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ORIGINAL
Vol. 1 of 3

R2574

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

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Wednesday, February 11, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
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EXHIBITS

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 o'clock am., in Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Greissing, Jim Johnston, Dan Dwyer and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.

PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. Will you stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. First of all, sir, we'll start with some procedural matters. I'm not going to ask you to state your name for the record because we have agreed before beginning here today that you would testify under an alias so as not to jeopardize your ongoing activities.

Is that the way you understand our agreement?

TESTIMONY OF AMLASH CASE OFFICER

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Is that satisfactory to you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you understand that at any time we refer to your participation or your authorship of a document or receipt of a document, we are prepared to substantiate the reference that we are making, and we are not trying to avoid proving the fact that it is indeed you that were involved in the incident. It is simply because we were not able to use your name.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you've previously testified before this Committee, and I assume you've had a copy of the Committee rules, and we have another copy available in case you want to refer to them.

And are you appearing here voluntarily today without a counsel?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. Do you understand that at any point during this examination you are free to stop answering any questions and request the advice of Counsel?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. And do you understand as well that all your constitutional rights are intact here before the Committee

including the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, if you choose.

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. All right.

Let me state that the purpose of this interview is to refine and clarify certain questions about the AMLASH operation.

It is my understanding that you were the case officer on the AMLASH operation from the time period, say, of the first of September on through, for all relevant purposes, December '63, and November '64, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. At this time you were a member of what was called the Special Affairs Staff, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. And that's abbreviated SAS.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Would you describe your position in SAS and your relationship to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was Chief of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was a special assistant to Mr. Fitzgerald, charged with the responsibility of attempting to organize a military coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Did you report directly to Mr. Fitzgerald on your work?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Was there anyone else knowledgeable in SAS of what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only the other people who were involved working on the project.

Mr. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS and the Western Hemisphere Division under, at that time, I believe, Mr. J. C. King?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall exactly what the organizational relationship was at that time. I do know that we operated on a somewhat -- I wouldn't say autonomous basis from the Division itself, but the chain of command was certainly from Mr. Fitzgerald, not necessarily through the Division Chief, but up to the DDP at that time.

Mr. Johnston. Who was Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, there could be direct reporting from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Is it necessary that Mr. King was knowledgeable of all operations of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not necessarily. I don't know if he was kept fully advised of all the operations or not.

Mr. Johnston. Did he know generally what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. I presume he did, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And how often did he and Mr. Fitzgerald

meet to coordinate. They do coordination of their work?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I wasn't involved in that part of it.

Mr. Johnston. Was SAS targeted directly at Cuba, or were there other countries under its jurisdiction?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. SAS was strictly a task force set up to deal with the Cuban problem.

Mr. Johnston. And finally on this general matter, who did -- who gave the counterintelligence support for SAS operations?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had a Counterintelligence Branch within SAS.

Mr. Johnston. Who headed that in the fall of '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. There was a change. I don't recall the name.

Mr. Johnston. Let me -- as I stated earlier, you of course have testified before, and I have before me the transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap you in any nature with this transcript. However, there are some things that were not asked before that I would like to clarify.

First of all, how and why was AMLASH first contacted to set up the September meeting that you attended?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had been contacted the year before in Helsinki, and we found out at that time that he was coming out to a sporting event in the Western Hemisphere, so we went down and contacted him.

Mr. Johnston. In my review of the file -- and I don't think we have the document here today, but my notes indicate there was a cable from Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963, that is in the AMLASH file.

AMLASH Case Officer. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. Johnston. In my review of the AMLASH file, there is a cable from headquarters to Rome on 19 June 1963 which states that AMWHIP, who was your contact with AMLASH, had sent a letter as part of "an activation effort to reluctant dragon."

I ask , do you have any recollection or any knowledge that this was a sign to AMLASH that CIA was back in contact with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't comment on that because I didn't get into the operation until September of '63, and this took place before I became involved in that part of the AMLASH operation.

Mr. Johnston. So in other words, you're saying you don't really know who made the contact with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had contact with AMLASH from the year before. He had been contacted by a CIA case officer in Helsinki.

Mr. Johnston. In July and August, 1962.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Then he returned to Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. And this was the first time, to

the best of my knowledge, that he had come out from Cuba since the Helsinki trip.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, you're not aware of any prior contact between CIA or an intermediary and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not between that period of time.

Mr. Johnston. All right. You met with AMLASH in Brazil on September 5th through 9th. I don't mean you specifically, but the general meetings with AMLASH were in that time frame.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall seeing a cable, or receiving instructions from headquarters to the effect -- and this is after your series of meetings -- instructions to the effect that headquarters felt that AMLASH appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer, and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him initially in FI and ops reporting and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on a more orderly basis.

Do you recall seeing something to that effect after your Brazil meetings with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall the cable itself, but certainly that would be in line with the thinking at that time.

If I may state, he was not considered a controlled asset,

shall we say, and it was somebody with whom we felt that we could collaborate in organizing the internal group.

Mr.Johnston. But my summary of the cable would indicate that on September 9th, or after your meetings in Brazil, you really didn't think of him as a gatherer of information, but as someone who wanted to go on to other things, as a conspirator of some kind.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. The file also has a document in it, the AMLASH file, dated 16 September, marked OFPA 72775. I don't really know what an OFPA is.

AMLASH Case Officer. It's a dispatch.

Mr. Johnston. In any event, it reports a transcript of the conversation, and to the best of my ability to understand the document, it's a conversation of an intercept in the Cuban Embassy in Paris. The document says "Mary: I don't want to imagine things, but this thing of" AMLASH -- uses his real name. I have sanitized this -- "Moreno. It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter." And then there is an unreadable portion, and then a word either "treason" or "reason" I'm not sure what is referred to, and then a participant whose name is Betty says, "I believe it is a top secret matter."

My question to you is, did you, in September of '63, know about this intercept?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall today that I would have known about it. I presume if we had it in file, that I was working with it, that I would have seen it.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any information about any recollection about something on this order?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And assume that at least the portion I quoted seems to reflect on the Cubans' view of AMLASH's activities in Paris.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it may have. As I recall, I think that he was also at that time -- I may be wrong, and we would have to go back to the files to check, but he was rather outspoken to some of his closer friends in the fact that he was no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro.

Mr. Johnston. I don't want to dwell on this, if you don't have a recollection, but this conversation seems to indicate that the employees in the [Cuban embassy] think that AMLASH is there on a top secret mission.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so because of his independent way of comportment. He didn't answer to anybody.

Senator Schweiker. What was his role in government at that point?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was -- excuse me, this must have been '63. He was a personal representative of Castro to the games, first in Brazil, and I don't think he had a specific

post in '63, as I recall. He had been Deputy Minister of Interior. He had been a military attache in Spain. I don't think he had a specific post at that time.

Excuse me, if I may add just one more point. Before that he had been President of the Student Federation at the University of Havana. He may still have been in that post, or about the time that he was getting out of it, and this is, I think, where really the trouble between this particular fellow and the Castro brothers more or less came to ahead.

Mr. Johnston. On the 19th of September, Jim Wave sent a message to headquarters basically warning, giving a warning, making the statement that there was an anti-Communist group in Cuba, and the name AMLASH is part of that group, and it concluded by saying that Fidel is allegedly aware of both the anti-Communist group and a Communist group, and that he acts as a moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the government of Cuba.

Do you recall receiving that information?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically receiving that information, but I do recall that at that time Fidel Castro himself was talking about -- was concerned about a Communist takeover of the revolution, and he did meet with the subject and some other friends of his in order to prevent this.

Mr. Johnston. When was this?

AMLASH Case Officer. This was in the early '60s sometime.

Senator Schweiker. What year were you in?

Mr. Johnston. '63.

AMLASH Case Officer. This was before '63. This must have been in '62.

Mr. Wallach. This is before his trip to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Johnston. Before Castro's trip?

Mr. Wallach. Right.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MR. Johnston. The question being put is after your meeting in Brazil with AMLASH, Jim Wave cabled headquarters that AMLASH was part of a group of anti-Communist Cuban government leaders and that Castro was aware of that fact.

AMLASH Case Officer. My answer to you is that he certainly was because he had been talking with these people, including AMLASH, a year before. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. Castro was aware that he was anti-Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that he was one of the anti-Communist group.

Senator Schweiker. Why would he be so trusted and be the special representative at that point in time if he was known as anti-Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the relationship with Castro. Castro himself had not declared his Communist, more or

less intentions, as of that time.

Senator Schweiker. Wait, this was after the Cuban missile crisis. This was '63, and the Cuban missile crisis was '62. I'm confused here.

AMLASH Case Officer. Let's go back to the dates here.

Senator Schweiker. The Jim Wave date is September 1963, and he knows at this point, allegedly now, that this AMLASH was a member of an anti-Communist group. I have trouble reconciling that with not pinpointing AMLASH and his possible subversive agent. I think that is what Jim is getting to.

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, my answer is I don't know specifically why or what the origin of the '63 J. M. Wave cable was.

My answer again to the question is that Castro, from his previous knowledge, going back to '62, did know and had consulted with this group of people of which AMLASH was one, who were the group of Anti-Communist officers in the revolution.

Mr. Johnston. So --

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why in '63 this report would have come out, but it would confirm Castro's knowledge of this group, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Let me move on into October. There was a meeting with AMLASH.

Senator Schweiker. How long did he tolerate anti-Communist officers in high positions in his government? I've got to

believe there's some cutoff here. I realize the uniqueness and broadness of his support earlier, but it would just seem to me that at some point he really had to weed out, nottnecessarily weed out or be suspect of anti-Communist officers who had too high decision making in his government, would he not, or am I missing something?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not really, because out of this group that was mentioned, and with whom he himself discussed the need in the early '60s to keep, say, the Communists out, some of those officers are still in his goverment today.

Now, they may have changed, or Castro may have changed, but he didn't purge all this group of officers. Maybe he won them over, and if they are still there, evidently he has some confidence in them.

Mr. Johnston. According to the file, there was a meeting on October 5th, apparently, in Paris, and I'm not sure that you were the case officer at that meeting, and the cable from Paris sets the tone of that meeting as AMLASH apparently was trying to get things off his chest in talking to you.

Were you the case officer at that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer during that period of time.

Go into a little of the detail because we did talk about these problems.

