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The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

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1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968 CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko."

2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be inaccurate in many important details and to contain the results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.

3. We have deleted certain portions of this study containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

4. We request return of this study when it has served your purposes.

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The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

Yuriy I. NOSENKO

February 1968

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Introduction

The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed the distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence information assembled in connection with his case, including the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of KGB operations which he related, the results of file checks of thousands of individuals involved, comparison of his assertions against collateral information from all sources and with counterintelligence records on the KGB and related matters. The examination herein reduces this volume of material to manageable proportions, to essential elements of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his statements with matters of known fact and to permit application of reasonable judgment. Conclusions are drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate of conclusions independently drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography.

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Summary of Case

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A Soviet official approached an American diplomat with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. The diplomat advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation.

Later meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet official identified himself as NOSENKO and stated he was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that the American had previously served in Moscow and erroneously believed that he was the "American Rezident" in Geneva. NOSENKO stated that he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva. He offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. These were the identity of a former American Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB. In reply, the American explained that he was not an intelligence officer, but that he could place NOSENKO in contact with an appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that same day.

That evening NOSENKO was met by a CIA officer and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell

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

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

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(Summary of Case)

the two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he also expressed dissatisfaction with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. With the second meeting on 11 June, his earlier expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations. His knowledgeability was almost exclusively limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR). NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within certain limits to collect information on matters indicated to be of interest to CIA. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow. He promised to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came to the West again.

NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964. Since last meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States. He cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity which he had collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA.

(Summary of Case)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that he had received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to the Soviet Union. That night exfiltration plans were implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany where his debriefing was resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected on his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked change in NOSENKO's comportment. While outwardly cooperative during most debriefing sessions, it became increasingly difficult to get him to respond to specific questioning. His free time in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name, and on this basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week visit to Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still further. He drank heavily and almost constantly; he consorted with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and conspicuously.

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(Summary of Case)

During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. This Agency was concerned that his behavior would attract undesirable attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April indicated it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were advised.

On 4 April NOSENKO was driven to a new safehouse in a Washington suburb, and told that this safehouse thenceforward would be his regular place of residence. Since that time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to answer all questions put to him. Because more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous assertions. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions

(Summary of Case)

in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the Embassy and its personnel as critical KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's claimed knowledge of the activities of the Embassy Section, of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.

In keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols", most of which concerned the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession", but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct", at the end of the final page. With one exception, he did so calmly and without objections. In one or two instances he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them

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(Summary of Case)

look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's KGB experience to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal and professional background.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English. Although the interrogations identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts which contained the greatest number of contradictions and discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrepancies could be resolved.

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From his arrival in the United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric observation. A CIA psychiatrist and a CIA psychologist, both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors, monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965 the psychologist for three weeks questioned NOSENKO on his life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined the KGB, in an attempt to identify psychological factors which might underlie NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent accounts. The psychiatrist has continued his periodic observations of NOSENKO to the present time. The psychiatrist and the psychologist concluded independently, on the basis of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable.

(Summary of Case)

NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.

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CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is comprised of his own statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials, and the counterintelligence information he has provided.

NOSENKO's Statements About Himself

In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made numerous statements about himself. More than any other, however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and well-expressed exposition of how he wished CIA to regard him. It is quoted here in its entirety.

> My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life before the death of my father were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-1952. The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the betrayor of the people was Yezhov, the head of the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of Stalin. Soon after Stalin's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people, important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of Stalin and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

The new leaders (Khrushchev and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others). Khrushchev's endless blabbing about

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successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry. But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness and death in August 1956.

The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the

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entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

The split of the international Communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' was immediately dispelled. And what I met in my own work, how which Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my KGB acquaintances think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

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I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomol member like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of Stalin and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the Deputy Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy Chief of a department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaires were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter

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(since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

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If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from. To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

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Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with the KGB officer who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief Directorate, as I learned from my colleagues, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the

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CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass from the Second Department and went, in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964

Signed: Yu. NOSENKO

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Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

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The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted that he was acquainted with Ministers of the Soviet Government, who were friends of his father, and he heard what was said in their circles. His debriefing and interrogations did not bear out his assertion that he was informed of the attitudes and aims of the Soviet leaders. His responses to questions about the viability of the then Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge. From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his entire adult life either as a student or as a state security official, and he stressed that since the early 1950's he had had few interests and "no real contacts" outside of the KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics, including various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics, communications, unconventional weapons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development, NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such matters and that his responses reflected only personal opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special knowledge. He explained that he took no part in the substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any connection in the USSR with officials or organizations concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.

NOSENKO's failure to provide any useful positive intelligence information was not unique, although previous KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB

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officers who defected earlier to Western services provided no significant military, economic or scientific information on the USSR, and the political information provided by a few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal value.

Counterintelligence Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned with KGB operations within the Soviet Union. His information on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of his KGB assignments involved operations against American targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of the Embassy staff in Moscow. From this circumstance he represents himself as an authoritative source on KGB success and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the years 1953-1963.

NOSENKO has described scores of KGB operations mounted against American Embassy personnel during that ten year period. Because of lasting relationships he established with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations against the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in the Embassy Section. NOSENKO has stated that he would know if the facts were otherwise, and he has asserted unequivocally that no American stationed permanently at the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his defection in 1964. NOSENKO named six members of the Embassy staff who rejected KGB recruitment overtures, and all have confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the vulnerability of a significant number of Embassy personnel; in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently withdrawn from Moscow. Physical search has confirmed the information he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance installations in the Embassy.

Among Americans other than Embassy personnel whom NOSENKO described as KGB targets, he provided information leading to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow representative of the American Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), and Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,

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Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOSENKO's information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated in part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (if not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports of their recruitment. Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided leads to four other American KGB agents, including an officer in an American military intelligence organization, none of whom has yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to be American Intelligence agents.

From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents have been identified. Although investigations are still incomplete, in 39 of these cases the individual's KGB recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the individuals were suspect for other reasons. Among these 68 individuals were a French and a Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, an Austrian and an Indonesian Army Attache, a Director and a Deputy Secretary of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO's information about the KGB electronic attack on the German Embassy in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical search.

With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are or have been affiliated with Soviet intelligence and security organizations. These included over seven hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the 165 KGB officers he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, over one hundred had been previously reported to be KGB personnel, as reflected in CIA files. NOSENKO's information permitted updating CIA holdings on previously received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization, particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate. He described further refinement of responsibilities, the Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously independent directorates, the creation of new units from elements

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formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as productive with respect to KGB operational methods and Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these topics.

Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service

All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described are favorable evidence of his bona fides, but they break down into two qualitatively different groups. Operations which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at particular times are described in the following section in connection with an examination of his KGB career. The remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because of) the KGB position he held at the time. Since these are not material to his claimed positions at various times in the KGB, they are summarized in Annex B. (NOSENKO's leads to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group, but for reasons of brevity they are omitted from this paper.)

Among the items of information which NOSENKO provided but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times, there are several which merit special note here. These, which are among the most significant of his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, "the KGB agent in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL), "SASHA" (the KGB agent in American Military Intelligence), "ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH), Edward SMITH (CIA officer) and the KGB electronic attack on the West German Embassy in Moscow.

"The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)

The first item of information given by NOSENKO upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB agent who was an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive U.S. military installation in the Paris area. The agent had been the source of documentary intelligence which had been

shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still active, the agent had lost access to classified documents some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the lead as the most important single counterintelligence item that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

NOSENKO's Information

Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetration of a classified documents vault at an "important American military installation" in the Paris area. Because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation". The installation had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for bringing Top Secret documents in and for taking them out".

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section technicians travelled TDY to Paris under diplomatic courier cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation. Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instructions to his agent, and the technicians probably never met the American.

Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation, officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief Directorate were used. The Special Section was comprised of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious entries to Western embassies in Moscow. Among these officers were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN, V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV. IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and FOFANOV was later involved.

The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then

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resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed some radioactive substance, with the help of the American agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was removed, they could pick the lock. They did the same thing [used some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault. Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section technicians had to visit Paris several times. The first time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris Residency couldn't have launched the operation before 1962, because they couldn't do it without the help of Special Section technicians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the agent used some radioactive substance to determine the combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB study. Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer, who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the case officer for return to the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry.

The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had to pick up the materials, drive some place ("maybe the Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close them again just as they were, and return them to the agent. The KGB could not specify which documents the agent was to bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened shows that they were sealed when they were received from the agent.

Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide on his person. From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone for only 5 or 10 minutes".

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The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same military post, he had lost access to the classified documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation.

Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO chatted with him. FOFANOV said he "was not doing good" and he "would probably be sitting there until May", but he had hopes "that something might happen".

The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the KGB had for him after he left Paris.

NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at separate times from various members of the Second Chief Directorate Special Section who participated in it, principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has also alleged he learned of the case from IONOV, the Chief of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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Comment: NOSENKO's lead was identified as Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period 1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly Field, Paris. JOHNSON confessed to KGB recruitment of himself and his wife, his recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and the latter's subsequent collaboration with the KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have corroborated JOHNSON's statements.

NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB in Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans, France. With respect to the 1962-1963 surreptitious entires of the courier station vault, however, JOHNSON's admissions coincide with the information provided by NOSENKO, with no significant differences.

"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)

When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case and he was asked to search his recollection for any evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA. NOSENKO knew of none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent, an American known as "SASHA", who was a member of a U.S. military intelligence organization.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO learned of "SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB officer who, while assigned to the First Chief Directorate and working in Berlin, recruited the agent in 1955-1957. "SASHA" who had been recruited by financial inducements, had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings with his KGB handler and he could have been either a civilian or military intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned to the United States "in the 1960's" or "in 1962". "SASHA" was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any

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relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early 1963.

NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK. GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In 1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treatment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him, would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany "at that time" [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew of "SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.

Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the case with SHALYAPIN "at some time". Pressed to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who could have told him about it because they were likely to know of it though none of them was actually involved in the operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA".

Comment: "SASHA" has not been identified.

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William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")

Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more important, KGB agent who was employed in the British Admiralty.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB has now (in 1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence services' conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or "something like that" in the Admiralty. "He may be an assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the Minister. All papers for the Minister go through him. He's not an intelligence officer. He is meeting with the KGB now." Several KGB officers received the Order of Lenin for their part in the operation, including the London Rezident RODIN. NOSENKO learned of the agent's existence, but not of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second Chief Directorate, V.A. CHURANOV, who had made the recruitment while chief of a section in the British Department.

Comment: GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO's information, on the basis of which the twenty-man list was reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full

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Comment: (Continued)
details of NOSENKO's information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed.

VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two KGB officers, one of whom he identified as CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London, first in his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as clerical officer assistant to the Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally, as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was met by KGB officer "KOROVIN" who has been identified as London Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At the time of his arrest in September he had, in preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photographs of classified Admiralty documents.

KGB Audio Attack on the [West German] Embassy

In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the [West German] Embassy.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect to the [West German] Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the [West German] Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American Ambassador Thompson. The microphones were operative during the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-Ambassador [Kroll]'s dictation of cables, dispatches and

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conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing on the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK, Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the American Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger volume of material addressed to the Third Department, from which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even more successful in monitoring the West German Embassy than it was the American Embassy.

Comment: NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Independent of that information, however, West German authorities learned in 1963 that their technical security officer in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB. They surmised that the recruitment may have taken place as early as 1956. In August 1964 the leader of a technical search team was seriously disabled by mustard gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the KGB. In 1965, finally, another search team completed a "tear down" of the West German Embassy, in the course of which two separate audio systems with 24 microphones were found, as well as 27 microphones in the residence of the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was found indicating that the Embassy had been the target of a sophisticated electronic attack against its cipher machines and its acoustic room.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones were operative in 1959 and his sourcing of his information to the periodic visits of Tatyana GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contradictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the American Section until 1960.

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"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in Washington "near ciphers".

NOSENKO's Information-1962

"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate, although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment. The KGB approach to "ANDREY" was based on "women and money".

"ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing "materials" and information on ciphers. He promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow. The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in "ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to find the agent. KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV", under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

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KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had looked for him a long time. He found where "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY" lived in a place where there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. At first "ANDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered $1,000, the agent accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, due to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that point on he worked well with the KGB. He again provided good information, information considered important by the KGB. When KOVSHUK found him, "ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still working there in 1962.

In reference to his modus operandi for meetings with "ANDREY", KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the FBI. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would sit with him in the car, receive "ANDREY's" information, and give him the money. Then KOVSHUK would get out, and the American would drive on.

The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL [Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. "ANDREY" was the only such witness called, and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as the only person who testified at the trial. During this investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and arrested. "ANDREY" may have feared that RHODES was involved in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as

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RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB, "having little other choice".

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there must have been one since "ANDREY" was still working with the KGB in 1962.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that "ANDREY" was recruited in "1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".

"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN. After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at the Pentagon, "in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted him in the United States he was nearing the end of his enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office. He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK.

It was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation. "ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death. "ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial.

In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs" [sic, meaning rotors]. Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in the "ANDREY" case: NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with

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questions to be asked of "ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department, NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been able to read your military codes..." "ANDREY" brought no military code material to the KGB, only State Department material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made.

"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made in the United States until he ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial. Again, after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that "something is going wrong with this operation".

Comment: "ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code machine mechanic while assigned to the office of the U.S. Military Attache in the Embassy in Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954.

NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as substantially correct by admissions of Roy RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH ("ANDREY"). RHODES informed the FBI in a 1963 interview that among other American enlisted personnel of the Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to the KGB. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided

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Comment: (Continued)
the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recontacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957, where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962. He identified by photograph all of the KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation.

NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned of the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues.

Edward Ellis SMITH

NOSENKO's Information

In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered: "SMITH? The red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was "RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD").

SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed. These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at the meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further meetings.

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When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance. To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work".

In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played any personal role in the case. He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in so important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach to SMITH.)

GOLITSYN's Information

In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful operations against the Embassy in Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident

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which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruitment, as was alleged in the study.

Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy Security Officer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB. The first, received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had received three threatening letters. In reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russian maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months.

NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's statement that he reported the blackmail attempt to the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH. If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department as he claims. If he played a role in the SMITH case as well as in the Seventh Department recruitment of [BURGI] (see p. 115), it remains ok possible that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in some other KGB capacity.

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CHAPTER II

EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent *prima facie* evidence that NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a *bona fide* defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes. Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his account of how he functioned in these positions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail.

The following portions of this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims.

Notes for the Reader

In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following:

The examination tests the validity of the presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency, and compatibility with fact and plausibility.

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(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information. It is not the function of the examination to speculate about possibly credible alternative explanations for the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.

If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following text. Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of their aggregative significance: they will be a matter of comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following each major portion of the examination.

Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions, omissions and the like, are reflected in the text. Where, during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or insight into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively, if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn't say", or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness" and so forth, the reader properly may assume that the matter was covered extensively.

In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given to his final assertion as opposed to earlier contrary claims.

To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative is broken from time to time by a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions, or to what conclusion is drawn.

(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his life. The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.

CHAPTER III

PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY

NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations.

Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account

NOSENKO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine. At the time of his birth, his father, Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September 1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to 1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.

NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to

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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

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NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Attendance at the Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)

In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.

In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute, NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant "in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the Navy.

Comment: Soviet students completing their second year of higher institutions are commissioned, but in an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense forces. At that time they receive their voyennyy bilet (military booklet) which reflects their assigned MOS and category (sostav). CIA interrogators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded it may relate in some manner to his claims to subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.

In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign against Marshal Zhukov's associates. NOSENKO recalls neither the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. [The significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contradictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce. See below.]

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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

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[redacted]

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone" and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute from which he was graduated.

In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". [Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of Pillau.] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953, after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB] Chairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining the KGB.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU, and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department. After passing the state examination on the second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information of American naval forces in the Far East. A radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an "apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested a transfer from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far East. Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took unauthorized leave. (He could not learn what his actual assignment was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk, where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57), a small town "in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.

Comment: Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's interrogators pointed out to him at the time. NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy Kray, a fact known to him from the way his letters were addressed. This is also an error. See below.

In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.

Comment: NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to Rostock he himself had received training in Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk. In retracting that claim, he explained that he knew his CIA interrogators would not believe that he had successfully refused the assignment in Germany.

In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded as leave, but official business. He afterwards returned to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late 1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer. When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder NOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's leave in January 1953. At the end of January NOSENKO visited the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste for his work. KALOSHIN told him to "look around", and NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working, he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.

Comment: Just before giving this account of his January 1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent January and a part of February at the Kubinka Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two statements.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated

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to join Naval Intelligence. After passing all of his examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders calling him to active duty. Offered a choice of assignments, NOSENKO chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready to make a man of himself". Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in Primorskiy Kray (sic), NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports Section.

Comment: Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in Primorskiy Kray. Shown contemporary Soviet maps clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray, NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been falsified by his interrogators to confuse him. NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to being stationed in Oregon for an extended period and thinking oneself to be in California.

In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a good job despite rigorous working and living conditions, and during his service there he was commended as an outstanding officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.

In spring, 1951, after about seven months' service, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months for Far East service.

In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his intent to divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary legal papers to Moscow.

NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October or November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that time. An understanding superior, however, arranged for him to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On 2 May

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he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return for reassignment at the end of his leave. NOSENKO was on leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal of the Naval Ministry". [According to his 1962 and 1966 versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]

In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the RU Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Naval espionage school, and to a post in Germany, but he turned them all down. He rejected the opportunity to attend the academy, because he had had almost all of the courses earlier at the Institute of International Relations.

"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan'," NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his divorce from TELEGINA. [According to his 1964 account, NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment, to complete divorce proceedings.]

In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk, in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952. His assignment there was as a political officer, in which capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such subjects as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally to see to their needs. NOSENKO did not care for his assignment in Sovetsk and in December 1952 he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. In January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working for the KGB.

After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several days" at the Hertzen "House of Rest", located 65-70 kilometers from Moscow near Kubinka. There he met his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [In 1964 and 1966 statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January and February.]

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO's Information-1966(April)

At an interview with the military placement commission at the Institute before graduation, NOSENKO indicated that he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization". Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and hereafter referred to as, the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his background and his knowledge of English. Later, however, the chief of the Institute's special section informed NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assignment to the KGB. During the summer of 1950 "while state examinations were underway" [in earlier versions NOSENKO claimed the examinations were over in June], NOSENKO began to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He filled out questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and, in August or September, submitted copies of his diploma. [Note that this version of events omits any reference to delayed graduation caused by his having to take a state examination a second time.] For the next nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called to RU service. [In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he entered the RU in 1949 or 1950.]

On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and the other assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. On 13 March, on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow City Military Commission and was issued his travel documents, and NOSENKO departed Moscow for his post on 16 or 17 March. At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan' on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. [Note earlier versions in which he was transferred because of illness, and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June 1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.

During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the Bay of Gdansk). Sovetsk was a small village located on the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. [The only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction from Baltiysk. When NOSENKO was shown their locations on contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct, although Primorsk, where NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he was assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he returned to Moscow at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment. Before his departure he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. [In previous versions he claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's service.]

On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a place in the KGB.

From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953 NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [NOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated that it was of considerably shorter duration.]

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO's Information-1966 (October)

In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO said that before graduation from the Institute the military placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was told that he was not qualified as a candidate because of mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said he did not mention this rejection earlier, because his interrogators would not have believed that he ever became a KGB officer after once being rejected.

NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied" when he claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950. In fact, he said, he entered the RU in March 1951 and was on active duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.

Comment: This latest assertion discredits almost all of his earlier claims regarding entry into the RU, including the date of his graduation from the Institute, the timing if not the fact of his promotion, the number, sequence, and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his assignment to the Baltic Fleet.

Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which are still unresolved after interrogations over a three-year period, he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in either 1949 or 1950. Before graduation, he (a) was selected for Naval assignment, (b) sought a Naval assignment, or (c) was selected for and rejected by the KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or, immediately following graduation, or three months or nine months later (in the following year), he was called to

active Naval service and assigned to the RU. With neither training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to the Far East for nine months or three years; there he participated in agents' operational training, or reports work. In the latter capacity he was or was not involved in RU radio signals intercept operations. He either never served in the Baltic or, if he did, it was for three months or six months, during which he either participated in agent training or was an administrative or political officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen months' RU service.

Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disclaims knowledge of RU organization other than at the posts where he served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the posts' actual locations.

The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelligence staffs. Some thirty GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities at the places and times he claimed.

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CHAPTER IV

KGB ENTRY

Comment: Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was accompanied by extraordinary repercussions. The Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and State Security (MGB) merged under the MVD, of which Beriya became Minister. There followed a period of widespread reorganization entailing the transfer or dismissal of many personnel. Beriya's arrest just four months later in June 1953 was followed by another extensive (if bloodless) purge and reorganization, which culminated in the creation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) in March 1954. Vladimir and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr DERYABIN, among others, defected in the wake of these events. From information they provided, as well as from that acquired from other sources, CIA has a substantial amount of information against which NOSENKO's accounts of this period may be weighed.

For the convenience of the reader, the term "KGB" is used hereafter to refer as well to its predecessor organizations in 1953-1954.

In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned that he had joined the MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic statement written immediately after his defection, however, he asserted his KGB service began in 1952, a date he insisted was correct even after reminded he had earlier said 1953. Repeated interrogations produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging from "the beginning of 1952" to April 1953, all of which were accompanied by modified accounts of the circumstances of his entry (as well as of his earlier period of service

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(KGB ENTRY)

in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the Institute of International Relations). To the extent to which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953 as the time of his entry to the KGB.

Date of Entry

NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO had just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic, he said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing his processing, he reported for duty in the Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in March 1953, "just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on 5 March 1953.)

Comment: According to KGB defectors, the precise date of entry to the KGB would not likely to be forgotten by a KGB officer. The date is the basis for computing length of service and is a common entry on KGB administrative forms periodically filled out by KGB officers in the course of their service.

According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952", "just after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directorate".

Comment: GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred out of the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

(KGB ENTRY)

In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in which he noted that he entered the KGB in 1952, and in which he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community) which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was confronted with his contradictory claims. In response, NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in August 1952 [by most of his other accounts, NOSENKO returned in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952. By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the Embassy Section for some months against American correspondents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the reorganization" that he assumed responsibility for operations against American Army Attache personnel. [NOSENKO ultimately settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment. See p. 84.]

Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of his earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO asserted that the truth was that his service dated from March 1953, after Stalin's death. He went on to explain that he finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic), "defended his diploma" and then failed one of the four required State examinations. All four examinations, he said, he had to take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949. NOSENKO said that to avoid admitting "this unpleasant thing", he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that to be a fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around again". NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953" or about 15 March 1953.

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Comment: NOSENKO's explanation takes no account of the fact that he had already said (in 1962) that he joined the KGB in March 1953.

KGB defectors describe the period immediately following Stalin's death in the KGB as one of extensive reorganization and uncertainty in which new candidates were not being accepted. Other evidence of the improbability of NOSENKO's entering the KGB in March 1953 is discussed below.

NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the date 13-15 March 1953. In 1966, however, in a written statement, he said he entered the KGB on 2 April 1953, but a week later, in another signed statement, he said it was the "middle of March 1953".

In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENKO said he entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledged that he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, when he had said he joined in 1952. Asked by his interrogators why he had lied, NOSENKO said, "There was no sense." He went on to explain that because he was only an average student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950; he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his account by one year, since his interrogators would not have believed that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an earlier rejection.

The Role of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV

In all of his accounts NOSENKO has attributed to General KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to the KGB. In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA in 1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend of the elder NOSENKO whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the NOSENKO dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("early 1953") was First Deputy to Beriya, the Minister of the

(KGB ENTRY)

then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the General's office. NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless received a week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already arranged for a building pass.

NOSENKO gave a different, somewhat more detailed account in April 1964. In this version, he first met KOBULOV, a friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time posted in Germany, not in Moscow.] According to NOSENKO, KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. "My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the (Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to return to the Baltic." NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms. NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV immediately returned from Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and on "maybe the 10th of March" NOSENKO received a call from KOBULOV's assistant. NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's office, and although he waited two hours to see the General, the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV, however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American Department.

In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder NOSENKO's], KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and to

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(KGB ENTRY)

receive necessary forms. NOSENKO stated that he heard nothing further until after Stalin's funeral, when he was summoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to the Second Chief Directorate.

During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship with KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never visited the NOSENKOs.

In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January 1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV were departing to attend Stalin's funeral. On that latter occasion, NOSENKO claimed, KOBULOV promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office and told he was appointed to the KGB.

Comment: General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career security official, but from the immediate post-war period until after Stalin's death he was not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952, he was posted to Germany with the Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the Council of Ministers and latterly to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Until he returned from Germany in March 1953 to assume the position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office in KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.

In light of the foregoing, it is improbable that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO claimed. If KOBULOV ever interceded in NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO would later have been purged after KOBULOV's

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: (Continued)
and Beriya's arrest and execution. NOSENKO's eventual retraction of his assertion that his father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB.

