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MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD on SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

206-10001-10001

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

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ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
<u>September 12, 1963</u>		
①	9:00 - 11:00	<u>The Chairman's Time</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ⓐ Administrative Announcements Ⓑ Counterintelligence and Counterespionage: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Dunlap espionage case at NSA ② Defection to USSR of former NSA employee Hamilton ③ Damage to U.S. classified information and intelligence techniques resulting from recent Soviet espionage operations in West Germany, Sweden and the U.K. ④ COMSEC developments involving USSR Ⓒ Alsop article on CIA and Defense Ⓓ Intelligence capabilities for detecting violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty Ⓔ Photo reconnaissance satellite developments * ① Highlights of intelligence community reports to White House in response to earlier Board recommendations Ⓗ Report of Clifford Panel
②	11:00 - 12:00	<u>Intelligence Community Capabilities for Detecting Violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty</u> Dr. Doyle Northrup, Technical Director, Air Force Technical Application Center
③	12:00 - 12:15	Executive Session
④	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
⑤	1:00 - 1:45	Discussions with Director, National Security Agency Lt. General Gordon Blake, USAF
⑥	1:45 - 2:45	<u>Counterintelligence Programs of CIA</u> Mr. James Angleton, CIA Mr. Raymond J. Rocco, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA
⑦	2:45 - 3:15	Executive Session
⑧	3:15 - 4:15	<u>Status Report on the Organization and Programs of the National Reconnaissance Office</u> Dr. Brockway MacMillan, Director, NRO
⑨	4:15 - 4:45	<u>Review of SIGINT and Related Intelligence Activities in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the U.K.</u> Dr. Baker

roughly will be late

** Not taken up at Board Mtg.*

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
10.	4:45 - 5:45	Consideration of Revised SIGINT Report of Board's Communications Panel <u>Dr. Baker</u>
11.	5:45 - 6:00	Status Report on Covert Action Operations <u>Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel</u>
12.	6:00 - 6:15	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities <u>Murphy Panel</u>
<u>September 13, 1963</u>		
13.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
14.	9:30 - 10:15	Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Relating to Cuba <u>Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA</u>
15.	10:15 - 12:15	Discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John McCone</u>
16.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
17.	1:00 - 1:30	Discussion with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs <u>Mr. McGeorge Bundy</u>
18.	1:30 - 2:00	Executive Session
* 19.	2:00 - 6:00	Preparation of Draft Report to be Submitted to the President at a Later Date, Following Appropriate Review and Coordination with the Board Members.

* not taken up at Board Mtg.

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WASHINGTON

September 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
September 12 - 13, 1963.

At 9:00 a.m., September 12, 1963, the Board began a two-day meeting in the Board's offices, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Baker, Langer, Murphy and Gray; and also present were Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford recalled that at the last meeting the Board discussed ways and means of increasing its effectiveness, and it had been agreed that ample time would be allotted for the discussion of subjects covered throughout Board meetings. At this morning's session two hours had been set aside, the Chairman announced, for discussion of the various subject matters referred to in the first item on the agenda.

Turning to some administrative matters, the Chairman made reference to Mr. Coyne's August 5 memorandum regarding a request made to the Special Counsel to the President for guidance to Board members in complying with newly-revised Federal legislation governing conflicts of interest, and revised regulations calling for the submission of statements of financial interest (Board members having already submitted the latter some time ago in compliance with the previous law and Presidential instructions). The Chairman asked Mr. Ash to summarize the memorandum just received by Mr. Coyne from Assistant Special Counsel White under date of September 10, 1963, suggesting the procedure which should now be followed under the new law.

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The Board meeting was joined at this point by Raymond G. Rocca (substituting for Mr. James Angleton of CIA) for a briefing of Board members on CIA's counterintelligence program.