Mr. Johnston. There appeared from the file two meetings

in early October 1963, the first meeting on or about October 5th that AMLASH comes in and says I want to get things off my chest, and seems to express great dissatisfaction with the CIA's position.

Then there's a second meeting on October 13th or so where he specifically asks to meet with Robert Kennedy, and you previously testified about that second meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Now, the file indicates there was an earlier meeting on October 5th, and AMLASH was complaining apparently about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed in Brazil, and implying that he had a more valuable role to play, and the file says the case officer provided the necessary assurances that his feelings were not in fact true, and that his case was receiving the consideration at the highest levels.

With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering AMLASH off his chest, a much more relaxed AMLASH departed, stating his desire to return to Cuba to undertake the big job.

Do you recall that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I think you are getting those two meetings mixed up. In other words, the later one, yes. I was there and talking to him in the second meeting. In the first meeting I don't recall precisely, but there could have

been a meeting with a contact in Paris, in other words, not a case officer, but the contact we had in Paris. I don't remember who that was, one of the officers there.

Mr. Johnston. In addition to you he was in contact with --

AMLASH Case Officer. Only for purposes of contact. I mean, only to make contact with me, not to carry on the case. But he knew that the other officer was a friend of mine, and he was in touch with him, and when he came to Paris he would get in touch with him. So I would be notified.

Mr. Johnston. I think you have used his name in the prior transcript, Fred Stent, the case officer?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because he was the one who furnished the quarters where we had the meetings.

Mr. Johnston. In furnishing the quarters, did you have a taping system going as to the discussions that would take place?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't believe we taped any of those meetings?

Mr. Johnston. Is it procedure to tape meetings with Agents?

AMLASH Case Officer. Sometimes. It is not a standard procedure. Sometimes it is not physically possible.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go back into this meeting of October 5th, which you don't recall that you were at this meeting, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. There probably could have been the

meeting when he first arrived in Paris, and the meeting that he had -- I don't recall specifically.

I do recall, if I may, I do recall that he said he was unhappy because of the requirements, the intelligence requirements that we had levied on him in Brazil, and it is true that his position was at that time, even in Brazil, and later in Paris, that he was not disposed to cooperate just to furnish intelligence. In other words, he felt that he wanted to do something about the removal of Castro but was not just prepared to keep us advised as to what was going on. He recognized that this was certainly part of a needed operation, but he did not consider himself just as a provider of information.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go off the record for a minute because I want to use a code name.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Having mentioned the code name that is used in this cable, you now recall you were at the 5 October meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And the cable, you can look at it, indicates that AMLASH was in a confessional mood.

My question to you is, after recalling that meeting, was it basically one where he was expressing his concern about the CIA role for him?

Mr. Johnston. He was expressing his concern for what?

Mr. Johnston. The CIA's plans for using him.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. He was concerned as to how and in what way he was to cooperate with CIA. He was also -- and we must underline this, right from the beginning, dubious as to our resolve to really follow through on initiating a coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Is the cable correct in stating that he was assured that his case was receiving consideration at the highest levels?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Was the word "highest level" used, or was a name used?

AMLASH Case Officer. Highest levels, but at that stage of the game he knew he was talking to CIA, so highest levels in CIA is what was meant at that particular time.

Mr. Johnston. That's the word you used?

You didn't say Director McCone?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not use names, no.

Mr. Johnston. On October 5th, you reassured him that his consideration, that his case was receiving consideration at least at the highest levels of CIA, and the cable reflects that when he left that meeting he seemed much more relaxed about the case.

Is that an accurate portrayal of the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. As I mentioned, there was another meeting on or about October 13th, where, as I understand it, AMLASH made his demand or his request to meet with Robert Kennedy, and he made that request to meet with Kennedy by name.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

Well, he said somebody such as, somebody high in the administration, again, to receive the assurances that we were prepared to -- that we were serious about developing and organizing a coup.

Mr. Johnston. After that meeting, you were recalled to Langley for discussions, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was traveling back and forth between Paris and Langley, yes. I don't recall if I was recalled at that particular time, but I would go there -- I was TDY.

Mr. Johnston. I want to set the stage. There is a message from the Director, 75683, to London, directing you to return to headquarters for discussion of all facets of the case.

This is after you reported that AMLASH wants to meet with someone like Robert Kennedy.

Do you recall that flow of events?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have at Langley,

and I don't want to go through your previous testimony again, but basically are we correct in understanding that out of the discussions at Langley came a decision to go to Paris with Mr. Fitzgerald representing himself as a personal representative of Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Then you met on October 29, according to the file, with AMLASH, Mr. Fitzgerald, in Paris.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. Can I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wallach. I think you stated that AMLASH said that he would like to meet with one of the U.S. leaders such as Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. A high representative in the U.S. Government.

Mr. Wallach. Did he mention any other names that you recall?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

Mr. Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Such as Robert Kennedy.

Mr. Wallach. Did AMLASH, to the best of your knowledge, from what he told you, know about any prior assassination attempts that had been run by the U.S.?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. Did he have any reason to believe that Robert Kennedy had been involved with any of the sabotage operations as contrasted with any assassination attempts?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he knew, he never mentioned it to me. We never discussed that.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you didn't say to him, how did you know that Robert Kennedy -- or why did you pick Robert Kennedy.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all. I mean, it's a perfectly, I think, logical name to have been mentioned at that time, because by him, since he was the President's brother and since he was the Attorney General, he wanted somebody high in the Government; at one time he had mentioned the President, you know, I want to talk to the President.

Mr. Wallach. It seems strange to me he didn't pick the Secretary of State or someone like that.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at --

AMLASH Case Officer. He wanted somebody directly to the President. In other words, he wanted the assurances from the highest authority, again, from the President of the United States.

Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is we, from our examination of the alleged assassination attempts, have also

gone into the sabotage attempts, MONGOOSE, etc, and found out that Bobby Kennedy did play a role in the sabotage attempts.

What I'm trying to get from you is your understanding of whether or not AMLASH, from his Cuban side, knew that the Kennedy's had played that role, and would necessarily say I want to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reason.

AMLASH Case Officer. No. He never mentioned it, not at all in any way.

Mr. Johnston. Let me finally go to the October 29th meeting, and before we went on the record this morning, you were explaining to us how you characterized the AMLASH operation.

Would you repeat in summary form what you told us before we went on the record?

AMLASH Case Officer. The operation was never conceived, certainly, carried out during the period I was associated with it, but was never conceived as an assassination plot. It was conceived as a coup in order to organize a military group within Cuba to overthrow Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have the understanding that if necessary AMLASH was proposing to assassinate the Castro brothers?

AMLASH Case Officer. Assassination was not a subject of discussion that came up at every meeting or contact that we had with AMLASH. It was so stated by him that he felt that the only way to initiate a coup in Cuba was to direct the

first blow at the leadership.

Since we were not willing to discuss specifically eliminating Castro, this was never discussed in terms of the operation. We certainly had no doubt that in his mind this was the only way to go about it.

Mr. Johnston. And you dealt with him on that basis?

AMLASH Case Officer. Trying to temporize this, and if possible we were not looking for a bloody coup at that time, planning a bloody coup inside Cuba, but we were trying to certainly get him to think in terms of much more than just the elimination of the leadership.

Mr. Johnston. And to broaden it.

AMLASH Case Officer. To broaden it into a coup. Our interest was the coup, not the specifics of how he got it started.

Mr. Johnston. You were concerned about whether his plans were realistic, weren't you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Very definitely, yes.

Senator Schweiker. Did you personally evaluate AMLASH as fully capable of leading a coup and being able to implement it and carry it out if support were given?

How did you evaluate AMLASH?

As I understand from the dialogue here, and also from reading a summary of these, at first the operations talk was fairly low level sabotage, which he out of hand rejected, and

he pictured himself as a leader of a top level effort on the condition that it had assurances of government support and top level support here.

Now, I guess my question to you is, how, as case officer, did you evaluate his capability? Did you evaluate him as someone who could lead a coup and who would, that our government could put trust in, faith in in terms of his ability to carry it out or not?

AMLASH Case Officer. At that time we did not evaluate him as the leader of a coup. He was not our candidate to be the next ruler of Cuba. He was only evaluated in our dealings with him on the basis of what he and his group could contribute to a coup inside Cuba.

So I don't recall at any time that he was selected or that anybody ever talked of him as the next leader in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Wasn't there some thought that he would be a good rallying point for strong leaders of a new government in Cuba, that he had an ability to attract good people to work with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had proven this because he had been one of the two leaders, or the two top leaders of the Directorado Revolutionario, which is the Revolutionary Directorate which is a group not part of the 26th of July Movement, but a separate group, which is -- he was one of the leaders, and became a military commander of that group, separate from the 26

of July movement.

So he had a group in the DR which we knew about, and he afforded himself very well in the fighting -- this was in the province of Lasvillas, during the time that Castro was -- he was in a separate area of the country.

Mr. Baron. I had a recollection which I haven't checked against our transcripts that when we discussed this before, you had said although AMLASH might not be considered the leader of a new government, that he was a potential candidate for that job. He might not be a good military leader, but he would have an ability to bring good people together in a new government.

AMLASH Case Officer. Of the people left in Cuba at that time, we didn't have much of a choice. I mean, you know, we weren't in contact. He was one of the few who could travel.

Senator Schweiker. You put him up near the top but not necessarily at the top.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, as one being able to contribute.

Senator Schweiker. And you didn't have too many options at that point.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. One of the documents that CIA previously provided us in a sanitized version is a memorandum for the record dated 19 November 1963, and the subject is Plans for AMLASH Contact, and let me just show you that and ask you

if you not necessarily prepared that document, because it is a sanitized document, but whether you prepared a document that that apparently came from, the memorandum for record of November 19th.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I recall.

Mr. Johnston. You prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. I believe I prepared the memorandum from which that extract was made, yes.

Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

AMLASH Case Officer. It had to be late October sometime.

Mr. Johnston. November 19th is the date.

AMLASH Case Officer. Early November, certainly after my October meeting with him in Paris, and before going back, 19 November, that's probably it.

Mr. Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the date I prepared it. I don't remember when I returned from Paris after the October-meetings.

Mr. Johnston. You prepared a memorandum for the record on the contact before you went to the meeting in Paris on November 22nd?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Part of that document, Paragraph 3, states that you would show AMLASH a copy of the President's speech in Miami.