Eligibility

Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influential was his father's prominent position in the Soviet Government.

Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy to avoid recruiting the children of senior Soviet officials.

NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.

Comment: Other than claiming to have completed an undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, NOSENKO acknowledges that he was no more eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he was at the time of his rejection.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol, and that he had not been recommended for Party membership. He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization.

Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not membership itself, is a requisite for KGB appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time, twenty-five was at that time the maximum age. Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB appointment, he was within six months of being dropped by the Komsomol as well as still unqualified for Party membership. He could not have been secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed on p. 338.

NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.

Comment: According to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.

KGB Processing for Entry

NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary for him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he

(KGB ENTRY)

never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the personnel office (and thus completed no forms provided by them).

Comment: The most important document filled out by prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page personal history questionnaire, Anketa spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB, which was completed in one copy only. Classified even when blank, the form was not permitted to be taken home. KGB defectors have described completion of the form "as an experience not likely to be forgotten". NOSENKO omits in all accounts reference to other documents which are known to have been required in connection with a KGB officer's processing for duty.

NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in connection with processing for KGB entry.

Comment: A medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of a KGB candidate's processing. Former KGB defectors could think of no instance in which the examination could be waived, particularly for a candidate with a recorded history of tuberculosis.

NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office, was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on the pass.

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(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Persons not holding a valid KGB identity document were not permitted entry to or movement in the building without escort. The interviewer's name did appear on the building pass. The interviewer's name was essential to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer had complete responsibility for the visitor's custody while on KGB premises.

Initial Service in KGB (1953)

NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counter-intelligence directorate. The designations were later reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's successor.

Comment: Beriya reversed the designations of the First and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953, and they were not changed back until March 1954. NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate was designated either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his entire first year of KGB service.

NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period, but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall anything unusual about it.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Twice, following Stalin's death in March 1953 and again following Beriya's arrest in June 1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily recalled for revalidation. On both occasions new stamps were placed on the document, lacking which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB installation. KGB defectors state that the events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at the time.

NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon reporting for duty. He had explained that training was unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.

Comment: NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service, by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.

NOSENKO stated that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700 rubles as a case officer, plus secrecy, language and longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant. He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers did not receive the pay for rank.

Comment: KGB officers' rank pay was abolished in September 1952 and not restored until April 1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first year of claimed service in the KGB.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.

Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time Beriya became Minister in March 1953 until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of promotions has never been established. He has also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952 and in 1954. See p. 351.

NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest, during which reviews numerous negative factors in his background would have come to light. He stated, however, that he could only assume that the important and influential position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.

Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his father had on his KGB service aside from that exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself arrested and executed.

Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service

NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet security agencies. Preceded by a series of purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably be memorable to a KGB officer serving in Moscow Headquarters at the time.

NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate (subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate) was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Information) Building".

Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI Building" were one and the same. From his statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI (a combined foreign intelligence agency) ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a substantially later time, but one which other KGB officers serving in Moscow in 1953 recalled easily.

NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the Militia was located in 1953-1954.

Comment: According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time would have had frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of the Militia.

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(KGB ENTRY)

KGB Entry: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954 period throw no more light on the actual date of his KGB entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are interrelated.

It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and be vague on what his KGB identification document looked like. Recognizing that administrative regulations and procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he had tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party membership, that he had been previously rejected and all at a time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.

The probability of these events being coincident, however, is remote. On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that he "actually" entered the KGB in March 1953, is no better substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the time he claimed.

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate) from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets during this period were at first American correspondents residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow. His assignment involving American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered the KGB). His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO has sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activities during this entire period which he characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no consequence". He has repeatedly stated that he "found himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American Embassy Section. Until then, he asserted, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work". (He has variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in connection with his participation in and award for the [BURGI] 06 case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.)

Operations Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.

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Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's 06 wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY 06 and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER. 06 For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and 06 06 Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were recruited agents of the KGB.

Comment: 06 SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO. 06 SHAPIRO's KGB agent cryptonym, known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309). The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954 06 identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.

NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" or drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE, 06,06,06 SALISBURY and WHITNEY. 06 He met with his agents periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents when there was even a hint that something of interest might

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develop. NOSENKO has described some of these agents in general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO stated that he was taken directly to the offices of the American Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as ones on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYANKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY.

NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours". He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country". GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he (the subject of the file) is an agent or not". NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on the seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as

notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember". He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on [SHAPIRO], [WHITNEY], [SALISBURY] and the [GILMORES] and met them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, whom did [SHAPIRO] meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, whom he is contacting, etc". He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied:

> "Let us take the same case of [SHAPIRO]. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in [SHAPIRO]'s behavior since our last meeting, whether [SHAPIRO] had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was [SHAPIRO] walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the American Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

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KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said:

> "My first agent 06 was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one." (While reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena S. KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard 06 KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information.) "My second agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving for WHITNEY. 06 Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, 06 charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]."

Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's 06 office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

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NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen. NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddy GILMORE C6	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law and GILMORE's Russian wife. C6
Thomas WHITNEY C6	One agent, his driver, "SERGEY". C6, 11
Henry SHAPIRO C6	Three agents; SHAPIRO's secretary and his chauffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROs in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in Moscow.) C6 C6 C6 C6
Harrison SALISBURY C6	Two agents; SALISBURY's driver, and a part-time cleaning girl. C6

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral", in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINA". When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the American Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINA", whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.

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Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel

NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties. (NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about the Embassy Section's targets while he was its deputy chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates. Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, with the work against the service attaches and diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be studied systematically and slowly.)

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and the microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department.

Comment: NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these microphones until he re-entered the Embassy Section in 1960; and that he learned of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

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Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts allegedly failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control. He has also used this explanation to support his assertion that there were no recruitments of American military personnel during this period.

Comment: NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was to control rather than to recruit American military attaches is contradicted by the emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on conducting operations against the United States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance, in this case American officials with access to classified information, who were residing in the Soviet Union.

In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service Attache travel program was the primary means by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelligence information on the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. The prevention or inhibition of this collection activity fell consequently to KGB components concerned with the security of military-industrial installations,

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Comment: (Continued)
with transportation facilities, and with the geographic regions to which the Service Attaches travelled. Approval of Service Attache travel itineraries was not within the competence of a case officer within the Embassy Section; the determination would have to have been made by officials concerned with the USSR's military and industrial security and aware of reciprocal privileges being extended to Soviet Service Attaches in the United States, matters involving the GRU as well as the KGB. An Embassy Section case officer would have as a matter of course monitored reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching for personal vulnerabilities among his targets, and assisted local KGB elements in setting up provocations outside of Moscow. NOSENKO, however, has included neither of these latter functions as having been among his responsibilities.

Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel

"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

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-10 April 1964: "I made a mistake [when] I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV.... I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

-18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me.... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the Attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months". If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

Agents Reporting on Army Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'.... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this

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network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none was targetted against specific members of the attache office.

Comment: As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and "RAKETA" as agents he used against correspondents and against Army Attache targets, but he never again referred to them and, in describing his own activities, he never indicated how or in what cases they were used.

According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in their offices.

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache 06 [Earl L. MICKELSON] and his successor, [Fillmore K. MEARNS] 06 Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside".

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, [Ira RICHARDS] 06. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

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Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent "SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Army Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV; NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Army Attaches.

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who provided some technical information on the Embassy, but he related him to his second tour in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962 and did not then claim that the electrician was his agent.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV

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and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VORONYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the Embassy biographic cards on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

NOSENKO's Targets

Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO orally listed the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."

06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

Comment: In the order as given by NOSENKO, the list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow. It is neither in alphabetical order nor chronological according to date or service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captains MULE and STROUD to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA.

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06

MICKELSON

NOSENKO correctly identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.

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NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about 06 MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

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Comment: MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge. In August 1954 06 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photography south of Kharkov; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released. It is judged that such events, particularly those staged by the KGB, would be known to the KGB case officer responsible for the attache officer concerned.

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MEARNS

06

NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as 06 MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. 06 Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. 06 Besides being told to attempt to overhear 06 MEARNS' conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects 06 were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.) NOSENKO described 06 06 MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had 06 been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

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06
RICHARDS

NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA", but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.

Comment: RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS.

RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him, an incident which was not recalled by NOSENKO.

For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. In another context, NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during 1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS or to the 1953-1955 period.

RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (the diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's father was a rich jeweler in Moscow at the time of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with

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Comment: (Continued)
06 RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. NOSENKO did not know of Volodya who, as RICHARDS' driver, was NOSENKO's agent by NOSENKO's own account.

06
FELCHLIN

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08 NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in 08 Moscow. By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest, NOSENKO said FELCHLIN served 08 in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against 08 FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid 08 who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO 08 said, the Assistant Army Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the 08 precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel 08 FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. 08 For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other 08 similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of 08 agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on 08 FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said 08 then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.

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Comment: FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States. During his entire tour in Moscow he was the object of intense KGB surveillance.

Shortly after his arrival in September 1953 FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF and two Air Force Attaches, took a train trip to Siberia, the first trip permitted such Americans in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article falsely alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some "spy documents" on the train. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled neither of these incidents.

In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours. Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the American Air

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Comment: (Continued)
Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time. Ambassador Bohlen successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from another chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Army Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: (Continued)
FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew Pearson with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. Pearson printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.

BENSON

NOSENKO correctly identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

STROUD

NOSENKO correctly identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Army Attache drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: STROUD, with BENSON and MULE, was the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American defector living there. According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer. The visit of ex-FBI agent SISCOE and a military officer to an American defector is judged to be an event in which the KGB would have taken interest and one which the Attache's KGB case officer would find memorable.

MULE

NOSENKO correctly identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and as such said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected. He was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and information from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other Attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section), NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room,

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant". BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out.

Comment: MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE identified SIEGAL/BORODIN by photograph, but was unable to identify NOSENKO.

KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which NOSENKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache targets, is belied by the MULE case.

BENSON, MULE and STROUD Expulsion from the Soviet Union

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Seventh Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.10 The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done by having the Foreign Ministry declaring each persona non grata.

Comment: The equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May, a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Seventh Department. When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Seventh Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO offered no comment.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

CARDELLA 06

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA.06 The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him.06

Comment: As a member of the Army Attache's staff, 06 CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target. 06 Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964 a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office 06 CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was believed to have been emplaced in 1952. See p. 227.

VAN LAETHEM 06

08 NOSENKO incorrectly identified 06 George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM 06 which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, along with other 06 members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO 08 knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953. When VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953 (when NOSENKO said he entered the KGB), he was succeeded by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed responsibility. The fact that he was Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor should be known to the responsible KGB case officer, in this case, NOSENKO. As cryptographic security officer and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, VAN LAETHEM had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until VAN LAETHEM's departure from Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEM's duties also included responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.

VAN LAETHEM was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955, when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches. Although this visit was only a temporary assignment, it was represented to the Soviets as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army Attache (and thus, presumably NOSENKO's target) because of the sensitive nature of his duties. He was project officer for the entire signals collection program at the Embassy, and he went to Moscow to review the program including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (while VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow). VAN LAETHEM stated that no meeting such as the one NOSENKO described with LARIONOVA ever occurred.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Additional Reporting

Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p. 37). NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956, by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of [Richard BURGI]. His involvement in the [BURGI] case has been confirmed.

NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), whose true name he claimed not to have known. He dated the recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955. However, NOSENKO also related that "ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that RHODES "had spotted 'ANDREY'". "ANDREY" and RHODES overlapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953. "ANDREY" fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953, and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY" was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security officer, NOSENKO's target [Army Captain Walter MULE]. If NOSENKO served in the Embassy Section during 1953-1955 as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.

American Embassy Section - ca. 1953-June 1955: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he describes as the most sensitive and important section of the Second Chief Directorate. There, after first handling agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,

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he was made the case officer solely responsible for operations against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.

Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache targets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. Although NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to explain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so. Instead, he is positive and insistent that his statements about his targets are a factual and complete account of what was then known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not interested in his targets' vulnerability to recruitment is belied by his own statements as well as by the [MULE] case, 06 as he himself related it. He is uninformed about both Attache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own account, were his targets and his agents.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed. Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953 nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats, NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.

CHAPTER VI

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: NOSENKO's claimed Second Chief Directorate service during 1955-1960, in which he was involved with Seventh Department operations against American and British tourists, coincides with the growth of a substantial American and British Intelligence program aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth of tourism which followed the post-Stalin thaw in the USSR had grown to the point where it could be usefully exploited by CIA. Initially, returning American tourists were debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet Union and particularly with regard to their acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who might be susceptible to eventual recruitment. Gradually, leads were developed to Americans planning to visit the USSR, and from among these, agents were selected, trained in clandestine operational techniques, briefed on intelligence requirements, and instructed how to identify and develop potential agents from among their Soviet contacts. The American agents performed a variety of clandestine tasks including passive assessment of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propaganda activities, and infiltrating equipment, loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing secret writing, all destined for CIA agents in the Soviet Union.

The program reached its height in 1959, by the end of which over one hundred and fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA alone had performed missions in the USSR; by

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued)
then a substantial number of similar missions had also been launched by American military intelligence organizations and by the British and allied services.

It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture, that as early as 1957 a large number of these agents were coming to the attention of the KGB within the Soviet Union. Few were arrested. Instead, all were surveilled, and some provoked or entrapped, as the Second Chief Directorate and its provincial KGB counterintelligence elements sought to identify the Soviet citizens with whom the American agents were in contact, as well as the agents' specific clandestine tasks. By the summer of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British agent, George BLAKE, complete details of the objectives and methods of CIA and British Intelligence tourist programs, together with a number of case examples.

It is within this context that one must examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in and consequent knowledge of Second Chief Directorate counterintelligence operations against American and British tourists in 1955-1960.

NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department from June 1955 until January 1960. According to him, the Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union, including businessmen, seamen, foreign delegations and some tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by these visitors. He said that by 1958, however, the number of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created. NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became

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responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted against American and British Commonwealth nationals, the other section was charged with all other nationalities.

It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's claims to service in the Seventh Department into two periods. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 until June 1958, during which NOSENKO said he was a case officer handling and recruiting agents of all nationalities and planning and managing other operational activities. The second period covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958, when he claimed to have become Deputy Chief of the newly-created American-British Commonwealth Section, to the beginning of 1960.

NOSENKO described his personal and direct participation in Seventh Department operations during this four and one-half years as including:

-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and targetting them against American tourists. NOSENKO's agentura varied in number from eight to fourteen agents, most of whom were employees of Inturist.

-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners, principally Americans, in the Soviet Union.

-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents to be utilized against foreign homosexual targets. NOSENKO managed the pair from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958 until their retirement in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruiting and handling Arsene FRIPPEL, the American Express Company representative in Moscow. (NOSENKO continued to meet FRIPPEL even after the latter was transferred from Moscow to New York and after NOSENKO was transferred from the Seventh Department.)

From personal involvement or otherwise NOSENKO claimed that he learned of all the important operations conducted against American tourists during this period of his Seventh Department service.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents

The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning".

As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist. These were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man could approach with questions about somebody or something". NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied. Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately twelve. The substance of NOSENKO's description of his agents is as follows:

Larissa SOBOROVA

An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within Inturist. She reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO when he served as a guide for British subjects [BIRSE] and [LANE] in the summer of 1957. During 1957-1959 she was involved and possibly sexually intimate with American [travel writer Horace SUTTON]. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959, when she married and "retired".

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number of American tourists, including CIA agents, between 1957 and 1959. [SUTTON] has identified her. In 1959 she was the head of all English-language interpreters at Inturist headquarters in the National Hotel, Moscow. 06

Vladimir MUROMTSEV

MUROMTSEV, KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV", was recruited by NOSENKO from Inturist in 1955. He was NOSENKO's agent until called into the army in about 1959, when he was sent to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as an interpreter with Syrian students there. During that period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central Asia. When he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the KGB Second Directorate.

Comment: NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958", implying that someone else recruited him and that he thus could not have been NOSENKO's agent in 1955. MUROMTSEV was identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by two CIA sources.

Nikolay ROGOV

ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO", was recruited in 1955. He had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central Inturist office which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.

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Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV who in 1960 was a senior official at the main Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.

Nataliya SHULGINA

SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY [see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA".

Comment: KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA did not warn him. SHULGINA was for two years the secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow in July 1955. She served as a guide for an American musical troupe's visit in the USSR in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a guide for American tourists in Moscow. According to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of [British MP Tom DRIBERG]. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans, as well as with [DRIBERG], and of her foreign travel, belies his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-1958 period. Shown her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it. When he was then given her name, he identified her not as his former agent but just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once involved with BELITSKIY. 06 06

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Tamara KUNGAROVA

KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor [John THOMPSON] 06, but there was no attempt to recruit him. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against American tourist and suspect CIA agent [Philip NIELSEN] 03 (see p.420). KUNGAROVA [married NIELSEN] and emigrated to England, and the KGB was still interested in [NIELSEN] at the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department. 08,03 03

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an agent who came to the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department in 1957 or early 1958. If true, he could not have recruited her or have been her case officer in the 1955-1957 period. In describing the [NIELSEN] 03 case, NOSENKO indicated he himself was not involved and, although he commented on KUNGAROVA's role, he never mentioned that she was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information and she confirmed that she had been intimate with [THOMPSON] 06 while serving as an Inturist guide, as well as with other Americans. She denied, however, that she had ever collaborated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.

Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO", when NOSENKO recruited him in 1958, was a candidate member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. He spoke Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. He "was used against British and American nationals". DMITRIYEV was also used against communications

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personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned NOSENKO, he was meeting with another KGB case officer. DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a Soviet circus to Japan.

Comment: DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in 1958 is confirmed. From NOSENKO's own statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV's activities, but he was not his case officer.

(Fnu) IVANOV

Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his case officer. IVANOV was later turned over to the British Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that".

Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable with IVANOV.

Marina RYTOVA

RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA", was turned over to NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A. KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. When NOSENKO became her case officer she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. She continued this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information

which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where she served as an interpreter in English and Greek. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa farmer [Roswell] GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's farm in the United States, and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute and while there. RYTOVA was married to a captain or major who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

Comment: RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her biographic data is consistent with the information related by NOSENKO.

Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO

DANKO, KGB cryptonym "OKSANA", worked in the American 29 Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPEL 06 (NOSENKO's agent, see p.137) and later for FRIPPEL's 06 successor, Michael JELISAVCIC. 06 NOSENKO took DANKO over from Seventh Department case officer I.A. KONSTANTINOV in 1955-1957. She was used to report on JELISAVCIC. 06

Comment: DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and 1959, and she was working for the American 29 Express Company office in 1960. 06 FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the Seventh Department.

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Soviet Homosexual Agents

The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly involved sexual entrapment. Many of the operations in which he claimed a personal role involved the use of homosexual agents, KGB agents whose homosexuality was exploited against susceptible male targets. While NOSENKO was never their official case officer, in specific recruitment-entrapment operations he worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV", "SIBIRYAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY, used in the compromise of Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the Canadian Ambassador WATKINS). He provided virtually no personality information on them and usually could not recall their true names. Two such homosexuals, however, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were discharged in 1963 because they had become too well known. He said he met them frequently, and directed them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO claimed he took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 and back again in early 1962 to the Seventh Department.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. To verify this possibility in 1957, a homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time inactive, was summoned by the KGB and, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among

homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:

> "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like. I have homosexuals, in particular, one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British... I permitted this pair to work [without specific assignments] on their own. I give them money and tell them to go look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here.' I say: 'Well, let him [do what he wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat].' After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go with him again. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is observed by the KGB. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives and a conversation ensues: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out'..."

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When NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the American Embassy but, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects". VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961. After they were employed once more [against W.E. JOHNSON] in 06 January 1962] it was decided that they were "too well known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962 or 1963.

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents: Summary

NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer for two to five years, during which he met each regularly, assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports. With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds. It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing recollection. He knows no more about the three whom he claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he continued to be their case officer for two more years, than he does about the others. In the two instances where his agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, and 06 was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against and 08,03 married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity with the nine agents he named appears to be that which would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact as he claimed.

With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either agent's background. He cannot say where either of them lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he required their services. With the exception of the W.E. 06 JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and

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YEFREMOV's known activities with respect to Americans took place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-1960. It is probable that NOSENKO's claim that he was their sole case officer during even this relatively brief period is also false. In the period April-November 1959, apparently unknown to NOSENKO, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including three CIA agents) in the Soviet Union. Further, in other contexts NOSENKO has described their involvement with Americans MATLAN (see p.419) and KARLOV in 1959, of which NOSENKO only learned when he retired VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's file in 1962-1963. KARLOV was a Swedish, not an American, citizen.]

Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Tourist Section Case Officer

According to NOSENKO, he was among the first case officers to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it was being formed. He took part with other officers in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and generally "getting things going". After several months, he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compromise American student Martin MALIA. NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Professor Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally involved in the attempted recruitment of the German business-man GEHRCKENS and in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of SUNDAR, a Norwegian journalist. [Both GEHRCKENS and SUNDAR admitted to having been the object of KGB recruitment attempts, the former reluctantly in a private interview, and the latter publicly in the press. It has been possible to question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the

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British publisher Sir Allen LANE and the latter's interpreter BIRSE on a tour of Soviet publishing houses. According to NOSENKO, it was for the purpose of observing BIRSE, a suspected British intelligence agent.

Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information

Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations with MALIA. NOSENKO arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow. NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices. MALIA insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious", and the KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Comment: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently unusual at the time to be publicized in the Soviet press. On 1955 and 1962 trips he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and he smuggled to the West literature for publishing

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Comment: (Continued)
abroad. In December 1963 06 MALIA was the object of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches". 06 MALIA was then in periodic contact with CIA; in the spring of 1963 he denied having had any involvement with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union. 06 MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's allegations.

Recruitment of 06 BURGI (1956)

At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06 Yale professor. The recruitment was effected on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.

This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the death of NOSENKO's father, was by NOSENKO's later accounts a turning point in his personal and professional life. From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because 06 of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain.

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NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO stated that at the time of [BURGI]'s arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving [BURGI]'s anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning [BURGI], and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on [BURGI], no other checks were made. The KGB interest in [BURGI] derived exclusively from the fact that he was [a professor of Slavic studies] and therefore had contact with students who might eventually work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When [BURGI] arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO could not recall how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning [BURGI]. ([BURGI] had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that [BURGI] was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make [BURGI]'s acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met [BURGI], the fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and [BURGI] was invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did not meet [BURGI] at this time.

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As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI 06 in the United States. 06 BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there to prepare the operation. BURGI 06 arrived the next morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover.

In accordance 06 with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. 06 The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO", but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:

> "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed

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out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students may become future specialists on Russia or may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students can be used by intelligence. They may be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..."

According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence". (NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later he could not remember whether it was he or KOZLOV.) BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGI to an old

cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From Kiev, BURGI left the Soviet Union without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. BURGI was instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first meeting in the New York Public Library.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but the KGB refrained from establishing contact. The first actual meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURGI appeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the revolution in Hungary in late [October] 1956, when BURGI refused to collaborate further. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO."

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Comment: In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI, 06 [BURGI] had recounted how he was compromised and recruited by the KGB while in the USSR in June 1956. His version substantially confirmed that provided eight years later by NOSENKO. 06 [BURGI] asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account) that the KGB officers knew a good deal more about him than what might have been acquired 06 during [BURGI]'s visit to the USSR, including 06 details of [BURGI]'s close relatives, his work 08 10 with the [Russicum] in [Rome], his earlier travel to Brazil, his military service in Korea, and his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY.

06 On 25 May 1964 [BURGI] positively identified NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the junior of the two KGB officers who recruited him. The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was "the controlling figure and was in command".

06 The [BURGI] case is the earliest confirmed instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB operation. See p.39 for comment on the 06 relevance of the [BURGI] case to the period of NOSENKO's claimed service in the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO's claim that [BURGI]'s compromise 06 and recruitment was based only on information routinely acquired from [BURGI]'s visa applica- 06 tion and from apparently chance meetings with KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, is contradicted by [BURGI]'s description of the 06 KGB's familiarity with his personal life. NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having personally traced [BURGI] through First Chief 06 [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate files (the probable repository of information on [BURGI] 06 which the KGB recruiting officers used). NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures. 06 According to [BURGI]'s statement and NOSENKO's own eventual admission, NOSENKO lied when he

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first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaided. NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims regarding the effect of this case on his career: Contrary to his earlier assertions, he now says it won him neither awards nor promotion.

Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 to Hamburg shipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS, on the basis of GEHRCKENS' commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsible case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and GEHRCKENS was known to speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little". When asked why a German-speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case', and that was all." After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS, NOSENKO saw him several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon GEHRCKENS' return to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

Comment: GEHRCKENS was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West Germany and was recently reported to have

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Comment: (Continued) negotiated a sizable [shipping] contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at the Soviet Trade Mission in [Cologne] has been a GRU officer.

