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Paper on Covert Action to Chairman, PFIAB, Tab B.

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Covert Operation (Bulk)

Mar, 29, 1971.

Staff Paper on Covert Action to Chairman, PFIAB

Tab B

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NW 185

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"KENNEDY BOARD"

CONSIDERATIONS OF COVERT ACTION MATTERS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Briefing of President by DCI, June 28, 1961

References to Covert Actions, Board Reports to President

CIA Report on USSR and Communist China Expenditures

Briefing of Board Panel by Secretary, Special Group, May 11, 1962

Chairman's Discussions of Covert Action Matters with DCI, May 1962

Discussion with General Taylor, June 29, 1962

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, July 20, 1962

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, November 1, 1962

Board Discussion with General Taylor, Chairman, JCS,
January 26, 1963

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, April 15, 1963

CIA Briefing of Board Panel, September 6, 1963

State Department Briefing of Board Panel, September 6, 1963

Discussions with McGeorge Bundy, September 23, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NAS 9-4-98

Excerpts, Minutes of Board Meetings, 1961--1963

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CIA BRIEFING OF THE BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

APRIL 15, 1963

On April 15, 1963 Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA met at the Board's offices with the Board's Panel on Covert Actions (Messers. Murphy, and Gray); Mr. J. Patrick Coyne; and Mr. A. Russell Ash.

Mr. Meyer briefed the Board Panel on the major covert action programs of the CIA (with the exception of programs relating to Cuba, a subject scheduled to be covered in a briefing of the full Board on April 23, 1963). Mr. Meyer described the political action programs which had been pursued with respect to Chile. In his briefing Mr. Meyer also covered programs with respect to Argentina, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Japan, Congo, Kenya, Italy and France.

(As a follow-up to the above mentioned briefing of the Board Panel on Covert Actions, Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne were given a further briefing on the subject at CIA Headquarters on May 16, 1963, with a number of CIA representatives participating from the DDP Staff. This briefing included considerable information with respect to the nature and level of Soviet espionage activities being conducted in various areas of the world.)

BRIEFING OF BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

BY STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES

September 6, 1963

Mr. Murphy, Dr. Langer and Mr. Coyne met with Mr. Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State on September 6, 1963, for a discussion of several matters in the intelligence area.

With regard to covert action matters Mr. Hughes said that his Bureau in the Department of State is responsible for coordinating all NSC 5412/2 matters throughout the Department. Mr. Hughes felt that this job was being performed satisfactorily but he regreted that the State Department played a relatively minor role in Special Group activities. Mr. Hughes also expressed concern about the DCI's failure to provide sufficient time in advance of Special Group meetings for the coordination of covert action proposals which are to be discussed at the meetings and concerning which the Department of State has an interest.

In a discussion with Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, the Panel was told that in Mr. Johnson's opinion CIA is now coordinating its covert action programs with the appropriate elements of the Department of State. He did comment, however, that new programs are submitted to the Department at the very last moment, because the Director of Central Intelligence wishes to sign off personally on new covert action proposals before they are submitted to the Department of State or to the Special Group.

Secretary Johnson, in reply to a question posed by the Panel, said that the Special Group does not follow the general practice of reviewing periodically the status of implementation of covert action programs approved by the Special Group; and he thought it would be a good idea to have such reviews made, possibly by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department.

CIA BRIEFING OF THE BOARD'S COVERT ACTION PANEL

September 6, 1963

The Board's Covert Action Panel met on September 6, 1963. Present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; Dr. William Langer; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

During the course of the meeting the Board Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and CIA representatives Cord Meyer and Desmond Fitzgerald. The briefings were on the subject of covert action programs with respect to British Guiana, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Bolivia, Brazil and Cuba.