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I didn't show him a copy of the speech at all.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you Paragraph 3 of that.

They were talking about leading up to the November 22nd meeting with AMLASH.

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AMLASH Case Officer. It may have been planned to show him a copy of the speech, but as I recall it was not shown him. I talked to him about it, but I don't recall having shown him the speech. But it was probably clear that I could have taken a copy of that speech to him and shown it to him.

Mr. Johnston. Paragraph 4 of that document states -- would you just read it?

AMLASH Case Officer. "Chief SA has requested written reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum."

Mr. Johnston. And that's Desmond Fitzgerald, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald tell you that on November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. It might not have been the first time he mentioned this because -- in other words, on sensitive operations it was always a case of trying to limit the number of people aware of sensitive operations and this certainly is considered in that category.

He reiterated, I presume, since I put it in the memo at that time that the written communications would be minimized.

Mr. Johnston. And this is a memorandum for record.

AMLASH Case Officer. Remember also this is primarily the cables because I had to communicate with headquarters and the station in Paris. I didn't have my independent communications.

Mr. Johnston. Where were you on November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. At headquarters. He told me this personally.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Is it normal to prepare a memorandum for the record about plans for contact of an agent?

AMLASH Case Officer. Normally, yes.

Mr. Johnston. So there's nothing unusual in your preparing this memorandum for record. Is that your testimony?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there wasn't anything unusual about it. That's the usual thing unless advised to the contrary.

Mr. Johnston. The last time you testified before the Committee you mentioned on November 22nd you had a pen-like device with a hypodermic needle on it. This memorandum for record of November 19th does not mention that.

Is there some reason that it doesn't?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't remember why it would not have been mentioned. I don't recall when I left for Paris. I may have left for Paris on the 21st and --

Mr. Johnston. I think that's correct.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know if the decision had been made that we would even show him something like this that time.

Mr. Johnston. You're talking about the 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the 19th, when I wrote the memorandum.

Mr. Johnston. When you left for Paris my understanding is that you carried the device.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, I carried it with me.

Mr. Johnston. And you had approval to show it to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had approval to show it to him.

Mr. Johnston. The file indicates that AMLASH was contacted on November 20th, I believe, in order to set up the November 22nd meeting and he was telephoned by, I assume, somebody in Paris.

Did you arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that fact?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I was going to go there to see him. We would have made arrangements to set the meeting up.

Mr. Johnston. The cable reporting the telephone call on November 20th states that somebody apparently was in the room with AMLASH when he was telephoned, and that therefore there had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling him and the CIA agent --

Pardon me. AMLASH asked if the meeting would be of interest to him, and the CIA agent said, I don't know if it's going to be of interest to you but it's the meeting you requested. And I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting that you requested?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably to give him an answer on the caches that he wanted inside Cuba, and I understand that was

the primary point which had not been, he had not been informed of this at the previous meeting with Fitzgerald, so were we going to give him that material. In other words, it was given to him later in the caches, was that material going to be given to him?

Mr. Johnston. What about the pen device?

AMLASH Case Officer. The pen device was something again, it could have been part of that package. I don't think he was specifically asking about the pen device because we had been so reluctant to even discuss something like this with him and he knew it that he was primarily concerned with the caches.

Mr. Johnston. Is it correct to say that at the October 29th meeting AMLASH was happy with the U.S. policy but asking for equipment to do the job?

AMLASH Case Officer. To initiate the coup.

In other words, he didn't want a massive amount of equipment but he said we do need some equipment to get the thing started.

Mr. Johnston. And that that was in his mind on November 20th.

AMLASH Case Officer. When he made the call?

Mr. Johnston. When the call was made to him and he was told that the November 22nd meeting was the one that he had requested.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

Mr. Johnston. And that AMLASH would have understood that that was what you were going to give him, some or all of the things discussed at the October 29th meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. To see what could be given to him, not if it was or anything like this because Paris didn't know what we were prepared to tell him at the 22 November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. As you said before, you were at Langley on the 20th. There's a cable indicating you left Washington arriving in Paris on the morning of November 22nd.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did anyone go with you from Washington to Paris?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Fitzgerald was where at the time?

AMLASH Case Officer. At Langley. He was present at the meeting, at the late October meeting, not at the 22 November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Let's go then to the November 22nd meeting. You previously testified as you recall it was late afternoon or evening because it was dark when you came out.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Where was it held? What kind of place was it held?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that we used a safe

house or in the study of [redacted]'s home.

Mr. Johnston. Who was there at the meeting? You and AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. The October meeting?

Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, November 22nd meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH and myself.

Mr. Johnston. Nobody else was there?

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was [redacted] home, it may have been in another part of the house but he was not at the meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that meeting taped?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

Mr. Johnston. If you did have it taped, where would the tape be today?

AMLASH Case Officer. In the file.

Mr. Johnston. In this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I don't recall that that meeting was taped. I don't think it was possible to tape it.

Mr. Johnston. Who was knowledgeable of that meeting outside yourself and AMLASH? Generally, were the people at the Paris station aware of it?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not generally, no. It could have been the Chief of Station, naturally, and [redacted].

Mr. Johnston. At a meeting like that did you have some kind of back-up support, counter-surveillance, any kind of

back-up support so that you could be assured that you were not under surveillance at the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I took the necessary precautions in going to the meeting to assure myself. I didn't have somebody else following me to tell me if I had any surveillance on me.

Mr. Johnston. What about AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know. I don't know if he was counter-surveilled.

Senator Schweiker. Could AMLASH have been a double agent?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's a good question. I can only give you an opinion. I didn't think so then and even with everything that has happened today, I don't think so today.

Again, that is strictly my opinion.

Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, and I realize this is a very difficult, complex area, why don't you think so?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the power play that was taking place in Cuba at that time between certainly the 26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his position, this was the early '60s now, around his people and his movement, the fact that we had information from several sources that he was disillusioned with the revolution.

Senator Schweiker. He, meaning AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. He, AMLASH, was disillusioned.

Senator Schweiker. And he wasn't in the 26th of July?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was not in the 26th of July.

He was DR, So he was not a member of Castro's July 26th movement. He was one of the other revolutionary groups which had student support primarily and urban support and compared to Castro's rural so-called support.

So there was a struggle going on there. In other words, this was not an imaginary type of thing. The background that we could check did not, to the best of my recollection at any time lead us to believe in our relation with him at that time that he was playing a double game.

The other reason that I felt that way at the time was that we had to persuade him to return to Cuba to stay. He was ready to defect, to leave. He didn't want to come to the United States with all the rest of the Cubans who were here because he had stayed on, he felt, too long with the revolution. But he was ready to leave Cuba and to defect. He was fed up with the way life was. A lot of the travel that he did was that he would take any opportunity to get off of the island. He had told us, me personally, that and this was also confirmed by other sources.

Senator Schweiker. Wouldn't one of your reasons also be that he is in jail now?

AMLASH Case Officer. That would be a very good reason. I think I mentioned that the last time, certainly when I was talking about this. If he was taken back --

Senator Schweiker. Are we absolutely certain he's in

jail now?

AMLASH Case Officer. We checked that I believe the last time, I think the last report we had was what, a couple of years ago?

Mr. Baron. I was given the name of a CIA contact in Florida who had been on the Island of Pines at one point and said as far as he knew, although he hadn't been in Cuba for several years, AMLASH was a prisoner, but he wasn't in prison. He was doing some sort of hospital work which was considered part of his rehabilitation program.

AMLASH Case Officer. He was a doctor, wasn't he, for the prison?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

AMLASH Case Officer. He had more freedom because he was being used as a doctor for the prisoner but he still was still on the Isle of Pines.

Mr. Baron. It is my understanding that he was working as a doctor even outside the prison and again, this is just hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone.

Mr. Wallach. Are you positive that someone just not using his name is there, that he switched over using an alias? You wouldn't have intelligence of that type?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. I want to quickly follow-up on something that Jim and the Senator were getting at.

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Why were you not willing to discuss with AMLASH the assassination of Castro?

AMLASH Case Officer. We?

Mr. Wallach. You have told us --

AMLASH Case Officer. We were very reluctant to discuss the subject.

Mr. Wallach. Why?

AMLASH Case Office. I guess we didn't want to get involved in assassinations.

Mr. Wallach. But you had them before this.

AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't know this, and certainly in this operation the objective of this operation was not to go in and assassinate Castro but a much bigger type of program.

Mr. Wallach. But that was the first step, or at least the potential first step.

AMLASH Case Officer. He was convinced that was the only first step. AMLASH. We weren't convinced that it had to be, at that time that it had to be the first step, and that's why we didn't want to discuss and we didn't discuss and we were reluctant to discuss this subject with him.

Mr. Wallach. At the late October meeting I think you said before that -- what did you request that led to the giving him of the pen, the hypodermic needle?

AMLASH Case Officer. The pen he requested was something with which to protect himself now.

Mr. Wallach. A pen with a hypodermic needle would protect himself?

AMLASH Case Officer. He put himself in a situation and asked us the question. He said I may be confronted by Castro or by Raoul or by one or the other of Castro's people in a meeting in which I am not armed, and I may be confronted with an accusation of plotting against the regime.

And at that time he said this would be before we are ready to move in formenting the coup, and he said, I would like to have something with which I can protect myself at that time. In fact, the words that I think I mentioned here before was, if I fall, I don't want to be the only one going down.

So he was seeing himself in a situation of going back into Cuba, of being in a meeting in which he could have been, because, again, of the relationships. Fidel Castro himself or Raoul Castro could confront him in their office, accuse him.

Mr. Wallach. Couldn't he use that pen offensively and not defensively?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he could have. He was not at that time talking about using it offensively and we weren't discussing the offensive use of that pen.

Senator Schweiker. Following up the point that I switched away from as to whether Cuban intelligence might have been trailing him or following him or observing what you were doing with him, we have some knowledge, I gather, from a summary

here that AMLASH's one-time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be Cuban intelligence.

If this is correct, wouldn't that pretty well mean that whatever he was doing over there might well be observed by Cuban intelligence even though he might have been a straight single agent in terms of working with us and not a double agent that they may well have known or monitored what in fact he was doing with us?

AMLASH Case Officer. This is possible, Senator. We had no indication at the time that they were monitoring his activities. Again, he was at such a level and the people certainly in Paris and the Cubans overseas knew that he was at such a level that we never heard that they were ever given this mission.

