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CASTRO, FIDEL

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Vol. 3 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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The United States Senate *R866*

transcript file

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:

ON *3/1/77*

BY *EL*

Hearing held before

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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STAFF INTERVIEW:

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m.
in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional
Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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2 Mr. Baron. Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here
3 testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not actually
4 your true identity?

5 Mr. Halley. That is correct.

6 Mr. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with the
7 review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the
8 Committee if that becomes necessary?

9 Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

10 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a piece of paper marked
11 "Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you
12 whether this is the statement you signed as we were beginning
13 here today which indicates your true identity and which I have
14 witnessed?

15 Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I
16 signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled
17 in the Senator's name.

18 Mr. Baron. All right.

19 For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into
20 the record as is, as Exhibit 1.

21 (The document referred to
22 was marked Halley Exhibit
23 No. 1 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we
2 have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby
3 the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit
4 and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two references
5 to your true identity which will only be available at this
6 Agency.

7 Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

8 Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel
9 before the Committee?

10 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

11 Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today
12 without counsel?

13 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

14 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are
15 entitled to cease answering any questions and consult with
16 counsel if you wish?

17 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that.

18 Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your Constitu-
19 tional rights are intact before the Committee here today,
20 including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?

21 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

22 Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the
23 arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this
24 is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are
25 testifying here today without placing you under oath because

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1 there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and
2 I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if
3 your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some
4 point as soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's
5 session.

6 Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made
7 is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior
8 to this conversation going on the record.

9 Mr. Baron. Thank you.

10 Let us begin then with some very broad questions
11 about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you
12 were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with the
13 JMWAVE station?

14 Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in
15 approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Head-
16 quarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the
17 Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those
18 duties to conduct a survey of the opportunities for running
19 intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those
20 duties; I did engage in a survey of the possibilities for running
21 intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations
22 against Cuba.

23 Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence
24 for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was
25 your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs,

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1 is that correct?

2 Mr. Halley. That is correct.

3 I want to qualify that. Undoubtedly, there were some
4 actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area
5 that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs
6 operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until
7 approximately February of 1962.

8 Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?

9 Mr. Halley. I joined the Agency originally in 1951.

10 Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the
11 nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of '62?

12 Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was
13 an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency
14 training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities
15 where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.

16 I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany. In the
17 course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the
18 Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
19 Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in
20 Soviet operations and East German operations.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American
22 affairs prior to February of '62?

23 Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I was responsible
24 for setting up operational activity in Latin America that
25 was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites.

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1 to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of time
2 where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their
3 presence in Latin America. In my duties in the Eastern European
4 Division, I was responsible for getting this program going in
5 Latin America, so I did have an extensive exposure to Latin
6 America in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.

7 The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official
8 travel records, and so on.

9 Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually
10 in Latin America helping to set up this program?

11 Mr. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I
12 travelled to Latin America during this particular period of
13 time.

14 Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the
15 course of that operation?

16 Mr. Halley. Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba
17 on air stops being routed to various countries. I think I was
18 at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.

19 Mr. Baron. Not long enough even to talk to the people at
20 the Station in Cuba?

21 Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the
22 Havana Station.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time,
24 a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments
25 toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that

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1 attitude, if you did?

2 Mr. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad
3 political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was
4 much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European
5 targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly
6 specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture.

7 Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of
8 the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?

9 Mr. Halley. No, it was not.

10 Mr. Baron. Coming then to February of '62, is that the
11 point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?

12 Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey,
13 it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment,
14 to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that
15 particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task
16 Force that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of
17 Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular
18 point in time.

19 Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?

20 Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey.
21 These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into
22 a permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates
23 from my service records, but after having completed the survey
24 report, shortly thereafter I was asked to go to Miami to become
25 permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall

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1 the exact date at which that permanent change of station took
2 place.

3 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before
4 the end of May of '62?

5 Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I
6 say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look
7 at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it
8 could have been March, it could have been April. But I reserve,
9 you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical
10 point in terms of what you are trying to establish.

11 Mr. Baron. Certainly.

12 I should say generally at this point, if anything we cover
13 today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely
14 helpful to us if you would check your answers against documents
15 that might be available in the CIA.

16 Mr. Halley. Yes, all right.

17 Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that
18 one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you
19 joined the JMWAVE station.

20 During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while
21 you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other
22 than William Harvey?

23 Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on
24 behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While
25 I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed

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1 matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in
2 charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was
3 essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox, who has since died.

4 Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?

5 Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would
6 be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.

7 Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when
8 you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the
9 JMWAVE Station?

10 Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that
11 unit until such time as I replaced him.

12 Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you
13 were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called
14 Special Group in the White House which was part of the National
15 Security Council structure and used the project name: MONGOOSE
16 for anti-Cuban operations?

17 Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted
18 this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence
19 which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a
20 survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against
21 Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General
22 Lansdale and Mr. Helms.

23 This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical
24 purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey.
25 I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you

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1 used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not
2 know the exact words you used. I am not familiar with that
3 terminology.

4 Mr. Baron. During the whole period of your involvement
5 with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as
6 such?

7 Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not
8 recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in
9 common usage in my conversations.

10 Also, you have to understand that during that particular
11 time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of
12 command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will.
13 There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting
14 regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he
15 was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.

16 Mr. Baron. You began your survey just about the time that
17 Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?

18 Mr. Halley. That is right.

19 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship
20 between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William
21 Harvey as head of Task Force W? Did that group task Harvey
22 directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms
23 and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include
24 the DCI?

25 Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were

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1 really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this
2 three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of
3 that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back
4 from one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey,
5 it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two
6 channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task
7 force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr.
8 Helms who was the DDP.

9 Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assign-
10 ment or order from Richard Helms was an order to be taken at
11 face value? Harvey did not have to question whether it had the
12 stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been
13 your operating understanding?

14 Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes.
15 Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid
16 Agency instruction.

17 Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.

18 Mr. Halley. That is correct.

19 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship
20 between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?

21 Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to
22 Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational
23 plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone
24 to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the
25 presentation was being made.

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1 Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which
2 the presentation was made.

3 Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and
4 other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular
5 meeting.

6 Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special
7 Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?

8 Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is
9 1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was
10 a meeting of the Cabinet or whether it was a meeting of the
11 National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the
12 Special Group.

13 Mr. Baron. That is perfectly understandable. Do you recall
14 which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?

15 Mr. Halley. Yes. My recollection of that was that Mr.
16 McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the
17 Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now
18 at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in
19 my memory as being present.

20 Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?

21 Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a
22 portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave
23 the other portion of the presentation.

24 Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as
25 Chief of Task Force W?

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1 Mr. Halley. Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs
2 of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald,
3 then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those
4 This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot
5 outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald
6 took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over
7 and so forth. This is something that I would have to research
8 to give you the precise dates.

9 Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that
10 they had in which the President was present?

11 Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that
12 were being conducted against Cuba.

13 Mr. Baron. Was there any mention of any assassination
14 effort at that meeting?

15 Mr. Halley. No, there was not.

16 Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection
17 with the survey you conducted?

18 Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the
19 Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the
20 issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed,
21 substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the
22 Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked
23 me if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this
24 three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not
25 know the relationship, but that there were meetings that were

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1 attended by me in which Mr. McCone was talking to individuals
2 like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that
3 group.

4 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone
5 by any particular name or designation?

6 Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

7 Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the term Special
8 Group?

9 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of the term Special Group.
10 I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special
11 Group, 40 Committee and so forth, but as I mentioned to you
12 earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between
13 whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group
14 meeting, or what it was.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man
16 group that you referred to, including the Attorney General,
17 General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship
18 to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-
19 man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special
20 Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from
21 the National Security Council structure.

22 Mr. Halley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative
23 answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told
24 you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the
25 chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man

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I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you even

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1 have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts
2 of material for you. I feel that you would just have to get
3 those dates for the record.

4 Mr. Baron. We can do that.

5 Would you say that every major operation that you undertook
6 at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at
7 least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any
8 major operation that you were planning?

9 Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider
10 to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a
11 problem? If you feel that you cannot do that.

12 Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could
13 you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you
14 would refer to this three-man group initially, ^{to} in the Special
15 Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on
16 notice, the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed
17 unilaterally?

18 Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized
19 with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be
20 done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed
21 upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man
22 group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things
23 and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is,
24 the Special Group. As procedures became more formalized, we
25 had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that

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1 would be conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary fields.

2 In other words, if we were going to run an operation that
3 was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mainland, that
4 had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that October
5 schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so
6 they could make it available to the Special Group sometime in
7 September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of
8 operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up
9 from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance,
10 resupply missions, paramilitary operations against fixed instal-
11 lations would all be approved.

12 Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the
13 assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government
14 leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been
15 referred to either the three-man group or later the Special
16 Group.

17 Mr. Halley. If such an operation had been proposed from
18 Miami, it would have had to have gone through that particular
19 process.

20 Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only
21 operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be
22 referred up for approval. Is that correct?

23 Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have
24 firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, I told
25 you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 through

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1 either June or July of '65. That was my stewardship. That was
2 my involvement in the Cuban operation.

3 During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge
4 of these events would be, if that kind of operation were to go
5 forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism,
6 it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it
7 were something that certainly would -- for some reason might not
8 be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it
9 orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me
10 to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or
11 later, when the Task Force became reintegrated into the Western
12 Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of
13 the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was FitzGerald.

14 Mr. Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above
15 the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily
16 have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that
17 correct?

18 Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, there-
19 fore I am trying to restrict myself to those things that I have
20 personal knowledge of. In other words, that is the kind of
21 thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those who were
22 involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey
23 or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you a better
24 perception of that.

25 I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami,

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1 I was a regular visitor to Washington, but always for one or
2 two days at a time when there was always a full agenda of events
3 to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not
4 carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with
5 my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand
6 situation of how they conducted business on a sustained basis
7 on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.

8 Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any
9 operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could be construed
10 as an assassination effort?

11 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

12 Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation
13 run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could be construed
14 as an assassination effort?

15 Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge.
16 You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In
17 other words, from what I have read in the Press since then,
18 obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking
19 me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand
20 knowledge at that particular time?

21 Mr. Baron. Exactly.

22 Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not.

23 You also have to put yourself in the historical context of
24 that particular time. Thousands of refugees were coming out of
25 Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the Florida

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1 Keys. There was a regular mechanism to screen these people.
2 Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the
3 situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation
4 in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba.
5 This was something that was talked about, you could go down to
6 any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking
7 that kind of language.

8 So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the
9 word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we
10 are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned opera-
11 tion by CIA.

12 Mr. Baron. Or with CIA involvement of any sort?

13 Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that
14 was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole
15 purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C. This was
16 the ^{ambiente} ~~allente~~ of the time. People were talking about these
17 things in the refugee community, these kind of things were
18 being discussed.

19 Mr. Baron. Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro,
20 Raul Castro?

21 Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood
22 of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is
23 a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with
24 conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup,
25 one of the things that people talk about is how do you control

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1 the leadership which then exists at that time.

2 Mr. Baron. Are you saying that you are not aware of any
3 operation which could have had as one of its subsidiary objec-
4 tives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination
5 of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with
6 CIA involvement?

7 Mr. Halley. I would like to phrase that question slightly
8 differently, because I think, you know, you have several things
9 tied together. I would like to answer your question this way.

10 During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals
11 to mount an assassination operation. In other words, there
12 was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals
13 along this line.

14 Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being
15 put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that
16 particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.

17 Mr. Baron. What kind of problem did you have with the
18 question as it was asked?

19 Mr. Halley. Well, you lumped a number of things together.
20 I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in
21 there a secondary or tertiary consideration.

22 Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that.

23 Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not
24 put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be
25 held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a

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1 paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the
2 collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might be to
3 organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had
4 their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know,
5 never discussed with us, through the communications channels
6 that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and
7 may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.

8 I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that
9 existed that I could exercise through the Station over such a
10 situation that I could be held responsible for that. Therefore,
11 I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary
12 situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have
13 some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by
14 some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have
15 to look at that at the time.

16 Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying
17 to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important
18 to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you,
19 which I am not trying to do by my questioning --

20 Mr. Halley. That is a complicated question.

21 Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the
22 attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness
23 that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassina-
24 tion as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to
25 any extent. That is what I am asking you for.

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1 Mr. Halley. Right, and I will stand by my answer; that is,
2 I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know,
3 during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of
4 the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify
5 this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics.
6 If you are prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal
7 with those within the framework of that general statement that
8 I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors
9 that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be
10 identified with any action conducted by some group over which
11 I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.

12 Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will
13 cover some specifics later.

14 One more question on this dual chain of command: on the
15 one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey
16 to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision
17 making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and
18 Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man
19 group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making
20 before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made
21 in a less formal way than they were later under the Special
22 Group?

23 Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that.
24 In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man
25 group. In other words --

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1 Mr. Baron. What about the kind of reporting that was
2 required of you by the three-man group as opposed to the Special
3 Group?

4 Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmed
5 in the early days from Harvey. If there were any special
6 requirements, he was taking them from the three-man group and
7 translating them and, in fact, much of the system of reporting
8 in those early days was generated by me and what I thought
9 was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commander
10 fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the
11 record that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore
12 I was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and thought
13 I had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informational
14 sense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of the
15 reporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit to
16 Headquarters.

17 Mr. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?

18 Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.

19 Mr. Baron. In Berlin?

20 Mr. Halley. Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and successful tunnel
22 operation?

23 Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel
24 operation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that very
25 tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on, I

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1 was involved primarily with Eastern European activities.

2 Mr. Baron. You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of
3 operating?

4 Mr. Halley. Yes. I worked with him -- I think the date is
5 somewhere in June or July of '54 to somewhere in '59. I would
6 have to look that up in the record, the exact date.

7 Mr. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working
8 relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal
9 friend of his?

10 Mr. Halley. Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend
11 of Mr. Harvey.

12 Mr. Baron. Returning to your statements about the chain
13 of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the
14 funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were
15 concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source
16 may have been originally, is that correct?

