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29 Dec. 67  
Re: MOC

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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION		
		SECRET		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO	Chief, WH Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK (CAN JUDGE INDEXING)	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE			MICROFILM 150	
SUBJECT	AKULE/MIHSPAWN AMNOP c Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress				
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
REF: JMWAVE 0180					
<p>1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMNOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organization Demócrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMNOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMNOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMNOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.</p> <p>2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Roger E. Marchbank</i> Roger E. MARCHBANK</p>					
Distribution: 3 - WH/COG					
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B- 201-767219	UFGA-29068	1 December 1967			
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER			
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Re: NDC  
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30 Aug. 67  
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
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PROCESSING ACTION

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TO: Chiefs, All WH Stations and Bases X

INFO: ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Christian Democracy in Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.

The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and is transmitted to all WH Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class elements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which

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BOOK DISPATCH 5961

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DISPATCH

represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

### I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

a. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-leaning parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three key states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sualdo) and Bolivia



(Remo di Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

## II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

5. CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparative figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

8. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORNEU and various student training

courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program must be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

### III - THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement. A KIMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole raison d'etre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian Labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the Comite Relacionador Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrita Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CD parties

to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. Negative CLASC Influence on Party Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest progress in Central America.

#### IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President : Rafael Caldera, Venezuela  
 Vice President : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru  
 Vice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala  
 Secretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) but on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and on negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. EYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for at least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WCDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de Centroamerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

#### V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NEI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (ISF). Between them they will contribute an estimated \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$480,000 for the 1968 election from ISF at the rate of \$160,000 per year commencing in 1966.

a. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	BOOK DESIGNATION 9961
<p>Social Democratic counterpart (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IIS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.</p>		
<p>5. <del>The FIS</del> - The International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Secretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).</p>		
<p>18. <u>Difference in Function of IIS and FIS.</u> From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italians have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only \$15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas -- support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONCLUSIONS</u></p>		
<p>19. <u>CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University.</u> It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats -- the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemispheric domination of the campus.</p>		
<p>FORM 53a 8-64 1421</p>	<p>CLASSIFICATION SECRET</p>	<p>PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED 8</p>

20. CD Strength in University No Indicator of CD Party Strength or Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lacking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university-trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1968 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.



23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challenge of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by-country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

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


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**DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

*Special Report*

*Christian Democracy in Latin America*

**Secret**

No. 1100

3 March 1967

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## CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

### Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.


In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weaken-

ing Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

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# CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA



**EDUARDO FREI**  
 President of Chile,  
 Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.



**RAFAEL CALDERA**  
 Venezuelan presidential aspirant and  
 number-two Latin American Christian Democrat

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No Foreign Dissem.

Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC),

led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots, lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

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No Foreign Dissem

1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, São Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

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Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

#### The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and

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the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards

and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

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**EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS**

**GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)**

**WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)**

**KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION**

Eichholz  
Academy

Political  
Leadership  
Academy

Student  
Institute

Institute  
for  
International Solidarity  
(IIS)

DIRECTOR  
Adolf Herkenrath

European  
Christian  
Democratic  
Union  
(ECDU)

Christian Democratic  
Organization  
of  
Latin America  
(ODCA)

Christian Democratic  
Union  
of  
Central Europe  
(UCDEC)

International Union  
of  
Young Christian  
Democrats  
(UIJDC)

International Solidarity  
Foundation  
(FIS)

PRESIDENT  
Johannes Schauff

**SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT**

Support To:

Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC

(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:

Political Parties

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CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadership of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its

creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

#### Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have

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any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership

abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SECRET

7 FEB 1966 Miami

RE: MDC

SECRET

25 Nov. 1966 New Jersey  
RE: IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ

CONFIDENTIAL

31 Oct. 1966 Miami, Fla.  
RE: MDC CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEPT. 1966 NEW JERSEY  
IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ  
CONFIDENTIAL