Senator Schweiker. Have you heard that his Cuban mistress was working with Cuban intelligence?

AMLASH Case Officer. Which one of his mistresses, because he's had several, including his sister who worked for the Presidency, his own sister.

Mr. Johnston. We extracted that from a file and I'm sorry but in the respect and the need to keep that information compartmented I did not take her name down and I don't think we have the file that indicates that.

My recollection is that he had a mistress for a considerable

period of time who was, who was suspected of being the GI, anc certainly her brother was actually known to be an employee of the GI.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall the specific case, but let me remind you that he was the Deputy Minister of the Interior, which did have the security services at that time under that ministry. So it wouldn't surprise me that there would be somebody he would know in that ministry.

Mr. Johnston. AMLASH was?

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH was at one time before he was President of the Student Federation.

Mr. Johnston. Not in '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Senator Schweiker. And Cuban intelligence would have come under him?

AMLASH Case Officer. Some of the security apparatus was under the Ministry of Interior, but he was in that job, I don't recall, a very short period of time.

Mr. Wallach. If Castro knew about the assassination attempts, you would assume that AMLASH would have known, wouldn't you, from being in that position?

AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know if at that time that he knew that -- well, he was saying, in other words, he was on the radio every day saying that the Yankees were making an attempt on his life but that he knew the specifics of operations,

A. I don't think we have that information, or at least I never have seen it.

After the Bay of Pigs every occasion that he had he would accuse the imperialists of mounting another operation against him.

Mr. Baron. Just a couple more questions on this point. Did you take any special precautions aside from the standard precautions that you would take in dealing with any foreign contact?

Were special precautions taken in dealing with AMLASH to guard against the prospect that he was either a double agent or under surveillance by Cuban intelligence?

AMLASH Case Officer. What would you mean by special precautions?

Mr. Baron. You would have to tell me more about the techniques that you could use, than I could tell you.

AMLASH Case Officer. What I would do is to make sure that I wasn't under surveillance in going to the meeting or at the meeting, and we would certainly check the meeting places to make sure that the meeting places were not under surveillance by them, which would adso hopefully would have picked up in the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the meetings.

I don't recall that we ever put him under surveillance in Paris, which would have meant disclosing our interest in him

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either to our surveillance team or the French police, or whoever.

So we never did that because, again, of our interest in protecting and minimizing the number of people who knew we were in contact with him.

Again, I refer you, I think, to what the Senator raised before, that he was arrested and sentenced, and as I recall, I may be wrong but as I recall the contacts that we had with him in Paris never surfaced in that trial. He never, as far as the transcript that we have of the trial, he never reported, he never testified about the contacts that he had with us. It was only afterwards when he was in contact with the exile group.

Mr. Baron. So you never took any affirmative action against him or investigated him or treated him in any way that you would treat a person suspected of being a double agent or being closely watched by an intelligence service?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not in mounting an investigation against him because in doing that we would have to show our interest in him to other people, so we did not do that.

What we could do with myself and with the other knowledgeable people say in Paris, of him, we did do and did everything we possibly could do.

In other words, to check where he was and who he was seeing and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when he came to meet us that that meeting was secure,

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that we did.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go back to the November 22nd meeting.

As you recall, after you met AMLASH there, did you give him the newspaper article about the Kennedy speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. I may have shown him the article. To the best of my recollection, we talked about the speech and he had, I think, at that time, the article had already appeared in the French newspaper and he had read it.

Mr. Johnston. What did you tell him about the article?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he liked the article. It was one in which I think the Administration, as I vaguely recall, was taking a rather positive stand.

Mr. Johnston. Was this Kennedy's speech before the Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18th?

AMLASH Case Officer. I believe so.

Mr. Johnston. I have an extract from that.

AMLASH Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but I think it was.

Mr. Johnston. There's an indication that you told him that Fitzgerald helped to write the speech.

Do you recall doing that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I could have.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall specifically?

AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no, but we did discuss

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the speech.

Mr. Johnston. You have testified a great deal about the poisbn pen or the pen device and my only question is what is your best recollection about what happened to the pen? Did he take it with him? Did you take it with you when you left the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, as I mentioned to you the last time, I don't remember specifically if I kept the pen and threw it away or if he kept it.

What I do remember was his reaction when I showed him the pen. I can't today tell you for sure that he kept the pen.

Mr. Johnston. It seems to me that's rather compromising evidence, if he kept the pen and you recall that. It's also such compromising evidence -- I have difficulty believing you would have thrown it away.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because it was compromising evidence. I had carried it one way. I mean I wasn't going to carry it back. It was nothing but a Papermate pen in which a hypodermic needle had been inserted.

In other words, it wasn't a $10,000 piece of equipment or anything like this.

Mr. Johnston. I agree, but it's a very compromising piece of evidence to have around.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right. But what I can't

recall specifically is whether it was broken, thrown away or --

Mr. Wallach. Why do you believe he wouldn't have taken it with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. He said he wouldn't. I specifically remember this. He says, and then later on he says, I'm not going to take any compromising material back with me.

This would have been a piece of compromising material. He did not like the pen. The only point probably that we made with him is that we were willing to consider, because he knew our opposition to something like this, that we were even willing to consider showing him something that -- whether he could again defend himself.

He did not think it was a good idea.

Senator Schweiker. What kind of weapon or substance could he get that would not compromise him? I'm a little confused. He wanted something to defend himself, but he doesn't want anything that will compromise him.

Unless you have a disappearing weapon, what could he possibly get that would not compromise him to take back?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were talking also about caches inside Cuba at that time, so it could have been dropped to him inside Cuba. He didn't exactly have to take it back with him.

In other words, here again, the whole idea of this was not to give him something there that he would be able to take

back with him.

Mr. Wallach. Were arrangements made for caches inside Cuba if he was worried about defending himself?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had asked for caches inside Cuba.

Mr. Johnston. Can you be positive that he did not leave the meeting with the pen in his possession?

AMLASH Case Officer. I cannot be positive that he didn't. I'm almost sure that he didn't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask him for the pen back? Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back before the meeting concluded or after the conclusion of the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Since I recollect his reaction to it that, you know, it's no good, I just can't logically believe that he would have kept the pen. This is the point. But I don't specifically recall what was done with it except that it was probably destroyed.

In other words, you know, broken, throw the needle out of it and break the pen.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, but I don't recall that he took it in the first place, because what I recall is, gee, is that the best that you can come up with type of thing.

So he was not in any way enthused about what we had shown

him.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, is it correct you did promise him at this meeting that you would drop rifles with telescopic sights for him in Cuba?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Was there any mention of paying him money to support his coup plans?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had never really asked for money. In promising him full support for the coup, if money was required I presume that could be conjecture that he could get that also, but he did not specifically ask for money.

Mr. Johnston. Was there discussion of his escape in the event he assassinated Castro or killed Castro but did not pull off the coup?

AMLASH Case Officer. At the last meeting I don't believe that was discussed.

Mr. Johnston. At your prior meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was, it was touched upon, but as I recall, and this is from reading the file afterward, where this was discussed was a year later when he was in contact with the exile group. I think it was with the exile group that he was then concerned about, how do I get out if something goes wrong and we can't pull the coup.

But we did not at the 22 November meeting, I don't believe we discussed that. In fact, I'm sure we didn't discuss it.

Mr. Johnston. When did the meeting end? About what time?

What time did the meeting end?

AMLASH Case Officer. Approximately 10:00 in the evening.

Mr. Johnston. And we basically discussed while we were off the record the fact that the assassination occurred at 12:30 in Dallas, which we think would have been around 7:30 in Paris, and the meeting was then over at 10:00 o'clock.

When you walked out of the meeting you testified previously that you heard about the assassination.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. And that's the first word you heard about the assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. You previously said that AMLASH made a comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the assassination by AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. That was it, because I left him at that time.

Mr. Johnston. I don't understand. If the meeting is either in a house or somewhere else how you would leave together and you would have access to a radio or something to hear the report.

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in the house, it could

have been the occupant of the house who told us. In fact, I am sure it was the occupant of the house, Rod Stent, who told us he had just heard on the radio about the assassination when we came out of the meeting. We didn't go or come together to the house. He left on his own and then I left after he left.

Mr. Johnston. So in other words, what you're saying is that you're not walking out of the building but you're in the house and the meeting is over and Rod Stent knows that the meeting is over and that he tells you.

AMLASH Case Officer. We came out of the room, out of the study in which we were holding the meeting, and when we came out of that into his living room he told us what he had just heard on the radio.

Mr. Johnston. And then AMLASH made this comment and walked out of the door?

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH made this comment and shortly thereafter I don't recall, we finished our business. He was -- I don't remember the exact quote. You have it on the record there, like why does it have to happen to somebody like that.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know who committed the assassination at this time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And even with that you don't recall whether AMLASH walked out the door with the poison pen?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't believe he did, I don't believe he did and it could very well be that what I would have done is pull the hypodermic needle out of it, that's very simple, and then it's just a pen, throw the pen away or keep the pen.

It's not a complicated object, in other words. It was very simple to just pull the hypodermic needle out of it, and that's probably what was done. But I don't recall specifically that I did it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you do that after the meeting was over?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it was during the meeting, not after.

Mr. Johnston. Now there's an indication that you got instructions from Washington after the meeting to break off contact with AMLASH.

Do you recall receiving those instructions or instructions to that effect?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, there was a cable, I believe, as I recall. It wasn't necessarily to break off contact with AMLASH because everybody knew that that was the last meeting. He was preparing to, we knew this, he had been preparing and we had been talking to him since October since he was out about his return to Cuba.

Senator Schweiker. Did the arms drop cache ever occur?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had left, I wasn't involved in

that part of it, Senator. Again, only from the record that I read afterwards, I think a couple of drops were made to him. In fact, the next year or something like that.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure exactly what was left or what he received or what was available.

AMLASH Case Officer. And I don't know if he ever picked them up. I don't think we know that.

