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1 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

SECRET

1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub-conclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2. Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing remarks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment:
Summary

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

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I. INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in

the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provide new positive information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.

II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately [875] KGB officers, [100] KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and [400] other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all

available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

0001014

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been debriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.

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Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have MEYKA and NEPTUNE 60? Yes.

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

Was [SHUBIN 06] in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.

Did you telephone the GRU about [SHUBIN 06] at this time? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

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To the best of your knowledge, was MITROKHIN exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy? Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative of deception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following relevant questions were asked on test four:

Did you join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

Were you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you only a Captain at this time? Yes.

Were you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March 1953 to May 1955? Yes.

In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

From January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the Chief of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.

From January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, at the time of the Stalingrad operation against [Benson, Mule] and [Stroud]? Yes.

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The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides AUDREY and HOWARD? No.

Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.

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To the knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHERNYAKOV papers? No.

Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTYMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.

Did you personally make an approach to [KAYSERS] 06 at the Moscow Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.

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Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact with [redacted] on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.

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Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions asked.

WBR

III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions?

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H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?

A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON

WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, associates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement

by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily substantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement concerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature. An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

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Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

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1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941 I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon

after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3).

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the international relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, received a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was deal ing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization

and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950 I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the

second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to

come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the reception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation)). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV, was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case

officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the 2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the 1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hospitals. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of 2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia

(counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for "cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-KGB at St. Kiselni.

Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of disarmament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concerning the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, First Section, First Department, SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief." The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used

in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this

issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment

as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.



NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.

NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through [David MARK] whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.

NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)

Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the information furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive determination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception.

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.

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The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.

E. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps [2,000] KGB officers and [300] KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately [250] former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

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limited period of time or for the handling of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately [2,000] KGB officers and [several hundred] KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of [2,000] CIA employees and [several hundred] agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts

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can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.

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NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value

cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the [illegible] summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of [Herbert HOWARD, a USIA] 06, 08 employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963. NOSENKO identified [Herbert HOWARD] 06 as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that [HOWARD] 06 furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, [HOWARD] 06 did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of [HOWARD] 06 was great enough so that his contract with [USIA] 29 was not renewed.

If indeed [HOWARD] 06 was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by [HOWARD] 06 while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if [HOWARD] 06 was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using [HOWARD] 06 as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHAR" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true

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name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fcuri Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.

Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, [redacted] information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the British

Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termination by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the microphones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.

If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it

was not until circa April 1962 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system [illegible] which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late [illegible]ber 1961 - [illegible] January 1962.

A few general comments in regard to the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section. As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal

support assets. Also included are local correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads originally defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive

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intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.

F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.



NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.

NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to [James STORSBERG 06]. (This was a lie and an interview with [STORSBERG 06] with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited [LUNT 06 (Horace LUNT)] in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met [LUNT 06].)

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(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with [Edmund 06 STEVENS] who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met [STEVENS 06] and only had seen [STEVENS 06] once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

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he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to [Johan PREISFREUND] 06

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a [military code clerk case (James STORSBERG)]. 08,06

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

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Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to [Edmund 06 STEVENS] and [Isaac Henry 06 SHAPIRO].

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

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that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN

that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was [a long and "German sounding"] name. 08

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against [Collette SCHWARZENBACH,] 06 who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However [SCHWARZENBACH] was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow]. The recruitment attempt against [SCHWARZENBACH] according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 06

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(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of [James 06 STORSBERG] who was actually the subject of a recruitment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that [Johan 06 PREISFREUND] had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. [Johan PREISFREUND 06] was used in the [STORSBERG 06] operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

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aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about [PREISFREUND 06] since GOLITSYN wanted to use [PREISFREUND 06] in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use [PREISFREUND 06] as an agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the [James STORSBERG 06] case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the reporting by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the [James STORSBERG 06] case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the [James STORSBERG 06] case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against [STORSBERG 06] has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by [James] 06

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[STORSBERG] that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by [STORSBERG] himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of [Robert BARRETT], who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving [BARRETT 06] in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on [BARRETT 06] was later given to the First Department and that [BARRETT 06] was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. [BARRETT 06], following his return

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to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the [Robert 06 BARRETT] case. It should be noted that [Robert 06 BARRETT] could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly [John GARLAND 06] and the train manifest lists [John GARLAND 06] and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of [John GARLAND 06] but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

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A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN,

select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counteract the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts

of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelligence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even considered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and [Herbert HOWARD]. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an

example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS?

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C. Is there evidence that a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to

be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly

revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:

a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume

extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that

NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 196[illegible] WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

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necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963. 0001109

The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB

could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

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COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

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PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO

AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF

"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who

enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of the KGB [redacted] Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

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D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance."

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently

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cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made."

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."

