

**JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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"Diff Files" for NARA 2025 Documents Release JFK Assassination Records

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Red: Newly revealed in 2025.
Blue: Present in earlier releases, but not in 2025.
Black: Unchanged between versions.

For Original Documents visit:
archives.gov/research/jfk/release-2025

Notes:

Black text on a blue background indicates content
that was previously redacted using black ink.

I did my best to be accurate in revealing what is new,
but please confirm with the original sources
where accuracy is essential.

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TELEGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT

TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/650,938

SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE
COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO:

1 AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES:

PLACE & DATE ACQ:

VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL:

SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS

SOURCE: PARAS 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE
PARAS 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG, AT AN AMERICAN CONSULATE
PARA 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS
BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

COMMUNICATED OFFICER OF THE CIVILIAN INFORMATION COORDINATING BOARD HAD INTERVIEWED
1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS

REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING

DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE

A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN

PARAS 10 THROUGH 14.

2. CHAU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED

AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH

DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT

OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

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STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC DODX OCI ONE DODX DODX DODX DIA CIB

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

100-443887-100

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF ALEXANDER (XUAN) LIU'S OFFICE 'RECOVER AVAILABLE' SERVED INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INTERFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

W. ARTHUR BOY V. ANDREW COOK, WASHINGTON, D.C. RECIPIENT. THE ABOVE SUBJECT IS INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

UNKNOW. DID NOT CHECK ON THE MICHIGAN J-S VIOLENCE PAGES. THIS PERSON IS BEING CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-

7. ~~REDACTED~~ ~~COMMUNIST~~ ~~VIETNAMESE~~ ~~THE~~ ~~CONF~~ ~~D. EVAL~~ ~~DESCRIBED~~ ~~IN~~ ~~THIS~~
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED

~~ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO~~

TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE

PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR

LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:)

TDOS-3/518-127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE

ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP

D'ETAT.) CORRE D'ETAT ON MICHEL OL T-S VOTEL 1965

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE

GOVERNMENT-ON-25-JULY-1962-THAT-HIS-INTELLIGENCE-SECTION-HAD-INTERCEPTED-A-
 REF ID: A66387

VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE MONTH

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WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.) MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA. MAJOR LONG FIELD COMMENT: CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME IN SO FAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

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IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. /AT 102000 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPE'S CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE OF CINCPAC ARPAC TO PACAF PAFET.

END OF MESSAGE

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