Mr. Wallach. Why did he tell you he wanted the rifles with telescopic sights?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he wanted grenades and he wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters later on. We said, well, look, could you expand this somewhat too, and he was talking about, well, yes, and we should probably attack the radio station at the same time. It was a matter of attacking a building, whether it was a radio station or whatever it was, in order to, in his mind, he was probably thinking of attacking the headquarters, Castro's headquarters.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection. In your previous testimony with the Select Committee on page 114 you stated:

"When we came out of that meeting we heard the news of President Kennedy's assassination and I received a cable after that which I thought that this was probably the reason the whole operation was being re-assessed.

AMLASH Case Officer. That was strictly my thought at that

time.

Mr. Johnston. And on page 115 of your prior transcript you said, "well, the whole Cuban operation, the way I interpreted it, was being called on."

Did you receive a cable to that effect?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was a very cryptic cable saying, you know, return to Washington, which I was going to do anyway, so this is why --

Mr. Johnston. Did it say to break off contact with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that it did but it didn't make any difference because headquarters knew that that was the last meeting with him before he was returning to Cuba anyway.

So there was no reason to tell me to break off contact with him. This is what I'm trying to say.

Mr. Johnston. Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I don't know where they got their information, said that was an OPIM cable.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's Operation Immediate. In other words, it's an immediate cable. That set precedence on the cable.

Mr. Johnston. And what does that mean for transmitting --

AMLASH Case Officer. It was transmitted before a routine cable or a priority cable. It's just the precedence --

Mr. Johnston. It has the highest priority next to FLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the one below FLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And that tells you to break off the meeting or to come back to Washington?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall receiving that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And you read that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, or I was told about it because I didn't go into the embassy to read it, so I don't think they brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to Washington.

Mr. Johnston. Let me state that that cable is apparently not in the AMLASH file and the 1967 Inspector General could not find that cable.

Does that surprise you?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it doesn't really because I don't think there was that much importance given to that kind of cable at that time.

What you say about the Operation Immediate, we handled all of our traffic, more or less, in this case on an immediate basis because of the short periods of time that we had with AMLASH.

So if you are implying that because of the OP AM cable that there was something else behind this, no, I don't think that

there was in any way. It was just, you know, return to Washington, and as I assumed, and I assumed at that time that certainly the whole Cuban operation was going to be re-assessed after what happened to President Kennedy.

Mr. Johnston. Now there is in the file a cable reporting from Paris to Washington reporting that you planned to depart Paris that morning of November 23rd and arrive in Washington 8:10.

Did you in fact take that flight?

AMLASH Case Officer. Did you ever find that cable?

Mr. Johnston. I saw the cable of your return to Washington.

AMLASH Case Officer. If it referred to a cable, that was the one telling me to come back. This is a travel-type of exchange.

Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact arrive back in Washington -- I said 8:10. I'm sorry, it would be 18:10, which would be 6:00 Washington time.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Where did you go when you arrived in Washington at 6:10 in the evening on November 23rd?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically if I stopped by my home, which is en route to the office, whether I went right back to the office before going home

Mr. Johnston. But you did go to the office sometime that

evening?

AMLASH Case Officer. I may have.

Mr. Johnston. Did you go to the office on the 24th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. That was a Sunday?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been.

Mr. Wallach. One question about the cable that we can't find.

Did you have any other business in Paris besides AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically at that time.

Mr. Wallach. Was there a date that you intended to return?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. When was that date officially?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the time that I returned.

Mr. Wallach. Why would they have sent you a cable telling you to return if you intended to return that day?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. This was probably a reaction to what had happened. But again, I want to point out to you that travel cables of this type, even if your plans are such, and the way I was travelling at that time I was not travelling on a diplomatic passport or anything like that. You don't even need a regular passport to travel France. It was just to keep track and record of our personal travel.

In other words, it's our security to make sure that

that headquarters knows that we are coming back and I sent a cable saying I'm arriving on such and such a date, the same way I sent a cable to Paris telling them I'm arriving on such and such a date.

Mr. Johnston. Would you have sent your cable without getting a cable first from them?

AMLASH Case Officer. I could have, sure.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure I understand the purpose of their cable. Were you saying it's a regular thing that they will send extra traffic?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't tell you what the purpose of their cable was except what I'm trying to explain to you is that keeping headquarters informed or headquarters inquiring of you in such circumstances, it's not unusual to get a cable, you know, advise us when you're going to return or please return or us sending a cable.

If there was any other reason for sending that cable, I can only conjecture, I don't know, that it was because of what had happened.

End 2B

Begin 3A

Mr. Johnston. I'd like the record to show that Senator Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator being here you have the prerogative to stop your testimony.

Do you understand that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And that if we proceed, that you can continue

to stop at any time during the testimony and ask for it to continue when we have a Senator present.

Do you understand that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Are you willing to continue under the conditions of not having a Senator here?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. We have you back in Washington at 6:10 on November 23rd, and you may or may not have gone to the office that day and you said you definitely did go to the office on November 24th, on Sunday.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so. Scratch definitely. I'm probably not that definite about it, but I'm sure I touched base with the office as soon as I returned, either telephonically or physically going there.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection then and remind you that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.

Does that aid you in recalling where you were at that time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I mean I was home, certainly.

Mr. Johnston. You mean home in Washington?

AMLASH Case Officer. In Washington.

Mr. Johnston. But you don't know whether you were at the office or at home on that day?

AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on the hour that we

may have been working.

If you're going back to asking about normal hours that we kept during that period of time, Sunday was just another working day, so you know, it wasn't because it was Sunday that we would not have been in the office.

Mr. Johnston. But you con't recall being in the office?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall being in the office. When we heard the information that Oswald was involved, I could very well have been home.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall being in the office when you heard that Oswald was shot?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you hold, when did you first talk to the chief of the section about your meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when. What would have been ususual is for me to have called the office when I got in and whether I went there or not, I don't recall. And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been, he would have been the only person I would have talked to. If he was in on that Sunday and I went in, I would have talked to him on Sunday, and if not, it would have been on Monday.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. Helms about the November 22nd meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I did not talk to Helms.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. McCone about the

November 22nd meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to anyone in technical services about the pen device or the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not at the time, no.

Mr. Johnston. So it was your recollection that the only one you talked to in this time period of November 23rd and November 24th, November 25th about the meeting in Paris is Mr. Fitzgerald?

AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And what is your recollection of that discussion?

AMLASH Case Officer. The report, as to what had taken place, reporting that he had not thought highly of the device that we had provided him with, that he did not intend to carry it back, that he was pleased with the fact that we had decided that we would put caches down for him inside Cuba, the reaffirmation of U.S. support for his movement inside of Cuba, the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had made his reservations to return, and his dismay and his reaction when he had heard that Kennedy had been assassinated when we got to the meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion about any link between AMLASH or your Cuban operations and the Kennedy assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever that I can remember.

Mr. Johnston. No discussion between you and Fitzgerald at all about any connection?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I can recall.

Mr. Johnston. When you say not that you can recall, are you saying that it's possible but you don't recall it, or are you certain, fairly certain to the best of your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. I'm fairly certain to the best of my knowledge that there was no connection between the AMLASH -- in other words, that we discussed it, we discussed the Kennedy assassination. I'm sure we did. I mean who wasn't discussing the Kennedy assassination at that time. That we tied the Kennedy assassination in with AMLASH, I don't recall any kind of conversation of that nature.

Mr. Johnston. On November 23rd and November 24th and November 25th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. All right. Let me point you to one of the documents we wanted to ask you about and it is a contact report dated 25 November, and let me just show that to you.

Is that a document -- let me state for the record what it is.

It's the original, apparently copy, of the November 25th contact report of the November 22nd meeting.

Did you prepare that contact report?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And is that the document you prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. I'm asking you directly is that the very document you prepared? That's a very specific question.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

AMLASH Case Officer. The date is 25 November.

Mr. Johnston. Is it your recollection that that's the date you prepared that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of doing it on that date?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically on the 25th, but if the document is dated the 25th, I presume that's the day that I did the memorandum.

Mr. Johnston. Now how did you prepare it? Did you dictate it to somebody who then typed it up, or did you yourself personally prepare it? And in asking you that question, is there any way to tell from the document how it was prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, the secretary probably typed it. I mean I didn't type it myself.

Mr. Johnston. You did not type it yourself.

Is there any way to tell from the document? There are no initials on it or anything that would indicate that it was

dictated and typed?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. What are you asking me?

Mr. Johnston. I'm just asking you if you're the one that prepared that or how it got prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's a contact report of my meeting with AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And you prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. But you did not type it?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not type it, so I could have dictated it to a secretary or wrote it out longhand and gave it to her and she typed it.

Mr. Johnston. What about the fact that on November 19th in your memorandum for record you indicated that Fitzgerald wanted written reports to be kept to a mimimum?

With those instructions why did you prepare a contract report?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because I probably contacted Fitzgerald about it and he said prepare the one on this meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that but that would be a normal thing.

Mr. Johnston. That he would have in effect --

AMLASH Case Officer. I briefed him on this, and then he said, let's have a memorandum, a contact report on that.

In other words, when he said 'minimize the written communications on the operation, he didn't say we won't have any other communications on any other memos on it or any further memorandums on it.

So what would happen if you put things within the dates here, I had briefed him on this and then it was by agreement or maybe by his order that he told me to write up a contact report.

Mr. Johnston. Have you had an opportunity to examine that report either before you came here? I'm not sure we've given you enough opportunity to look at it closely while here. Maybe you could take that time right now to look at the document.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Look at page 3 of the document. Compare page 2 and page 3. Page 3 is in a much different type than page 2.

Do you notice that? It's much fainter.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's fainter, and I don't know if the type looks like it's the same but it's fainter.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any explanation for that?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Was page 3 what you prepared on November [illegible]

AMLASH Officer.I didn't personally prepare it again, so I could have given the secretary my long hand report, something could have happened, and then I finished it and she put it on a second page. That is possible. I don't have any explanation

why it's lighter than the other one. The type appears to be the same.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying that the way you prepared it it's possible that the second page and third page were prepared on different days?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it could have been at different times of the day. If I had writen out the first part of the contact report and I hadn't finished it, the secretary could very well have started to type it, and then when I finished it I would have given her the last page to type because it was all on the 25th.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying --

AMLASH Case Officer. Because there's no date on the second page.

Mr. Johnston. You're stating that your recollection is that that document was typed on one day by one person.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, probably so. That's the usual case. I have no reason to doubt why it would have been done any differently.

