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Jun
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1963

MEETING OF THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
June 25 - 26, 1963

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JUNE 25 - 26, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
June 25, 1963 (all unless present)		
1.	9:00 - 10:00	The Chairman's Time Mr. Clifford
2.	10:00 - 10:15	Report on OXCART Incident General Doolittle
3.	10:15 - 11:00	Status Report on Organization and Operations of CIA in non-Covert Action Areas Doolittle Panel
4.	11:00 - 11:30	Briefing on Organization, Management and Operation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State Mr. George C. Denney, Jr. Deputy Director, INR, State Mr. Allan Evans, INR Staff
5.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities Murphy Panel
6.	12:00 - 12:30	Status Report on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Activities Baker Panel
7.	12:40 - 2:00	Lunch - Metropolitan Club (Anderson Room - Second Floor)
8.	2:00 - 2:30	a. 2:00 - 2:15 -- Budget Bureau Views on Management and Budgetary Control of Intelligence Mr. Gary Pettibone, Budget Bureau Staff Mr. Irving Lewis, Budget Bureau Staff b. 2:15 - 2:30 -- Over-all Budgeting for Intelligence Face Panel
9.	2:30 - 3:00	Executive Session Discussion of DCI's Comments on Report and Recommendations Growing Out of the Board's Cuba Review
10.	3:00 - 3:30	Discussion with the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Mr. Brockway McMillan, Under Secretary, Department of the Air Force

For material on Panel

Assignments see ① Lk of Panel Mr. Conser
② Lk of Ash and Coyne

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ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	3:30 - 5:00	Discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. McCone
12.	7:00	Dinner at Mr. Clifford's Residence 9421 Rockville Pike, Bethesda, Maryland

June 26, 1963

13.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
14.	9:30 - 10:30	Status Report on Defense Intelligence Activities (other than SIGINT and NRO) Gray Panel
15.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Covert Action Activities Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
16.	11:00 - 11:30	Status Report on NRO Activities Land-Doolittle Panel
17.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on DCI's Coordination Role and on Intelligence Community Relationships with and Support of the White House Clifford Panel
18.	12:00 - 12:30	Executive Session
19.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch -- The White House Mess
20.	1:30 - End of Day	a. Consideration of Chairman's Draft Communications Concerning Future Status Reports of DCI, CIA, State and Defense

b.	Discussion of Board's SIGINT Panel Report
c.	Discussion of the question of recommending a ninth Board member
d.	Discussion of frequency of future Board meetings
e.	Discussion of future business of the Board and the Board's Panels
f.	Determination of next Board meeting date

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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No. 1 of 2 Copies, Serial 2

June 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board - June 25-26, 1963

The Board convened in its offices at 297 Executive Office Building, 9:00 A.M., June 25, 1963, on the first day of its two-day meeting. Those present were Board Chairman Clark Clifford and Members Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Land, Langer, and Pace; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Chairman Clifford began the meeting with the observation that the Board has been in existence for two years, and has been very active during that time. Mr. Clifford thought that it was exceedingly appropriate at this time to look back on the two years' work of the Board, to evaluate the work, and to arrive at conclusions concerning areas where the Board can expand its usefulness to the President. Accordingly, Mr. Clifford said, he has purposely kept to a minimum the appearances of briefers from outside during this meeting, and Board business would be confined mostly to consideration of reports by the various Board Panels. On the following day the Chairman indicated that he would set aside time for a discussion of the usefulness of Panel reports with a view to seeing whether there might not be increased use made of Panels in pursuing the Board's functions. If this procedure proved useful, the Chairman thought that perhaps there would be fewer formal meetings of the whole Board and that the Panels could prepare proposed reports to the President to be considered at formal meetings of the Board, thereby avoiding a last-minute rush in the preparation of reports to the President.

The Chairman then turned to a number of items which he had drawn up for discussion with the Board, with the assistance of Mr. Coyne.

First, the Chairman read to Board members the letter which had been written to Mr. Clifford on June 5 by Dr. Killian, thanking the Board for the gift which he had received on the occasion of his resignation as Chairman of the Board.

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Turning to the Board-suggested item regarding the status of current efforts to mount clandestine collection and covert operations against Cuba, the DCI referred to the close attention being given to these matters. He told the Board that since March of this year Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA has been heading up the Agency's headquarters element directly concerned with clandestine activities against Cuba. Agents have been placed in Cuba for CIA by Argentina, France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Britain. A total of 104 new agents of all types are in operation, 41 of them in Cuba where three "black", illegal teams are working. As yet there have been no penetrations of the Castro regime or military installations. CIA gets reports from these agents and liaison observers but the Agency has "no agents sitting on the Cuban General Staff".

Mr. McCone said that we do not know how many Soviets are in Cuba, although it can be estimated that there are 12,000 to 13,000 still there and possibly more, all scattered over the island. He informed the Board that pursuant to approvals by the Special Group, the NSC and the President there are active programs for intensified intelligence collection on Cuba, as well as efforts to promote disaffection in the Cuban military; hampering the Cuban economy; and sabotage.

Mr. Clifford asked for background on the recent news stories about Cuban exiles claiming that invasion teams had been sent into Cuba. Mr. McCone stated that these claims were national stories by Cuban exiles in Miami with a view to obtaining U. S. military intervention. The DCI added that CIA assessed the development accurately the night that word was first received about it. He went on to say that an approved U. S. program calls for a long term effort over two years aimed at disaffecting the Cuban military from Castro, and it is

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expected that this effort will result in press releases, and Soviet protests at the UN and elsewhere. However, Mr. McCone expressed the belief that there is already some disaffection within Cuban military circles, and if the CIA effort succeeds the result will be an overthrow of Castro but it will also mean a military dictatorship in Cuba for a time.

