Date: 08/15/ Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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"Diff Files" for NARA 2025 Documents Release JFK Assassination Records

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Red: Newly revealed in 2025.

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For Original Documents visit: archives.gov/research/jfk/release-2025

Notes:

Black text on a blue background inidcates content that was previously redacted using black ink.

I did my best to be accurate in revealing what is new, but please confirm with the original sources where accuracy is essential.

Created by: x.com/hlywdufo

JFKdiffs.com

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Sam Gold /

Dr. Edward Gunn

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

September 25, 1961

Castro

Juan Orta

Dr. Raymond Treichler

Comelius Roosevelt

OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned (Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, Three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osbor to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.

STAFF:

Rhea

July 1, 1975 DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 6, 1960

Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization

Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."



SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960 Cage

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley
June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Father Peyton Peter Grace DATES:

Dec. 5, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Mongoose Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

The Special Group discussed (1) the possible by of providing sixty, thousand dollars from the Cuba budget to sponsor the religious activity of heather. Peyeon in Cuba; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.

SOURCE:

Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:

CUBA

TSD

OCCURRENCE:

CATEGORIES:

CARD 1 of 2

DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO's favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted Ray Greichleit, of TSD, (Sept. 6, 1960) and gave him the box of cigars (21).

recalls "that he did contaminate a full box of 50 cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon merely putting it in the mouth. Treichler's notes showed delivery of the box on February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom. (22).

FILE:

16 Report 167

Page 7/3/79

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

<u>DATES</u>: FEB, 1961 (APPROXIMATE) CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

coltin

(Card 1)

-CUBA - PHASE I

10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D

OCCUMBENCE STATE

or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI

GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI

RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P

4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security

5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer

6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4

7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD

3. PAY TREE CHEEK, Chemical Division, TSD

tion in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security

13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at

11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was en-

countered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the opera-

. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services

the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Sam Gold

Dr. Edward Gunn

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

11 E-0

September 25, 1961

Castro

Juan Orta

Dr. Raymond Treichler

Cornellus Roosevelt

OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned [Dr. Raymond Preschief to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERN

AMLASH

Dr. Edward GUNN

DATES:

Nov. 20, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel HALPERN and SANCHEZ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to SANGHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTI TES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Helms Harvey, Wm. Gunn, Dr. Edward 5/25/67

CASTRO

The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services; and, brief records of Ray Treichler (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.

For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant innaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).

SOURCE:

16 Report 1967

CHE MINAME

Baron

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Zoobov Harvey Bissell

Kennedy, Robert
HALPERN

Ent 1961 October,

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and Trackose Jobes was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occurred in the middle of Octo of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General form as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both the and to me for to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (3) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Mothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/73

STAFF:

Phea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS	/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Halpern Gen Lansdale Bissell

Oct 1961

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after meeting with Bissell Hapern, and color were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove in the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Phea

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Helms MCCONE

Harvey

Dec 1961

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Ualpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Melms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) Reguley told Halpern that Delms had no inkling that he swould be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime of Form soperations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the EU Division (14).

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Phea

FILE:

7/1/75 DATE:

PERSONS	/ENTITIES:
----------------	------------

FITZGERALD, Desmond

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Early 1963

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

DESMOND FITZGERALD originated a scheme to assassinate CASTRO: "The idea was to taken an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch CASTRO's eye, load it with an explosive trigger to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where CASTRO often went skin diving." (77). FITZGERALD explored this idea at several sessions with SAM HALPERN and BRUCE.

GHEEWER, but it was ultimately dismissed as impractical. (77). DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: There is no indication that FITZGERALD told any-

one above him in the CIA hierarchy of this plan.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967



STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

6/29/75 DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERN

AMLASH

Dr. Edward GUNN

DATES:

Nov. 20, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

-Samuel-HALPERN-and SANCHEZ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA-Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

SEGNE

STAFF:

DATE:

F Baron

7/1/75

TOP SECRET

-				
PERS	ONS	/ENT	ITI	ES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

KING, J. C. IG REPORT BISSELL HALPERN .

May 23, 1967

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH_Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Freichler, John Warner, Neston Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Boncher, Richard Ober.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 196

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Harris

DATES:

June 27, 1962 June 21 23

7/1/621

6/21-23/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

1962 MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Rolls has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Almy will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operationsrepresentative.