Mr. Johnston. What about the information on page 3? Is that the substance, in fact? Is that exactly what you wrote on November 25th about the contact?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, and in fact I draw your attention to the part on the secret writing material because we were very concerned as to how we would continue to communicate

with him inside Cuba and this was one of the subjects that were discussed at the last meeting, communications. So that is not a new subject matter. That is definitely part of the subject matter that was discussed at the last meeting, which was communications with him.

Mr. Johnston. And it's your testimony that this report as it exists in that file is exactly the report that you prepared on November 25th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes..

Mr. Johnston. You'll note that the report does not mention the pen device or AMLASH's reaction to your giving it to him.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. You left that out of your original report. You did not make a written report on --

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not make a written report on that.

Mr. Johnston. Why was that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably because Fitzgerald said not to.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall it, but that's certainly what I'd have to assume.

In other words, don't include that part of it.

Mr. Johnston. Should it have gone in there in a normal

report?

AMLASH Case Officer. In a normal report, yes. But this certainly was a rather, again, sensitive subject that we were talking about. He did not accept it and I don't think that at that time it was felt that anything else should be said about it.

Mr. Johnston. Why is that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why. Again, because of the sensitivity, I presume, of the subject.

Mr. Johnston. And again, is it your recollection that Fitzgerald, is it your testimony that Fitzgerald told you not to put a reference to the pen device in the report?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if he specifically told me not to put it in or if when I gave him the report he was satisfied that it was not in.

Mr. Baron. Why would a reference to the pen device be any more sensitive than references to arms caches or suggestions of assassinations or all the other kinds of things that were already in the file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because again, in conjunction with this particular operation it was not an assassination operation. It was a coup operation. This was one of the aberrations of the operation which we got involved in strictly to provide bona fides to the man that we were dealing with and we were concerned for his personal security.

In other words, it was not part of the operational plan to provide him with any such devices for the purposes of assassinating Castro. The rifles and the grenades and all of this was something that was necessary to start a coup.

In other words, it was not directed at one particular person.

I think this was probably the thinking at that time and why such points did not get into it because this was not part of the AMLASH plan of operation.

Mr. Baron. For the sake of the accuracy of the records and the protection of the people who were involved at the CIA, wouldn't even the tender of such a device to AMLASH for whatever purporses normally be put into the records?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not in a contact report because in a contact report this goes into the regular file. Whether Fitzgerald would have made a note of this some place else I don't know, but in the regular contact report which goes into the regular file -- in other words, say the secretary would know about it and this could have been the other part of it.

In other words, to reduce the number of people, to contain the number of people.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything in your discussions with Fitzgerald that led you to believe that one of the factors that was in his mind in assessing the sensitivity of this tender of a poison pen device was the day on which it

happened as opposed to simply the fact that such a device was offered?

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in his mind, he never stated it to me. I think it was just the overall sensitivity that the Agency had been, has now, and always has had on assassinations.

I mean it's not the specific of what had happened that time. Assassinations were not part of the routine business of the Agency.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, you have mentioned the secretary who prepared it. Do you recall the name of the secretary who prepared this document?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have a regular secretary?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What was her name?

AMLASH Case Officer. She could have prepared it or it could have been Fitzgerald's secretary because, again, of the days, the Sunday.

I don't recall the name.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall your secretary's name?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I don't remember if a girl by the name of Bobbie Hernandez was still with me. She was my secretary during part of that time. She was probably my secretary then.

I don't recall Fitzgerald's secretary's name, and she could have typed it, but it would have been one of the two girls.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the report again and on page 1 of the report, I think it's paragraph 2 of that that discusses the newspaper article, the Kennedy speech. Paragraph two:

"AMLASH stated he was returning to Cuba." The second sentence of that is --"subject was pleased to read a copy of President Kennedy's 18 November speech in Miami and was even more pleased to hear that Fitzgerald had helped to prepare the President's speech. You the case officer reiterated the assurances given by Fitzgerald of full U.S. support if a real coup against the regime was successful."

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that's right.

Mr. Johnston. Does that refresh your recollection about whether or not you gave him the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, because at that time it could have already been printed in the Paris newspaper and he could very well have read it in one of the Parisian newspapers. But again, I could have had a copy of a newspaper clipping of the speech with me.

Mr. Johnston. But in the least does that refresh your recollection that you told AMLASH that Fitzgerald helped prepare the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, Fitzgerald told me that we

could tell him.

Mr. Johnston. Would you recall the portion of the speech you pointed out to AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No portion was pointed out to him. It was just that Fitzgerald had helped in preparation of the speech.

Mr. Johnston. I could show you a copy. This is an extract I have prepared from the November 19th, 1963 Washington Post, page A15, which carries an AP story of November 18th saying:

"The following is the text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association."

And I have extracted the only portions as are relevant to Cuba. Now I'll give you a chance to read it.

Incidentally, I'd like to have this marked as Exhibit 1 for the record.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1)

Mr. Johnston. I point out that in that speech, do you have a recollection of this being the part of the speech or you discussed this aspect of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. We did not discuss the speech paragraph by paragraph. All we did was a very small passing remark about the speech.

He had probably to the best of my recollection already read it in one of the Parisian newspapers, or if I had a newspaper clipping of the speech, he glanced at it while we were there, but I don't recall that. But he was certainly satisfied with the tone of the speech.

Mr. Johnston. You must have read the speech before you mentioned it to him. Is this the portion that you had in mind that would satisfy him about the tone of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly this sets the tone for the whole speech. The extracts that you have made here sets the tone for the full speech and specifically the one in which once the barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which in a few short years stirred the hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

Mr. Johnston. Was it your intent by making reference to the speech in your meeting with AMLASH to show that higher authority was behind what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, precisely.

Mr. Johnston. And you felt that this speech coincided with what you were telling AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that the U.S. Government was prepared, the assurances at first that Gerald had given him and I had been giving him that the U.S. Government was willing to support the Cuban people.

Mr. Baron. In the excerpt from the speech that we have just shown you it says:

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries. It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and soverignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere.

Then it continues: "This and this alone divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people."

That's the end of the quote.

Is it your understanding that this reference to a small band of conspirators is a reference to the Castro government?

AMLASH Case Officer. Precisely.

Mr. Baron. And in your report of November 19th, or your memorandum for the record of November 19th, you had mentioned that -- well, I will simply quote from the report. It says:

"Show AMLASH One copy of President's Miami speech(remark

to AMLASH One that blank helped with speech).

AMLASH Case Officer. Fitzgerald.

Mr. Baron. Blank is Fitzgerald.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. This memorandum was written before I went to Paris, so, in effect, these were my marching orders that I could use showing that the U.S. Government, indeed --

Mr. Baron. Would support a move against the Castro government.

AMLASH Case Officer. Would support the move against Castro.

Mr. Baron. And did you know for a fact that Fitzgerald helped with the preparation of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only from what Fitzgerald told me.

Mr. Baron. What did Fitzgerald tell you?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't give you a specific quote but I presume that he had had some input into the speech. This, again, wouldn't necessarily be Fitzgerald himself. It could be but it could also be the SAS, the CIA input into the speech, which is normal in Presidential speeches that there are inputs from different agencies.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the President or anyone close to him who had been involved in the preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the

End 3A, b 3B

AMLASH operation?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. Fitzgerald never told me specifically that the President had been apprised of this. The general objective, I never had any doubts in my mind that the general objective of organizing a coup against Castro did not have the highest governmental approval. I mean this was never a question, I don't think, in my mind. Again, not specifically assassination because what I mentioned before, I don't think Fitzgerald or Helms or anybody else would specifically have briefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot because it wasn't.

Mr. Baron. So you had no basis for believing that the President was informed that a component of the AMLASH operation was assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I have no reason. I don't know. Nobody told me that he had or he hadn't.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald make it clear to you that in providing input to this speech he had the specific purpose in mind of giving a public signal to AMLASH that he would receive support from the highest quarters of the U.S. Government if he would move for a coup?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, this was my understanding.

Mr. Baron. That the speech was to be a specific signal to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a general statement of U.S. policy?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Baron. Can you recall anything about your conversation that produced that understanding?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, just the general conversation of the time and what we were trying to do.

In other words, we were trying to organize a coup and the problems that we had been through specifically with AMLASH in trying to persuade him that the U.S. government was serious about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.

So this statement that appeared in the speech was certainly public notice that this was the case.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald or anyone else say anything to you that led you to believe that the President had been specifically informed that representations would be made such as the ones on October 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high American officials would stand behind AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically tell me.

Mr. Baron. Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about this speech, his input to this speech, lead you to believe that the President had been specifically informed that a poison pen device was being prepared to be tendered on November 22nd?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you in a different context now, was there a decision after the assassination to break off further contacts with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but that decision evolved, it wasn't an automatic decision right after the assassination. In fact, as you recall from my previous testimony we had contact with AMLASH again in late '64 when he came out. I think the only hesitancy at that time was what's the new policy? Does the new President want to continue to, in our attempts to organize a plot against Castro, a coup against Castro --

That probably was the hesitancy, not the fact that it was immediately decided to stop contact, which, as I said before, it wasn't, because we saw him again.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion at all in November or December 1963 about the relationship between the AMLASH operation and the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, we have in several versions and the one that is most available is this document here, and I have got the document you're looking at is in Volume 12, I believe, of the AMLASH file.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And it is a yellow legal size paper.

AMLASH Case Officer. Let me correct. It's not a document. It is evidently somebody's type-written notes of probably the recollection of what had happened.

Mr. Johnston. Okay, and it's on yellow legal-size paper typed. And I also have a document that I'm sure is in the file

but we don't have it pointed out. It's the sanitized version of a memorandum for the record dated 29 March, 1965, subject AMLASH, and both of them convey the same subject, the same information. And on the paragraph that has the marking at the left and the language of those documents, those documents say "22 November, '63, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed."

Is that the portion you're reading?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. "(Telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). Situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassination. Because of this fact, plans of subject changed and it was decided that this Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro), and it would not aid subject in his attempt.

"This included the following: ' We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

Did you prepare this document?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not prepare this document. I was not with the task force with SAS at the time this document was prepared on 29 March, '65. I had already left.

Again, the only thing I can state for you here on what

I knew of the operation, that this was somebody trying to put together, this was a memo from Chief FI probably in the task force trying to put together by this time, 29 March, what had happened. The other document since it's, it's probably a later date, the yellow document was somebody probably again trying to reconstruct what had happened. The facts are not as I knew them at the time.

Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took place over a period of a year and the decision probably was not made until '65 after I had left the operation, that we were pulling out.

But the facts as stated here in those two documents are incorrect, and certainly the timing that they insinuate is wrong.

Mr. Johnston. I think we should develop that on the record and if you want to point out what facts are incorrect, why don't you do so?

AMLASH Case Officer. "The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated." That's incorrect.

Fitzgerald wasn't with me on the 22nd of November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. What about the sentence before that, that Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed, with your qualifier that Fitzgerald was not at the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. This was at the meeting in October and not at the November meeting because that is correct, provided you put it in the right context.

Mr. Johnston. What about the statement, all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. Inferred. I mean I don't recall that money was ever discussed with this man at any time. In fact I was asked this question before and I couldn't really recollect when I had given him some money.

It turns out that the record shows that I did give him $350 for his expenses. But money, specifically, again, that is somebody else interpreting. I don't know of any other document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I prepared in which money specifically was mentioned.

Mr. Johnston. But would you disagree with the statement?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, the statement as a whole, if you leave out the money, which again, anything that he needs.

Mr. Johnston. Well, that's what we want to leave in. the money.

AMLASH Case Officer. If he needs the money, I think it was not excluded in the offer. But what I'm saying --

Mr. Johnston. This makes a positive statement, him saying that you and Mr. Fitzgerald assured AMLASH that the Agency would give him everything he needed, all the money he wanted.

And I'm asking you directly either on October 29th or November 22nd did you make that assurance to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't recall that such an issue was made of money because he never asked for money and we specifically didn't have to respond to telling him that we would give him money. In telling him that the support necessary, all of the support necessary for a coup, I think it is implied that he would get whatever he needed, which would mean supplies, but not specifically money, and the reason I state this is that money was never a subject of contention between the Agency and AMLASH. He never asked for money, he never was offered specifically money.

Mr. Johnston. Was he assured that he would get all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. All the support he needed, not the money that he wanted. He never asked for money.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you what he asked for. I'm asking you what you told him. In this thing it says you assured him that you would give him all the money that he wanted.

Did you give that assurance to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not because I did not write this document. And the person who wrote this document that I know of didn't write it from any factual report at any time.

This is not a document. This is somebody's notes in putting together. These are rough notes typed on yellow, legal sized paper of somebody trying to reconstruct what happened here probably two or three years afterwards.

Mr. Johnston. I guess what I'm asking is a yes or no answer. In October or November, 1963, did you or Mr. Fitzgerald, to your knowledge, assure AMLASH that he would receive all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, and I must qualify that. Unless you want to infer that in giving him the support that he needed he would also receive money. But money specifically, all he wanted, was never a part of the conversations, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. We have talked about the next sentence and it continues.

"Because of this fact plans of subject changed and it was decided the Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader, including Castro."

Is that accurate? I'm giving you an opportunity to rebut the document.

AMLASH Case Officer. It's accurate from the point of view --

You have to put it in the right time frame, in the right context. When he was met in late '64, after having visited and lived in Cuba for a year or almost a year, he came back more

convinced than before that the only way a coup could be launched in Cuba was the elimination of Castro and when he expressed this conviction, not in '63 but in late '64, is when the Agency, and I presume the U.S. Government at that time felt we can't continue that directly involved with AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And the last sentence of that:

"This included the following -- 'We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination. Furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help the subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

Was that the substance of the discussion immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. A year later in November of '64.

Mr. Johnston. And you're saying that this does not describe the fall AMLASH meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. It does not. It is a mixture of what happened over at least a two year period.

Mr. Johnston. It perplexes me somewhat that your failure to keep written records would so warp later thinkers as to what was going on. I mean take the March, 1965 document. As of March, 1965 CIA is going on the assumption that you and Fitzgerald met AMLASH in Paris, that you assured him that he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans changed after the meeting because of the Kennedy assassination.

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't sit here and presume to give you an explanation for that as to where the person who prepared that particular memorandum got that information. The file itself indicates, as you are well aware, that Fitzgerald did not travel to Paris in November. He travelled in October.

So the person who prepared the 29 March, 1965 memo came up with this particular type of information, I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Who is that memo addressed to again?

AMLASH Case Officer. This is to Chief, FI from Chief, Reports.

Mr. Johnston. So your only explanation, your explanation for the memo is that it is inaccurate but even if it is inaccurate, it indicates that in March, 1965 these people had it all wrong as to what the AMLASH operation was all about.

AMLASH Case Officer. If you want to interpret exactly what they wrote here, yes, it was wrong. Now I'm not saying that it was wrong because it could have been. I don't know. I'm just saying it could have been that they didn't have access to all the restricted files because this operation until it received its recent publicity was kept on a very restricted basis.

So the Chief of Reports, I don't even know, well, probably the Chief of Reports in the division or maybe some place, probably did not have access to all of the operational files.

Mr. Greissing. You're saying that the information itself is inaccurate only in a chronological way that it is developed?

AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly wrong in its chronological context, definitely because it throws everything into one very small period of time. In reporting or trying to report what took place over a much longer period of time.

Mr. Greissing. But the facts that are there over a period of a year would be true?

AMLASH Case Officer. But not in this context.

Mr. Greissing. But I'm saying over the period of a year from 1 November to the following November when you actually informed AMLASH of the feelings that the Agency had developed at that time, I believe it is the next sentence down.

AMLASH Case Officer. What is wrong here, what is wrong is that after we left that meeting, which I presume they left the meeting, I presume they're talking about, yes, the 22 November, '63 meeting -- this is absolutely wrong, that when we left that meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated, we had told him, you know, that this was all off.

That is wrong. It was not at that meeting that he was told that. He went back after that meeting with the idea of organizing a coup inside Cuba.

Mr. Greissing. I believe it clarifies that later in the next paragraph. It says that this information was given

to AMLASH the following November in 1964.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. So I don't know why we're taking that particular piece of information out of context because in that same memorandum it does state that.

Mr. Johnston. Let me move off these documents. The file on AMLASH contains a November 27th report from Paris which indicated a source in the Cuban embassy in Paris.

AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. November 27th of what year?

Mr. Johnston. 1963. A source in the Cuban embassy in Paris was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the revolution.

Did you see that report on November 27th, 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. I probably did. I can't specifically recall that I did.

Mr. Johnston. And as I read the report, or my statement to you of its substance, it would suggest to you that AMLASH was known by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting down the Castro revolution.

AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on who. In other words, who did he say this to because he did have friends in the different embassies.

Mr. Johnston. The Cuban embassy?

AMLASH Case Officer. He stayed at the Cuban embassy. He was a Cuban official at that time. So he had friends who were

of like mind that he was. They were not happy with the way the revolution was moving.

Mr. Johnston. So that fact would have been more broadly known say in the Cuban embassy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes. This was fairly well known.

End 3B

Mr. Johnston. The cable seems to indicate that the source of the information was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the revolution, and went on to say that she or he wished he or she had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another person were saying, suggesting it is not a friendly source to AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, that suggests -- and again, I can't give you any definitive explanation for it -- what that suggests is that she overheard AMLASH talking with somebody else of like mind, and she didn't like what she heard, I guess.

Mr. Johnston. Let's go now to again what you talked about, any link in your mind or in Fitzgerald's mind in November and December 1963 between what you had been doing with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever, none whatsoever, and no discussion, and again, again, I go back and take you back in time, if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not 1976, after all of this has taken place, after we have had all the public theories expressed of the connections, all built on circumstantial evidence of what and who were involved in the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and try to place yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963 when this happened.

First of all, I have to preface what I have to say by saying that this was not an assassination plot, so there would

be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination with this assassination plot. This was not an assassination plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot. As a coup against Fidel Castro, yes. The fact that the U.S. Government was not happy and was supporting people who were opposed to Castro, this was well known. This was in the aftermath, '63, of the Bay of Pigs. So there was really in the context of the time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived as an assassination plot, there was really no reason to connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of President Kennedy.

Mr. Johnston. Okay.

We do know that on the 29th of October Fitzgerald told AMLASH that Robert Kennedy was behind the plot or behind AMLASH's proposal, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. What we told him was that the U.S. Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Johnston. And AMLASH had previously told you that at least one of his plans for a coup would require the assassination of the Castro Brothers.

AMLASH Case Officer. He had not exactly put it in those terms, but he certainly felt that the first move would have to be against the leadership, yes. In other words, we never talked to him in terms of assassination, and I want this

perfectly clear.

Mr. Johnston. And he told you before the 29th meeting that the first step would probably have to be the assassination of the Castros?

AMLASH Case Officer. He never told me assassination because he didn't even like to use the word "assassination."

Mr. Johnston. What word did he like to use?

AMLASH Case Officer. The neutralization, the elimination if you will, of the leadership.

The first move in any coup attempt, in order for the other officers to fall in line, would have to be the removal, the removal of Fidel Castro, because of the loyalties that he still had personally with some of the officers.

Mr. Johnston. And after he told you that on October 29th, you gave him an assurance that Robert Kennedy backed his proposal generally.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, the U.S. Government and Fitzgerald as the representative of Robert Kennedy, supported a coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. On the very day of the assassination, you referenced the speech of President Kennedy's talking about an ouster of the current regime in Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the September 7th statement of Fidel Castro's, threatening the lives of U.S.

leaders, and let me -- I have a poor Xerox copy, but especially a portion of that statement by Fidel Castro on September 7th at a party at the Brazilian embassy in Havana, he talked to a reporter, Daniel Harker of AP and said, among other things, "we are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. The United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

I would think from your description of the AMLASH operation that AMLASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders, and that it is very possible --

AMLASH Case Officer. So did everybody else. So did every other Cuban exile who was plotting against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. But this is in the Brazilian Embassy on September 7th, and you started meeting with AMLASH on September 5th in Brazil, and it may be coincidence, but Castro does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and you were doing that very thing.

AMLASH Case Officer. There is probably a coincidence there. I don't recall that I knew of this at that time. I've certainly heardof it since, but I don't see the point that you are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind AMLASH to involve him in the assassination of an American leader, then are you proposing that he would also publicly

in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take place?

In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he had?

Mr. Johnston. I don't know. I assume not.

