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20 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on
October 16, 1961

The meeting with Dr. Miro on October 16 was postponed from 10:00 until such time as his audience terminated with Cardinal Spellman. He arrived at my room at about 10:50. He declared that the Cardinal had wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubans at the hands of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami wasn't doing enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wasn't doing enough for them; that Castro must be overthrown. Miro told the Cardinal that in all Latin America there were going to be organized acts of sympathy for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Mass for them on October 17. He invited Miro to see him at any time.

Miro answered my query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium and another 1,000 people outside; that Lacerda had received such applause.

The Inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Miro) had told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other details; had described how Communism was gaining ground day by day; that in Cuba they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin America; that ten countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has not; that everybody is confused.

He informed me that as for the documents relating to the Cuban plots in Argentina, the Argentine military men came to talk to Varona, and he gave them some documents that have no importance. The officers told Varona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign Office," nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the documents to the Foreign Office. But these documents had no importance; they were merely to demonstrate that there had been an extradition of documents, and that they were originals. The important documents are held by Varona in Miami.

Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in Miami, but that his "administrative" budget really does not provide for propaganda activities (such as the Current SEP and Lacerda affairs). I countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for him to conduct some propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major scale -- but some things.

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Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and that it was believed that measures are necessary to ferment in Cuba the opposition to Castro. "The people are against him!" declared Miro. "But increase it," I answered. Miro then stated "If this action doesn't stem from the Consejo (CRC) -- not as an independent agency, but in close contact with you (the Agency), -- what we ferment is a complete disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no government can succeed; secondly, if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a more or less limited period of time, there will surely be more shooting of people (prisoners) by Fidel."

"And this is my insistence. Now I am afraid to go to Miami. What am I to tell the people there? What do I do? Converse? Meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba but disconnected from the Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify the membership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that. In the Council there are other great organizations - delegates from each of the organizations - that ask me for arms, dynamite, things, and I am here powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how we may hand over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is not merely an endless series of sabotage actions." I replied, "Well, I believe that a well-worked-out plan that shows good chances of success will be favorably considered."

"How about arms for the Escambray?" asked Miro. I replied that it was my understanding that arms for the Escambray could only be landed on the North Coast; how then would they get to the Escambray? Miro said that the boat which had made many trips (working for YOU), would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick up the arms; what cannot be done is abandon Osvaldo Ramirez in this situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate situation for three months.

I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly identified" replied Miro. "He assured that it is perfectly identified and requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arms. I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell us the means of delivery, the people to contact and then deliver to our Cubans the arms, dynamite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of Cubans against inaction) increases daily."

"All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council ask me for arms and means for fighting. But I cannot provide them anything. Meanwhile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely a 'council painted on the wall.' I have said, 'Look for someone else if I am not considered able to do the job but we must work. I have confidence in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion.'"

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"I've asked for money for the clandestine groups. What have they said about that?" Miro asked. I replied that there is a problem of the means of delivery, that the Italian Embassy at present appears undesirable. The Ambassador isn't there. Well, we look for another means; the Argentine - anything - those people need money" he countered. I have to carry out concrete things," he declared. "I'm now like a person in a swimming pool without water." "For three and a half months I've struggled to maintain a revolutionary spirit. My military people are waiting till I arrived and tell them, 'this must be done, that must be done. Nothing yet! And without any plan, I don't go anywhere; nowhere!'"

"The other time I went with my eyes closed, through faith. We had a failure and the failure fell upon me: I cannot proceed under such circumstances in no way. I've asked for \$50,000 to send in to the underground. The Russians are spending \$400,000 in propaganda and have less than the U.S. We shall not compromise the U.S. Tell me the way to send it in. The Council is to aid them, not merely to conduct meetings."

"On that request they haven't replied anything?" he asked. I answered that on this item, I had made known Miro's desire, but that so far nothing had been resolved.

"I'm not complaining," he stated, "but for three months I have been asking for a contact with the authority to resolve. Why? Because I'm getting nowhere. When I return now I shall be asked, 'How about it?' and must answer, 'You will have to wait because I have nothing.' And meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba independent of the Consejo. Let us go back. Without being in agreement, I cannot serve you. I have no interest in presiding over a Council that is of no use."

I pointed out that the Council must continue to exist, with him as its president, as the coordinating body of the resistance movement, but that there are certain difficulties in putting the student or labor activities under the direction of the Council; that these groups are now functioning efficiently and that I trusted that he could see the problems of completely changing their control, direction, and coordination. I added that I believed that he should know something of what they are doing and that I believed that should be kept informed.