Among but had been been been

Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400) FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Harris Craig DATES:

June 27, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

June 21 23, 1962 MONGOOSE

7/1/62

6/21-23/62,

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Rong, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July-1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

Joseph James Marie

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented

from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-

00400) FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MARVEY, William

QJWIN

SHEWER, ARROUG

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

MARVEY testified that QJ.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through MRNO SILVER for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the neople spotted by &.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMON

25, 1975, pp. 50-

STAFF: Rhea

30.6.75

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard Harvey, Mr.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he does not recall whether he sclected Harvey to head the Cuban operation, but that he did certainly approve Harvey's selection. Prior to receiving the commitment Harvey had been in charge of a staff in the foreign intelligence staff whose function was to mount operations against dubassies and installations of foreign powers overseas to acquire codes



SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

DATE:

Rhea

STAFF:

6/28/75

11-4-94

(1) (B)

(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during World War II he worked on counterespionage matters with the FBI, having entered the Bureau as a Special Agent in 1940. He continued in that job until 1947, when he joined the CIA as the head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch. Between 1947 and 1952, he worked on Soviet counterespionage and special operations in the Department of Plans. Between-1952-and 1959, he was in Berlin as Chileton for the CIA. He was instrumental in the Berlin tunnel operation. In 1959, he became Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division, D. This is the Division which is responsible for communications including surgeptions—of-Staff Division which is responsible for communications including surgeptions—of-staff Division which is responsible for communications including surgeptions—of-staff Division of the Surgeptions of communications.

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 5-9

STAFF: Rhea

<u>DATE</u>: 30.6.75

11-4-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES

HARVEY, William O'DONNELL Justin RISSELL. Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called JUSTIN O'DONNELLE that O DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that 10 DONNELLE told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested O'DONNELL to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)

STAFF:

DATE:

30.6.75

Rhea

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM SILVERSARNOLD KUBARK

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Jan. 26,1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey was asked about notes written by him and sliven from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised. that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time the the project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific from the local (59) SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 4, 1918, STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR THIS DOCUMENT RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SAME THE PARTY OF T

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's hadwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives". The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division if with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed. (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials.) (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

6/30/75

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Jan 26, 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRifle

OCCURRENCE:

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Harvey 6/25/75

DATE:

6/30/75

Rhea

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

MARVEY, William V SIEVER, Arnold BISSELL, Richard

26 Jan. 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52) HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARNOLD SHEVER? (52)

TOP SEGNET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

30.6.75

Rhea

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES: EXECUTIVE ACTION

Silver, Armold Harvey, William Bissell, Richard 1/26/61

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Armold Silver (52)

TOP SECTI

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF:

Rhea ...

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY K. G. WIN DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

R. R.fre

Jan.26, 1961

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes eneitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets: (1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief for the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg, in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States .- For aperiod of a year and a half he was contacted sparcatically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960: K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200 Hire of safe houses and other Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and automobile expenses \$1,000 other agents and agent candidates \$2,000 Total \$14,700

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates \$2,000

Travelogic staff employees engaged in Zrriffle \$2,000

(Harvey Exhibit 1, pages 1 - 3)

FILE:

Harvey 6/27/75

STAFF:

Rhea DATE:

6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Y-94

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BISSELL, Richard O'DONNELL, Justin BRECKENRIDGE, S.
HELMS, Richard QJWIN
LUMUMBA, Patrice
OCCURRENCE:

DATES: FEB May 1961 EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

TOP SECONDARY

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by WINDELL for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released — which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT

HARVEY, WILLIAM

DATES:

2/61

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to stead codes rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (30)

Breckeinridge testified that on the <u>face of the documents</u> relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at stealing codes. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William

Harvey. (81)

BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75

STAFF: WALLACH

DATE: 7/5/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard HARVEY

STEVER, Arnold

WHITE HOUSE

GOTILIEB, Sidney

February 1961 (HARVEY's rough

estimate)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EUR - JUNEA

EXECUTIVE ACTION

CASTRO LUMBEL CONGO

OCCURRENCE:

the

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability; a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. i.e.,

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD SIEVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

end left.

I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38 SOURCE:

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

CARD 2 of 2 DATES:

Feb. 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used STEVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)



SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

DATES: (APPROXIMATE) CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

- ALLEN DULLES, DCI
- GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
- RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
- SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
- JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
- J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
- CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD

RAY TREICHLER, Chemical Division, TSD EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services

10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D

- 11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
- 12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
- 13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See list of names below.)

TOP SECRET

CASTRO

GUEA - SYNDICATE/PHASE II --KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

RICHARD HELMS, DD/P

WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W

JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.) 4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)

5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)

6. BRUCE CHEEVER HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (CHEEVER knows that HARVEY was meeting with gansters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.) 7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

11-4-94 lea

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Apr 17, '61

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. RAY TREISCHIER, TSD (TREISCHIER's participation was limited to furnishing the pills -to-0'CONNELL-on -18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.) 11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)



(con't.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Harvey Bissell

Kennedy, Robert

Det abor,

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and the Ghose was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occured in the middle of Octo of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General form as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both Are context and to me for to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (3) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/73

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

lal pern **HeJms**

Harvey 6

MCCONE

Dec 1961

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Coghey sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) Toppey told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he swould be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to lockey's office, chelced into the organization of lock eyes operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the MII Division (14).

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Rhea

7/1/75

FILE:

DATE:

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

11-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PARVEY, LANSDALE
Polig, Podio

DATES: June 19, 1962

MONGOOSE

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas.—"The-Cuban-source to story-need not-await-your-determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."

