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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 21 -- 22, 1963

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ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		November 21, 1963
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:30	Board Panel's Review of the Dunlap Espionage Case and its Ramifications Messrs. Clifford, Gray, Toolittle
3.	10:30 - 11:30	Actions Taken and Contemplated by NSA Based on its Study of the Dunlap Case Lt. General Gordon A. Blake, USAF, Director of NSA
4.	11:30 - 12:00	Executive Session
5.	12:00 - 1:00	Results of U. S. Army's Study of Dunlap Case and of Counterintelligence and Personnel Security Screening Processes Applied to Army Personnel Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
6.	1:00 - 1:30	Executive Session
7.	1:30 - 2:15	Lunch - White House Mess
8.	2:15 - 3:00	Executive Session
9.	3:30 - 4:30	Assessment of the Adequacy of the Several Defense Department Reviews as an Outgrowth of the Dunlap and Related Espionage Penetrations. Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA
10.	4:30 - 6:30	Discussion and Drafting of Material to be Included in Report to the President.

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ITEM TIME SUBJECT

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November 22, 1963

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| 11. | 9:00 - 9:15   | Chairman's Time   |
| 12. | 9:15 - 10:00  | Resume with Item 10   |
| 13. | 10:00 - 12:00 | Discussions with the Director of<br>Central Intelligence<br><u>Mr. John A. McCone</u>   |
| 14. | 12:00 - 12:30 | South Vietnam: Activities of CIA Preceding<br>and Following the Overthrow of Diem.<br><u>Mr. William Colby, DD/P Staff, CIA</u> |
| 15. | 12:30 - 1:30  | Resume with Item 10   |
| 16. | 1:30 - 2:15   | Lunch - White House Mess  |
| 17. | 2:15 - 6:00   | Completion of final draft of Report<br>to the President.  |

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

November 21, 1963

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in Executive Session at 9:00 a.m. November 21, 1963, on the first day of a scheduled two-day meeting, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; members Land, Gray, Langer and Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that in this two-day meeting consideration would be given to the Soviet espionage case involving the late U. S. Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, previously assigned to the National Security Agency by the Army Security Agency. Mr. Clifford said that the Board was in a position to do a unique service in this situation, and was the only Government entity engaged in a detailed, full-time review of the counterintelligence and national security ramifications of the case. Chairman Clifford advised Board members that some of the facts involved are extremely sensitive and must be given extreme security. (Here Mr. Clifford outlined to the Board the substance of highly sensitive information which had been given orally to Mr. Coyne by FBI Director Hoover for the information of the Board and the President with respect to a uniquely valuable intelligence source which supplied information concerning the espionage activities of Dunlap.)

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November 22, 1963

The Board re-convened at 8:45 a.m. in executive session. Chairman Clifford announced that General Carroll had called to emphasize that during his remarks yesterday he did not intend to be critical of corrective measures taken by General Blake (Director of NSA) after the Dunlap case, rather, his criticisms were directed at the situation existing prior thereto.

Board members directed their attention to a further review of materials relating to the Dunlap case, and to further work on the draft of the Board's report to President Kennedy.

(Messrs. Pace and Murphy joined the meeting.)

At 10:00 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. McCone, DCI, who was accompanied by CIA officials Kirkpatrick and Helms.

Mr. Clifford informed the DCI that the Board would appreciate his comments on the subject matters which had previously been indicated as of interest to the Board, and in any comments on other subjects which the DCI or his associates might wish to make.

Mr. McCone said that he was prepared to discuss all of the items listed by the Chairman, plus 3 additional subjects: (1) the Soviet Space Analytical Center, (2) organizational changes in regard to CIA's scientific and technical activities, and (3) Vietnam. He said that at noon he would have available to the Board Mr. William Colby, CIA headquarters official assigned to Far East matters, who had just returned from a several weeks' visit to Vietnam at President Kennedy's request. Mr. McCone said that he himself would have to leave the meeting at 12:20 in order to keep an appointment with McGeorge Bundy.