17 Mr. Halley. Correct.

18 I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was
19 concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three-
20 man group. I would see Lansdale -- as I told you, Lansdale came
21 down to visit me in Miami on one occasion. He came as part of
22 that three-man group. But my chain of command, during my
23 visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale was down there,
24 I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans,
25 programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions

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1 the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force
2 Commander, Mr. Harvey.

3 Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a
4 body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various
5 mutations.

6 Mr. Baron. Would you say that the three-man group had a
7 less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making, and
8 there was a real change in the rigor with which you were required
9 to report after the Special Group took over?

10 Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting
11 became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I
12 cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man
13 group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent
14 with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from
15 a body of experience that was gained as the operation was
16 established and got some experience.

17 So I would not want to characterize that as being a result
18 of the groups.

19 Mr. Baron. You did not have any problem with the propriety
20 of the three-man group in the early stages?

21 Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was
22 not a duly constituted body. In other words, the officers that
23 I reported to, in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms,
24 were my chain of command at that particular point, were the
25 ones who briefed me on the existence of this three-man body

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1 and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of
2 that body.

3 Mr. Baron. Who briefed you on the existence of the body?

4 Mr. Halley. My recollection of the initial briefing was
5 from Mr. Harvey.

6 Mr. Baron. Do you recall how he described that three-man
7 group and the responsibilities?

8 Mr. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As
9 you know from my records, these intervening years have been
10 very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision
11 that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first
12 briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from
13 Harvey.

14 Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might
15 occasionally meet with you personally. This is in Miami, at
16 JMWAVE Station?

17 Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific
18 meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.

19 Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?

20 Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on
21 their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelli-
22 gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether
23 it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him.
24 personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making
25 progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having

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1 problems, and so on. It was a substantive management operation,
2 problem-oriented type of conversation.

3 Mr. Baronv. What period of time would you place this in?

4 Mr. Halley. Probably sometime in the summer of '62,
5 because my family was already in Miami at that point, and when
6 I first went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my
7 wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know,
8 I would have to research that. It is obviously available from
9 the records as to when my family moved and a permanent change
10 of station.

11 Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion whether direct or
12 indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings
13 with General Lansdale?

14 Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You
15 know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little
16 bit on this perspective. I would like to try to focus on the
17 perspective for you in the historical setting.

18 Mr. Baron. Please do.

19 Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest,
20 you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let
21 me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at
22 the time which may help you understand my answers.

23 Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment?
24 I would like to get back on the track that we originally
25 started on of asking you about the JMWAVE Station in general

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1 and the context at that time. Could I ask just a couple of
2 specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group
3 that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to pull *pt*
4 out of what we have said so far and everything that will follow
5 into context.

6 Did you have any individual meetings with Robert Kennedy,
7 who was then-Attorney General?

8 Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on one?

9 Are you saying did I have a meeting,--a personal, private
10 meeting with the Attorney General?

11 Mr. Baron. Yes.

12 Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.

13 Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with the Attorney
14 General of any sort during this period of time?

15 Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting
16 that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr.
17 Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He
18 did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the
19 questions were at this particular point in time. I answered
20 some of those questions that were put during the course of that
21 particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time,
22 that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that
23 I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.

24 Mr. Baron. During the entire period that you were
25 involved with JMWAVE?

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1 Mr. Halley. That is right.

2 Mr. Baron. At that meeting -- again, I realize what we
3 are doing is an isolation, out of context -- at that meeting that
4 you attended, with the Cabinet members and the President, was
5 there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means
6 of any circumlocutions of the subject of assassination?

7 Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.

8 You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it
9 en masse, the first -- you know, Director McCone, myself,
10 Bruce ^{Ch}ever, several other people who went. We went in
11 several cars. We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the
12 first item on the agenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban
13 thing was over after this period of time. We, the technocrats
14 left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my
15 presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about
16 assassinations.

17 Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself
18 and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?

19 Mr. Halley. I never recall discussing assassinations with
20 John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms,
21 these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and
22 problems like that would be discussed, and I am sure somewhere
23 in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the
24 subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up. This was part
25 of the life of that particular period.

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1 I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at
2 which that was discussed, and you know I never received any
3 instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.

4 Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these
5 kinds of conversations out of their historical context. Before
6 we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection
7 of the manner in which assassination might have come up between
8 yourself and Helms?

9 Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of
10 the times. We were running Foreign Intelligence collection
11 operations against Cuba with classical agent means. We were running
12 collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were
13 involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as
14 commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.

15 We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing
16 refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination,
17 the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint --

18 Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to
19 be used or people to be involved?

20 Mr. Halley. No. Even such things as discussions of
21 various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably
22 know from this experience, every individual who deals with
23 weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If
24 you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I
25 am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.

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1 Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our
2 paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed
3 in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, weight
4 of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were
5 quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is
6 the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular
7 range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon
8 for close combat?

9 Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life,
10 of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get
11 across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than
12 that.

13 Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and
14 extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassina-
15 tion would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons
16 that would be used for commando raids or equipping your
17 operatives.

18 Mr. Halley. Paramilitary teams, right.

19 Mr. Baron. Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as
20 an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?

21 In other words, was that phrase used positively?

22 Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing
23 that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.

24 For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against
25 something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are

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1 you going to get across the guard force that is around a
2 refinery? One of the questions you have, of course, is if you
3 bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any
4 kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are
5 implanting your target and the guard stumbles on you, you know,
6 the guard force then becomes an immediate risk to your operation
7 and usually there is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a
8 question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to
9 give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of
10 noise. Therefore, if you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic
11 rate of fire and one made less rate of noise than the other
12 for that job you would pick the weapon with the lowest noise.
13 You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine
14 gun out of it.

15 These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions
16 of weapons.

17 Mr. Baron. The technology of assassination and targetted
18 shooting, are you referring to -- when you say assassination
19 weapon -- to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?

20 Mr. Malley. In this particular context, I think most
21 people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for
22 discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be
23 done from a long range.

24 You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis
25 that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their lives

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1 can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not
2 that kind of a person. That was not his psychological make-up.
3 He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his
4 accomplishment. Therefore, while they were brave and dedicated,
5 they were the kind of people who would probably engage in
6 something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon
7 as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.

8 Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you
9 know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range
10 of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman. Therefore, that is
11 the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of
12 weapons.

13 Mr. Baron. When you were discussing weapons with high
14 range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the
15 context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as
16 opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.

17 Mr. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in
18 which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.

19 Mr. Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all
20 into historical context. I am going to ask you if you can
21 explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both
22 the channels upward from you to the Agency and the Special
23 Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives,
24 if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to
25 make some comments about the historical context, that would be

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1 appreciated.

2 Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to
3 put this into some perspective.

4 The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay
5 of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the
6 Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem
7 of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy
8 Administration created this three-man task force or this three-
9 man group and wanted to see what else could be done against
10 Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of
11 '62.

12 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that
13 you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell
14 Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the
15 Bay of Pigs operation?

16 Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that
17 inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know,
18 because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once
19 I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical
20 documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report,
21 and so forth, but I have never read it.

22 All right.

23 Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this
24 was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what
25 kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by

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1 collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based
2 on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other
3 words, the difference here was that people thought that the Bay
4 of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence.
5 Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of
6 intelligence to see what could be done.

7 In order to collect intelligence at that particular time,
8 it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used,
9 so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations,
10 counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and
11 the use of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuba to collect
12 intelligence on that part of the island that could not be
13 covered by what you would call the more classical means of
14 foreign intelligence collection.

15 As the program was started essentially by me or accelerated
16 by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis --
17 that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and
18 our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in
19 Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the
20 Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the
21 actions which they did, that is, to verify this.

22 There was a great problem for a while when we were all
23 talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennedy,
24 was telling us, give us hard intelligence. We thought we were
25 giving him hard intelligence. What he meant, in his definition

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1 of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-2
2 photograph. He never articulated that to us in those terms.
3 Then we got caught up into the eyeball to eyeball confron-
4 tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we
5 got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement
6 of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime
7 into early '63.

8 Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot
9 more about them than we had when we started in February of '62,
10 to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at
11 that point that no external invasion was going to be possible,
12 because that was something that was excluded by the Khrushchev-
13 Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event,
14 therefore it was a question of what could be done. So we were
15 collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the
16 situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the
17 military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force
18 that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment
19 that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see
20 whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought
21 on Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating
22 an environment in which a resistance could be created on an
23 island.

24 Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at
25 that point when Castro had consolidated his strength and

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1 when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no
2 external invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn
3 primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group
4 within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro,
5 number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining
6 the economic strength of the Castro government.

7 Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support
8 certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there
9 that were not in the Army.

10 Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements were those?

11 Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that were in
12 Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people
13 who were already in the bush who we had already established
14 contact with or they had established contact with us, and we
15 were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they
16 could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that
17 particular time.

18 That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of
19 '65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation. In
20 effect, one, a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its
21 post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of
22 intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with
23 military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with
24 natural dissident elements that were still on the island.

25 I think you know that all of your questions have to be put

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1 into these various timeframes. When you talk about, was there
2 ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people
3 were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee
4 would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know,
5 X, Y or Z. It might have been some commandante in his particu-
6 lar area; it could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part
7 of the fabric of the times.

8 Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE
9 Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station?
10 What was the command structure within the Station?

11 Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever
12 timeframe it was, somewhere after the survey was completed. It
13 must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You
14 know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably
15 somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August
16 of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest -- my
17 recollection was that it was the second largest station in
18 existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on
19 a particular number of people on any particular day.

20 Mr. Baron. Could you give some idea as to the number of
21 employees at the Station during its peak?

22 Mr. Halley. I would say somewhere in the neighborhood of,
23 you know, **three hundred.** You know, again, this means staff and
24 contract employees. 21

25 Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract

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1 employees?

2 Mr. Halley. These would be, for instance, maritime case
3 officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that is,
4 that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they
5 were not longterm staff employees. These would be people who
6 would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic
7 implementation of the program.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or operatives among
9 the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were
10 affiliated with the Station although not employed by it
11 directly?

12 Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some
13 terms.

14 Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply get a
15 picture of the scope of the Station's strength and its
16 activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for
17 its activities.

18 Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because
19 I think we are going to get into a semantic problem here.

20 When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that
21 is roughly in the neighborhood of **three hundred** people, and that 21
22 was those people who would be involved in the management
23 effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover
24 procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing
25 out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is,

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1 people who were not knowledgeable necessarily of whom they
2 worked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth.
3 Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might have
4 had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred
5 people involved in maritime activities, you know?

6 Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it.
7 The records are still available and you know how many people
8 we had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talking
9 about? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captains
10 of the vessels that were used in infiltration operations to
11 put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of
12 techniques. In other words, you might start on with the mother
13 ship, which would be an LCI -- I am not sure how familiar you
14 are with various kinds of vessels.

15 Mr. Baron. What is an LCI?

16 Mr. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessel, or a patrol
17 craft, a PC, 110-foot vessel, that would be a mother ship.
18 This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies and
19 water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it.
20 So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing a
21 smaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down to
22 fifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boat
23 over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less
24 likely to be picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that
25 would take the team in close to the shore where we might finally

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1 put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use
2 a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.

3 Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts
4 would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly?
5 They might be agents, even non-paid agents?

6 Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they
7 might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I
8 am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC
9 Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of
10 the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran
11 maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it
12 could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-
13 five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them
14 was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I
15 would have to go and look at each vessel.

16 Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?

17 Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in
18 existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries
19 or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with
20 personnel or with equipment?

21 Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies,
22 they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between
23 companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed
24 to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms
25 mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's

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1 involvement in each is different. I am having a little
2 trouble --

3 Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of
4 companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about
5 how many of each there might have been?

6 Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are
7 talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that
8 period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company
9 set up and registered and run out of some attorney's
10 office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of
11 the small boat.

12 Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a
13 Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if
14 I had access to the files to answer your question, it would
15 take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer.
16 I don't think there is an overview statement.

17 Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had coopera-
18 tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private
19 enterprise in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?

20 Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had
21 extensive cooperation -- I do not like your word "grand" -- that
22 we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in
23 Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of
24 this clandestine mission.

25 Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from

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1 civic officials and law enforcement agencies in being allowed
2 to operate free or the law? For instance, were you allowed to
3 put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered,
4 or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard
5 or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send
6 people through the streets of Southern Florida who may have
7 been armed or violating local law in some other way, who were
8 held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement
9 agencies?

10 Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three
11 questions.

12 Mr. Baron. Right.

13 Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each
14 question separately.

15 Let me first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we
16 had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts
17 insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any
18 vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate
19 safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any
20 vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into
21 the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty
22 foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things
23 like that. These boats were owned in either a corporate name
24 or by a private individual who had to register them with the
25 Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations.

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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that, you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.

Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern Florida immune from search or arrest by local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. They were not immune.

Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the weapons were taken away from them.

So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida,

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1 we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want
2 you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and
3 you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we
4 operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under
5 our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct.
6 This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their
7 weapons when they came back, we took them before they landed,
8 so they were not immune.

9 Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements
10 with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the
11 treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE
12 Station?

13 Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security,
14 a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies
15 in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them
16 and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired.
17 Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be
18 looked at on a case by case basis.

19 For instance, you know, we had a training site in north
20 Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that
21 was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English,
22 the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this
23 with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest
24 to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular
25 case.

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1 Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships
2 between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives
3 or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would
4 it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station
5 ultimately were channeled out through you?

6 Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you
7 know this Station went through several mutations in organization
8 during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that
9 existed for the longest period of time was something like I am
10 going to describe to you.

11 There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a
12 Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman
13 who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of
14 Moore, Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and
15 he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also
16 retired, a Mr. Corris.

17 Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of
18 branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines.
19 Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence
20 Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be
21 classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to
22 recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with,
23 you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in
24 Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might
25 live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker or

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1 butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could
2 communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.

3 Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the
4 group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that
5 ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or
6 established contact with resistance groups. This was a group
7 that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people,
8 either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being
9 run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.