"I know absolutely nothing," he replied. "What comes to me is from these same individuals. I am not in agreement with that, I'm becoming ridiculous. Under these circumstances I cannot continue. I have planted the problem of the underground, the problem of the collateral organizations (that he would like to have in Council by being their source of support and coordination), of the magistrates, and now you have seen what ALABAU has done (proclaiming GARCERAN as president of exile government), who is working with you people, and you have seen the reaction of the State Department. Now yesterday ALABAU is publishing political denunciations against the Council. I have discussed the matter of the magistrates with the C.I.A., I don't remember the name of the person. A month has passed and the other magistrates (those with ALABAU) haven't been stopped (in their activities) and they haven't had elections as I requested to select another leader."

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"The students are continuing their activities. I believe that I have something in my head as a basis for the determination of what should be discussed in the Council with us; and in agreement with you; but these existing circumstances, without any connection, make it so that I cannot continue the clandestine aid. To the first problem, I presented your reply, "We shall see." To the second problem, the collateral organizations -- which continues the same as before; the third problem I presented, on arms to send in, nothing. The fourth problem, the propaganda operation "Grieta" that I showed you, nothing." I replied that on the latter I had discussed the matter, that it was, I believe, a suggestion given to him in the Department of State.

"If we don't take propaganda and send arms into Cuba now, it's useless," he declared. "And I cannot remain in silence." I replied that I believed quite a bit of propaganda was being conducted. "Yes, but independent of the Council. I CANNOT BE A PUPPET!" "They (the Agency) keep on dealing with the MRP, with the Unidad Revolucionaria, and they haven't entered into the Council simply because they are in direct contact with the Agency. Thus it appears that none of the problems that I took up with you some twenty days ago have been resolved, and I'll have to take another solution. I want to know the truth if I'm not acceptable. I'll leave and without any scandal whatsoever. I have swallowed all the criticism, in my own house, in silence, as though I were responsible for everything. I cannot continue to do this and be doing nothing. I cannot be a puppet! I have no arms to give."

He reiterated that nothing had been resolved on any of his requests and proposals, and that he couldn't continue thus. That he could quit, go to Puerto Rico as a professor. He added he would want to work with us. He then referred to the acts of Lacerda in New York, which had cost four thousand dollars, plus passage, a ridiculous sum spend from the Administrative Budget. "We have paid the passage, his living costs here," he said.

"Now I go to Miami where I have to face the organizations grouped into the Council. "Arms for everywhere?" "I haven't any. All the organizations free-wheeling there which don't want to join together because they are working directly with your people." I said this was unfortunate and asked whether there could not be some form of realizing contacts with them without necessarily channelizing their support and direction through the Council, such as by forming a committee along the lines I had suggested in Miami.

Miro then referred to the agreement reached in the White House meeting with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Woodward, with gentlemen of the C.I.A., and with Mr. Hurvitz. First, "That the only thing that is recognized is the Consejo (CRC); Dr. Miro is the person of our confidence and will have an administrative budget which he will control and will report later the expenses of coordination, and that any other expenses, propaganda or clandestine activity, will be paid by the Agency; for the problems of the organizations in the Council there will be a contact to assist in working out their solutions; that is to say, that their problems of boats and arms." Another point was that in case there are organizations that do not choose to join the Council, Dr. Miro will be perfectly informed in advance of the matters at hand and will give his

authorization. That is to say, it establishes a unifying control over the

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(CRC). I have seven, to work with you, with me, with the people who are going to carry out the activities, with the people that I designate. Nothing of that is being done. Then what they want is to work alone."

"I will not continue. I will not continue from the time I return to Miami. I have gone on for five months, struggling. I cannot accept this situation. I have tried to pull together these groups as asked in the White House. I haven't succeeded in grouping any more, because - I want to speak clearly in order to remain good friends always - because you have prevented it. The students haven't joined, not because of no political reason, but merely because you support them directly. Presumably the idea is that in this way the security of this nation is better safeguarded. A Consejo was desired to serve as the coordinating group and to provide a means by which the United States would not appear to be intervening in Cuba. If there is to be a Consejo, it must have all the dignity of a Council."

"When I try to form a Council, grouping all elements together, they don't join because they are talking directly with your people - and there is an office for that purpose in Miami - which deals with all the men who want to work, who want to do things. This is all independent of the Council. And some work for a destruction of the Council. I cannot tolerate this. I have a son who is a prisoner; either I know the plans, and I knew the maneuver and the problems that they are going to carry out, or I, when I arrive in Miami, will say, "No," and send word to Washington. Let them do without me. There will be someone who will submit to these things, but not I."