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First Mr. McCone said he wanted to refer most emphatically to the damage being done to CIA through adverse publicity appearing in the press, radio and TV in a campaign which, if not arrested, could well destroy the CIA. If the campaign continues, it will prevent CIA recruitment of good men, and will discourage present CIA personnel at all levels in the organization. Mr. McCone said that there is little he can do to dissuade the press from pursuing this line for ideological reasons or otherwise. There are those in the Defense Department who have opposed CIA ever since it was established, and there are Foreign Service Officers in the State Department who are highly critical of the CIA. Mr. McCone urged most emphatically that the Board bring this matter to President Kennedy's attention and to urge the President to take not one but several occasions to try to correct the CIA's public image. For example, CIA has been accused of being a "Third Government in South Vietnam", and various people have been led to the erroneous conclusion that the anti-Diem coup was engineered by CIA. One result of irresponsible charges may be that Cambodia will swing over to the Communist camp.

Mr. Clifford asked whether these criticisms are traceable back to the Bay of Pigs as a turning point. Mr. McCone said yes, and back to CIA's involvement in Guatemala. The criticisms of CIA make interesting copy for writers who know there will be no denial or defense. For some reason or other, extreme liberals in and out of Government feel that a secret intelligence service is contrary to the democratic principles of our Government. The N. Y. Times is particularly critical and Times staffer James Reston would destroy CIA if he had his way; and the Washington Post from top to bottom is opposed to CIA.

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Mr. Gray asked if Mr. McCone was suggesting that the President should talk to the Secretaries of State and Defense about criticisms of CIA made by persons in those Departments. Mr. McCone said, no, what must be done is for the President to make the matter the subject of a major speech and several press conferences. General Doolittle inquired whether Mr. McCone had discussed this with the President, and Mr. McCone replied that he had and this was the reason for remarks which the President made 30 days ago during a press conference. Mr. Murphy observed that public statements of the kind urged by Mr. McCone often have a way of proving to be a liability, because they may generate a whole flock of further press and radio commentaries, and for this reason Mr. McCone might consider the prospect of having to ride out this storm.

Dr. Land asked what is the CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said its role was not to overthrow governments, and there are many other reasons why CIA is in Vietnam. Dr. Land asked what, however, should the President publicly say about CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said that he could supply the President with that.

Chairman Clifford stated that the matter raised by Mr. McCone is an area in which he would hope that the Board might be of assistance. However, Mr. Clifford did not know how much the President could do in the way of public statements to the press. Perhaps a lot could be done within Government to stop damaging leaks of information from the various departments and agencies. Mr. Clifford said that the Board would address itself to the problem. Mr. McCone agreed that leaks are a part of the problem, and he recalled that the editor of News Week told him that he obtained information from State Department, but the editor would not name the source.

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Turning to the subject of Counterintelligence which was included on the Board's list of items of interest, Mr. McCone asked Mr. Helms to speak to this matter.

Mr. Helms said that in looking at the subject of our counterintelligence posture he preferred to refer to it as "counter-espionage". He said that it is the most dreary and least attractive job that CIA has. When CIA goes out for positive collection of intelligence in an espionage operation, the objective is clear -- e.g., the obtaining of information about a Soviet missile site. But counterespionage is like Blind Man's Buff where you know someone is in the room but you aren't certain who it is. There is a passive side of the effort, involving security checks, safes, fences, guards, etc.; but if the counter effort is only passive, it continues to be a game of Blind Man's Buff. Therefore, a counterespionage activity is needed for the purpose of identifying hostile espionage agents. In this latter activity CIA has about 5 years to go before getting to the level that is desired.

Mr. Helms pointed out that the USSR not only has an aggressive cold war policy but it uses the instruments of the GRU and the KGB operating in parallel -- with coordination taking place under Khrushchev in Moscow where decisions are reached as to dividing up the slots and espionage missions between the GRU and the KGB.

