

Date:09/30/93

Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10105

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 62

SUBJECTS :

ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
THE PRESIDENT
QJWIN
MAFIA
SILVER, ARNOLD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 245
Folder 13

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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6

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and
2 the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the
3 War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until
4 the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

5 Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as
6 head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

9 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked
11 on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in
12 the Department for Plans, is that right?

13 Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular
14 command and staff responsibility on ~~communications intelligence~~
15 and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten
16 months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

17 Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to ~~Berlin as Chief of~~
18 ~~Station~~ for the CIA?

19 Mr. Harvey. I did.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

21 Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some
23 rather substantial accomplishments there, such as ~~the Berlin~~
24 ~~Tunnel~~.

25 Could you just very succinctly describe the ~~Berlin Tunnel~~?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7

1 operation and then move on?

2 Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that

3 ~~Frank Rollett~~ and I conceived some time before I went to

4 ~~Berlin.~~

5 Senator Tower. You and who?

6 Mr. Harvey. ~~Frank Rollett~~, who for many years was one of
7 the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the
8 ~~cryptologic group.~~

9 And one of the reasons I went ~~to Berlin~~ was to attempt to
10 mount this operation.

11 In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly
12 complex cover within a cover installation ~~in West Berlin and~~
13 ~~driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground,~~
14 ~~across the sector boundary, and tapping into three main~~
15 ~~telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.~~

16 ~~I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these,~~
17 ~~which were, among other things, the main circuit between the~~
18 ~~command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the~~
19 ~~outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow.~~

20 ~~We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in~~
21 ~~Unter den Eichen and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including~~
22 ~~a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not~~
23 ~~really readable.~~

24 Senator Tower. Were not what?

25 Mr. Harvey. Were not ~~readable.~~

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1 Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not
2 correct -- that you not only conceived the program but ~~helped~~
3 ~~to dig the tunnel?~~

4 Mr. Harvey. I did.

5 Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign
6 Intelligence Staff Division D?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which
9 is responsible for ~~communications intelligence?~~

10 Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.

11 Mr. Schwarz. But part --

12 Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may,
13 Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services,
14 which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two
15 things: ~~the procurement of communications intelligence through~~
16 ~~operational and clandestine sources and the control and utilization~~
17 ~~of the product of communications intelligence, as it~~
18 ~~affected the clandestine services.~~

19 We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of
20 research and analysis use which was handled in ~~a separate~~
21 ~~COMINT shop in the~~ what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director
22 Intelligence.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibilities
24 ~~the surreptitious obtaining of code information?~~

25 Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and

TOP SECRET

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9

1 coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the
2 security risk, and also in the direct procurement through
3 operational means abroad, but not in this country.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean entering into
5 buildings?

6 Mr. Harvey. Surreptitious entry, intercepting couriers,
7 monitoring of communications, monitoring of scatterback from
8 microwave, that type of thing. Clandestine monitoring would
9 be covered as well.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call Justin O'Donnell work
11 for you in Staff D?

12 Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.

13 Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did Mr. O'Donnell recount to
14 you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

15 Mr. Harvey. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?

17 Mr. Harvey. Briefly, Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said
18 that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then
19 Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the
20 Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of
21 Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to
22 undertake this assignment.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversa-
24 tion with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had
25 requested Mr. O'Donnell to undertake such an operation?

*He Plans in Fall
1962*

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1 of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and
2 theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to
3 determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was
4 willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment,
5 this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly,
6 of self-protection.

7 I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions.
8 In the field of political assassination, although I cannot
9 document this by evidence, I have no question but what the
10 Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of
11 assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside
12 of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to
13 make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-
14 simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps
15 three classes.

16 One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous
17 agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official
18 staff officers of other intelligence services.

19 During the seven years that I spent in Berlin, which was
20 the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to
21 Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great
22 many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other
23 nationalities.

24 Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean
25 Russians who were working with the United States?

TOP SECRET

19

1 Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

2 Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just
3 these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB
4 to assassinate me ~~in West Berlin~~ than it would have been for
5 me to assassinate my opposite number ~~in East Berlin~~, in the
6 Soviet Embassy ~~across the border.~~

7 Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish
8 between political assassination, direct agents of the United
9 States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

10 Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but
11 emigres and Soviet nationals.

12 Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

13 Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are
14 the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States
16 ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

17 Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected
18 or doubled?

19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

20 Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country
22 enemies of the United States?

23 Mr. Harvey. No.

24 Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United
25 States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

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1 Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary
2 documentation for the authority which was later signed off on
3 by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.

4 Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --

5 Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story,
6 not the real story, the objectives --

7 Mr. Harvey. It is both.

8 Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, an
9 assassination or assassination capability.

10 Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code
12 and cypher materials.

13 Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a
14 perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover
15 story except that if this project had gone so far as to the
16 actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the target-
17 ting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would
18 have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were
19 spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also
20 honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of

21 communications intelligence outside the U.S.

22 So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover
23 in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.

25 Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

1 Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWINN an agent
2 who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection
3 with the Executive Action program?

4 Mr. Harvey. No, QJWINN is an agent that I considered for
5 possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver
6 for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld
7 connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of
8 whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I
9 personally know, were ever used.

10 Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one
11 purpose the possible use in assassination?

12 Mr. Harvey. Only ⁱⁿ the sense that had we ever been saddled
13 with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination.
14 I might have considered the people spotted by WINN as possibil-
15 ities.

16 But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is
17 approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I
18 don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to~~ -- is
19 actually approached, there ^{should be} ~~is~~ a long period of assessment,
20 crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting
21 mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.

22 I only know of one use made by QJWINN until we terminated
23 him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was
24 before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an
25 operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation.

1 and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do
2 with assassination.

3 I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment,
5 pages that were written by ~~Mr. Arnold Silver~~?

6 Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the
7 same writing as these first three pages.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by
9 you?

10 Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.

11 I would also like to point out that from page 4 that --
12 that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting
13 was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I
14 would guess were probably ~~Arnold Silver~~'s notes and probably
15 based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me,
16 and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that
17 I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting,
19 is that right?

20 Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.

21 Mr. Schwarz... And at the bottom of page 8, does that
22 indicate that you had a conversation with ~~Mr. Silver~~ on January
23 26th?

24 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

1 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

2 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr.
4 Bissell that you have recounted?

5 Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when
6 I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to
7 be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this
8 is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with
9 Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint
10 because there were several such discussions in varying degrees
11 of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in
12 '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early
13 on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question
14 of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at
15 the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already
16 had discussed the matter with Silver. X

17 Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of
18 paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's
19 from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used
20 to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations
21 that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

22 Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them,
23 classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save
24 them. There is no relationship between the material that
25 appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just

1 before the 26/1-AS, and the material which appears above
2 it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.

3 Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?

4 Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb
6 on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included
7 the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --

8 Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of
9 assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a
10 discussion on a number of other things that were of particular
11 and specific interest to the communications intelligence field
12 and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you
13 will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a
14 sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably
15 held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after
16 he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual
17 Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the
18 clandestine services.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that
20 conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last
21 resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to
22 assassination?

23 Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination.
24 That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the
25 use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

1 of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that
2 the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases
3 as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really
4 sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions --
5 it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in
6 my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in
7 the words that are here, I just don't know.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that
9 make up the examples of 3?

10 Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume
11 that the logical candidates at that point would have been
12 Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that
13 we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets
14 for assassination, but that these were sort of the three
15 people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this,
16 these are three to be considered.

tape 2b 17 But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of
18 Sid's job. **ELINT-RED** - Memo." **Ludford** is the name of the staff
19 officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

20 This "translating machine" was an experimental device,
21 done under -- hoped for development **BYGE** that I was most
22 interested in, because of the serious translation problem that
23 we had **and particularly in communications intelligence**.

24 So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the
25 framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination

1 as a general problem.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten
3 page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's
4 notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had
5 with ~~Mr. Silver~~ and it is his notes about that conversation, is
6 that right?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

8 It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth.
9 I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any
10 specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers,
11 because ~~Arnold Silver~~ was under specific instructions not to
12 discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing
13 it with me first.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about
15 "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth,
16 and that reflects the conversation you had with ~~Mr. Silver~~?

17 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has
19 the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page
20 4?

21 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

22 Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows --
23 two sentences, which I should read into the record, three
24 sentences.

25 "Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

1 crossed in this document.

2 Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

3 Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the
5 January 26th reference, which reads in the first line **AS**.

6 That is **Arnold Silver**, I take it?

7 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's **Arnold Silver**.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI
9 matter. What does that mean?

10 Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to
11 that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never
12 even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context.

13 Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to
14 throw up my hands. I just don't know.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI
16 in the notes means?

17 Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr.
18 Schwarz.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

20 Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the
21 portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisfied
22 at this point?

23 Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are
24 either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the
25 members have questions.

Sed 21 - 25/1 - Area (station)
 "The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro ~~✗~~ ~~→~~ ~~→~~ ~~→~~
 "for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Cartoon - Bankruptcy - No Star
 eyes - Jim A. / Contradict /
 not a TSD problem from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
 a confession of weakness. -

- El Benefactor - assumptions -
 Example 3 "wrong"

Framework of 3-10 job.

~~Elmer R. D.~~

Memo.

~~"Translating Machine" - F.E.~~
~~basic acoustic project~~
~~phenomena - (month CB)~~

~~Commit~~

Gear

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CIA

Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~AS~~ - Fanfare-OC1 - Matter -

No file Review -

1. Select proper open to run -

2. ~~Planes - Co-ord~~

May 1/2

3. Security Rules

B-WHM-AS-3

4. ~~Threat~~ Review

~~Sect 4~~ Review

SECRET

2

9

6. No ~~other~~ ~~operation~~
 7. No projects or papers except per cones.
 8. Principal Agent - ~~g~~ ~~(Mouset)~~ ? -
~~AF~~ Project Chief LCH -
ticket 1500 - from NB -
mark spot again. ~~stet~~ ~~stet~~
project - de. Dike
 9. Disposal -
 10. Targets who & where -
Must know before
we can spot -
 11. Case officering
 12. ~~Coner file - create from~~
~~RS or old ch - remove~~
 13. ~~Not changed of RS counter~~
~~action & movement of ch~~
~~are - unknown~~
- Fd I list - Remember

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