"And of the four items that ~~Mr. Kennedy~~ promised me to resolve, there have not been resolved any, and I find myself in the dark. And I am very sorry. I am not going to compromise the security of this Nation, but neither am I going to compromise the situation of these boys. When they disappeared, lost their lives, etc., I was confronted with "And you are the president of the Council." I cannot remain in this way."

"I haven't been able to group together anything. I was promised that the magistrates would all incorporate together (into the Council), but that rascal ALABAU is working against the Council and I have reason to believe that he is doing it with Agency support, otherwise how would he pay for his political denunciations." I responded, that I believed this could not be true. He shouted, "I have expressed my position to you, and I want you to get an answer when you can. If these problems that I have set forth do not have an immediate solution, I do not know and to dispose of relative actions to be taken, then how, in view of my situation, must I do."

He asked about the plan for clandestine sabotage action by commando raid, that he had given us, and what had come of it. I replied that he must realize that the study of such a plan necessarily was slow and must be considered by many. He said he was convinced that there was no intention of accepting such plans, and that while now we discuss such plans, we lose out. "I cannot accept this situation, nor would you."

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He then said that he could go ahead and dissolve the Council, and let each organization go ahead and do as it pleased; that he couldn't preside over a meaningless council; that this was not a threat, but he would step out. I reassured him that he was highly esteemed in Washington and it was necessary that he continue as head of the Council. He replied, "But they disregard me."

He reiterated that he had planted four problems, none of which had been resolved; reiterated that he had planted the propaganda problem a long time ago, but that propaganda continues independent of the Council and people are sent out like those to the Congress of students in Sao Paulo, where they repeat things like parrots which don't go with Latin American audiences.

"I have asked for arms; either give us massive aid, one, two, three million - whatever is necessary, because this is to destroy Communism, and we'll take our plans. And we'll furnish the dead, for we can do no more. We must work in agreement, because now each time that I speak, it's 'we shall see, we are going to study,' - and nothing happens. No, no, I shall not preside over another Council existing under these circumstances. I have often spent 24 hours without sleeping, trying to pull together the groups, and meantime, problems arise on all sides. Why? Because so long as other groups get support, they won't enter the Council. The MKP is in contact with you and getting arms; now the Unidad Revolucionario. I remain the ridiculous one. Already I've suffered a lot and have a son who is a prisoner. And I've talked a lot during these days, and I keep on being a puppet, but worse than a puppet, because a puppet is moved, but I'm not even moved."

"Therefore, I say to you that the groups that want to work with us, you, the chief of that group, and I, we ought to resolve all these questions; for example, with the chief of the military group, because he has pulled together the professional army and the rebel army (elements) and the army of liberation, such as Varela, Sotus, Nino and the boys, who have come from the Brigade." He declared that SOTUS is a fighter, is willing to return to Cuba, and that he had great confidence in SOTUS.

I assured him that the legalization of SOTUS' residence would be arranged, and that Mr. Hurwitz informed me that he believed something could be done for the other three returnees whose names Mr. Miro had given me.

Dr. Miro reiterated that he must speak clearly, that he could not continue thus as a travelling president without having anything to give to his people - nothing to the underground through Council action; nor could he be ignorant of plans which he opposed where Cubans go out to die, and then having their relatives come to him as responsible. He declared, "I don't want to live on a budget, preside over an administrative office, receive people, tell their lies, saying, 'We shall see.' The men who are

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here (in Council) representing organizations must know something of what they are going to do and if they ask for 40 rifles, I must be able to say, "Here they are" - not to give arms directly into their hands - but through a contact for this. Otherwise you people make your plans, and I'll retire from everything. And be assured that never, never will I say a single word against the Agency or the United States, never; nor explain reasons which shouldn't be explained.

"If I cannot have the responsibility that I should have, I shall not lend myself to what may result in a tragedy. None of the problems I have planted have been resolved; not that of the registrars nor that of the Escambray, nor the money to the underground, has been resolved, not the plan of propaganda that I gave you. I cannot continue to sit in an office, while you continue operating, as you wish, with my silent consent. You may choose someone else like Mr. Godoy, who is asking for arms. Choose and see whether his name will save Cuba. You are going to create another Fidel, who is nothing.