Next Mr. Helms exhibited a chart reflecting a number of espionage cases which have been uncovered as a result of CIA's counterintelligence efforts: the Able case (an illegal KGB agent who was located by the FBI in New York after Able's subordinate defected to the CIA in Paris); Blake (of Britain's MI-6 who worked for the Soviets for 6 years until uncovered as a result of a Polish defection to the CIA); Philby (the old school tie MI-6 official whose Soviet espionage recruitment dates back to 1934 and who recently fled to the

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USSR from the Middle East); Clemens and Felfe (who served 9 years in the West German counterespionage service, and were uncovered through a Polish defector's tip to CIA); Cox (a U. S. citizen who took \$500 from the Soviets, returned the money, suffered a heart attack, and the case dropped by U. S. authorities); Ethel and Harry Houghton (uncovered through a tip from a Polish defector); the Krugers (a U. S. couple whose real names were Cohen and who disappeared in 1950); the Lansdale case in England; Vassalls (a homosexual clerk in the British Admiralty); and Wennerstrom (CIA didn't give the Swede's a direct lead to this Soviet agent, but CIA laid out to officials of Sweden the manner in which the Soviets would effect a penetration, and when the Swede's surveyed their situation they found that Wennerstrom fit the prototype, with the result that Wennerstrom confessed when confronted.) Mr. Helms also presented another chart dealing with cases of espionage penetrations by other Soviet bloc intelligence services including Czechs, East Germans, Poles and Yugoslavs.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA had concurred in the U. S. release of the Soviet espionage agent, Able, in exchange for U-2 pilot Powers. Mr. Helms said that considerations of national interest prevailed in that decision, although CIA's counterintelligence officers objected to the action.

As a result of information gained through CIA's counterespionage efforts, CIA has informed French and Israeli governments that the KGB is obtaining information from them. The worst situation is in the French government which has recently arrested the Soviet agent Pacques, and this action by the French government may be an indication that they are moving against Soviet espionage infiltrations. CIA believes in the accuracy of information it has received from a Soviet defector that there are 10 or 12 high placed French officials serving as Soviet agents.

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Mr. Clifford asked whether this situation should cause the U. S. to furnish less information to the foreign governments involved. Mr. Helms said that CIA is recommending to the USIB that there be less distribution of sensitive papers placed in the hands of foreign recipients, but that these foreign governments be provided more counterintelligence information to protect themselves against Soviet espionage penetrations (for example, West Germany is crawling with hundreds of East German agents).

In answer to General Doolittle's question as to motivations in these cases, Mr. Helms said that in the Western world the primary motivations have been desire for money, blackmail pressures, ideology, and vanity (the agent Blake enjoyed confessing how well he had fooled his British superiors). In blackmail situations, the Soviets develop leads as to personality defects and then exploit them persistently.

Mr. Clifford asked whether CIA's counterintelligence program has uncovered U. S. citizens serving as Soviet agents. Mr. Helms replied that one such instance was the case of Sergeant Rhodes. (Mr. McCone interjected that if there had not been a mix-up in signals, Dunlap would have been turned up as an agent. Mr. Clifford said that the Board knew about that.)

Dr. Langer asked whether the FBI is more active now in its counter-espionage coverage in the United States. Mr. Helms said that FBI is at a maximum of activity. He added that the Able case had proved something that CIA and FBI had doubted, i.e., that the USSR was operating "illegals" in the U. S. after World War II.