29 Aug. 1966 Miami, Fla.  
RE: MDC SECRET

REPORT COVER SHEET		PROCESSING ACTION	
<b>S E C R E T</b>			
FROM <b>JMWAVE</b>	REPORT NO. <b>UFG-8473</b>	COVER SHEET REQUIRED FOR INDEXING <b>XXN</b>	
REPORTING OFFICER <b>Henry J. SLOMAN</b>	DATE OF REPORT <b>8 August 1966</b>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED IF DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY	
APPROVING OFFICER <b>John C. TARBELL/vkl</b>	PROJECT <b>AMOT-245</b>	DISSEMINATION <b>61</b>	
<b>Philip G. ELMARD</b>	SOURCE CRYPT	DISSEMINATION	
FIELD DISTRIBUTION			
INTRA-AGENCY		EXTRA-AGENCY	
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Santo Domingo <b>HDC</b> 2 - <b>Santiago de los Caballeros</b> 2 - Caracas <b>HVO</b> 2 - Guatemala City <b>HGG</b>		State FBI I&NS Customs Border Patrol USCG <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block; margin-top: 10px;">             MICROFILMED              AUG 18 1966           </div>	
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA			
<p><b>TYPIC</b></p> <p>SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para 8 and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the document; para. 9: DD-1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD-1902, 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892; para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, 14 July, from Laureano BATISTA.</p> <p>AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there is no record of contact since that time.</p> <p>RID: Index <i>701-265277</i></p> <p>Name: <b>BATISTA Falla, Laureano</b></p> <p>Sex: <b>M</b></p> <p>DPOB: <b>1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba</b></p> <p>Cit: <b>Cuban</b></p> <p>Occ or Status: <b>&lt;Elected organization secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb 66. Trip to DR on behalf of MDC, June 66.&gt;</b></p> <p>Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification</p>			

19-300-10

SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet

UFG-8473

Name: ✓ BAZAN, Arnaldo  
Sex : M  
DPOB: ?  
Cit : Cuban  
Occ or Status: Emigre in DR. Connection with MDC base.  
Formerly with La Salle College of Camaguey, Cuba.

Name: ✓ HERNANDEZ Rojo, Angel (1922-1942)  
Nickname: Baby, El Baby  
Sex : M  
DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba,  
Cit : Cuban  
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second in command of military  
dept of MDC.

Name: ✓ BARBEITE Freyre, Placido A.  
Sex : M  
DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba  
Cit : Cuban  
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf of military dept of MDC.

Name: ✓ PALACIOS San Juan, Armando  
Sex : M  
DPOB: ?  
Cit : Cuban  
Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico.

# FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable, B Usually reliable, C Fairly reliable, D Not usually reliable, E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).  
 APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources, 2 Probably true, 3 Possible true, 4 Doubtful, 5 Probably false, 6 Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY	Cuba/Dominican Republic	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	Activities of the <del>MDC</del> <sup>possibility</sup> of Reactivating a Base in the Dominican Republic, Condition of Boats, Possible Alliances With Other Emigre Organizations	DATE OF REPORT	8 August 1966
		NO PAGES	4
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	29 May to late July 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ	United States, Miami (10 June to 3 August 1966)		
		UFG-8473	

**SOURCE:**

A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. This group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. Summary: Laureano Batista Falla, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami in late June 1966 from the Dominican Republic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro undertakings from the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending ~~approval~~ the approval of President Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC recently issued a document in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily ~~due to~~ lack of funds. Although representatives of the MDC have discussed the signing of agreements with representatives of the Students' Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

with representatives of the DRE and the Cuban Representation, no alliances have been made.

2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami on 26 June. On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC to inform them of the results of his trip?

3. Batista said that during ~~the~~ discussions held with General Juan N. Folch Perez, Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, he had requested ~~that~~ that Folch cooperate with the MDC by allowing the MDC to maintain Base Luna, located at Estero Salcedo near the town of Pepillo Salcedo (N 19-43, W 71-45). According to Batista, Folch indicated his willingness to cooperate and offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

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 NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

E/	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	OCR	FBI /2
SO #	USIA ( )	I&NS ( )					
FI	1	WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1		
RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1		
RE	3	WHC/CA	1				
CICS	1						
MO	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	WH/PACY(CINCSO)	1		
LS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO/H 1,						
							Liaison *

