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- 7 -

During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton. In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both agencies seemed to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the other.

Relationships Between 1965 and 1970

During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced that strong counter-measures were necessary. For example, Papich tried to promote consideration for the recruitment of a top-level Soviet official as a CIA agent. This was to be a joint CIA-FBI operation, but it was slapped down by Hoover. Further, a proposed joint operation involving sensitive electronic coverage of suspected Soviet activities was rejected. (S) 1B

During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the programs and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted. Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was coming to an end. Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinstitute some of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States. While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark.

While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude, Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich confided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effectively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.

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EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBIEfforts by Papich

Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's style. Papich was able to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done with Hoover's approval.

Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover. for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were approved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there would not be any invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements. For instance, the CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the Foreign Resources Division) was always looking for foreigners in the United States to recruit as agents abroad. The FBI also had an interest

in these foreign officials if it was discovered that the official was working for an opposition service. In the 1960's the CIA came to Papich to see how the Domestic Operations Division could recruit without conflicting with the Bureau. Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that he was concerned with possible CIA invasion of the FBI's jurisdiction. It was therefore agreed

between the CIA and the FBI that CIA could continue to recruit foreigners in the United States if they would immediately contact the FBI upon recruiting an individual and furnish Papich with all information obtained from that individual which pertained to internal affairs. Further, the individual was to be made available to the FBI if he possessed substantial information within the FBI's jurisdiction. This program culminated in a Memorandum of Understanding between the CIA and the FBI dated February 7, 1966. The program apparently worked well and much valuable information was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more

importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed. However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project.

Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not come about until about the time that Papich retired.

Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.

Papich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship with Jim Angleton. He feels that this relationship was probably responsible for the FBI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abel. Apparently a Soviet agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained led to Able's arrest and conviction.

The following grey areas were delineated by Papich:

1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left to the CIA.
2. Activities with respect to defectors and the debriefing of defectors in the United States. (At present the FBI generally lets CIA do the debriefing as long as the FBI is given access to the man within a reasonable time. On occasion the bona fides of defectors have been disputed by CIA and the FBI.) (S) 1B
3. The question of who is responsible for continued supervision over defectors once they have been resettled in the United States. FBI doesn't really have the manpower to monitor the many defectors presently in the United States. Papich feels that these individuals could go sour and should be watched by some one. (S) 1B
4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for CIA operations overseas.
5. The handling of agents suspected by CIA to be Communist agents overseas who travel to the United States.
6. Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.
7. See the subheadings below.

Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA. Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we ask Kelley for this type of information.

Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining factor of jurisdiction is a strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't be.)

Espionage Matters

Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable evidence of espionage existed, even if the suspect was an employee of the CIA. In some instances, the CIA might come to the FBI with information

106
3/24/75

Ober's Operation: (continued)

had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such activity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing supply of information from Ober. Most of this information related to the relationship between domestic and foreign groups. Incidentally, information pertinent to internal security may have been picked up and passed on to the CIA. Papich is also aware that some of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States as well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended and he or she returned to the States. This information was also passed on to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI would provide CIA with an introduction to a sympathetic student in a dissident group.

2. Project ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] Office of Security (S)

Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups by the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had been extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident groups and constantly monitoring them. Papich could not recall an incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was turned over to the FBI. He did recall occasions when Ober's group turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas and no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a small amount of information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI from the Office of Security.

(1)(B)
per
CIA

Papich states that during this entire period of the dissidents, the atmosphere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the more militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings, and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were screaming for action to bring this unrest to an end. It was a difficult time for all Federal agencies.

Criminal Cases

Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law enforcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was not some cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton would contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's source of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to the arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay Administration.

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- 17 -

Penetration of Embassies in the United States

Papich has no knowledge of any CIA efforts to obtain positive intelligence by penetrating foreign embassies in the United States, although they did on occasion attempt to recruit Embassy personnel for activities overseas, pursuant to the FBI/CIA Memorandum of Understanding of Feb. 7, 1966. Papich believes that if the CIA attempted to gain positive intelligence information through these embassies, this was an improper action which should have been performed by the FBI. (S) (S) (S) 1B

Information Obtained From Tax Returns

Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns to obtain information on Americans.

PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United States presently obtain great amounts of information through new technological developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to penetrate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is "If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me alone." He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He believes that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.

Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups were directed by the Communist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich retired.

Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3 man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto, California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover. Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.

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