In answer to a question as to whether new policy guidance is needed with respect to counterespionage activities, Mr. Helms stated that CIA does not feel that NSCID No. 5 needs revision -- the problems that exist are encountered in the implementation of the directive. There is a view in the

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intelligence community (supported by Army and Navy, although CIA and FBI are not keen on it) that there is a need for a Counterintelligence Committee. The objection to this is grounded on the nature of counterintelligence work which involves highly sensitive operations aimed at penetration of foreign government's intelligence services, and the security of these sensitive operations would be weakened if several agencies shared in them. Under present arrangements there is no duplication of counterintelligence actions on the part of the agencies involved because of the day-to-day liaison that is maintained among them; and, also, the CIA maintains a central counterintelligence index file for use by interested agencies. In addition, the USIB provides a place for the resolution of policy questions. Therefore, Mr. Helms said, the CIA feels that the present bureaucratic apparatus is sufficient for its purposes. He added that one improvement that is needed is for U. S. military agencies to make good memoranda for the record concerning contacts made by U. S. military attaches with foreign officers (in the Wennerstrom case it has been found that no such records were maintained about the many contacts with Wennerstrom during the period in which it is now known that he was serving as a Soviet agent).

Mr. McCone next addressed himself to the subject of Cuba, in which the Board had expressed an interest. He said that from 15,000 to 18,000 military personnel have been withdrawn since the missile crisis. A few hundred have arrived during the past month, and since October there appears to have been a rotation replacement of Soviet personnel in Cuba. It is believed that the USSR is maintaining a large "MAAG-type" contingent in Cuba, including military advisers, technicians, and personnel training the Cubans in the operation of SAM sites and KOMAR vessels. All missiles have been removed from Cuba by the Soviets except cruise missiles, FROG missiles and CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT.

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SAM's. The Soviet decision to train Cubans and to relocate SAM sites indicates an intention to turn them over to Cuban control eventually. Further Soviet withdrawals will probably take place when Cubans become proficient in the weapons systems. So, in Cuba there is a transition from Soviet military forces to a MAAG-type operation, with the Soviets retaining control of only the most sophisticated weapons systems. Equipment withdrawals have been limited to the missiles and launchers, and the replacement of advanced SAM radars with older types of the kind supplied by the USSR to Egypt and Indonesia.

In answer to Mr. Clifford's query about news accounts of CIA agent operations in Cuba, Mr. McCone said that CIA has had a very active operation against Cuba and the Board has been briefed on it from time to time. Although there have been some disappointments and roll-ups of agents, CIA has vastly improved its agent nets and internal agent sources among legal travelers and friendly foreign government missions in Cuba. Of the 17 agents reportedly executed in Cuba, 7 were CIA's. One unfortunate experience was the identification of the S.S. Rex as a CIA support ship. (Mr. Helms said that the story first came to public attention on October 21 when Cuban planes strafed a bauxite ore vessel, thinking it was the mother ship which CIA was using to return an agent team from a desolate area in Western Cuba. The CIA agent team had been in 6 weeks, had recruited additional agents, and was scheduled to come out on October 21. The S. S. Rex was lying off shore and personnel were sent ashore in small boats to meet the agent team. The infrared blinker signals from shore were correctly given, although the lights were placed closer together than they should have been. A hailing signal was given from a rubber boat and was acknowledged, but then machine gun fire opened up on the small boats.) Mr. McCone stated that the cover story

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for the S. S. Rex was a good one -- a hydrographic oil exploration vessel -- and when the agent team was rolled up it was decided to bring the Rex back to a Florida port as called for in the cover plan, rather than taking it to some foreign port and thereby ruin the cover story.

Referring to the Dunlap case, Mr. Clifford said that the Board was shocked to learn of the lack of coordination between NSA and ASA, and he invited the DCI's comments on this in view of the Board's responsibility to the President in this matter.

Mr. McCone replied that his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense is to overhaul the security system and to ensure that military personnel assigned to NSA be subjected to the same kind of security screening as that which NSA applies to its civilian personnel, i.e., a background investigation and polygraph examination. The DCI noted that NSA rejects 20 per cent of the military personnel who have been working as military assignees to NSA, when they apply for civilian employment at NSA. Critics of Mr. McCone's proposal say that any such new procedure would have to be applied among agencies generally and that would present problems, but Mr. McCone feels that the more stringent security clearance procedure should start at NSA which is the heart of the problem, and then widen the circle to other agencies gradually.