Mr. McCone suggested that it might be profitable for the Board to receive a briefing on Cuban matters from Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA, at the next Board meeting. Mr. Clifford agreed that this would be desirable.

Mr. Gray observed that newspaper accounts and items in the Central Intelligence Bulletin have been in disagreement on the Soviet turnover of the armored camps to the Cubans. Mr. McCone thought that CIA's assessment is the correct one.

Mr. Pace inquired about the quality of U-2 photography being obtained from missions over Cuba. Mr. McCone replied that in the present season of summer storms there is more cloud cover and shadows which means fewer sightings of the 30 critical target points of top interest to the CIA, and he noted that there was a 15-day period of such bad weather recently. At present U-2 missions are flown daily and sometimes twice daily, all of them direct overflights. The objective, he said, is to get a mosaic of the whole island every 7 days.

In answer to General Doolittle's question, Mr. McCone said that special authorization is still required for the sending of low-level missions over Cuba. Answering a question by Dr. Langer, the DCI said that no evidence of camouflage had been seen. He added that each day CIA issues an analysis of "exotic" reports received from refugee, agent and other sources, and there are innumerable such reports of all kinds which cannot be checked out. For example, a refugee from Cuba arrived in Miami with the story that he had seen an enormous submarine

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base at a location near Banes. But an examination of photography of the village in question shows only some fishing shacks and the presence of a shoal which would prevent the entry of any vessels other than shallow draft fishing boats.

Mr. Pace asked whether useful information had been obtained from CIA's own recovered agents. Mr. McCone said yes, definitely.

Turning to the subject of OXCART, the DCI said that ten are on order, ten have been delivered and six have been flown. The remaining three will be delivered one at a time in July, August, and September. Plans call for subsequent development of Air Force interceptor and reconnaissance versions of OXCART.

As for the crash of the OXCART last month, the DCI reported the facts substantially as previously given to the Board by General Doolittle. Mr. McCone indicated that no security breach had occurred; when picked up by the persons who came up in a jeep the pilot succeeded in steering them away from the crash scene; the State Police secured the area; all pieces of the plane were removed within 30 hours; the only news photos made were retrieved before the film was processed or published; and only an innocuous news story appeared in the press. Mr. McCone said that the Board of Inquiry found that false instrument readings were caused by frozen pitot tubes. It appeared that there was some pilot error; corrective recommendations have been made; and meanwhile OXCART will be flown under conditions of clear visibility.

In answer to Mr. Pace's question, the DCI said that the overall cost of project OXCART is \$750 million (of which \$300 million is engine cost), and that project TAGBOARD will require an additional expenditure of \$85 million.

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(Dr. Baker departed the Board meeting at this point.)

Taking up the sixth item suggested by the Board for discussion, the DCI said that he felt that there were no security implications in the Profumo case in Britain. Mr. McCone said it was thought that it would be contrary to Soviet procedure for Ivanov to attempt to use Keeler for espionage purposes, although there might have been a Soviet attempt at political action against the MacMillan government. In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. McCone said that the British had cooperated fully with CIA in regard to the Profumo case with respect to any U. S. people involved, but that the British have rightfully withheld information on the implication of other Britishers. Mr. McCone informed the Board that within a couple of days the Labor Party in England will break the case involving Philby who turns out to be the "third man" in the Burgess-MacLean case, and who in the late 1940's was in liaison with the CIA and FBI. The DCI added that MacMillan has been sitting on this case for a long time and CIA has tried in the past to get the British to surface it.

Turning to the next item listed as of interest to the Board, Mr. McCone said that the Penkovskiy espionage case in the USSR had no implications for British or U. S. intelligence security. The DCI noted that we suffered a serious loss of valuable source with the execution of this individual who provided over 8,000 pages of very important documents during the period 1960-1962. Mr. McCone related that the Soviet Colonel had been recruited by CIA but the British were brought in when it developed that contacts could best be made when the Soviet officer was in London escorting visiting military and trade missions. Therefore, Mr. McCone went on to say, CIA got MI-6 to share in the reporting aspects and means were set up whereby information could be delivered by

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Penkovskiy (for example, dropping a roll of tinfoil wrapped microfilm into a baby carriage pushed by the wife of a Britisher in a London park). The DCI said that apparently the Soviet officer's cooperation was motivated by an emotional resentment of the fact that he had been passed over in promotions. According to Mr. McCone, the officer was probably uncovered as a result of Soviet penetration of British intelligence, and it is known that he had no access to CIA or FBI. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA or Penkovskiy had initiated the contact with CIA, and whether he could have been planted. Mr. McCone replied that CIA was of course worried about the possibility of a plant but decided that such was not the case.

Taking up the next item on the status of Board recommendations growing out of the Hanson Baldwin article of July 1962, the DCI informed the Board that the FBI completed its investigation but did not positively identify the source of the leak and therefore dropped the matter. As to the proposal for controls on press contacts as a means of protecting intelligence matters, the DCI said that State and Defense put in a system of control procedures which set off the furor over "management of the news" which is still raging. State finally dropped its system; the Defense Department retained its procedures; and CIA already was following a control system and still does. With regard to the Board's proposal of a special investigative group to investigate unauthorized disclosures, Mr. McCone said that he suggested this to State and Defense but the "managed news" furor was at its height so nothing was heard from those departments about the proposal. Meanwhile unknown to anyone outside CIA, the Agency's Office of Security is developing a mechanism to cover any serious leaks occurring in the security field should the President request action.

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