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EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETINGS WITH RESPECT TO COVERT ACTIONS MATTERS

Meeting of May 15, 1961:

The then DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles, joined in a discussion of the highlights of CIA's activities. In the covert actions field Mr. Dulles suggested that the Board look into the future relationship of CIA to paramilitary activities -- Mr. Dulles being of the opinion that paramilitary operations should not be conducted by the CIA. Mr. Dulles thought that the Board should look at such CIA activities as the use of proprietary organizations including Radio Free Europe, REA, the Afro-American Institute, and various labor and youth groups. Mr. Dulles was asked whether a removal of paramilitary activities from CIA responsibility would permit a significant cut in the CIA budget and personnel figures, and Mr. Dulles replied that such was not the case because of the extensive activities being carried on by the International Organizations Division of the DDP, and because of the many proprietary activities in which CIA is involved. (Dr. Land said that he was both shocked and indignant to learn that Radio Free Europe is a proprietary organization of the CIA. Mr. Clifford said that he had been on the Board of Directors of RFE for the past three years and this was the first time he had known it was connected with CIA. Mr. Dulles was asked what was the extent of the knowledge of American business men concerning the RFE-CIA connection and Mr. Dulles replied that certain American business men are aware of the connection, but not the man-in-the-street who makes dollar contributions to the tune of \$3 million a year.)

Board Chairman Killian appointed himself and Messrs. Murphy, Langer and Taylor to serve on a Panel of the Board to study the extent to which the Government should be involved in political, psychological, propaganda, and paramilitary activities; and the policy which should be pursued by the U. S. Government in these matters.

President Kennedy joined the Board meeting, and when the discussion turned to a recommendation of the prior Board, the President referred to a recommendation that covert action programs of the CIA may not have been worth the risk nor worth the great expenditure of manpower and money; that CIA concentration on such activities had tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence-gathering mission; and that there should be a total reassessment of U. S. covert action policies and programs. The President indicated that except for Laos and Cuba, he did not have extensive knowledge of other covert operations being conducted by the CIA; he said

that he had the feeling that someone in the White House should be constantly in touch with and on top of covert operations; and he observed that the Congress believes that someone in the White House is keeping close watch on such matters. After a discussion of the Indonesia situation, President Kennedy thought that the Cuba fiasco was "Indonesia all over again," and he wondered if the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should not be better informed regarding these matters. The President also expressed concern over the recent development in Singapore which involved some bungled efforts on the part of CIA to penetrate the Singapore police. Following expressions of views by General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Mr. Gray, the President agreed that in addition to the need for staffing of NSC 5412/2 matters, the President needed to be kept informed with respect to these programs on a continuing basis.

Meeting of May 26, 1961:

In this second meeting of the PFIAB the discussion included a statement by General Doolittle that proposed reorganization steps with respect to the CIA would involve the question of the interference of covert operations with intelligence collection. General Doolittle had found, he said, that the "covert operations dog is wagging the intelligence tail" when in fact this should be reversed. General Doolittle added that a great number of people in the CIA are more interested in the political, psychological, propaganda and paramilitary than they are in the dry, difficult but important task of collecting, interpreting and distributing intelligence—a matter which General Doolittle thought could be corrected by a change of emphasis and by a change in organization.

At one point in the meeting when the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles, was present, that official said that with respect to organizational matters he favored transferring paramilitary activities to the Defense Department; he opposed the separation of other covert action activities from foreign intelligence activities; and he was opposed to separating the post of DCI from that of Head of the CIA.

Meeting of June 7, 1961:

Upon the completion of its third meeting on June 7, 1961, the Board met that evening with President Kennedy (the Attorney General and Mr. McGeorge Bundy were also present.) In connection with a statement by the President that he was receiving inadequate information concerning developments in a number of countries, Board Chairman Killian said that it was the general

NW 185 Docld:2507 consensus of the Board that the CIA was placing too much stress upon covert action activities, with insufficient emphasis placed upon the acquisition of intelligence. Later in the discussion, Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that in line with the President's wishes, a list was being prepared of all programs involving covert support to political parties abroad, and support to individuals associated with political parties, with a view to assessing the direction and value of those programs -- Mr. Bundy noting that certain of these problem areas which had been referred to by Ambassador Galbraith in connection with covert actions in India had been recently reviewed by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Board Chairman Killian informed the President that in the Board's view the responsibilities of the U.S. Ambassadors should be clarified to make sure that each Ambassador is cognizant of the intelligence collection and covert action activities which are conducted in or from his country of assignment and for the purpose of assuring that such activities are consistent with the over-all national security policies of the President. Later on in the discussion, the President commented on a suggestion that he not be publicly identified with clandestine or covert action activities, saying that he thought this raised a question about the desirability of setting up on the White House staff a "Special Assistant for Intelligence." (Mr. Bundy thought it would be all right to establish such a position, provided that the Special Assistant was himself not publicly identified with any responsibility for covert operations.)

Meeting of June 30-July 2, 1961:

A portion of this Board meeting was attended by Mr. Mc-George Bundy who, at one point, read to the Board the letter from President Kennedy appointing General Taylor as Military Representative. Mr. Bundy emphasized that General Taylor's appointment was not exclusively military in character, for the President desired that General Taylor counsel him with respect to certain intelligence matters, and in the field of covert action activities the President wished to look to General Taylor for special guidance; and therefore the President had appointed General Taylor to serve as Chairman of the Special 5412/2 Group. Mr. Bundy mentioned that recently a two-hour briefing had been provided to the President, Mr. Bundy, General Taylor and Mr. Coyne by Messrs. Dulles and Bissell concerning major covert action programs currently being carried out by the Agency.

At another point in the meeting the Board heard comments from Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. Among other things, Mr. Hilsman felt that the U. S. Government was not making full use of covert action operations in providing assistance to foreign political parties. He thought that such operations were important and could be helpful if done skillfully. Mr. Hilsman expressed criticism of the fact that the Department of State was brought into CIA's planning in the NSC 5412/2 area only at the last moment, which made it difficult for the State Department to take a position without knowledge of the extent and nature of the CIA resources that would be. involved. Mr. Hilsman went on to say that he favored reorganizing the CIA along the general lines of the British Intelligence System; he would place clandestine collection and covert political action operations under the Department of State; and he would require that the State Department exercise policy control over all aspects of intelligence including political, psychological, propaganda, paramilitary and related covert activities.

Meeting of July 18, 1961:

In the course of this meeting, Mr. Bissell of CIA was invited to discuss with Board members his views on possible reorganization steps that might be taken with respect to the CIA. At one point in the discussion Mr. Bissell volunteered the suggestion that perhaps a step might be taken by the President to obtain a better public understanding and acceptance of the CIA's responsibilities. Mr. Bissell suggested that perhaps the President could make an appropriate announcement which would include recognition of the existence of the body known as the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, telling of the Group's duties and who compose it, without giving the public any information on the actual nature of the covert operations performed by the CIA.

Meeting of October 16-17, 1961

During the Board meeting of October 16-17, 1961 the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, commented that the "principle of compartmentation" was being violated by CIA in its dealings with the PFIAB because of the CIA's effort to meet the convenience of the Board. Mr. Dulles said that one example of this was the action taken by CIA in furnishing the detailed compilation concerning the proprietary and other cover organizations with which CIA has dealings in its covert action programs. Mr. Coyne observed that material received by the Board from the CIA, and more sensitive information received from other U.S. intelligence agencies, is given a greater degree of security in the Board than in the CIA itself. (For use at this Board meeting a 17-page summary had been prepared in the Board's offices based on an undated document from CIA marked "Top Secret -- Eyes Only -- Extremely Sensitive" containing a listing and brief description of all CIA cover organizations and proprietary activities, including references to the Asia Foundation, Radio Free Europe, Institute of National Labor Research, World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, U. S. National Student Association, and many others.)

Mr. Dulles told the Board that the CIA can play a help-ful but relatively modest, role with regard to the Iaos and South Vietnam problems, and he thought it would be well if the Board would suggest ways in which the CIA could more effectively utilize its resources in meeting such problems. The DCI observed that the CIA must do more in all covert action fields because the U. S. faces the most formidable covert action apparatus ever seen. He said that this apparatus is the most effective one ever established, and the U. S. has nothing like it.

Chairman Killian suggested that Board members give serious thought to the CIA's use of Foundations as covers for operations and he cited the Asia Foundation and the International Commission of Jurists as examples. Dr. Killian felt that there is danger that the entire Foundation systems in the U.S. would be discredited if there were a disclosure of CIA's connection with them. It was Dr. Killian's view that the CIA should not place clandestine cover on any student,

and he felt that it would be very serious should it become known that the National Student Federation, for example, was being financed by CIA as a cover organization. Dr. Langer expressed agreement with this, but felt that CIA would be justified in using foundations as a cover in combatting communist influence in such activities as labor unions. Mr. Clifford thought that perhaps Dr. Killian's concern with regard to educational foundations might be possibly met by the use of cut-off organizations between the CIA and the foundations, as a means of concealing CIA financial support to the foundations. Mr. Coyne reminded Board members of the Board's recommendation of last July, that all existing covert action programs be reviewed by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. In answer to a question from General Doolittle, Mr. Coyne told the Board that written summaries which had been furnished to the Board members concerning CIA's cover organization activities, were being given special security handling and strict accountability.

The Board meeting was joined by CIA representatives Lyman Kirkpatrick, Richard Helms, Cord Meyer, and others, for an oral presentation and discussion with respect to CIA cover organizations, including commercial organizations and such foundation-supported student groups as the National Student's Federation. After Mr. Helms had discussed the use of nonofficial covers for individual CIA personnel, Mr. Cord Meyer described the CIA's use of foundations and proprietary organizations. Mr. Meyer then described such large scale CIA cover organizations as Radio Free Europe (where the objective is propaganda) and other organizations which CIA directs against Soviet front organizations (where the effort is to exert influence and at the same time do genuine work for the benefit of the cover organization and its program, as in the case of the Asia Foundation and the Afro-American Institute which are based in the U. S. and whose activities are subject to CIA influence in the form of money and a degree of policy direction). .

In answer to questions from Board members as to the danger of a disclosure of CIA's relationship to these various foundations, Mr. Meyer said that there was no grave danger of a "cultural U-2 incident", and the risk of a disclosure, by a defector, for example, was less than the risk of a U. S. news story or a disclosure resulting from gossip among members of the U. S. "foundation community". Mr. Meyer considered it inevitable that the Asian mentality would suspect that there is U. S. government influence in all U. S. based foundations; Chinese communist propaganda continually charges that U. S. government or Wall Street control exists in these foundations, even in the Ford Foundation where this is not the case;

nevertheless the cover foundations which are in fact influenced by CIA continue to do legitimate work as, for example, in the case of a labor training school supported by the Asia Foundation in Pakistan, and in the case of a teacher-training grant at the University of Rangoon; and in the case of the National Student's Federation, Mr. Meyer pointed out that CIA financial support is normally funneled through a variety of channels and CIA money goes to the National Educational Association through a cut-out arrangement. Mr. Meyer expressed the opinion that CIA's budgetary control over the use of moneys contributed to international student groups would deter any effort to impose foreign influence upon U. S. student organizations.

Mr. Meyer informed the Board that CIA cover organization activities are approved by the CIA Project Review Committee with the State Department being made knowledgeable. Mr. Helms stated that since January 20, 1961, there had been no review of such activities by the NSC nor by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

Next the Board was briefed by CIA representatives Amory, Breitweiser, and others concerning CIA paramilitary involvement in Laos and South Vietnam (in the latter country this activity included ground reconnaissance teams and intelligence teams, and a recent requirement on CIA "to harrass Soviet air drops of supplies" in the Southeast Asia area).

When the Board met with President Kennedy, on the afternoon of October 17, 1961, the Chairman read to the President the text of the Board's report on paramilitary activities, and he mentioned to the President the highlights of presentations which the Board had heard earlier that day concerning developments in Laos. The President directed Mr. Coyne to discuss this subject with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, with a view to a review of paramilitary activities in Laos, to be conducted by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (this was discussed by Mr. Coyne with Mr. Bundy who said that he would have the review made of the paramilitary activity in Laos and the question as to whether the responsibility for the activity was properly assigned to the CIA).

Meeting of December 9, 1961

During this meeting of the Board an opportunity was given to Mr. Gray to present some of the highlights of Mr. Gray's and Mr. Coyne's findings in the course of their on-the-scene review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities in seven Middle East countries. One of the recommendations of Mr. Gray's report to the Board, which the Board subsequently adopted and submitted to the President, called for a review of NSC 5412/2 and related NSC Intelligence Directives to insure that adequate guidance is given to Ambassadors and CIA Station Chiefs with respect to covert actions generally; and that the station in Cyprus be reviewed with a view to placing increased emphasis on covert operations, particularly in the newspaper and trade unions fields, with appropriate support to be furnished by the CIA stations in Athens and Ankara. Subsequently, at the request of General Taylor, Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne briefed the Special NSC 5412/2 Group concerning covert action-related matters which had been reviewed during the Middle East trip.

Meeting of January 19-20, 1962

In the course of this Board meeting discussions were had with the newly-appointed DCI, Mr. John McCone. During a discussion of possible ways to reorganize and strengthen the CIA, the DCI said that he might decide to separate the functions of the DD/P area within the CIA. Mr. McCone thought that he might possibly name one assistant who would specialize in "conventional covert operations", including the management of the clandestine services world-wide, and designate another assistant in the DD/P area who would be in charge of such matters as COMINT, ELINT, satellite reconnaissance, etc. Mr. McCone added that he thought he would pick a military man to head up covert operations and to handle paramilitary activities in order that these functions would be conducted on an absolutely professional basis, without disturbing the lines running from the DD/P to the CIA Station Chiefs.

Further on in the discussion with the DCI, Mr. McCone expressed concern over the fact that in the CIA organizational responsibility for financing was placed at a rather low level in the headquarters organizational set-up, and therefore the DCI desired to place this responsibility upon a higher level official who would serve as Comptroller in the Office of the DCI. Mr. Gray asked whether this would increase problems

with the Bureau of the Budget if the DCI made the Comptroller responsible for all funding, including covert operations; and the DCI replied that in his opinion he could compartmentalize the work of the Comptroller in a way which would facilitate dealing with the Bureau of the Budget concerning covert action matters.

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Meeting of March 23-24, 1962

During a discussion in Executive Session, Board Chairman Killian noted that President Kennedy had accepted the Board's recommendations concerning a re-definition of the role of the DCI, and regarding reorganization of the CIA. Dr. Killian thought that the point had now been reached in the Board's efforts when it should serve the President by examining selected areas of the government's intelligence effort, and he mentioned as an example, covert actions carried out under NSC 5412/2.

At another point in the Board meeting, Chairman Killian again pointed out that there was a need for the Board to explore thoroughly the activities being carried out in the NSC 5412/2 area; Dr. Killian thought that a general session with General Taylor at the next Board meeting would give the Board an opportunity to become acquainted with the present status of the specific programs being carried out under the Special NSC 5412/2 Group; the Chairman thought that it would be advantageous if the DCI were present at such a Board meeting; and Dr. Killian added that the Board lacks clear information on covert action programs with respect to Cuba.

Later on in the meeting, the Chairman made several Panel assignments to various Board members. Dr. Langer was asked to obtain information concerning covert actions being carried out under auspices of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, in order that the Board might be informed in depth with regard to such activities. The Chairman said that Dr. Langer's report to the Board should include information concerning covert actions with respect to Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Guatemala, among other countires.

In another reference to covert action matters, during an Executive Session of this Board meeting Mr. Coyne suggested that consideration be given to having one or more of the Board members take an on-the-scene look at covert operations which are being carried out abroad, particularly in South America. Dr. Killian agreed that this should be done.

Meeting of May 11-12, 1962

During this meeting, Board Chairman Killian reported to the Board concerning a talk he had had with Mr. McGeorge Bundy about the role of the President's Board. It was

NW 185 Docld:2507 Page 15 88132 Mr. Bundy's view that the Board must continue to keep itself fully informed about the foreign intelligence program, and Mr. Bundy emphasized the need for the Board to be completely informed regarding covert action operations taking place in the NSC 5412/2 area.

In an Executive Session, Mr. Coyne reported on a discussion which he had had with the newly-appointed DCI, Mr. McCone, for the purpose of outlining the various Board Panel assignments, and for the further purpose of scheduling CIA briefings for the members of the various Board Panels. Mr. Coyne reported that the DCI's reaction was to indicate his belief that the Board Panel activities seemed to be concerned with matters which were appropriate for the DCI himself to pursue. Chairman Killian said that following this discussion between Mr. Coyne and the DCI, Dr. Killian had contacted the Deputy DCI, General Carter, to pursue the request that CIA furnish briefings to the various Board Panels. General Carter replied to Chairman Killian that the DCI wanted to hold up on such briefings, for example, the briefing of the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 activities, because the reorganization process was still underway in CIA. Chairman Killian also reported that when he contacted General Carter a week later on this same subject, it appeared that the CIA was reluctant to furnish the desired briefings, but Chairman Killian took a firm stand in requesting them.

During an Executive Session, Chairman Killian asked for suggestions concerning subject matters to be discussed with the DCI when that official joined the Board meeting the following day. With respect to the Langer-Gray-Murphy Panel, Dr. Langer said he had no particular questions to raise with the DCI concerning activities carried out under the NSC 5412/2 Group. Dr. Langer observed that he was impressed by the way the Special Group checks up on the implementation of covert operations. Chairman Killian referred to various indications he had received that General Taylor was doing a very good job in this respect. Mr. Gray thought that if the Board is going to try to protect the President in this particular area, the Board must have a better flow of information to the Board concerning NSC 5412/2 activities, in order that the Board may make a necessary evaluation of the covert action programs involved. Chairman Killian agreed with a suggestion by Mr. Coyne that the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 activities should remain in existence on a continuing basis in order that the Board might

be kept informed concerning these activities.

Dr. Killian remarked to Dr. Langer that the Board Panel on NSC 5412/2 matters should conduct a continuing review, with the objective of the Panel becoming fully informed regarding covert action programs, following which the Board would determine the next step to be taken.

Meeting of June 25-26, 1962

In Executive Session Chairman Killian informed Board members that recently there had been scheduled a CIA briefing of the Board Panel on covert action programs. However, the day before the briefing was to have been given by CIA officials Chairman Killian received a telephone call from the DCI, Mr. McCone, who said that he hesitated to provide the information requested by the Board Panel because only the President was privy to some of the covert operations involved. Mr. McCone told Chairman Killian that he had discussed this matter with the President who had concurred in the DCI's suggestion that the briefing of the Board Panel be limited to procedural aspects of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Dr. Killian's reply to the DCI was to the effect that this would be a waste of time because the Board was already fully informed concerning these procedural matters, and therefore the Chairman expressed his intention to discuss this matter with the President, and the DCI indicated that he favored Thereafter, Chairman Killian discussed this course of action. the problem with Mr. McGeorge Bundy who felt that under the Board's Directive it should have full information in order to carry out its duties. Continuing his report to the Board, Dr. Killian said that on the preceding evening he had dined with the DCI who on this occasion said that he was prepared to give the Board whatever information it needs, including information on CIA operations in the covert action field. The Chairman added that Mr. McCone planned to brief the Panel himself from a book prepared for the first time in CIA with regard to all of the activities involved. Mr. Gray stated that the ability of the Board to get complete information concerning covert action activities was essential if the Board were to be able to discharge its responsibility to the President. Mr. Clifford thought that the gravity of this issue with the DCI was such that it warranted mention to the President when the Board met with the President the following day, and the President should be told the background of the problem and how the matter had been resolved. the natter had been resolved.

At another point in the Board meeting there was a discussion of the need for identifying the President with clandestine intelligence and covert action activities. One Board member suggested that in any event the public probably has an idea that the President is fully aware of covert actions undertaken by our Government; however, Mr. Clifford pointed out that an attempt has always been made to maintain a separation of the President from intelligence agency operations all down the line in Government, and this separation should be preserved.

Chairman Killian observed to Board members that when the DCI arrived at the Board meeting later in the day the matter of previously withholding information from the Board concerning covert operations would not be brought up unless the DCI himself should bring it up for discussion. Dr. Killian added that steps should be taken by Mr. Coyne to contact the DCI and re-schedule the CIA briefing of the Board Panel on Covert Actions, preferably within the next two weeks.

When the DCI, Mr. McCone, joined the Board meeting for a discussion of intelligence matters, at one point the DCI referred to his recent extensive field trip in South Vietnam. Mr. McCone said that training is being given to South Vietnam villagers in civil defense, arms and training are being supplied to hamlet leaders who train and arm others, and there are plans for additional similar projects if the Special NSC 5412/2 Group approves. The DCI described the extent to which CIA is involved in the conception and administration of these programs which are backed by U. S. military teams. He added that CIA trains mountain people as trail watchers to report on the infiltration of communist forces from North Vietnam; and CIA is installing communications between villagers and is equipping military units with communications.

In the course of a discussion with the DCI concerning CIA budgetary matters, Mr. Gray observed that at times in the past the Budget Bureau had been prone to look into policy decisions which had been arrived at with respect to covert action programs in the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Mr. McCone said that he anticipated no such problem in the Bureau of the Budget in the future, with the recent appointment of Mr. Robert Amory (formerly DD/I at CIA) to fill the Budget Bureau post which is concerned with CIA budgetary matters.

In his further remarks to the Board members at this meeting, Mr. McCone took up the subject of covert action programs which he then proceeded to describe to the extent that they involved aerial reconnaissance missions over China following consideration and approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

Later on in the meeting, the Board was briefed by Mr. Helms of CIA concerning Cuba. Mr. Helms said that after the abortive Cuban invasion there was a relaxation of covert action and intelligence collection efforts for several months with respect to Cuba; however, since December 1961 a major intelligence effort has been aimed at Cuba, involving U-2 overflights, interrogations of Cuban refugees in Florida; and the obtaining of intelligence reports. In answer to a question by a Board member, Mr. Helms said that thought had been given to sabotaging petroleum which is enroute to Cuban refineries, but such a covert action project was awaiting further policy consideration. General Taylor joined the Board meeting at another point, in response to the Chairman's invitation, and among other things he discussed the subject of covert action activities. General Taylor asked whether the Board wished to indicate any reaction it might have to its current review of NSC 5412/2 matters, and Dr. Langer responded with a comment that as yet the Board's discussions had not gone beyond a briefing on procedures given by the Secretary of the Special Group. In answer to a question by Dr. Langer, it was General Taylor's opinion that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group is not set up nor equipped to run a continuing check on the implementation of all covert action projects, and for/ this reason the Special Group places dependence upon the PFIAB.

(When the Board met with the President on the afternoon of June 26, 1962, Chairman Killian mentioned to President Kennedy, among other things, the problem of assuring appropriate political control of covert actions conducted by the CIA or other elements of the government. Chairman Killian observed that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group was functioning effectively. As a footnote to its report to the President, Chairman Killian informed President Kennedy that the Board was happy to state that there had been resolved a problem which had recently arisen with respect to the Board's need-to-know regarding certain intelligence and covert action programs; and Dr. Killian felt that with the resolution of this problem, the Board could

expect to receive the information which it had to have in order to carry out its responsibilities to the President. Dr. Killian added that based on briefings which had been received by the Board there appeared to be a lack of information on the overall plan with respect to covert actions regarding Cuba which prompted General Taylor to explain that he had not yet had an opportunity to give the Board a thorough fill-in concerning covert actions against Cuba, which had been considered in the Special Group. After the Board meeting with the President, General Taylor summarized briefly for the Board the intelligence programs being established with respect to Cuba, pointing out that such programs were the first phase PJT NOJS objection Subject to PFEAR opproval. 912198 of the effort against Cuba at this time.)