I reminded him that I had my talks with him only ten days before, not twenty, and that I could talk to no one in Washington until a week ago and had to have many conversations with many people, and that his proposals could not be resolved in such a short time. He returned to the agreement that "plans of action be discussed jointly; that if there were objections, that the objections be discussed. He said there had been no objections so far to discuss; nor objections to propaganda plans. He was to have contact with a representative of C.I.A. to meet with representatives of organizations that want to collaborate, and with Dr. Miro - nothing developed on that! He declared that he should have knowledge of the activities of those that don't want to collaborate; and said each day there will be more, because they want to gain the power for themselves; to act on their own account. He said he knows there is a "Jim" and a "Robert" and others that are doing things.

I assured him he must realize that there were many problems involved in his proposals and that time was essential to work them out. I reminded him of his conversation with Mr. Goodwin and the latter's statement to the effect that there could be no thought in the foreseeable future of a military operation against or invasion of Cuba. Miro countered by referring to his conversation with the President on 18 July and his (Miro's) complaint of inactivity. He said the President proposed the recruiting of Cubans in different units of the Army for training so as to utilize them at the opportune time, and that the officers would be invited to our military schools. Miro said he had gathered some of the military together and informed them of this offer, and the next week he was called to discuss the recruiting, which he approved. Then General Herashey went to see him at his house, telling him that Cubans wouldn't be sent to Berlin or any such place but kept in the U.S. available for use later. Miro said, "If there is to be no invasion, then let's utilize the underground, which needs arms and money."

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He again repeated, "There must be massive propaganda; secondly arms; we shall furnish the dead, but I need to know 'How are we going to die.'" He commented that he was going to ask that his photograph not be put on the cover of a certain magazine because he didn't know whether he was going to continue; that in the present circumstances he didn't see how he could continue. Again I urged that he must do so, and that I felt certain that we could resolve some of his proposals, probably not to the extent that he desired, but at least in part, but that time was necessary to accomplish this.

He repeated that the Council needs to have some action taken in Cuba, but the Agency keeps on undertaking actions without any connection with the Council. Further, that he must have the means for conducting propaganda, such as outlined in the "Operation Grieta." He asked so when could I give him some answers. I replied that during the current week I expected to have meetings in which these matters would be discussed - the Department of State, with Mr. Goodwin, with representatives of the Agency, and that I hoped that something would be resolved, but that he must realize that many people are involved in such matters and solutions are not reached quickly. He reiterated that he had to keep telling his organizations "wait a little longer" and that this was becoming embarrassing.

Then he brought up his proposal of having him and the Council go to Cuba, saying "perhaps it would be advantageous that I die in Cuba; that the Council ask recognition from Cuban soil and the military aid of the United States -- all to take place within 48 hours. He added, "I have told you of the reaction of Cardinal Spellman, 'We have done very badly in the Cuban affair.'"

I reminded him that despite the urgency that we all recognized in the Cuban situation and its threat to the United States and all the Americas, there are many other world problems - Laos, Berlin, etc., - which also occupy the attention of our government people.

Then I said I wished to take advantage of our meeting to ask him for information relative to his current budget; first, did he believe that there were any people receiving a salary from the Council who might also be getting financial aid from H.E.W. He said, "No, I would never permit that." Then he declared that he had two ways of operating: when he absorbed the personnel of the various organizations into the CRC; either to cut off their salaries suddenly, or to put them to work for their pay; that the "morins" (payroll) grew a little bit because he had to take in certain people, and that he considered his absorbing them was according to the policy of C.I.A. Then he declared that the maximum benefit received by refugees from H.F.W. was \$100 per family per month, and that no where here could a family live on a hundred a month. Hence, he did not feel that he could cut off the people on the staffs of the CRC organizations, and send them to the H.E.W. Therefore, they were assigned to the different

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"The money for the underground is such and contact is doubtful, an excuse. The problem of Cuba costs a lot of money! The people of the Escambray - it's difficult to deliver arms to them? But we are going to run that risk. The arms are going to be lost? Well, risks must be taken." Piro again referred to the groups that didn't want to collaborate with the Council but would collaborate directly with the Agency stating that he had opposed it and still opposed it; that he received a very affectionate letter asking him to try work out all the problems between us and accept a solution, and that a representative would be designated to work with him; that I had appeared and he had spent two very pleasant days with me; that I was very understanding; that twenty days had passed of great anxiety. ("Not twenty but ten," I interposed.) He said he figured that probably he might have arms and help for the underground and know about plans of action and had felt strengthened. "But" he said, "now I feel knocked down. None of the plans or propaganda proposals have been accepted, none. The firing wall in Cuba continues functioning, 31 dead in 30 days. My resignation has been written long ago, and I am ready to submit it as soon as I return to Miami."