SOURCE:

Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lans-

dale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)

FILE

STAFF:

DATE: di Genova July 1, 1975

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AS SANITIZED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZ

DATES:

July 10, 1962 June, 11, 1962 July 1, 1962 May 1962 CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginal Leitao de Cunha, she contacted Ruz and obtained Ruz agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidels." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico:

SOURCE:

Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re:

Juana Castero Ruz, 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: di Genova
July 1, 1975

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11 - 4 - 94

(1) (A)

CATEGORIES: DATES: PERSONS/ENTITIES KIRKPATRICK 11 114/62 DDP William Harvey Special Group Augmented Nov. 21, 1962 Mr. Halpern Gen. Lansdale Operation Mongoose MEEVER Walter Elder Cuba DCI

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov.

1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever, which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever, and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and Almorator teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

of the Matahambre operation."

Phul Wallach

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
William Harvey DDP
Gen. Lansdale Mr. Halpern Nov. 21, 1962
Walter Elder CHFEVER
DCI

DATES:
CATEGORIES:

CATEGORIES:

Operation Mongoose
Cuba

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov.

1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and Amorato teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF:

of the Matahambre operation."

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

Paul Wallach

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(3)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William ✓ Chief, FI Staff, CIA QJWIN

DATES:

<u>CATEGORIES:</u>

TOP SECRET

27 June 1963

A April 1844

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, "stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41)

was terminated by

TW

DEWILL I

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

FILE:

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 14-4-94 (1)(p)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

KING, J. C. IG REPORT BISSELL HALPERN

May 23, 1967

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Trenchler, John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortner, Richard Ober.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 196

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

PERSONS/ENTI (ES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Helms Harvey, Wm & Gunn, Dr. Edward 5/25/67

CASTRO

CCURRENCE: The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services; and, brief records of Ray Treachlers (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.

For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant innaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).

SOURCE:

With Mange

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

16 Report 1967

FILE:

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(1)(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Edwards King

Bannerman

Gomez Holcomb▶

O'Connell

11/62

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not ''privy' to project. O'Connell was embarassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcombe, Knew (100)

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

6/30/75

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14-4-94

(1)(B)

	1		
PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:	
HOUSTON	'50-'60 '60's	Castro	
OCCUPRENCE	assume one		

OCCURRENCE:

Houston testified that he cannot remember that his legal advice as to not continuing a project was ever rejected by CIA, (47) although Houston recalls vetoing two propositions: cone to train personnel for foreign;

clection work by training in donestic political parties; and stwo; to a monitor long-distance telephone calls from Latin America to Canada and to New York (47,-7)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Lawrence Houston, 6/2/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

6/30/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY
KILPATRICK
MCCONE
HUGHES

COL. KING

June 20,1963

DUVALIER

Special group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1963the Special Group approved a CIA paper dated June 1970 regarding political action in [Halta.] (The substance of the paper is not expressed). "Mr. MCCONE said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for DUMANTER but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Hauti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel KING... said that in his opinion, we have no feasible alternatives to cooperate with BOSCH in attempting to unseat DUMANTER...

SOURCE:

Minutesof Special Group meeting June 20, 1963

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES: HUGHES FITZGERALD BOSCH, JOSE OPAPICH **JESSUP** RFK **JMWAVE** STEAKLEY **JMWAVE** VANCE

MCCONE

BUNDY

DATES: CATEGORIES: 8/19/64 SGA 7/30/64 MONGOOSE 6/10/64

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report'related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking frice was \$150,000.- JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacandi Rum would contribute \$50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McConie to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intrws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117) IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

MCCONE

JESSUP

JMWAVE

BUNDY

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PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: FITZGERALD 8/19/64 HUGHES SGA ○PAPICH BOSCH, JOSE 17/30/64 MONGOOSE RFK 6/10/64 CASTRO STEAKLEY **JMWAVE**

VANCE OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64."It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum_information report from the DDP_to_the_Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report'related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking frice was \$150,000. -- JOSE MARDO REPERING ROSCIL, Prese of Bacandi Rum would contribute \$50,000. ROSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McColle to Bundy, 8/19/64.

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came of the plot."(117) TO DEDOD'T 1067

Damon

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14-4-94

(1)(A)

CATEGORIES: DATES: PERSONS/ENTITIES: 8/19/64 SGA HUGHES MCCONE FITZGERALD 7/30/64 MONGOOSE BOSCH, JOSE OPAPICH BUNDY 6/10/64 CASTRO **JESSUP** RFK STEAKLEY JMWAVE **JMWAVE** VANCE

According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed OCCURRENCE: that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking frice was \$150,000.- JOSE MARIO PERIN . BOSCH, Preso of Bacardis Rum would contribute \$50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McConie to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intrws with the alleged participants "Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117) Baron, 7/1/75 IG REPORT 1967

PERSONS/ENTITIES: KIRKPATRICK DDP

William Harvey' Gen. Lansdale

Walter Elder DCI

Mr. Halpern CHEEVER DATES:

Nov. 21, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and (MOORID) teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the timp STAFF:

of the Matahambre operation."

Paul Wallach

July 1, 1975

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)