A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU

IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND

TIMES HE CLAIMED

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

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It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was nonexistent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.

Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

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Skrenev Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence (on agents), then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Sozer Ivan and Trashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.

2. Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1951-1952.

3. Boydanovskiy - a deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.

4. Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

5. Chikin - in 1950's a colonel, worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

6. Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950's worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

7. Demchenko Petr - an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.

9. Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency "Novos".

10. Bulganin Lev N. - in 1950's worked in GRU.

11. Isliyev - an officer of GRU in 1950's. (or Iyerlev).

12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.

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13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations, in 1951 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (knows German)

17. Kapalkin – a general, in 1940s was a deputy of chief the Military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kapalkin Sergey – finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife – a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko – Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkin Victor – in 1940s studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.

18. Kabalinov Vladimir – a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khabarov – in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

17. Khaytor S.S. – a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligen of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

18. Konkov – a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.

19. Kozlovskiy – in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

20. Molchanov – an officer of GRU (in 1950s)

21. Ozchkov Gennadi – in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

22. Pogodin Boris – a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a japanese language.

23. Rezantsev – a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

24. Shalin – a general, in 1940s was a chief of the Military diplomatic academy; later was a chief of GRU.

25. Shapeshnikov Dyoil – a general, works in GRU; his father was a marshal USSR

26. Mel'nikov Sergey – a chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

27. Namgaladze – a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea, 1950-52

28. Sergeyev – an engineer-~~lieutenant~~colonel, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).

29. Fuslovich – in 1950-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

30. Snishchenov – an officer of GRU, worked in the USA, last years in India, from where was recalled.

31. Tishkin (or-ev) – a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy intelligence of the ministry of military navy.

32. Vasilevskiy Yuri – works in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.

33. Voronkov Albert – an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.

34. Vorontzov Mikhail – a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-51)

~~35. Yegi[illegible] – a doctor of the fleet, works in port Leningrad, archives agent of GB.~~

35. Yershov – an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.

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The 15 of March, 1951 was signed an order about my appointment as an interpeter of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district., where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amure, then crossed the river and from station Pivan' went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).



The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in Bay Postovaya, here were also political directory of 7 Fleet, submarines and destroyers bases. The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhilinbet. The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I., a chief of staff - vice-admiral Kasatonov. 6001128

The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Melnikov Sergey K., his deputies - captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy

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(agents department), captain of 1 rank Khaytov Semen S. (information department), captain of 1 rank Kovtun (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the information department. Officers Kuba Sinov, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant-brouther Albert, major Eisher, captains Orekhov, Radionov, Pogodin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also seargents and privates.

In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.

In June-July 1952 a personal department of the chief directory of the navy intelligence (a chief-colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district - former Prussia).

Sovietsk is a little city-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.



Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there were a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).

Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.

The commander-in-chief of 4 fleet was admiral Golovko N.G.
The chief of my navy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Kyzantsev.
There were officers: Kirgradov, Bulakh, Demchenko and others with sergeants and privates.

Before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transferred from east Germany in Soviet. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another task – a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). – an absolutely new by business.

In the end of December I took a case resuming it with my illness, b.t. having in mind a transference in another place.

In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of MGB (former MOD).

B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO

was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly

entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is

in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist.

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his

information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American correspondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of

the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his

assigned functions, but makes no allowance for the uncertain personnel status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.

NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "[redacted]LODINA and "[redacted]" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.

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The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.



D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A

SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF,

THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH

COMMONWEALTH SECTION

D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of [Richard BURGI] 06 in June 1956, contact with [Sir Allen 06 LANE] and [Arthur 06 BIRSE] in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of [Gisella 06 HARRIS] in 1958, the recruitment of [George 06 DREW] in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

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William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.

Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named individuals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.

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NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty

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pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer when

considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

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During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including [William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE] 06, 06, 06, 06, 06 It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and [William TARASKA] 06 were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.

NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the [Patrick PRESSMAN] 06 and [Gerald SEVERN] 06 cases; and, the listing of the [Sofia SHATTAUER] 06 case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether [Gisella HARRIS] 06 was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

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This question seems quite superfluous since HA[illegible]06] was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO

concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including businessmen, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.

The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen [John SHUBIN 06] in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since [John SHUBIN 06] did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no

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assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.

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According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other

hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest

importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

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(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had

little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.

ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

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ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

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First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relate it to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post

near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond

this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has consciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous interviews leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational

letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but

there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible

case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the

First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,

it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details concerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that responsibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for reporting on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally

not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

The following comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

The first case, [James STORSBERG, 06] is covered on pages 166 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB effort against [STORSBERG]. 06

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made to [STORSBERG]. 06 NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach to [STORSBERG]. 06

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to [STORSBERG] 06 since [STORSBERG] 06 dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the

approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the [STORSBERG 06] case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to [STORSBERG 06] but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to [James KEYSERS 06] (June 10, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against [KEYSERS 06].

When recently reinterviewed, [STORSBERG 06] continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.

[Joseph MORONE 06] another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by [STORSBERG 06] that [MORONE 06] was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of [MORONE 06] clearly indicates that the events [STORSBERG 06] describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.

The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to [STORSBERG 06] occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to [STORSBERG 06], it is

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believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning a successful operation against a [military 08 code clerk] in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to [STORSBERG 06] and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against [James KEYSERS 06]. As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way reflect against NOSENKO. [KEYSERS 06] did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the airport, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to [KEYSERS 06].

There are certain statements relative to the [KEYSERS 06] case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard [KEYSERS 06] as the replacement for [STORSBERG 06]. In fact, [KEYSERS 06] actually was being trained by [STORSBERG 06] as a substitute, not a replacement, even though his primary assignment

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was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that [06 KEYSERS] either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that [06 STORSBERG] was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to [06 KEYSERS]. The observations of NOSENKO are of interest since [06 KEYSERS] actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by [06 STORSBERG] so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that [06 KEYSERS] was to be the eventual replacement of [06 STORSBERG].

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, [06 KEYSERS] acknowledged to his supervisors [06 Colonel URBAN] his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).

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Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of [Colonel URBAN] reflects that [KEYSERS] was not informed by [URBAN] of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."

(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones [KEYSERS] failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that [KEYSERS] did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to [Colonel URBAN] in the office of [Colonel URBAN], it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before [KEYSERS] left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that [KEYSERS] had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach [KEYSERS] at the airport. In view of the short time between [KEYSERS] report of receipt

of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the [KEYSERS 06] matter therefore is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to [Matthew ZUJUS 06], who succeeded [James STORSBERG 06] having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for [ZUJUS 06], according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that [ZUJUS 06], during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph [MORONE 06] in 1960, not [ZUJUS 06] in 1962.

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Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met [06 MORONE] at American House. In a recent interview, [06 MORONE] confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of [06 MORONE] therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with [06 ZUJUS], nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of [06 ZUJUS] since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.

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It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about [ZUJUS 06] or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of [ZUJUS 06]. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding [ZUJUS 06], the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. [ZUJUS 06], who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about [ZUJUS 06] after 1 January 1962.

Pages 165 - 169 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to [Paul JENNER 06]. Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that [Paul JENNER 06], who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as [JENNER 06] to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with [JENNER 06] as a part of a future operation against [JENNER 06] in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with [JENNER 06].

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of [JENNER 06].

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and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.

06 [JENNER] after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to [06 JENNER], they both said that they might see [06 JENNER] in Moscow. About three months later [06 JENNER] reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave [06 JENNER] a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised [06 JENNER] not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter [06 JENNER] at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.

Insofar as is known, [06 JENNER] has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.

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During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards [Paul JENNER] (06) he still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with [JENNER] (06) from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that [JENNER] (06) was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the [31] (08) March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as [JENNER] (06) or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to [JENNER] (06), struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to [JENNER] (06) at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV. or whether it may have been some other person entirely.

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It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as [06 JENNER]. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and [06 JENNER] were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with [06 JENNER], this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the [06 John GARLAND] case. [06 GARLAND] was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to [06 GARLAND] other than to identify him as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of [06 GARLAND] from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that

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the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (fnu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name

concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful.

As regards the KOSOLAPOV-[06 GARLAND] matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case [06 GARLAND] that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

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Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against [GARLAND 06] was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND 06] matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists [John GARLAND 06] and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. [GARLAND 06], when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as [GARLAND 06] from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not

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matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND 06] trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of [GARLAND 06], he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.

As with the [JENNER 06]-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the [GARLAND 06]-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of

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this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the [JENNER 06] case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the [JENNER 06] case nor those in the [GARLAND 06] case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk [Joseph MORONE 06] from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against [MORONE 06] was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that [MORONE 06] and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of [BEGGS 06], were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as [MORONE 06] and [BEGGS 06]. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise [MORONE 06] sexually. She

successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the [MORONE 06] case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the [MORONE 06] trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the [MORONE 06] case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. [MORONE 06] and [BEGGS 06] departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the [MORONE 06] case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOSENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that [MORONE 06] when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning [MORONE 06] (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that [MORONE 06] had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of [MORONE 06] with "IVANOVA's friends."

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NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with [MORONE 06]. He has furnished information on a developing operation against Marine guard [GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA 06)] based on the involvement of [GARCIA 06] with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered of using IVANOVA against [MORONE 06] to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, [MORONE 06] and a Marine guard, possibly [GARCIA 06], had been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about [MORONE 06]. The summary also states that [MORONE 06] was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that [MORONE 06] had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning [MORONE 06], but he, NOSENKO,

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knew of no black market involvement of [06 MORONE] with CECCHI. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the [06 Maurice ZWANG] case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that [06 MORONE] met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of official records indicates that [06 MORONE] did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.