I declared that he must not do that, that he must have patience., that it takes time to resolve these things; He replied that he has been waiting since April and mentioned all the suffering he had gone through, attacks by everyone, rumors of prisoners and dead, the American Press, Fortune, Time, Life, New York Times, etc., all against him along with ALABAU Treilles, and others; and that he had supported all of this in silence. He had been asked if it were true that there was no air support and had not answered. "The other time I kept my lips closed with absolute faith, the next time I shall have my eyes open and have many questions. I don't understand how you people can deal with some of these unknown Cubans."

He said, "I've given many proofs of loyalty to you. What they attribute to me the other day in Miami that "there would be an invasion in a few days", that is not true. I have a tape recording of what I said which was "very soon (without mentioning any date) in Cuba there would be unveiled the great Pascuas (resurrection) of the Fatherland. And the press has misinterpreted Pascuas as the Pascuas de Navidad (Christmas)."

"Thus the press comes out with statements attributed to Dr. Piro that the invasion will take place by Christmas, completely a lie and nothing like what I said." I conceded to Dr. Piro that he had suffered a tremendous number of attacks in silence and that the press had over a period of time come out with critical remarks. I asked him if he planned to pass through Washington before returning to Miami and he said he didn't have money for such expenses; that his wife was terribly worried about their son, but that he would have to remain in New York until Wednesday to attend the luncheon for all the editors of the Latin American press, who want to converse with him, to help with propaganda but without costing the U.S. a cent.

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commissions within the CRC: finance, propaganda, clandestine, military, organization, etc. The ones who are no good or don't want to work, he said, he would cut off, but that he couldn't just fire someone suddenly. He then said salaries were small @ \$200, \$225 per month as an average except for particular individuals, such as his assistant Aragon, a very capable person, and the chiefs of the various organizations who work "full time" and receive \$400 each; further that he planned to give each organization approximately \$700 per month for their operating expenses, some less, some a little more - (MRR, Rescate, 30 de Nov, 20 de Mayo, AAA Independientes, Montecristi).

When I questioned whether the Montecristi organization was still in the CRC, he said it was, that only Justo Carillo had dropped out of the CRC but the group remained in and had a new head. He added that he had just had a request from Carillo to provide him (Carillo) with a thousand dollars; that Carillo had photographic copies of some checks that he had paid to Waldo Frank for propaganda activities against Cuba and that Carillo was asking reimbursement but Miro said he didn't consider he had to give it to Carillo.

Returning to the budget, Miro said, "There are the various employees; there is the item of trips; there are the military people grouped under the military commission - I cannot let them suffer misery. There are no students on the payroll because they are being supported by you (the Agency). And right there a difference is established between those in the Council and those who receive money from the Agency directly, which is more than that received by my people. See how you (the Agency) without intending to, and for reasons of insecurity, are going to destroy the Council." He then stated that he had placed Alvarez Diaz, who had been Minister of Finance, in charge of finance matters because he (Miro) could not be everywhere, and to make certain that no expenses were paid on which they were not in agreement, and which Paula would carry out.

I queried whether Paula would continue as accountant, and Miro said, "certainly, as accountant." He said that everyone has been coming to him (Miro) with all kinds of pleas for money and therefore it was necessary to have Alvarez Diaz in there so that he and Paula might resolve the finance matters. Miro added words of praise for Paula, "It's like I want to have for each section of the Council, like I wanted Conte Aguero to handle propaganda, but since he is receiving money from you (the Agency) he doesn't want to. I have to have someone to take this load off of me; first as in Naval affairs, someone to look for boats, arms, etc."

I asked about Pestre for propaganda and Miro replied that Pestre is no good, never was of value; that he had been put in charge of the propaganda commission previously and given \$48,000 monthly, but had done nothing. Then he launched into a criticism of the Swan propaganda; that it was a shame, handled by Batistianos: Fernandez VARELA, a Catholic; Suarez Hernandez, a senator in the epoch of Batista. He named another (sounded

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like Chau Miller) a bad person and a Batista. Miro said he had asked that Swan be stopped but, since they work directly, these people are defended. He added wryly that he wished they (the Agency) would defend him (Miro) that way.

He said they (the Agency) had posed the problem five months ago in Miami relative to Joaquin, Jagerio, a Cuban who was working with the Council and has worked significantly, but then he accepted work with the C.I.A. and continues doing this (and does whatever he pleases) -- intelligence, arms, recruiting, etc. -- and will have nothing to do with the Council.

Again Miro declared that he had the highest regard for Paulo and couldn't despoise with him; had even proposed his name to be the Magistrate of the Tribunal of Accounts in the future government of Cuba. I added by understanding that Paulo had done an excellent job, particularly mentioning his handling of paying dependents, a meticulous and arduous task. Miro exclaimed that he had never considered replacing Paula but merely needed Alvarez Diaz to handle details with Paula. He said everyone in Miami knows it is Paula who has the money to make payments by check, and that he thought it would be better for the people to get payments in cash and sign a receipt; that sometimes someone might rob Paula and then people will ask "from where does this money come," since the Cubans have no money."

Then Dr. Miro said he would like to clarify any doubtful questions. I asked whether he had received any other communication from the Escambray group. He replied that he had not, but that the one had come through the Montecristi group and they continued to ask him for this arms aid. I asked whether any changes or additions had been made in the Council at the October 10th meeting. He replied that the MRP had not answered his invitation because they were working with the Agency, and that the new group, the Union Revolucionario, had replied that they did not, because they have a delegate in Washington who is seeking direct contact with U.S. Government Agencies.

Miro then declared that in order to call a Council meeting, he had to have a press conference or a press release (about calling a CRC meeting) but Prio, ALAEL, and everybody were against all this, and were doubtful whether to come or not to come. "I talked with Conte Aguero and with Arrellano many hours. Arrellano is a fuhrer; if things aren't done as he wants, he won't go along. Moreover, he has a strong anti-American sentiment. I talked to them, but they said, "No." "There were two problems: their lack of confidence in the Government, and my contradictory view that we want to be with them (with U.S.). I would like to have had to call a Council meeting almost by force. Therefore I decided to have no meeting and no press conference, and to come here (to New York City). There was no session //

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"The Pastistianos are very well organized and also the Prio followers, waiting for me to do something, and I cannot do anything. I'm like St. Lawrence, roasted on one side and fried on the other."

I asked whether the Council was looked upon too much as a political entity rather than a unifying medium. Miro replied, "Those people (Prio, Alabau, etc.) want to obstruct the ones who are fighting Castro through the medium of the Council. They are divided into two groups: (1) Politicians; Prio, Alonso Pujol; those that want to be the directors; (2) The groups that want to act within Cuba who don't want to join CNC but rather to deal directly with you people in order to have the power tomorrow in Cuba; people only of action, but not of common sense and who cannot mean much to the future of Cuba; they would cause another era like that of Fidel, who is nothing but a student. That is extremely dangerous. You give these people the means and if one of them overthrows Fidel he is the one who assumes power. He may be a good man of action but only 24 or 25 years old and not one who can orient Cuba in the way of democracy. After reaching 40, people think differently. Fighters are capable of carrying out the action you give them to do, but not to govern."

Dr. Miro continued to dwell on his concern as to the future if these young fighters are given a free hand to do as they please; that care must be taken as to who is supported, that these people are the ones who don't want to work with us; that the PRP hopes that it will be the one who will lead tomorrow in Cuba; that ones of the future will be something to which you the U.S. has contributed by supporting such elements.

Dr. Miro commented in further detail his views and again hartered on the manner of using funds to avoid being like the ostrich. "Everyone knows where the money is coming from and we have to be careful of the form. Everyone does not know of you, but of where the help is coming from."

"We are the politicians of the war against Castro," affirmed Dr. Miro. Let a military man function as chief of staff as long as the military action against Castro continues, but then the civil action must be carried out by non-military men."

He added that during the softening-up action against Castro, we must take good care of the manner in which the action is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so we are losing the now as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of these groups. And we must not lose, we must win.

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I told Dr. Miro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking these groups with Dr. Miro and the Council, without having to channel direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now functioning well under existing arrangements.

Dr. Miro said he would be pleased to meet with them outside of the Council, and they may continue to function as collateral organizations independently; but that they realize that they have one direction. Dr. Miro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude -- they are injuring the Council.

Dr. Miro commented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated that all the collateral organizations must operate within the orbit of the Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions just as he as a professor had done with students--often times resulting in excellent ideas and viewpoints.

Then I mentioned that I had read in one of our magazines a laudatory item describing his demonstrated capabilities as a mediator between political groups and individuals.

Dr. Miro again returned to his belief that funds of all organizations should funnel through the Council because every Cuban has a sense of smell that inclines him to go where he knows the money is dispensed; that this is sad but true; and that those who are still outside and hope to get direct support, they knew that the money was here (in his hands), would come running without urging. He then said that he had seven hundred dollars, more or less, for each organization's operating expenses. He concluded by saying that he didn't wish to operate without us (Agency) or without any of the Agency people, but merely desired to pull together the diverse groups and other activities.