COORD. RELEASE





UFG-8473

- (1) The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard at Stock Island, Florida.<sup>6</sup> The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts to make commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This boat is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.
  - (2) The KYA-ORA<sup>7</sup>, which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.
  - (3) The LANCHA AZUL<sup>8</sup> is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.
- d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment.
9. In July Jorge Mas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC will be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.
  10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saunell<sup>9</sup> is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MDC and RECE ~~xxxx~~ which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbeite in a less important position than that which he currently occupies. ~~xxxx~~ department of the MDC in order to occupy Barbeite from his present position to an unimportant position in the department.
  11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez<sup>10</sup> expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

UFG-8473

1. Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf. ~~UFG-8322~~)

3. Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican ~~sixxxx~~ Armed Forces aid in a ~~x~~ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. In ~~TDCSDS-315/00700-66~~. Another source reported ~~that~~ in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente (N 19-47, W 71-46). ~~TDCSDS-315/00798-66~~

4. The location of the house was not given.

5. Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to \$10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that \$75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327) ~~UFG-8327~~

Field Comments.

6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.
7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.
8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327~~). Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.
9. Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) ~~UFG-8423~~
10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

CS 21-312/  
01727-66

FBI

29 June 66 New York  
Re: MOC Secret

7 June 66 Florida  
Re: MOC Secret

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

Chief, VMD  
ADMIN/TYPIC

Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1966

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Headquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey these files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JMWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

Attachment:

1. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution:

S-COS/JMWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

S E C R E T

1-WH/RMO, w/att.1  
1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1  
1-WH/C/CA/PP, w/att.1  
1-Historical Staff

WH/RMO

NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA/PP

STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT  
TO WGS-8398

IDENTITY - Paul Loeb

SECRET

FBI

Miami, Fla.

3 June 66

Re: MDC      Confidential

*Attn: C. ...*

IS  NO TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ C. TIED MESSAGE **E** TOTAL COPIES \_\_\_\_\_

TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE PID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM **JMURVE**

**26 SECRET**

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2		6	CB
3	MO	7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED  
*File M.D.C*

ACTION **WHLB**

ADVANCE COPY  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

INFO **FILE VR, SIDA, CAZ, CALPROP, CALO4, CALICZ, FL, FILINT, WHB**

SECRET 210017Z  
LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0321  
TYPIC AMMOP

**ACTION**  
RET LIMA CONF 23-26 APRIL,  
71 APR 65 100958

REF A. WAVE 0031 (59790)\*  
B. DIR 75895

AMMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 APRIL ON  
PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 65 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.

SECRET

CFN 0321 0031 75895 AMMOP-1 MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 PERUVIAN 65

BT

**SECRET**

*(Handwritten mark)*

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 X-REF. TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE RID  REV. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

26 **SECRET** GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	2	FI
2		3	CO
3	MO	4	3
4		5	2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/CB  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO FILE VA, CIAA, CAZ, CALPROP, CALO4, CALICZ, FI, FILINT, WAB,

SECRET 210317Z  
 LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0322

**ACTION** 21 APR 68 = 00953

TYPIC AMMOP  
 REF WAVE 0321 (N00958)  
 IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY  
 FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

*(Handwritten mark)*

SECRET  
 CFN 0322 0321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC  
 BT **SECRET**



INDEXED  NO  
 CLASSIFIED TO FILE NO.  
 NUMBER TO FILE NO.  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

**15 SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	3	EA
2		8	CA
3	MD	7	D
4		8	X

FROM: JM WAVE

ACTION: 1148  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBES

ADVANCE COPY

UNIT: TIME: BY:

INFO: FILE, NR, WAVE 8, SOCB, CLOPS, CLOA

SECRET 101812

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0194

13 APR 66 07580

DYVOUR ANNOP

1. ANCRIB-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, WHO TRAVELED THROUGH JM WAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LETTER TO ANCRIB-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED ANCRIB-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO BE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH \$1402 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTS OF CARS.

2. ANCRIB-1 TELEPHONED ROSARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIRM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCURING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED ANCRIB-1 THAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMBLY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE WOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMBERS.

SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN 97580 PAGE 2

CFM: 0194 AMCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO  
JMWAVE AMCRIP-1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRSC -1 PRSC DOMREP 51400  
-1 11 -1 PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA APJ

PT

NNNN

SECRET

YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.  
 R-REF TO FILE NO.  
 FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *1* TOTAL COPIES **27**

**15 SECRET**  
 PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	AP-	1	FA
2		0	FA
3	PO	3	3
4		0	0

FROM: **JMWAVE**  
 ACTION: **W.H.P.**  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

INFO: **FILE, VR, W.H.P. 8, SOD 6, cilops, ciloa**

**SECRET 151742Z**

**SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0195**

**15 APR 66 0957588**

**DYVOUR AMMOP**

**REF: WAVE 0194 (09 97.500)**

**IDEN: JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO  
 DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO <sup>OF</sup> CUBA.**

**SECRET**

**CFN: 0195 0194 JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA  
 CRISTIANO CUBA**

**SECRET**

**BT**

NNNN

INDEX:  YES  NO  
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *13* TOTAL COPIES *2*  
 H-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE DIR  REF. TO BRANCH   
 DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

FROM *JN WAVE*

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION *WAVE 2*  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO *FILE, WAVE, C/102, C/104, FI, FI/INTZ, CA2, CA/PROP, WAVE*

**SECRET** 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

14160785525

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (*094245*)\*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND  
 WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED  
 MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

**SECRET**

*\*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO*

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

**SECRET**

NNNN

INDEX  YES  NO  
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
A-REP TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH   
DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *18* TOTAL COPIES *22*

**SECRET**  
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM *JMWAVE*

ACTION *WH/c 8*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO *FILE, VR, WHB, 2/1/52, C/ON, FI, FI/INTZ, CIA, CIA/PRUP, CIA/04*

**SECRET** 141024Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 APR 1962 06026

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 *CON 96675*

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

**SECRET**

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA **SECRET**

BT

NNNN

INDEX  YES  NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *B* TOTAL COPIES

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

FILE NO. TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

FROM *JM WAVE*

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED *File MDC*

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	IRL
2		6	C
3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	FD	8	

ACTION *IR/PA 2*  RID COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBES

INFO *FILE, VR, WAVE, C/IC2, C/PA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP*  
*LA/04*

SECRET 141654Z FM 000000 96625

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167  
 TYPIC AMMOP  
 REF: WAVE 0132 (*094245*)\*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND  
 WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED  
 MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET *\*RE METRIN BRIDGING FOR  
ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO*  
 CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

*GC*

NNNN

INDEX:  YES  NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

S. REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION

WAVE 8

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

ISSUED

SLOTTED

TUBED

DATE

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, WHB, @/102 C/101, FI, FI/INT2, CH2, CH/RRUP, CH/04

SECRET 141024L

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (in 96675)

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

**SECRET**

BT

NNNN

14 APR 68 090626

**DISPATCH**CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, WH	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief of Station, Santiago		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	AMMOP/Operational AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Organizations		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI  
REF: WAVE 9754

1. As indicated in reference, the AMMOP organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the AMMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/1, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are forwarded under separate cover.

3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was replayed by FUSEE and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by Identity C.

*Philip G. Elward*  
Philip G. ELWARD


## Attachments:

- A. Identities - u/sc  
B. Cys of Ltrs - u/sc

## Distribution:

- 3 - WH/C w/atts  
2 - COS, Santiago w/atts - *T. G. P. Pouch*  
2 - C/WH - w/atts

\*Please furnish HQS File Number



CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-24893	APR 1 1966 31 March 66
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	



SECRET

To WH/c  
U/sc att #A to  
UFGA-24893

- IDENTITIES:
- A. Christian Democratic Party
  - B. Alfredo Lorca
  - C. Jorge Roman

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET UFGA-24893

1-2-30-10

Marzo 15 de 1966

SECRET

RECEIVED  
UNIVERSITY STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33136

Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Humberto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas líneas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incomprensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creído que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creído que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvador donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccionario. Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano firme, sino un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,....."

SECRET  
MAY 12 1966

SECRET

19. 30. 1966

Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se descamascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sino una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que des gobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrecen sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino también ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochornosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndolo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, si está realizando una revolución en libertad, si ha defendido en todo momento el sano nacionalismo, si se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,



Ernesto Rodríguez  
Sec. de Relaciones Internacionales del  
MDC de Cuba

SECRET

SECRET

JUVENTUD DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANA DE CUBA.