AMLASH Case Officer. I would find it highly unusual that if he was serious about being involved in something like this, that he would publicly announce his plan, but I may be wrong. That's just my opinion.

Mr. Johnston. So we have this Castro speech of September 7th, whatever that means, and we have the AMLASH operations we talked about in November and October, and then almost at the very moment of the Kennedy assassination we have your meeting with AMLASH and giving him the technical equipment or the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at the October 29th meeting.

You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that the alleged assassin of President Kennedy was pro-Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald was pro-Castro.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't even know that at this time.

Mr. Johnston. You don't know that at this time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, where did you get that?

Mr. Johnston. You don't know?

AMLASH Case Officer. That he was pro-Castro?

Mr. Baron. Wasn't that a logical deduction from the fact that he was part of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been, but I haven't seen that.

Mr. Greissing. He had come out publicly in interviews stating that he was for Castro and would defend Castro if the U.S. took action.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, probably so, but I never had --

Mr. Johnston. And in fact, Oswald had visited Mexico City, and on November 25th, the very day you wrote your contact report, the Mexico City chief of station cabled headquarters and reminded them about the Castro speech threat, and I assume that our information is that Mr. King was handling the activity in Mexico City.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. So on November 25th he was aware of the threat, reminded of the threat.

I think it is fair to say that Mr. King knew that Oswald had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. He knew that on November 25th.

Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn Scott -- I don't know whether you knew him -- in Mexico City, on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico in which he said, Mr. Scott's memo says there are still some important questions concerning Oswald and his visit to Mexico

City. Was the assassination of President Kennedy planned by Fidel Castro, and were the final details worked out inside the Cuban embassy in Mexico?

That's again on November 25th.

There's no reason for you to have seen the document.

AMLASH Case Office. I don't know that, but again, I'll just question, this was just a question that was asked. I wouldn't report it as fact.

Mr. Johnston. No, on November 25th that is a question being raised.

Knowing now, looking back at Mr. King, we have the Western Hemisphere Division on November 25th is informed that Castro has made a threat against U.S. leaders, that the chief of station in Mexico City is telling the President of Mexico that there is a possibility that Castro was behind it, Oswald was known to be pro-Castro, and on November 22nd, you in turn were meeting in Paris, giving a high level Cuban assurances that his coup plot that might include assassination of Castro was backed by the U.S. and that yet you made no connection between those, all those events, and there was no discussion of any connection.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there was no discussion between the -- the connection between the assassination of President Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.

Mr. Johnston. Was there an investigation?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not to my knowledge. I left the operation right after that, so I wouldn't know if there was or wasn't. But the coincidence that you are talking about, if you are connecting or trying now to imply that there was a connection between AMLASH and the fact that it was on the 22nd of November, the same date as President Kennedy's assassination, they must have had a very terrific system of communication.

Mr. Johnston. Although you had set up the meeting on the 20th of November, is that right?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but he didn't know specifically what we were going to say. In fact, the answer that we could have given him could have been reversed.

Mr. Johnston. Well, you said he requested it.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested it before he left, but the assurances, you can go back before that. You can go back to the October meeting when the assurances of support were given to him.

So I can't -- I find it very difficult to follow what you are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH directly to the assassination on 22 November. This is what I find difficult to understand.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you a copy of a cable, no indication that the cable went to SAS. The cable is Mexico City, 7045, dated 24 November '63 and by way of background, tell you that immediately upon the assassination, the personnel

in Mexico City then started putting the entire Soviet apparatus in Mexico City under surveillance and pulling the records, and I don't want to read this into the record because it uses a true name.

Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me read it, except for the true name.

It says "Provided below sufficiently definitive summary of local contacts of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev." It gives his contacts, it says "23 December 1961 with the Third Secretary of Cuban Cultural Attache," naming her, and arranging a press conference for AMLASH. It's a very tangential relationship with the AMLASH operation, but again, on November 24th, 1963, Mexico City is reporting KGB ... or ... Alferiev's contacts, and it includes a contact in '61 with AMLASH.

So I have difficulty believing that they are, in hindsight, not related, and that on November 24th or November 25th no one at CIA related the two events.

AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you is -- I'm not telling you that no one at CIA relates the two events. You asked me the specific question, did you and Fitzgerald discuss any relationship. My answer to you was that Fitzgerald and I did not specifically discuss that.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of anyone who discussed it?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any investigation that was conducted?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me now talk -- and again the groundwork is that you were unaware of any investigation of a connection between the two, and you were unaware of any discussion about a connection between AMLASH and Kennedy's assassination.

Is that a correct summary?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. I will show you a document. For the record, this is a document appearing in Volume IV of the AMLASH file, and the first page of it has AMLASH's name on it, but I call your attention to the red handwriting in the upper right hand corner of that, on that cover sheet, and it says, "not to leave this office, per" blank's "orders."

Is that correct?

This document has handwriting in the upper writing hand corner that it is not to leave this office, whatever that is.

AMLASH Case Officer. Without specific clearance, without orders.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of such orders being given by any one, yourself, or Mr. Fitzgerald?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, what we have talked about before, that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledgeability

of this particular operation because of its sensitivity.

Mr. Johnston. And that is the reason that this instruction was given about the file, this particular file or this particular document?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I can't see at this time that anything else would have been thought of at that time.

Mr. Johnston. What suddenly required that order to be given?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, nothing specific except that by December of '63, the man with whom we were dealing, AMLASH I, was going back, or was probably back by that time already in Cuba. It was primarily probably I would say as much to protect his security as anything else.

Mr. Johnston. So that nobody else -- did this have the effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operation from other people within the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably from my office down. Certainly not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed to know about the operation, absolutely not. This was just circulation within other components of SAS. That would not -- in other words, a note of this type would only mean that I would be, or whoever would clear the order would be asked before this file was allowed to circulate or was given to anybody.

Mr. Johnston. And I don't want to indicate -- my question

does not imply intent or anyone's purpose, but would this notation have blocked anyone but Mr. Helms or Mr. Fitzgerald from getting access to this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. This is too informal. If you want to block a file like this, there is a much more formal procedure to go by, to block the file for, say, the Director's use only, or even at that time, the Chief of SAS. A note like this is strictly, can only be interpreted to restrict the circulation of this file for the other people in SAS below my office, not restricting it for anybody else.

Mr. Johnston. Upwards.

What about laterally? What about to the other divisions?

AMLASH Case Officer. Laterally also. In other words, they would have to be checked out. It would have to be. We would have to know who got the file. It is a matter of control. This is what it amounts to, really. It is to know who the file goes to. It is to control the file.

Mr. Johnston. But you do that anyway, right?

That's routine procedure. This seems to be something more than that, of saying don't let this leave without my approval.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it isn't anything more than that, and I think that you're really much more into it than what it is.

I don't even recall giving -- telling the secretary this particular thing. It probably came about from the miminized

circulation order that Fitzgerald had given way before in October, as I recall.

Mr. Johnston. Did you expect this instruction to be carried out, that the file would not leave the office until you had given your personal approval or Fitzgerald had approved it?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I would have thought that my secretary would not have permitted this file to leave unless cleared.

Mr. Johnston. We previously discussed whether Mr. King knew about the operation.

Did he specifically know, to your knowledge, about the AMLASH operation in the fall of 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I never briefed him personally.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have any reason to know that he did know about AMLASH operation?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Our notes indicate that on February 4th, 1964, Mr. King sent a memo to you, requirements for AMLASH, and I'll show you our notes. They basically detail questions, intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically remember receiving this, but if we have -- certainly the fact that we have an asset who can surface any intelligence requirements from the community or anybody else in the Agency, it would be perfectly

normal for anybody to send these requirements.

Mr. Johnston. Would you agree, at least from that summary of the document, that really he's asking you to get intelligence type information from AMLASH?

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And given the October 5th, 1963 meeting when AMLASH sort of indicated he didn't want anything to do with that, this would be very inconsistent for someone who was knowledable about AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?

Mr. Johnston. October 5th, 1963, is when AMLASH complained about the low level espionage requirements.

AMLASH Case Officer. He did not want -- he did not say that he would not surface intelligence requirements. He did not want to exclusively be that type of an asset.

So therefore it would be perfectly normal, regardless of what he thought himself to be, or what even we may have thought for him to be, that if he had access to information, we were going to levy the requirements on him.

Mr. Johnston. My direct question is, then, having read the summary apparently prepared by Mr. King, and sent on February 2nd, 1964, do you think that Mr. King knew about the AMLASH operation, the events of October and November?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he sent us a memo giving us

requirements for AMLASH, at a minimum he had to know that we had an agent with this particular access. But he knew about the operation?" Not necessarily so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you find this consistent with the nature of the operation as of November 22nd, 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. Explain that. I don't understand. What are you -- what is your question?

Mr. Johnston. As of November 22nd, 1963, you were now involved in coup plotting with AMLASH, and were delivering or planned to deliver the equipment, rifles, sights, explosives, to assist him in that coup. It seems inconsistent, suddenly in February, to go back to trying to get espionage information from him.

AMLASH Case Officer. First of all, I have to address that question from this point. Receiving a memo from King at that time doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to levy the requirements on AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. Oh, I agree with that.

AMLASH Case Officer. So, to clarify the other part of your question, that if we needed intelligence after the October '63 meeting in which he said I'm not going to be strictly a source for intelligence, I want to do something more for my country, it would not be in any way out of the orderinary to ask him to send information that we felt was required on the outside.

Mr. Johnston. So you are saying you would not infer from this document a conclusion one way or the other about whether Mr. King knew the details of the AMLASH coup plotting.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. As a final matter from my point, as we did in your past meetings, could you briefly summarize, were you contacted prior to today's session at the Agency, and did you discuss your testimony or the ramifications of your testimony with anyone at the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was called yesterday morning, February 10th, by Mr. Walter Elder, and informed that I was to come here at 10:00 o'clock to discuss the AMLASH operation, and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those portions of the file that you wished to discuss.

I picked up the files from the review staff last night and came here this morning.

Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss the substance or proposed substance of your testimony with anyone?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I read the file and informed myself as to those points that you wanted to talk about.

Mr. Johnston. That's all the questions we have.

I want to thank you very much for spending the time with us today.

Is there any other comment you would like to make?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all.

You're quite welcome.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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Exhibit #1

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *