

TOP SECRET

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

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Notes:

Black text on a blue background indicates content
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I did my best to be accurate in revealing what is new,
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(vi)

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(vii)

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the Key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version (more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class) NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidentally shoot himself. a sensitive source [redacted] quoted [redacted] to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942. a KGB officer

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)

After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-Building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

A sensitive source

~~Source~~ is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to ~~Source~~, NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments. this source

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source two [redacted] has quoted KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter.

a sensitive source According to [REDACTED], FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [REDACTED] Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.K. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent) by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the United States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and "not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source identified him as "an employee of the KGB"; and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to ~~SECRET~~ a sensitive source,

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

A sensitive source

Comment: [REDACTED] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [REDACTED] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

Comment: (Continued)

In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [REDACTED]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [REDACTED] a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [REDACTED] a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

a sensitive source

Comment: Earlier, [redacted] identified an agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. PEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

sensitive sources,

Comment: Other sources, including ~~SENSITIVE SOURCES~~ have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment:

Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV caroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of the KGB.

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

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