1732 N.W. 7th St.

MIAMI, FLA. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apóstol José Martí que dice: "ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándolo al Presidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario", "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chile"....etc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en días pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos días atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añadió Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda más armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

Cuba del mañana. . . 1/2 Democrata-Cristiana

radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han recorrido todo el país sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un déspota como Fidel Castro afirma - añadió Lorca-. En cambio él está resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón lo buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 100 000 personas han huido del paraíso fidelista. Y me atrevo a pensar que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín. "Es un hombre íntegro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que nunca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, íntegro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que nunca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición

Jesús Angulo  
Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **B** TOTAL COPIES **31**

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM **JHWAVE**

ACTION **WHIS**  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  FLOTTED  TUBED

INFO **FILE, VA, WHB, CAZ, CALPROP, CALO4, FI, FILINT, CILOA, CILICZ**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED			
1	PP-	5	MO
2		0	FI
3	CA	7	D
4	PL	0	

SECRET 042230Z

*File m. n. C  
1100-1100-1100-1100*

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A DIR 75895\*

4 APR 65 189790

B WAVE 9034 **(IN 51776)**

1. AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.
2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN B. IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.
3. AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELEGATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.
4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-1.

*CC*

SECRET <sup>WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS SCHEDULED LIMA</sup>  
<sup>11-14 MARCH</sup>  
 CFN 0031 75895 9034 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRIB-1  
 B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 201-749991 AMMOP C AMCRIB-10  
 B AMCRIB-1  
 BT

SECRET

INDEX:  YES  NO \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **G** TOTAL COPIES **31**

X-REF TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE RID  RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY  SIG. \_\_\_\_\_

FROM **JHWAVE**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED			
1	PP -	3	MS
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	S
4	RR	8	

ACTICN **WH/CB**  RID COPY  ADVANCE COPY  ISSUED  SLOTTED  TUBED

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFO FILE VR, WHB, CAZ, CA/PROP, CA/04, FI, FILINT, C/0A, C/1C2

S E C R E T 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 INGHURST ACTING

4 APR 68 089798

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0031 (IN 87790)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN


S E C R E T

CFN 0032 0031 A UIJDC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN C

JOSE M ILLAN

~~SECRET~~

BT

REPORT COVER SHEET		<b>S E C R E T</b>		PROCESSING ACTION	
<b>JMWAVE</b> Henry J. SLOMAN Sylvia B. MONESTIER <small>REPORTS OFFICER</small>		<small>REPORT NO.</small> <b>UFG-7960</b>		<small>COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING</small>	
<small>APPROVING OFFICER</small> John C. TARBELL/vkl <i>John C. Tarbell</i> Philip G. ELMARD		<small>DATE OF REPORT</small> <b>15 February 1966</b>		<small>NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY</small>	
		<small>PROJECT</small>		<small>CS DISSEMINATION</small>	
		<small>SOURCE CRYPT</small> <b>AMOT-245</b>		<small>TDCS DISSEMINATION</small>	
FIELD DISTRIBUTION					
<small>INTRA-AGENCY</small>			<small>EXTRA-AGENCY</small>		
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Caracas 2 - Lima 2 - Santiago 2 - Bogota			1 - JMBAR  State FBI I&NS Customs USCG		
<small>SUPPLEMENTAL DATA</small>					
<b>TYPIC</b>  <b>SOURCE:</b> AMOT-245 in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2 was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February.					
<b>RID: No Index</b>					
					
Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification					
<b>NO RI COPY</b> <i>m DC</i>					
<b>CS COPY</b>					
19-300-10					



# FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

**CONFIDENTIAL  
CONTROLLED DISSEM  
NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Christian Democratic Movement  
to Hold Congress in Miami,  
24 to 27 February 1966

DATE OF REPORT 15 February 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early February 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami

UFG-7960

(7 to 14 February 1966)

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SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February 1966.<sup>1</sup> Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress.<sup>2</sup>
2. The MDC is preparing to hold elections for positions on the executive committee.

### Field Comments:

1. The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico and Mexico attended. (Cf. CSDB-312/00790-65)
2. Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.

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