange for regional meetings of senior intelligence and security service representatives of Latin American countries and the United States for the purpose of fostering the exchange of intelligence concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities and developing the necessary mechanisms and procedures therefor.

SECRET