The DCI said that he is also looking into the need-to-know by NSA with respect to the large number of sensitive CIA documents which are used by NSA. Some 135,000 such documents were at NSA during Dunlap's employment there. The DCI stated that CIA has not completed its damage assessment yet, and a few weeks more would be required.

Mr. Gray asked whether the CIA investigates a military man assigned to CIA in the event that derogatory information is developed concerning him.

Mr. McCone replied that before a military assignee comes to CIA, the CIA

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ELINT. For example in connection with a Soviet missile shot on Kamchatka there was a suspicion that the test would include a Soviet anti-ICBM shot, but our Alaskan radar site was not alerted, the radars were not up, and we missed coverage of any anti-ICBM test. Mr. McCone agreed with Dr. Baker's observation that there is a relationship between the activities of the new Center and the responsibilities to be assigned under the Defense ELINT Plan, and the DCI added that there may well be resistance from some elements of the military.

Next Mr. McCone reported to the Board on the recent U-2 crash in the Gulf of Mexico. The whole plane has been found in 9 fathoms of water 40 miles NW of Key West. The ejector canopy is off and the seat is out. An empty life raft and parachute were found. There was no attack made on the aircraft. The pilot reported a successful mission over Cuba, he flew over the Key West station on the return trip and 10 minutes later he was down. When the wreckage is raised it should be possible to determine the cause.

Mr. McCone said that this exhausted the list of things he had in mind to discuss at this meeting.

Mr. Clifford asked if there were any intelligence facets of the arrest of U. S. professor Barghorn in the USSR. The DCI said that an analysis of the professor's debriefing had not yet been completed. He had no intelligence mission even indirectly, but was once a CIA consultant and the KGB knew that. No doubt this Soviet move was made because they had run out of pawns to use in obtaining an exchange for the Soviet spy Egeroff arrested in the U. S. As a matter of fact CIA had forecast that the Soviets would do something like this when they ran out of people to use in exchanges, Mr. McCone said.

At 12:15 Mr. McCone brought in Mr. Colby who was in charge of the CIA

Station at Saigon for 5 years and more recently has been in charge of the  
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Far East desk at CIA headquarters. At an NSC meeting following the anti-Diem coup in South Vietnam the President decided to send Mr. Colby to Saigon to survey the situation as a representative of the President and of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Vietnam coup is the 8th that has taken place around the world during the past year. Mr. McCone said that he has looked back over CIA reporting on these events and found that without exception there had been a forecast of what was to come and of the people involved.

Mr. McCone said that reports of possible coups in Vietnam had been received for years. Up to early August it was CIA's practice to inform the Diem government about reported coup plotting. Then when Diem began to resist efforts to get him to change some of his policies, CIA decided not to report to him on coup talk which was noted in August, but CIA would watch the situation -- which CIA did in detail through August and September. CIA knew quite a lot about the General's coup plotting but not their precise plan. General Dhin told CIA that the coup was ready. CIA maintained a radio telephone link between the Joint General Staff and the CIA Station in Saigon, information on so that the CIA contact could report developments. CIA did not have/and does not know about the assassinations of Diem and Nhu. CIA had no part in organizing the coup, Mr. McCone informed the Board, although some have accused CIA of this. Mr. McCone said he would now ask Mr. Colby to brief the Board, noting that Mr. Colby attended the Honolulu meeting (as did Mr. McCone) and is knowledgeable of the decisions made there. (At 12:25 Mr. McCone left the Board meeting to keep his appointment with Mr. Bundy.)