Mr. Rocca began his briefing with the statement that CIA does not have the entire world-wide responsibility for counterintelligence (CI). To illustrate this point, he exhibited a chart dated September 1962 entitled "U. S. Organization for Counterintelligence" showing the various elements of the numerous U. S. departments and agencies whose functions and responsibilities bear some relationship to counterintelligence. Within CIA itself the CI function is compartmented under the Deputy DCI for Plans. The headquarters staff consists of 85 officers and 66 clerical personnel (although there is a large number of CIA headquarters personnel assigned to other intelligence activities which are related to CIA's CI programs). At CIA stations overseas, CI functions are performed by various CIA personnel in such areas as Penetration, Provocation, Double Agents, Technical Surveillances, Protective CI Services, Interrogations, and Deception.

Mr. Rocca stated that studies and recommendations made by General Doolittle some 10 years ago had a great deal to do with the fact that there is a separation in CIA of the handling of CI activities and positive espionage operations.

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It was emphasized by Mr. Rocca that the CI program of CIA is directed against the Soviet bloc espionage apparatus which is operating against the United States, and the primary objective of the CI effort is to obtain intelligence concerning Soviet bloc attempts to effect espionage penetrations of the United States. Mr. Rocca also explained to the Board that within CIA the responsibility for personnel security and physical security rests with the CIA Office of Security which is located in the area of the Deputy DCI for Support, whereas the CI program is located in the area of the Deputy DCI for Plans.

It became apparent in the discussion with Mr. Rocca that Board members were primarily interested in the nature and effectiveness of CIA personnel security programs (in comparison to the NSA system which did not result in an identification of Sergeant Dunlap during the three years which he acted as a Soviet agent while employed in a sensitive area at NSA headquarters). Accordingly, Mr. Rocca received a number of questions from Board members which involved responsibilities of the CIA Security Office and which Mr. Rocca could not answer on the basis of first-hand knowledge. Within this limitation, however, Mr. Rocca endeavored to be of assistance to the Board in response to various members' questions which he answered to the effect that (1) efforts to uncover a "Dunlap" in CIA would involve the personnel security and physical security protective

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measures administered by CIA's Office of Security whose programs include thorough background investigations and the use of polygraph interviews, (2) the identification of a "Dunlap" in CIA might also result from the CIA's CI program carried on outside the United States in an effort to cover foreign intelligence efforts to penetrate the United States, (3) re-investigations of CIA personnel are conducted at 5-year intervals -- Mr. Rocca said that he would have to refer to the CIA Security Office questions as to whether all CIA personnel are polygraphed and whether they are periodically re-polygraphed, (4) the best hope of successful CI coverage of Soviet bloc penetration efforts is the inducement and wise exploitation of defectors, (5) the objective of Soviet bloc espionage penetration efforts is to "go for the jugular vein," that is, to find and use people who are in a position to produce valuable information "in the clear" thereby overcoming the problem of obtaining such information from communications channels which are increasingly safeguarded by encryption and other protective measures, (6) although the United States has made some efforts to use blackmail against Soviet bloc personnel for CI and intelligence purposes, with some success, these efforts have failed insofar as Soviet personnel are concerned, and (7) the key to improving the effectiveness of CIA's CI effort is not a larger budget, but the obtaining of CI people having the specialized knack required -- and there is also a need for common training of all U. S. Government

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personnel overseas in order that they may have adequate awareness of the nature of the Soviet penetration threat.

In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. Rocca said that although there is no evidence of over-all penetration of U. S. Government agencies, we must assume that such penetrations are being effected, and we should recognize that the size and complexity of our Governmental organization and the ^{numbers} ~~members~~ of departments and agencies which are targets for Soviet bloc penetration efforts make us "a sitting duck."

Upon Mr. Rocca's departure at 3:30 P.M., the Board resumed in executive session.

Referring to Mr. Rocca's appearance before the Board, Chairman Clifford said it was apparent that the Board had been hearing from a representative of the wrong CIA area, as indicated by the fact that Mr. Rocca had found it necessary to say that most of the Board members' questions fell in the area of competence and knowledge of the CIA Security Office headed by Mr. Bannerman. Mr. Gray agreed that Mr. Rocca had been unable to respond to the questions in which the Board was particularly interested.