10 All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who
11 dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio
12 activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a
13 whole panoply of -- then there was Maritime, in terms of
14 finance, and so on. Security was a branch. Obviously, under
15 that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of
16 a corporation or a Station Chief, can see every single piece of
17 paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a review
18 procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual
19 operational reviews were conducted.

20 Mr. Baron. By yourself?

21 Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with
22 the impression that I knew every single thing that was going
23 on every minute and could account for the activities of three
24 hundred employees on a daily basis.

25 Mr. Baron. In talking about the personnel affiliated

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1 with the Station a moment ago, I think we may have created a
2 misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations
3 were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true
4 that there were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida
5 who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored
6 operations?

7 Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up
8 for me. I am not sure what you really mean.

9 If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections,
10 you know, the people who were producing --

11 Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary
12 operations.

13 Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were
14 involved in paramilitary operations that were not in some way
15 paid.

16 Mr. Baron. By the Agency?

17 Mr. Halley. By the Agency.

18 Let me make sure that we understand each other, because
19 during this period of time there were a lot of independent
20 Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the
21 Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period
22 in time when these groups could not run their operations from
23 Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs,
24 Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on
25 it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard

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1 so that they could keep them from going.

2 If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 66
3 or Commando L or somebody like that, they were not a part of
4 the CIA apparatus.

5 Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?

6 Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities,
7 certainly.

8 Mr. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add
9 to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from
10 yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the
11 Directorate of Plans within the Agency?

12 You would report directly to William Harvey?

13 Mr. Halley. William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W,
14 later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from me to them.
15 You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor
16 the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you
17 know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent
18 on what I told them. To have an appreciation of what was going
19 on in Miami they had their own staff that was following
20 individual operations.

21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would
22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and might
23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this
24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the
25 weather during this particular month of October. We do not

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1 think they could do it. We think they should be guided to run
2 only twenty, fifteen, something like that. So they were not
3 totally dependent on me.

4 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the split of responsi-
5 bility between Task Force W and JMWAVE Station?

6 In other words, were there certain operations that were
7 run directly out of Task Force W?

8 Mr. Halley. Also, you have to put this into a historical
9 time. What period are you talking about?

10 Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there
11 were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not
12 explain those?

13 Mr. Halley. There were. Each one is different. Let me
14 give you a couple of examples.

15 Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run any
16 any paramilitary operations where they took command and control
17 for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in
18 Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be picked
19 up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would
20 task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area
21 in Cuba, for instance, Oriente province. We would know simply
22 that it was a radio perhaps. We would then put it into
23 Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord.
24 They would communicate to the agents in Cuba who would go
25 recover the cache.

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1 So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign
2 intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were
3 reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They did
4 work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a
5 couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with
6 Arttime. I had no contact with the Arttime group as a general
7 rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not
8 have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of
9 larger exile groups.

10 The Task Force also specialized in much more economic
11 activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such
12 things as England bus exports from Great Britain to Cuba. 13, 13

13 Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an
14 assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would
15 you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have
16 been aware of such an operation?

17 Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.

18 Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial
19 practice to let you know that there was an operation that might
20 have been run through Florida into Cuba?

21 Mr. Halley. No.

22 You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism.
23 You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you
24 are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with
25 the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time I

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1 was not -- Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me
2 to review the activities of the station, and while there would
3 go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was
4 meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to
5 me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting
6 them or what he was doing with them.

7 Mr. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent
8 than that.

9 Was it strictly one of involving what correct management
10 techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of
11 Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective
12 job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations
13 into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be ...
14 necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every
15 other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?

16 Mr. Halley. I think what I am saying during that particu-
17 lar time -- I do not want you to come to the conclusion that
18 I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through
19 the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for
20 instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented
21 gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an
22 operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida
23 and I would not know about it.

24 Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.

25 Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following up on the

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1 nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any
2 operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro.
3 Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge
4 of and that was not affiliated with JMWAVE?

5 Mr. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall
6 anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of
7 command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular
8 basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our
9 paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.

10 We would have operational discussions. He would talk to the
11 Branch Chiefs, he talked to people. He also went out on his
12 own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he
13 was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the
14 Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he
15 was meeting.

16 Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire
17 of him whom he was meeting?

18 Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.

19 Mr. Baron. Did you have suspicions or speculation about
20 whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he
21 was having these meetings?

22 Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There is a whole,
23 you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know,
24 frankly I was a very busy guy; when Harvey was there, it occupied
25 one hunk of a lot of my time. If he wanted to go off, you know,

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1 do something else and was going to meet someone else, that was
2 fine with me. It enabled me to get back to my immediate and
3 more pressing problems.

4 In this business you just do not ask your superior, what
5 are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way
6 the game is played.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you recall a time when Harvey asked you to
8 procure arms and equipment to be passed to a Cuban exile?

9 Mr. Halley. To a Cuban exile?

10 Mr. Baron. Let me strike the reference to a Cuban exile.

11 Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procur-
12 ing arms and equipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona
13 who was a contact of Harvey's?

14 Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period --
15 prior to the Bay of Pigs, he was part of the consejo.

16 Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that
17 up, I think you need some basis, that I think that can trigger
18 my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being
19 in Harvey's --

20 Mr. Baron. In contact with Harvey?

21 Mr. Halley. You know, I may have procured something for
22 Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of operational
23 support task.

24 Mr. Baron. Let us make it more specific.

25 Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of

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1 about \$5,000 worth of arms and equipment to be left in a parking
2 lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's? And this
3 would be in approximately April of 1962.

4 Mr. Halley. I do vaguely remember something about a rented
5 truck. Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details
6 of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know,
7 personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that
8 I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics
9 apparatus, and whatever he had requested from official stocks
10 he was provided.

11 Mr. Baron. During that same period of time --

12 Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do
13 not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this
14 truck incident seems to be -- I do not remember what it was.
15 We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck
16 being involved with some logistic material in terms of a
17 parking lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of it
18 at this particular time.

19 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of
20 poison pills in any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE?

21 Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall -- poison pills? Poison
22 pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when
23 people were talking about being on mother ships, you know, what
24 would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion
25 occasionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to

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1 the people who were manning these vessels so they could do
2 themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that,
3 but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions
4 of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who
5 were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into
6 the bush and so forth who asked for some sort of pills which
7 they could kill themselves with if they were captured.

8 But other than that -- if that is what you were referring
9 to, I think they are called L pills, or something, as they
10 were referred to in those days.

11 Mr. Baron. Why were they called L pills?

12 Mr. Halley. Everything has a number or nomenclature, I
13 do not know.

14 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of poison pills to be used
15 in assassination operations against Fidel Castro or other
16 Cuban leaders?

17 Mr. Halley. No.

18 Is that referencing to this material that I might have
19 provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel
20 that quickly, because I would not have had access to them.

21 Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills?

22 Mr. Halley. No, I would not have access to them.

23 Mr. Baron. Why not?

24 Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory. That is
25 not anything that I have, you know, command and control of. That

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1 is why --

2 Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from
3 Technical Services Division at CIA?

4 Mr. Halley. That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is
5 that you are trying to establish from me.

6 In other words, if you are saying --

7 Mr. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more
8 specific now.

9 We have a document that I am about to show you. I just
10 wanted to clear up the background of it before we discussed
11 the document.

12 Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are
13 talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so
14 if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing
15 to do with that. If you are talking about, you know --

16 Mr. Baron. Arms and equipment --

17 Mr. Halley. -- weapons or something, yes, that was in my
18 inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns,
19 ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had
20 access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really
21 where the thrust of your questioning is.

22 Mr. Baron. There were two prongs to the question, you
23 have picked both of them up. One is whether you had ever heard
24 of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation
25 against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had

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1 not, is that correct?

2 Mr. Halley. That is right. I would not have had access
3 to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if
4 I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corres-
5 ponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if
6 in fact it existed.

7 Mr. Baron. You never had any such correspondence?

8 Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can
o recall.

10 Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and
11 equipment to which you already replied.

12 Have you ever read that Inspector General's Report of
13 1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any
14 assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?

Mr. Halley. No, I have not read the report.

16 Mr. Baron. Before you came here today you were not shown
17 any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at
18 the CIA?

Mr. Halley. The IG Report?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. No, I have not.

22 Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA
today to refresh -- or in preparation for today's session --

Mr. Halley. No.

In preparation for today's session I have had several

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1 conversations with Seymour Boulton --

2 Mr. Baron. Walt Elder?

3 Mr. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know
4 the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for
5 that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke --

6 Mr. Baron. George Clarke?

7 Mr. Halley. Yes.

8 -- I talked to a number of people, I asked to see the
9 newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern
10 activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I
11 have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it,
12 I have not seen an extract of the IG Report.

13 Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to
14 the kinds of things that you could say or not say here today?

15 Mr. Halley. You know, nothing beyond what you and I
16 touched on which you have already put on the record.

17 Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA
18 officers who are still operating under cover?

19 Mr. Halley. Right, or agents who would still be viable
20 that I know of.

21 Mr. Baron. Right.

22 Then let me show you a document which we will mark as
23 Halley Exhibit No. 2.

24 (The document referred
25 to was marked Halley

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Exhibit No. 2 for
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1 Mr. Baron. Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General's
2 Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read
3 the portions that I will bracket which deal with a report of
4 a meeting between yourself and William Harvey involving the
5 supply of arms and equipment.

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this. I may have
8 provided this support. I do not recall sitting in a parking lot
9 observing --

10 Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing the passage
11 that begins, "When the pills were given to Varona through
12 Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the
13 support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request
14 to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of [Mr. Halley], the chief
15 of the JMWAVE Station, procured" --

16 Continuing.--And then it continues to say a large shopping
17 list of arms and equipment, which cost about \$5,000 and were
18 supplied in a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented
19 U-Haul truck.

20 Would the cost of \$5,000 have been an unusual expenditure
21 at that time at JMWAVE Station for arms and equipment?

22 Mr. Halley. No, \$5,000 would not have been an unusual
23 expenditure.

24 Mr. Baron. Not unusual enough, in fact, for you to have
25 a particular memory of the event?

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1 Mr. Halley. No.

2 Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told
3 you earlier before you showed me this document something about
4 a rented truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him
5 some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this
6 specific list of equipment being involved, you know, somewhere
7 you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there
8 are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct
9 or not.

10 Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list is correct,
11 you would say that these couple of passages from the IG Report
12 generally characterize your involvement with Harvey in this
13 one incident correctly?

14 Mr. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you
15 have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph
16 there is a reference to some pills. I had nothing to do with
17 any pills. I have no recollection of any pills.

18 Mr. Baron. Let us jump then to the very last statement and
19 let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge.

20 The report says: "Harvey says that [Halley]" -- here I
21 am using your alias -- "never knew to whom delivery was made nor
22 for what purpose. [Halley] was merely called upon to furnish
23 support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise
24 excluded."

25 Does that generally characterize correctly your point of

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1 involvement with this activity?

2 Mr. Halley. I would say that is correct.

3 I want to go back to these other points, though, because
4 I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the
5 specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall,
6 you know, sitting in a parking lot, surveilling any kind of a
7 vehicle. On the other hand, I do recall having been involved
8 with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck.
9 Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct,
10 I knew nothing about any of this delivery and I was called upon
11 to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which I
12 was otherwise excluded.

13 Mr. Baron. You are not denying, are you, that you may have
14 sat near the parking lot and surveilled the truck until it was
15 picked up?

16 Mr. Halley. I have no recollection --

17 Mr. Baron. One way or the other?

18 Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked
19 car with Harvey surveilling a parking lot is the kind of thing
20 that would have stuck in my mind. I do not recall ever doing
21 that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here
22 and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own
23 memory. It would have been damned unusual for Harvey and I to
24 have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that.

25 I do have a vague recollection of being involved with him

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2 Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of
3 you to supply \$5,000 worth of equipment like explosives,
4 detonators, .30 caliber rifles, .45 caliber handguns, radios
5 and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipment to Harvey
6 or to anyone he designated without asking him what the purpose
7 of the operation was?

15 Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure in a
16 paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have
17 been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates
18 was done in this case?

22 In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan business-
23 man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile
24 group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan
25 businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida

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1 or equipment which I will give you, then maybe under that kind of
2 a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly
3 identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the
4 normal thing to do. I would have to know the sponsorship.

5 Mr. Baron. This request would not have been extraordinary
6 either, to provide "sterile" equipment to a contact of Harvey's?

7 Mr. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to
8 make it seem out of the ordinary.

9 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presence of a CIA officer
10 named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time?

11 Mr. Halley. No.

12 Mr. Baron. Had you been aware of any operational
13 involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in Florida at
14 any time?

15 Mr. Halley. I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen
16 references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and
17 things like that since I have been reading the Press, but I
18 do not know Jim O'Connell. If he walked into this room, I
19 would not recognize him because I do not think I ever met the
20 man. I do not know who he is. I asked several of my colleagues
21 when I first saw his name appear in the Press who it was, and
22 nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to
23 remember ever having seen or met the man.

24 Mr. Baron. Had you heard of the man in connection with
25 operations against Cuba --

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1 Mr. Halley. I had not.

2 Mr. Baron. -- before reading it in the newspapers
3 recently?

4 Mr. Halley. Before reading in the newspapers and I do not
5 know what year I first read this, because somewhere in the back
6 of my mind is a Jack Anderson column --

7 Mr. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.

8 Mr. Halley. -- a couple of years ago in which it was
9 obvious that this was obtained from a military assignee to the
10 Agency named Brad something -- I cannot think of his name
11 right now -- and that he was the source of that information. I
12 think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had
13 appeared several years ago. I frankly do not know who the guy
14 is.

15 Mr. Baron. At any point in your operational relationship
16 with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you
17 suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of
18 Task Force W against Fidel Castro?

19 Mr. Halley. No.

20 Mr. Baron. I would like to run down a list of the names
21 of some people who were involved in one way or the other with
22 an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force
23 W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an
24 assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task
25 Force W beginning -- and out of the CIA -- beginning in October

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1 of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people
2 who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the
3 gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involved
4 the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly
5 for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented.
6 And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed
7 by Harvey during Harvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W.

8 Mr. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I
9 have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment on any
10 of the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect
11 any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because
12 I have no knowledge of it.

13 Mr. Baron. You have already stated that you have no
14 knowledge of any assassination effort involving poison pills?

15 Mr. Halley. Yes.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination schemes
17 which may or may not have been put into effect involving
18 exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving?

19 Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells
20 while Castro was scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being
21 an avid scuba diver is well-known to me. As I recall, somewhere
22 in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group
23 or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused
24 on the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the
25 time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that discussed but

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1 frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your reference to
2 the scuba diving has triggered that response. Nothing about
3 exploding sea shells.

4 Mr. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond
5 FitzGerald mention that subject or hearing that Desmond
6 FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting
7 an exploding sea shell?

8 Mr. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off-
9 beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I
10 don't recall it.

11 I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representing
12 a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory,
13 that does strike a bell with me that some exile group, somebody
14 was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was
15 scuba diving.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of a plan to present Castro
17 with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his health
18 would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced
19 tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?

20 Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach
21 to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro.

22 I do want to come back to this that I do recall something
23 about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidel being
24 vulnerable at the time he was scuba diving, but I do not recall
25 exploding sea shells or bacteria.

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1 Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to the list of name --

2 Mr. Halley. Wait a minute. Just let me make a note to
3 myself.

4 (Pause)

5 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly
6 or indirectly, of any involvement of John Roselli in Cuban
7 operations?

8 Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers --

9 Mr. Baron. Other than what you read recently in the papers
10 did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of
11 Station at JMWAVE of John Roselli's involvement in Cuban
12 operations?

13 Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression from Harvey going
14 off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time
15 I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name
16 of John. Who John was, I had no idea. We were involved in an
17 attempt to try to find two Soviets at one point who were of
18 interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been
19 a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you remember who that was?

21 Mr. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's
22 name. It may come to me. You are asking me things that
23 happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been
24 in a lot of places.

25 Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source

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1 of this lead, I was surprised with the speed with which we got
2 a response back on this man and the details run down that we
3 got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so
4 forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew
5 this fellow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, either
6 Justice or we or somebody had access to somebody who could give
7 us a great deal of insight into people who had been involved
8 with the gambling establishment in Cuba.

9 Those are the only two things that I can say to you that
10 I knew at the time. Obviously I have since read the papers and
11 I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John
12 that I was aware of that Harvey was in touch with must be John
13 Roselli, but I cannot provide to you --

14 Mr. Baron. Would this person with contacts with gambling
15 interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?

16 Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who
17 Santos Trafficante is.

18 Mr. Baron. How do you know this?

19 Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where
20 7th Street is in downtown Miami. Santos Trafficante is a name
21 that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a
22 well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had
24 in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA?

25 Mr. Halley. None that I know of. To the best of my

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1 recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the
2 Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time.

3 I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was
4 in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some
5 Federal agent who was somehow involved with the Mafia and with
6 the Syndicate and there was some linkage in the Press between
7 Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent, but I do not
8 remember the details of it.

9 Mr. Baron. The Federal agent was not a CIA employee?

10 Mr. Halley. No, he was not. My recollection is he was
11 Narcotics or something.

12 Mr. Baron. You would make the same statement about John
13 Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any
14 CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against
15 Castro personally?

16 Mr. Halley. At the time that I was there -- you know, I
17 want to caution you that I have read the Press. If I have
18 trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that --

19 Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly.

20 Mr. Halley. -- that this is a dilemma for me. Obviously
21 I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that
22 Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of
23 20/15 hindsight to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not
24 know that.

25 Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any

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1 knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated
2 with the CIA?

3 Mr. Halley. No.

4 Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I
5 have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations:
6 and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.

7 Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana.

8 Mr. Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that
9 I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about
10 Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him.
11 Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.

12 Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield
13 Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was
14 connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally
15 or against the Castro government?

16 Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me
17 as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of
18 his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a
19 personal sense.

20 Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my
21 staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about
22 the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during
23 the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see
24 him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the
25 performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything

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1 that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.

2 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony
3 from Edwards and from Jim O'Connell who was an officer working
4 in the Office of Security under Edwards that they were involved
5 in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro
6 which was run out of the Office of Security and later transferred
7 to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of
8 any such operation at that time?

9 Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I
10 did not even know Jim O'Connell.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?

12 Mr. Halley. That name is familiar to me. It is a name
13 that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell
14 you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace
15 run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the
16 name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell
17 in my memory.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any
19 direct contact with Juan Orta?

20 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

21 Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of
22 Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?

23 Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar
24 with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number
25 of names -- you asked me to look at that other thing -- a number

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1 of names that do ring bells with me. I really would have to
2 have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This is
3 one that happens to ring a bell with me, but I have no way of
4 linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any
5 way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.

6 Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact
7 of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?

8 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

9 Mr. Baron. He also used the name of Garcia Gomez and
10 the name Godoy?

11 Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me
12 in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?

13 Mr. Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias.

14 In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?

15 Mr. Halley. My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy
16 is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre
17 community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point.
18 I would have to go back.

19 Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected
20 with?

21 Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that
22 obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. You
23 know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what
24 was going on in terms of these various groups and what they
25 had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with

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1 Mr. Baron. Would it surprise you if that were the case?

2 Mr. Halley. The Tony Varona thing would surprise me,
3 frankly. I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.

4 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

5 Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy
6 was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and
7 I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts
8 with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically
9 appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done
10 under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was
11 aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch
12 with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me
13 that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to,
14 I accept that. I am surprised by it.

15 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship
16 to Arttime?

17 Mr. Halley. Well, the Miami Station had no direct relation-
18 ship with him. As to the nature of the project, you know Arttime
19 ran from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with
20 him on a first time basis.

21 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?

22 Mr. Halley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same
23 thing.

24 Mr. Baron. Off the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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Mr. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH case is as follows. At some point in time; I had a conversation with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting the nature of our approach to the military establishment in Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently identified to me the personality he was talking about was AMLASH-1.

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1 My advice to him was that it would probably not be a good
2 idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see
3 coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr.
4 FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of
5 these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was
6 too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong,
7 an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the
8 Agency and the social world in Washington, would be exposed in
9 the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not
10 worth what would be gained from that meeting.

11 Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963?

12 Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.

13 Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had
14 indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation
15 with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met
16 in Spain at some point in time --

17 Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?

18 Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in
19 Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that
20 I read a Press article showing that he had been apprehended
21 and I remember reading the publicity of that particular
22 activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache
23 for him.

24 That is about the sum and substance of it.

25 Mr. Baron. Do you recall what the purpose of that cache

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1 was? Was it a cache of arms?

2 Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could
3 go to the record to establish what was in the cache. I do not
4 recall specifically what the material was that was in the
5 cache.

6 Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these
7 conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first
8 instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1,
9 in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1,
10 do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that
11 AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the U.S.
12 government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on
13 behalf of the CIA?

14 Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.

15 You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from
16 the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to
17 1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with
18 the case. But at the time -- I am trying to be schizophrenic,
19 you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are
20 talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know
21 that.

22 Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr.
23 FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a
24 representation to AMLASH-1 that Robert Kennedy or other high
25 officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?

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Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassination was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond

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1 FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in
2 Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military.
3 In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First,
4 we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could
5 collect intelligence. What were their strengths, weaknesses,
6 what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we
7 wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in
8 other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel
9 consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-
10 movement against Fidel?

11 We were looking for people, once we had identified them,
12 to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders
13 so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward
14 an overthrow of the Castro government. You know, those were
15 the basic steps.

16 Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow
17 Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a group who
18 wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously
19 one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the
20 existing leadership going to be during this event, who has
21 control of the various units. So our discussions were all in
22 that context.

23 Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it
24 surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact
25 with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassination

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1 attempt against Castro.

2 Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the
3 time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the
4 '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the
5 time.

6 Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file.
7 Did you read all of those files?

8 Mr. Halley. No, I did not.

9 Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that
10 was in the AMLASH files?

11 Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes
12 of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases
13 keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry
14 at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or
15 discussing it with my staff and so on.

16 Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of
17 the contact with Arttime?

18 Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Arttime?

19 Mr. Baron. Yes.

20 Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Arttime thing was looked at
21 as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to
22 see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could
23 simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment,
24 some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban
25 solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,

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1 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the
2 effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Arttime
3 indirectly. what they did not want to achieve directly in a
4 fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the
5 assassination of Castro?

6 Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together
7 there and I do not think I can answer the question that way.
8 I would like to separate the question into two parts.

9 Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

10 Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier
11 the CIA did establish a relationship with Arttime and he was
12 given funds and other support to run his approach to solving
13 the Cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were
14 run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is
15 correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no
16 direct attribution in his activities to the United States,
17 because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall
18 it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the
19 Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the
20 whole cover story, if you will, for him.

21 So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel
22 track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in
23 my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination
24 operation, because that was a fantastically large operation
25 involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of

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1 money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set
2 up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train
3 Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an
4 awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up,
5 you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period,
6 and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge
7 of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had
8 occurred.

9 Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was
10 supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating
11 Castro?

12 Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina-
13 ting Castro.

14 Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1
15 was a reliable agent?

16 Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him,
17 you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out
18 of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it
19 to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper
20 articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.

21 Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling
22 Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were
23 connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational
24 purpose including the intelligence gathering?

25 Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that

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1 I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an
2 individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved
3 with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us with
4 leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defect.
5 That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the
6 man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and
7 so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.

8 Mr. Baron. You are not aware of any other use of people
9 with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?

10 Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something
11 specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some other
12 clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply
13 do not recall any other case but that one.

14 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA
15 and Meyer Lansky?

16 Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the
17 CIA and Meyer Lansky.

18 Mr. Baron. Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban
19 operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?

20 Mr. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs
21 Operation. After the Bay of Pigs Operation was over, he did not
22 participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of. You
23 may know something that I do not know, because, you know, you
24 have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am
25 not aware of. You may know something that I do not, but

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1 certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I
2 was in Miami.

3 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive
4 Action?

5 Mr. Halley. Yes.

6 Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you?

7 Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a
8 euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears
9 in the popular jargon.

10 Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?

11 Mr. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been
12 bandied about in the Press that has come about in the Press to
13 be synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.

14 Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in
15 common usage within the Agency?

16 Mr. Halley. No.

17 Mr. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run
18 by William Harvey?

19 Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is.

20 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of --

21 Mr. Halley. I want to make sure here that I am accurate,
22 you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for
23 something.

24 Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.

25 Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen

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Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the development of a capability of carrying on assassination was

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1 run by William Harvey?

2 Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the
3 assassination?

4 Mr. Baron. Yes.

5 Mr. Halley. No. I have no knowledge of Harvey being
6 focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one
7 out.

8 Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell,
9 I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell
10 to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961
11 and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in
12 coordination with an asset in New York named QJWIN and I think
13 that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was
14 involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under-
15 world in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty
16 deeds.

17 Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive
18 Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the
19 incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of
20 incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It
21 was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities
22 that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere
23 from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death.
24 Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.

25 Mr. Baron. Does that ring any bells?

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1 Mr. Halley. No, it does not.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLE
3 Project involving the development of an "Executive Action"
4 capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation
5 against Cuba?

6 Mr. Halley. No, that does not ring any bells, none what-
7 soever.

8 Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit
9 3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy
10 Vendetta," subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against
11 Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.

12 Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether
13 you have read it?

14 Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.

15 (The document referred
16 to was marked Halley
17 Exhibit No. 3 for
18 identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some specifics and discuss
2 them briefly here.

3 Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE
4 Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of
5 \$50 million.

6 Would that be accurate to you?

7 Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate
8 figure. We would have to go back to the records. You know, as
9 I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking
10 place in March and escalated up to a high point and then
11 dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a
12 mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate
13 answer. That is something that could be researched -- we have
14 the files -- rather than speculate for you on the buildup and
15 reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is useful.

16 Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to
17 place the annual budget of the Station in the neighborhood
18 of tens of millions of dollars?

19 Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition,
20 you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to
21 get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then
22 tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want
23 to draw a figure of --

24 Mr. diGenova. What would the start-up cost?

25 Mr. Halley. In terms of what they involved or dollars?

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1 Mr. diGenova. Dollars.

2 Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars.

3 Mr. Baron. Would you say that \$50 million would be in the
4 right ballpark for your activities at the peak?

5 Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar
6 figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve
7 it in the files. It is available.

8 Mr. Baron. Were the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with
9 other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates
10 here?

11 Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that
12 Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were
13 coordinated with JMWAVE.

14 Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE?

15 Mr. Halley. With JMWAVE.

16 Mr. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility?

17 Mr. Halley. Washington.

18 Mr. Baron. Was that delegated by Washington to you?

19 Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall
20 coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration.

21 Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in
22 Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a
23 flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico
24 City with an information copy to Washington outlining who we
25 were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to

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1 Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational
2 opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico
3 City. So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.

4 The final coordination authority rested in Washington. I
5 will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local
6 political reasons in Mexico the Mexican Station Chief did not
7 want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by
8 Washington.

9 Mr. Baron. Let me quote you a passage here and see if it
10 comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements
11 you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforce-
12 ment authorities in Florida.

13 The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were tech-
14 nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws,
15 and Immigration statutes, so that the Station had to work out
16 special arrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast
17 Guard."

18 Is that generally accurate?

19 Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there
20 was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel
21 departures. The other is Immigration?

22 Mr. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.

23 Mr. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been
24 coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On the
25 other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason and

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1 a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the
2 mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one
3 of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was
4 picked up and picked up by Immigration inspectors, then they
5 would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual
6 It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been
7 phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say
8 we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest
9 in this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated
10 at that point.

11 Now the third group was Customs. Customs did have a
12 number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted
13 off the Florida Keys in particular, those were coordinated with
14 the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower
15 to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the
16 Agency was doing.

17 Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal
18 for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic
19 explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to
20 establish liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along
21 the Florida coast and into the Keys. The result was that
22 any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to
23 illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."

24 Is that accurate?

25 Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the

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1 record on that as saying that we did not drive around, there
2 were no vehicles moving, manned by these Cubans with arms and
3 weapons on them.

4 In other words, you are coming back to the same point,
5 because as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to
6 them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back
7 from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct.

8 Mr. Baron. What about the end of that passage where they
9 say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree
10 as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which
11 you say was not carried on at all.--

12 Mr. Halley. It was not.

13 Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was
14 arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession
15 of firearms would be quickly released.

16 Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question
17 into two parts. There were no firearms --

18 Mr. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by
19 the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the
20 street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special
21 in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving. Would
22 such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection
23 surfaced?

24 Mr. Halley. My answer to that is no. In other words, if
25 he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the police

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1 and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us,
2 the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he
3 had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any
4 intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with
5 his task on the behalf of CIA.

6 I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various
7 parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp
8 and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English
9 or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of
10 getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of
11 disorderly conduct.

12 Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of
13 liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with
14 JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI?
15 How had that been done?

16 Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the
17 operation, you know, there had already been a Station there
18 and there also were two security units in the greater Miami
19 area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were
20 expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the
21 security of personnel who had established contact with other
22 jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some
23 cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out
24 to these jurisdictions and identify themselves simply with a
25 badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were

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1 interested in so that there would not be a cross of problems
2 with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on
3 that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.

4 Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular
5 commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of
6 Cuba, and that those commandos were equipped with all kinds of
7 explosives and armaments.

8 Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on
9 a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?

10 Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids
11 run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.

12 Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered
13 rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied
14 to those commando teams as a matter of course?

15 Mr. Halley. No, they were not. For most of those
16 commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a
17 weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire
18 power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation
19 rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking
20 about.

21 In other words, you would find that type of a group armed
22 with a submachine gun, as for example.

23 Mr. Baron. If an assassination weapon as we have
24 described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have
25 to have a specific purpose in mind for its use?

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24 Mr. Hallay. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him
25 personally. I know of him. He was a member of our boat

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2 Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez
3 indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of
4 weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and tele-
5 scopic sights were left in designated inland spots."

Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when he says he put caches on the coast of Cuba that contained weapons. I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of these missions were planned, the cache was put together and packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened it up because it was always in a sealed container.

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1 Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were
2 made for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a
3 weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

4 Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As
5 I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were
6 multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cache that
7 went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role
8 to assassinating Fidel Castro.

9 Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy
10 directives under which you were operating at the time to
11 supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have
12 access to Castro?

13 Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance,
14 I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had two or
15 three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis.

16 Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba?

17 Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in
18 the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and
19 got ammunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was
20 very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying
21 that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do
22 with these weapons once they got their hands on them. They
23 were free agents.

24 Mr. diGenova. This is an interesting point. This has
25 come up before. We are aware of our reading of the record that

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1 what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms of
2 realizing that it was a possibility but of people like Dean
3 Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then
4 once these agents are in another country and are supplied that
5 there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons
6 after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of
7 course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and
8 to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be
9 tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that
10 be correct?

11 Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it
12 exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our
13 mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them
14 in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers. Their
15 first task was to collect intelligence.

16 The second task was to organize a resistance which would
17 take armed action if we ever got a total package put together
18 that gave us an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary
19 missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if
20 you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants
21 anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there
22 was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that
23 peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do.
24 To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument, you
25 know, over a woman. Any number of things.

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1 Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for
2 example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or
3 air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana
4 Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who
5 was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that
6 they were aware of the weapons drops and were intimately
7 familiar with where they would be.

8 Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. I have no
9 knowledge of that. During my time, we made no drops by air.

10 Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were
11 placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into
12 Cuba to these internal resistance groups?

13 Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are
14 addressing.

15 Mr. diGenova. During your period.

16 Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued
17 essentially as self-protection for the people who were living
18 in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at
19 such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they
20 were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids,
21 ambushes, sabotage operations.

22 Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in
23 this article that I would like to ask you to comment on.
24 He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some
25 of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They

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1 were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopes, Springfields
2 with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not
3 sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the
4 Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping
5 the Underground. I was with the Underground as well as the CIA,
6 so you can see I was involved in the plots too, but that is
7 also obvious."

8 You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the
9 air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to be taking
10 that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots
11 underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and
12 that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots
13 and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were
14 supplying.

15 Is that an accurate statement?

16 Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that
17 statement. Martinez' role as I described it to you, he is
18 accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that
19 he participated in putting them in. I again question how he
20 would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and
21 I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement
22 by him because of the way that the caches were put together.
23 I just do not see his knowing that.

24 Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular
25 kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action

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1 Springfields did go in.

2 Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after
3 the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the
4 resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the
5 nature of the items that they would have received in a cache
6 delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out?
7 Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?

8 Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period
9 that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some
10 of these people have come out since then, and maybe he has
11 talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that.
12 I cannot exclude that.

13 At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had
14 that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble
15 with that statement and I cannot identify with it.

16 Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: "By the end of
17 1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been
18 foiled in attempts to kill him" -- meaning Castro -- "among
19 them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in
20 prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped
21 to the United States. Had these men succeeded, their efforts
22 would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all."

23 Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask
24 you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of
25 those men named to the CIA.

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1 (Pause)

2 Mr. Halley. No, there is no connection that I know of
3 between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not
4 ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of
5 Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time
6 that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for -- he
7 was in Miami for a long period of time.

8 Mr. Baron. Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the
9 record?

10 Mr. Halley. Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that
11 was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government.
12 They claimed to have attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and
13 claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance
14 organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name
15 to me. We had no direct contact with him.

16 William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities
17 and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt
18 with Cuban affairs.

19 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection
20 between any of these people and assassination attempts against
21 Fidel Castro?

22 Mr. Halley. I have none, no connection between these names
23 and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

24 Mr. Baron. The fact that they are listed here as having
25 been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they

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1 were connected with CIA is news to you?

2 Mr. Halley. Well, no, I would not say that. If you had
3 Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he were to say in 1962 I
4 attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did
5 this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis
6 for proving it, either.

7 Mr. Baron. You have never heard of these alleged assassina-
8 tion attempts before?

9 Mr. Halley. No.

10 Morgan's name I would have to do a file trace to get myself
11 back up to date. Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel
12 over some issue,, as I recall was in prison. I do not recall,
13 remember if he was executed, although this says he was executed.

14 Mr. Baron. What about the last name on the list,
15 Antonio Veciana?

16 Mr. Halley. That is a name that rings a bell with me, but
17 I do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name
18 I have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports.
19 I remember no operational relationship with him between the Miami
20 Station and this man during my tenure in Miami.

21 Mr. Baron. During your tenure, would you have been in a
22 position to know that these people had led assassination
23 attempts against Castro, if that were indeed the fact?

24 Mr. Halley. Not necessarily. I would say that the odds
25 would have been high that we would have, particularly, say

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(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by George McGovern,
2 to whom Castro had sent this report.

3 Mr. Halley, is it true that I had asked you to review this
4 report before we began our session today?

5 Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask me to look at the
6 report.

7 Mr. Baron. Can you point to any names or incidents in
8 this report that are connected in any way in your mind to
9 actual assassination attempts against Cuba -- Castro?

10 Mr. Halley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my
11 mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro.
12 You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the
13 names were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some
14 of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons.

15 One name is Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was
16 active, he was active with the DRE.

17 Mr. Baron. At what page is that?

18 Mr. Halley. There is no page number.

19 For instance, here's a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is
20 familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the
21 reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly
22 got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the
23 counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed
24 my desk, to see the name.

25 All right. The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona.

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1 That was a Cuban exile leader. We talked about Tony Varona. I
2 told you I did not know that Tony Varona had any connection with
3 Mr. Harvey.

4 There is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned
5 Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a
6 relationship with the Agency. You know, I told you Arttime was
7 one; Manolo Ray is another. He is familiar to me as a result of
8 that.

9 Mr. Baron. You did not know of any involvement of Manolo
10 Ray in an assassination effort against Castro?

11 Mr. Halley. I do not.

12 Here is another name mentioned in the same paragraph,
13 Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that is familiar to
14 me as a prominent Cuban exile.

15 Mr. Baron. You have no more specific recollection?

16 Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question,
17 telling you which names ring a bell with me as I run through
18 this.

19 Mr. Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the
20 record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these
21 names.

22 Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this
23 report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium?

24 Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that.
25 According to this, if this is correct, it took place in October

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1 of '61 which I would not have had any knowledge of because I
2 was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as I told you, early
3 February 1962.

4 Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a
5 bazooka towards the Presidential Palace?

6 Mr. Halley. I have no knowledge.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to
8 assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?

9 Mr. Halley. No, I do not. As you know, Guantanamo had
10 a number of Cuban exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in
11 the base at one time or another. During the time that I was the
12 Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at
13 Guantanamo. We did use them for intelligence collection
14 purposes, but I do not have any linkage between that intelligence
15 project and assassination.

16 Mr. Baron. Were paramilitary operations run out of
17 Guantanamo Bay?

18 Mr. Halley. They were not during my time as Station Chief
19 in Miami by CIA. There was an office of ONI, Office of
20 Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo. I have no
21 knowledge of what they may have been doing during various
22 periods of time. I am talking about CIA.

23 Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you
24 in this report?

25 Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarría

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1 Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do
2 not know. You know, we would have to run a name trace to get
3 a rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central
4 index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier
5 I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are
6 completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at
7 it, I will be glad to do so. It may trigger some response.

8 This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It
9 is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just
10 as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would
11 have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a
12 bell with me.

13 Mr. Baron. You do not remember him in connection with an
14 attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says
15 there?

16 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

17 Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar.
18 Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already
19 went over that one.

20 The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked
21 about.

22 Mr. Baron. Right.

23 Mr. Baron. The last name on here -- I cannot find it --
24 the other name is Antonio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now,
25 but that is the last name that rang a bell.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Cuesta
2 Valle's specific activities with the CIA?

3 Mr. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and
4 take a look at what the information is.

5 Mr. Baron. Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JMWAVE
6 Station?

7 Mr. Halley. He was not.

8 Mr. Baron. Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?

9 Mr. Halley. No, he was not. This is again one of these
10 great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a
11 soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery
12 of the Cuban exile community. He was involved in free lance
13 operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI,
14 Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name,
15 but he was not on the CIA payroll during the period that I was
16 involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami
17 Station. I remember name traces being run on this guy and so
18 forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that
19 period of time.

20 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of his ever having been on the
21 payroll of the CIA?

22 Mr. Halley. I personally am not aware of it, and I think,
23 you know, if you had gone to the Agency that they must have given
24 you all sorts of traces on this fellow and told you the same
25 thing.

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1 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the AMOT program?

2 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

3 Mr. Baron. How was that spelled?

4 Mr. Halley. AMOT.

5 Mr. Baron. What was that program?

6 Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre
7 group that was used as an operational support mechanism to
8 support the Miami Station.

9 Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide?

10 Mr. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came
11 out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate
12 the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us.
13 They provided information on the various mainstream activities
14 that were going on in the Cuban exile community.

15 Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary
16 operations against Cuba?

17 Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they
18 thought we should interview or look to or see if they would
19 fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they
20 had the contacts in the Cuban community. Say we had a require-
21 ment for a diesel engineer. We would say to the AMOT organiza-
22 tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel
23 engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go
24 through all of their contacts until they would come up with
25 one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified

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1 the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. We would then
2 send somebody around to talk to him independent of them and
3 pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.

4 It was that kind of operational support.

5 Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were
6 not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they
7 operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of
8 them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then
9 left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOT organiza-
10 tion.

11 Could we go off the record for a moment?

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 Mr. Halley. We are now back on the record.

14 The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which
15 was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they
16 were used across the board for operational support tasks.

17 Mr. Baron. One more general question.

18 Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship
19 with the FBI?

20 Mr. Halley. I would not --

21 Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your
22 activities in any way?

23 Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language,
24 because I think --

25 Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.

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1 Mr. Halley. I do not know if your question means the same
2 thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relation-
3 ship with the FBI, that is, on matters dealing with counter-
4 intelligence matters. There was a regular exchange of data
5 with the FBI. There was an exchange of name traces on people
6 that they were conducting investigations on, for counterintelli-
7 gence purposes. We would trace certain individuals and with the
8 FBI there were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we
9 discovered that were turned over to the FBI.

10 So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison
11 that existed between the two agencies.

12 Mr. Baron. But the FBI was not involved in supporting
13 paramilitary commando raids to the shore of Cuba, is that
14 correct?

15 Mr. Halley. I do not know what you are driving at.
16 there. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying
17 that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as
18 an organization?

19 Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training
20 of any of the CIA operatives?

21 Mr. Halley. No. The FBI did not train any CIA personnel
22 during my tenure in the Miami Station.

23 Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you
24 links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba?

25 Mr. Halley. No. We covered the gambling thing previously.

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1 The one case that I mentioned is this man who gave us the
2 lead of the two Soviets from the missile site, and that did not
3 come to the Miami Station through the FBI.

4 Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a CIA attempt to
5 secure the aid of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an
6 "accident," to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban
7 plane?

8 Mr. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post
9 years, but I was not aware of this at the time, at the time I
10 was in Miami.

11 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had
12 been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA Headquarters
13 during your period of involvement with Cuban affairs?

14 Mr. Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65 when
15 I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious
16 you know, program operational effort towards assassinating
17 Castro.

18 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had
19 been given to the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassina-
20 tion at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as JMWAVE
21 Station Chief?

22 Mr. Halley. No, I was not aware of any, you know, planned
23 program effort at assassination.

24 Mr. Baron. If we limit it --

25 Mr. diGenova. What do you mean when you say that?

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1 Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came
2 in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination
3 was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a
4 part of the fabric of the times.

5 Mr. diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only
6 one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying
7 let's kill him, let's get together.

8 Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of
9 subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be
10 precise that there was no programmatic operational program that
11 I was aware of to assassinate Castro.

12 Mr. Baron. Although the context in which we discussed the
13 talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shops
14 in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversa-
15 tions among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you
16 aware that there were at least serious discussions of the
17 use of assassination against Castro at CIA Headquarters?

18 Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground
19 that we covered before in this.

20 As I indicated to you, people would come out of Cuba and
21 discuss these kinds of things. Some of these were reported in,
22 you know, traffic back to Washington. People would discuss
23 what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate
24 Castro. In that particular context, yes, discussions on the
25 assassination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming

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1 back, if you are saying that if anybody outlined an operational
2 plan to me, did I help construct the plan, did I make a contri-
3 bution to a plan, my answer is again no. We talked earlier,
4 you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said
5 I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's
6 vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me
7 about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of
8 bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability
9 in this context. Where I heard it, as I told you before, I do
10 not remember.

11 Mr. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same
12 furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you
13 were before. You just now said that the subject of assassina-
14 tion probably came up in the context of discussing the contin-
15 gencies of Castro's death. Did it come up in terms of discus-
16 sing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate
17 Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted --

18 Mr. Halley. I cannot recall any such discussion, but in
19 any state where there is a leadership dominated by one man, it
20 is always a discussion of succession. That question has come
21 up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is
22 thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody
23 is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides sudden-
24 ly to take his machetti and just get out in the sugar cane
25 field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we

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1 generally focused on Raul. There was talk of a collective
2 leadership.

3 These are all kinds of things that are always done against
4 that kind of a one-man state, whether it is, you know, a
5 Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a
6 military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Right or the
7 Left.

8 Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the
9 contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means --

10 Mr. Halley. Non-Agency induced.

11 Mr. Baron. As opposed to this, which is my question:
12 were you aware of any kind of a discussion at CIA Headquarters
13 on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel
14 Castro?

15 Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such discussion. That
16 is why I have gone into all this background to try to explain
17 the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in
18 my sense of the word, as a professional intelligence officer,
19 of an operational plan, I was not a participant in any discus-
20 sion in which an operational plan for the assassination of
21 Castro was discussed. That is, I think, the heart of the
22 matter.

23 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

24 Joe, do you have any?

25 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your immediate superior

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22 Mr. Halley. My recollection of that was that he came down
23 on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the
24 plane with him, I do not recall, but he landed at Homestead
25 Air Force Base. As I recall, we picked him up from there.

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25 (Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock the hearing was concluded.)

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HALLEY EXHIBIT

believed he was being supported by U.S. businessmen with financial stakes in Cuba. Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.)

When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured explosives, detonators, twenty .30 caliber rifles, twenty .45 caliber hand guns, two radios, and one boat radar. Harvey says that the "shopping list" included some items that could be obtained only from the U.S. Government. Harvey omitted those items, because Roselli, posing as a representative of private business interests, would not have had access to such equipment. The cost of the arms and equipment, about \$5,000, was T/A'd to headquarters.

Harvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name, loaded it with the arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. The keys were then given to Roselli for

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SECRET-EYES ONLY

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La Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) de Estados Unidos, ha jugado el papel principal en la historia de las agresiones contra Cuba, promoviendo, organizando, financiando y en muchos casos dirigiendo acciones vandálicas, no sólo contra el territorio cubano sino también contra nuestras representaciones e intereses en países extranjeros o en aguas internacionales.

En esta amplia gama de actividades desplegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos subversivos de Estados Unidos contra nuestro país, se destacan por su peligrosidad, los reiterados planes dirigidos a la eliminación física de los principales dirigentes de la Revolución y, en especial, contra la figura de nuestro Primer Ministro.

Las pruebas que aportamos evidencian que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus objetivos principales, mediante el empleo de los más variados métodos técnicos de precisión. En los casos de agentes radicados en el exterior, les han facilitado medios de traslación y comunicación.

① *FB*
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has played the leading role in the history of the aggressions against Cuba, promoting, organizing, financing, and, in many cases, directing vandalic actions, not only against the Cuban territory, but also against our representations and interest in foreign countries, or in international waters.

In this wide variety of activities carried out by the CIA and by other United States subversive bodies against our country, the reiterated plans toward the physical elimination, of the principal leaders of the Revolution, and specially, against our Prime Minister, stand out because of their dangerousness.

The proofs we provide, evidence that, since 1959, this has been one of its major aims, by using the most varied technical precision methods. In the case of agents living abroad, they have been given means of transportation and communication.

Es de destacar que en las innumerables infiltraciones organizadas por la CIA, utilizando miembros de organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, uno de los objetivos constantes ha sido también la eliminación física del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz.

La CIA, para la ejecución de sus planes, ha utilizado elementos contrarrevolucionarios en el interior y exterior del país. No sólo ha tenido como colaboradores a los desplazados del poder, sino también a elementos de distinta procedencia social, incluyendo a exponentes de todo tipo de lacras.

Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en reclutar a destacados jefes y elementos de la mafia norteamericana, a quienes les han conmutado fechorías a cambio de su participación en los planes de atentado contra nuestros dirigentes.

No han vacilado tampoco en tratar de ejecutar sus acciones en lugares públicos, donde el número de víctimas inocentes hubiese sido incalculable, como fueron: los atentados planificados en el Stadium Latinoamericano, Plaza de la Re-

(2)

It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable infiltrations organized by the CIA, using members of counterrevolutionary organizations, one of the permanent goals has also been the physical elimination of Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro Ruz.

The CIA, in order to carry out its plans, has used counterrevolutionary individuals inside and outside the country. It has had collaborators, not only those who had been shifted from power, but also individuals of different social origins, including samples of all types of viciousness.

In the same way, they have had no objection to recruiting well-known leaders and members from the American mafia, to whom they have barred their offences, in exchange for their participation in the plots against our leaders.

Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry out their actions in public places, where the number of innocent victims would have been incalculable, as were the crimes planned to take place at the Latin American Stadium, the Revolution Square and the University of Ha-

3

During the last month, the American press has published an increasing and extensive information about the accomplishment of these activities, offering details about the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the elaboration and execution of the criminal plans.

In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller Commission, as well as the one headed by Senator Frank Church, for the researches on the illegal activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all that we have stated above, has been undoubtedly demonstrated.

A former agent made public statements about the participation of this Agency in the criminal act carried out against the French steamship "La Coubre", where more than one hundred Cubans were killed and about 200, were seriously injured. He offers details about his accomplishments trying to "justify" this killing by blaming a slight damage in the mechanism of the blowing equipment which was used.

durante los últimos meses, la prensa norteamericana ha publicado una creciente y amplia información sobre la realización de estas actividades, ofreciendo en detalles la participación de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia en la elaboración y ejecución de los planes de atentado.

En los informes rendidos por la llamada Comisión Rockefeller y la presidida por el senador Frank Church, para las investigaciones sobre las actividades ilegales de la CIA, ha quedado demostrado de forma categórica lo antes expuesto.

Un ex-agente hizo públicas declaraciones sobre la participación de dicha agencia en el criminal atentado perpetrado contra el vapor francés "La Coubre", donde más de un centenar de cubanos resultaron muertos y alrededor de 200, heridos graves. Brinda detalles pormenorizados sobre su realización, tratando de "justificar" esta matanza por un desperfecto en el mecanismo del equipo explosivo utilizado.

Resulta significativa la información --
aportada por el columnista Jack Anderson
en el diario "The Washington Post" sobre
la intervención del gangster John Rosselli
en varios planes de atentados contra el
Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, algunos de
ellos mediante envenenamiento con pasti-
llas entregadas por la CIA. Posteriormente,
según la propia prensa norteamerica-
na, Rosselli admitió ante la Comisión de
Inteligencia del Senado su participación
con esta Agencia en varios complots para
asesinar al Primer Ministro Cubano.

Paulatinamente, funcionarios, senadores,
jefes, oficiales y ex-agentes de la CIA,
así como conocidos columnistas de la ---
prensa norteamericana, han hecho categó-
ricas declaraciones, que coinciden con -
las denuncias formuladas, oportunamente -
por el gobierno de Cuba.

Sin pretender relacionar todos los pla--
nes de atentados fraguados, exponemos a --
continuación algunos casos, que en su --
casi totalidad no han sido de conocimien-
to público y prueban la diversidad y rei-
teración de la participación de la CIA y
otras agencias subversivas en estos he--

4
Very significant is the information given by-
the journalist Jack Anderson from "The Washing-
ton Post" about the gangster John Rosselli's-
participation in various plots against Prime-
Minister Fidel Castro, some of them by means-
of poisoning, with pills handed to him by the
CIA. Afterwards, according to the American --
press itself, Rosselli, before the Senate ---
Intelligence Commission, conceded having parti-
cipated with this Agency in various plots for
assassinating the Cuban Prime Minister.

Gradually, officials, Senators, chiefs, offi-
cers and former CIA agents, as well as well -
known American press press journalists, have-
made categorical statements, which coincide--
with the denounces expressed, apropos, by the-
Cuban Government.

Without pretending to mention all the plots--
attempted, we expose some of them the majority
of which have not been publicly known.
They prove the diversity and recurrence of --
the CIA as well as other subversive agencies
participation in these actions:

A mediados del año 1960, los elementos con-
trarrevolucionarios Armando Cubría Ramos-
y Mario Tauler Sagú, miembros de la orga-
nización contrarrevolucionaria "La Cruz",
se infiltraron por la zona de Punta de Hi-
cacos, Matanzas.

Tauler Sagú, elemento gansteril, junto a-
Cubría Ramos traían la misión de realizar
un atentado a nuestro Primer Ministro, así
como perpetrar distintas acciones de sabo-
taje y terrorismo. Para cumplirla fueron
pertrechados por la CIA de gran cantidad
de material bélico y equipos, los que fue-
ron ocupados al ser detenidos.

(5)

In mid 1960, the counterrevolutionary Armando -
Cubría Ramos and Mario Tauler Sagú, members--
of the "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary organiza-
tion, were infiltrated through the Punta Hica-
cos zone, in Matanzas Province.

Tauler Sagú, a gangster, together with Cubría -
Ramos, were instructed to carry out a plot ---
against our Prime Minister, as well as to ----
commit various sabotage and terrorism actions.
For accomplishing this, they were given great
quantity of warlike material and equipment by-
the CIA, which were taken from them when arres-
ted.

El traídor Humberto Sorí Marín, con cua-
tro contrarrevolucionarios más, se in-
filtraron en marzo de 1961, por la cos-
ta norte de La Habana con el objetivo -
de reagrupar a las organizaciones con-
trarrevolucionarias, realizar un atenta-
do al Comandante en Jefe y desarrollar
todo tipo de actividades subversivas pa-
ra apoyar la invasión de Playa Girón.

Para tales fines fueron entrenados y ar-
mados por la CIA, ocupándoseles gran can-
tidad de material bélico y otros equipos
al ser detenidos.

Entre los principales encartados figura-
ban: Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lo-
renzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Na-
varrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona,
Eufemio J. Fernández Ortega y Rafael Díaz
Hanscons, responsables de diversos grupos
y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias
dirigidas por la CIA.

6
The traitor Humberto Sorí Marín with four other
counterrevolutionaries, were infiltrated in ---
March 1961, through the north coast of Havana, -
with the purpose of grouping the counterrevolu-
tionary organizations, of carrying out the ----
assassination of Commander in Chief and of deve-
loping all type of subversive activities in ---
order to support the Playa Girón invasion.

For this purpose, they were trained and armed--
by the Central Intelligence Agency. A great ---
quantity of warlike material and other equipment
were taken from them when arrested.

Among the participants were Rogelio González Cor-
cho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodrí-
guez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, -
Eufemio J. Fernández Ortega and Rafael Díaz Hans-
cons, heads of various counterrevolutionary ----
groups and organization directed by the CIA.

En junio de 1961, se celebra una reunión con la asistencia de un elemento infiltrado en Cuba por la organización contra revolucionaria "Frente Revolucionario Democrático"(FRD), quien traía la orden de realizar un atentado al Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz.

Para ejecutar dicha acción fueron designados: Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer y otros, entregándoseles dinero para sufragar los gastos de la operación.

El plan consistía en situar dos jeeps -- con bazookas en el garage, sito en las Avenidas de Rancho Boyeros y Santa Catalina, y un panel por la Ciudad Deportiva, con hombres portando granadas. Al pasar nuestro dirigente obstaculizarían el tránsito, abriendo fuego.

Al ser detenidos, Guillermo Coula Ferrer e Higinio Menéndez acusaron a la CIA de ser el principal director del plan. Los encartados mantenían contactos a través de la Base Naval de Guantánamo y la Embajada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y autoridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro-

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In June 1961, a meeting was celebrated with the attendance of an individual infiltrated in Cuba by the "Frente Revolucionario Democrático"(FRD) counterrevolutionary organization, who was instructed to carry out a plot against Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz.

To accomplish this action, Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and they were given money to meet the expenses of the operation.

The plan was to place two jeeps with bazookas in the garage which is at Rancho Boyeros and Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at the Ciudad Deportiva (Sports City) with men carrying grenades. When our leaders would pass by, they would stop the traffic and open fire.

When they were arrested, Guillermo Coula Ferrer and Higinio Menéndez accused the CIA of being the principal director of the plot. The indicted kept contacts through Guantánamo Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members of the CIA and American authorities, who gave them means and instructions to carry out ---

Después del descalabro de Playa Girón, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia continuó sus actividades subversivas contra nuestro país, iniciando el reagrupamiento de las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias bajo la organización "Unidad Resistencia".

Esa labor fue llevada a cabo por los agentes de la CIA infiltrados: Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) y Jorge García Rubio (Tony) entre otros. Seguidamente se dieron a la tarea de desarrollar todo tipo de actividades subversivas, incluyendo un atentado contra el Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz durante el desarrollo del acto provincial del 26 de julio de 1961 en Oriente; la autoagresión a la Base Naval de Guantánamo, con el fin de justificar la agresión por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas norteamericanas; así como ataques a las repúblicas cercanas para provocar un conflicto internacional.

Los planes contemplaban también un atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe en el acto central de la misma fecha en la Plaza

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After the Playa Girón defeat, the Central Intelligence Agency continued its subversive activities against our country, starting the regrouping of the disperse counterrevolutionary organization, under the "Unidad Resistencia" organization.

This task was carried out by the infiltrated CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) and Jorge García Rubio (Tony) among others. Afterwards, they tried to develop all types of subversive activities, including a plot against the Division Commander (Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, during the provincial celebration of the 26 de July at Oriente Province in 1961; the selfaggression to Guantánamo Naval Base, with the purpose of justifying the aggression by the American Armed Forces, as well as attacks to neighbor republics, in order to provoke an international conflict.

The plans included also a plot against the Commander in Chief, during the central rally the same day, at the Revolution

de la Revolución, para lo cual fue a coordinar en territorio de Estados Unidos el contrarrevolucionario José Pujals Mederos, quien salió clandestinamente hacia ese país. Allí se entrevistó con los oficiales de la CIA, Jim Bender, conocido por Jim Boul- ding, Harold Bishop y Carl Hitch. En esta entrevista Mederos fue nombrado jefe de los oficiales de la CIA que operaban en Cuba, en sustitución de Alfredo Izaguirre conocido por Tito, que estaba detenido.

En la Base Naval de Guantánamo se llevaron a cabo las reuniones conspirativas, y sus autoridades (Capitán Schenweias) proporcionaron gran cantidad de material bélico y equipos para la realización de estos planes.

El mencionado Capitán Carl E. Schenweias, ex jefe de la Base Naval, fue uno de los más activos organizadores de las agresiones.

Detenidos todos los encartados, se les ocupó gran cantidad de material y equipos bélicos.

Es de significar, que todos estos planes subversivos fueron denunciados oportunamente por el Comandante Ernesto Guevara en Punta del Este.

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Square. For this purpose, the counterrevolutionary José Pujals Mederos made an undercover visit to the United States, in order to coordinate this action. There, he met CIA officers Jim Bender, known as Jim Boul- ding, Harold Bishop and Carl Hitch. During this meeting, Mederos was appointed chief of the CIA officers, who operated in Cuba, substituting Alfredo Izaguirre, known as Tito, who was arrested.

The conspiratory meeting were carried out at the Guantánamo Naval Base, and its authorities (Captain Schenweias) supplied a lot of warlike material and equipment for the accomplishment of these plans.

The mentioned Captain Carl E. Schenweias, former chief of the Naval Base, was one of the most active organizers of the aggressions.

When all the indicated were arrested, a great number of warlike material and equipment was taken from them.

It is worth noticing that all these subversive plans were denounced opportunely, by Commander Ernesto Guevara, at Punta del Este.

En la segunda quincena de julio de 1961, un grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios de las organizaciones "30 de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" y "Frente Revolucionario Democrático", planeaban atentar contra nuestro Comandante en Jefe y otros dirigentes.

Recibían orientaciones de la CIA a través de contactos con Tony Varona, Manuel Ray y Aureliano Sánchez Arango en el exterior -- del país, y con el Almirante Burke y agentes de la CIA en la Base Naval de Guantánamo. El atentado se efectuaría en las cercanías del domicilio de la compañera Celia Sánchez Manduley, en el Vedado. Resultaron detenidos Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto Coscuyuela Valdés, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González González y -- otros, a quienes se les ocuparon armas y explosivos.

During the second fortnight of July, 1961, a group of counterrevolutionaries from "30 de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" and "Frente Revolucionario Democrático" organizations, were plotting -- against our Commander in Chief and other leaders.

They received CIA instructions through -- contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aureliano Sánchez Arango, and with Admiral Burke and CIA agents in Guantánamo Naval Base. The plot would be carried out in the proximity of Celia Sánchez Manduley's house, in Vedado. Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González González and others were arrested and weapons and explosives were taken from them.

Entre sus planes figuren también el fracasado atentado al Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez llevado a efecto el 13 de setiembre de 1961 cuando dicho dirigente regresaba de Matanzas hacia La Habana. Con ese fin, un grupo de contrarrevolucionarios pertenecientes a las organizaciones antes mencionadas, establecieron contactos con representantes del "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR). Al frente de los mismo se hallaba Juan José Martore Silva.

Estos elementos mantenían estrechos vínculos con un agente de la CIA, así como con un jefe de bandidos en la provincia de Matanzas. Al resultar detenidos se les ocupó el material bélico que poseían.

Among their plans was also the failed plot against Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, which was attempted on September 13th, 1961, when he was coming back from Matanzas to Havana. With that purpose, a group of counterrevolutionary individuals, belonging to the organizations mentioned above, contacted representatives of the "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR). The group's leader was Juan José Martore Silva.

These individuals kept close relation with a CIA agent as well as with the chief of a band in Matanzas Province. When arrested, warlike material was taken from them.

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On October 1961, "II Frente del Escambray" and "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR) counterrevolutionary organizations, directed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved a joint plan for a sabotage in the capital, in order to cause people's indignation and to influence on the mass gathering to welcome the President of the Republic Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, on his arrival from Punta del Este.

This tactic was aimed to facilitate the plot, which would be carried out on the 4th of the same month, shooting with a bazooka in direction to the tribune located on the terrace of the former Presidential Palace, from an apartment located in a nearby building. The withdrawal would be covered by the criminal launching of grenades against the public, in order to cause confusion and panic.

Their purposes were frustrated when all of the indicted were arrested and a great number of warlike material was taken from them.

En octubre de 1961, las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias "II Frente del Escambray" y "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR) dirigidas por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA), aprobaron un plan conjunto de sabotajes en la capital, a fin de provocar la indignación popular e influir sobre la concurrencia masiva al acto de recibimiento al Presidente de la República, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a su llegada de Punta del Este.

Esta táctica estaba encaminada a viabilizar el plan de atentado que ejecutarían el día 4 del propio mes, disparando con una bazooka hacia la tribuna situada en la terraza del antiguo Palacio Presidencial desde un apartamento situado en un edificio contiguo. La retirada sería cubierta con el minimal lanzamiento de granadas contra el público, para crear la confusión y el pánico.

Sus propósitos fueron frustrados al ser detenidos todos los encartados, ocupándose gran cantidad de material bélico.

A principios de 1962, siguiendo orientaciones de la CIA y la Base Naval de Guantánamo, el contrarrevolucionario Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo se da a la tarea de reestructurar algunos grupos y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, creando la denominada "Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert y otros se reunieron para elaborar planes de alzamiento e informar sobre los contactos establecidos en la Base Naval norteamericana de Guantánamo para recibir material bélico y equipos.

La CIA persiste en sus planes de atentar contra la vida del Primer Ministro y de producir una autoagresión a la Base Naval. Cumpliendo estas órdenes, el contrarrevolucionario Cuervo Calvo hace contacto con la organización DRE, procediendo a elaborar lo que denominaron "Plan Z", que consistía en: atentar contra la vida del Dr. Raúl Roa, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, lo que les permitiría llevar a vías de hecho otro atentado de mayor proporciones contra el Primer Ministro y demás dirigentes de la Revolución que concurrían al sepelio.

In early 1962, following instructions from the CIA and the Guantánamo Naval Base, the counterrevolutionary Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo reorganized several groups and created revolutionary organizations, and created the "Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert and others met in order to prepare plans for uprising and inform about the contacts established with the Guantánamo Naval Base for receiving warlike material and equipment.

The Central Intelligence Agency insisted on its plots against the Prime Minister's life, and to carry out a self-aggression to the Naval Base. Following these instructions, the counterrevolutionary Cuervo Calvo made contacts with the DRE organization, and elaborated what would be known as "Plan Z", which consisted on attempting against the life of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Raúl Roa, what would enable them to carry out another plot of bigger proportions against the Prime Minister and other revolutionary leaders who would attend the burial.

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It is worth noticing that the intellectual authors of this plan were the counter-revolutionaries Cay Hernández y Cay Gispart, members of the DRE organization, which was headed by Julio Hernández Rojo, a CIA agent infiltrated into our country.

Es de destacar que los autores intelectuales de este plan fueron los contrarrevolucionarios Cay Hernández y Cay Gispart, militantes de la organización DRE, que era dirigida por el agente de la CIA, infiltrado en nuestro país, Julio Hernández Rojo.

La organización "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista" (RCA) en cuyo seno se agruparon el "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi", y otros, era dirigida desde el exterior por la CIA, a través de su agente Nino Díaz.

En 1963, la CIA orientó al bloque RCA organizar y ejecutar acciones internas que aparentaran la existencia de una resistencia popular activa, con vista a solicitar la intervención armada a Cuba, en la reunión de Presidentes de países miembros de la OEA.

Las instrucciones eran suministradas por la CIA a través de la Base Naval de Guantánamo. A partir de entonces la RCA elabora nuevos planes de acción y atentados, en apoyo a la invasión armada que esperaban en el mes de julio.

Con motivo de los actos conmemorativos del 13 de Marzo, planearon asesinar al Comandante en Jefe, desde una casa cercana a la Universidad de la Habana, disparando hacia la tribuna, con un mortero. Los principales encartados fueron Samuel Car-

The "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista" organization (RCA), to which "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi" and others were joined, was directed from abroad by the CIA, through its agent Nino Díaz.

In 1963, the CIA gave instructions to the RCA block for organizing and carrying out internal actions in order to give the impression of the existence of a popular civic resistance, and therefore, demanding an armed intervention in Cuba, at the meeting of the Presidents of countries members of the OAS.

The instructions were given by the CIA through Guantánamo Naval Base. Since then, the RCA elaborated new plans for actions and crimes, for supporting the armed invasion which was expected in July.

On the occasion of the acts commemorating the 13th of March, they planned to assassinate the Commander in Chief, from a house near the University of Havana, shooting with a mortar in direction to the tribune. The principal persons indicted were Samuel Car-

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ballo Moreno CIA agent), Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales -- Sosa and others.

Simultaneously with this plot, attacks to the Committees of Defense of the Revolution and the National Revolutionary Militias sites, were planned to be carried out.

ballo Moreno (agente de la CIA, Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales Sosa y otros.

Simultáneamente al atentado proyectaron ataques a locales de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución y Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias.

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Having failed, the RCA elaborated a new -- plot against the Prime Minister, this time at the Latin American Stadium on April 7th, 1963. Sixteen men armed with pistols and -- fragmentation grenades would participate -- in it.

Among the principal persons indicted were -- Enrique Rodríguez Valdés, known as "Mulgado" Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

Ante el fracaso, la RCA elabora un -- nuevo plan contra el Primer Ministro, esta vez en el stadium Latinoamericano el 7 de abril de 1963. En el mismo -- participarían 16 hombres armados de -- pistolas y granadas de fragmentación.

Entre los principales encartados se -- encontraban Enrique Rodríguez Valdés -- conocido por "Mulgado", Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo y Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

They elaborated another plot, this time ---- against the life of the Minister of the --- Armed Forces, División Commander (Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, at the Revolution Square, during the celebration of the 26th of July. Four groups lead by René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria and Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez, would participate. The head of these groups was Ibrahim Machín Hernández.

All these actions, organized and promoted by the CIA through the RCA block, were ---- frustrated, the persons indicted were ---- arrested and a great number of weapons and equipment were taken from them.

Elaboraron otro plan, esta vez contra la vida del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz, en la Plaza de la Revolución, con motivo de la celebración del 26 de Julio. En el mismo tomarían parte cuatro grupos dirigidos por René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria y Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez. El jefe de estos grupos era Ibrahim Machín Hernández.

Todas estas acciones, organizadas y fomentadas por la CIA a través del bloque RCA, fueron frustradas, detenidos sus encartados y ocupadas gran cantidad de armas y equipos.

For September the 22th 1963, anniversary of the Committees of Defense of the Revolution, the counterrevolutionary Orlando Man- tiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Ca- zañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosque- ra, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis- co Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernán- des González and others, related to the -- CIA agent Pierre Owen Díez de Ure, prepared a plot against our Prime Minister.

These individuals grouped into the "Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), - "Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR), "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN) counterrevolutionary organizations, had CIA advice and support.

The plan was to dynamite the sewage pipes - which pass under the presidential tribune. Once the plan frustrated and the authors -- arrested, the agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, --- French citizen living in our country, --- confessed that he had been working for the CIA for approximately two years, and that he had given this Agency information of various sorts.

Para el 26 de setiembre de 1963, aniversario de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, los contrarrevolucionarios Orlando - Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel - Cazañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosquera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis - co Vlanco de los Cueros, Federico Hernández González y otros, vinculados al agente de - la CIA Pierre Owen Díez de Ure, prepararon - un plan de atentado contra nuestro Primer - Ministro.

Estos elementos, agrupados en las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias "Frente Interino de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), "Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR), "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" -- (ELN), contaron con el asesoramiento y aseguramiento de la CIA.

El plan consistía en dinamitar las conductas del alcantarillado que pasa por debajo de la tribuna presidencial. Liquidado el plan y detenidos los autores, el agente -- Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, ciudadano francés -- residente en nuestro país, confesó que trabajaba para la CIA desde hacía dos años -- aproximadamente, facilitándole informaciones de diversa índole.

En el mes de marzo de 1964, se gestó otro plan de atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe. El principal encartado, Mario Salabarría Aguiar, elemento gansteril, mantenía contactos con la CIA a través del agente Dr. Bernardo Milánés López, Jefe de una red, quien pasó la información del plan al Centro CIA y gestionó desde España la ayuda de los apátridas Tony Varona y Juan Bosch, amigos de Salabarría.

El plan consistía en instalar una ametralladora calibre 30 ó 50 en un vehículo y aguardar la posibilidad del paso del Comandante en Jefe, para atentar contra su vida. La CIA entregó a Salabarría las armas y medios necesarios, incluyendo grandes sumas de dinero.

In March 1964, another plot against Commander in Chief was elaborated. The principal indicted Mario Salabarría Aguiar, a gangster, had contacts with the CIA through the agent Dr. Bernardo Milánés López head of a net, who informed the CIA center of the plan and sought, from Spain, the support of Salabarría's friends, Tony Varona and Juan Bosch.

The plan consisted in installing a machine gun caliber 30 or 50 in a vehicle and waiting for the occasion when the Commander in Chief would pass by, in order to attempt against his life. The CIA gave Salabarría the necessary weapons and means, including great sums of money.

A mediados del año 1964, los contrarrevolucionarios Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, conocido por "Mankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe Alonso Herrera y José Manuel Rodríguez Cruz, conocido por "Lolo", miembros de la organización "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", que formaba parte del bloque de organizaciones, RCA, dirigidas por la CIA, comienzan a preparar un plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

Estos individuos estaban vinculados a los agentes de la CIA, Alberto y Ramón Grau Sierra, quienes formaban parte de la red dirigida por Ramón y María Leopoldina Graudina Alsina, que posteriormente en junio de 1965 intentaron envenenar al Primer Ministro.

El plan consistía en el lanzamiento de granadas contra nuestro Primer Ministro en el Stadium Latinoamericano, por un grupo de nueve hombres, quienes fueron detenidos, y ocupados los equipos bélicos.

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In mid-1964, the counterrevolutionaries Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, known as "Mankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe Alonso Herrera and José Manuel Rodríguez Cruz, known as "Lolo" members of the "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", which belonged to the RCA block of organizations, directed by the CIA, began to prepare a plot against the Prime Minister.

These persons were related to the CIA agents Alberto and Ramón Grau Sierra, who belonged to the net headed by Ramón and María Leopoldina Graudina Alsina, who latter in June 1965 attempted to poison the Prime Minister.

The plan consisted on throwing grenades against our Prime Minister at the Latin American Stadium, by a group of nine men who were arrested and whose warlike equipment was taken from them.

En setiembre de ese mismo año (1964), un grupo de contrarrevolucionarios de las organizaciones "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN) y "Frente Interno de Liberación" (FIL), que cumplían misiones de obtención de información para la CIA, comenzaron a gestionar la unificación, cumpliendo también órdenes de dicha Agencia.

Enfrascados en estas labores de unidad, el contrarrevolucionario Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, pone en conocimiento de Angel Miguel Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola y otros el plan de atentado que venían fraguando contra nuestro Primer Ministro en la Calle 11, en el Vedado, orientados por la CIA.

A principios de 1965, los contrarrevolucionarios Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín González Carballo y Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, miembros del "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (integrado al bloque de la RCA, dirigida por la CIA) comienzan a ultimar detalles de un plan de atentados contra el Comandante en Jefe en Santiago de las Vegas.

In september of this same year (1964), a group of counterrevolutionaries from the "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN), and "Frente Interno de Liberación" (FIL) organizations, who were accomplishing instructions of obtaining information for the CIA, began to seek unification, according, to the CIA's orders.

While accomplishing these tasks for achieving unity, the counterrevolutionary Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, informed Angel Miguel Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola and others about the plot they were elaborating against our Primer Minister at 11 St., Vedado, according to the CIA instructions.

At the beginning of 1965, the counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín González Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, members of the "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (integrated into the RCA block, directed by the CIA) began to complete details of a plot against the Commander in Chief in Santiago de las Vegas.

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They gave up this first plan and devised another plot, which would be committed by armed men with fragmentation grenades at the Latin American Stadium, and in a near building, there was another group-- which would open fire with machine guns-- against the people producing panic and confusion and, thus, guaranteeing the withdrawal.

Desisten de esta primera variante y proyectan otro plan que sería perpetrado en el stadium Latinoamericano con hombres armados de granadas de fragmentación, y otro grupo, apostado en un edificio cercano, abriría fuego de ametralladoras contra el público para crear el pánico y la confusión y garantizando así la retirada.

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En junio de este mismo año- según se ha mencionado anteriormente- una red de agentes de la CIA, dirigidos por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau Alsina (conocida por "Polita")- se dedicaba a todo tipo de actividades enemigas y otras de carácter antisocial para lo cual se valían de contactos con sedes capitalistas en el país, que servían de enlace con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia.

Estos elementos formaban parte de las organizaciones "Rescate", "Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario" (MAR) y otras dirigidas y subversionadas por esa Agencia.

María Leopoldina Grau Alsina recibió instrucciones de la CIA de fraguar un plan para envenenar al Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, para lo cual le enviaron un frasco de pastillas venenosas, que fueron entregadas a Alberto Cruz Caso, quien a su vez las entregó a los miembros de la organización (MAR) Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Múñez, para que efectuaran el atentado en el hotel Habana Libre.

As it has been said before, in June of this same year, a net of CIA agents, headed by Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina (known as Polita) were devoted to all type of enemy activities, as well as others of antisocial nature. For this purpose, they made use of contacts with capitalist representations in the country, which were used as liaisons with the Central Intelligence Agency.

These individuals were part of the organizations "Rescate", "Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario" (MAR) and other organizations directed and sponsored by that Agency.

María Leopoldina Grau was given instructions by the CIA to plot for poisoning Primer Minister Fidel Castro, thereby, she was sent a poisonous pill bottle, which was given to Alberto Cruz Caso, who, in turn, gave it to Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Múñez, members of the Organization (MAR), so that they would commit the attempted crime at the Havana Libre Hotel.

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The counterrevolutionary Tony Varona sent another bottle with 500 capsules when --- this attempt failed, in order to try to carry out the act again.

Likewise, "Polita" received from the CIA - some weapons with mufflers and special - projectiles for personal assassinations, - which were taken from them when arrested - in June, 1965.

Al fallar este intento, el contrarrevolucionario Tony Varona envió otro frasco con 500 cápsulas, a fin de tratar de realizar nuevamente el hecho.

Asimismo, "Polita" recibió de la CIA para -- iguales propósitos, varias armas con silenciadores y proyectiles especiales para atentados personales, las que fueron ocupadas -- en junio de 1965, al ser detenidos estos -- elementos.

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Una vez más, en 1965, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia intentó reagrupar las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, bajo la denominada "Unidad Resistencia" (UNARE).

En estas actividades, los elementos contrarrevolucionarios Enrique Abreu Vilahu, conocido por Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga y otros, planean un atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe, aprovechando su visita al restaurante "Vita Nuova", en el Vedado. En este lugar, Abreu Vilahu abriría fuego contra una subametralladora Thompson contra el Primer Ministro y postas del Ministerio del Interior ubicadas frente al restaurant, a fin de crear confusión y evadirse.

Al detenerseles, en julio de ese propio año, se les ocupó el material bélico para la realización de sus propósitos.

Once more, in 1965, the Central Intelligence Agency attempted to group the dispersed counterrevolutionary organizations, under the named "Unidad Resistencia" (UNARE). In these activities, the counterrevolutionaries Enrique Abreu Vilahu, known as Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga and others, plotted against the Commander in Chief, taking advantage of his visit to Vita Nuova's restaurant, in the Vedado. In this place, Abreu Vilahu would open fire with a Thompson machine gun against the Prime Minister and the guards of the Ministry of the Interior building located across the restaurant, in order to create confusion and escape.

On being arrested on July of that same year, warlike material they had for the fulfillment of their purposes, was taken from them.

También en 1966, fue detenido el ex-Comandante Rolando Cubela Secades, por ser el principal encartado en un plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro. Dicho plan fue articulado por la CIA aprovechando el viaje de Cubela a Madrid, lugar donde fue reclutado por los agentes de la CIA, Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreño conocido por el "Mago", Luis Enrique Trasancos y Carlos Tepedino.

Igualmente intervinieron en los planes del atentado, los traidores José Luis González Gallarreta, funcionario de la embajada de Cuba en Madrid y Alberto Blanco conocido por "El Loco".

En la entrevista de Cubela con Manuel Artime, éste último le garantizó la entrega de embarcaciones piratas, armas y hombres para una invasión que sería el complemento, en menos de 72 horas, de un atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

A tal efecto, antes de regresar Cubela a Cuba, recibió de José Luis González Gallarreta un fusil con mirilla telescópica y silenciador que le fue ocupado al ser detenido, conjuntamente con gran cantidad de armas y equipos que la CIA le había hecho llegar. También fueron detenidos Alberto Blanco Romariz y Jo-

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Being the principal indicted in a plan to kill the Prime Minister, the former Commander Rolando Cubela Secades was also arrested in 1966. That plan was prepared by the CIA, taken advantage of Cubela's trip to Madrid, where he was recruited by the CIA agents Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreño known as "The Magician" (El Mago), Luis Enrique Trasancos and Carlos Tepedino.

Others that also participated in the plot, were the traitors José Luis González Gallarreta official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and Alberto Blanco known as "The Crazy" (El Loco).

In the interview of Cubela with Manuel Artime, the latter guaranteed the delivery of pirate crafts, weapons and men for an invasion which would support the plan for the assassination of the Prime Minister in less than 72 hours.

For that purpose, before Cubela came back to Cuba, he received from José Luis González Gallarreta a rifle with telescopic peephole and muffler, which was taken from him when arrested, together with a great number of weapons and equipment that the CIA had sent to him. Alberto Blanco Romariz and José Luis

Dirigidos por la CIA, las organizaciones "Comando L" y "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre", con representación en territorio norteamericano, se dan a la tarea de preparar dos embarcaciones artilladas para infiltrarse en nuestro país y realizar actividades subversivas, a mediados de 1965.

Desisten de la infiltración y deciden tirotear la zona de becados de Miramar y el hotel Riviera, dirigiendo sus ataques fundamentalmente contra la residencia del Presidente de la República. Después de esta acción regresan a Estados Unidos.

En mayo de 1966, estos elementos se infiltraron por la zona de Monte Barreto, en la capital, con la misión de realizar un atentado al Primer Ministro. En la acción resultaron muertos Armando Romero Martínez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García, y detenidos: Antonio Cuesta Valle, cabeza principal de los "Comandos L", y Eugenio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas, a quienes se les ocupó gran cantidad de equipos y material bélico.

Estos elementos recibieron entrenamiento de la CIA en Puerto Rico y algunos de --

The "Comandos L" and the "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre", with representation in the U.S. territory, directed by the CIA, undertook the task of making ready two crafts equipped with guns to be infiltrated, and commit subversive activities in our country, about the mid-1965.

They gave up the infiltration and decided to shoot at the scholarship zone in Miramar and at the Riviera Hotel, mainly in direction to the residence of the President of the Republic. After this action they returned to the United States.

In May, 1966, these men were infiltrated by the Monte Barreto zone, in the capital, with the mission of assassinating the Primer Minister. In the action, Armando Romero Martínez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García were killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle, principal head of the "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas, were arrested and a great number of equipment and warlike material was taken from them.

These men were trained by the CIA in Puerto Rico, and some of them were the authors --

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of the bombardment to the "San Pascual"
merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarién
Port, in Las Villas Province.

ellos fueron los autores del cañoneo
al buque mercante "San Pascual", fon
deado en el Puerto de Caibarién, Las
Villas.

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El 17 de marzo de 1967, resultaron detenidos Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez, al tratar de infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Frágoso, - procedentes de Estados Unidos.

El objetivo principal que traían era realizar un atentado contra nuestro Primer Ministro y desatar una actividad sistemática de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos, todo ello complementado con ataques piratas, para dar la imagen en el exterior de actividades subversivas de grupos en distintas zonas y crear una situación que permitiera a las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias radicadas en Estados Unidos, recabar ayuda oficial.

Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en territorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrenados por la CIA, a través de las organizaciones "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras. Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el material bélico necesario.

Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez were arrested on March 17th, while they tried to infiltrate by the Cayo Frágoso zone, coming from the United States.

The main objective they should carry out was to assassinate our Prime Minister and launch a systematic activity of sabotage with plastic explosives, all that supported with pirate attacks, in order to give abroad an image of the existence of subversive activities in different areas and, thus, to create a situation which would permit the counterrevolutionary organizations located in the United States to succeed in getting official support.

In order to carry out their activities in Cuban territory, they were trained by the CIA through the "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others organizations. For this mission they were given all the necessary warlike material.

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En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandante en Jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".

El principal encartado en este plan era Jesús Domínguez Benítez, conocido por "El Isleño", para quien (a través de contrarrevolucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela) se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acreditaba como periodista venezolano, lo que le permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer Ministro en dicho país.

El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que no existían garantías para la conservación de sus vidas.

Domínguez Benítez, perteneció a la organización terrorista "Poder Cubano", fue acusado por las autoridades norteamericanas de promover acciones terroristas en Estados Unidos y otros países como miembro de dicha organización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.

On 1971, due to Commander in Chief's trip to Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country for which the CIA, the Chilean fascists and Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alpha-66" organization came together.

The major indicted in this plan was Jesús Domínguez Benítez, known as "The Islander". Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaper man, which permitted him to report our Prime Minister's visit in that country.

The plan would be carried out using a gun --- camouflaged into a television camera, but --- they gave this up on considering there were --- no guarantees for the preservation of their --- lives.

Domínguez Benítez, belonged to the "Poder Cubano" terrorist organization. He was accused by the American authorities of promoting --- terrorist actions inside the United States --- and other countries, as a member of that organization, and was arrested by the FBI in 1968.

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Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustrado intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por Oriente, refugándose en la Base Naval, donde nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por infrangir las condiciones de una fianza sobre una condena de 18 meses por la causa anteriormente mencionada.

No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin dificultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para participar en el atentado. Posteriormente regresa a Estados Unidos.

However, in 1970 he participated in the "Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltration through Oriente Province, and sought refuge at the Naval Base, where he was arrested again, this time because he violated the conditions of a bond over an 18 months-condemn due to the trial just mentioned before.

Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves United States without any difficulty, and moves to South America in order to participate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to the United States.

Consideramos que el análisis de las informaciones que aportamos, las públicamente conocidas y las que las autoridades norteamericanas poseen y no han sido publicadas, permiten afirmar que la eliminación física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cubana, principalmente del Primer Ministro Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituido una política reiterada de los Estados Unidos a través de sus agencias subversivas, utilizando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y todo tipo de elemento corrompido, tanto interna como externamente, sin tomar en consideración las víctimas que ocasionarían estas acciones.

Con este objetivo han sido facilitadas en grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, medios técnicos, de transporte y comunicación a los participantes, para la realización de sus planes.

Estos son algunos hechos connotados y comprobados de las numerosas actividades subversivas que ha realizado la CIA destinadas a la eliminación física de los dirigentes del Gobierno Revolucionario de --

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We consider that the analysis of the information we offer, the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities possess -- and have not been published, allow us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.

These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.