Mr. Colby began by informing the Board that CIA has for some time been watching signs of instability in the Vietnam government, in order to

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determine reasons for discontent and to learn of any plans to overthrow the government. (Two earlier coups had been attempted. In November 1960 junior paratrooper officers took part. In 1962 two Air Force pilots bombed the palace in the hope of killing members of the royal family.) In the summer of 1963 CIA's policy was tied to clear and present danger to U. S. interests. If CIA saw threats to the Diem regime, CIA would give warnings to Diem so as not to spoil CIA's contacts with the regime. In the summer, the intense feelings over the Bhuddist issue were graver than any that CIA had seen in Vietnam. There were major popular grievances against the regime. The regime insisted it had the answers to all questions and that any opposition was either venal or stupid. All was decided from the Palace, and the Generals did not have much to do. The regime had a total lack of appreciation of public relations both at home and internationally. While the Bhuddist suicides by burning were taking place there were 6 or 8 potential coup groups being formed, some of them being alliances between civilians and the military. The situation was crystallized with the Government raids on pagodas, resulting in public outcry. Diem convinced his Generals that these repressive actions were necessary to maintain the war effort, when in fact Diem was making a political move against a Bhuddist political operation. (Mr. Colby said there was no tie between the Bhuddists and the Vieg Cong, although there had been some Communist penetration of the Bhuddist priests dating back before 1954.) The anti-Diem Bhuddist movement actually began as a concept to protect Bhuddism against Catholic supremacy. When the Government raided the pagodas, this almost set off a coup attempt at that time but the coup planners had not yet obtained support of sufficient troops. Meanwhile, CIA was watching developments carefully, Mr. Colby said. In answer to a question from Mr. Coyne, he stated CIA funds and activities were

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not directly or indirectly involved in support of Diem forces which raided the pagodas.

Continuing, Mr. Colby reported to the Board that in September and early October CIA had identified (1) a General's coup group, and (2) a coup group headed by junior officers and civilians, which was all set to move on October 24 but could not do so for lack of needed trucks. Mr. Colby then went on to describe the Generals' coup action which resulted in the overthrow of the Diem government, along the lines publicly reported.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Colby informed the Board that there were 10 executions of members of the Diem regime during the coup action.

Looking ahead, Mr. Colby stated that as soon as the Generals have finished removing pro-Diem officials from the Government they will proceed to institute popular programs in an effort to solidify the support of the people in the prosecution of the war effort (the strategic hamlet program will probably be continued). The Generals will have to change the compartmentation of the Vietnam military forces which Diem had established as a means of preventing the Generals from knowledge of the overall situation. Accordingly, the new ruling Generals' group sees the need for thorough reorganization of the military chain of command, and are attempting to form an organizational pattern which will be better suited to fighting the war against the Viet Cong. The basic war concept is to clean out Cong forces in the southern delta area and then expand military activities in the northern area.

General Doolittle asked whether there is any organized Communist movement within South Vietnam. Mr. Colby replied that the Viet Cong guerilla

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effort has penetrated into the South Vietnamese society. Viet Cong military units are guided by Cong Political Committees which are set up in each Province. There is, Mr. Colby stated, a Communist Party in South Vietnam whose main efforts are directed at "shooting at us" and propagandizing the South Vietnamese into the belief that their real enemies are the U. S. and the present Government of the country.

In answer to Mr. Pace's question as to whether realistic looks have been taken of the potentials for winning the war in Vietnam, Mr. Colby said that a hard nose look is necessary. It is not yet clear whether the new Government regime can claim the support of the people in the countryside. The situation is in fair shape in the northern two-thirds of the country, but is bad in the southern one third.

Mr. Coyne inquired about U. S. coordination of its some fifteen intelligence elements in South Vietnam. Mr. Colby said that the J-2 is coordinating military intelligence activities, CIA coordinates political intelligence efforts, and paramilitary matters are being turned over to U. S. Special Forces. He said that there are 200 personnel engaged in the CIA effort in South Vietnam.

Dr. Langer asked about the recall of the CIA Station Chief in Saigon (Richardson). Mr. Colby said that Richardson had become publicly identified as a close contact of the Diem regime at a time when the U. S. Government became critical of policies of the Diem regime.

As for French Government attitudes toward the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Colby observed that the French have considerable commercial holdings in the country and a history of cultural affinity, and the French are piqued at their loss of a "protective image".