Chairman Clifford referred to General Blake's appearance before the Board earlier in the day, and Mr. Clifford pointed out that the NSA Director had emphasized his confidence in the thousands of good and reliable people who are employed at NSA.

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Mr. Pace said that he was concerned about the heavy investment of time and money on security without a program to make it clear what the threat is. The absence of public awareness of the threat has in Mr. Pace's opinion resulted in a popular notion that the word "traitor" is no longer an opprobrious term in peace time, and the peace time impact of treason is less than in war time. (General Doolittle observed that the impact of treason is punishment by death, which is a pretty firm impact.)

Next, the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of the CIA headquarters group concentrating on Cuba) and his assistant, Mr. Bruce Clark, who were present to brief the Board on covert actions being directed against the Castro government. Chairman Clifford asked the CIA representative to confine the discussion to 25 minutes in view of changes which had been required in the Board's schedule.

Mr. Clark informed the Board that CIA has kept a close watch on the situation in order to reach an estimate on the number of Soviet forces in Cuba. Recently, he said, the intelligence community arrived at its estimate, and at the last Presidential Press Conference the President had answered questions on the subject without getting into numbers, an approach which Mr. Clark favored. He said that CIA estimates there are from 6,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba, and the range of this estimate is indicative of the difficulty of estimating the number of Soviet ground forces. The Soviets control and operate the SAM system and related communications. There are no longer any Soviet

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ground units as such because they were removed along with the missiles and IL-28's in February. Cubans now control and operate all the MIG aircraft although the Cubans continue to receive training from Soviet pilots. Also the Cubans control the helicopters and use them effectively in counterinsurgency activity. Cruise missile sites and the KOMAR boats are operated by Cubans.

In air defense there are some 2,300 to 3,000 Soviet military technicians, but these personnel are not likely to be the kind to bear arms against an insurrection in Cuba, Mr. Clark stated. It was on July 12 that Cubans began to receive Soviet training in SAM site operations, and the training will extend over 10 months. Therefore in April 1964, Cubans will be prepared to take over the SAM sites and related communications. Some 300 Soviet personnel are estimated to be engaged in training Cubans in the operation of 12 patrol boats. Some 800 Soviets are assigned to cruise missile activities. And Soviet ground forces number between 2,000 and 4,000, Mr. Clark stated.

As for communications, Mr. Clark said that all Soviet naval links are down, but a Moscow-Havana link remains. The traffic on this scrambler circuit cannot be read by us, although useful information is obtained through traffic analysis procedures, and we do intercept Cuban VHF voice traffic.

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In answer to a question from Mr. Clifford, Mr. Clark said that there have been no substantial new arrivals of Soviet personnel in Cuba. However, CIA does not get enough information on loadings and unloadings from vessels because of Cuban port security measures.

Mr. Clark said that from 3,000 to 4,000 Soviets would be expected to conduct MAAG-type operations in Cuba. In answer to Dr. Langer's question, he said that CIA has no knowledge of the number of Soviet agricultural advisers in Cuba.

Mr. Fitzgerald began his presentation with the remark that this was a good day to be talking to the Board because yesterday CIA was in a position to disseminate the best intelligence report received to date on the situation in Cuba. He showed Board members a copy of the agent report which he said had come from a "high level Commandante" in the Cuban army who is a reliable source. Mr. Fitzgerald also read from another CIA agent report which quoted a source as saying that not even Fidel Castro can enter Soviet military installations in Cuba, anyone who reports knowledge of the level of Soviet forces in Cuba is lying.

Mr. Fitzgerald said that the level of CIA resources directed against Cuba includes 467 CIA personnel at headquarters and in Miami, and 45 CIA personnel at CIA stations overseas. There are also 595 foreign sources, mostly Cubans.

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At the present time, Mr. Fitzgerald said, CIA has a number of integrated covert operations which were approved by the Standing Group and by the President. The six-part program is a long-range one geared to a period of 18 months, and it is within the framework of U. S. policy toward Cuba. The elements of the integrated program are:

(1) Intelligence collection, both strategic and operational.
(2) Propaganda actions to stimulate resistance efforts and sabotage within Cuba.

(3) Action to stimulate disaffection in the Cuban military which CIA considers is the strongest group which can be expected to successfully seek the overthrow of Castro.

(4) A program of economic denial on an increasing basis. The Cuban economy is already suffering. Ninety per cent of Cuban industry uses U. S. machinery and replacement parts cannot be obtained from the United States. (Mr. Fitzgerald agreed with Mr. Murphy that Cuba can look to Canada for needed materials.)

Mr. Clifford asked Mr. Fitzgerald who is responsible for the raids reportedly launched against Cuba in recent times. The answer was that CIA is responsible for only a relatively few of the raids that have been publicized. On two occasions, August 17 and 19, CIA put ship-borne teams into Cuba, but CIA isn't responsible for the bombing raids with planes which have been staged by Cuban exiles from the Bahamas. (CIA thinks these raids are ineffective and would prefer that they be stopped.)

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is thinks will be effective in following through on a number
and overthrow of Castro within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald's answer
was that the remarkable thing about the Cuban people is their
volatility and their tendency to be heartened by sabotage
acts against Castro. The long range plan, Mr. Fitzgerald said,
is to stimulate Cuban resistance to Castro. In answer to
Dr. Ladd's query, Mr. Fitzgerald said that if an intervention
was about to succeed the Soviet forces in Cuba would not be
powerful enough to put it down. He noted that Cuban military
forces number 150,000 plus 75,000 militia.

Mr. Murphy asked if CIA had anyone in mind as a replace-
ment for Castro and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that there is
none in mind but there are three exile groups being considered. (?)
He added that CIA is not working with State Department on a
possible replacement, and CIA prefers that no leader in exile
be considered.

Messrs. Fitzgerald and Clark ? concluded and departed at

10:10 A.M.

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The DCI then referred to the problem of CIA's limited access to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there are sources in the USSR who would be willing to work with the CIA if the Agency had personnel on the scene to operate these sources. Mr. McCone noted that there are only four CIA people in the Embassy, along with some 17 U.S. military personnel. In contrast, Mr. McCone noted, in the U.S. there are 185 Soviet and 93 Soviet satellite intelligence officials operating against the U.S. in the Washington D. C. and New York (UN) areas. The DCI stated that on the question of placing additional CIA personnel under official cover in the Embassy at Moscow, the Ambassador has steadfastly held that the risk of damage from exposure of such personnel is so severe that it is not worth the gamble. Therefore, Mr. McCone said, CIA has only four men in the Moscow Embassy and they would all have to work on any one case. Recalling that several CIA operatives had to be taken out of Moscow when the Penkovskiy case blew up, the DCI emphasized that CIA needs to augment its personnel there. In answer to Mr. Clifford's inquiry as to what steps were being taken by the DCI to obtain authorization for the assignment of additional CIA personnel to the Embassy in Moscow, Mr. McCone said that he has had conversations with the head of the State Department. However, housing for U.S. personnel is limited in Moscow and the net result of increasing CIA personnel there would probably necessitate the removal of a State Department political officer or some other State Department representative.

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Mr. McCone referred to the Vietnam situation as being very bad, with a disintegration of relations between the Diem regime and the Vietnamese and the U. S. The situation is so bad we may have to get out of the war. The U. S. could live with Diem's antagonism but he has lost popular support and winning the war would be a hollow victory. The U. S. has had no success in getting Diem to mend his policy. The shooting into a crowd of Buddhists and the deaths of 8 of them began an impossible situation, and the August raids on the pagodas were the last straw. If the Diem regime were to be disposed of, there's no one to replace him, and even though a military coup were pulled off; CIA does not believe it could stay in power. CIA is maintaining contact with the military to keep watch on them (but there is no CIA support as has been publicly alleged).

The DCI said that there have been received disturbing reports that Nhu is making a deal with the North Vietnamese (who would pay any price to get the U. S. out of the war.) The French Ambassador left Saigon for Paris last night. Mr. McCone added that our President and the Executive Committee of the NSC have been meeting regularly on the problem. There are differences of opinion in our Government and in the U. S. Embassy at Saigon as to the best solution. Some think if we can get Diem to do reforms we can win the war and get out. Others think Diem should be overthrown.

In answer to Mr. Clifford, the DCI said that State Department and CIA collaboration is close on the Vietnam situation. He added however that there was no coordination of the hastily composed August 24 cablegram from the State Department telling the Embassy to begin thinking about "unloading the Nhus" and that a change of the regime was in the offing.

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Mr. Clifford invited the DCI to take up any other matters he wished to cover. Mr. McCone said there were a few that time didn't permit him to cover, but he would furnish the Board memoranda on "Deep Cover" and "Soviet Trawlers".

As to scheduled CORONA launchings care should be taken as to their frequency having in mind that CORONA shots cost \$9 million each and GAMBIF \$12 million. *Mr. McCone advised.*

Mr. Gray mentioned to the DCI a recent remark made by Alexis Johnson to some of the Board members to the effect that although the U. S. can put a man on the moon for a billion dollars, we can't place an agent in Castro's office. Mr. Gray said that he would like to hear Mr. McCone's comments to the Board some time as to the prospect of CIA penetrating the USSR and Cuban Governments if unlimited millions or billions of dollars were available. Mr. Clifford agreed that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at the next Board meeting. Mr. McCone's visit completed, he departed the Board meeting at 12:15.

Following lunch, the Board resumed in executive session. Mr. Coyne reported some information just received in the Dunlap case. Dunlap's wife produced another Government document which her husband had apparently removed from NSA. She said she found it in a strong box to which her husband was not supposed to have had a key. NSA Director Blake had informed Mr. Coyne that the document was from NSA to overseas stations on steps to be taken in tests of procedures with respect to intercepts of Soviet scrambler traffic. Dr. Baker noted that this is serious, because our only hope for exploiting Soviet scrambler communications is to take advantage of operator and encryption mistakes, so any reminder to the Soviets that NSA personnel are looking for "busts" will be very bad.

Dr. Baker said that the DCI's remark about Dunlap being at the cross-roads of NSA information is untrue, because in fact Dunlap had access only

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to the crossroads of NSA activity against Soviet SIGINT. Also Dr. Baker said that the DCI's comments on CIA's WALNUT data system were exaggerated, for in fact the project has proved to be a useless disaster to say the least, and it is certainly not a "leading edge" to automation as the DCI had claimed. Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne had recently received word on the inadequacy of the WALNUT system from Mr. Griffith of IBM, privately.

Chairman Clifford agreed with Mr. Coyne's suggestion that at the next Board meeting the DCI be asked to report on the status of coordinated effort in the intelligence community with a view to achieving a data processing capability in the intelligence field.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy joined the Board meeting at 1:30 and addressed himself to the items which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's memorandum to Mr. Bundy dated September 11, 1963 (attached as a part of these minutes).

First Mr. Bundy expressed the view that there have been significant improvements in intelligence community support to the White House. This is particularly true with respect to current intelligence topics specially covered by CIA's OCI. These submissions are useful to the President and White House staff members because they are more timely than NIE's and supply the need for information without having to wait for the results of the necessarily slower process of turning out finished estimates.

Also, Mr. Bundy said the White House is getting good ad hoc reporting from Department of State Intelligence (INR). Some of it goes to the President and it is of value to staff members in discussions with the President. Also, DIA's material forwarded to General Clifton is a useful supplement to more formally prepared estimates.

CIA's Deputy DCI/Intelligence reports at Mr. Bundy's morning staff meetings and if a particular intelligence memorandum is needed it is asked for,

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but largely the initiative is with State, Defense, and CIA in making these current intelligence submissions.

In short, Mr. Bundy said that the means of access to intelligence are good, for policy purposes.

As to the second item on the Board's list, Mr. Bundy said he would have to throw back to the Board the question as to any modifications considered desirable in providing intelligence community support to the White House (in the light of the Board's Cuba report). Mr. Bundy thought that he would not be as good a witness on the Board on this.

Dr. Land remarked that this morning the Board heard optimistically-worded reports by CIA on the responsiveness of Cubans to small sabotage efforts, but when the CIA representatives were asked about a long range plan for use in case of a coup in Cuba, they indicated that they had none. Dr. Land also wondered whether we would have advance intelligence on a coup in time for our Government to act on it. Mr. Bundy said that we do have an intelligence input on the question of whether a coup would result in unacceptable Soviet reaction, and the tentative judgment that there would not be.

Mr. Clifford recalled remarks by the CIA representatives to the effect that if agent teams now being sent into Cuba are caught, CIA will get the blame as it does in the case of non-CIA covert actions detected by the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy agreed that this is not a very good defense when agent teams are caught and their activities are attributed to CIA by Castro.

Mr. Bundy said that the Standing Group file on Cuba is large and Mr. Coyne might well look through it.

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Mr. Murphy wondered whether the intelligence effort is adequately tied in to the policy process, and he cited the August 24 State Department message to Saigon representatives indicating a policy change. Mr. Bundy said that the State Department message was not very well coordinated in its preparation, but there was no failure of intelligence involved.

Next, as to the adequacy of intelligence community production of timely, cumulative assessments of current intelligence and indicator-type data, for example in the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Bundy said that the intelligence record on problems developing there since last May is pretty good. The difficulty is that when you get into a matter involving daily operational-type policy decisions, it is not easy to keep track of the very latest developments. From now on, Mr. Bundy said that steps will be taken to make sure that the Standing Group and Executive Committee of the NSC have the same daily "new news" as their various intelligence officers do. The principal question regarding Vietnam is what does Diem actually think he is doing. Raw intelligence material is not lacking, Mr. Bundy said, but assessment is the problem.

As to the fourth question listed by the Board, Mr. Bundy said that it would cause a problem if the Board were to be made recipients of the daily CIA Presidential Check List, because the Board would then be getting something to which the rest of the White House family does not have access. Mr. Bundy said that he analyzes the Check List on a daily basis and this has resulted in the President getting sharper information. However, Mr. Bundy said that it would be a good thing if Mr. Coyne would look over past Check Lists for periods of perhaps a month, with a view to analyzing the submissions.

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As to the fifth and last item in Mr. Clifford's list (inviting suggestions for increasing the Board's access to covert action matters and Special Group activities) Mr. Bundy said that he frankly did not know the Board's present method of covering NSC 5412/2 matters. Dr. Langer said that the Board Panel on the subject gets briefings from time to time on covert action operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he himself looks to CIA for reports asked for concerning the status of particular programs, but he did not want to have in his office a compilation of all of such sensitive activities. But if the Board appoints a Panel to do a review of all covert actions to date, or of selected programs, he stands ready to meet the Board's needs.

Mr. Clifford said that he or Mr. Coyne would be in touch with Mr. Bundy regarding the desired review of NSC 5412/2 activities.

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Chairman Clifford then turned to the subject of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, noting that the Board had looked at U. S. intelligence capability to detect violations. He said that it appeared thus far that the U. S. capability is largely based on the acquisition and enlargement of detection systems in the future. Mr. Bundy said that he is concerned about the U. S. capability to apply intelligence safeguards against the treaty violations, but is unwilling to sign a blank check for detection programs. So the Board should keep aware of the question as to the worth of adopting certain additional detection systems, and in Mr. Bundy's view we need more than we now have. Dr. Baker observed that only two or three systems are well established, and all of the 13 or so under consideration are probably not necessary. He added that thus far only about 30 percent of previous Soviet tests have been learned of in advance through SIGINT, although some 60 to 90 per cent alerting could be achieved through better SIGINT take and better use of the take.

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J. P. Coyne
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel on Covert Action Operations (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Lenger) was formed for the purpose of keeping the Board fully advised on the status of the planning and execution of covert action operations.

