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
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF DECEMBER 6, 1962
OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN PANEL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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Kp 25 Feb 98

Item	Time	Subject
1.	10:00 - 12:10	Cuba - Review of Data Assembled by Board Staff
2.	12:10	Depart for CIA Headquarters
3.	* 12:30	Discussions with DCI's Cuban Review Committee (Consisting of Messrs. McCone and Helmsman, and Generals Carroll, Blake, and Carter) (Lunch will be served in the course of this meeting.)
4.	4:00	At approximately 4:00 P.M. - or whenever the Board Panel terminates its discussions with the DCI's Committee, the Panel will return to the Executive Office Building to continue its review of the material referred to in item 1.

6:00

Discussions of the full Board with
Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense
Research and Engineering

*Dept of State
has no objection
MJA 8/6/98*

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MJS 3-12-98

* Dr. Killian will join^{ed} this meeting at about 5:30 P.M.

*Murphy
Gray
Doolittle
Baker*

10 am

*Clifford - 6 PM
Pace - 6:30 PM*

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR MEETING OF DECEMBER 7, 1962

<u>Item</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<i>Not taken up</i>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Status of Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations <i>Mr. Ash</i>	
2.	9:30 - 10:30	Oral Report by Board's Cuban Panel	
3.	10:30 - 1:00	Discussions with DCI's Cuban Task Force (Messrs. Malone, Carroll, Blake , Wilkinson and Cartan) + <i>Kirkpatrick - Helms</i>	
4.	1:00 - 2:00	Lunch	
5.	2:00 - 2:30	Executive Session	
6.	⁴⁵ 2:30 - 3:15	Discussion with Dr. Charyk (<i>Capt. Sullivan</i>)	
7.	¹⁵ 3:15 - 4:35	Status Report on the Organization, Programs and Plans of NRO (Messrs. Charyk, Scoville and Carroll - possible joined by the DCI) + <i>Kirkpatrick</i>	
8.	4:00 - 5:30	Discussion of Board's Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations on the Cuba Problem.	
9.	5:30 - End	Discussion of Future Board Business	

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
December 6 and 7, 1962.

The Board convened on December 6, 1962, at the call of the Chairman, Dr. Killian, for a two-day meeting at the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building.

Beginning at 10:00 a.m., Board members Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, and Baker reviewed materials and summary memoranda which had been assembled as the result of a study conducted by the Board staff of information then available concerning intelligence aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.

At 12:30 p.m. the Board Panel on Cuba (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Doolittle), and Messrs. Coyne and Ash, proceeded to CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Purpose of the visit was to discuss with DCI and the members of the DCI's ad hoc committee that committee's interim findings which had been reached thus far in its study and preparation of a report on the actions taken by the U. S. intelligence community relating to the Soviet buildup in Cuba prior to October 14, 1962. (Details of the Board Panel's discussion with the DCI, et al., are set forth in a separate memorandum in the Board's files.)

At 6:00 p.m. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, joined the Board meeting for a discussion of some aspects of advanced intelligence collection capabilities. Those present were Messrs. Killian, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Baker, Clifford, and Pace, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian informed Dr. Brown that the Board had in mind discussing Project OXCART with the President, and the Board anticipated that the President would have

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to maintaining coverage of activities in Cuba.

Dr. Killian next informed the Board that he was somewhat troubled by the position of the Board with respect to the following: (1) Mr. Bundy once told Dr. Killian that inasmuch as a special Cuban operation had been laid on with the Attorney General involved, the MONGOOSE group would have particular jurisdiction with respect to Cuba (2) during the height of the Cuba crisis the Board had not been included in the designated recipients of intelligence regarding strategic missiles in Cuba, and (3) it would appear essential that the Board have an opportunity to examine the records of the Special Group.

Mr. Gray pointed to an additional matter of concern to the Board, namely, the view expressed by Dr. Charyk that different interpretations had resulted from the analysis of satellite and U-2 photography of the same areas. Dr. Killian agreed that this presents a most serious problem, because our Government could be induced to adopt an unwarranted attitude of disbelief regarding Soviet military capabilities in the same way that an attitude of disbelief was engendered with respect to the likelihood of the Soviet introduction of an offensive missile capability into Cuba.