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A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective: 08, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

(a) Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he

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responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that [ZWANG 06] was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of [ZWANG 06] were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of [ZWANG 06] or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.

(b) [John TAYLOR 06] - NOSENKO identified [TAYLOR 06] as [a State Department code clerk 08] and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of [TAYLOR 06] with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit [TAYLOR 06] before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might

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endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to [James STORSBERG] who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although [STORSBERG] was not approached until after the departure of [TAYLOR] the operation against [STORSBERG] was underway before [TAYLOR] became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in [TAYLOR] since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) [Frank DAY] - NOSENKO identified [Frank DAY] as [a State Department code clerk] who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about [DAY] and no operational measures were taken against [DAY]. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, [DAY] traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and [former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN]. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons

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at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on [DAY] 06 and [BROWN] 06 but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) [Robert DWELLY] 06 - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve [Robert DWELLY, a code clerk] 06,08 in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion [DWELLY] 06 was a homosexual.

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There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where [DWELLY 06] was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

[DWELLY 06] has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed [DWELLY 06] as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about [DWELLY 06] as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) [Joseph GAFFEY 06] - NOSENKO has identified [Joseph GAFFEY 06] as a [code clerk 08]. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure [GAFFEY 06] into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated that [GAFFEY 06] arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that [Fred KADERA 06] had reported that [GAFFEY 06] had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Americ[illegible] C00125

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House. It was further noted that [GAFFEY 06] was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by [GAFFEY 06] during interview, [GAFFEY 06] also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to [GAFFEY 06], IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May

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1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from microphone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side handwritten notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active microphones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was characterized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO

has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that from 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which

was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical coverage. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: [LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN] and [Sipe BURTIN]. 06,06,06 06 The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of [LUBIN] 06 and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of [SMITH]. 06 NOSENKO has explained that [LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN] 06,06,06 and [Sipe BURTIN] 06 were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as

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Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that [LUBIN is George LUBIN] and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN are correct names, with [Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN]. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. [SMITH] at this time, has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV

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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he [illegible]ly had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known

to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 246), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not

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arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that [Eugene 03 MAHONEY] was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that [03 MAHONEY] reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of [03 MAHONEY] and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c) [03 Steve WASHENKO] was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

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that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in

the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation against [STORSBERG 06] was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit [KEYSERS 06] newly-discovered vulnerability," it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dispensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the [STORSBERG 06] case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from [MORONE 06], that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence

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of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the [STORSBERG 06] operation had been completed.

As to the [KEYSERS 06] case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to [KEYSERS 06] took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that [KEYSERS 06] was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.

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F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases

are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of [Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS]. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against [JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS] has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals.

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.

In the [Wallace Everett JOHNSON] case, it was previously noted that [JOHNSON] arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of [JOHNSON] were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews

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has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of [JOHNSON 06] "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where [JOHNSON 06] stayed. They met [JOHNSON 06] there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to the [William Carroll JONES 06] case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against [JONES 06], including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against [JONES 06] and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the [JONES 06] case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the [Natalie BIENSTOCK 06] case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the [BIENSTOCK 06] case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the [Horst BRAUNS 06] case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why [BRAUNS 06] visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom [BRAUNS 06] met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

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the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that [BRAUNS 06] was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that [BRAUNS 06] was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made [BRAUNS 06] of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since [BRAUNS 06] was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that [BRAUNS 06] listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. [BRAUNS 06] had a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.

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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although [BRAUNS] 06 when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On

the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore

would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.

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As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.

It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of [Edward McGOWAN]. 06 NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with [a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,] and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. 08,24,14-1 Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.

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Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclusion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explanation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed information concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

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Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:

(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their

inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.

G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and [Herbert 06 HOWARD] who actually was a [USIA 29] employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows. 6001237

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(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Department since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert 06 HOWARD] case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

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learned of the name when the First Section, First Department, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of [HOWARD 06].

In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and [Herbert HOWARD 06] were the only successful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

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V. ANNEX

ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers."

Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of [49]08 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of [49]08 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.

To comment specifically on each of the [49] cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately [40] of the [49] cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps [four] cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all [49] of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the [49] cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:

(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as well as several 1956 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,

First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.

Certain of the 08 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 08 49 cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however, that the

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explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 08 [49] cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.

ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,

during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is

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nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information."

or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive information" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full consideration. These areas are:

(a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American personnel in the United States Embassy during 1958 - 1960, nor is there any information suggesting the KGB had an American source or American agent in the Embassy during that period of time.

(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU officer who had been an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under Department of State cover assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

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In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 - 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.

In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically

CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

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If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that

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the latest information in the papers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.

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