

Date:09/30/93

Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10106RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-398

DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEYDATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : ~~96~~ 104SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAMDOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 245
Folder 14-----
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

"Diff Files" for NARA 2025 Documents Release JFK Assassination Records

Generated using diff-pdf and OpenCV.
Thanks to the Mary Ferrell Foundation and
The Black Vault for their archiving work.

maryferrell.org
theblackvault.com
github.com/vslavik/diff-pdf
opencv.org

This file highlights **differences**
between the 2025 release, and previous releases.

Red: Newly revealed in 2025.
Blue: Present in earlier releases, but not in 2025.
Black: Unchanged between versions.

For Original Documents visit:
archives.gov/research/jfk/release-2025

Notes:

Black text on a blue background indicates content
that was previously redacted using black ink.

I did my best to be accurate in revealing what is new,
but please confirm with the original sources
where accuracy is essential.

Created by: x.com/hlywdufo

JFKdiffs.com

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

SECRET

HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

gyp

1

21 JUN 74 Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~out~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement and maintenance of foreign and domestic assets in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, ~~as specified by the National Security Agency~~~~ since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

REC'D

JUN 24 1975

CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~for the operational procurement of foreign and domestic assets~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted] could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the [redacted] the Chief of Station, [redacted], in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ^{October} ~~September~~ 1960,

RECEIVED

JUN 24 1975

CIA

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretext: ~~Not to be~~ search; this established ~~is~~ ~~done~~
 j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who was obtained v.s. visas

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ mutability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers included - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning hours or checks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. ~~Should have plan, 20 min to backstop theory, all~~

~~document to be in hand of backstop. Will be able~~

~~to act~~

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~to be done~~

Keeping of files.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

Legal, operational + ethical → morale problems.

~~Not to be used~~ case.

- Legal not secure enough.
- 1) Maximum security + within KGB only (e.g., how much does ~~the~~ know?). Limitation on number ~~of~~ ~~agents~~. Use of ~~the~~ objectives.
 - 2) One focal point for research, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DBP authority in this focal point mandate. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) comm.
 - 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Opium) has been examined.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. i.e. 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) ~~Concepts~~ recommended. ~~Instructions will be~~

~~Miles~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selector.

13) ~~Army~~ ^{all} Subsec personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~Substance~~ + stable in ~~person~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sel~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

ed of - 25/1 - eye (action
"The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro ~~Handwritten scribble~~
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Button - Bankruptcy - No Star
eyes - Jim A. / Contract structure
not a TSD problem ~~Handwritten scribble~~ from U-2

Apply brakes

Last report beyond last report &
a confession of weakness -
- El Benefactor - assumption -
~~Handwritten scribble~~ Example 3 "wrong"

Framework of ~~Handwritten scribble~~ job. ~~Handwritten scribble~~
Memo ~~Handwritten scribble~~

~~Large blacked-out redacted area~~

~~Handwritten scribble~~ Year

REC-111
JUN 24 1975
CIA

Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~Handwritten scribble~~ Foreign 2001 - Matter -
no file Review - ~~Handwritten scribble~~

1. Select proper open to run -
2. ~~Handwritten scribble~~
3. Security Rules
4. ~~Handwritten scribble~~ levels

May 17 2
B-WITH-AS-3
- Review

6. No [redacted]

7. No projects or papers
except per cases.

8. Principal Agent - [redacted] ?
[redacted] Project Chief LCH -
Ticket 1500 - from MB.
mark spot regim. Staff at
project - see Disko

9. Disposal -

10. Targets who's who -
Must know before
we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

FdJ list - Remember

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA