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Vol. 1 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
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The United States Senate R3014

Report of Proceedings

STANDARD  
DATE 3/2/77  
BY SP

Hearing held before

INVENTORIED  
DATE 4/19/77  
BY EC

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, May 6, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
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--accompanied by--  
John Rigall and  
Seymour R. Bolton

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Thursday, May 6, 1976

United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 o'clock P.M. in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professors.  
Staff Members.

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PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. I guess we will swear you in, so if you will stand up and raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so Help you God?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full name?

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1 TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. HALLEY

2 ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN RIGALL AND SEYMOUR R. BOLTEN

3 Mr. Halley. My name is Robert G. Halley.

4 Mr. Johnston. And I understand that is an alias and your  
5 true identity will be preserved by the Agency.

6 Mr. Halley. That is correct.

7 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Bolten, would you state your full name?

8 Mr. Bolten. Seymour Bolten, Seymour R. Bolten.

9 Mr. Johnston. And John, the alias you are testifying  
10 under?

11 Mr. Rigall. John Rigall, R-i-g-a-l-l.

12 Mr. Johnston. And Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigall, would you  
13 state your capacity in this session today?

14 Mr. Bolten. I am chief of the Review Staff of the CIA,  
15 and responsible for dealings with the Senate Select Committee.

16 Mr. Rigall. I am Special Assistant to the DDO, sitting  
17 in here as an alternate monitor.

18 Mr. Johnston. And the discussion that has taken place  
19 prior to going on the record today basically has resulted in a  
20 decision to have Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigall attend as monitors  
21 to this session, and do you understand that, Mr. Halley?

22 Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

23 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Halley, what was your capacity with a  
24 Agency in November, 1963?

25 Mr. Halley. In November, 1963, I was the Chief of Station

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1 of the CIA operation that was based in Miami, Florida, targeted  
2 as its primarily responsibility for the Cuban operation.

3 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wallach has reminded me to remind you of  
4 a procedural matter which, you understand you have the right  
5 to counsel.

6 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I do.

7 Mr. Johnston. And you understand you have a right not to  
8 answer questions if you don't wish to, or not to answer questions  
9 until you consult with Counsel, is that correct?

10 **Mr. Halley.** That is correct.

11 Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily  
12 without counsel.

13 **Mr. Halley.** That is correct.

14 Mr. Johnston. And going back to substantive questions, how  
15 long did you remain as Chief of Station?

16 What were the dates of your service?

17 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I arrived, or became involved in the  
18 Cuban operations in the early 1962, and I stayed there until  
19 approximately June of 1965.

20 Senator Schweiker. What month again in '62?

21 **Mr. Halley.** Early '62. I didn't give you the month,  
22 Senator, because I originally came down to Florida to conduct  
23 a survey of this operation to see what possibilities could be  
24 carried out in terms of the collection of intelligence. I  
25 later filed a report on it, and I was later assigned down to

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1 Senator Schweiker. And this was called JMWAVE, was it?

2 **Mr. Halley.** That is the cryptonym that the Agency used  
3 for the Miami station.

4 Senator Schweiker. And to whom in that chain of command  
5 at the CIA did you report when you were the operating head?

6 **Mr. Halley.** There were different people at different  
7 times. When I first went to Miami, the task force commander was  
8 Mr. William Harvey. He reported then to the DDP, who reported  
9 to the Director of Central Intelligence. At a later point in  
10 the operation, Mr. Harvey moved on to other tasks, and Mr.  
11 Fitzgerald became the chief of that particular unit, and then  
12 after Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Hart was the head of that  
13 particular unit.

14 And between Harvey and Fitzgerald, I think there was a  
15 short period of time when a fellow by the name of **Bruce Cheever**  
16 was the acting chief of that particular unit, or the chief.  
17 I have forgotten the exact arrangement there.

18 Senator Schweiker. Sometime during this period did it  
19 change its title from Task Force W to SAS, is that correct  
20 or not correct, or do I have it mixed up?

21 **Mr. Halley.** My recollection of that chronology was that  
22 it was first called SAS and then became Task Force W, and then  
23 became integrated back into WH Division, which was the Western  
24 Hemisphere Division.

25 Senator Schweiker. SAS preceded Task Force W?

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1 **Mr. Halley.** Yes. That's off the top of my head. That's  
2 my recollection of it.

3 Mr. Johnston. Just for the record, I think it was the  
4 other way around. Task Force W was first and SAS was second.

5 Senator Schweiker. But in sum and substance your duties  
6 were basically the same, whether it was Task Force W or SAS  
7 under Harvey and Fitzgerald, was that not true?

8 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think you have to break this period  
9 up into two phases, Senator. The early phase, 1962, was  
10 focused on coming up with an appraisal of what kind of an  
11 operation could be run against Cuba in the context which existed  
12 at that time; in other words, after the Bay of Pigs, after the  
13 post mortems had been conducted. The Administration at the time  
14 decided that they wanted to take another look at Cuba as an  
15 intelligence and national security problem. Therefore, an  
16 assessment was to be made in the early period of time as to  
17 what kind of an operation could be run in pursuit of U.S.  
18 policy objectives, which was to see if Fidel Castro's  
19 government could be removed. And when that assessment was  
20 conducted as to what kind of intelligence operations could be  
21 conducted, what kind of paramilitary or other operations could  
22 be run, that was an initial phase, and that phase was approved  
23 and put into effect. But as that operation was being put into  
24 effect the missile crisis came upon us, so that that was never  
25 really carried to its logical conclusion because the operation

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1 then shifted.

2 Senator Schweiker. After October of '62?

3 **Mr. Halley.** No, prior to October of '62, because the  
4 Cuban crisis was in October of '62, but the buildup preceded  
5 it, and our operations which were collecting intelligence in  
6 Cuba detected this buildup as it was unfolding. Therefore,  
7 the national priority became now how do you take action against  
8 Fidel Castro, but what is the nature of this Soviet buildup.  
9 And therefore the operation changed.

10 Then after the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962,  
11 the problem became one of monitoring the Soviet disengagement  
12 from Cuba, and then there was another phase after that when  
13 the Soviets were out, Castro was clearly recognized as the  
14 established power in Cuba, and the problem became one of  
15 looking at Cuba in the context of was there some other way to  
16 get a political change in Cuba other than by military action  
17 or by paramilitary action. In other words, the emphasis  
18 shifted to looking at the Castro military establishment to  
19 see if a coup could be pulled from within, to see if economic  
20 pressures could be put on the Castro regime.

21 So the tasking of this particular unit did change, and  
22 change of nuances and degrees during this period, but in our  
23 professional sense it was focused on the Cuban targets. So  
24 in that sense you are correct, but it did go through various  
25 changes as events changed.

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1 Senator Schweiker. What was the relationship of your  
2 station and your assignment to General Lansdale? What role  
3 did he play?

4 Mr. Halley. Well, in the early days, in the early period  
5 of 1962, General Lansdale was a member of a group that was  
6 looking at the basic problem of what could be done against the  
7 Cuban activity. This came up in one of my previous conversations  
8 with Mr. Baron.

9 Senator Schweiker. Are you talking about something we  
10 call Operation MONGOOSE, are we talking about Special Group  
11 Augmented, or what are we talking about?

12 Mr. Halley. Well, when I first came into this activity  
13 in 1962, the principal people that seemed to be involved with  
14 it at that time were Robert Kennedy, General Lansdale, Dick  
15 Helms, and William Harvey, and the group of Kennedy, Lansdale  
16 and Helms were providing, if you will, the guidance and the  
17 direction as to where this thing should go in the early days.

18 Shortly after the operation was established and I was  
19 in Miami, Lansdale seems to have faded out of this particular  
20 picture, and I was not involved in the Washington nuances of  
21 this, so I am not clear as to exactly what was the reason for  
22 his departure from this particular scene.

23 Senator Schweiker. And was that -- do you remember the  
24 cryptonym, Operation MONGOOSE?

25 Mr. Halley. I've heard the cryptonym Operation MONGOOSE.

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1 but that didn't impact on my life at that particular time.

2 Senator Schweiker. All right.

3 Mr. Johnston. Moving to the time of the Kennedy  
4 assassination, were you Chief of Station and in Miami when  
5 the President was assassinated?

6 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I was the Chief of Station and I was  
7 in Miami.

8 Mr. Johnston. You were physically in Miami on November  
9 22nd.

10 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I was.

11 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders through CIA  
12 channels to conduct an investigation in any fashion into the  
13 assassination of the President?

14 **Mr. Halley.** Well, my recollection of that was that we  
15 had requests for name traces at the time that Oswald was  
16 arrested, and that was our contribution to the investigation.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any order in the form of  
18 a cable or any other fashion to conduct an investigation?

19 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall receiving one, but if you  
20 showed me a cable, I would have to comment on it. In other  
21 words this was in 1963. This is 1976, and as you know from  
22 record, I've been in an awful lot of high volume projects since  
23 that time, and I don't think it is likely that I would recall  
24 a specific cable, you know, on a particular day. I mean, I  
25 have been in Berlin, Laos, Vietnam. My life has been active, and

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1 therefore I do not recall a specific cable. If you've got a  
2 cable, I'd be glad to comment on it.

3 Mr. Johnston. Well, I don't have one, and I'm asking you  
4 whether one would exist.

5 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall one.

6 Mr. Johnston. And your judgment would be that there was  
7 not a cable ordering an investigation.

8 **Mr. Halley.** I can't say that. I can only say that I  
9 don't recall one, but I do recall that at a later point, once  
10 Oswald was detained by the police and there was some investi-  
11 gative material emanating from that, we participated in  
12 name trace activity of whatever was sent to us at that time  
13 from Washington, because I do recall that at the time that  
14 the name traces were conducted, that one of the Cuban groups  
15 that we were in touch with at DRE, they did come up with a  
16 tape of a debate which had taken place between Oswald and some  
17 member of the DRE in New Orleans, and you know, that sort of  
18 sticks in my mind as an event of that particular time. And I  
19 commented on it, and as I recall, forwarded the tapes to  
20 Washington.

21 Senator Schweiker. That was Brinquier's group, was it  
22 not?

23 **Mr. Halley.** That was the DRE, the Direction Revolutionnaire.

24 Senators Schweiker. Wasn't Carlos Brinquier -- maybe  
25 I'm pronouncing it wrong, involved in that, and wasn't he

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1 associated with you folks at that time?

2 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I don't recall that specific name,  
3 Senator, at this time.

4 He did have a relationship with the DRE. We did deal  
5 with a number of their top leaders.

6 Mr. Johnston. Let me come back to that later.

7 Did you receive any orders not to investigate an area,  
8 or not to conduct an investigation of any kind?

9 **Mr. Halley.** No, I don't recall receiving any such orders.

10 Mr. Johnston. At this time period, November 22nd,  
11 November 23rd, 1963, what was your capability in regard to  
12 conducting an investigation among Cuban exiles, and with Cuban  
13 sources?

14 **Mr. Halley.** Well, in relationship to Cubans living in  
15 the United States, I would say that our capability was quite  
16 good.

17 Now, if you are referring to our capability to conduct  
18 an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited.  
19 I have to know where specifically you are referring to. In  
20 other words, if you're talking in the area --

21 Mr. Johnston. First I'm talking domestically of Cuban  
22 exiles in the United States, and your answer is --

23 **Mr. Halley.** That it would have been quite good.

24 Mr. Johnston. Secondly, with regard to collecting  
25 intelligence as to possible Cuban involvement --

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1 **Mr. Halley.** From Cuba or in Cuba?

2 Mr. Johnston. Any other source.

3 **Mr. Halley.** Well, if you're talking about collecting  
4 information in Cuba --

5 Mr. Johnston. I see.

6 **Mr. Halley.** It would then have to be focused specifically  
7 on different geographic areas. In other words, as an  
8 example, if you told me I want some information on a specific  
9 town in the province of Pinar del Rio, that probably was  
10 within our capability at that time because we had a rather  
11 extensive network in Pinar del Rio. If you had said to me,  
12 you know, in that same timeframe on this day, I want you to  
13 conduct a kind of an investigation in the province of Camaguey,  
14 I probably would have had to say, you know, we're not as well  
15 equipped, because our coverage varied from province to province.

16 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources -- and I mean specifically  
17 JMWAVE station, did JMWAVE station control sources in Cuban  
18 intelligence?

19 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall that we had any staff officer  
20 in the Cuban intelligence service under our control. We may  
21 have been involved in some double agent operations at that time,  
22 but certainly we did not have a staff officer penetration of  
23 the Cuban services.

24 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever receive any orders to control  
25 whatever your contacts were in the Cuban intelligence, to

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1 inquire about the assassination of President Kennedy?

2 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall receiving any such instruction.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did that ever occur to you on your own?

4 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think as you probably see from some  
5 of the traffic, we did come up on our own with samplings of  
6 opinion, what was happening in the Cuban community. We were  
7 reporting what was coming out of Cuba in terms of information  
8 brought by, you know, refugees, material that was being made  
9 available through people corresponding and so forth, yes, we  
10 were sensitive to that particular problem.

11 Mr. Johnston. But did you affirmatively go out and  
12 seek the information from sources in Cuba?

13 **Mr. Halley.** Well, to the extent that this was available  
14 to us, you know, we had lots of agents. If you're asking me  
15 did we send an SW message and task a specific agent to  
16 conduct an investigation, or did we send them a radio message  
17 or something like that, I don't recall one.

18 Mr. Johnston. Why didn't you do that?

19 **Mr. Halley.** My recollection of this is that we felt  
20 that the nature of our capability was to simply respond to  
21 what we were able to obtain in the Miami area, and from our  
22 sources in a passive way, because this was an investigation  
23 that was being conducted in the United States with the primary  
24 responsibility with agencies other than CIA.

25 Mr. Johnston. I guess I don't quite understand the answer.

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1 Because the CIA did have responsibility and certainly the  
2 capability to collect information from foreign countries.

3 **Mr. Halley:** Well, we had no reason at the particular time  
4 to feel that there was any kind of a case, hard information,  
5 that the Cubans were behind the assassination.

6 In other words, you know, at that particular period in  
7 time there were a large number of rumors, gossip, in the  
8 Cuban Community. Those that came to our attention were  
9 reported, and we tried to put them in some perspective, that  
10 is, who was the individual, what access did he have to this  
11 data and so forth.

12 But we had no persuasion that this was being mounted  
13 by the Cubans at that particular time.

14 Mr. Wallach. I would like to ask a couple of questions  
15 by way of background and let him go right back to his line  
16 of questioning.

17 Taking the period as exemplary, October of 1963 --

18 **Mr. Halley:** October of '63, okay.

19 Mr. Wallach. Which I take it would be fairly indicative  
20 of what was going on in May, June, July and August of the  
21 same year, I want to pick a fairly standard month for that  
22 period.

23 **Mr. Halley:** Oh-huh.

24 Mr. Wallach. Before the assassination.

25 It's my understanding that in addition to getting post-

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1 intelligence from refugees, etc., coming to this country,  
2 that your station did operate agents and did have sources,  
3 whatever terms you want to use, inside Cuba, is that correct?

4 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, we did have sources inside Cuba.

5 Mr. Wallach. Could you briefly for the record --

6 {Pause}

7 Mr. Wallach. What I'd like to do very briefly for the  
8 record, as you know, I think you had an interview with Mr.  
9 Baron and went into it with you, but very briefly describe  
10 generally the type of operations that your station was conducting  
11 vis-a-vis Cuba.

12 **Mr. Halley.** Well, in the first instance we were engaged  
13 in foreign intelligence collection activities, that is, trying  
14 to establish information which related to the plans, intentions  
15 and capabilities of the Cuban government. We were also  
16 involved in counterintelligence operations, that is, trying  
17 to figure out what the Cubans were doing in terms of their  
18 intelligence operations in the United States, or through the  
19 United States into Central and Latin America. We were also  
20 involved in propaganda operations against Cuba, and covert  
21 action in the sense of trying to establish contact with  
22 dissident military personalities in Cuba.

23 Mr. Wallach. Without naming names, did you in the time  
24 period I've been talking about, October of 1963, have either  
25 sources or agents fairly highly placed within the Cuban

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government?

1 **Mr. Halley.** I don't think -- there I'd have to get a  
2 better definition from you of what is highly placed. If you  
3 are talking about Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage --

4 Mr. Wallach. People who could possibly have been in  
5 meetings or dinner with Castro, or meetings with Castro. I  
6 don't know enough about how Castro operated.

7 **Mr. Halley.** I would say if you are talking about somebody  
8 who was a member of his immediate entourage and who was dealing  
9 with him in a governmental sense, then the answer is no, but  
10 we did have people who were on the periphery of this. That  
11 is, they wouldn't have been major participants. But they  
12 would have been in social contact with Castro or members of  
13 his entourage.

14 Mr. Wallach. How about persons within the DGI, whatever  
15 the correct name for Cuban intelligence is.

16 **Mr. Halley.** Well, again as I mentioned earlier, we had  
17 no staff officer penetration of the Cuban intelligence service.  
18 We had some reporting on people who were in touch with  
19 various leaders in the Cuban intelligence, and it was all in  
20 social or family or other context that these people were  
21 reporting on.

22 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time in 1962 or 1963  
23 the fact being brought to your attention that certain Cuban  
24 agents out of New York City were actually beginning to run  
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assassination plots against Cuban exile leaders down in Miami?

**Mr. Halley.** Out of New York? No, I don't recall that. One thing, just before we leave this, so we don't have an incomplete record, you asked me the other kinds of operations that we were running. We were running a full scope of paramilitary operations against Cuba. That is, we were putting people back into Cuba who may have come from a particular province, and who then went into the bush and lived in the bush, and we kept them supplied with food, arms, basic equipment. We did have radio contact with them. We were involved in raids against the Cuban coast, we were involved in putting caches into the Cuban coast.

Senator Schweiker. Does that finish your point?

**Mr. Halley.** Yes, sir, that's roughly it.

Senator Schweiker. Following up this other question, was any one part of your job plugging intelligence leaks at this given time?

Was there any concern during your timeframe that you were involved in Cuban operations of intelligence leaks from our country to theirs through the Cuban intelligence system?

Was this ever a consideration or priority of you as Station Chief?

**Mr. Halley.** Yes, in terms of -- well, yes, the answer to that is yes. Now, let me elaborate on it.

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1 We had a jurisdictional problem. For instance, a Cuban  
2 agent detected in the United States or being suspected of being  
3 a Cuban agent would have been a case that we would have had  
4 to have coordinated with the FBI, and essentially the FBI took  
5 primary action on this.

6 I recall one case where we detected a Cuban agent in the  
7 United States, and the case was transferred to the Bureau, and  
8 it involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue, which was  
9 clearly the Bureau's right to take that particular case over.  
10 So in that sense, the primary responsibility in the Miami  
11 area in the counterintelligence sense that you are discussing,  
12 Senator, would have rested with the Bureau.

13 Senator Schweiker. Did you ever attempt to find a leak  
14 by placing one of our agents into the system to plug a leak?  
15 I mean, was it ever that magnitude of concern attached?

16 **Mr. Hailey.** No, I don't recall that kind of a case. In  
17 other words, I do recall cases where people came out of Cuba,  
18 gave us a story that we did not necessarily believe, where  
19 we would turn them back and send them back to Cuba, so that  
20 over a longer period of time we could determine what it is that  
21 they were really after, what they were trying to do. In other  
22 words, were they trying to come into the United States to  
23 penetrate and immigrate, were they trying to get in touch with  
24 American intelligence, and if so, why. But it was all done  
25 back into the Cuban context.

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1 Senator Schweiker. This is a tough question to answer,  
2 but at that period of time, how successful in your opinion was  
3 the Cuban intelligence system in doing some of that penetration  
4 and I realize that we had a lot of Cuban exiles here, and it is  
5 pretty hard to tell the players from the scorecard we are in.  
6 It is a tough relevant question, but I wonder how you would  
7 analyze it.

8 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think it would be fair to say that  
9 given the Cuban propensity to talk -- in other words, you have  
10 to start off with a fundamental point of departure that if you  
11 get two Cubans that have got a secret, it is not going to be  
12 a secret, because they do talk, and therefore they all constantly  
13 talk.

14 Our biggest problem in maintaining security of our own  
15 operations, such as an infiltration operation into Cuba to  
16 put in a cache or run a commando raid or put a person back  
17 in was to maintain security. The only way we could do it would  
18 be to take all participants of that operation and take them  
19 out of the Cuban community and in fact isolate them for a week  
20 or ten days or more prior to the mounting of the operation so  
21 that they wouldn't talk, and we could know where they would  
22 be constantly, 24 hours a day. And within that milieu, I think  
23 it is safe to say that the Cuban intelligence service did have  
24 some agents and could be expected to have a general feel for  
25 the pulse of the community at that time.

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1 Senator Schweiker. During that same time frame, or  
2 during the time frame that you were Station Chief, what are  
3 some other Cuban groups that you worked with that come to  
4 mind? I have mentioned DRE. I realize there were several  
5 different ones?

6 Any others particularly that were helpful and worked with  
7 you like the DRE?

8 **Mr. Halley.** Well, the DRE was the main group because  
9 what had happened is after the -- or prior to the Bay of Pigs  
10 there was a great collaboration between CIA and a number of  
11 these groups. After the Bay of Pigs, the dialogue with these  
12 groups sort of dried up, and during my tenure, the main group  
13 that we worked with in that sense as an organizational entity  
14 was the DRE because they had a lot of active, imaginative  
15 young student leaders who had contacts throughout the Western  
16 Hemisphere who were equally interested in using them in the  
17 propaganda and covert action sense in Central and Latin  
18 America as we were actually using them against Cuba itself.

19 Senator Schweiker. Where did Alpha 66 fit or not fit  
20 into that?

21 **Mr. Halley.** We did not have an organizational relationship  
22 with Alpha 66. Alpha 66 was in being. We monitored their  
23 activities so that we would know when they were going to lead  
24 raids against Cuba. We may have had people who at one time  
25 or another were in our paramilitary teams who left us for

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one reason or another and may have ended up in Alpha 66.

Senator Schweiker. We realize that one of the other intelligence agencies might have had a liaison or working operation with Alpha 66, not the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I think -- you know, in the back of my memory I believe that one of the military services --

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been the Army Intelligence?

Mr. Halley. My recollection, it was probably a military service, and it probably was the Army, but I would have to check the record.

Senator Schweiker. We also were informed, and I just wondered if this was your recollection, that at some point some of the operations got a little bit overlapping and duplicating, and that the boats would -- I'm simplifying it of course, but that the boats weren't coordinated too well, and at one point it got to be -- a problem with whoever else was involved, and that finally an agreement was worked out with Army intelligence that all the boats would be supplied by CIA instead of having them sort of fly-by-nighting and possibly mess up some things because of duplication or conflict.

Do you recall any of that at all?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think there were periods when the U.S. Government was putting a clamp-down on refugee groups going out, and the whole apparatus of government, Coast Guard

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1 Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were working  
2 together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba.

3 In that context, the military did have some problems, but  
4 my recollection of that, Senator, is that we put them into the  
5 coordination mechanism that we had for getting boats out. I  
6 don't recall our taking their people --

7 Senator Schweiker. I might have stated it wrong.

8 What do you mean by a coordination mechanism?

9 **Mr. Halley.** Well, for instance, we had, let's say, for  
10 the month of October 1963, we would draw up an operational  
11 plan in September. In the course of that operational plan and  
12 geared to the dark of the moon, we would have a number of  
13 infiltration missions scheduled to put in caches. We'd have  
14 a number of missions scheduled to put in teams or to take  
15 people out of Cuba. We'd have a number of missions  
16 scheduled to conduct commando raids against fixed installations.

17 So we would draw up the schedule and coordinate the  
18 schedule with the appropriate agencies like Coast Guard or  
19 Customs so that we could move our boats in and out and not  
20 cause the U.S. Government to expend manhours and money in  
21 pursuing our boats.

22 Senator Schweiker. I think that is what I had in mind.

23 **Mr. Halley.** And therefore, on this schedule, when we  
24 worked this out, we therefore would tack on the military  
25 operations and work this out so that there was a central

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1 clearinghouse, and the U. S. government had a grip on what it  
2 was doing in this clandestine field.

3 Senator Schweiker. To your recollection, besides Army  
4 intelligence, were there any other intelligence services that  
5 were involved to any extent with that general picture?

6 **Mr. Halley.** Well, with the mutation of that, as I recall,  
7 the Navy had some activities in and out of Guantanamo, and there  
8 were some discussions at various times on how their people  
9 in Guantanamo could be supported, and the people were going  
10 in and out of Guantanamo.

11 Senator Schweiker. Were the Army operations very extensive  
12 or not compared to yours?

13 **Mr. Halley.** No. Compared to ours, they were infinitesimal.

14 Senator Schweiker. And Navy?

15 **Mr. Halley.** Navy, as I think all of this was limited to  
16 the perimeter all around Guantanamo, and Guantanamo.

17 Senator Schweiker. All right.

18 Mr. Wallach. I just want to ask you a couple of more  
19 questions as I was going to before.

20 I realize this question is going to your expertise, and  
21 if you have any trouble with definitional terms, let's get  
22 them straight.

23 **Mr. Halley.** Right.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did JMWAVE itself as an entity have the  
25 capability to conduct an investigation to determine whether or

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1 not there had been Cuban involvement in the assassination of  
2 President Kennedy in 1963?

3 **Mr. Halley.** I don't think there would have been a real  
4 world capability. I mean, if you're talking in my terms of  
5 conducting an investigation of this type in Cuba, which would  
6 have been professionally sound, that people could have put  
7 confidence in, I think the answer to that is probably no. I'm  
8 giving you an opinion. That is my opinion.

9 Mr. Wallach. Let's go back to terms, then. I'm not talking  
10 about an investigation where you could obviously have the  
11 freedom to go up and interview anyone you wanted to interview.

12 **Mr. Halley.** No. We are talking about through clandestine  
13 resources. In other words, to conduct this kind of investiga-  
14 tion, you know, in my view, you would have had to have had  
15 a penetration of one or more of the Cuban intelligence service.  
16 The penetration would have had to have been in the 26th of July  
17 Movement, and had enough rapport with the top leadership that  
18 it could have moved freely in and out of a specific circle.  
19 It would probably had to have been at the level of a Comandante.  
20 We did not have that kind of resource in depth to conduct  
21 that kind of investigation.

22 Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any discussions at that time  
23 that you remember between yourself, Fitzgerald, Helms,  
24 anyone, as to whether or not the CIA did have the capability  
25 to conduct such an investigation?

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1 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall such a discussion, but again,  
2 the reason for it was, it was essentially felt at that time, as  
3 name traces were done, the whole mood and the whole atmosphere  
4 was that this was a case that was being investigated by the  
5 FBI. It was their jurisdictional problem.

6 Mr. Wallach. Did the FBI, to your knowledge, have the  
7 capacity to investigate or to conduct any sort of investigation  
8 inside Cuba?

9 **Mr. Halley.** Inside Cuba? No, I don't think they did.

10 Mr. Wallach. Did you have direct contact with anyone  
11 from the Bureau on a continuing basis from the FBI?

12 Mr. Johnston. Let's restructure that whole area.

13 What was the liaison relationship between JMWAVE, the  
14 Bureau and Florida?

15 **Mr. Halley.** There was a direct liaison on a daily working  
16 basis, if this was required, between JMWAVE and the Miami  
17 Field Office, I think it was called, as a separate field  
18 office.

19 Mr. Johnston. At what level was this liaison conducted,  
20 directly with you?

21 **Mr. Halley.** No. This was conducted at at least three  
22 levels that I can recall: periodically the Chief of the Field  
23 Office and I would meet to review problems, if we had any  
24 particular problems, or frankly, just to get together just  
25 to make sure that we did not have any problems. There was

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1 direct liaison on a working level between the people in the  
2 Counterintelligence shop of the Station and what I think the  
3 Bureau used to call the Tamale Squad, which were former  
4 Bureau agents who had been down in Havana, who had left when  
5 Fidel came into power, and were still working in Miami. And the  
6 third liaison was essentially with people who were working  
7 specific cases, where the name trace mechanism between ourselves  
8 and the Bureau would show some mutuality of interest in a  
9 particular case.

10 For instance, as an example, the Bureau might call up and  
11 say, look, what do you know about Juan Jose Gonzalez of the  
12 Second Front of the Escambray. We'll say, okay, we'll take  
13 the question, we'll do a trace, prepare the answer, and somebody  
14 would go down and talk to them. So it was close. I would  
15 say it was close.

16 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever do the reverse? Did you ever  
17 ask the Bureau for information?

18 **Mr. Bailey.** Yes. We traced specific people with the  
19 Bureau.

20 Mr. Johnston. In November, after the assassination of  
21 President Kennedy, did you personally meet with anybody from  
22 the FBI regarding the investigation?

23 **Mr. Bailey.** I don't recall meeting on that specific  
24 subject.

25 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in INWAVE met

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1 with the FBI in regard to the FBI investigation in Florida?

2 **Mr. Halley.** My recollection is that this name trace  
3 procedure was working, whatever they were working in relationship  
4 to their investigation, was being run through us. In other  
5 words, how many traces, who was being traced, I couldn't answer  
6 that.

7 Mr. Johnston. Well, name traces are one thing. I guess  
8 I am talking one step above that. Did anyone in JMWAVE to  
9 your knowledge discuss with anyone in FBI in Florida the  
10 CIA's capability to assist the FBI investigation?

11 **Mr. Halley.** I have no way of answering that. I don't  
12 recall that. I don't recall that kind of thing. You know,  
13 this is -- you know, we're talking about 1961. This is 13  
14 years ago, and I keep telling you, you know, I've had a busy,  
15 active life.

16 Senator Schweiker. You are doing so far very well.

17 **Mr. Halley.** I feel you are pressing me on something that  
18 is almost unreasonable. I mean, I don't recall each and  
19 every conversation. I mean, I had a 300 man station.

20 Mr. Johnston. I agree with you on that, but you are  
21 describing name traces, which you do seem to recall, but I'm  
22 saying was there anything beyond name traces that you recall?  
23 Was there any assistance given beyond name traces?

24 Senator Schweiker. Was there any higher level investigation  
25 that you can recall?

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1 **Mr. Halley.** The reason this name trace thing sticks in  
2 my mind, frankly, is because of the name traces that were con-  
3 ducted on Oswald when we got the hit, and I recall, the hit  
4 was made on the fact that there was the discussion and debate  
5 between Oswald and the DRE fellow, and we were tracing a lot  
6 of names at that time, and in conjunction with this particular  
7 event, once people were arrested and detained and there was  
8 some reason to expect that there was what I called an investi-  
9 gative follow-up, you know, you've got to start from some  
10 fact. What was the fact? You had a name, an address, a  
11 telephone number, that kind of tracing was going on. That  
12 is what impacts on me, what is this, you know, 13 years later.

13 Senator Schweiker. In connection with that, the group,  
14 the DRE group, there was some allegation that Oswald, I guess  
15 part of it is reality for sure, that he tried to penetrate  
16 the group himself by coming in when he was in New Orleans and  
17 infiltrate it on his own, which I guess is known, and what  
18 is in doubt, there was an allegation that while he was doing  
19 that, that he possibly talked of assassinating Kennedy or he  
20 paid money to assassinate Kennedy.

21 Does any of that conversation strike any bells or recol-  
22 lation with regard to DRE?

23 **Mr. Halley.** No, it doesn't, Senator, and I think I've  
24 got to explain this to you as to what was the nature of our  
25 relationship with the DRE. In other words, we had a

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1 relationship with the DRE where we gave them a monthly  
2 subsidy. In other words, this would make them in our category  
3 like independent contractors. In return for this particular  
4 subsidy, they were to collect intelligence for us on the island  
5 of Cuba where they still had people. They were to be a symbol  
6 of a certain amount of resistance, therefore they had to engage  
7 in certain activities, propaganda, radio broadcasts, correspon-  
8 dence to their friends and associates on the inside to show  
9 that there was a spark on the outside, around which people could  
10 rally.

11 They also wanted to have a boat to move people inside  
12 and out of Cuba, and the money, the subsidy that we gave them  
13 helped them do all of these things. And we got an accounting  
14 from them. But we did not control each and every action that  
15 they took, so that if they chose, you know, not to report  
16 something to us, we wouldn't necessarily know it, and not  
17 every little detail of their organization did we know. If  
18 they met somebody --

19 Senator Schweiker. Well, I can understand that because  
20 there were a lot of groups like that, I'm sure.

21 Mr. Halley. But that particular one was one with which  
22 we had a subsidy relationship.

23 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall who your control  
24 relationship was with that particular group? I assume there  
25 was a CIA control relationship.

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1 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, there was a particular man that was in  
2 liaison with that group, and there were several during that period  
3 of time.

4 Senator Schweiker. Might it have been Carlos Bringuier,  
5 the name we mentioned before?

6 **Mr. Halley.** You mentioned the name, and to be honest, the  
7 name doesn't ring a bell. But is he also known as Fatty?

8 Senator Schweiker. Well, you've got me now.

9 **Mr. Halley.** Well, every Cuban has an alias, like, they  
10 call him El Gordo or something like that.

11 Senator Schweiker. Well, it might be. He fits it.

12 **Mr. Halley.** Well, you might be able to answer this. Was  
13 he the fellow that was on the DRE boat that raided Havana?  
14 I have trouble matching up some of these names, and frankly,  
15 that name doesn't ring a bell, but I might have known him as  
16 El Gordo, and he was on the boat, and we dealt with different  
17 people.

18 (Discussion off the record.)

19 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you WAVE cable 8049, dated  
20 21 November '63, which is your report on this DRE matter, and  
21 that cable basically indicates that you got information from  
22 DRE about Oswald.

23 Is that correct?

24 **Mr. Halley.** Yes. The wording of this particular cable  
25 shows that we did get from the DRE files this information.

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1 Mr. Johnston. My question to you is, of partial signifi-  
2 cance, and that is the fact that that cable says that Oswald  
3 "allegedly lives in home of Foreign Minister for two months."

4 My question is that this allegation that he lived in  
5 the home of the Soviet foreign minister has never been  
6 substantiated through any other source, and I wonder whether  
7 you have a recollection of going back to DRE to see where  
8 they got that information.

9 **Mr. Halley.** No, I don't have a recollection of going back  
10 on that specific cable.

11 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of headquarters  
12 ever coming back to you and saying what is the source of that?

13 **Mr. Halley.** You know, I don't see how you can expect me  
14 to remember that, really. You know, in the course of a day,  
15 a normal day, I might read a thousand cables.

16 Senator Schweiker. Well, does the fact that he might  
17 have lived in a Soviet foreign minister's home for two months  
18 ring a bell?

19 **Mr. Halley.** Well, you know, showing me that cable, I  
20 have to accept the cable at face value. That is what it says.  
21 I acknowledge that is what it says. The cable says we got it  
22 from the DRE. I accept it on face value. That incident,  
23 the foreign minister's residence, does not ring a bell with me.

24 Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand where that  
25 allegation came from.

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1 **Mr. Halley.** No, I don't know. We would have to go back  
2 to them and their criteria for carding might not coincide with  
3 ours. In other words, many of these Cuban groups were prone  
4 to act on rumors. They were prone to publicize things that  
5 were not true. The DRE had a record of publicizing, embroidering,  
6 elaborating on things, and therefore we treated a lot of their  
7 material with caution.

8 Senator Schweiker. Right.

9 Go ahead, Paul.

10 Mr. Wallach. Generally, now, and I'm not asking for  
11 specific conversations at all. I think it is entirely true,  
12 it is a caveat throughout this entire thing, we are talking  
13 about 13 years ago, millions of matters ago. But generally, do  
14 you recall whether or not the FBI, the people you dealt with  
15 had any general knowledge of the CIA's capability inside  
16 Cuba to get information?

17 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think it would be fair to say that  
18 the FBI knew the kinds of operations that we were running, and  
19 I think they could have drawn certain conclusions about, you  
20 know, what our capability might have been. That is, let me  
21 put this in perspective. I'm talking about the people in  
22 Miami. Occasionally when I would come to Washington for  
23 conferences, I would meet somebody like Papich. We happened  
24 to be, you know, friends, and I would talk to him and say  
25 how are you doing, how are things going, what kind of activity

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1 are you involved in?

2 Papich probably have a feel for the scope of our activity,  
3 but whether he would have an appreciation of the kinds of  
4 specific sources, I doubt it.

5 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would doubt whether or  
6 not anyone in the Bureau would have known whether or not you  
7 had an extremely high level source in Castro's entourage.

8 **Mr. Malley.** I doubt that they would know that.

9 Mr. Wallach. At any time, do you recall after the assassi-  
10 nation anyone from the Bureau, even from the Miami field office  
11 or from headquarters, through Papich, through your headquarters  
12 contacting you to determine whether or not you had the capability  
13 to conduct investigations on Cuba?

14 **Mr. Malley.** No, I don't recall that.

15 Do you want me -- can we go off the record for a minute?  
16 Senator Schweiker. Yes.

17 (Discussion off the record.)

18 Mr. Wallach. Let's go back on the record.

19 Were you known to the FBI under your real name or under  
20 an alias?

21 **Mr. Malley.** No, I was known to the FBI under my true  
22 name. If you are wondering about whether the name is going to  
23 show up in the FBI records, I think they always would, in the  
24 writing of reports, do not use the true names. In other words  
25 they say, you know, source or confidential informant, or A-

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1 whatever it was called, and that is the way they write their  
2 reports.

3 Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. I realize this was  
4 a subject matter that was covered in your previous testimony.  
5 I deem it of relevance, and I would like to ask you here, were  
6 you aware on November 22nd, 1963, that the CIA had at some point  
7 in time prior to that date itself engaged in attempts to assassi-  
8 nate or used others in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

9 **Mr. Malley.** No. I think the basic answer to that question  
10 is no, but if you looked at my previous testimony, I previously  
11 said that in the case of this Cuban comandante over the years,  
12 I had acquired some knowledge of the fact that he existed and  
13 he was being run by my colleagues in Washington, but that case  
14 was not known to me as a clearcut assassination operation. In  
15 other words, at one point in time I knew that Des Fitzgerald  
16 was going to meet this fellow. I knew at one point in time  
17 there was going to be a meeting in Spain. I knew at one point  
18 in time that we were putting caches in to support this particular  
19 fellow. I never knew whether the caches were recovered. All  
20 things like that. But the fundamental answer is no.

21 I have also previously testified that on some of the  
22 activities that were being engaged in by Mr. Harvey, that I  
23 was not knowledgeable on, you know, the thrust of those  
24 activities.

25 Mr. Wallach. Did your own sources in the Cuban community

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1 tell you that the, what we call the underworld, the Mafia,  
2 was engaging in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

3 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall any such reports, but I've  
4 explained this, and let me go again on this, that assassination,  
5 the word "assassination" was part of the ambience of that  
6 time. In other words, every Cuban that you talked to, nobody  
7 could be involved in Cuban operations without having had  
8 some sort of a discussion at some time with some Cuban who  
9 said, gee, we ought to knock this guy off, or I'd shoot him if  
10 I had the chance, or the way to create a revolution is to  
11 shoot Fidel and Raul, and then go down through the whole  
12 proposition. So the fact that somebody would talk about  
13 assassination just wasn't anything that was really out of the  
14 ordinary at the time. It was part of the climate. There  
15 were professional revolutionaries in some cases, men who had  
16 been in the 25th of July movement and left, and come in and  
17 become exiles, and had been exiles two or three times.  
18 Revolution and assassination was a way of life for them.

19 **Mr. Wallach.** Did you have any doubt in your mind that  
20 Castro was aware in November 1963 that the CIA was supporting  
21 these revolutionaries?

22 **Mr. Halley.** Supporting revolutionaries.

23 **Mr. Wallach.** Right.

24 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I think Castro knew that the United  
25 States was in touch with groups like the DRE, that people

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1 were being infiltrated by CIA into Cuba, because they apprehended  
2 some of them.

3 Mr. Wallach. Groups that were trying to overthrow  
4 Castro.

5 **Mr. Halley.** But he had to assume that if they were coming  
6 in, they were setting up guerrilla forces in places like  
7 Oriente Province, and Pinar del Rio, that yes, they were going  
8 to work to overthrow him, and he had to know that.

9 Mr. Wallach. Were you aware of any other country that  
10 the United States Government was at that time attempting to  
11 overthrow the government of, and we can get your answer off  
12 the record if it is positive.

13 **Mr. Halley.** Well, wait a minute. Would you rephrase  
14 that? I'm not sure I follow that particular one.

15 Mr. Wallach. You came back to me with the word assassi-  
16 nation, said it was part of the ambience of the times, that  
17 that might have been discussed at one time or another. My  
18 belief, as a layman, had been I don't see that much of a  
19 distinction between sending someone in who is going to try to  
20 foment a revolution, the result of which would probably be  
21 the death of Castro as opposed to sending someone in to --  
22 don't want to get into this, but I think that may have been  
23 something that you were teaching on.

24 In any event, are you aware of any other country that  
25 the U.S. at that time was directing attempts to overthrow the

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1 government of?

2 **Mr. Halley.** No. Off the top of my head, no, but I  
3 do want to come back to your point. I do think there is a  
4 difference in the Latin American revolutionary sense of plotting  
5 a revolution against somebody as opposed to plotting a  
6 specific assassination operation against a particular individual.  
7 You know, maybe we have an honest difference of opinion on that  
8 point, but my view differs from yours.

9 Mr. Wallace. All right, let me continue on.

10 You also mentioned before that some of the people, the  
11 people that you felt were making general policy, were Helms,  
12 Bobby Kennedy, at one point Ed Lansdale.

13 **Mr. Halley.** Oh-huh.

14 Mr. Wallace. Did the Cubans know that? Did the Cubans  
15 know that Bobby Kennedy was involved?

16 **Mr. Halley.** I don't know that they were at that point in  
17 time, but clearly at later points of time when the Brigade 2506  
18 returned, yes, they knew that Bobby Kennedy was in the Cuban  
19 policy affairs. Leaders of the brigade like Artimo, Oliva,  
20 the San Juan brothers and others were brought to Washington  
21 for lunches, dinners with, I guess at that time it was the  
22 Attorney General, because there were various phases in this  
23 thing.

24 Yes, they knew he was involved in Cuban affairs.

25 Mr. Wallace. Are you familiar with an article that appeared

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1 in I think it was the September 7th issue of the New Orleans  
2 Times-Picayune, among other newspapers, which reflected an  
3 interview Castro had with Daniel Barker of the AP, within which  
4 he said in substance that U.S. leaders would be in danger if  
5 they continued in their attempts, I think he used the word  
6 "eliminate".

7 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I'm familiar with the general article,  
8 yes, but I can't tell you with certainty that I was aware of  
9 that article at the time that it appeared. In other words,  
10 you're asking about 1961, did you say it appeared?

11 **Mr. Wallach.** September 7, 1963.

12 **Mr. Halley.** I cannot swear that I knew about it in 1961.  
13 I since know that that article has been referred to a number of  
14 times.

15 **Mr. Johnston.** Let me just state for the record that I  
16 did not bring the WAVE cable on it, but WAVE did pass to head-  
17 quarters the gist of that article as it appeared in Miami  
18 articles, passed that information to Headquarters either on  
19 the 23rd or 24th of November because the FBI was inquiring  
20 about exile groups claiming that Castro had threatened Kennedy  
21 anyway, so that at least WAVE had knowledge right after the  
22 assassination of that article.

23 **Mr. Halley.** All right. The reason I qualify my response  
24 that may have been a cable that would have been released by  
25 some member of my staff. It didn't necessarily follow that

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1 was a WAVE cable, that I personally released it. I don't happen  
2 to recall it, but I am familiar with the article and the thrust  
3 of it.

4 Mr. Wallach. I realize again you may not have been familiar  
5 with it at that time, or even before the assassination, but  
6 what -- and I'm not asking specifically for what facts, but  
7 you have testified previously that -- I don't want to paraphrase  
8 your testimony, it speaks for itself -- that you had no reason  
9 to believe that the Cubans were involved in the assassination  
10 of President Kennedy.

11 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, at the time that the incident occurred,  
12 and when Oswald was apprehended, I had no reason to believe  
13 that the Cubans were involved.

14 Mr. Wallach. Taking the other side of the coin, what  
15 evidence was there in your mind that they were not involved?

16 **Mr. Halley.** Well, because we didn't have any evidence  
17 that they were.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did you conduct any investigation at all to  
19 determine if there was any involvement?

20 **Mr. Halley.** I didn't have any charter for that. I mean,  
21 people were arrested. The FBI and the authorities in that  
22 particular, in Dallas, were pursuing the case. I had no  
23 charter to pursue that.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether or not  
25 you could conduct such an investigation, or did he ever tell

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1 you that you could or could not?

2 **Mr. Halley.** No, I answered that, that I don't recall  
3 any such conversation where Helms told me I could or could not.  
4 I mean, this was not a subject that was being discussed.

5 I think the frame of reference at the time was that this  
6 was not a jurisdictional case for the CIA to pursue.

7 Mr. Wallach. You mean, the President of the United States  
8 is murdered, and it is not within the jurisdiction of the CIA  
9 to determine if a foreign country is involved?

10 **Mr. Halley.** Not if the investigation is run by the  
11 FBI and a person is apprehended, and one is going to assume  
12 that he is going to be interrogated, investigative leads are  
13 going to be obtained from it, and a particular agency has got  
14 the action responsibility. Under those circumstances, my  
15 perception of the various rules is that CIA performs a support  
16 function. In other words, if you are asked for a name  
17 trace, or traces on telephone numbers, physical descriptions,  
18 you know, license plates, whatever it may be, you respond.

19 Mr. Wallach. Who gave you those instructions, that  
20 CIA was only going to have a support function?

21 **Mr. Halley.** That is my perception.

22 Mr. Wallach. Who told you that?

23 **Mr. Halley.** Nobody has to tell you that. You're an  
24 intelligence human being. You're allowed to think for yourself  
25 and you can come to logical conclusions.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Did somebody tell you that the FBI had  
2 primary jurisdiction?

3 Mr. Halley. No, but the FBI has primary jurisdiction,  
4 this is something we are taught in our training courses, in  
5 the United States, you know, for cases in the United States.  
6 For instance, my explanation of this -- I gave you an explanation  
7 of the counterintelligence case in the States where we found  
8 a Cuban agent in the United States, and the jurisdiction of the  
9 case reverted to the FBI.

10 Senator Schweiker. Do you want to make a comment here,  
11 Seymour?

12 Mr. Bolton. I'd like to go off the record.

13 Senator Schweiker. All right.

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 Senator Schweiker. Let's go back on the record.

16 Mr. Wallach. I have one or two more questions on this.

17 Senator Schweiker. All right.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did at any time during the existence of the  
19 Warren Commission, do you recall -- and I'm not asking for a  
20 specific event, but do you recall having any type of indirect  
21 relationship with that Commission, in essence, responding to  
22 requests that were made of the Agency and they asking you for  
23 general information?

24 Mr. Halley. Would you give me the dates of the Warren  
25 Commission?

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Mr. Wallach. December 1, '63 --

Mr. Halley. December 1, '63 to when?

Mr. Wallach. September of '64.

Mr. Halley. No. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any reason today to believe that there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halley. I have no hard information on that.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any hearsay information?

Mr. Halley. No. I mean, hearsay information, what constitutes hearsay? Uziel wrote an article in the Washington Post, you know, suggesting that there is some -- is that hearsay evidence? I mean, I don't happen to believe his thesis.

Mr. Wallach. I am asking you if you have any belief as an expert?

Mr. Halley. As an expert I only deal in facts, in other words not -- what I consider hard intelligence, I don't have any hard intelligence.

Mr. Johnston. Other than the FBI, did you have a liaison with other investigative agencies?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have an investigative relationship with the U.S. Customs Department, specifically a Customs agent who was on detail to CIA?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we had a relationship with a Customs

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1 agent by the name of Caesar DeEstado. Caesar DeEstado was  
2 detailed on an arrangement between CIA which was in being when  
3 I came to the station. His primary function was to be  
4 stationed in Key West, Florida. He generally covered the area  
5 from Key West to either Marathon or it could have been --  
6 either Marathon or El Marado, and his tasks were, one, to  
7 find Cubans who were coming into the United States in small  
8 boats, and to ensure that he took a quick look at them to  
9 see if any one of them could be turned around to be used as  
10 intelligence sources. If they couldn't be used as intelligence  
11 sources, he skimmed off the perishable information that was  
12 really critical, and then put it into our system. He also  
13 flagged the knowledgeable people for further exploitation by  
14 us when they went to the Opa Laca briefing center. He also  
15 picked up equipment, that is documents from these people,  
16 weapons, clothing, so that we could use authentic clothing to  
17 equip our own teams.

18 Mr. Johnston. Did he also stay in contact with certain  
19 Cuban exiles?

20 Mr. Halley. He did stay in contact with Cuban exile  
21 groups because it was part of his job to know when they were  
22 going out so that we didn't have these uncoordinated problems.  
23 In other words, at one point we tried to stop them. He also  
24 has to know who was in the area running a training camp or  
25 something like that, so that our operations would not be

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1 compromised by coming into a camp next to where some exiled  
2 Cubans were already working.

3 Mr. Johnston. And did he -- let me back up. First, have  
4 you participated in the Agency's response to the Committee's  
5 written inquiry about this?

6 Mr. Halley. Well, to this extent, somebody in the Agency  
7 called me and said the Committee had a request in for some  
8 data on a Customs officer. Nobody could remember his name. I  
9 happened to remember his name. I said Caesar DeEstado was the  
10 guy's name. I don't remember how to spell it. Phonetically  
11 I think it is as follows, and try to find a file on it. And  
12 so to that extent, yes, I am aware that there was some sort of  
13 a response being prepared. I did not see the response. I  
14 don't know what it says.

15 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he was asked either by  
16 you or by anybody in WAVE to contact Cuban exiles after the  
17 assassination to see what knowledge they might have?

18 Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to clarify that. I was  
19 not his contact point. In other words, I was a manager of a  
20 large operation.

21 Mr. Johnston. I understand that. So did anybody under  
22 your control contact him?

23 Mr. Halley. His point of contact was in Key West. Period.  
24 ally he would either come to Miami or meet with one of our  
25 people, and once every three months or something like that I

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1 would have a meeting with him to review broad trends, either  
2 in Key West or in Miami. I never took him with this type of  
3 thing. I don't recall anybody else in the station tasking him  
4 to conduct an investigation of Cuban groups relative to the  
5 President's assassination. But as we were putting together  
6 mood cables -- you showed me an example of one there -- it is  
7 conceivable that he is the kind of person that we would have  
8 talked to to find out what was going on in the Cuban community  
9 at that time.

10 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he did in fact contact  
11 Cuban exiles about it? Do you have any knowledge of his contact  
12 Cuban exiles?

13 **Mr. Halley.** I don't have any firsthand knowledge.

14 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever?

15 **Mr. Halley.** I would have to say firsthand, I don't  
16 recall any information of any subordinate of mine reporting to  
17 me that he had done that.

18 Mr. Johnston. You testified earlier that you met with  
19 Mr. Fitzgerald at some point, and that he told you at that  
20 time that he made contact personally with a Cuban agent, code-  
21 named AMLASH?

22 **Mr. Halley.** I think my testimony was something along the  
23 line, that I had a conversation with Fitzgerald, that he was  
24 going to meet a Cuban source. My recollection was that the  
25 name may have come up, that he was asking my opinion and advice.

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1 as to whether this would be a useful thing to do. And as I  
2 have testified before, my recollection is I told him I thought  
3 I would find this conversation interesting, but I didn't think  
4 it was worth his doing because he had too high a profile, and  
5 it would not be a good thing to do from the point of view of  
6 attribution in relationship to a clandestine agent.

7 Mr. Johnston. And let me go through what you have just  
8 told me.

9 First of all, was this agent, when he used the true  
10 name, was it the agent whose cryptonym is AMLASH?

11 **Mr. Halley.** Yes. Subsequently I have concluded that that  
12 is who it is.

13 Mr. Johnston. Did he tell you or indicate that a meeting  
14 between him and AMLASH was proposed?

15 **Mr. Halley.** Well, he was considering a meeting with  
16 AMLASH, with this particular person.

17 Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection as to what  
18 timeframe your discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald was?

19 **Mr. Halley.** No, I don't.

20 Mr. Johnston. Knowing that Mr. Fitzgerald met with  
21 AMLASH on October 29th, 1963, does that refresh your recollection  
22 as to whether the conversation took place earlier in 1963?

23 **Mr. Halley.** I am sorry, I can't narrow that down for  
24 you.

25 Mr. Johnston. But you advised against the meeting.

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1 **Mr. Halley.** Right.

2 Mr. Johnston. You were knowledgeable, I take it, of the  
3 Agency's dealing with AMLASH from time to time, as part of  
4 JMWAVE.

5 **Mr. Halley.** Yes. I mentioned to you earlier that we had  
6 put in caches which were scheduled to be retrieved by AMLASH  
7 or his people, so yes, I knew that we were providing support to  
8 an agent in Cuba, but that was not unusual because we were  
9 putting in a large number of caches for a wide variety of  
10 people who were being run out of Washington, over and out of  
11 other stations.

12 Mr. Johnston. And you may have testified about this before  
13 but was it common to drop caches of rifles or telescopic sights  
14 for agents?

15 **Mr. Halley.** I would not necessarily have known what was  
16 in each cache.

17 Mr. Johnston. Well, was it common to drop, to your knowledge,  
18 to drop rifles with telescopic sights?

19 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think the thing that would be us-  
20 common would be telescopic sights. Many of our caches were  
21 weapons caches. A large bulk of the caches were rifles of one  
22 kind or another. We put in the FAL, the Belgian FAL, we  
23 put in M-1s. We put in carbines, we put in Springfields, we  
24 put in Thompson submachine guns. I think if I were looking at  
25 a cache list and I saw a telescope on it matched up with a

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1 Springfield '03 rifle, that probably would have struck me as  
2 being unusual, but I did not see the inventories of all the  
3 caches.

4 Mr. Johnston. Would you commonly or routinely see cables  
5 from the Director, especially on the AMBLASH operation?

6 Mr. Halley. No.

7 From the Director to whom?

8 Mr. Johnston. To JMWAVE.

9 Mr. Halley. My recollection is, other than specific  
10 requests to put in caches, that there wasn't any cable traffic  
11 between Washington and JMWAVE on that particular operation.

12 Mr. Johnston. I am searching through my notes --

13 Mr. Halley. Right.

14 Mr. Johnston. The Committee does not have copies of the  
15 file of AMBLASH. That is at the Agency. Let me, if you'll  
16 accept it as a fact that there was a cable in early December  
17 1963 from the Director to JMWAVE directing, using the crypt  
18 AMBLASH and directing that a cache be supplied him, including  
19 in that, itemizing two rifles with telescopic sights.

20 Mr. Halley. That kind of a cable I may or may not have  
21 seen. In other words, that would have been a fairly standard  
22 logistics kind of thing to get a cache and it would have come  
23 up on my briefing chart for the month, the operation, X number  
24 of days before the operation was launched, I would have had  
25 a briefing with all of the paramilitary and maritime officers

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1 and our COMINT, ELINT and other specialists to look at the CV  
2 and make a decision as to whether the operation should go or  
3 not go. At that point I probably would have known that it was  
4 a cache, that it contained weapons, that it was in support of  
5 a headquarters run operation.

6 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall on or about 7 or 8 December  
7 1963 a stop being put on operations, certain operations that  
8 went into Cuba?

9 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall that specific timeframe, but  
10 there were periodic ups and downs in the number of operations  
11 that could be run. We would get policy guidance to stand  
12 down for a period of time, that once one of those things came  
13 out, I think that we had a series of discussions, I think, with  
14 Washington, and appeals, that if there was a standdown, and  
15 we had to say something, who were dependent on us in Cuba  
16 for food and a continuing flow of weapons, that we couldn't  
17 have them preparing these caches and risking their lives to  
18 come to the reception points and not be able to meet the  
19 schedules.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall, though, in the period 6, 7  
21 and 8 December, headquarters first authorizing certain  
22 operations and then calling off the operations, and specific  
23 cables which said, and I quote -- pardon me, I don't quote,  
24 the operations being called off, "pending major top level  
25 Cuban-Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which

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1 should provide basis for decision."

2 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall your specific dates or your  
3 timeframe, but the point I would like to leave with you is that  
4 there were several periods like that where we had ups and downs,  
5 and yes, I do recall standdowns on operations.

6 Mr. Johnston. You don't recall a standdown within two  
7 weeks of the assassination of President Kennedy.

8 **Mr. Halley.** I am sorry, I don't. You know, I accept that  
9 it occurred, but you know, there were so many of those during  
10 the three and a half year period of time that I don't recall  
11 that specific one.

12 Mr. Johnston. What does the phrase "higher authority"  
13 generally mean in Agency cables?

14 **Mr. Halley.** Well, at that particular point in time, I  
15 think higher authority was a euphemism for the President and  
16 top level policy decisionmakers at the NSC 40 Committee level.

17 Mr. Johnston. And again, you don't recall knowing in  
18 the same time period, December 1961, that you were cabled that  
19 the Headquarters procedure was to present the infiltration  
20 procedures to higher authority.

21 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I have forgotten the date when this  
22 transition took place. As of a fixed date, in the course  
23 of this operation, we had to supply all of our infiltration  
24 operations a month in advance. I'm sorry, I just don't  
25 recall when that went into effect. Prior to that time we were

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1 pretty well scheduling these ourselves, but then a request  
2 came in that we put these in a month in advance. So as I  
3 told you before, if I wanted to run a schedule for October, I  
4 had to have it in in Washington with all of the Ops plans  
5 by I think the 15th of September.

6 Senator Schweiker. Did a former ambassador William  
7 Pauley, a man called William Pauley, who at one time owned  
8 properties in Havana and now living in Miami, did he ever  
9 finance some of the operations that you are aware of out of  
10 Miami, William Pauley?

11 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I know Bill Pauley. He was involved in,  
12 in my time, in one specific operational activity. I don't  
13 think it would be proper to say that he financed it, however.

14 Senator Schweiker. This is the one where people were  
15 killed in a boat raid?

16 **Mr. Halley.** Well, we don't know what happened to them.  
17 My recollection of the operation is that Bill Pauley was  
18 approached by Life Magazine, and this was involved with an  
19 individual by the name of John Martino, because this has come  
20 up recently. The Committee has asked me about this before I  
21 told them at first I couldn't remember the name, and I had  
22 to go back and conduct a file search, and I came up with  
23 John Martino's name, who had been involved in gambling casinos  
24 in Cuba.

25 Martino was in touch with a number of Cubans who

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1 claimed that they had access to two Soviet missile technicians.  
2 Pauley brought this operation to the Agency, and the Agency  
3 agreed that we would cooperate with them in pursuit of this  
4 operation.

5 Senator Schweiker. And Time-Life did some funding for  
6 it, too?

7 **Mr. Halley.** Well, they were involved, but they did not  
8 fund it. My recollection is Pauley made the boat available,  
9 the Flying Tiger, which was his yacht, we paid for the gas and  
10 oil for that particular boat, and we provided all of the other  
11 equipment that went into the operation. Pauley went on that  
12 vessel down to the launch point. The men were launched in a  
13 small infiltration boat. It took off, went off toward the  
14 Cuban mainland, and were never seen or heard from since then.  
15 We never had any reporting on them.

16 Senator Schweiker. Was Pauley involved with other  
17 operations with you folks, or is that the only one?

18 **Mr. Halley.** That is the only operation that he was  
19 involved with the Agency. He, however, was very helpful in  
20 terms of providing advice on various people that he had known  
21 from his long involvement in Cuba. He was useful in providing  
22 introductions to various people that we wanted to meet. I  
23 recall on one occasion he introduced me to a prominent Cuban  
24 that I wanted to meet. He brokered that.

25 Pauley, on his own, gave money to various Cuban groups.

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1 unrelated to what we were doing. He was also a participant  
2 in the raising of the initial ransom for the members of  
3 Brigade 2506.

4 Senator Schweiker. Here is an article -- rather than me read  
5 it, I'll give you a chance to read it. It is Claire Booth  
6 Luce. As you know, she is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory  
7 Board, and has been for some time, and Bill Colby was her  
8 chief of station when she was ambassador to Italy. This  
9 story came to me not through the paper, frankly, but from  
10 Mrs. Luce personally, expressing her concern. It subsequently  
11 did appear in a paper and I did not release it. Mrs. Luce  
12 specifically released it to Betty Beale, and the reason it is  
13 relevant here is that from what I read here, the group she  
14 is referring to is probably the DRE group or some part of  
15 the DRE group in New Orleans, and while that is not too clear,  
16 she did associate Mr. William Pauley with it. But that is  
17 somewhat confused, because you said he wasn't involved in any  
18 other operation other than the one you mentioned.

19 Mr. Halley. Well, I'm -- Mr. Pauley, I know Mr. Pauley  
20 and Mrs. Luce are friends. They see each other, or they used to.  
21 I haven't seen them in a number of years, but they used to  
22 be in the same social circuit, so I am sure that Mr. Pauley  
23 recounted a war story in his contacts, so she is probably  
24 aware of the general operation to get the two Soviets out of  
25 Cuba. That is the only operation that he ran with us during

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1 my stewardship of the station.

2 Senator Schweiker. There is a vast difference of recollec-  
3 tion between the two on what happened. She very strongly  
4 recalls that in addition to the thing that you described,  
5 which is a matter of record, by the way, with the Senate  
6 Committee, it is a matter of Committee record, in addition to  
7 that, that this is in it also.

8 Rather than read the whole thing, you might read the  
9 paragraphs I have outlined. She feels very strongly about it.  
10 She has called me several times about it. She is absolutely  
11 certain of her information, and her Cuban source doesn't want  
12 to talk for fear of his life.

13 (The Witness reads the document.)

14 **Mr. Halley.** No, that doesn't ring any bells. I cannot  
15 put that in any context.

16 Let me go back to this Pauley business. I think at one  
17 time, one other thing that Pauley did for us, I think he  
18 provided an opportunity for us to pick up some cargo in the  
19 Dominican Republic to provide cover for one of our vessels that  
20 we were using at that time for infiltration operations in the  
21 area but those are the only things that I can remember off the  
22 top of my head.

23 Senator Schweiker. You see, where he says here that he had  
24 contact with a group, the story goes on to say that this  
25 group supplied a tape and pictures of that contact, and that

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1 FBI did not follow them up, which is a rather serious charge  
2 itself, and that is why I wonder if there is some DRE relation-  
3 ship here with Bringuier.

4 Maybe you can give us that case officer's name, Seymour.

5 Mr. Bolton. Which one?

6 Senator Schweiker. The case officer for the DRE group.

7 It would have to be the one at the time when Oswald was  
8 in New Orleans, which is -- when was that?

9 Mr. Johnston. The fall of '63.

10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 Senator Schweiker. Going on, I didn't follow the final  
12 question on DeEstada, your detail man to Customs.

13 Were you aware that he was doing some investigating  
14 after the Kennedy assassination?

15 Mr. Halley. No, I don't have any firsthand recollection  
16 of that.

17 Senator Schweiker. And the way you were structured, would  
18 he be the logical person to, if somebody asked for either a  
19 name check or some follow-up --

20 Mr. Halley. He would have been the logical person if we  
21 had something specific to pursue or he would have been the  
22 logical person to put a question to if we were looking for  
23 atmospheric, you know, what the Cuban community was thinking.

24 Senator Schweiker. How about Julie Lobo?

25 Mr. Halley. He's the sugar king.

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1 Senator Schweiker. He's the sugar king there.

2 Did he assist with any of your operations, either finan-  
3 cially or in terms of his people or in terms of his organization?

4 **Mr. Halley.** My recollection of that, there was no direct  
5 contact between us and Julio Lobo. We did have various  
6 Cuban investigative and research groups that we were working  
7 with. My belief is that one of these groups must have been  
8 tapping Lobo for his knowledge of the sugar market, because  
9 we were constantly making projections of where the sugar crop  
10 was going in Cuba, because that impacted on the stability of the  
11 Cuban economy. In other words, when it was a good crop, you  
12 could figure that Castro's going to have 2 millions of dollars.  
13 When he didn't have a good crop, this was going to impact on  
14 where he wanted to go with building the revolution.