Contact with [LANE] and [BIRSE] (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

The British subject [Sir Allen LANE] travelled in the summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing houses and brought with him as an interpreter [Arthur BIRSE]. The latter was of Russian extraction, having left Petrograd (Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in [British Intelligence] during the Second World War. The case was handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but because of [BIRSE]'s past, "some of our leaders decided that it would be good if one of our workers could approach him, would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing companies. The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this job." Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO accompanied [BIRSE] and [LANE] in Moscow and Leningrad during their stay there. The only object was to watch [BIRSE] because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission, and no approach was made or contemplated. NOSENKO explained that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with [BIRSE] and [LANE] made it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling to Great Britain in 1957 and in 1958.

Comment: [LANE] was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's photograph as that of a "Russian official he met in Moscow who was introduced to him as "NIKOLAYEV". [LANE] said that he could remember

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Comment: (Continued)
nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who had opened up considerably towards the end of my visit to Moscow in July 1957".

NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis for KGB interest in BIRSE. Born of Scottish parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSE served with the British Military Mission in Moscow during World War II and was interpreter for Churchill during the latter's meeting with Stalin. He was the official interpreter for the Royal Commission investigating the revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV and his wife, who defected in 1954 in Australia. NOSENKO apparently does not know that BIRSE returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958 and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the Tourist Section) and that in the latter year two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.

Recruitment of Egil SUNDAR (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

In 1957 or 1958 a Norwegian journalist, (fnu) SUNDAR, visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, made SUNDAR's acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. NOSENKO presented himself to SUNDAR, using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told SUNDAR that he could find women for him. A party was arranged with a KGB agent as SUNDAR's date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with the female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and SUNDAR saw one another the next day, SUNDAR announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket. NOSENKO

offered to arrange the sale and took [SUNDAR] to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, NOSENKO asked [SUNDAR] to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia station, [SUNDAR] was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment. There was no further contact with [SUNDAR] after he left the USSR, however, because on his return to [Oslo] he published an article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them".

Comment: [Egil SUNDAR], a journalist for Aftenposten in Oslo, travelled to the USSR in December 1957 as a member of a press delegation in connection with the opening of a new [SAS] air route to Moscow. [SUNDAR] wrote an article on his return in which he described his arrest for blackmarket activities and his subsequent recruitment; he also reported this to Norwegian authorities. According to [SUNDAR], he was introduced to Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose name he did not know, and was apprehended immediately afterwards. [SUNDAR] has not been interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

Travel to London (1957-1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security officer accompany any such delegation. [NOSENKO elsewhere cited this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was issued]. The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate

officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 60 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only KGB security officer which accompanied the group.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO said he was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any member of the delegation.

NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London because it was the alias used earlier with the British subjects BIRSE 06 and LANE 06. NOSENKO explained this situation as follows:

> "With BIRSE 06 and LANE 06 I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, again representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people BIRSE 06 and LANE 06

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went back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question [BIRSE] especially, as one 06
who used to work in intelligence... [BIRSE] would 06
say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [BIRSE].' That was 06
why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

Comment: That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is corroborated by [British records], according to 11
which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30 October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels on 20 August 1957. His visa application described him as a member of a group invited by the Light Athletics Association to participate in contests in London. He left on 27 August 1957. With the same name and date of birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on 12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all described as boxers. His visa application described him as an "office worker", but on his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as a boxer. He left London on 19 October 1958. On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the attention of any [British security service]. 29

While these trips are corroborated, they are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have served in the KGB positions he alleges he held at the time.

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Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorganized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concerned with tourists from the United States and the British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the most important section of the Seventh Department".

In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he supervised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT, although Seventh Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments - DREW, LUKIS, WILBY, TAYLOR, and MERTENS. NOSENKO stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and MILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL. NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintelligence mission, on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

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reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of tourists and tourist cover by Western intelligence services. It was from this task that NOSENKO claimed he learned of all the important arrests and recruitments among American tourists as recorded by the KGB at the time.

Recruitment of [HARRIS] (1958) 06

NOSENKO's Information

29,10 NOSENKO in 1958 recruited [Gisella HARRIS], an employee of the [American Express Company in Salt Lake City]. The recruitment was based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen, who told [HARRIS] that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. [HARRIS] agreed to meet and cooperate with the KGB in [Salt Lake City]. The case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her. 06 06 10

Comment: [HARRIS], a former German citizen, visited the USSR on a tourist visa in 1958. According to statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose of her visit was to contact her former lover, a Soviet soldier who had fathered her child in [Germany] in 1953. She hoped to persuade him to divorce his Soviet wife and marry her. She described her recruitment by two men, one of whom resembled NOSENKO. When shown a photograph in 1964, she tentatively identified NOSENKO as one of the men who recruited her and said that, of the two involved, he "was definitely the man in charge" while the other "was merely present and listened". According to [HARRIS], she has had no further contact with Soviet intelligence. 06,08 11 06

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Compromise of KRAFT 06

NOSENKO's Information

06,08

Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, with his wife visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer. 06 The KGB learned KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Leningrad, where she was then living, in order to compromise KRAFT. 06 KRAFT and the Soviet 06 woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the 06 room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in a nearby room, supervising the operation. The recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself".) Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT 06 and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet 06 Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came 06 to Moscow in 1963, and afterwards his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good 06 region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Comment: According to the FBI, some time before 1960 06 KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described the KGB approach, omitting reference to his sexual compromise. In a statement given to the FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT, who is an 06

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Comment: (Continued) 08,10
[Associate Pastor of the Peoples Church in Chicago], stated that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed NOSENKO's information in detail except that he denied having been intimate with the Soviet woman involved. He related that the "Chief" who interviewed him had "several photographs which portrayed him and the female in intimate compromising positions and which appeared to have been taken in her hotel room". [KRAFT] said 06 that he had told the "Chief" that they could do him no possible harm as "no one would believe that they were valid photographs". [KRAFT] denied 06 agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any time.

Recruitment of [DREW] (1959) 06

NOSENKO's Information

[George DREW], 06 an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, was the responsibility of case officer V.V. IVANOV. By chance, however, [DREW] became involved with 06 NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not judged qualified.) NOSENKO arranged for [DREW] to be 06 compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone 06 recruited [DREW] in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in [DREW]'s recruitment 06 because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

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Comment: 06 DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's account of the operation. Re-interviewed by the FBI on 12 May 1964, DREW identified NOSENKO's 06 photograph as that of his interrogator and said that, although NOSENKO was a young man, from the way everyone reacted to him it was clear that he was the man in charge. Another man was present, DREW said.
06

Recruitment of 06 LUKIS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a British subject, (fnu) LUKIS (or LUCAS), in a room of the 06 Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS had been compromised 06 by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently.
06

Comment: 06 LUKIS has not yet been identified by the British services. 29

Recruitment of 06 WILBY (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

By himself NOSENKO recruited 06 William Stanley WILBY in a hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro- 06 mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual agents. WILBY is a British citizen and his case was also 06 (like LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN.
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Comment: [WILBY] reported the approach to [British authorities] in 1959, saying that he was "brought up before SERGEYEV" (an operational alias sometimes used by NOSENKO). He has not been re-interviewed since NOSENKO's information was received.

Recruitment of [TAYLOR] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of [British European Airways], whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.

NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the [BEA] man. That section had asked NOSENKO's section for help.

> "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him."

[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy chief of the section.]

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Comment: David TAYLOR, confessed homosexual, is described by British services as a neurotic type who had been discharged from the R.A.F. on grounds of mental instability. In 1962 (before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR admitted his recruitment to British authorities, indicating that it took place in August 1959 on the basis of his homosexuality. He reported in 1962 that the recruitment had been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV", and when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly identified NOSENKO as 'Colonel SERGEYEV'," adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back". TAYLOR also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.

Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had been the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. [He did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a physical description.] MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with

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06 MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with 06 MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not recall the American's name. In 1964 he stated the name was MARTIN, or MARTINS.
06 06

Comment: In a signed statement given to the FBI on 5 August 1964, MERTENS, an American professor, 06 generally confirmed NOSENKO's account. He names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON" and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be that of a person whom he had met while visiting the Soviet Union in 1959. MERTENS 06 reported one KGB attempt to recontact him after he returned to the United States. In September 1959, according to arrangements made at the time of his recruitment, he received a letter signed "George PETERSON" telling him to be at a rendezvous point in New York. By the time he received the letter, however, the date of the meeting had already passed and so he ignored it. MERTENS claimed 06 that there were no further attempts by the Soviets to contact him.

Compromise of 06 BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06 Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow 08 in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground. Although 08 06 BARRETT was not an active homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded after a long period of development in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,

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NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and he has described the occasion in detail. (There was much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and treated them well because they were a big help to him in this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by the Central Committee on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO reported that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. The recruitment was carried out by the First (American) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.

Comment: Immediately on his return to the United States in January 1962, BARRETT confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of photographs depicting him in a homosexual act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow. He claimed that the photographs had been taken while he was unconscious, after being drugged. BARRETT was contacted once by the KGB in New York City following his admissions to the FBI. He was contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORTSOV of the First Chief Directorate, during later trips to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and 1965 and arrangements were made for meetings in the United States. No Soviets appeared at such scheduled meetings.

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Compromise of [WILLERFORD] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

[Frederick WILLERFORD, an American Negro], was [BARRETT]'s roommate during the [1959 exhibition] in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which believed [WILLERFORD] to be an FBI agent and had been collecting information on him. Unaware of the interest of the other KGB element, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made [WILLERFORD]'s acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs to be taken of [WILLERFORD] and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched [WILLERFORD] and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after these compromising photographs had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the Moscow City KGB Directorate's interest in [WILLERFORD]. NOSENKO's own department and the Moscow City Directorate then made a joint request for operational approval to recruit [WILLERFORD], but permission was refused because of the ban on recruitment attempts at the time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether [WILLERFORD] was approached subsequently.

Comment: [WILLERFORD] was interviewed by the FBI in July 1964 and "advised emphatically that he had never been compromised by anyone nor did he feel that he ever could be compromised by anyone except through the use of drugs, since he felt that he was 'too smart' and most Soviets that he has ever met are aware of his pro-American sentiments". [BARRETT] has reported that [WILLERFORD] had visited VOLKOV in his hotel room and was friendly with him. [BARRETT] said that he had often wondered if [WILLERFORD] was a homosexual because of his manner and bearing.

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Recruitment of FRIPPEL (1959-1963)

As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers, even after transferring to the American Department in 1960. FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever claimed to handle, FRIPPEL confessed to his recruitment when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead. Although the FRIPPEL case only started during NOSENKO's first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960), it is described in its entirety through 1963, for the convenience of the reader.

NOSENKO's Information

At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detail including the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room. NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPEL by name the following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:

> "There was another agent, [KGB cryptonym] 'Artur'. He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express Company [main office in New York City]. A new

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department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this 06 [FRIPPEL]. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was [FRIPPEL] 06 recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States]. I was interested in him from the point of view of counter-intelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested me. But he didn't know anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether [FRIPPEL] 06 would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied no, that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means.

In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning the [FRIPPEL] 06 case.

NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the [FRIPPEL] 06 recruitment as follows:

"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the [American Express Company], and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and which send tourists to the USSR." 29

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Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL 06, he did not do so alone. Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL 06's case officer.

NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL 06 until January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL 06's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL 06. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL 06. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited", and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment".

As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL 06 in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL 06 alone, otherwise it was always with CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange meetings with FRIPPEL 06 at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL 06 despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something". (In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that GRIBANOV insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)

When NOSENKO began to work in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL 06 with him because FRIPPEL 06 was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL 06 never told NOSENKO anything useful.

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NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview; [subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews]. After the interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did remember that they were "satisfied". Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.

NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whisky in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)

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When FRIPPEL 06 returned, he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL 06 reported "nothing of importance", and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative. 29 (NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL 06 had been assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow. This report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.)

FRIPPEL 06 provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL 06 returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309) in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage dealing with FRIPPEL 06 which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN:

> "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... One day, as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHVEDOVA [the fact of] 'ARTUR's' affiliation with American intelligence."

Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably a cleaning woman". [Elsewhere NOSENKO described SHVEDOVA as his own agent working against American Army Attaches, see p. 85.] Asked what connection FRIPPEL 06 had with American intelligence, NOSENKO replied that he could not say. To the inquiry why not, since he was FRIPPEL 06's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.

Spencer ROBERTS 06 [whose KGB recruitment is described on p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the

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latter, the Soviet told ROBERTS, was FRIPPEL, whom the KGB suspected of being an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO reported ROBERTS' recruitment but has never indicated awareness of other KGB agents being targetted against FRIPPEL.

FRIPPEL's Information

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur", was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1958 to 3 January 1961. He was first interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a picture of NOSENKO, FRIPPEL admitted his recruitment by the KGB in 1959. During this and subsequent interviews with the FBI, FRIPPEL has reported in detail on his association with the KGB. FRIPPEL's version coincides with that provided by NOSENKO to a considerable degree, with the following exceptions:

- FRIPPEL asserts that at the time of his recruitment the KGB wanted only general information on American Embassy officials and American tourists travelling to the Soviet Union under American Express auspices. According to NOSENKO, FRIPPEL was originally recruited to provide information on American intelligence approaches to Soviets in the United States, and he claimed that FRIPPEL was not needed for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union, since the KGB had already "great success" by other means. NOSENKO stated that later, when he transferred to the American Embassy Section, he took his agent FRIPPEL with him to report on acquaintances among the Embassy employees. NOSENKO and FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when FRIPPEL was queried regarding BONDEN and WINTERS), FRIPPEL was not so used.

- FRIPPEL, while acknowledging that NOSENKO participated in all meetings and on occasion met FRIPPEL alone, stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the entire operation".

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FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met FRIPPEL but once in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. He freely related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the USSR. His account of FRIPPEL's activities is consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as noted above.

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with OSWALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959.

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Operational Activities - 1955-1960: Summary

According to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment in the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957 he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists. One of these attempts, that against [Richard BURGI], was the first recruitment of the Tourist Section; it won NOSENKO a commendation, brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer. In 1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO's success in the Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him back to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against American Embassy code clerks.

It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO became involved in nine not because they were operations of his section, but because the targets were the victims of homosexual or other entrapment. In addition, three of the fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but by senior Seventh Department officers. According to his own statements, four others were specifically the responsibility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements, including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS), Delegations Section [LANE] and [BIRSE], Commercial Representatives Section (TAYLOR), and [WILLERFORD] (Moscow City KGB). [FRIPPEL] does not relate clearly to NOSENKO's claimed Seventh Department service: NOSENKO states he was also used as an agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the remaining case, that of [HARRIS], was not necessarily a

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Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements, she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry a Soviet citizen.

While NOSENKO's participation in the attempted recruitment of the targets he describes, even where not confirmed, is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.

Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. The evidence is that he was more active, but not that he had any administrative and supervisory responsibilities.

Knowledge of other Seventh Department American Tourist Operations

NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Department in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In the course of that review he made written notes of the section's operational targets during that period notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319.) NOSENKO could not describe the operations other than to say that he recorded the target's names and such details as he could acquire at the time of his review. Eleven of the operations included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, fnu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA. All were from the period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were identified by the KGB as homosexuals. All of these cases are described in Annex B.

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Comment: NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases, which predated the records he claimed he reviewed, were included in his notes. More important, he never could explain why he was unfamiliar with American tourist cases which occurred at a time when he claimed that he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable of all such cases.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960

Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services throughout the 1955-1960 period. Information from other sources serves as a basis for judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's Tourist Study

Sometime between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during the period 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO said he assembled this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh Department case officers. NOSENKO recalled only that the study incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the study, any examples included in it, or what the study concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist

operations. Nevertheless, based on his research for this study as well as on his general and supervisory responsibilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.

Extent of KGB Knowledge

According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No agents were definitely identified among American tourists, and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception. 06 (McGUIRE, sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists because of their apparent interest in photography, or because they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never established any firm intelligence connection, however, despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka (covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in contact with the suspect tourists. No American tourists were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents, NOSENKO concluded. On related matters, NOSENKO asserted that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department the KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelligence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no documentary information on this topic from any agent source.

American Tourist Agents

The one exception in which an American tourist was observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said, was one whose name he recalled as McGUIRE, and who mailed a 06 letter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's clandestine letter mailing.

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Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward McGOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was in fact detected by the KGB while clandestinely mailing an operational letter in Minsk, but in August 1958.

There was a Robert Alan McGUIRE who visited the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh Department service, but he was not connected with American Intelligence at the time and he mailed no letter. McGUIRE, however, was a former CIA staff employee. He visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959, during which period he was the target of numerous KGB provocations, including black-market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request for assistance in defecting to the Americans. Also, a customs officer confiscated from McGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language script, and McGUIRE was compelled to sign an acknowledgement of the event, although the reasons were left blank. Interrogation has never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of McGUIRE, but not the background of the case, or the background of McGOWAN's case, but not his name.

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6, [George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union. In early June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a nineteen-page document was drawn up which described operational doctrine on tourist operations, including agent spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist season. The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists

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for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually, communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it came into his possession.

Comment: It is not advanced that NOSENKO should necessarily have known of BLAKE, although his statements on the matter have been ambiguous. Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE was a less important source than the Canadian Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked "Who's BLAKE?"

The significance of BLAKE is that his confession established that the KGB was fully aware of the status and character of American and British Intelligence tourist operations while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh Department. It is judged, by any measure as well as by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB, that the substance of the information if not the document itself would be brought to the attention of a key KGB counterintelligence officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, which NOSENKO claims was himself.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union. The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.

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SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen KGB operations. Other than to allege that certain KGB officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no information to substantiate his claim that he had any supervisory or administrative responsibilities. The common feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own description of the function of the Seventh Department's Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Commonwealth Section. Most were sexual or other entrapment operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations conducted by KGB elements other than his own section. In short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated in the activities he describes. Although NOSENKO gives a graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence aspects were incidental. Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted against American tourists during the period, nor what was known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British tourist operations.

Conclusion

While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting operations against American and other foreign tourists during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962)

Deputy Chief of the Section

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962. This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counter-intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for recruitment.

The functions of the American Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all information possible on American Embassy employees, and to use this information as a basis for planning and implementing recruitments. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts. The officers also benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, as well as information obtained from telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and homes. Each officer had a limited number of American targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar. Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for

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exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section special emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence officers in the Embassy and actively developing them, acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks, creating the basis on which they can be recruited".

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited ca. 1953, see p. 33). From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960-and 1961, who remained in the section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until his January 1964 departure in Geneva.

Transfer to the American Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him back to the American Department's American Embassy Section, as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:

> "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department. This [the transfer] was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And there, in the American Department, I must prove myself with new people."

NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target".

Predecessor as Deputy Chief

Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied: "No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security file from KOVSHUK. Various case officers earlier had been responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE, including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October 1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive until March 1960.

On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO had referred to a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department. In February he identified a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department. In June, in listing KGB officers who had received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremembered department" of the Second Chief Directorate.

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On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of all officers who had either joined or departed the American Embassy Section from the time NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American Embassy Section in 1960. NOSENKO listed fourteen officers as having joined the section, and five who had been transferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.

A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September 1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief, [not the others he had identified earlier] had been LANGELLE's case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining the Embassy security file and stated that BAKHVALOV had shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code clerk operations.

Comment: Interrogation has never resolved contradictions between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what functions he assumed from whom when he entered the Section, and his belated assertions that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.

Responsibilities

Shortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said he met with American Department Chief KLYPIN and Embassy Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN

suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their assistants. NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain sensitive files in the section.

NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:

"During the entire period in the First [American Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:

-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.

-Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.

-Case officer for American Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.

-For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the Army, Naval, and Air attaches.

Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally responsible for (as contrasted to supervising) operational activity against Naval and Marine officers of the office of the Naval Attache.

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-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

-I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [American Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.

-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR' [VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively].

"Throughout this entire period I sat in Room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

Comment: NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of these claimed functions are examined in some detail in the following pages.

Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief of Section

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to and was obliged to keep current on all information relating to the section's activities. On this basis he has assured his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his association with section officers made it certain that there were no such KGB successes even in the periods

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1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh Department. His statements on this subject during February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February:

"As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.

"As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks except against [STORSBERG] and [KEYSERS], both unsuccessful approaches.

"There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

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In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK was ill or on leave. NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again when KOVSHUK was ill. He recalled that KOVSHUK was also absent for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that he was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the American Embassy.

NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section. NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences, nor could he remember any of them except GLAZUNOV [whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's"] and the American correspondent [STEVENS] [about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his activities in 1953-55].

According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American Embassy officers, but the only such Embassy officer he could identify was WINTERS, and he knew of no details about KOVSHUK's relations with him.

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Comment: NOSENKO knows neither that William N. MORELL (03) was identified formally by the Embassy to the Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact), was in personal contact with MORELL. (03)

General Supervisory Duties

In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what major duties occupied most of his time, nor which were the most important: He stated that "everything" was important. His subordinates were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible for code clerk operations), [Vladimir] DEMKIN assisted by [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House), [N.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews of the Ambassador's aircraft), [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army Attache personnel), and [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache personnel). Except for "little questions" which the officers decided for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed their activities, discussed with them various aspects of their work, and responded to their questions as required. If he could not answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, or if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO discussed the matter with KOVSHUK. If it was necessary, NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV, and on some occasions, with Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting. He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA (agents working against America House residents), reports which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally. NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percentage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.

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In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction of agents, NOSENKO said he personally managed [PREISFREUND] 06 ("PROKHOR") and [WEISS] ("SARDAR").

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Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation". Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks under way, he stated, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No non-Soviet citizen agents were being used in operations against code-room personnel.

According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office. There, all KGB files on American code clerks as well as the files on all agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO was absent on a trip, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures.

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When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO asserted. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a Syrian military officer, Samih WEISS (see p. 181), and directed him against the America House. After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. Another such agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the military code clerk James STORSBERG (see p.166). NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the American code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Comment: Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO retracted his assertion that he read and studied all the files on individual American code clerks, stating instead that he did not study any although he "may have skimmed some". He insisted, however, that in any event he read all the current incoming information on code clerks received from microphones, agents and the like, and routed the reports to the case officer concerned.

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GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960-1961

The most significant collateral information about KGB operations against American code clerks in this period, with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions [on this topic], is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.

GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks in the American Embassy in Moscow." With respect to the priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that: "The task of strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly [in 1960]. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would have known about it.

Preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, GOLITSYN in the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. The code clerk had already provided the KGB with some information and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent. GOLITSYN was told by GRYAZNOV that, if the code clerk's transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki as his agent.

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GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960 that the latter had developed an operation against an Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.

GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, at the time was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN said that the homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and the KGB should find another basis for recruitment. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB would hold in reserve.

While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back to Moscow on the train. KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the case. GOLITSYN reasoned that there would be no reluctance to discuss the case if it had been unsuccessful, and that therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing the code clerk on the train or afterwards.

GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KOVSHUK that the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy.

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Comment: Two of GOLITSYN's leads may refer to [STORSBERG] 06 and [GARLAND] (see below). The other leads, more than one of which may refer to the same individual, have not resulted in an identification of any code clerk target of the KGB.

Operations Against Military Code Clerks

Comment: According to official U.S. Government records, Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center and a single military code clerk (except when two code clerks overlapped during periods of turnover). The military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a cryptographic clearance and was trained to replace the regular military code clerk when the latter was absent.

[James STORSBERG was the only military code clerk] assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960 to September 1961, when his successor, [Matthew ZUJUS], arrived. [STORSBERG] himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of [STORSBERG]'s tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the [Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY]. [HURLEY] performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the KGB approach to [STORSBERG], and he could be loosely termed a code clerk. (Although NOSENKO has distinguished between [STORSBERG]'s function as "military code clerk" and [HURLEY]'s duties as "military code machine mechanic", he considered both to be within the general category

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)
of "military code clerks". NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against 06 HURLEY.) Additionally, HURLEY performed repair 06 work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. 06 HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly 06 before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06 in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS 06 worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in 06 the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.

The significance of the following cases, particularly that of STORSBERG, is the extent 06 to which collateral information corroborates or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, to have supervised all KGB operations against Embassy code clerks, and to have certain knowledge that no Americans in the Embassy were recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in 1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.

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Attempted Recruitment of [STORSBERG] 06

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO first alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an unnamed American military code clerk during his initial meeting with CIA in 1962. He was describing a new technique (which he later claimed to be his own idea) introduced in the 1960-1961 period to overcome the reluctance of Americans in Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens. Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructed "third-national" agents (Germans, Frenchmen, and Finns, for example) to visit the American Club on Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate American enlisted men living there. (GOLITSYN learned of one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN had reported the KGB practise to the Americans, because foreigners no longer were permitted to enter the America House billets freely for dances, movies, and the like at the club there.) NOSENKO had recruited the agent known to GOLITSYN in order to develop an American military code clerk. Without identifying either the foreign agent or the American target, NOSENKO provided further details on the case in subsequent meetings.

Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the American Embassy Section's "number one assignment", and for a year NOSENKO was involved in an operation against such a target almost to the exclusion of all other duties. The case was considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB Chairman SHELEPIN as well as Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV impatiently inquired as to its progress. The target was an American [Army sergeant] with about 20 years' service 08 who, the KGB learned, wanted to retire and take a position [as a code clerk] with the State Department. For the purpose 08 of developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who visited the USSR frequently. The "third-national" agent was placed in contact with the American, and they had several drinking bouts together. After about two months, NOSENKO instructed his agent to take the American to the agent's hotel room and introduce him there to a KGB female agent.

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Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photographs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time the agent provided the American with a girl. On the third such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain incriminating photographs. The foreign agent also involved the American in an illicit currency transaction in which the American contributed $300 as his share to finance the purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit: the money was actually furnished by the KGB.

After a year's development, GRIBANOV decided that a recruitment should be attempted, through another foreigner. The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation, and a KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French businessman "Marcel MICHAUD". SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and drank with the American several times, "even at America House". It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment while drunk. After meeting with the American at the club in America House one evening, SKVORTSOV telephoned him and invited him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch girls". When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls had refused to come, but that he could call another girl for the American. The girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964 as Inga VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used for such operations, and she and the American were intimate in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. In an adjacent room were GRIBANOV, NOSENKO, KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical Directorate, who taped the American's conversations. When the American left SKVORTSOV's room at two o'clock in the morning, he was "very tipsy". NOSENKO and another officer intercepted him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent room, and locked the door. NOSENKO himself solicited the American's collaboration with the KGB in exchange for $20,000 in cash (which was offered in two packages of $10 notes) and the promise of additional sums. When the American refused, the KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his plan to transfer to the State Department. They threatened to inform the Embassy that he had collaborated with the KGB, in which case he would get neither the cash nor the job with

the State Department. The American was adamant in his refusal, although he was held in the hotel room all night long. At about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers received a telephoned report that the Embassy Marine guard had called America House to advise that the American was needed at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had arrived. The American was then released.

The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the recruitment attempt. Using that circumstance for blackmail rather than the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.

When the non-Soviet agent used in the first year of developing the American target had come to the attention of GOLITSYN, GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he could use him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad. NOSENKO was on leave at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with another Embassy Section officer. GOLITSYN was told "Don't touch him, he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is discussed below.]

NOSENKO's Information-1964

At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO identified the American military code clerk as "Jim" 06 STORSBERG. The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the case was Johannes PREISFREUND 06 (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR"), a Finn. // In repeating the substance of his 1962 account of the KGB recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal role in directing both PREISFREUND and the KGB officer SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD.

06

GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO was not present; he waited outside the room with GRYAZNOV. Neither did NOSENKO recruit 06 PREISFREUND. The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO had initially cultivated the Finn. // Under KOVSHUK's orders, NOSENKO served as PREISFREUND's case officer, although KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the agent.

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PREISFREUND was used in no KGB operation other than in the development of STORSBERG. His usefulness declined because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow Finns, of having some relationship with the KGB.

Comment: A report of the Finnish security service advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISFREUND "is a Soviet agent who calls at the America Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an attempt to penetrate Western circles".

After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and KOVSHUK concluded that PREISFREUND thereby had been identified as a KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that PREISFREUND should not be used again against American Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the Finn in Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since he knew only Finnish and Russian.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO provided some additions as well as further amendments to what he had related earlier about STORSBERG. GRYAZNOV wrote the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and approved. The plan called for a detailed study of STORSBERG and the creation of some basis on which to make an operational approach. The case developed slowly in 1960. From a female clerk named YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the Finnish Embassy, PREISFREUND obtained background information on STORSBERG, who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish Embassy. PREISFREUND was directed to visit America House in order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG, and when he was successful, he managed to lure STORSBERG to his hotel room, where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs of STORSBERG and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. STORSBERG visited PREISFREUND's rooms many times at different hotels in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on

only two occasions. [PREISFREUND] introduced [STORSBERG] to SKVORTSOV, and when they had become acquainted, SKVORTSOV invited [STORSBERG] to his room at the Leningrad Hotel on a number of occasions, but [STORSBERG] always refused. On one evening in the middle of 1961, however, [STORSBERG] accepted SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet non-Soviet girls. NOSENKO was in the hotel and he had made arrangements with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate to call at once if audio coverage of the American Embassy indicated anything which might affect the recruitment attempt.

While NOSENKO waited outside the room, GRIBANOV attempted to recruit [STORSBERG] on ideological grounds; his proposal was translated by KOVSHUK. [STORSBERG], however, must have given SKVORTSOV's hotel room telephone number to someone at the American Embassy, because while GRIBANOV was talking to him someone called SKVORTSOV's room looking for the American. When this happened, either GRYAZNOV or NOSENKO knocked on the door and advised KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching for [STORSBERG]. The recruitment attempt was thereupon terminated, unsuccessfully.

NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB file on [STORSBERG]. [In describing KGB practice, NOSENKO consistently equated custody of a case file with being the responsible case officer.] He had no interest in "earlier reporting", although he had read current materials concerning [STORSBERG] as they came into the Embassy Section.

Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted with the substance of the 1962 meeting transcripts in which he claimed to have run the operation, to have been deeply involved in it, and to have personally spoken to [STORSBERG] during the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO interrupted the reading of the transcript, calling it "nonsense". He said he was drunk at all the 1962 meetings in Geneva and was nervous in the presence of CIA officers. He

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Comment: (Continued)
admitted that he had "painted himself" as being somewhat more active and important than facts justified, but said this reflected only "white lies" which did not affect the otherwise complete accuracy of his story with respect to the position he occupied at the time nor the events which then transpired.

NOSENKO's Information-1966

During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as to the timing and sequence of events in the STORSBERG opera- 06
tion, and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or any other operation he described, stating he could no longer be sure when any particular incident occurred. Questioned 06
again about the STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO insisted that he had directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and that it was his most important case. At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following chronology:

January 1960: 06
STORSBERG arrived in Moscow. (NOSENKO accepted the actual date as supplied by the interrogator.)

Early 1960 or mid-1960: 06
PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. NOSENKO, after retracting his claim he recruited PREISFREUND, said he 06
first met PREISFREUND "a week or so 06
after his recruitment" (which occurred, according to most accounts, in early 1960). In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND 06
first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960".

Summer 1960: 06
PREISFREUND first provided a woman to STORSBERG. 06

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Early 1961: Compromising photographs of [STORSBERG] 06 and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.

About May. 1961: [PREISFREUND] 06 was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced about three weeks before the approach to [STORSBERG].

June 1961: Unsuccessful KGB approach to [STORSBERG] 06 in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier in the 1966 interrogations NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half before [STORSBERG] 06 left Moscow". Told that [STORSBERG] 06 was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961, five months before [STORSBERG] 06's departure.) [STORSBERG] 06 reported that the approach was in October 1961. See below.]

[STORSBERG] 06's Information

[STORSBERG] 06 did not report the KGB recruitment approach until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize his chance for employment with the State Department. He said that he provided no information to the Soviets during or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception of the timing of the recruitment attempt, [STORSBERG] 06's account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by NOSENKO, including the roles of [PREISFREUND] and SKVORTSOV, 06 whom he positively identified by their photographs. He was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, or NOSENKO.

[STORSBERG] 06 said that he first became acquainted with 06 [PREISFREUND] in February or March 1960, he was first intimate with a female procured by [PREISFREUND] 06 "six months or so"

[e.g., ca. June] after arriving in Moscow, and it was not until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel MICHAUD". STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV, stating variously that he met him through State Department code clerk Joseph MORONE, through friends at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV while he, STORSBERG, was serving as bartender in the America Club. During September 1961 STORSBERG was intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

In the middle of October 1961, on the evening of the KGB recruitment attempt, STORSBERG saw SKVORTSOV, MORONE, and an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.

Comment: STORSBERG could not have met MORONE with SKVORTSOV in October 1961. MORONE was transferred to Lisbon the previous August after he himself was compromised by the KGB. See p. 198. As far as CIA is aware, MORONE has never been questioned regarding his alleged association with SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD or STORSBERG.

While MORONE was dancing with the unknown female, STORSBERG was invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks. STORSBERG and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, and STORSBERG was again intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV's room on this night when STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB.

In a signed statement which he gave a representative of the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on 29 July 1965, STORSBERG gave somewhat different details. According to this account, three or four months after arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met PREISFREUND through friends at the Finnish Embassy. Thereafter PREISFREUND became a frequent visitor to the America Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four

occasions STORSBERG was intimate with females in PREISFREUND's hotel rooms. STORSBERG last saw PREISFREUND around the end of September or the beginning of October 1961, when PREISFREUND stopped coming to the America Club. At about that time, he first met SKVORTSOV through MORONE, at the America Club. [MORONE left Moscow the previous August.] STORSBERG was not sure of the exact circumstances of his introduction to SKVORTSOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with MORONE. After meeting STORSBERG, SKVORTSOV frequently visited the America Club and actively cultivated STORSBERG's friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit SKVORTSOV's apartment, where STORSBERG was intimate with a Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a second visit to the apartment, about a week after the first, that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to this as well as STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961.

In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August 1965, STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign intelligence agency since his return to the United States, or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelligence agency". He also denied having agreed in any way with PREISFREUND to buy diamonds. [STORSBERG's denial with respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited by the KGB after being compromised by PREISFREUND in illicit speculation.]

PREISFREUND's Information

CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in July 1965 in Helsinki. [NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.] While PREISFREUND correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even know what the initials "KGB" stood for.

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PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he had been involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG and he agreed to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while containing some internal contradictions, only partially coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. PREISFREUND claimed to be hazy on the date of all events connected with his contacts with the KGB. The dates, however, could be reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events which he said occurred about the time he was recruited or first met STORSBERG or last visited the America House, and so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK, first dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of 1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to PREISFREUND, he was "cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUK. The first time he met either was when he was confronted and recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black-market dealings. [NOSENKO is unaware of that feature of PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's recruitment, he became acquainted with STORSBERG, and in the summer of 1960 on one occasion he lured STORSBERG into intimacy with a female KGB agent (earlier identified by NOSENKO) in his hotel room. He never saw STORSBERG again, nor did he participate in any other KGB operations.

Referring to the night STORSBERG was intimate with the female KGB agent in PREISFREUND's hotel room, PREISFREUND said he slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and the girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron. He deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in surreptitious photography of STORSBERG and the girl.

Comment: NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of STORSBERG and a girl in PREISFREUND's hotel room. He has never said anything to suggest, however, that he ever personally was involved in photographing any of the compromises he claims to have arranged, nor has he ever claimed any competence in clandestine photography.

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Before his last meeting with CIA, [PREISFREUND] mentioned that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family, but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection. He was apprehensive and particularly concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related his role in the [STORSBERG] case to American Intelligence. During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965 [PREISFREUND] asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that if the situation was as he described, it could be quite dangerous for him to return. [PREISFREUND] stated then that he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.

Comment: [PREISFREUND] did shortly thereafter visit the Soviet Union as he planned, and according to [Finnish] official travel records returned to [Helsinki] on 24 July 1965. From his apparent immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that [PREISFREUND] is to some degree still under KGB control.

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on several occasions in 1960 [a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND] whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960 [GOLITSYN's passport showed that it took place in January 1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in Moscow to request the permission of KOVSHUK to use [PREISFREUND] against Americans in [Finland]. KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that [PREISFREUND] "helped in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to arouse American suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK that [PREISFREUND] had met the target at America Club in

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Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and lured him into intimacy with various female KGB agents. According to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND "had helped to create the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation before the actual approach, which was made by KGB officers. The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUK related to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk or diplomat. (GOLITSYN later expressed his personal belief that the individual probably was unmarried and might have been a "military man".)

Comment: If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG, but to some other American code clerk against whom PREISFREUND was used, NOSENKO's claim to have supervised all such code clerk operations is refuted.

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG: Summary and Conclusion

In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that GOLITSYN's lead refers to STORSBERG. The role of PREISFREUND is the key to this determination. While the time of the operation remains in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to be the most plausible because of the circumstances under which he acquired his information. These circumstances--GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow, about the use of PREISFREUND are confirmed by NOSENKO and the date, January 1961, is established by passport information. It follows that the operation against STORSBERG thus would have taken place more than six months prior to the time NOSENKO and STORSBERG claimed. Such a significant inaccuracy by NOSENKO, about an event which he said took place less than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962), undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section and supervisor of code clerk operations.

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Attempted Defection of KEYSERS

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS served in Moscow from 20 December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy Medical Officer Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain. KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY who had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer, KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. KEYSERS was trained also to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this duty in April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors on 16 June 1961.

NOSENKO first spoke of what turned out to be the KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962, but without naming the KGB target or identifying him as STORSBERG's replacement. The KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered the American to be a homosexual, he said; and when the KGB found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to the American. NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the airport just before his departure.

On 24 January 1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962 description of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's replacement, whom he identified as ZUJUS. Several days later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested an urgent meeting with CIA. At the meeting he announced that he had made a mistake, that STORSBERG's replacement was not ZUJUS, but KEYSERS. KEYSERS, not ZUJUS, he said was the homosexual code clerk whom he NOSENKO had personally accosted at the airport.

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NOSENKO's Information

KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement as military code clerk, and the KGB "sensed at once" that he was a homosexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of everything else. NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for example, chased KEYSERS all over Moscow, attempting (without success) to confront their target in compromising circumstances. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades troupe) came to Moscow, and KEYSERS became involved at America House with some of its male homosexual members. The Embassy Security Officer learned of KEYSERS' activities at about the same time NOSENKO learned of them through a KGB agent. The KGB would have preferred to attempt to recruit KEYSERS, but it learned that he was to be withdrawn from the Soviet Union. The KGB then sent a letter to KEYSERS at his room in America House, pointing out the trouble he was in, and offering him asylum in the USSR. KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the day of KEYSERS' departure, KGB surveillants reported that he had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in the terminal building found occasion to approach KEYSERS alone. NOSENKO asked if KEYSERS had thought about the offer in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately reported the approach to the officer escorting him.

In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at the time NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the KGB had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the letter inviting him to defect, because no information to this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps in the Embassy.

KEYSERS' Information

Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS acknowledged to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at America House. He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961, and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe in May. He denied any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner were asleep.

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In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961, KEYSERS related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow. On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred from Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.

Comment: NOSENKO's information generally coincides with that reported by KEYSERS and Embassy officials. However, before the events NOSENKO described, KEYSERS' behavior and reputation had already been discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache, Colonel HOFFMAN, a conversation which HOFFMAN concludes was among those sensitive matters compromised by microphones later discovered in the Army Attache offices. Similarly, Colonel URBAN's conversation informing KEYSERS of his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would have learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, that KEYSERS did report the receipt of the defection letter to his superiors.

KEYSERS described the Russian who approached him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225 pounds, and having a dark complexion and light hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is several inches taller and not rotund. When KEYSERS was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he did not recognize him.

According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at once" that KEYSERS was a homosexual. He is unaware of certain information relating to KEYSERS' homosexual activities, drinking, and difficulties with his superiors, although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected

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Comment: (Continued)
with the case could regard KEYSERS as STORSBERG's replacement. KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost a year before STORSBERG's departure, and was assigned to the Air Attache office. ZUJUS, STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and worked with STORSBERG about three months before STORSBERG departed Moscow. KEYSERS stated NOSENKO was not the person who approached him at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he was, forgot the name of the single American target whom he ever personally confronted.

Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS

In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personally recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS, the "main agent" in a KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS. ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG, and he remained there until January 1963. NOSENKO did not recall the ZUJUS case until he was reminded of it by a reference to Samih WEISS which was among his notes which he brought to Geneva.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO recruited WEISS, a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961. WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club, and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the persons he had met there, he was told to develop him, not to pay any attention to anyone else. WEISS and ZUJUS had something in common in that ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short distance away. WEISS merely studied and developed ZUJUS during conversations at the America Club. On one occasion, when ZUJUS agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal Residency in Beirut, and WEISS presented it to ZUJUS as a gift from friends.

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ZUJUS' case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the "main agent" WEISS, NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities with respect to ZUJUS. NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directorate file on the American, as well as all reports as they came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan, which called for thorough development by WEISS in order to learn everything about him and eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through the Syrian. Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House. Although WEISS and ZUJUS became acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days WEISS planned to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses. This occurred every week or two, depending on WEISS' availability. When they met the day following WEISS' meetings with ZUJUS, WEISS would report such things as which Americans were drinking heavily and who at America House was involved with which girls from foreign embassies. Although WEISS visited America House once or twice a month, and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest.

The KGB learned "something" about ZUJUS' family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall: he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of interest to the KGB about ZUJUS' family background. There was no information on ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, telephone taps or surveillance, and the KGB was unaware of any vices or vulnerabilities which ZUJUS may have had. NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against ZUJUS. The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS while NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO would certainly learned of it from GRYAZNOV.

"Because no one else knew him", at the American Department's request NOSENKO continued to manage WEISS' contact with ZUJUS after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Department in January 1962. In March or April 1962 it was planned that WEISS would invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he would be introduced to "a friend", but the meeting had not

materialized before NOSENKO turned 06 WEISS over to GRYAZNOV and left for Geneva. When WEISS returned to Syria in April 1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate: his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.

06 ZUJUS Information

During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in 06 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that in the summer of 1962 ZUJUS had been intimate with an 06 Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had visited America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. 06 Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, 06 the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport. She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.

Comment: NOSENKO described this incident, but in connection with KGB attempts to entrap Joseph 06 MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962. 06 (See p. 194.) NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962. Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident.

06 ZUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS. 06 ZUJUS often used her an an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide considerable background information about her.

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Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House. He never related her to ZUJUS.

In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described having met in Moscow a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut, or a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus, he could not recall which. ZUJUS met him while acting as doorman at America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes and ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about. He may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he favored the beverage. ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his father, Matas, is secretary of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Alliance of America, an emigre organization concerned with the liberation of Lithuania. ZUJUS indicated that his father often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.

Comment: Emigre organizations, including the Lithuanian, have been traditional KGB targets and most have been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the elder ZUJUS' emigre activities is almost certainly to have been known to the KGB, making ZUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties.

From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with ZUJUS' father's activities, ZUJUS' intimacy with KGB agent "Lillian" and relationship with KGB agent UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role in the case, if any, was limited to his relationship with WEISS and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory function in the development of ZUJUS.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Operations Against State Department Code Clerks

KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as military cryptographers at the Embassy. In several such cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures prominently.

Development of Paul JENNER 06

NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER 06 case in a 1964 interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV had travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact with an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled" such an incident which happened in 1960-1961. He explained that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks. According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others. NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as Paul JENNER 06.

NOSENKO's Information

A month before JENNER 06's arrival in Moscow the Embassy Section received a copy of JENNER 06's anketa (visa application) listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was subsequently found to be a pouch clerk) 06 "the group" decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying JENNER 06 on the train to Moscow to study JENNER 06's behavior. JENNER 06 and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age. KOSOLAPOV was to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV's, "SOLISTKA", a Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after it entered the USSR at Vyborg.

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A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approval of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assigned to Moscow usually only for one year [thus limiting their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signature and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release. There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow. NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and "maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had [JENNER]'s photograph and his 06 name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV on [JENNER]'s train. 06 NOSENKO did not recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train.

NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA". According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on 06 the train with [JENNER] as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in [JENNER]'s car. 06 06 "SOLISTKA" gave [JENNER] her Moscow telephone number. While in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow. Nothing came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Section later learned the Residency had "more important questions".

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Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained a target for development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet the couriers. JENNER saw her but did not approach her, turning away. The KGB took no further steps to cultivate JENNER. The KGB "had nothing on JENNER at all except a suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof".

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928] his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photograph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm, who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March 1960 [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April. NOSENKO acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki to accompany JENNER back to Moscow in 1960.

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish train manifest showing that Paul JENNER was the single passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960 and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2 April on a train carrying no Americans. Repeating the substance of the KGB operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV's report of the trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled on the same train with JENNER and that the Finnish manifests must be in error. [See accompanying exhibits.]

JENNER's Information

After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students". The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers

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to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. "Yuliya" explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk [JENNER] had seen the Irkutsk flight 06 depart a half hour earlier) and told [JENNER] that her male 06 companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's" 06 questions concerning [JENNER]'s impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When 06 [JENNER] said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her. She advised [JENNER] 06 that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone".

Comment: As far as CIA is aware, [JENNER] 06 has never been asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.

06 Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, [JENNER] also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid.

Comment: Although NOSENKO has not identified either of these women as KGB agents, he has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.

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EXHIBIT 1 - Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow

Luettelo matkustajista, joka Junalla Vainikkalan asemalle

Sukun- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus ja kotipaikka	Matka suoritettu — Mistä matkustettu ja mihin saakka	Suomen passintarkastus
06 Jenner, Paul Francis	arkist.sih	17.07.23	U.S.Am.	U.S.A. - Mosk. /F	
				Passintarkastaja: V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen	

31 March 1960

NOTE: 06 JENNER single international passenger on train. (Soviet passengers who may have boarded train in USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)

Luettelo matkustajista, joka Junalla Vainikkalan asemalle

Sukun- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus ja kotipaikka	Matka suoritettu — Mistä matkustettu ja mihin saakka	Suomen passintarkastus
Ferdinand, Klaus Vilhelm	Yliopiston opettaja	10.04.26	Tanska	Tanska-Afganistan/F	
Kourpiladi, Sofie	konttoristi	20.02.17	Kreikan	Tukholma-Mosk./F	Se suun
Kolossov, Viktor	Sielmän virkamies	10.03.27	Neuvosto Kotipaikka:	Hki. - Mosk.	(Copy./Mosk.
Suomen kansalaiset:					
Korhonen, Jouko Aarre Armas	työnjoh	16.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	(Copy.viis.
Laukkanen, Kirsti Hellin Irene	kemi.apul	24.07.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-Gorki	(15py.viis.)
Koskennical, Tyyne Kyllikki	rouva	03.09.11	"	"	"
Kärnä, Elli Helena Vask	"	23.07.22	Lahti		
Tiili, Aake Viljen Vask	opettaja	13.07.29	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15py.viis.)
Tokola, Tojve Erkki Vask	var.hoit.	27.02.22	"		
Utriainen, Erkki Olavi Vask	kirj.mies	09.08.20	"		
Laspio, Otto Allan	toimittaja	08.12.17	Helsinki		
Kuki-Heinikka, Antti	liikk.siht.	18.04.23	"		
Karukoski, Unto Mattias	mor.siht.	13.12.16	Suvila	Hki. - Mosk.	(15py.viis.)
Järvinen, Aarne Juhani Tam	varastomies	17.01.31	Toijala		
Gurtman, Judith Josefina	toto.apul.	03.03.15	Helsinki		
				Passintarkastaja: V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen	

2 April 1960

NOTE: No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Information From Other Sources

I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER, who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before. SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent from "about 1945 on".

Development of JENNER: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's version of the JENNER case in some degree resembles less the facts about JENNER than KGB activities directed against John GARLAND (see below), activities which NOSENKO asserts never occurred. GARLAND, not JENNER, travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND, not JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month". The Helsinki Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about JENNER indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about JENNER, not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki. It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the actions of KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Development of John GARLAND

06

The GARLAND case is of particular significance to judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim to complete knowledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks. NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with respect to GARLAND, he vehemently asserts no such action was taken.

06

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was 06 GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing doing". Later asked to review the list and supply any additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that 06 the KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against GARLAND, 06 nor could he recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, 06 but he thought he must have read reports concerning him as they came into the Embassy Section. There was no operational plan drawn up 06 for GARLAND because the KGB developed no derogatory information concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned or attempted. NOSENKO could recall no background information concerning GARLAND, 06 such as his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below] of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND back 06 to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and 06 that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to 06 GARLAND. (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve

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in advance any operational travel performed by his subordinate outside of the USSR.) Reminded that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960 (the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with GARLAND), 06 NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV's travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.

06 GARLAND's Information

06 GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the GOLITSYN lead [see below]. In this interview GARLAND denied 06 having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 06 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that 06 GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent". 06 GARLAND, by his own statement, took the train on 16 November 1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as supervisor of the State Department code room in the Embassy.

08

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960, reported that "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow. The telegram stated that the responsible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki [illegible] alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow. The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the American's compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to the train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow, and he talked with KOSOLAPOV. Later in the summer or fall of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired

about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer would have been willing to talk to him about it.

Shown GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962, GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV".

Information From Other Sources

KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960. The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND, the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.]

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND, an American who would arrive there on 14 November.

Development of GARLAND: Summary and Conclusion

Whether or not GARLAND was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately reflect) that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki except in connection with JENNER, and his assertion thus cannot be dismissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he confuses the cases of JENNER and GARLAND.

NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks. Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO's claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks.