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Mr. Colby concluded his discussion with the Board and left the meeting at 1:00 p.m.

In executive session, the Board had a further discussion of its report to be made to President Kennedy on the Dunlap case. Chairman Clifford brought Messrs. Murphy and Pace up to date on the principal matters covered at the preceding day's session of the Board meeting with regard to the extensive review and materials which had been completed thus far by Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne in the Dunlap case. Mr. Clifford summed up the Board's reaction of being aghast at the shocking looseness of security attitude at the NSA. He referred to the many questions which had been put to the Director of NSA at yesterday's session. Mr. Clifford observed that General Fitch had made a very intelligent presentation, and that an exceedingly valuable session had been had with General Carroll of DIA. Mr. Clifford said that after lunch the Board would complete its consideration of the Dunlap report and recommendations which the Board Panel had drafted. Arrangements had not been made for a meeting of Board members with President Kennedy in conjunction with this particular Board meeting because Mr. Clifford had felt that the Board would require all the time of this 2-day meeting to complete action on its report on a complex subject.

Chairman Clifford said that Board members should plan to convene for half a day at the next Board meeting and then meet with the President for an hour on the Dunlap case report. In view of the serious nature of the counterintelligence problems involved, Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that the Board's report and recommendations may well constitute one of the most important contributions which the Board has made.

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Mr. Clifford then informed Board members Murphy and Pace of the Board's discussion yesterday assessing the degree of damage resulting from Dunlap's espionage activities. Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at an assessment at this time, Mr. Clifford observed that the damage must have been serious, and he noted that the CIA is still evaluating its practice of sending its sensitive documents to the NSA. Mr. Clifford stated that despite differences of opinion which may exist as to the damage done to U. S. interests by Dunlap's espionage service for the Russians, the Board has information which bears on the subject but which cannot be made generally known and which the Board can pass on only to the President. (Mr. Clifford then related to the Board the most sensitive item, consisting of information which had been given to Mr. Coyne by appropriate authority, for reporting to the Board and to the President. It was agreed by Board members that the Board must take particular pains to protect this information, and would do so.)

At 1:35 the Board adjourned for lunch at the White House Staff Mess.

Having heard the report of the assassination of President Kennedy which had just occurred at 2:00 p.m. EST in Dallas, Chairman Clifford reconvened the Board in executive session. Mr. Clifford expressed the keen sense of personal loss which he felt upon the President's death. He joined Board members in their individual expressions of profound sorrow occasioned by the tragic circumstances of the President's death, and their deep sympathy and concern for the President's family.

Chairman Clifford announced that at this point the Board's meeting of the past two days was at a close, and that completion of the Board's report which was in preparation for submission to President Kennedy would be suspended pending further developments.

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It was Chairman Clifford's feeling that it would be inappropriate and premature, during the transition period following President Kennedy's death, for the Board to present to President Johnson the Board's recommendations calling for substantial changes in the U. S. intelligence effort. Mr. Clifford expressed his intention, and Board members agreed, to indicate to President Johnson as soon as possible the Board's willingness to serve in any way possible. Meanwhile, pending a resolution by President Johnson as to whether the Board would continue as an institution, and as to the President's wishes concerning continued services of the present Chairman and members, Chairman Clifford asked that the Board members be prepared to meet on a quick notice should intelligence developments require it. Mr. Clifford said that he would inform the DCI of the course of action which the Board was taking at this time.

The Board meeting was adjourned at 3:20 p.m., subject to call of the Chairman as determined by developments.

*A*  
A. R. Ash

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The Director of Central Intelligence has suggested to the Chairman that the Board might wish to be brought up to date on recent intelligence and related activities involved in South Vietnam, including the activities of CIA preceding and following the overthrow of Diem. The Chairman concurred in this suggestion.

Accordingly, arrangements have been made for the Board to be provided an oral briefing on the subject by Mr. William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, of the DD/P Staff, CIA.

/s/

J. Patrick Coyne

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