He then referred to his conversations with Mr. Berle and General Taylor, and his view expressed to them that in the April affair he felt that the Agency had functioned more or less effectively -- sometimes their people had been "rough", or "tough", but that he had no complaint; that the lack of air cover no doubt caused defeat. When he had been quizzed by reporters and other on specific questions designed to pry secrets out of him, he had replied, "I didn't see them," or similar evasions, and thus had endeavored to be loyal to us.

He said his son had been certain that his father would be with the expeditionary force, and, in route to the Bay of Pigs from Guatemala the son had searched for him on the boats, and was disillusioned because his father wasn't there.

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Again he emphasized his view that the students sent to Latin American countries on propaganda missions should be indoctrinated by people in the Council to prepare them for the cross examining that they would undergo, and thereby prepare them against traps and foolish statements; and to insure that no Batista supporters were sent out. He emphasized that one of the first questions asked of these propaganda emissaries would be "with what money do you come here?" "What Yankee organization is behind you." He added, "The people have to be well prepared to answer; just as I had to undergo a succession of penetrating questions when I first went into exile in Argentina and could answer them without hesitation because of a clean record."

Again he came back to his argument that the collateral organizations should function through the Council - not "forgetting the Agency, but not being forgotten by the Agency." I told Dr. Miro that I hoped during the course of the week to have a series of conversations in the course of which certain decisions and solutions would be reached that would enable me to sit down with him the following week and work out some details on propaganda and other matters.

Dr. Miro then asked, "How best can the security of this nation be insured - the Agency dealing directly with these people or working with them through Miro?" And he emphasized that he was concerned both with the security of Cuba and of the United States, and that these people (Cubans with whom the Agency is dealing directly) at any moment when they felt they were losing out or were not sufficiently paid - would ask for more, and, being Cubans, might be very indiscrete; but that if they had to deal with Miro they would be obligated to go to him with their complaints. He said that just as a bee seeking sweets will go to any source, but if there is only one source it will go to that one; and that thus all groups must look to the Council.

Again Dr. Miro returned to his thesis that sooner or later there must be war to overthrow Castro, and that Cubans and Americans must realize this; that as a preliminary the Cubans must carry out sabotage, etc., but just as blockades didn't overthrow Franco or Mussolini, neither would they cause the fall of Castro; further that if sabotage was conducted without being a part of an overall plan of missions, the people inside Cuba would come to react adversely to the sabotage and align themselves with Castro.

He then expressed his view that time is being sadly wasted in trying to bring the Latin American countries into agreement with the U.S. against Castro, because, unfortunately, many are ruled by dictators and they fear concerted action against themselves, but if the U.S. attacks and destroys Castro they will applaud. Again he repeated that the Punta del Este agreement might well cause many countries to say, "Thank you Fidel, and not, thank you Mr. Kennedy."

Dr. Miro emphasized that he wanted to collaborate with us fully. Then the conversation turned to the dissolution of the FRD by Varona, and Dr. Miro declared that this step was difficult for Varona, to take because he

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had been its chief and in a high position and had thus submitted to the Council. He declared his esteem for Varona, a very brusque man but very honest. He said Varona had declared with respect to the Argentine documents that, "They are in Miami. I don't feel like sending them to Argentina because they don't belong to Argentina. They belong to the thief; that is Castro. Argentina has diplomatic relations with Cuba and if it feels like it, will send the documents to Cuba." Varona declared in the SIP that the Argentine military men had deceived him because, having stated that they didn't trust the Argentine Foreign Office, they nevertheless took to Argentina the three documents that were given to them and upon arrival turned them over to the Foreign Office. Miro added that Varona stated this clearly in the SIP meeting where two Argentine delegates were present. They said, "Without mentioning names, Doctor, do you declare this before the SIP?" "Yes, I declare it," he replied, "and they shut up."

Miro added that Varona had declared last night, "Let them give us arms to finish off with Castro, but give them to us! Whoever has them, give them to us! Dr. Miro then declared, "We are willing to disembark, but here we are just playing hide and seek."

Dr. Miro then referred to his view that Diario de las Americas should receive a small subsidy; that sometimes it published articles unfavorable to the U.S. but that usually, and if subsidized, would eliminate adverse items.

Then I returned to the subject of the budget and concern that some on the Council payroll might also be on H.E.W. payroll. He replied that for October he would have them swear that they were receiving no other money and remarked that many are on the payroll. He enumerated the different sections - delegations in Latin American countries, each person (two or three at most in each country) received only enough to live on; without operating funds. He said each chief of organization in the Council received \$400, "which is very little."

He added that during the past month with funds left over, he had sent to Mexico \$3,000 because some 240 people had arrived there in need and hungry. He said C.I.A. aided with \$5,000 and he had sent \$3,000 because they were Cubans. Further, that he had provided each organization with \$700 for its expenses of mailing, office, car, etc., but that that wasn't a fixed sum. He added that whatever was left over he wanted to send to Cuba to those who are fighting there.

He declared, "As for me they can reduce the budget to the minimum provided that they send funds to Cuba; but my problems must be resolved. This payroll was promised to me when I was vice president of the Council, and I didn't create it."

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I queried about the expenses of his recruitment section, and he said he had told Paula to eliminate that item since recruiting is now done elsewhere, but the military personnel in recruiting should be grouped in the military so that some form of intelligence agency could be maintained to provide information.

He affirmed that his military staff really consisted of three officers (Varela, Domaigne, Pontagnolo) but that they had extensions of office, transportation, and secretarial help. As for his Social Welfare section, he said this had been established by C.I.A. and was necessary for dispensing medicines, etc., for Cuban refugees here.

He declared that he hadn't touched any of the expenses (inherited from FRO) except operating expenses, in order to give him a margin of funds to meet unforeseen urgent expenses.

He said, "I told Paula to eliminate all that could be eliminated; naturally he would have to consult with you." (Agency)

Relative to the Naval section he said he planned to eliminate their expense allowance but not the section itself, because he deemed it essential for matters such as sending arms to Cuba, since they cannot be sent by air; and that an office is necessary for them but their expenses must be cut off slowly.

As for the Medical Section which had been created before, he said only two "rutilados" (casualties) remained and that the section was to be eliminated. He reiterated that these sections had been created by us (Agency) and that they could only be eliminated gradually.

He affirmed that there was left for his use only some eleven or twelve thousand dollars for matters such as attendance at the SIP and Iacerna affairs, and such minor propaganda affairs, but that he felt he should have restored to him the funds for propaganda (that had been going through Pestre).

I assured him that it was certainly intended that the Propaganda Commission now function under him as the propaganda section of the Council and that if Pestre was not considered to be its chief, that he should designate someone else. He declared that Pestre was in New York, had talked to Varona yesterday, and asked Varona what he should do, to which Varona replied, "Resign."

Miro then said he would like to put Conte Aguero in as head of propaganda but that Conte would not agree unless he told him to. Miro mentioned that the staff which Pestre had was very good but that Pestre was no good because he wanted to spend the whole day at a swimming pool. He mentioned Angel del Cerro, Fernin Reimann, Ruler Mario Rurbaud. He said Angel del Cerro would be a good chief of propaganda, but that for this he would also like a good adviser such as Conte, who really is no good except to talk, but would like to be president. Miro said

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Humberto Madrano, a reporter, also would be good to direct propaganda efforts. He added that Castro, chief of propaganda for the FIM, which no longer exists, is the one who continues receiving the propaganda funds from Paula. He declared that he (Miro) didn't control these funds; that he didn't have anything except a bureaucracy.

I told him that I considered this problem of propaganda section and its operators should be corrected right away. He added that he felt that Radio Swan should be put under the propaganda section of the Council; further, that the propaganda section had to quit sending printed matter to the Latin American countries and instead send a format to each country so that they could be printed there with the terms used in each country; in Argentina, in Argentine style; in Brazil, in Portuguese; in Panama, in the manner of speaking in Panama; that such propaganda must be said for. He affirmed that Humberto Madrano was a great reporter and hard worker and could handle this well; that Fernin Peinado was a fine worker who now is having a struggle to live, but works well at propaganda matters.

Again ^{he} said that the propaganda funds should pass through his control, and that I ~~was~~ take this up upon my return to Washington. Again he declared that he felt plans must be made for him and the Council to return to Cuba. I said this was a matter for the future.

We terminated our meeting with my statement that it would probably not be till the following week when I would return to Miami, after getting matters resolved in Washington. He said that he would probably be returning to Miami on Wednesday after the Press luncheon.

I added that if it seemed desirable for him to come to Washington en route to Miami, I would call him; that otherwise I would look forward to seeing him in Miami. I said I felt we had covered a lot of ground, and thanked him for giving me so much of his time to our meeting.

Again he reiterated that he desired responsibility for all groups and that if he wasn't considered to be the right one, that he was ready and willing to resign. Upon this, we finished and I escorted him to the elevator of the hotel.

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