On previous occasions, the Panel's activities have included a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (with respect to Cuba only), and briefings by the Secretary to the Special Group and by CIA officials. Most recently, on September 6, 1963, the Panel again consulted with CIA officials and was briefed on a variety of developments in the covert action field. The Panel Chairman, Mr. Murphy, will make an oral report to the Board on the foregoing.

J. Patrick Coyne

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September 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

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The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963. Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as follows:

MESSRS. HELMS and MEYER

British Guiana

For a 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan. CIA worked out with George Meany a program of CIA financial support (\$435,000) to the strike under the cover of "AFL-CIO contributions." A CIA cover representative ran the strike program. The activity was tricky because the United States and the British desired to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the fact that the British Governor-General opposed the strike. CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn and the TUC survived.

The strike activity took place against a background of agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill the vacuum when the British do withdraw.

Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a \$1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export Corporation (an arm of Jagan's East Indian Peoples Progressive Party) which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime. Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over \$100,000 to Jagan's Party through banks.

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CIA at present is providing \$5,000 to the PNC Party made up of anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana, and CIA is sending a Negro cover representative from New York to aid the African Party.

(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from Chicago, is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation.)

Haiti

CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token amounts of money to test them out. Efforts of the groups to form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier for the present. Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the border.

Dominican Republic

In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions, political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of an effective nature. Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges by political opponents than in performing the administrative job of running the country.

Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues. A twenty per cent unemployment figure is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made peace with church elements (with CIA's help).

Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of the Army. He has met individual Communist moves as they arise (e.g., an attempted infiltration of the Planning Commission), but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or crusade. Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees from Cuba.

The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the basis for a coup in the months ahead. Meanwhile the Army strong-man Embert (one of Trujillo's assassins) waits in the wings.

Vietnam

CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been two-fold:

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(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, including the training of some 43,000 irregulars (now turned over to U. S. Special Forces); support to the mountain people in operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U. S. Special Forces in South Vietnam.

(2) CIA support of infiltration operations in North Vietnam. (Not a great success. High losses of teams.)

In response to/question based on recent U. S. press allegations that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government: "CIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever -- no instigation of the Buddhists -- nothing." CIA considers that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame Nhu. The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire to unify what is a loosely-joined, individual-Pagoda-type religious movement.

August 20 saw the temple raids, martial law, and then the arrests of students. One U. S. reaction was an August 24 cablegram from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared) which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representatives in Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus" -- i.e., indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that they should get moving. However, the Generals proved to be lacking in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem sentiments. CIA considers that the August 24 State Department cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's true capabilities and intentions. CIA understands that subsequently the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the subject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected a revision of the earlier "unload the Nhus" message.

As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increased Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms departed at this point.)

Italy

With approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of \$1 million in the campaign leading to the June elections (plus \$600,000 to other political elements in Italy). CIA's rationale for the loss of CDP strength in the elections is that (1) there was a loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities;

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(2) Fanfani, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians, including wives of the workers who had previously been able to persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates. Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend \$125,000 to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the establishment of a center-left government coalition.

Bolivia

The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize" the tin mines -- i.e., a project calling for the firing of surplus tin miners and resettling them in new jobs. This will take some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among the Bolivian miners.

Brazil

Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit the legislature, (2) obtain backing of the Army, and (3) make a demagogic appeal to the Brazilian people as the only leader who can serve their interests.

CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened. In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going and assets are in place (e.g., in the top executive committee of the Students' Federation). However, there is no large-scale CIA political operation in Brazil now.

MR. FITZGERALD
(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert actions against Cuba. The covert program assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage of time runs in Castro's favor.

Mr. Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals which were previously under consideration, it should be kept in mind that they have now been approved as "interdependent" actions. The actions call for (1) covert collection of intelligence, (2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage", (3) stimulate disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial

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program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba, (5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations from U. S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to internal sabotage actions. CIA mounts about 10 "black" operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted. CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time.)

Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly. The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them. The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in this respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents a good sabotage target. Finally, the Soviet aid at a rate of \$1 million a day (military and economic) is not enough to keep the Cuban economy going. Cubans are not starving but they do not eat "comfortably" even in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)
U. S. contractor personnel: 33
Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)
Personnel at overseas posts: 45
DD/I staff: 12
NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.

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CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best information comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are 108 agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic personnel. There are two illegal teams working, one of which has 200 sub-agents. There are 44 legal travelers working; 60 agents in Cuban shipping; and there are 31 penetrations of Cuban installations abroad.

As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in every port, but observers cannot say what is in the crates they see being off-loaded.

Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken by agents on-the-ground in Cuba. Also CIA has furnished its agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.

CIA's estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba: 12,000 Soviet troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel); an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians; and "a lot" of Czech and other bloc technicians working with the Cuban military forces.

CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has been made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program. CIA feels that the "X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change overnight if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations against the Cuban government.

CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he is being sent back into Cuba next week. The major says that there is a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro, but although this view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of training of the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the Castro security system.

The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting by nonprofessional observers. However, there is no evidence of offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-21's operated by Cuban pilots. Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them. We don't know what is in the caves, exactly. Neither CIA agents nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Against Cuba

Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, who heads up a Cuba task force within the DD/P area at CIA, has been asked to join the Board meeting for one hour for the purpose of reporting on covert action and intelligence operations relating to Cuba.

When Mr. Fitzgerald last appeared before the Board on April 23, 1963, to brief members on this subject, his presentation included reference, among other things, to (1) the numbers of agents, teams, reports, etc., involved in the CIA clandestine agent effort against Cuba, with less detail on the substantive intelligence collection results being obtained thereby; (2) the fact that CIA had no policy guidance for "positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature," and that the policy guidance available to CIA in this area was concerned with creating "low key" resistance and "subtle sabotage" (e.g., leaflet drops and shorting out electric power lines); and (3) the fact that a decision regarding such policy guidance was to be obtained later in April 1963.

In the course of Mr. Fitzgerald's appearance before the Board, members may wish to raise questions about the following:

- (1) The extent to which policy guidance has been provided to CIA, and by whom, pertaining to the execution of positive, major covert action programs against Cuba.
- (2) The results of efforts to mount clandestine agent operations designed to (a) obtain on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, and (b) attempt intercept of emanations from Soviet encryption machines (as recommended by the Board to the President).
- (3) A description of covert actions against Cuba which (a) have been approved and are under way or are scheduled for future execution, and (b) have been proposed by CIA but for which approval has not been obtained.

J. Patrick Coyne

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Discussions With The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman has invited Mr. McCone to meet with the Board and has requested that he be prepared at the meeting to discuss the following subjects:

1. Coordination of U. S. foreign intelligence activities.
(Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies encountered by the DCI in the implementation of the President's memorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordination and guidance of the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)
2. National intelligence estimating process.
(Status and results of survey looking to possible improvements in organization, procedures and product.)
3. Current intelligence assessments and spot reporting on crisis situations.
(The DCI's comments on the adequacy of present arrangements for providing the President and members of his staff with such assessments and reports.)
4. Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign intelligence agencies.
(DCI's appraisal of current effectiveness. DCI's views on methods for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U. S. classified information, intelligence and sources resulting from recent Soviet espionage operations in several NATO countries.)
5. National Reconnaissance Office.
(DCI's views on adequacy of current organization; operations and funding; status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of efforts to eliminate Agena-related failures.)
6. Cuba.
(DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine intelligence collection activities and U. S. covert operations currently directed against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of Soviet-bloc personnel in Cuba.)
7. Deep Cover.
(DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community efforts to improve deep cover intelligence assets overseas.)

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8. Intelligence collection activities of Soviet trawlers operating off U. S. coasts.
9. Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
10. Such other topics as the DCI may wish to raise.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested By Board Members For Discussion
By the Director of Central Intelligence When He
Meets With The Board On September 13, 1963

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(DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community efforts to improve deep cover intelligence assets overseas.)
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9. Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
10. Such other topics as the DCI may wish to raise.

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