EXHIBIT 2 - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow

Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla *lähtevät* Vainikkalan *kautta* 1 *19*6

	Sukun- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määränsä	Osoite Suomessa
1	Kouravieva, Nonna	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Borosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S-F	Kauttakulku
4	Otchapovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Laria	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	"
6	Kolossov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	"
7	Agadjanov, Garnik	"	1922	"	"	"
8	Akolzine, Petr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	"
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Bruckers, Henry Charles	teto siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Rantalainen, Aatu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. S.H.85, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent.	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja,Ro.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Reikki Juhani	lainop.kand.	21.01.30	"	"	Kivalterint.23.C, Hki.
15						
16						
17				Passintarkastaja:		
18				V.t.ylikonst.		E. Saukkonen
19						
20						
21						
22						

16 November 1960

NOTE: GARLAND (06) and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same train.

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TS No. 197124
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KGB/Polish UB Operations Against [MORONE] 06

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female Polish UB agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls. He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in Moscow.

In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again, and when the names of code 06 clerk [Joseph MORONE] and Embassy Marine guard [Frank BEGGS] 06 were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men involved.

NOSENKO's Information

[MORONE] 06's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read 06 the file on [MORONE], and saw his visa photograph, but never saw him in person. NOSENKO discussed the [MORONE] 06 case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several KGB agents were employed against [MORONE] 06 including foreigners as well as Soviet citizens.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or heard concerning [MORONE].06 KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss [MORONE].06 and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information from IVANOVA on [MORONE] which was interesting or useful. 06

SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited America House and met [MORONE], but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled. 06

Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about [MORONE]. 06

In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of America House. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed 06 [PREISFREUND] (see the [STORSBERG] case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on [MORONE].06 The second East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.)

From one of these agents, 06 or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that [MORONE] was planning to go on leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after

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some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the 06 train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and his companion, 06 06 BEGGS, for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's 06 acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse with MORONE during the trip. 06 The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Comment: At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation he was reminded that he was en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960 and did not return to Moscow until mid-December, and that State Department records indicated that 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived on the following day. NOSENKO responded that instead of having talked to the technician personally, he may have read the technician's

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Comment: (Continued)
report and had seen "the film strips" after his return from Cuba. NOSENKO, it will be noted, had said earlier that there was no photographic coverage of [MORONE]'s train compartment. 06

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called [MORONE] at America 06
06 House, and [MORONE] subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on [MORONE]. 06 He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to attempt to recruit [MORONE]. 06 The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that was definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure [MORONE] out of 06 America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered [MORONE] out of 06 Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit [MORONE]. 06

NOSENKO has also explained 06 (to the FBI) that no attempt was made to recruit [MORONE] because Khrushchev instructed the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States.

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06

MORONE's Information

Following receipt of information about his compromise, received from a sensitive Polish source, MORONE was first 06 interviewed about the allegation in May 1961: On 19 August 1961 he was transferred from Moscow. In an October 1962 security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with 06 06 Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he 06 had sexual relations with at least two other women while in 06 Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow, 06 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. 06 MORONE has denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

Information From Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE 06 out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE and was 06 intimate with him on the train to Warsaw. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE, 06 but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a 06 suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONE and herself. 06 The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961

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and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and [MORONE] on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and [MORONE].

The Marine guard [BEGGS] has confirmed that the Polish girl and [MORONE] were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and that [MORONE] had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

[MORONE]'s fellow code clerks and residents of America House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that [MORONE] was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by SARWAT EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and [MORONE] confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the introduction of [MORONE] and other code clerks to Soviet females. [MORONE] was intimate with one of them in SARWAT's apartment in the spring of 1961. [MORONE] was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro CECCHI, and [MORONE] had admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to [MORONE] in the State Department code room, (a restricted area to which CECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that [MORONE] had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO. [MORONE] denied having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued.

The Army code clerk [STORSBERG] has reported that [MORONE] was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as "MICHAUD", was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit [STORSBERG]. (See p. 173.) [STORSBERG] recalled meeting MICHAUD at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there. In one version of his recruitment [STORSBERG] said that [MORONE] was

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in SKVORTSOV's company the night SKVORTSOV lured STORSBERG 06 to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.

Operation Against MORONE 06: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the MORONE 06 case, the use of the Polish UB female agent. He is apparently unaware of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB), such as MORONE 06's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS. He errs in relating to MORONE 06 the East German female agent sent to America House: the incident occured, but later, when MORONE 06 was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself still in the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit MORONE 06: if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other reasons. KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period between the U-2 incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis (August 1961).

Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the GARLAND 06 case.

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of recruitments among Embassy personnel.

Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks

In connection with his responsibility for directing KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961, NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code clerks who served in Moscow during that period. Their brief treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but NOSENKO's limited comments and the lack of collateral

information. The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects the KGB's knowledge of each target.

Maurice ZWANG 06

NOSENKO identified ZWANG 06 as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced 06 ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incriminating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG and 06 refused his sexual advances. In January 1962 (when NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against ZWANG. 06 The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him, and had no information indicating ZWANG 06 was vulnerable.

Comment: In connection with a State Department security interview conducted after ZWANG 06 returned from Moscow, 06 ZWANG related that in March or April 1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on several occasions but with whom he was not intimate. Although ZWANG 06 denied it, a polygraph examination indicated that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her apartment.

06 ZWANG's maid has been identified as a KGB agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that ZWANG 06 was active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.

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06

John TAYLOR

NOSENKO identified 06 TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was interested in 06 TAYLOR because of his intimacy with his Russian maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people". No attempt was made to recruit 06 TAYLOR because of the lack of compromising photographs of 06 TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG 06 case by risking a scandal with 06 TAYLOR.

Comment: 06 TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until his departure in early 1961, on one occasion in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that 06 maid had told 06 TAYLOR she was pregnant and 06 TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion. 06 TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG did not occur 06 until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, or October 1961, according to STORSBERG. 06

06

Frank DAY

NOSENKO identified 06 DAY as a State Department code clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. The KGB knew nothing interesting about him such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities he may have had. No operational measures were taken against him.

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Comment: 06 DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. 08, 06 The two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip. On one occasion they found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and on another an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

06
Robert DWELLY

Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY was 06 a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no 06 approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the operational plan against DWELLY nor the identity of any agent 06 who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV. 06

Under interrogation in February 1965, however, NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room". There was a "big hunt" for DWELLY and 06 on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free 06 from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would 06 visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained: there was no approach and no recruitment. 06

NOSENKO later added that "perhaps" GRYAZNOV's homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY in a 06 public toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis that he concluded DWELLY was a homosexual.

06

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Comment: DWELLY 06 was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk from April 1959 to July 1960. In a Department of State security interview in March 1966 (prompted by NOSENKO's information), he categorically denied being a homosexual. He described two occasions in Moscow when, while walking alone, two men, who by their general appearance and actions made him think they were "queer", were trying to attract his attention. He recalled that, on one of the two occasions, one asked him the way to the toilet.

Joseph GAFFEY 06

NOSENKO originally identified GAFFEY 06 as a military enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however, he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO supervised. The KGB attempted to lure GAFFEY 06 into downtown Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY 06 rejected her repeated invitations. The KGB was unaware of any vices GAFFEY 06 might have had and had no derogatory information regarding him.

Comment: GAFFEY 06 arrived in Moscow in September 1961. A fellow resident of America House, Fred KADERA 06, reported during a State Department security interview that GAFFEY 06 had told him that he had been intimate with a girl at America House. GAFFEY 06 told KADERA 06 that he did not know she was Russian until he was walking her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her as such. America House manager Peter BINDER 06 reported rumors in America House that GAFFEY 06

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Comment: (Continued)
was having an affair with IVANOVA in America House. He described [GAFFEY] as the heaviest 06 drinker in America House and said that occasionally 06 [GAFFEY] could not report to work due to his drinking. In describing the KGB approach made to him in early 1963, [BINDER] (see p.405) 06 quoted his interrogator as saying that [GAFFEY] 06 took IVANOVA to [BINDER]'s room in America House, 06 implying that he was intimate with her at that time.
06 [GAFFEY] was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before the expiration of his tour, because of drunkenness. During a State Department security interview, [GAFFEY] admitted 06 being intimate with IVANOVA at America House and at her apartment. 06 [GAFFEY] reported that IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion.

Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section, operations against the American code clerks were the Section's priority task and thus his most important single responsibility as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations. Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially at variance with his account, in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks. Consequently, he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among other Embassy personnel.

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Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer
John ABIDIAN

Comment: John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy Section of the American Department. The State Department replacement for CIA officer Russell LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing deaddrop emergency communications from CIA source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959, and Khrushchev at the end of 1959. These

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Comment: (Continued)
duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations. One of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy Section.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.

Duties as a Case Officer

When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN. Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN

had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA. That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counter-intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but that unit had no information not included in its original report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but none were ever received. NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments, military service, or foreign service status.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead "to another POPOV". [POPOV, a GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB sources was apprehended in 1959.]

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy

was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case. As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports.

In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the operational plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but specified that:

-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes. (According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long afterwards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. "ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the Embassy Section.

-Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

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-All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two other KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB agent -- whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were involved with ABIDIAN. GROMAKOVA, a language instructor for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He learned nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.

Comment: Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with ABIDIAN until told that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. In actuality ABIDIAN took regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons per week, from shortly after his arrival until his departure from Moscow.

The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and

no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in Armenia.]

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly, since it contained the office room number of each American employee. [The Embassy telephone list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.] ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent (identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There was no such sign.] NOSENKO was unable to determine if ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed there. [In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was found in the room occupied in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO recalled no particularly interesting or important information about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since "data of this nature was not operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development".

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made. Such information would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. However, there was no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow".

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With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

Comment: According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his travel plans with Embassy language teacher GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least some occasions used international telephone calls to arrange for accommodations at his destination in Europe. Also, the Foreign Ministry UPDK (which office provides administrative services to foreign diplomats in Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for an exit visa for each departure, could have noted from passport entries the whereabouts of his earlier travel.

ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which provides administrative services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

-Advising the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and any other necessary operational activity.

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-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen, their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. ABIDIAN attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him.

After being told ABIDIAN had attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip.

With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled having been on leave at the time. However, NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN's trip. In 1966, NOSENKO stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave was taken in January, not October.

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Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because there was nothing of interest in the conversations.

At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little about this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.

ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka. He cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet Union. He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several. He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such as a letter. All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing of metka, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed were intercepted. [NOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat, literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of light-sensitive device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had mailed a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic area, probably to Riga, and all were detected by metka, not by ABIDIAN's surveillants. According to NOSENKO, no new agents were discovered, however, since all of the agents to whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the KGB.

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Comment: NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa. No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia and Estonia.

CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. Ultra-violet, chemical and microscopic analyses developed one possible use of a metka like substance. Analysis of an article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction.

NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in Odessa and to his parents in the United States.

"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.

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"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret writing specialist). I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."

Comment: ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for him part-time from July 1961 until he left Moscow. Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed 1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.

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Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters were intercepted by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was responsible.

ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960 or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow. He provided additional details when questioned again in 1965.

NOSENKO's Information

In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the corner, where he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV, the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance

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Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. The post was manned around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected deaddrop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post at the site was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This case file NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh Department.)

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NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, and periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had already been discontinued without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.

When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:

> "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes', and I cannot say 'no'."

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Comment: ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a full year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN entered the building where the site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later, returning to the Embassy.

The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY in August 1960. CIA officer [Eugene MAHONEY] walked 03 by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960; on 21 January 1961 [MAHONEY] briefly entered the 03 building to confirm the site's precise location. If the KGB had surveilled [MAHONEY]'s visits and 03 had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO might be relating those events by mischance in attributing the visit to ABIDIAN. In such a circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN's case officer, would have known that his target visited a site which had been previously noted in connection with the suspicious movements of another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's description of ABIDIAN's route, companion, and sequence of movements is so precise as to refer clearly to ABIDIAN. Lastly, NOSENKO dislcaims any knowledge of [MAHONEY] or his activities; he 03 asserts that [MAHONEY] was neither the object of 03 KGB suspicion or concern. For reasons no combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe ABIDIAN's deaddrop site visit although it occurred at a time when NOSENKO was no longer ABIDIAN's case officer and when he was assigned to another Second Chief Directorate department.

If he turned over ABIDIAN's file on 28 December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer, as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received

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Comment: (Continued)
nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site. If he transferred to the Seventh Department two days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and NOSENKO's participation in the [M.E. JOHNSON] case 06 indicates that he was working against tourists by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited the site as he described nor could he have received thereafter the daily surveillance reports. He could not, of his own knowledge, assert that the surveillance was terminated after three months, since well before the three months' surveillance ended he was abroad in Geneva. Lastly, it cannot be for the reason NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was unsuccessful) that NOSENKO did not mention ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion

If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run the traces himself nor know the results. According to NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of the most important targets of the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio surveillance, and technical aids, with almost absolutely negative results. The results could not have been negative: for NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not informed of the results. In the two instances NOSENKO cited of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ABIDIAN Russian throughout his stay in Moscow, not just "several times". NOSENKO acknowledges

that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had to been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case officer would have issued orders for his surveillance outside of Moscow and would have later received reports of the target's activities. NOSENKO acknowledged that he was not so involved, although he belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN made. Lastly, although NOSENKO claims to know, from his Embassy Section assignment, details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop, the event occurred at a time when NOSENKO by his own account could not have been physically present in the Embassy Section.

Conclusion

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN.

Supervisor of Operations Against American Service Attaches

Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed no personal role in operations against American service attaches. He said only that when he arrived in the section, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval personnel, including the Embassy Marine guards, and when DRANOV was transferred shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were assumed by BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names and functions of American Department personnel, NOSENKO mentioned that Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN was Second Deputy to Department Chief KLYPIN: ALESHIN had the special assignment of coordinating Second Chief Directorate activities against all foreign military intelligence personnel, including service attaches.

In January 1965 NOSENKO claimed for the first time that he had among his other responsibilities as Deputy Chief that of supervising operations against American service attaches,

and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how, at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume supervisory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff of the Embassy. NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the case officers for the service attaches referred their questions to him, not to KOVSHUK. These included case officers GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all services. "While he was getting acquainted with the section on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel. This responsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall how long he supervised service attache operations; he later said "several months" and finally "five or six months". Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or duties caused him to be relieved of this function. He said this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and coordinator for Second Directorate operations against military intelligence officers of all nationalities.

Supervisor of Service Attache Operations: Summary and Conclusion

Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been responsible for operations against service attaches and because he was not able, when challenged, to substantiate his claims by providing any details of KGB activities against these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his claimed KGB service is a fiction.

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Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security

As former Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically, NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief Directorate's file on Embassy security.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derived both from his general supervisory functions during 1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB file on the Embassy security. He received the file from the Section Chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in January 1960. As was permissible under KGB procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p. 153 for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.] NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28 December 1961, only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (both of whom shared NOSENKO's office and safe) had access to the file.

The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on Chaykovskiy Street. The file contained detailed floor plans and photographs of both buildings.

No operational analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years in the Embassy Section. It was used only for reference purposes, since the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the American security precautions in effect.

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All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors", were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest in these offices. [The secure area barred to unescorted local employees is comprised of the eighth through tenth floors.]

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file, while he was custodian. None of the information was of interest or important or useful enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB agent sources. [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously] that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security Office".]

Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone. NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness and to certify the destruction of classified documents. If NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated it in any context.]

In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents. The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists contain names, apartment numbers and telephone numbers, but omits office room numbers.]

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. None of the technical specifications of the room were known, nor was its location. An unrecalled source reported only that meetings were held in the room, which was in the restricted area.

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The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material during 1960-1961. A charwoman who was an agent of BELOGLAZOV stole a bag of papers from the Naval Attache office. The torn and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the KGB. The charwoman was granted a cash award.

Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code room, or the State Department communications center. In fact, he cannot describe the location of the office of any individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador. When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never read it nor paid any "special attention" to its content in the two years he was file custodian. It is concluded that NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an invention.

Audio Operations Against the American Embassy

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversations. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have attended a meeting at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific microphones hidden in the Embassy. Lastly, NOSENKO claimed he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his former subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in 1962, as the most important he provided CIA.

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NOSENKO's Information

Handling of Monitor Reports

According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports. These included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies), KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB Departments. The reports were produced by the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU). The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN. KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and transcribed the tape recordings. Their reports of the preceding day's product were brought daily by Tatyana GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American Department. (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he received the reports first, at other times that they went first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours returned the reports to the Second Special Department. In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised the source of the information contained: the abstracts were returned to the American Department for the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy.

Location of the Microphones

In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the service attaches and particularly, to conversations held in the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he referred to "points" [microphones] in the office of an unnamed State Department employee, in the Agricultural Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the Embassy code room.

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In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the microphones in the Embassy which were operative in the years 1960-1961. NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department Chief KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section for use against non-Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special Section, but had been told that English linguists were engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be released to PETROV's Second Section. KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of lesser importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, temporarily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of the information obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.

NOSENKO's list showed that microphones were located in the following offices of the noted occupants:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

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NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in the chancery building before the Americans occupied it, but he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulnerable to technical search and discovery.

According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military personnel. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans, as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because of the risk of discovery. For the same reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers. The KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would be a scandal.

Performance Characteristics of the Microphones

According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it because they could not gain access to the inside of the Embassy. Referring to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to work with its product. The microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper". KUZMIN, the KGB officer responsible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in place, about twenty no longer were operative.

In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. NOSENKO learned from DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to

monitor conversations in that office. Only very experienced linguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten, fifteen, even twenty times" in order to understand portions of the recording. After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section, on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones' decline. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up only snatches of conversation, and that in a year or two they would be completely inoperative. As a result, GRYAZNOV told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of code clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality of the microphone's signal, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV attributed the diminishing value of the audio operation to the Embassy use of the "room-in-a-room". [NOSENKO said that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in preparation for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber" had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conversations could be held.]

Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the building in 1962. In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva he described how he knew. When it was decided to permit the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a proposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval was held up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations because of the political consequences of discovery. By the time Shelepin approved the proposal two or three months later, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises. The opportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones. Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister Counsellor, the service attaches, and others presently occupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, be moved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neither audio equipment nor the capability of installing any.

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Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production

In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified, GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy personnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out.

In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He said that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke. When one of them was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was advance information obtained of a social affair, for which the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special Department would be asked to pay particular attention. There was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a political officer) office, but no secret information was obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant was obtained except "something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.

In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

"From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

"Also from the microphones in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB.

"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific service attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against service attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

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"I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone of any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

"During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

Results of Technical and Physical Search

NOSENKO's information [no action had been taken as a result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was a microphone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964. According to the USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery. [In 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.] The microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the various microphone installations. Fifty microphones were positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were found], although the system apparently was devised for a considerably greater number. The microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions. The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery in 1953.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic. The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation, probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing in 1962.

Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied the north wing, used it as a listening post for monitoring microphones in the chancery. In preparation for American occupancy the main cable from the chancery was concealed and run from the north wing roof to the basement, and presumably from there to a listening post elsewhere. The three coaxial cables may have been either installed at that time or earlier. Their purpose is still unknown, but they may have been a feature of a highly sophisticated electronic attack against the code room, the existence or character of which NOSENKO did not know and need not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in 1965 by CIA that there had been a technical discovery in the north wing, he offered his personal assurances that nothing was installed in the north wing and insisted that whatever was found must be something unrelated to an audio system.

Damage Estimates

With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetration, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable

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knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col. HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just the conversations held in his office, could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code clerk STORSBERG 06 was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager Peter BINDER 06 (the personality problems, drinking habits and other incidents relating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS 06 from Moscow (homosexuality). [Besides his general duties as Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in the KGB attempts to recruit STORSBERG and KEYSERS. 06 (The KGB attempted later to recruit BINDER, 06 as well.)] In summing up his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised."

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Audio Operations Against American Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims, e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the chancery.

NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones' existence is not proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or even proof that he served in that unit). KGB sources serving elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specifically identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's office.

NOSENKO's acquisition of the list of microphones in "1960-1961" is singular (the more so since he never hinted of the list's existence while describing the microphones in the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired, that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates (GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two years, important ones of which were forwarded to Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such significance that they were the subjects of special reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Yet when challenged he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United

States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB), as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the microphones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained, he asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section. Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery microphones as sources of information on which he relied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel, he again can describe no actual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones (KEYSERS' failure to report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error. 06

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications

As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed

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st to the KGB he recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority
Of the micro- ask in 1960-1961]. He "knew", however, that the Eighth
NKO describes irectorate was reading at least some State Department
office of mbassy traffic.
hallenged to
rts that none
bassy Section
chancery
he relied to oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed
r Embassy f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was
tance. In reading all the State Department ciphers". He knew this
elied on ecause he saw the clear-text messages every day. In a
S' failure to ubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to
was in error xplain that while no service attache traffic was being
ead, certain State Department codes had been broken. He
ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables,
t the most, "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961.

NOSENKO's Information

The Russian text of those deciphered State Department
essages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who some-
imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief
ENKO's claim irectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the
y microphone aterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American
Deputy Chief epartment, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO
rsonally aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on
EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it.
ikolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief
irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State
epartment messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. He would open
he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit
LYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the material. This was Eighth
irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how
EMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were
ead aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the
ions osition of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government
n political questions and were of no significance to him.
nfrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of
of the mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy,
dgeable of nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the
ack on rrival of a one-or two-man "commission", to check the work
erted that f the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of
d communica tate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on
he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest

in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information.

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means.

NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms.

> "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations]. In the military code room--that was where [James H.] STORSBERG and later [Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we didn't get much. We could hear STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also."

With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by [James H.] McMILLAN [a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948], and by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to

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"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Department and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow a single code room was shared by State Department and military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment.]

NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American code clerk brought to the USSR from India" [unidentified, but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communications technician who defected to the USSR sometime between 1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized].

NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting regular reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned that various Embassy officers were less often overheard from KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant information. This development GRYAZNOV and American Department Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room" installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures. [The acoustical room was installed in December 1962.] After his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV told him that the Central Committee was exerting considerable pressure on the KGB Chairman for continuation of the information formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all KGB officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.

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Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications: Summary and Conclusion

From USIB and NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959. "ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953, serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications, and that such information as he provided can not be related to his claim to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy

As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the identification and development of American Intelligence personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment. The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect

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American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA. Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and on some officers who were not.

Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers

Boris KLOSSON 06

KLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow, for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter mailing. KLOSSON's case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON. He never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of KLOSSON's job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or any other features of his personal life, of his travels inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never read KLOSSON's file.

Comment: KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no connection with CIA in Moscow.

John ABIDIAN

ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a Department of State security officer during Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE. Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed operational letters and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See p. 206)

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Comment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.

Steve WASHENKO

WASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as an economic analyst to be assigned to Moscow. He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings. He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment.

Lewis BOWDEN

BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.

Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.

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Richard FUNKHAUSER

FUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on economic matters. NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB agents working against FUNKHAUSER, nor any information about him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB.

Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.

William HORBALY

HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try to recruit HORBALY.

Comment: Like WASHENKO, HORBALY was an overt employee and economic analyst of CIA before being appointed to a State Department position in Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact that he had formerly worked for CIA. In January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. While in Moscow HORBALY had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities.

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George WINTERS

WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case (see p.207). KOVSHUK was in personal contact with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.

CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB

Stanley BROWN

NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list indicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception, but insignificant production.

Comment: Like HORBALY and WASHENKO, 03 BROWN was an overt employee of CIA who was transferred to the Department of Agriculture prior to being assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He was engaged in no clandestine activities during his tour. In 1960 he visited Leningrad with WINTERS, whom NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer. BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR in 1961. 24

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06
William N. MORELL

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ctivity in the
ıal contact
: Foreign Af-
3 microphone
he returned

MORELL was not suspected of being a CIA officer.

06

Comment: 06 MORELL was an overt employee of CIA who was identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS (see p.430) 06 a KGB officer allegedly commented to STEVENS 06 06 that MORELL openly acknowledged himself to be a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivating MORELL. 06

03
Eugene MAHONEY

hose name was
a list in-
LY. In that
d reception,

NOSENKO identified 03 MAHONEY's name as that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was known of MAHONEY such as his previous career, whether he knew Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where he lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was a CIA officer.

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being assigne
engaged in
ıis tour.
WINTERS, who
CIA officer.
ıbassy staff
luring a trip

Comment: 03 MAHONEY was a CIA officer who served in Moscow from October 1960 until September 1961 as an 32 assistant General Services Officer. His specific CIA mission was to support communications with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. From the start of his tour he was active in attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. 03 MAHONEY went to the vicinity of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two occasions during November and December 1960,

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Comment: (Continued)
and examined the site itself on 21 January 1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour [MAHONEY] 03 was subjected to intense KGB surveillance. On 25 October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to a barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong 03 suspicions of [MAHONEY]'s primary role as a CIA officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreet.) 03 [MAHONEY] lived throughout his tour in Moscow in America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents among the local employees. 03 [MAHONEY] spoke Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees.

Paul GARBLER

GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)

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Comment: The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow, GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952, and he served CIA under Naval cover 32,10 in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the 32,10 cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer. He returned to active duty with the Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposed as a candidate for the position of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official biographic summary, followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p. .) CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October 1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage in Sweden.

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Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is most evident in the cases of MORELL and GARBLER. It is a fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents

NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during 1960-1961.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he transferred to the American Department (see p. 111). They were used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO described the compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 and knew of his later recruitment in 1961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO does not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.]

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06
FRIPPEL

NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the 29 American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Department. (See p. 137.) 06 FRIPPEL was an uncooperative and unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the American Embassy.

DMITRIYEV

NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the 1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. (See p. 107.) He was not used operationally during 1960 or 1961.

Marina RYTOVA

NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used operationally during 1960-1961.

Maya LEVINA

LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the Embassy used as an informant on her American language students, among whom were a number of code clerks. She provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was she ever used in operations. At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH, and NOSENKO 06 turned her over to another Embassy Section officer. The British Department planned later to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies. [LEVINA was employed at the Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. Cultural 08, 06 Affairs Officer SMITH left Moscow in September 1961, and could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termination. LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout NOSENKO's tour of duty with the Embassy Section.]

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06
[PREISFREUND]

Recruited by KOVSHUK, [PREISFREUND] 06 was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against [STORSBERG] (see p. 166). He was 06 used in no other operation during 1960-1961.

[WEISS] 06

The [Syrian Army captain] 06 studying in Moscow was first targetted against America House occupants, then used in 06 the development of [ZUJUS], [STORSBERG]'s successor. 06 The latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion

Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment, none was used operationally during 1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was not fired earlier, as he asserted. 06 [PREISFREUND] and [WEISS] 06 are discussed in considerable detail in connection with the KGB operations against [STORSBERG] and [ZUJUS]. 06 NOSENKO's claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or did not serve in the Embassy Section.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Temporary Assignments Abroad

NOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled) and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960 and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments. The significance of his travel is the extent to which it relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed supervisory responsibility.

Planned Travel to the United States

In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated that he had been in the United States. He later amended this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled. He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid being connected to the name NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early account he claimed that the decision to use his true name was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision was made by "the people in charge of such operations". NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee [GNTK], and was to accompany an automotive delegation. The visit, however, was part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO's travel was cancelled.

Comment: The name of NOSENKO appeared along with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)

When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy there for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation as a security officer.

NOSENKO's Information

In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure for Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate decided it was unnecessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Directorate officer accompany the group. Because of the short time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.

NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation

everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between Mikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. On arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern Europe and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived in Berlin Guevara was found to have left Berlin for Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.

Comment: Travel records obtained by CIA, which include photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas of NOSENKO's true name service passport and his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO, a "minerals engineer", transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)
Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.

NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier, bearing documents of the nature he described as he claimed.

NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising operations during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk 06 [MORONE], was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November) in connection with another code clerk target, [John GARLAND].

06

Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)

In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief Directorate American Department officer to discuss operations with Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American [professor Horace G. LUNT].

06

NOSENKO's Information

Consultation with the MVR

NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV

said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had requested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia. American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed NOSENKO to go. NOSENKO was told that he was going for "consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his duties with him. KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed its operations. NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with MVR representatives in Moscow before his departure, and knew nothing about the size or responsibilities of the MVR American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what the MVR's particular problems were.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961 and was met at the airport by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow. The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation, everything, right from letter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria. As far as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom NOSENKO himself described. The American Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demonstrated that it had lost none of its earlier demonstrated efficiency in controlling the activities of resident foreigners and in establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats. There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assignment, and therefore his account is judged to be untrue.

Compromise of [LUNT] 06

06 In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of [LUNT] in graphic terms, including his own personal confrontation of [LUNT]. In his subsequent accounts he had stated 06 that while he never saw [LUNT] personally, he supervised the activities of the MVR officers who dealt with [LUNT]. 06

About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name of [Horace G. LUNT]. 06 NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR officers confirmed that this [LUNT] was a Slavic specialist, 06 NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same [LUNT] who 06 had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a homosexual. (The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of [LUNT]'s homo- 06 sexual activities and the MVR had not known that [LUNT] was 06 a homosexual.)

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited an American". The three discussed the matter with General DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made for clandestine photography. They then advised YEGOROV, the senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV in Moscow. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involvement in the entrapment of LUNT 06 and NOSENKO's role thereafter was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what to do".

NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two homosexual agents, since "maybe LUNT wouldn't like one of them", and he advised them to weigh the time element in deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view to attempting to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for later blackmail. The MVR American Department Chief and his Tourist Section chief were to attempt the recruitment. NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further assistance.

NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had agreed to meet them again on the following day. NOSENKO later was told that the MVR did not give LUNT arrangements for a contact in the United States because he was expected to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language conference in 1962 or 1963.

LUNT's Information

LUNT travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there on 9 May 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George Kennan and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route back to the United States. He was given no other tasks.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06 [LUNT] stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in [LUNT]'s company, 06 ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian civil police. 06 [LUNT] corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.

Comment: 06 [LUNT]'s account refutes NOSENKO's claims that the MVR had no evidence of [LUNT]'s vulnerability 06 prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in May 1961, and that NOSENKO's personal participation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that [LUNT] was given no MVR contact in the United States. 06

NOSENKO's involvement in the 06 [LUNT] case is unrelated to the assignment he claims at the time. Although NOSENKO cites the [LUNT] case in 06 connection with his Embassy Section duties, it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation.

NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961 (when he claims his operation against [STORSBERG] 06 was approaching a climax and when his subordinates were apparently planning to exploit 06 [KEYSERS]' newly-discovered vulnerability) indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow was dispensable. The [LUNT] case is thus not 06 evidence supporting NOSENKO's claims regarding Embassy Section service in April-May 1961, nor regarding supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Promotion and Transfer to the Seventh Department (January 1962)

NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole American Department. However, according to NOSENKO, the new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior. Under the circumstances, NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO reported that he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section, with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962. NOSENKO asserted his proposal was made and approved by GRIBANOV in September or October 1961. GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for later promoting him to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962.

In view of his impending transfer, starting in December 1961 NOSENKO said he spent several hours each day in the Seventh Department. There he stated he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961, and within the next few days NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961. Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Seventh Department. Repeated interrogation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected.

In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Department compromise of [W.E. JOHNSON] is confirmed), NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)

NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV's candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the American Department is implausible. In contrast to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief of the American Department who had been personally involved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of CIA officers WINTERS and [MORELL] and the interrogation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more recent attempt to recruit [STORSBERG].

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January 1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, supervisor of all operations against code clerks and for some months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO's assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral information, he was none of these. Further, while he may have been familiar with the activities of some agents of the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in the manner nor circumstances he claimed.

From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter, of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff, and of the status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned elsewhere. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by the KGB. NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and in error.

Conclusion

NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a supervisor in that section.

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CHAPTER VIII

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 1964)

Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information obtained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, included accurate details of the objectives and targets of those operations, as well as the practices employed for the selection, recruitment, training and briefing of the agents involved. As a probable consequence of reports received from BLAKE as well as by the independent confirmation of tourist agents identified in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all of its resources to counter the threat. The KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the numbers of which were increasing by thousands annually. Evidently uncertain of the success of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Directorate. To that end, selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities in developing tourist agent countermeasures. In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problem, KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American tourist agents who had been identified in just one year in the Soviet Union.

In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962, the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed. By early 1961 the tourist agent program was suspended when technical collection programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary.

The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department counterintelligence operations among American

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued)
tourists during this period must be examined in light of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which vantage he asserts he was particularly well informed about KGB operations against American tourists, it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements.

NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department, first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his defection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former functions unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service (sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union, and persons travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere.

In addition to performing supervisory and administrative duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six American tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey OSWALD and of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he travelled on two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department duties.

Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (January - July 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against American (and British and Canadian tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of fifteen subordinate case officers. He had no deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962 to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid-February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. This involved discussions with the Eleventh (Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, as well as with case officers responsible for the investigation of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva, SHAKHOV. NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only part-time and in addition to his other regular duties. He spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB, a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Department in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruitment of FRIPPEL.] 06

NOSENKO's Agents

NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department he brought with him the agents which he had been handling in the American Department Embassy Section.

Arsene FRIPPEL 06 2-9-06

American Express manager FRIPPEL departed from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer since FRIPPEL had no 06 contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met 06 FRIPPEL twice in the USSR in 1963. According to NOSENKO,

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

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FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

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Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter.

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Johannes PREISFREUND

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The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

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Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175, and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

According to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual agents in the entrapment of W. E. JOHNSON several days after returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, because they were employed in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NOSENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110)

Comment: There is evidence that VOLKOV was invclved in a KGB entrapment operation directed against American tourist William J. ZUBON in July 1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his case officer), an event of which NOSENKO apparently is uninformed.

Samih WEISS

After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military code clerk ZUJUS (see p. 161). NOSENKO continued to meet WEISS during the first months of 1962, and in February or March he attempted to have WEISS arrange a social affair with ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first time, NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's successor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section. WEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to Syria.

Comment: Because of the political climate in Syria, there has been no opportunity to query WEISS regarding NOSENKO's allegations.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Marina RYTOVA

Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964.

NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sustain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department operations.

Operational Activities (January - June 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962, NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of [W.E. JOHNSON] 06 in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his assertion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited [Horst BRAUNS]. 06

Entrapment of [W.E. JOHNSON] 06

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first referred to [JOHNSON] 06 in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, [JOHNSON], a 06 08 [young Baptist from California]. The KGB was angered that the American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union. Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319) one bearing the name of Everett Wallace[sic] JOHNSON and the date "5 January 1962". Questioned about the note, NOSENKO recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date, and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some sort of developmental operation".

NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that it was something like JOHNSON or JOHNSTON, and that he was a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he wore no overcoat at the time. JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was discovered to be a homosexual, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. The Second Chief Directorate was not interested in JOHNSON as an agent because he had no access to important information and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that the KGB decided something had to be done" to prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. "At about the same time" there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR. No recruitment was to be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (NOSENKO said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.

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[JOHNSON] became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told [JOHNSON] that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited [JOHNSON] to visit their hotel room. [JOHNSON] agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals)." Under the guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB officers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [JOHNSON] was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the room where [JOHNSON] was being held.

The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO, in [JOHNSON]'s presence. Addressing [JOHNSON], NOSENKO said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight." Frightened, [JOHNSON] wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached [JOHNSON] in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When [JOHNSON] said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be released to the foreign press if [JOHNSON] were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that [JOHNSON] had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his notes paired [JOHNSON]'s name with the date of 5 January 1962, NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime. [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as the date of [JOHNSON]'s entrapment, since it occurred "immediately after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]

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06 JOHNSON's Information

According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his 06 visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority in Moscow requesting permission to preach there. He was informed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06 subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activity on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues.29 During his ten-day stay in Moscow, JOHNSON wrote and posted letters to some twenty persons outside the USSR.

06 06
JOHNSON reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plainclothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day. JOHNSON, 06 who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor" spoke English poorly, and JOHNSON agreed to visit the doctor's 06 room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon 06 after JOHNSON arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the "student" made homosexual advances.06 JOHNSON protested and started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06 room where he was confronted with a man who identified himself as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV, "the Chief of Police". 06 After threatening JOHNSON with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" offered to dismiss the matter, provided JOHNSON would sign a 06 commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.

On 8 January 06 JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs allegedly taken of JOHNSON and the "student" in the hotel room previously. 06

Shown photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, 06 JOHNSON thought VOLKOV to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as the "Police Chief".

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Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student" YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and was called Georgiy.

Although JOHNSON apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. According to NOSENKO's version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was a homosexual, concluded from "two or three" censored letters that he was a threat, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that JOHNSON's homosexuality was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO) before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's ignorance of JOHNSON's preaching (probably the actual cause of KGB concern) is further evidence that NOSENKO did not know the complete background of the KGB operation, and that his role was merely that of playing the "Police Chief".

NOSENKO's participation in this case contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department.
(See p. 260.)

William Carroll JONES

NOSENKO's Information

JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six or seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian Baptists. He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew President Kennedy. He was the target of Seventh Department case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union in 1962 JONES became involved with a Soviet female. Although she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took contrcl of her relationship with JONES and, on JONES' subsequent trips to the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully sought to obtain incriminating photographs.

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Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES (the sponsor of the annual Presidential "prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed the substance of NOSENKO's information but denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet female. JONES claimed to have made 24 trips to the Soviet Union and to have successfully smuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerous occasions. According to JONES, in 1963 Pravda publicized an incident in which a number of Bibles were confiscated from his luggage.

A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by GOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connection with a description of his Bible-smuggling activities.

NOSENKO reported the JONES case in 1962 in Geneva and stated that the Seventh Department case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO's subordinate in the Section. However, NOSENKO's ignorance of JONES' Bible smuggling (the activity which most likely prompted KGB action) and of the fact that JONES' activities had been publicized in the Soviet press, indicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection with the case.

Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCK

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB recruited BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to the USSR. The Seventh Department case officers were K.G. KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf of the Leningrad KGB. The latter had become interested in the American tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boy friend in Leningrad. (NOSENKO himself would have attempted the recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for Geneva in April 1962.) During the recruitment, the KGB officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an American Intelligence agent and that she had been involved

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in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States. The ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB, which concluded that [BIENSTOCK] was an agent either of CIA or of the FBI. After recruitment, [BIENSTOCK] was turned over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D (Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence.

Comment: [BIENSTOCK] was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the ballerina's brother in the USSR. [BIENSTOCK] refused, and the letter was delivered by other means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, [BIENSTOCK] acknowledged in July 1964 that she had been recruited by the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962, and that she had been intimidated by the KGB accusation of her involvement with the ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its knowledge of that involvement.) [BIENSTOCK] also admitted having contact in the United States through secret writing with KGB officers, until the letters ceased at KGB initiative in late 1962 or early 1963.

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Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)

NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962 as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. In addition to performing that function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and associated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period. Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO contacted CIA.

Purpose of Trip to Geneva

NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed officially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defection in Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union without an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has since stated that he can recall no such order.]

Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case officer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a department. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the trip on the basis that it would last only a month.

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In addition to his general security duties with the delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor, Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).

During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva. He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment, but that [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department, made the selection. The latter department was investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Department Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's assignment. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat", even though he had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy, and the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.

Investigation of SHAKHOV

According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case. He also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.

NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva earlier he was somehow connected with American diplomat [David MARK], 06

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who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with [MARK] in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, [redacted] KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

[redacted]

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

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Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]

KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation

NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G. FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the American Section of TASS and was "a genuine correspondent"; "definitely not an intelligence officer".

Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of the delegates as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO, Georges PAQUES. [British Intelligence] has reported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the permanent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled

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Comment: (Continued) a British double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time.

Association with Other Soviets

According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the "ANDREY" case: see p. 33 .)

A.K. KISLOV

TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other delegates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women. With reference to the threat posed his security by KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event constituted no threat.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.

In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.

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Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. [redacted]

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

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Association with British Female Secretary

NOSENKO has described his association with a British secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had probably believed him to be an intelligence officer.

Comment: According to an official British report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident came to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties". A Swiss official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent BELITSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He

learned of the case through his friendship with the chief of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Department, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know the date of recruitment but knew the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the Embassy Section (January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelligence).

The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside the Soviet Union, to learn the channels and means through which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This was the "most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure American Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union. After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him...didn't hold any meetings with him". Nevertheless, he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in somewhat deeper". The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya [disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used. (In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of the agent.)

Comment: According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its operations alone or in conjunction with (never subordinate to) other KGB departments.

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NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTEMOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter-intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Americans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him".

As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who was "called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the same as that of the person whose apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself had an "un-lived-in" look.

When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information, of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB. In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV arranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add things on his own". For this reason, the KGB limited BELITSKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant.

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Comment: NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA relationship is substantially correct, except for some inaccuracies about the origin of the case. BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio Moscow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry" in a safe apartment.

NOSENKO's version of his role in the case, however, is implausible. He asserts that BELITSKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances among influential officials of the Soviet Government, an agent ostensibly under the control of CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva to resume contact with CIA. The KGB, according to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible case officer nor an officer of the KGB section responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states that the KGB instead detailed a "young and inexperienced" KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even knowledge of operating conditions in Geneva. NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instructed NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unofficially, who had no experience or training in double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the other "inexperienced" KGB officer. NOSENKO can cite no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, although he claims he exchanged messages with Moscow about the case.

ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. He had had continuous service with the Second Chief Directorate at least since 1958, and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's

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Comment: (Continued)
involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American Section.

Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation started, did not know the nature of [British] involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB operation, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.

From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory function in the BELITSKIY case.

Contact with CIA

On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer [David MARK] 06 reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the following day. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told 06 [MARK] privately that he would like to talk to [MARK] as soon as 06 possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but "simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an earlier date. 06 [MARK] advised CIA of the appointment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.

At the 9 June luncheon with [MARK] 06, NOSENKO identified himself as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that [MARK] had 06 previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to

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be an American intelligence officer. NOSENKO said he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. The first item was the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow, who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area. The second item was the identity of a Soviet citizen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been planted on CIA by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed a one-time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of 9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union. He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell the two specified items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of becoming an American agent and that after his proposed transaction, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite this assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33) and the KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information about himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directorate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to more than a score of American citizens who had been compromised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB

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audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow. Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23) and described a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30). He talked freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delegation. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive KGB operations. He described his education, his service in the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general functions and operating techniques of the various components of the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the approximate dates of his service.

Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communication with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other year. He said he would not consider defecting except in circumstances in which his personal security was endangered, citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the Russian people.

NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were made for him to do so, when he came to the West again. Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain information which he was informed was of interest to CIA.

06

Attempted Recruitment of [Horst BRAUNS]

Immediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist [BRAUNS].

06

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NOSENKO's Information

BRAUNS was Russian born, and he lived in Leningrad until the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated. He eventually settled in the United States where the First Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, and other instruments". When BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV to handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take BRAUNS out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. KRUPNOV "couldn't get anywhere" with BRAUNS, and he called on NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from the Soviet Union). BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky", he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad and again talked to BRAUNS. BRAUNS was so frightened, however, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS was sent on his way.

NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union, nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS met in the USSR.

In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the BRAUNS case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his name.

Comment: NOSENKO did not mention BRAUNS in 1962. BRAUNS arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962, after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva. BRAUNS' version is consistent with the events as related by NOSENKO, although he could not identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other contexts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh

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Comment: (Continued)
Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, both of which were the responsibility of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that [BRAUNS] was a former Soviet citizen. [BRAUNS]' plan to visit relatives in Leningrad was information also available to the KGB through his visa application. [BRAUNS] had corresponded for a year before his visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned approach to [BRAUNS] in the hotel. NOSENKO was unaware of these facts.

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the transfer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims involvement only in the [W.E. JOHNSON] case, his time being spent either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department, over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his functions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season.

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In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELITSKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow, immediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, 06 he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man Seventh Department.

Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American Department", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred, as he said, in mid-January 1962, his earlier participation in 06 the JOHNSON compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time 06 for the JOHNSON operation, he could not have played the role he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop, see p. 216). In the period with one exception, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the five operations NOSENKO described as occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission, they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism because of tortuous contradictions. In Geneva he neither directed the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELITSKIY case, as he claimed.

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department (July 1962 - January 1964)

In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO

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was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB position during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO returned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD"). SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG personnel in New York City. NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. SVENCHANSKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Intourist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency.

SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form.

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When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV accompanied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow (in September 1963 and at the end of 1963).

Comment: SVENCHANSKIY, a Russian-born naturalized American citizen, is president of Afton Tours of New York City and the Cross World Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His partner, and the actual operator of Afton Tours, is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one-time "confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet espionage date back to the Second World War. His involvement in espionage has been publicized in the press (notably in a 1953 New York Times account of Harry GOLD's allegations).

Since SOKOLOW manages the Afton Tours office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually is occupied elsewhere with his other firm, he would be unlikely to review and mark suspect visa applications, as NOSENKO alleged. SVENCHANSKIY's background is such as to have prevented his being interviewed on the basis of the information NOSENKO provided.

NOSENKO did not refer to his association with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described it only after referring to the written notes he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)

Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER

On 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of "having connections with the FBI."

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NOSENKO's Information

06 [SLESINGER] came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that 06 [SLESINGER] was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. 06 [SLESINGER] had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning [SLESINGER] planned 06 another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that [SLESINGER] was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on [SLESINGER], 06 and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly 06 with [SLESINGER] while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. 06 [SLESINGER] went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit [SLESINGER], 06 but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. [SLESINGER] had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

06

Comment: [redacted]

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. [Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER], 06 reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa [SLESINGER] was contacted by a 06 Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether [SLESINGER] had "ever been bothered by the FBI." 06

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Comment: (Continued) 06
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in 06 contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case. 06

06
KOTEN's Arrest [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, 06 a guide for 29 Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of 06 Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN 06 was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name. [redacted]

NOSENKO's Information

06
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocatio agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the 06 Communist Party in the United States.

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On the eve of 06 KOTEN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh Department learned from V.S. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's S&T Department that 06 KOTEN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important S&T agent of the New York residency, and that 06 KOTEN intended to visit the agent's relatives while in the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be repatriated to the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the agent balked, arousing KGB suspicions. When it was found that 06 KOTEN was acquainted with the agent, the 06 KGB concluded that 06 KOTEN "evidently received from American Intelligence an assignment to visit [the agent's relatives]." After 06 KOTEN visited the relatives in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as a suspect American Intelligence agent. 06 KOTEN was entrapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested, although he was released when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested.

06 NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest nor meet 06 KOTEN, although he supervised the arrest from KGB Headquarters.

Comment: 06 KOTEN's arrest on charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the New York Times. In an interview with representatives of the Department of State, 06 KOTEN described how he had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28 August 1963, accused of being an American Intelligence agent and interrogated for three days, and held in jail for a month.

GRU Agent 06 John SHUBIN

The name of 06 John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth were among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva.

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NOSENKO's Information

06 SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. 06 SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN 06 was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was 06 placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance 06 observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent. 06

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name 06 and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according 06 to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN. 06

Comment: [redacted]

06 SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring 06 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

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Arrest of BARGHOORN

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964. NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. (NOSENKO had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself.")

NOSENKO's Information

In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the American Department. After describing the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and they had been observed taking notes. They could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow.

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GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on what other possibilities existed. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Seventh Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time. These included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American target. All information on BARGHOORN was gathered, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special substance which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials", but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06 29 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

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It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.)

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy. While the four -- NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV -- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN. Khrushchev was absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with [ORCHARD of the British Embassy] at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN

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had left the American Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to a Militia station where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a document was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Seventh Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained

the missile documents.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.

After one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB Department of Prosecution so that they could begin legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by that department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

Comment: BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment, arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly precisely with the version provided by NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the second day of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the proceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being "clever and quick-witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

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The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD.

NOSENKO's Information

Residence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR.

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Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.

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NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically instructed local authorities there to take no action concerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter, and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically nil."

Request to Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962, by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. No further word on him was received at KGB Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, requesting information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counterintelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD. The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the inquiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.

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NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

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Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. This summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction". GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specific instructions to carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

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OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assignments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSWALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particularly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Headquarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States.

Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had

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Comment: (Continued)
earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD.

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trustworthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten documents which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N. CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy Section and in November 1963 sent them through an intermediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow, and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV.

The significance of the CHEREPANOV incident is twofold. The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Department's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO has offered to substantiate his claim to personal participation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.

Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer.

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When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified) problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the American Department, working against State Department personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer for three KGB targets: Richard SNYDER and John McVICKAR, counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTE, secretary to the personnel officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him. Because of his service in World War II, for which he received three years' pension credit for each year of military service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for retirement from the KGB.

Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHERFPANOV got a job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.

Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for destruction.

In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about "a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO. MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of (Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent operations against an American. He noted that one of the documents was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV's deputy went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers. The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel assigned to the American Department during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.

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When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's handwriting, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of sight".

An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued, then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, and all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.

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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: [redacted]

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

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Contents of the CHEREPANOV Package

The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost equally between typewritten reports in final form and handwritten draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in Washington] whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August 1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV. (NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted by the KGB, a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various handwritten drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans.

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The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveillance, technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveillance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet citizens. The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment was that WINTERS "had a hostile attitude toward the USSR" and that there "was no basis for recruitment", care should be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity to attempt to recruit him.

NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar with their substance.

Comment: The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE, HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational techniques such as the use of metka.

NOSENKO's Travel Document

When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964 his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document (see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast to search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to Gorkiy during the period immediately before NOSENKO's trip to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that it was "illegal" to have kept the document and to have brought it with him from the Soviet Union. He did it, he said, to show CIA.

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Comment: NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention of the document nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher. Whatever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350). When he eventually said in 1966 that he was only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to explain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number of handwritten notes to which he referred when describing to CIA officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival, however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once, because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought to the United States.

Exhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

FRONT


КОМИТЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при Совете Министров СССР

15 декабря 1963 г.

1933

Командировочное удостоверение №

Выдано подполковнику Носенко Юрию Ивановичу

Командированному в УКГБ Горьковской области

Срок командировки 15 дней

по 30 декабря 1963 г.

Основание: распоряжение нач. Главного Управления

Действительно при предъявлении удостоверения личности НК-2513

Начальник Управления

Комитета Государственной безопасности при Совете Министров СССР

Committee for State Security Under the Council of Ministers, USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO Yuriy Ivanovich

For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya Oblast'

Length of temporary assignment: 15 days

through: 30 December 1963

Authorization: directive of Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate of Department

Committee for State Security Under the Council of Ministers, USSR

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Purpose of Geneva Trip

NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had brought him to Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as "a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he expected to become, he would travel to the West every two or three years.] He had discussed the possibility of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation. [A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department, supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would not have permitted NOSENKO to go.

NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962. He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment (e.g., investigating SHAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY operation).

Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would draw an unrelated assignment abroad which would last many weeks if not months. In another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season: he acknowledged that he was expected to attend, but nevertheless went to Geneva.

EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

REVERSE

1. Командированный не позднее 3-дневного срока по возвращении из командировки обязан представить авансовый отчет об израсходованных в связи с командировкой суммах.
2. При получении проездного билета предъявить в жел.-дор. кассу командировочное удостоверение для наложения компостера.

ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

(указываются даты прибытия и убытия, заверенные подписью и печатью)

Прибыл г. Горький 16 декабря 1963
Прибыл г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963
бесплатной квартирой
не пользовался.
Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р милиции Дубов

Убыл из г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963
бесплатной квартирой не
пользовался
Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р милиции Дубов

Убыл из Горького 17 декабря 1963
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Убыл из Москвы "____" _____ 196 г.
Прибыл в Москву "____" _____ 196 г.

Нач. секретариата

Печать

ФИНО КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расходы по командировке в сумме

Руб. _____

Перевозочные требования №№ 005867, 005870

Талоны на плацкарту №№ _____

Ст. бухгалтер

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy
16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye
17 XII 1963 Did not use
free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major_____
(Illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major_____
(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./_____(Illegible)

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Visits to Legal Residency

As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Residency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an officer in his status [temporary duty assignment which was independent of Residency] should not do so, but his case was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL. Illegals Directorate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently. TSYMBAL's wife once had taught NOSENKO in school, and TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.

Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his "old friend Yuriy GUK", not TSYMBAL. He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.

Availability for Meetings with CIA

In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. He said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February, NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight.

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NOSENKO's Written Notes

After returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB documents to which he had access, when he could safely do so. He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected items which he had excerpted from various documents to which he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh Department operations. He last had access to this special file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names, he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained in his notes by asking KGB colleagues. For safekeeping, NOSENKO said he kept the notes and documents in a wall safe of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of the Department.

Questioned repeatedly about the KGB operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more.

Comment: NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not explain how he learned of the cases described in the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period not covered by the documents NOSENKO claimed he reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of operations which occurred while he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American-British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknowledges that his access to a personal safe in

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued)
which to keep the notes was just fortuitous, since neither all offices had such safes, nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.

NOSENKO's Defection

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family". He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

-The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access;

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-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;

-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;

-The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. [From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. He cited as reasons the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkin himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following

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Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans.

On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHERPANOV Papers, (see p.309) which he was told were en route from Washington. He explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.

On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had

agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. Semichastnyy had decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning". NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964.

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Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, 06 the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations 06 of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, 06 his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

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tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

The KGB agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6 meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963. Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:

> "It has been established that the Intelligence organs of the USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels, specifically, in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delegations, in the USSR strive to visit areas and installations to which employees of the Embassy and military attaches have no access, establish contact with Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence information. In this regard, the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line with the preparation and dispatch of such agents, among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American Intelligence organs. These latter agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens.

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"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive activities, a so-called 'Information Center; has been established in the US with the participation of the Department of State. The 'Center' officially advertises that its purpose is to inform intending American tourists to the Soviet Union about the opportunities and restrictions existing there. Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the ideological preparation of American tourists, whom it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet Union and the methods to be used there for propagandizing the American way of life. The 'Center' collects information about the Soviet Union from returning American tourists, including the political attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses, etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.

"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photography, have specific technical training and must look upon their mission as a responsible assignment and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence organs prefer to use persons who have previously visited the USSR and person having relatives there.

"Once selected, the American tourist agent is instructed as to his intelligence assignment and his route, and he is acquainted with the security conditions in the USSR, including passport controls, documentation and customs controls, the hazard of both physical and technical surveillance, as well as the possibility of provocations and compromise making the agent vulnerable to blackmail.

"Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks there are included visual observation and clandestine photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information. For American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless

of his social status or his personal access to important information, is of interest, because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to American Intelligence.

"American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti-government sentiments, who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments, who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness of security principles, who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good knowledge of foreign languages."

Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the document instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residency abroad

"to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy intelligence or counterintelligence organs."

Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the Legal Residency

"to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim, the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; exploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR, with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Headquarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational interest, including the individual's surname, name, patronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the

tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to include where possible among tourists groups agents of the Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their presence and advising how the KGB could contact the agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly, the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible aid, including financial assistance, so that persons favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents among other tourists."

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurately reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the Seventh Department. In response to questions during his interrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department, during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automobile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multi-national tourist groups." He stated that the Seventh Department received no information during 1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as a cover for espionage. He was aware, he said, from the damage survey conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist operations, a document which had been written in the Seventh Department.

Comment: NOSENKO does not know the content of the document, which he describes as a statistical survey similar to the study he himself drafted in 1959 (see p. 146).

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KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists: Summary

BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO's statements is that the KGB did not know of the American tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counterintelligence operations during the period.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section in the expectancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he describes four. In this period NOSENKO also was assigned the unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he investigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY. On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first contacted CIA. In July 1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in this position he learned of all KGB operations against American tourists. In this connection he described five operations, as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an American GRU agent, and the investigation and search for a disaffected former KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states

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he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered notes of KGB operations of which he had learned since his last meeting with CIA in 1962. He also presented at this time a KGB travel document to substantiate his claimed rank of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of a telegram recalling him to Moscow, an event which prompted CIA to accept his immediate defection.

NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh Department is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made regarding his Embassy Section activities. He provides no information sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of his functions does not differ materially from that given in connection with his earlier claimed service in the same section, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents, with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department operations he described. Because of contradictions and the conflicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964 is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly did not supervise the management of the double agent, BELITSKIY.

NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who intended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent resident or former permanent resident of the Soviet Union, all have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh Department may have been responsible. This fact and the anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however, the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the period in the Seventh Department, although they are not persuasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief. A judgment of that latter claim must rest primarily on an appraisal of other

aspects of his statements, including those relating to his supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Directorate operations against American and other foreign tourists.

NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieutenant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never promoted beyond the rank of captain.

Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign, particularly American, tourists. A senior Seventh Department officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's preoccupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of the extent of KGB activities in connection with American tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

CHAPTER IX

OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICE

Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chronological fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections. Some can most easily be examined separately, since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category of claims are those he made about his relationship with Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service, and his KGB rank.

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

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GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about DeJean); GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved NOSENKO's operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted. The plan was written by another KGB officer.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subsequently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted. NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to Geneva in 1962 (Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted. NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relationship was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Communist Party Status

In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol members. The significance of NOSENKO's statements about his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.

NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining. He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic. He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without referring the matter to his former Daltic Komsomol unit.

Comment: According to knowledgeable KGB defectors, a member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit is contingent upon the endorsement of the individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance by the KGB Komsomol without referring the matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is impossible".

In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization. He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the Komsomol membership.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the secretary.

NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secretary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he describe his dealings with that official's office.

Comment: The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have occasion to deal with the latter frequently.

NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were ordinarily held yearly.

Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was held in March 1954, entailing considerable work by every Komsomol member and especially by the unit secretaries.

As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: All members paid in the amount of two percent of their monthly salaries.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale in which members earning 500 rubles monthly paid .5 percent, those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid one percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent.

NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 26 years of age, and that he was a member until he became overage in October 1954, and that no special privilege was extended to him.

Comment: According to Komsomol statutes at the time, the maximum age was twenty-five, a fact which would be known by a person who served as a Komsomol secretary at the time. NOSENKO would have thus been excluded from the Komsomol when he became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as he claimed.

The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained the 25 year age limit, but provided for two-year extensions in certain cases. Because of age at the time, and because of his claimed position as Komsomol secretary, the matter would have been of vital interest to NOSENKO if the facts he related were true.

From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because of age, until he was accepted as a candidate member of the Communist Party in January 1956, NOSENKO claimed that he was the only officer in the KGB who was a member of neither organization.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to CIA who claims to have occupied a position of trust and who claims he was not a Party member at the time.

In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and "to improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments. For more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and performed other such tasks. He stated that he applied for Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate member in 1956, and that he was accepted as a full Party member in 1957.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility, and contradiction by independent sources. It is concluded that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member at all, was no longer a member after reaching his twenty-sixth birthday in October 1953. The period in which he had no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh Department assignment. An officer unqualified for Party membership is ineligible for KGB service. Consequently, the evidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party status indicates that he was not serving in the KGB through at least a portion of the 1953-1956 period.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Knowledge of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures

In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had occasion to comment generally on various KGB forms and procedures. Interrogation on these points, however, developed that while he was generally familiar with various aspects unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant. Some of these topics are described on page in connection with his KGB entry, and others which are described below.

KGB Forms

NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal History Statement, including its appearance, the nature of the questions included, and the purpose of the document. However, he maintained that it was required to be completed in two copies, that it could be completed outside of KGB premises, and that it consisted of four to six pages.

Comment: The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page questionnaire. As a sensitive document, it is not taken from KGB premises. Defectors' describe its completion as "an experience not soon to be forgotten". If NOSENKO was a supervisor as he claimed, he would recall the form from reviewing personnel files in which the anketa is a prominent basic document.

NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist Party Questionnaire, (Lichny Listok po Uchetu Kadrov). Shown an exemplar, NOSENKO stated that he had seen it in personnel files, but had never himself filled one out. Asked in whose personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said those of civilians (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed his belief that the KGB did not use the document.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer, and while it is not of critical importance to the KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing KGB personnel files.

NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose was described to him, he gave a superficial description of its content.

Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the form, which he would see on every occasion in which one of his subordinates was promoted or transferred.

NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out only in "1958 or 1957".

Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed on entry on duty with the KGB. In citing 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO is claiming that he completed it only four or five years after entering the KGB.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Visitor's Pass Procedures

NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB visitor's gaining access to a KGB installation, but he maintained that the interviewer's name did not appear on the visitor's pass. (See p. 70.)

Comment: The interviewer's name does appear on the pass, a fact which a senior officer of more than a decade's KGB Headquarters service would recall, since he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors to KGB buildings.

Name Checks of KGB Central Files

NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with his direction of an operation he personally performed the check of the target's name against KGB files. Prominent among these cases were BURGI (see p.115) and ABIDIAN (p.205).

Comment: NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he performed the name checks he claimed, and his description contained numerous errors of fact. Among these were assertions that the Militia retained court records of all Soviet citizens, and that the First Special Department holds its criminal index separate from political and security card indices. NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the KGB term spetsproverka, meaning a clearance check. Despite NOSENKO's claim that he performed name checks of American Embassy personnel, he pleaded ignorance of any aspect of the files held by the First Chief Directorate, where any KGB record on foreigners is kept.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service.

Awards and Decorations

Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGB service. His assertions are material to any judgment of his general credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to having occupied various KGB positions.

In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate personnel in Moscow.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received first the Order of the Red Star. He confirmed that he received the Order of Lenin, in 1963. [Earlier he had said 1962, "just following visiting Geneva".] He claimed he received the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruitments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments, but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations. [For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326.] The Order of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it. NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star, he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation accompanied that decoration.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations were of some interest to the interrogators since they might reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged. However, before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO retracted his claim that he received the Order of Lenin, saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would receive the Order of Lenin "for creating the Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in January 1964.

Comment: Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experience and improve the quality of Second Chief Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO reverted to the earlier claim.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received in his KGB career. He replied that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruitment of BURGI [see p.115] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov. GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commendation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something, "perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day, or Army Day". In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received "something" from GRIBANOV, "maybe on the anniversary of the Soviet Army": GRIBANOV's deputy, PERFILYEV, made the presentation at an assembly of officers in the KGB Headquarters auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

for "several recruitments, including Americans 06 [MERTENS], 06 [DREW], 06 [FRIPPEL]," and three British citizens whose names he could not recall. Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said, "for good work in general". He received in 1961 the Order of the Red Star, he stated, with a group of Second Chief Directorate case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which the officer may retain.

Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this award in December 1962. He said he recalled that the presentation was planned for the KGB Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and not made until the end of the month.

In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and he also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service.

Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that in 1962 he would only have had nine years' service. NOSENKO said that he could not understand why, but he was certain he received the service award after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier retracted claim that he entered the KGB in 1952.) The following day NOSENKO announced that he recalled why he received the medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing KGB officers' time

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: (Continued)
in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in 1950, he said, and should have received the medal in 1960, but did not because of some administrative mixup. (See p.56 for NOSENKO's eventual claim that he entered the RU in 1951.)

In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and GRIBANOV told him that along with others he would receive the Order of Lenin "for inspiring the Seventh Department" on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary. NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva, he did not actually receive the medal. [NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.]

Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having received a commendation from KGB Chairman Shelepin for his recruitment of the three Americans and three British citizens in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner for these successful recruitments, but he did not receive it, probably because he transferred to the American Embassy Section at that time.

Comment: NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB practice of conferring decorations on KGB anniversary, 20 December. NOSENKO claims he transferred to the Embassy Section in January.

When NOSENKO's claims to various KGB awards was reviewed with him during the October 1966 interrogations, he said that during his KGB service he had received only the Red Army anniversary medal and an award for satisfactory completion of ten years' service, and that he had received no KGB award, decoration, or commendation for his operational work.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his claimed operational successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually categoric retractions.

NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies, contradictions, and retractions. Three of these categories, each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the validity of his sourcing, are personal participation (W.E. JOHNSON, p. 268) cases learned in the course of specific official duties (SHUBIN, p. 296), and information obtained informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, p. 24). The fourth category of sourcing relates to the notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964.

Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at various opportunities in order to bring them to CIA. He kept them in a wall safe in the office which he occupied as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. [In this connection, NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian businessman. NOSENKO said he copied the date for the remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File", which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief. According to NOSENKO, he obtained access to it for various

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reasons from time to time. The "Special File" contained no true names, however, and NOSENKO said he obtained such true names as were included in his notes by asking various case officers for them. Questioned on case after case which appeared in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written everything he could learn, and could add nothing more.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related is not credible.

NOSENKO's KGB Rank

When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO identified himself as a KGB officer holding the rank of major. He said at that time that he had served the requisite time in grade and expected to be promoted shortly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO said that he was a lieutenant colonel. In the course of his career as he initially described it, his military rank promotions had generally paralleled his assumption of successively greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank has evoked a series of inconsistent and contradictory statements leading to his eventual assertion that he had never advanced beyond the rank of captain. The matter of NOSENKO's statements about his rank is significant with respect to his general credibility, to the fact that he brought to Geneva in 1964 a KGB document identifying him as a lieutenant colonel, and to the paradox that as a company grade officer he held supervisory positions in which KGB officers of significantly senior rank were his subordinates.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major, but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic statement which included the claim that he had been a senior lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic) until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952] he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after he entered the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service was taken into consideration.

Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically, NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953, in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October [in Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and afterwards was personally congratulated by General GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his earlier promotions.

Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his date of rank, from which he computes his seniority and time in grade towards his next promotion.

In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never been a major nor was he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier. He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956, but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias,

with the use of KGB operational documents. He stated that thus he was a senior lieutenant still in 1959, and although GRIBANOV had promised him that he would be promoted directly to major at that time, an administrative error was made in the personnel office, and he was just promoted to captain. Instead of rectifying the mistake, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV persuaded him to remain a captain until (if a major) in 1963 he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. In October 1963, he concluded, he was promoted directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel; he was never a major, and he had served as senior lieutenant from 1953 to 1959, and a captain from 1959 to 1963.

Comment: According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely a captain when he claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, and still a captain for much of the time that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that he was proposed for advancement to captain in 1956, but he stated that he was not promoted because of shortcomings in his work. [He earlier had claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator's question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed.

In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO alleged that he had been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier claimed 1953], to captain in December 1959 [he could not previously remember the month] and that at the end of 1963 he was recommended for the rank of major. Continuing, NOSENKO said he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel, and the travel order [which he brought to Geneva in 1964] indicating his rank as lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel, that actually he had been but a captain. Asked why he had claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied that he had ever even mentioned his rank to CIA in 1962.

Conclusion

NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in 1964 an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying him as a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments and positions held, and in short, to the totality of his claims regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.

CHAPTER X

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From the time of his arrival in the United States he has been under psychiatric observation. In addition, he has undergone psychological examination. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were reached independently.

Psychological Examination

In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of psychological tests by the CIA psychologist. After monitoring numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's personality to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his life.

Findings

NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.

(PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT)

Psychiatric Examination

Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the interrogation sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at somewhat less frequent intervals since.

Findings

NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distinguishing fact from fiction.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion

The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are other than willful.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962.

-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

-NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance.

The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector.

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made.

Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent.

The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself.

Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.

It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources.

Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.

In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly.

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Annex B

Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The cases include, for example, Seventh Department operations of which he said he learned while serving in the American Department, and vice versa, as well as operations conducted by KGB elements other than the Second Chief Directorate. Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all of the information NOSENKO provided.

ACTOR/[06 PROCTOR]

NOSENKO's Information

An American known as ACTOR or [06 PROCTOR] is a valuable First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to Western Europe and there obtained other documents with which to continue clandestinely to the USSR.

Comment: The lead may refer to one [06 Vernon W. PROCTOR] who visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963. The investigation is not complete. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes he brought to Geneva in 1964.

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(Annex B)

06
ALBINGER, Donald

NOSENKO's Information

06
ALBINGER, an American citizen born in 1937, visited the USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi because he was believed to be an American Intelligence agent. In Sochi ALBINGER 06 was in touch with a KGB agent, "TRAPEZUND".

By NOSENKO's account, the 06 ALBINGER case was directed by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to the Seventh Department in Moscow.

Comment: According to the FBI, 06 Donald ALBINGER visited the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN), a Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR in the 1920's. OHANNES allegedly offered 06 ALBINGER intelligence-type photos which 06 ALBINGER said he refused to accept.

06
ALLOYAN, Lawrence

NOSENKO's Information

An American of Armenian background, 06 ALLOYAN visited the USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB. He stated to KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language School. The Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV, 06 and the KGB planned to contact him. NOSENKO noted the case 06 when ALLOYAN, a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow through a Seventh Department case officer.

(Annex B)

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965, 06 ALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR in 1963. He stated that he was acquainted with a Hugo VAN KRAKOW 06 who had a son of the same name, but disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an Army captain. 06 ALLOYAN said he had not seen the son for twenty years. The younger VAN KRAKOW 06 was interviewed by the FBI and said that he was discharged from the Army in 1953 as a staff sergeant, and that he was not in contact with ALLOYAN. 06

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

APISSON, Henry 06

NOSENKO's Information

An American citizen of Armenian origin, 06 Henry EPISON (sic) was recruited by the KGB of the Armenian SSR in April 1963, on ideological grounds. The recruitment was believed not to have been firm, however, and the KGB planned to renew it if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964. 06 06 EPISON had access to a military installation in the New York suburbs.

Comment: 06 Henry APISSON, a naturalized American and the owner of a hotel and restaurant near West Point, N.Y., visited the USSR in 1963. In 1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he may have conveyed an impression of willingness to see them if they should later visit West Point. 06 APISSON claimed he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

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(Annex B)

06

ARMSTRONG, Robert

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

ARMSTRONG, the American Ambassador's aide, is known by the KGB to be having a homosexual affair with a code clerk 08, 06 of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE. ARMSTRONG is a close friend of another homosexual officer of the American Embassy, Stephen HOFFMAN (see below).

06

Comment: Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, ARMSTRONG 06 acknowledged the truth of the allegations. Before resigning from the Department of State in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow.

NOSENKO provided no source for his information regarding ARMSTRONG, which was a 06 Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO claimed to be serving in the Seventh Department.

06

BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin

NOSENKO's Information

06

BARTHELEMY twice led American tourist groups to the USSR in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an American Intelligence agent. He was subsequently in contact with one V.A. LAINE, a Finn who was a KGB agent.

06, 11

NOSENKO only learned of the BARTHELEMY 06 case and of his 06 contact with LAINE while visiting the Leningrad KGB in 1963. 06 BARTHELEMY's Seventh Department file indicated that he had been under surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had information he had graduated from an intelligence school.

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(ANNEX B)

Comment: BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence connections were assumed to have been compromised during his visits to the USSR. He reported his contacts with LAINE to CIA. BARTHELEMY's name appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA.
(See p. 149 .)

BERMAN, Harold

NOSENKO's Information

While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union, American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with him".

Comment: BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system. He has visited the USSR on several occasions for study and research, and he had described several incidents which occurred in Moscow which appear to have been KGB provocations.

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on BERMAN, nor did he provide the date he acquired the information.

BINDER, Peter

NOSENKO's Information

The "top sergeant in charge of America House", BINDER, was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House, with whom at various times he had been intimate in his room. He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States. Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photographs of BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.

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(Annex B)

BINDER, Peter (Continued)

NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer working against BINDER, and the Chief of the American Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.

Comment: U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served as manager of the America House from 16 March 1961 to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothesmen, taken to a Militia station, and interrogated on the substance of a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador. The letter alleged that BINDER had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from 25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, that MORELLI had told BINDER she was pregnant and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion, had engaged in blackmarketing, BINDER had told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it, and that BINDER had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and that she and other Soviets should be wary of him. When BINDER denied the allegations and challenged the interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed to go free. BINDER acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she said she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion and made no other demands of BINDER. BINDER

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or July 1962, while BINDER was on leave. 06

Except for dating the recruitment attempt in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary information coincides with BINDER's account. 06 NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to Geneva in 1964 contained all information he was able to discover. NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in 1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06 officers, but he relates his knowledge of the case neither to that period nor to the position he then held.

BROCHES, Adam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06
BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR, and he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological grounds.

Comment: 06
BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother, 06 Alexander, was born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that a Seventh Department officer told him in 06 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in 1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might be on an American Intelligence mission to contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet Intelligence superior in Paris. According to GOLITSYN, the KGB placed BROCHES under surveil- 06 lance and the Chief of the Seventh Department was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what action the KGB should take.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)

Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES said that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 1960, and that on his last trip, in September 1960, he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members of his tour group. BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent. BROCHES said, however, that the allegation might refer to another of his brothers, Ignacy, now dead.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited BROCHES.

BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter

NOSENKO's Information

BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and an employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency" in New York City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds. He left the Four Winds agency and his case is inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own travel bureau. BUNDARIN was handled by Seventh Department case officer V.G. DERA.

Comment: BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an emigre and an employee of the Four Winds agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. He left the Four Winds agency in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by the FBI, BUNDARIN denied any connection with Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA members and participate in CP front organization activities.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

06
CHRISTNER, Robert Charles

NOSENKO's Information

While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of Americans who had visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted 06 that one CHRISTNER had been arrested while touring the Soviet Union by automobile. He did not indicate the source or date of his acquisition of the information.

Comment: As described in press accounts of the period and stated in a KGB document on American tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER 06 was arrested in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage in the summer of 1961. He had a CIA mission at the time, but he reported that he had managed to maintain his tourist cover throughout his intensive interrogations. In the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06
FAIN, Thomas

NOSENKO's Information

06
FAIN, an "American consul" stationed in Yugoslavia, 11 visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that

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(Annex B)

FAIN, Thomas (Continued)

FAIN was a homosexual. There was insufficient time during FAIN's visit to arrange his entrapment.

FAIN was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual.

Comment: In a Department of State security interview FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets whom he had met during his five-day visit to Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist. He reported no noteworthy incidents during his later permanent assignment in Moscow.

FINK, David

NOSENKO's Information

FINK is an American professor from Philadelphia and frequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a female agent. Because of his sister's love affair with a Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he applies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when the Leningrad KGB objected to FINK's being denied a visa: NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964, FINK acknowledged that his sister was trying to marry a Soviet citizen, but that she had been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the purpose. FINK admitted involvement with a female in Leningrad, during his visit to the

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
USSR in 1961, but denied recruitment. FINK 06 asserted that he had visited Europe every summer since 1957 (except in 1959, when he went to Mexico), and that he had only visited the USSR once, in 1961.

