

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

## Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10029  
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA  
FROM : C. TRACY BARNES  
TO :  
TITLE : REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA  
DATE : 06/25/1953  
PAGES : 15  
SUBJECTS :  
RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : Secret  
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/03/1998  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526

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Authority \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Refer To \_\_\_\_\_Review Date 2005 By Wade G. Collins

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25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcasting in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated 15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter contained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be separately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

a. Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears not to be feasible.

b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations.

c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S. propaganda efforts.

d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions, an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy guidance to the field.

e. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland, a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques for their use; and to continue research and development of other unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.

3. Chief of Operations,

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3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a. above.

4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning and supporting broadcasting operations.

/s/ C. Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY BARNES  
Chief  
Political and Psychological  
Warfare

Attachment  
As stated above

Distribution  
DD/P - 1  
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Chiefs, All Areas - 1 ea.  
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FE/Mr. Egner - 2  
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15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections:

1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD WAR. It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from Communism are doing the least to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our current and planned activities against them.

4. Section 4, Page 4, deals with the principal PROBLEMS peculiar to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953, entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86889.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953, TS 88465.)

(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

Attachment, as stated.

PP/CLE:ha

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15 May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psychological warfare.

b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.

c. This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much, if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broadcasts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor any restrictions on listening to them.

d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BBC and Canada together broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

e. In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking nations of the free world.

f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine stations, broadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles from Communist dominated areas.

g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94 to 12, Greece 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

h. The one-sided

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h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison of the broadcast output of the USSR alone, without the satellites, against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio propaganda battle with the Orbit.

2. Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a. Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or "captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with broadcasts of friendly countries.

\* \* \* \* \*

c. Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist, religious broadcasts. \* \* \*

d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) strengthening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influencing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problems concerning

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problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well. We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this study indicates it may be feasible.

\* \* \* \* \*

e. Use of purchased or free time through covert channels on existing radio systems in friendly countries. \* \* \*

f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts. [Example-- the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II.] This technique is discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.

g. To exploit the amateur [ham] broadcasters, large numbers of whom exist in Russia. \* \* \* A project is being drafted to explore the possibilities of this technique.

h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited audience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also presents special security problems. It is not recommended, except for possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or satellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but should, we believe, be explored.

3. Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy of present Projects

a. USSR.--Radio is the only consistent medium for piercing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approximately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are

in the hands of



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in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three wave bands for some time to come. One indication of this is the fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people. Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience, including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to some extent, also, on shortwave. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

c. European Satellites.--The preponderance of CIA broadcasting efforts are centered on this area. \* \* \*

d. The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. \* \* \* (See Para. 2.d.)

4. Problems of Covert Broadcasting

a. Cover

(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although the non-technical listening public can be and often is deceived. Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security and management problems. [These difficulties could, however, be minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget control, and high professional standards.] See Chart, Annex II.

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover headaches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.

(3) The best cover

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(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR, etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possibilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Bases

(1) Because governments object to providing bases for aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control, it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. However, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance, which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but, antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintenance are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transportation and other logistics have been provided. The present management of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA. In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems. If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.

c. Information Support

(1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material

upon intelligence

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upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, interesting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VOA, and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, produced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated, could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt PW effort targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

d. To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transmission at all hours.

For future planning purposes, however, these factors seem clear:

(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and on the increase.

(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be related to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areas--low-powered local jammers.

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques

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(3) What techniques are available to meet this requirement?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out" on a power basis only.

(b) Jamming evasion through the device of varying the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of laying down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting. These must, therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies, must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.

Our broadcasts using this technique have so far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjustments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting base in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in between.

(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting techniques for

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techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field which has been neglected thus far.

Some possibilities in this area are described in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to be within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being developed by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his own home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be capable of invention and development, and the scientific and practical potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting techniques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly developed and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the process of perfection and those which might be invented might even be

the means of



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the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We, therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capacities in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.

To recapitulate, it would seem desirable for CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting activities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings should provide:

1 A maximum transmitter power of 100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

2 Built in jamming evasion capabilities; and

3 Built in unconventional broadcasting capabilities.

4 Bases in secure and protected areas which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without interference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is now being made by this office.

e. Lead Time

(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes 12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter. Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotiation for bases, the staffing problem, etc.

(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio stations or systems likewise require time for development .

(2) All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabilities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

f. Control and Management

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required

to operate

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to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Likewise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same facilities they should be compartmented from each other.\*\*\*

(See Para. 4.a.(1))

g. Evaluation

(1) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting (25 February 1953—TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with particular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has initiated this much-needed undertaking.

h. Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any plans for new radio projects.

(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.

5. Recommendations

Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other overt media.

b. That any contemplated operation follow strict concepts for clandestine operations, including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both management and policy.

(2) Strict security requirements including compartmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

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(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country government.

c. That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task undertaken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipulation and/or control of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio facilities.

Our foremost objective should be to exploit the broadcasting systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally is possible in two ways:

(1) To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestic services of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western cause.

Within this frame of reference we made the following recommendations:

(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to us: indigenous radio systems in friendly and neutral nations with the objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and inhibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance of pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.

These missions should be undertaken in closest collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be accomplished overtly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.

(3) In cooperation with State, develop a positive program for information support of all propaganda activities through maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.

(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements and the exploitation of targets of opportunity. A mature staff officer experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed propaganda lines, (b) expedite P.W. support (c) coordinate with USIS

and (d) generally



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and (d) generally backstop the operation.

(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance, coverage, impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to electronically intrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to have these facilities ready at the earliest possible date for possible use in the cold war--Not to have them available at the outbreak of hot war would be a tragic mistake.

\* \* \* \* \*

Note: Recommendations with respect to specific targets have been transmitted to the appropriate divisions.

(10) A small staff element should be created to supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting. This staff should be instructed to expedite the implementation of the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA Policy and Program for the use of this Media.

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

15 May 1953