15 Senator Schweiker. There is another name that I believe  
16 had some relationship with him, maybe businesswise, James  
17 Cogswell, or Caldwell.

18 **Mr. Halley.** Caldwell. I think that was the fellow that  
19 was employed by the Agency at one time.

20 Senator Schweiker. Right.

21 **Mr. Halley.** Who was --

22 Senator Schweiker. What was his project at that point?

23 **Mr. Halley.** He was working here in Washington. He was  
24 on the Cuban project in Washington. He was primarily concerned  
25 with economic activities and how pressure could be put on the

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Cuban economy.

Senator Schweiker. And how about an Antonio Veciana, a Cuban name?

Mr. Halley. Yeah, I think he's the owner, one of the part owners in the restaurant in Miami called Las Violinas.

Senator Schweiker. At one point he worked for --

Mr. Halley. Could you spell the name?

Senator Schweiker. Maybe I'm not pronouncing it right.

V-e-c-i-a-n-a.

Mr. Halley. I think that's the fellow who used to run the restaurant called Las Violinas, and he was involved with a number of Cuban exile groups. I think he was connected with the second front of the Escambray, but that is off the top of my head. We'd have to do a trace.

Senator Schweiker. Did David Phillips, during your tenure there, have any assignment in Cuba?

What was his relationship at the time of this period? David Phillips? That's head of the Retired --

Mr. Halley. Yes, at that point in time he was stationed in Mexico City, and my recollection was that he was involved in covert operations against Cuba out of Mexico City, and he may have been involved in operations against the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. I am a little vaguer on that. I am on the first part.

I know we had some travelers going down to Mexico City.

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1 and their point of contact frequently was Dave Phillips, but  
2 most of those fellows were dealing with propaganda distribution,  
3 but he could well also have worked against the installation.

4 At that time he was not the station chief. He was a  
5 secondary figure, I guess, at the station.

6 Senator Schweiker. Did Howard Hughes or his organization  
7 or Intertel, assist you in any operations, and I am going to  
8 exclude for the moment Mr. Mahen, who we know had a very  
9 specific role, excluding the Mahen situation with Giancana  
10 and Rosselli that I think you are familiar with --

11 Mr. Bailey. Yes.

12 Senator Schweiker. To your knowledge, did Howard Hughes,  
13 Intergel or any of his other groups or associations assist  
14 or work with you in the Cuban operation?

16 Mr. Halley. Not with the Miami station that I am aware of.

17 Senator Schweiker. Well, I'm not talking about --

18 **Mr. Bailey.** Well, back here in Washington that could be,  
19 but I have no knowledge of it. I can only answer it out of  
20 the Miami context.

21 Senator Schweiker. At one point in time, probably when  
22 you first came aboard, there was a Lt. Colonel Samuel Kaly,  
23 who was military attache to the Havana embassy.

54. Chief Clerk James H. H. H. H.

25 Mr. Halley. Yes, it does.

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1 Senator Schweiker. What role was he playing when you came  
2 aboard?

3 **Mr. Halley.** He either came about the same time that I  
4 did or shortly after I arrived in Miami, and he was in fact  
5 the number two fellow at the Opa Locka debriefing center. We had  
6 inter-agency debriefing center set up at Opa Locka. The head  
7 of the center was a CIA officer. His principal deputy was  
8 Kalc. He was the general administrator of the program and he  
9 supervised the military personnel who were on detail to the  
10 center, and there were debriefing people there for positive  
11 intelligence, and when they found someone who was particular-  
12 knowledgeably or had some operational exploitation, they would  
13 flag them to us.

14 Senator Schweiker. Was he ever detailed to CIA or was  
15 he strictly Army intelligence?

16 **Mr. Halley.** No, at that time he was an Army officer  
17 working on a joint project that wasn't a detail assignment.  
18 was just assigned to Opa Locka.

19 Senator Schweiker. Purely Army, but working with you  
20 cooperatively.

21 **Mr. Halley.** Well, I think what happened, unlike what  
22 would go on overseas, a table of organization was drawn up  
23 for the Opa Locka center, and it was agreed that the head of  
24 this center would be CIA, so we assigned that man to that.  
25 It was agreed that the deputy of the center would be a G-2.

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1 officer. Therefore Kale was assigned to that. He continued  
2 to receive his pay, quarters, and other allowance through the  
3 military establishment.

4 Senator Schweiker. What about when he was at the Havana  
5 embassy?

6 You are talking about, I guess, after he left the Havana  
7 embassy.

8 **Mr. Halley.** Yes. I am talking about the period 1962  
9 forward, and as I recall, he must have been there up to the  
10 end of my tenure there. I have forgotten when he left. I have  
11 no knowledge of his activities in Havana. That was before my  
12 time. I simply know that he served in Havana, that he was  
13 a social acquaintance of a number of the officers that I had  
14 in the station, but I had no firsthand knowledge.

15 Senator Schweiker. How about Robert Brown or Colonel  
16 Nichols, the same question, Robert Brown?

17 **Mr. Halley.** Senator, you'll have to give me something  
18 more than Robert Brown. That doesn't give me anything. I'm  
19 sorry. The other was what, Colonel Nichols?

20 Senator Schweiker. Colonel Nichols. He was also at the  
21 Havana Embassy at some point in time.

22 **Mr. Halley.** I would have no knowledge of him.

23 Senator Schweiker. Now, there was a group called  
24 Celula Fantasma. Are you familiar with that group?

25 **Mr. Halley.** I have heard the name.

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6008

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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Senator Schweiker. And it was a project where two  
2 American pilots were killed. The group conducted some para-  
3 military operation.

4 **Mr. Halley.** That doesn't ring a bell, but the Celula  
5 Fantasma is a name that I've heard. I can't put it into any  
6 broader context for you. It certainly was not one of our  
7 operations.

8 Senator Schweiker. That was really my question.

9 Do you recall -- was there anyone using the name or  
10 cryptonym of Bishop for you at any point in time in terms of  
11 the Cuban operations, either Morris Bishop or some other  
12 Bishop?

13 **Mr. Halley.** That name doesn't mean anything to me.

14 Senator Schweiker. Here is a sketch of a person. Does  
15 this sketch look like anyone that might have been associated  
16 with Cuban operations, either pre-Castro or anti-Castro?

17 (The Witness looks at a sketch.)

18 **Mr. Halley.** No, it doesn't. I mean, there is something  
19 about the face that is familiar, but I can't put a name to  
20 it and it doesn't ring any bells with me in relationship to  
21 Cuban operation.

22 Senator Schweiker. We'll ask Seymour.

23 Seymour, how about you, any recollection?

24 Mr. Belton. Is it supposed to be Cuban or an American?

25 Senator Schweiker. I think an American, but I'm not c

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1 on that, someone who did do some work in the Cuban activities,  
2 supposedly on the anti-Castro side.

3 Mr. Bolton. He has very regular features, so he could  
4 be almost anybody, you know.

5 And like John says, it is a sort of -- he could be familiar.  
6 No, I wouldn't place him with anyone I know.

7 Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

8 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Director McCone visiting the  
9 station in early December or mid-December of 1963?

10 Mr. Halley. Mr. McCone made a couple of visits to  
11 Florida. I'm not sure it would be fair to say that he  
12 visited the station. My recollection of that is he came to  
13 Florida. He was put in the property that we had, we had  
14 conversations with him out at that property, but he didn't  
15 come out to the physical plant, that is, our station premises,  
16 and in most cases he was usually en route to or coming back  
17 from somewhere.

18 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a visit in December of  
19 1963?

20 Mr. Halley. I can't pin it down to that timeframe. In  
21 other words, my memory is that he came to Miami several times.

22 Mr. Johnston. Well, let's put it in the timeframe of a  
23 short period after the assassination of President Kennedy.

24 Mr. Halley. I cannot put it into the timeframe, I just  
25 can't. All I can tell you is McCone came down to Florida on

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Received 1 August 2003; accepted 10 October 2003

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[illegible]

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NW#: 55510

The image shows a large, dark, textured pumpkin with a short stem, set against a dark, grainy background. The pumpkin's surface is covered in a dense, irregular pattern of small, light-colored specks, giving it a mottled appearance. The stem is short and thick, with a similar textured surface. The overall lighting is low, creating a moody and somewhat mysterious atmosphere.



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1 a day, seven days a week, and a lot of this is a blur to  
2 me.

3 So when you say do you remember McCone coming, yes, I do  
4 remember that. Can you put it in a time frame of 7 to 8  
5 December, no, I can't.

6 Mr. Johnston. Can you put it in the timeframe of shortly  
7 after the assassination of the President?

8 **Mr. Halley.** I can. You know, you asked me, did anybody  
9 come down to visit you in the December timeframe. That's why  
10 I asked you about who was the chief because I do recall going  
11 to an Orange Bowl game with Harvey one year. Des came down,  
12 Fitzgerald came down a couple of times, but I don't remember  
13 him ever coming in the Christmas timeframe, you know?

14 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall having discussions with --  
15 and I take it your answer is yes -- do you recall discussions  
16 between you and someone from headquarters about the effect of  
17 President Kennedy's assassination on the Cuban operation?

18 **Mr. Halley.** I am sure that there were such discussions  
19 you know, where is the program going to go, how are we going  
20 to be tasked.

21 But if you will, who, what date, where, Washington or  
22 Miami, I couldn't sharpen it up for you.

23 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with  
24 Director DeLoach?

25 **Mr. Halley.** So, I don't.

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1 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with  
2 Mr. Helms?

3 Mr. Halley. No, I have to come back to the basic point.  
4 I don't recall this kind of specific conversation with a  
5 particular individual, but I am sure that these kinds of  
6 conversations must have taken place with somebody from Washing-  
7 ton or when I was up here in Washington.

8 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the cable that you looked  
9 at previously before we went on the record, which is WAVE cable  
10 8139 of 24 November 1963, and the copy we have is barely  
11 legible. The gist of that is the last numbered paragraph  
12 reports information WAVE obtained on an individual named  
13 Rodriguez in Dallas, and also, I think, reports, if you can  
14 read through the poor Xeroxing, that Rodriguez was thought to  
15 be anti-Kennedy.

16 My question being, where would you have gotten that  
17 kind of information?

18 (The Witness reads the document.)

19 Mr. Halley. Well, to be honest with you, I can't read  
20 the message. It says read Para 2, ATTACH 2. We'd have to  
21 go up and look up who the man is. This is one of literally  
22 thousands of cryptonyms across my desk.

23 It looks to me like ATTACH 2.

24 Mr. Johnston. Let's go off the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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1 **Mr. Halley.** WAVE traces, now, that indicates to me that  
2 whatever was done here was based on the material that was  
3 passively in the files.

4 Where did material that was in our files. We got material  
5 that was in these files from agent reporting, we got it from  
6 refugee debriefings, we got it from our, you know, from  
7 sources in the Cuban community who were reporting on Cuban  
8 groups. We got it on a monitoring of the Cuban press, and the  
9 Spanish press in Miami, we got it from monitoring radio broad-  
10 casts and so forth. So that it was this kind of a conglomerate  
11 of information.

12 Now, let's take a name, you know, like Rodriguez. A  
13 name like Rodriguez in the card file, there might be two  
14 inches of Rodriguezes. You know, if you were looking for a  
15 specific Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, you know, something  
16 like that, then you'd have to pin it down, in other words,  
17 age, what his membership was in the party and things like that.  
18 So that indicates to me that we found this material in the  
19 file.

20 And the source is, I can't know. We'd have to look up  
21 the crypt and find the true name, and maybe even then I couldn't  
22 tell you.

23 Mr. Johnston. But that source is liable to be a Cuban  
24 exile in Miami, is that correct?

25 **Mr. Halley.** Well, not being able to read the thing.

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1 don't even want to speculate on it.

2 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in Alpha 667

3 Mr. Halley. Yes, at times there were sources in Alpha 667.

4 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in SNES?

5 Mr. Halley. At times, yes.

6 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources, in the time period  
7 we are talking about, November '63 through the spring of 1964?

8 Mr. Halley. Well, I would have to say the probability  
9 is high that we had some sort of a source in that group, but  
10 I'd have to go back, you know, and check the record, and it  
11 would have to be researched, but my recollection to that is  
12 we would have sources in that group one way or another.

13 Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of a Cuban exile organization  
14 or anti-Castro organization called the Christian Democratic  
15 Movement, or MDC?

16 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in MDC?

18 Mr. Halley. Yes, we did.

19 Mr. Johnston. And in November of 1963, do you recall  
20 who was the leadership of MDC?

21 Mr. Halley. Off the top of my head, no, but you know  
22 there is a book, we put out a book at that time which was a  
23 front's work, of all of the anti-Castro groups that were  
24 located in Miami. The two papers are still with me, sep-  
25 arately. There were 250 some-odd exile groupings, and we

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(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. No, I don't. You know, the cryptonym AMKNOB rings a bell with me. I am familiar with the cryptonym. Now specifically AMKNOB 1 is I can't tell you. Reading the contents of this message, you know, this is a message dated 4 December '63, I would say that we got a message in secret writing via the mail from some source in Cuba, and he is giving this information.

Who he is, what reliability we placed on a particular source --

Mr. Johnston. That's what I'm asking you.

Mr. Halley. What accuses he did and so forth, I couldn't tell you. As I said so, you know, get the file. I would like to read it and see what the file says.

Mr. Johnston. And in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, when you get information like that, you viewed your responsibility as what?

Mr. Halley. Essentially putting it to headquarters, was the focal point for pulling together all kinds of data that were dealing with the Warren and others.

Mr. Johnston. And again the substance of this is a scope in those reporting to you on possibly seeing Oswald, possible Cuban assassinations.

Mr. Halley. That is the definition I come to by reading their message. I don't want you to hold me to this, and you

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PHOTO 1444 2021 544-6400

1 Will get the file and it says that this was an EW message  
2 from a guy in Mexico or something. I'm just reading a message  
3 and deductive analysis of what I know the case to have been  
4 at the time.

5 Mr. Johnston. Well, that's a correct statement of the  
6 message, is that right?

7 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, I'd have to go on the basis that we  
8 recorded material accurately. Therefore, by the way this  
9 message is written, by analysis I am having to conclude that  
10 it was a source inside Cuba.

11 Mr. Johnston. Then I put to you the question in regard  
12 to your previous testimony about tapping sources in Cuba, and  
13 though you were getting messages out of Cuba, you recall  
14 no action being taken through the WAVE station to tap sources  
15 in Cuba.

16 **Mr. Halley.** Now, with a message like this it is conceivable  
17 you'd have to look back at the file, and where there are  
18 additional questions, you know, like who are these people,  
19 you say to clarify the referring that you are receiving, and  
20 I can't clarify that off the top of my head. The only thing  
21 I could suggest is to go back to the file.

22 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you also Director Cable 631,  
23 which WAVE got, dated 10 November 1961. WAVE got an  
24 intercept of it.

25 Do you have any recollection of either receiving that

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1 or of receiving that information?

2 **Mr. Halley.** I would have to say because of the indicator  
3 on here, the communication system was very reliable, that  
4 this message was received, because that's what it shows, but I  
5 personally have no recollection of this message.

6 Mr. Johnston. Could WAVE have made a contribution to that  
7 report?

8 **Mr. Halley.** Well, again, I have to go back in the file.  
9 It says the above is from a KNULESA diplomat. I assume  
10 that that was from a Mexican diplomat. Italian?

11 Then that would determine whether we could have made  
12 a contribution. There was a time when we in WAVE had as  
13 recruited agents **Mexican and Italian diplomats in Havana.**  
14 That cryptonym doesn't ring any bells with me. Now you have  
15 to go back and look it up, look in the file, and that would  
16 tell you whether we were running the guy or not.

17 Mr. Johnston. Is that the only evaluation you could  
18 make?

19 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, looking at this, I'd say that's the  
20 only evaluation we could make, but there is one other  
21 possibility. There is a Cuban diplomat. It might be that  
22 some of the monitoring or communications that we had in the  
23 Cuban group's group that we had. It might be that some contribution  
24 to make to it.

25 Mr. Johnston. For verifying the flight?

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered.

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1 Senator Schweiker. And there were all kinds of Cuban  
2 Committees.

3 **Mr. Halley.** That's right, and therefore, unless there is  
4 a name that goes with it, I have trouble dredging it out.

5 Senator Schweiker. All right.

6 I meant, did your work involve any working relationship  
7 to the **Mullen Company** in Washington?

8 Did you use them in any relationship at all?

9 **Mr. Halley.** No, my knowledge **of the Mullen Company**  
10 **doesn't start until about 1972.**

11 Senator Schweiker. Okay, I'll let somebody else handle  
12 that.

13 Now about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? What, about  
14 your program, what role or relationship forgetting Oswald and  
15 did you have with them since they obviously had some foreign  
16 intelligence relationship?

17 **Mr. Halley.** None. In other words, we felt that that  
18 was an organization that really of interest to the FBI.

19 Senator Schweiker. However, you did have a counter-  
20 intelligence section.

21 **Mr. Halley.** Yes, we did have a counterintelligence  
22 section, but not a section against these kinds of groups.  
23 Our counterintelligence section was primarily concerned with  
24 the foreign kinds of things, collecting the information of  
25 these agents on these boats and other forms, like the Jan

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1 American flight coming into the United States, and the  
2 refugees coming to identify agents on that, identify agents  
3 who might be trying to penetrate our paramilitary teams or  
4 one of our collection of operations.

5 We also were looking at Cuban intelligence officers who  
6 were stationed overseas, in other words, could our debriefing  
7 of knowledgeable people result in our identifying, let's say,  
8 the DGI guy in Mexico City or in Madrid? We could then  
9 mount an operation on the basis of that to recruit him, to  
10 maintain him in place as a source within the Cuban intelligence  
11 service. So it was that kind of counterintelligence approach.

12 You know, we the head of the Cuban service, Barboza  
13 at the time, you know, people would come out and say I know  
14 him. We would look at that and see whether we could use it.

15 Senator Schweiker, I have just a few small ones, and  
16 then I'd like to ask you for some advice off the record, would  
17 you just give us some guidance.

18 On the record here, how about an organization called  
19 CUSA, Conservatives, U.S.A. I believe they were an anti-Castro  
20 group, and they did own some boats in paramilitary units.

21 **Mr. Harley:** That doesn't ring a bell.

22 Senator Schweiker, if one of the ships or one of the  
23 boats was called the CUSA,

24 **Mr. Harley:** That doesn't ring a bell at all.

25 **Mr. Harley:** I don't know that they were, you know, we

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2 No, that doesn't ring any bells with me.

Senator Schweiker. Then there is a Paul Holowell.

Mr. Bailey. He's a

5 Senator Schweiker. Florida banker. He was involved in  
6 paramilitary or some kind of operations.

7 Mr. Halley. Well, there were two phases. Paul Halowell  
8 was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation. In cleaning up some  
9 claims that the families of one or two of the pilots had who  
10 crashed involved in the Bay of Pigs. And I would have known  
11 that through the file.

Malinelli later was in touch with us at the time when I was in the Miami Station, and as provided, as I recall, he had real estate interests, banks, and he helped us create some cover companies through which we bought or leased such things as dock space at marinas for boats and items like that.

Sanator Converter. 1845.

7. (b) (7)(D) - This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D), because it is a confidential source of information.

Mr. Chairman, what are you doing

now major & fully and completely with **Paul Helowe!!?** **File**  
every personal contacts and you know what I mean?

22 Mr. Haggerty. My recollection would be that I probably  
23 only met him once or twice personally, but you know, you  
24 have to understand this, at that time, our larger cover in  
25 China was a commercial company. I was a vice president of

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TOP SECRET

1 that company. As a result, I traveled extensively in the  
2 business social community. At that point we had one of the  
3 largest covert payrolls in South Miami, and I was a member of  
4 a number of clubs, and people like Helowell I would meet  
5 at cocktail parties or dinners, you know, or the yacht club  
6 that I belonged to or whatever, but officially, in terms of  
7 business sense, I only recall talking with Helowell twice, I  
8 think.

9 Senator Schweiker. Would he look anything like that  
10 picture?

11 (The Witness looks at the sketch.)

12 Mr. Halley. No. At that time he would have been much  
13 heavier.

14 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever discuss the Kennedy assassi-  
15 nation with him?

16 Mr. Halley. No, I wouldn't have. I wouldn't have talked  
17 about that. My recollection of the kind of things that I would  
18 have talked about with Helowell would have been the formation  
19 of some cover company, the purchase of a boat, the rental of  
20 term lease of you know large pieces of luggage for traveling  
21 cases and things like that. That's about what I recall of  
22 Helowell's relationship with us at the time.

23 Mr. Johnston. I guess I just have a little bit of  
24 trouble, and that is with your recollection of conversation  
25 with him, but you don't recall whether you talked

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10

1. *Introduction*

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1 **Mr. Halley.** I don't recall it.

2 Mr. Johnston. Is it you don't recall such a discussion,  
3 having such a discussion, or you have a recollection and your  
4 recollection is there were no discussions.

5 **Mr. Halley.** No, I don't recall such a discussion. That's  
6 what I've said several times. I assume that such discussions  
7 took place, but frankly, I don't recall them.

8 Senator Schweiker. All right, that's all we have. We  
9 appreciate your cooperation and your testimony. I do want  
10 to ask for some guidance off the record.

11 Whereupon, at 4:30 o'clock p.m., the interview in the  
12 above-entitled matter was concluded.  
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