06
FISK, Norman

NOSENKO's Information

06
FISK visited the USSR as a tourist in 1959, when he was assessed to be a homosexual. The KGB planned to attempt to recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO 06 noted FISK's name while reviewing files of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV (see p.145) in 1963.

Comment: 06
FISK visited the USSR with his wife and parents in 1959. In an interview with the FBI in December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet contacts in the USSR were with Inturist personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO has never explained why he learned of the case only from the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1963, since he claims he was their case officer at the time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in 1959.
06

06
GINSBERG, Michael

NOSENKO's Information

06
A professor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 1957 or 1958, when operational contact was established between him and the KGB.

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(Annex B)

Comment: One [Professor Michael GINSBERG] reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he had been the target of a Soviet recruitment attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom [GINSBERG], according to the FBI, has met during subsequent visits to the USSR.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

[GROVER, Preston]

NOSENKO's Information

[GROVER], currently (in 1964) [Associated Press correspondent] in Moscow, is a recruited KGB agent handled by the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Comment: [Preston GROVER] retired in 1965 and now lives in France with his wife. [GROVER]'s wife was born in Russia and apparently emigrated at about the time of the 1917 Revolution. [GROVER] met her in Moscow, where she was a correspondent for a French newspaper. According to FBI reports, she associated with known Communists in the United States during an earlier assignment here. NOSENKO indicated no source of his information on [GROVER].

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(Annex B)

06

HAMZAVI, Charles P.

NOSENKO's Information

An American, one Charles KHAMZAI (sic) was the object of considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1 November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to resume this contact in the United States. The Seventh Department action with respect to KHAMZAI was in response to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assistance in developing a contact with him in Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent contact with Soviet officials from 1955, when he immigrated to the United States, until 1963. According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963, when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry official which CIA identifies as KGB officer I.D. BORISOV.

HARMSTONE, Richard

NOSENKO's Information

In 1958 or 1959 the American Department's Embassy Section attempted to recruit HARMSTONE, a Second or Third Secretary at the Embassy. Both male and female agents were used against him, and photographs were obtained of HARMSTONE's homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted, however, HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB. HARMSTONE reported the approach to American officials, but asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.

NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309) in 1964, including the KGB plan of operations against HARMSTONE. NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the plan, which was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him

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USSR

(Annex B)

06

HARMSTONE, Richard (Continued)

while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. Because the KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had not reported the homosexual compromise, it was planned to attempt to recruit him again later, when he was transferred elsewhere abroad. If HARMSTONE had reported the homosexual compromise, it would have been monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office.

In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of the HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter had left the Embassy Section. If HARMSTONE had reported his compromise, he surmised, he would have been withdrawn immediately from Moscow, and HARMSTONE did not leave the Soviet Union prematurely.

Comment: Richard C. HARMSTONE, who served in Moscow from October 1957 to October 1959 as Second Secretary, reported to the Embassy Security Officer on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had tried to recruit him after threatening exposure through doctored photographs purporting to show HARMSTONE's homosexual activities. HARMSTONE subsequently identified from a visa application photograph the KGB officer as "KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy colleague WINTERS. HARMSTONE left the Soviet Union six months later, admitted homosexual activities, and resigned from the Department of State. The relevant portions of the CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions with respect to KGB agents with whom he was involved. "KOMAROV" has been identified as KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy Section and the source of what NOSENKO said he learned of the case.

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(Annex B)

HOFFMAN, F. Stephen 06

NOSENKO's Information

08,06 An American Embassy official and a friend of the Ambassador's aide Robert ARMSTRONG (see above), HOFFMAN 06 is known to have engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian in Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is planning to attempt to compromise and recruit HOFFMAN.
06

Comment: Interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allega-
06 tion, HOFFMAN in a State Department security interview denied homosexual activities. Informed that the results of a polygraph examination indicated he had practiced deception on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the 06 Department of State on 31 July 1964. HOFFMAN 06 asserted that he had no contact with the KGB while assigned in Moscow, an assertion supported by the polygraph examination.

NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the Seventh Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06 the target of the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06
HOWARD, Herbert

NOSENKO's Information

06,08
HOWARD, a USIA employee, was assigned temporarily for four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a 08 publications procurement officer. He was recruited by the KGB. G.I. GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad.
06

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Comment: [HOWARD] denied recruitment in an interview with the FBI, although a polygraph examination indicated he was disturbed on related questions. [HOWARD] had earlier declared his intention to divorce his American wife and marry a Soviet national. His contract with [USIA] expired in December 1964 and was not renewed.

NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the Seventh Department at the time [HOWARD] was a target of the Embassy Section.

[HUSTON, Hayden Henry]

NOSENKO's Information

One [HUSTON] (fnu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S. Government business from his assignment in [Belgrade]. In Moscow [HUSTON] was photographed making a blackmarket deal in a taxi, but the KGB did not exploit the incident because [HUSTON] did not again visit the USSR.

Comment: [USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON] was interviewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a report that he had been arrested in [Yugoslavia] in 1954 as a result of his sexual activities. [HUSTON] served in [Yugoslavia] for eight years-from 1953 until January 1962. During that interview he stated that during his tour in [Belgrade] he made two trips to the USSR, and he asserted that there were no other incidents in [Yugoslavia] or elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc which could be used to compromise him. Currently on a [USIA] assignment in [Taiwan], [HUSTON] has not been interviewed with respect to NOSENKO's allegation.

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(Annex B)

JAFFE, Sam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 JAFFE, an ABC correspondent 08 in Moscow, is an active KGB agent who was cultivated and recruited by V.A. KUSKOV. In 1963, while in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asked American Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent who could be used against a visiting American delegation, and GRYAZNOV suggested JAFFE. 06

Comment: Before NOSENKO's information was received, 06 JAFFE reported his recruitment by one "Slava KISLOV" in October 1962. In a CIA interview 06 in December 1966 JAFFE did not recognize A.K. KISLOV's photograph but identified a photograph of KUSKOV as being the KGB officer who recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled 06 from the USSR in October 1965. As far as CIA is aware, he has not been interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

KANTOR, Marvin

NOSENKO's Information

Melvin (sic) KANTOR, a Harvard student, was recruited on ideological grounds in 1961. His case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

Comment: Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language instructor at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in 1961 he admitted having had contact with Soviet Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in 1959, but asserted that he then had flatly refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had not travelled to the USSR since 1959.
NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought in 1964 to Geneva. NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department in 1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruitment, and does not explain why the KANTOR case was included among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961.

KAZAN-KOMAREK 06

NOSENKO's Information

06
KOMAREK, an American of Czech descent and somehow connected with a tourist service in the United States, has been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in contact with Western Intelligence and they have been trying to locate him. The Czechs have learned that KOMAREK might 06 possibly visit the Soviet Union and have requested [the KGB] that he be arrested on arrival and deported to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have agreed and Inturist is currently attempting to induce KOMAREK 06 into visiting the Soviet Union.

Comment: The subject of NOSENKO's lead was Vladimir 06 Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK, a naturalized American citizen and the operator of the Harvard Travel 29,10 Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He has never had any covert relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. In August 1963 the FBI was advised by another source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure KAZAN- 06 KOMAREK to the Soviet Union and take him to Czechoslovakia where he would be tried for espionage.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO's information, which he reported only to the FBI, was substantially accurate. In October 1966, after being warned of the risk by the FBI, KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06 for an Inturist travel agents' conference and, en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.

NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in the Seventh Department, had not been established. CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on KAZAN-KOMAREK 06 until the latter was arrested in Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's interrogation had been suspended.

06
MATLAW, Ralph

NOSENKO's Information

One 06 MATLO (sic) visited the USSR in 1959, and the KGB concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO noted the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.

Comment: The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW. 06 The case is still under investigation. NOSENKO claims to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case officer at the time one of them was in touch 06 with MATLAW in 1959, but learned of the case only later when reviewing those agents' files.

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06

[NIELSEN, Philip]

NOSENKO's Information

06

[NIELSEN] visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958. Because he made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in Moscow and tried to acquire from them a copy of the Moscow Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was connected with CIA. 06 [NIELSEN] was kept under surveillance during this and all subsequent trips, but was never observed in other intelligence tasks. On one of his visits to Moscow, [NIELSEN] 06 fell in love with KGB agent [Tamara KUNGAROVA], and the KGB 06 used her in the development of [NIELSEN]. 06 For purposes of assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was 06 introduced to [NIELSEN] in the role of [KUNGAROVA]'s father, but 06 with no positive result. NOSENKO heard later that [NIELSEN] 06 and [KUNGAROVA] had married 06,08 and were living in London.

NOSENKO was involved in the determination of [NIELSEN]'s 06 possible intelligence status on his first trip. Besides himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor KOPEYKIN was also involved.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited 06 [KUNGAROVA] in 1955 and that she was his agent until 1960, and that she was already an agent in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department.

06

[NIELSEN], a CIA agent at the time, visited the Soviet Union in April 1958. One of his tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet telephone book. 06 [NIELSEN] met [KUNGAROVA] on a 06 later trip, in January 1959. Despite CIA warnings that he was involved in what appeared to be a KGB operation, [NIELSEN] returned to see 06 her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met a person representing himself as [KUNGAROVA]'s 06 father. 06 [NIELSEN] returned to Moscow in 1962, 08/06 [married KUNGAROVA], and they moved to France. [KUNGAROVA] died in France in 1965. In January

06

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
1960, when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge of [NIELSEN]'s meeting with [KUNGARONA]'s "father", he was not in the Seventh Department, but in the American Embassy Section.

06
[NIXON, Dmitriy]

NOSENKO's Information

An American tourist, [NIXON] was recruited by Seventh Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, [NIXON] admitted having been recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He was not contacted by the KGB in the United States, although such arrangements had been made at the time of his recruitment. On a visit to Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection, [NIXON] was again contacted by the KGB and he agreed to collaborate for fear of reprisals against relatives in the USSR.

06
[OMELICH, Paul]

NOSENKO's Information

[OMELICH] was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley, California. Although he was not recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later, in Switzerland. When [OMELICH] visited Moscow in August 1963, Seventh Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV to meet the American.

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Comment: In 1963 [OMELICH] 06 reported his earlier contacts with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley. He denied that he had ever met KGB officers later, or that any meeting arrangements were made for Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets".

[PECHTER, Bernard] 06

NOSENKO's Information

[PECHTER] 06 was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Comment: In December 1959, a month after [PECHTER] 06's return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he had revealed his homosexual compromise and recruitment by the KGB to a member of his tour group. NOSENKO cited the [PECHTER] 06 case not from memory, but from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not relate it to his service there in 1959, nor did he indicate the source of his information.

[PRESSMAN, Aron] 06

NOSENKO's Information

[Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN] 06 visited the USSR in October 1957 with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited at that time by the KGB. The case was afterwards turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

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(Annex B)

Comment: NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to [Aron PRESSMAN], a long-time Communist and a friend of [Bernard KOTEN] (see p.295), whose sister has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945 marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence. [PRESSMAN] accompanied a delegation of metallurgists from NYU on an exchange visit to the Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself surveyed Soviet language training programs during this visit. He denied any recruitment approach was made to him there or on subsequent trips to the USSR.

NOSENKO cited the [PRESSMAN] case from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate it to his Seventh Department service nor did he indicate the source of his information.

[PROCTOR, fnu]

See [ACTOR].

[RASK, Walter]

NOSENKO's Information

[RASK, the president of World Wide Tours], was recruited in the USSR in 1960. He has returned to the USSR several times since. He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having intelligence affiliations. The KGB has received only one open code message from [RASK] since recruitment. [RASK] was recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department. On subsequent visits to the USSR he was met by Seventh Department case officers of the American-British Commonwealth Section.

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(Annex B)

Comment: [RASK], a former CIA contact who visited the USSR several times, reported the KGB recruitment approach in 1961.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in written notes he brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate the case to his 1962-1964 Seventh Department service.

[ROBERTS, Spencer]

NOSENKO's Information

[ROBERTS] was recruited at the end of 1962 after being compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR. The case was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and [ROBERTS] was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United States. [ROBERTS] confessed his recruitment to the FBI, news of which reached the KGB, and his KGB case officer in the United States was hastily recalled to Moscow.

[ROBERTS] was handled by the American Department because he was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow. The case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK. NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from B.A. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Department case officer.

Comment: [ROBERTS] had been coopted as a CIA representative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State Department officer assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He confessed his recruitment by the KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He was contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in New York in mid-1963. That official apparently suddenly departed the United States in December 1963. NOSENKO did not indicate the original source of his information on [ROBERTS].

(Annex B)

ROSS, Johanna

06

NOSENKO's Information

The former governess to the American Ambassador's family who now (in 1964) teaches at the American school in Moscow was recruited by the KGB on the basis of sexual involvements. The case was handled by the American Department at the time NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. 08

Comment: NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not indicate the source of his information. 06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of her arrest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral behavior with a Soviet citizen. In a May 1965 FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow in September 1963 with the KGB, which stemmed from her continued relationship with the same Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB attempted to recruit her or contact her thereafter.

06

RUFE, John

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB discovered that 06 RUFE was a homosexual during his visit to the USSR in 1959. When he returned to the USSR in 1962, he was entrapped and recruited. The case was only of marginal value to the KGB, and it was terminated in 1963.

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(Annex B)

Comment: RUFE, 06 a New York City attorney, has admitted that he had been compromised while visiting the USSR in 1962 and that he was in contact with KGB officers in the United States until November 1963.

NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE 06 case specifically to his Seventh Department service when he cited it from writen notes brought to Geneva in 1964, nor did he indicate the source of his information. His notes state that RUFE 06 was recruited on homosexual grounds by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of Leningrad Oblast.

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette 06

NOSENKO's Information

SCHWARZENBACH 06, who was working in Moscow at the time, fell in love with a male KGB agent and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959. The KGB had incriminating photography, but NOSENKO did not believe it was used, the KGB appeal being based solely on her affection for the Soviet people. V.M. MIKHAYLOV of the American Department Embassy Section directed the operation. NOSENKO never read the SCHWARZENBACH file, but he later saw it and the incriminating photographs. 06

Comment: SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secretary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the wife of the American Ambassador, and director of the Anglo-American School 06,08,09 in Moscow. In 1956 and 1957 she worked for Henry SHAPIRO, United Press correspondent in Moscow (see p. 76). While employed by 06 SHAPIRO 06,08 she became acquainted with one Viktor I. SERGEYEV, a Soviet publishing functionary.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
In January 1959 she was approached in Riga by a KGB officer who confronted her with incriminating photographs and solicited her cooperation in providing information on the U.S. Embassy. She immediately reported the event to [SHAPIRO], 06 who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON, and 06 [SCHWARZENBACH] left the USSR shortly thereafter in early 1959. She provided details of the KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department Regional Security Officer in [Geneva] on 4 June 1959. 06 10

NOSENKO did not recall from whom he learned of the [SCHWARZENBACH] case, which was directed by the American Department Embassy Section while he was assigned to the Seventh Department.

06
[SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey]

NOSENKO's Information

In 1955-1957, [SEREBRENNIKOV], 06 an employee of the [Library of Congress], 29 visited Moscow with a Congressional delegation. 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV] had a brother who was a Soviet citizen, a doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to the Seventh Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a 06 meeting at which [SEREBRENNIKOV] would be "felt out" as a prospective collaborator with the KGB. The meeting took place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no opportunity to discuss with [SEREBRENNIKOV] the possibility 06 of his helping the Soviet Union. [SEREBRENNIKOV] was in 06 Moscow only for a few days, and there was no opportunity for another meeting. The KGB concluded that [SEREBRENNIKOV]'s 06 suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.

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Comment: According to his 1964 interview with the FBI, 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV] visited the Soviet Union in 1956 in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson. On his last night in Moscow he received in his hotel room a telephone call from a person claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk, whom he had not seen since 1918. The "brother" requested a meeting, but [SEREBRENNIKOV] was 06 convinced from the caller's uneducated speech and other signs that he was not in fact 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV]'s brother, and he refused to see him. 06 [SEREBRENNIKOV] immediately advised Senator Jackson of the incident, as well as Embassy officials. After [SEREBRENNIKOV] 06 returned to the United States, the incident was described in an article in Newsweek magazine.

06
[SEVERN, Gerald]

NOSENKO's Information

06
[SEVERN], KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was recruited in Moscow by the Seventh Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological grounds. He is a valuable all-purpose agent. His case officer was V.M. IVANOV.

06
Comment: [SEVERN], a naturalized American citizen whose name originally was [Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV], had 06 Russian-born parents. He enjoys special residence arrangements in Moscow, and prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent. 06 [SEVERN] has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

(Annex B)

06

SHATTAUER, Sofia Greta

NOSENKO's Information

06

In September 1962 SHATTAUER visited the Soviet Union and was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A. DITYATEV. She had originally been recruited in Poland in 1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB believed her to be known to American Intelligence.

06

Comment: In 1962 an FBI source reported that SHATTAUER stated she was looking forward to her trip to the USSR and "to being away from the imperialist policies of the United States", and that 06 SHATTAUER "appeared enthusiastic about Russian ideology". In July 1964 SHATTAUER admitted to 06 the FBI that she had had intelligence contact with Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that she was recontacted by the KGB in September 1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically met a KGB officer in New York City until May 1964.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not indicate the source of his information.

06

SOCHUREK, Howard

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

The former Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK, was probably recruited by the KGB and was an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV. 06 SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in 1962 when Seventh Department surveillance noted his association with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

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(Annex B)

Comment: SOCHUREK who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-1960, reported to the Embassy a number of instances in which Soviet officials attempted to pressure him or in which he was in touch with identified KGB officers. SOCHUREK has named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter who invariably accompanied him while he was stationed in the USSR. NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on SOCHUREK.

STEVENS, Francis

NOSENKO's Information

STEVENS, an American correspondent, visited the Soviet Union in 1961 as a tourist. He was the target of American Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed him into accepting recruitment. His KGB cryptonym was "SERGEY". STEVENS, however, described the recruitment attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable summarizing the events described in the letter to the Department of State. The KGB monitored the dictation through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned to resume contact with STEVENS in New York City.

Although a tourist and a correspondent, STEVENS was the concern of the Embassy Section because he was a former member of the Embassy staff.

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(Annex B)

Comment: 06 STEVENS, after his compromise concerned for his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit to Moscow, did deposit with the Embassy a letter to his mother. However, he also gave Ambassador Thompson a written report of the KGB entrapment, immediately after the incident, and he was interviewed about the matter by the Minister Counsellor the following day. Interviewed periodically by the FBI following his return to the United States in 1961, STEVENS 06 has denied any further contact with the KGB.

According to the notes which NOSENKO brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of which he reported the STEVENS 06 case, STEVENS' 06 recruitment was accomplished jointly by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department and the American Department's Embassy Section.

06
TARASKA, William

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08 TARASKA, a New York City policeman, had been developed by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958. Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising target", the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in attempting to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union in June 1963.

Comment: 06 TARASKA, who had visited the Soviet Union in 1958, was recruited by CIA for a mission in 1960. When he returned to the United States he reported that the KGB had attempted to recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned 06 to the USSR in 1963 and later reported to the FBI that the KGB had again attempted to recruit him during that visit.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information on [TARASKA]. 06

[THOMPSON, John] 06

NOSENKO's Information

American professor [THOMPSON] 06, a specialist in Russian literature or Russian History, became involved with Tamara KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within Inturist. He was intimate with KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken. The KGB did not attempt to recruit him, however, but planned to continue his assessment and establish additional grounds for his recruitment if he returned to the USSR. When he did not return, NOSENKO reviewed [THOMPSON]'s file 06 and recommended that the case be retired to KGB Archives.

Comment: [Dr. John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University], 06,08 was interviewed by the FBI in April 1965. He identified KUNGAROVA's photograph as that of his Inturist guide during a trip outside Moscow in 1959, and admitted having been intimate with her. When he returned to Moscow in 1960 he had sought out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had been demoted in Inturist because of her [declared intention to marry an American (see Philip NIELSEN)]. 08,06 [THOMPSON] also visited the Soviet Union in 1964. 06 [THOMPSON] stated that he was unaware of any photographs the KGB might have and that he was never approached by the KGB on either trip. D6

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI in June 1965. She confirmed that she had been intimate with THOMPSON in 1959 but denied that she had been instructed to compromise him.
NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent in 1959, although he has not related that claim to his description of her role in the THOMPSON case.

06
TORREY, Carmen

NOSENKO's Information

06
TORREY, who was in love with a Soviet citizen, was recruited by Seventh Department case officers on that basis in 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate, which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as NATO). NOSENKO was in the American Department at the time.

Comment: In 1960 it was reported that 06 TORREY planned to defect to the USSR because she was in love with a Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an American. In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American identifiable as 06 TORREY during her October or November 1959 visit to Moscow. 06 TORREY worked for the Pan American Union 29 in 1954-1959, but there is no indication that she was ever employed by the UN or by NATO.
NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on 06 TORREY. In 1959, when GOLITSYN reported the KGB attempted to recruit 06 TORREY, NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department, not the American Department.

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(Annex B)

06
[TWAROG, Leon]

NOSENKO's Information

An American professor of Russian Literature and a fluent Russian speaker, 06 [TWAROG] visited the Soviet Union in 1962 or 1963. The target of Seventh Department case officer K.G. KRUPNOV, 06 [TWAROG] was lured into intimacy with a female KGB agent, of which the KGB took incriminating photographs. At one point Seventh Department case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV was placed in direct contact with [TWAROG], but no recruitment 06 attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the incriminating photographs were not sufficient to ensure success. The KGB deferred further action pending [TWAROG]'s 06 expected return to the Soviet Union in 1964 or 1965.

Comment: In a 1965 interview with the FBI, 06 [TWAROG] said he had visited the USSR in 1957, 1960, 1962, and 1964. On his 1962 trip he had met and befriended one Nina S. PETROVA, and on one occasion they attended a party accompanied by friends of hers, a Soviet couple. The man's name was Yevgeniy. 06 [TWAROG] stated that he was later intimate with PETROVA, but was never confronted by anyone about that fact. In 1964 (after NOSENKO's defection), [TWAROG] stated, he 06 was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian whom he had met in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected in Sweden in 1955, redefected to the USSR in 1962. According to [TWAROG], HAMAN offered 06 $50,000 if [TWAROG] would provide background 06 summaries of members of his tour group and threatened him with the denial of future entry 06 to the USSR if [TWAROG] did not comply. [TWAROG] 06 stated that he refused, and no further pressure was applied.

NOSENKO provided the information on [TWAROG] 06 from notes, in Geneva in 1964.

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(Annex B)

06

VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich

NOSENKO's Information

06

VOLKOV, construction company employee and an American, was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in the summer of 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to be used in emigre operations.

06

Comment: VOLKOV has been identified as a carpenter living in California who travelled to the Soviet Union in 1962. He is a religious fanatic with a record of many arrests, and he may be mentally disturbed. In an FBI interview 06 VOLKOV denied that he had been recruited by the KGB.

NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information, which was contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

VOLSKIY, Boris

NOSENKO's Information

08 06

The president of "American Travel Abroad". VOLSKIY was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on ideological grounds. His mission is to advise the KGB by open code of any tourist whom he suspected of having some connection with American Intelligence.

06

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIY advised that he travelled annually to the USSR on tourist business and has frequent contacts with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union. He denied having any intelligence contacts, with one possible exception. In about 1962 he was visited in his Moscow hotel room by a

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) 06
person represented to be an Inturist official who solicited [VOLSKIY]'s aid in curtailing foreign tourists' distribution of Bibles and literature in the USSR. [VOLSKIY] asserted that 06
he was in no position to provide such assistance, and he was not contacted again.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06
[WALLACE, William]

NOSENKO's Information

A student at the University of [Vienna, WALLACE] was 10, 06
recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet Union in 1961. The Seventh Department made the recruitment,
06 and turned [WALLACE] over to the First Chief Directorate, which was still managing the case in 1964.

Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in [Vienna], 10
06 [WALLACE] admitted having been approached by an unidentified Soviet during a visit to the USSR in 1961. He claimed he refused to "help them", and said there had been no further attempts to contact him.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964; he has not indicated the source of his information.

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(Annex B)

06,06

YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn

NOSENKO's Information

06

The YOUNGER couple were identified as American Intelligence agents and arrested and recruited by the KGB while they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they failed to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The case was handled by the American Department while NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO's former subordinate, V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.

Comment: The YOUNGERs were on a mission for the U.S. Army at the time of their arrest, and they reported their recruitment immediately upon leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias in 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERs were scheduled to meet with the KGB in Denmark.

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information which he related to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

06

ZIRING, Stanley

NOSENKO's Information

06

ZIRING, a student who visited the USSR in 1960, was recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in blackmarket dealings.

Comment: Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING admitted blackmarketeering but denied recruitment. British authorities concluded that he may have given the impression of willingness to cooperate without realizing the purpose of the Soviet offer. British authorities report no evidence of subsequent contacts between ZIRING and Soviet officials.

06

NOSENKO claims he was in the American Department at the time ZIRING was recruited by the Seventh Department.

06

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