Mr. Gray, referring again to comments made to him by Dr. Charyk, thought that Dr. Charyk had identified two additional problems which would seem to be of concern to the Board, namely (1) the near shortage of photographic film which prevailed during the week of October 15, and (2) the fact that when U. S. intelligence operations detected the presence of C-Band radar in Cuba, the U. S. was surprised by this and had no C-Band jammers available except a laboratory model in the possession of a Government contractor, despite the fact that we had discovered as early as 1961 that the Soviets possessed this radar capability. With respect to the latter point Dr. Baker affirmed the seriousness of the problem, noting

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that our ELINT coverage had revealed that this radar capability was deployed in the USSR against our SAC forces but nevertheless our B-52-s still have not been equipped with a capability to jam this Soviet radar.

Mr. Clifford expressed the view that the Board has a peculiar and particular responsibility to the President in assessing intelligence aspects of the Cuba experience, particularly in the light of the earlier debacle at the Bay of Pigs at which time the President stated privately that he could not make correct decisions without correct intelligence, and that he could not endure "another Cuba". Therefore, Mr. Clifford recalled, the President had established this Board and one of the reasons for doing so was to bring professionalism into the field of U. S. foreign intelligence. Now the possibility arises that valid refugee reports on Soviet use of Cuban caves may be disregarded. Mr. Clifford also feared that the Administration may now have adopted the view that everything is all right again now that the missiles and the bombers are out of Cuba. Mr. Clifford acknowledged that no policy advisory officials like to have a check made on the advice they give to the President, and this is understandable, but on the other hand the President looks to the Board to assess the intelligence aspects of the policy advisory function. Mr. Clifford believed that CIA had made errors in not conducting sufficient overflights, and top level Presidential advisers erred in not proposing sufficient overflights of Cuba. And now that the Cuba crisis was successfully met by the President, the feeling in responsible parts of Government seems to be that things turned out all right so why bother the President. Mr. Clifford said that he of course could not say what the President thinks about the U. S. intelligence job that was done regarding Cuba, but the President did say to the recent meeting of the Business Advisory Council that the DCI had been the only one who had called the shots on what was going on in Cuba. This prompted

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Mr. Clifford to observe that if the President thinks a good intelligence operation took place, this could have dangerous implications, and therefore the Board should push on with its thorough review of the subject no matter what attitudes of resistance are encountered among the Government agencies involved. Dr. Killian expressed complete agreement with these observations of Mr. Clifford.

General Doolittle questioned whether the Board was certain that the President was not informed of the views expressed by the DCI in the cables which he dispatched to CIA from France. Dr. Killian said he did not know the answer to this, but he was disturbed at the manner in which the DCI was making this case for himself. Mr. Murphy advised the Board that he had been told by the DCI that General Carter had not informed the President about the cables received from the DCI. Dr. Killian thought that this question of whether the DCI had communicated with the President should be pursued with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting today. General Doolittle added that it would be appropriate to ask whether General Carter had been instructed by the DCI to make the DCI's views known to the President. Mr. Clifford surmised that General Carter could have thought that the DCI would have returned if he considered his views urgent.

Mr. Gray was of the opinion that it was in the area of CIA's Deputy DCI/Intelligence where the DCI's messages were ignored, and therefore it would be well for the Board to talk to that Deputy.

Mr. Pace felt that the intelligence weaknesses apparent in the Cuba situation indicate the presence of broader weaknesses. He thought that in highlighting the weaknesses observed in the Cuba matter, the Board would be in a position to make recommendations for broader improvements in the foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. Langer cautioned the Board to consider, however, that out of the thousands of refugee reports coming in there were bound to be reports containing false and

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misleading information. Mr. Pace observed that if that line of thinking were pursued to its conclusion the question would arise as to why we should have a refugee interrogation program. Mr. Pace was of the opinion, however, that the interrogation program offered an unprecedented opportunity to obtain information and CIA should have made the most of it. Mr. Pace recalled that the Board had received articulate briefings on Cuba from Mr. Cline of CIA, who also reportedly briefed Prime Minister MacMillan, the President and others, but Mr. Pace wondered on what firm intelligence basis these briefings had been conducted. Mr. Murphy noted that Mr. Coyne's study reflected that on August 14 Mr. Cline had issued an order not to publish any information on missile bases unless it had been checked out with NPIC. Dr. Killian then suggested, and Board members agreed, that an effort should be made to have a discussion with Mr. Cline during this meeting of the Board.

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Secretary of Defense. (Dr. Killian expressed the view that the DCI, as coordinator of the overall U. S. intelligence effort, should certainly have the right to look at the budget of any element of the intelligence community, and Mr. McCone said he thought that he could work this out.) The DCI went on to say that the total Department of Defense Budget is \$3 billion whereas the CIA budget is around \$400 million and the Defense budget is up over the previous \$2½ billion figure because the Secretary of Defense has added the cost of the reconnaissance program. The result is, Mr. McCone said, that the USIB is unable to look at this large budget and therefore Mr. McCone is endeavoring to discuss it with Secretary McNamara. As for the CIA budget, Mr. McCone had thought that it could be kept at last year's level through reorganization steps and cutting down on wasteful expenditures, and at the same time an effort has been made to absorb salary increases within the existing budget. The DCI said that despite hard work on the CIA budget by all CIA elements, then there had to be added on the cost of the Cuba operations, so the former budget of CIA is up to \$425 million, exclusive of \$146 million involved in OXCART and NRO. The Bureau of the Budget cut this down to \$381 million by charging the Cuba budget to the CIA's Contingency Reserve over the opposition of the DCI who feels that the Reserve should be held intact for use in unforeseeable emergencies. Mr. McCone said he was not sure how all this would finally be resolved with the Bureau of the Budget.

Turning to another subject, Mr. McCone explained the MONGOOSE project in answer to an inquiry from Mr. Clifford. The DCI said that this project developed out of a discussion last Fall between himself, the President and the Attorney General. The objective is to create dissensions in Cuba which will lead to revolt against the Castro regime and to the unseating of Castro, leaving the Cubans to form a government of their own choosing. Some \$26 million of the CIA budget is allocated

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to activities authorized by the MONGOOSE Committee (Composed of the Special Group, plus the Attorney General and 2 or 3 other officials). MONGOOSE plans are developed under the coordination of General Lansdale who works with State, Defense, CIA and USIA elements for this purpose. Mr. McCone said that the first phase of the project was an intelligence gathering effort. The second phase was to involve sabotage, insurgency and other actions which were tentatively agreed upon at the MONGOOSE meeting of August 10 but which then fell into limbo during the Cuban crisis until two days ago when the Executive Committee of the NSC tentatively renewed consideration of the project. Mr. McCone said that he personally does not favor sabotage or guerilla activity for a few months until the dust settles. The DCI said he was disturbed over the possibility of a new confrontation by the Soviets who could take the stand that there had been compliance with U. S. demands for removal of offensive weapons and therefore any continuance of U. S. aerial surveillance of Cuba will be countered by shoot-downs of our surveillance aircraft by SA-2's. Dr. Langer suggested that the SA-2 defenses might be for the purpose of meeting an anticipated invasion of Cuba by the U. S., but Mr. McCone thought not, pointing out that the SA-2's would be easy to knock out if an invasion should take place.

Turning to the NRO, Mr. McCone said that the Defense Department/CIA agreement had not worked out too well because the Director of NRO feels he should have fiscal control over Department of Defense as well as CIA resources, through a review of programs and the allocation of funds on a monthly basis. This approach, Mr. McCone stated, puts accounting and fiscal responsibility into NRO, i.e., into the Air Force, in effect. Mr. McCone said that he favors more CIA control because it is necessary for CIA moneys spent for NRO purposes have to be defended before special Congressional Committees in a special way, and since \$150 million of this CIA money is tied up in NRO (OXCART) the DCI feels he will have a hard time explaining how this money got

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