Meeting of September 28, 1962

During this meeting of the Board, Mr. Murphy presented an oral report of the Board's Panel on Covert Actions Operations, based on a detailed report which had been prepared by Mr. Coyne with respect to the recent meeting which the Panel had had with the DCI. Mr. Murphy touched on some of the highlights of the information which had been supplied by the DCI and by Mr. Helms, and Mr. Murphy suggested that Board members read the memorandum report which Mr. Coyne had prepared. Mr. Murphy thought that a good rapport had been established by the Panel with the DCI and he indicated that the Panel would continue to review the subject periodically with Messrs McCone and Helms. Dr. Baker, Acting Board Chairman, emphasized the need for the Board to obtain full and accurate information concerning covert operations being conducted with respect to Cuba and with respect to other. matters.

Meeting of November 9, 1962

At the beginning of this meeting, it was announced that Mr. Pace was absent on a trip to South America, in the course of which he would, on behalf of the Board, look into some foreign intelligence and covert action activities in Argentina and Uruguay.

Meeting of December 6-7, 1962

During this meeting Mr. Coyne suggested that the Board consider the advisability of a recommendation to the President that the Board be granted continuing access to records of the

NW 185 Docld:2507 Special NSC 5412/2 Group in order that the Board's responsibilities to the President may be fullfilled; Chairman Killian said that he would see to it that this was accomplished in another way.

Meeting of December 27-28, 1962

During this meeting of the PFIAB, and in the course of the discussions had with DCI McCone, the DCI made reference to the "MONGOOSE" program with respect to Cuba. He said that Phase I of the program consisted of obtaining intelligence on the possibilities for organizing and supplying resistance groups within Cuba. The DCI said that it had not yet been considered an appropriate time for the execution of plans for "violent actions" of a sabotage nature within Cuba. Mr. McCone had thought that such actions would not be appropriate because of his own speculation in August 1962, that the U. S. would be faced with MRBM's. In any case, the DCI said, the "MONGOOSE" effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba.

Meeting of January 25-26, 1963

For use in connection with the Board meeting of January 25-26, 1963, primarily on the subject of Cuba, A. R. Ash prepared a memorandum for the file, dated January 11, 1963, summarizing the results of a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, and of the Special Group "Augmented" (the latter group including the Attorney General, concerned with the "MONGOOSE" program directed at the Castro regime in Cuba). At the August 4, 1962 meeting of the Special Group "Augmented", the Attorney General stated that the President felt that more priority should be given to mounting sabotage operations, and the Attorney General urged massive activity within the entire framework of the "MONGOOSE" program. was agreed that one of the objectives of the Special Group "Augmented", under the chairmanship of the Attorney General, would be to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime. (The review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group with respect to Cuba, reflected that this body was concerned primarily with reconnaissance overflight questions during the period leading up to the Soviet missile crisis.)

Meeting of March 8-9, 1963

In the course of this Board meeting the only consideration of any significance given to covert action matters was in connection with the visit of the DCI for a discussion of intelligence-related problems with members of the Board. The DCI, Mr. McCone, mentioned that CIA had traditionally carried out activities in the paramilitary field; however, the Department of Defense now has Special Forces operating in the paramilitary field in South Vietnam and elsewhere, which has resulted in conflicts between the CIA and DOD elements in those areas.

Meeting of April 23, 1963

At this meeting, in the course of a discussion of covert action matters, the question was raised as to whether the Board should not ascertain specifically whether the President desired that the Board go into covert action programs deeply, and if that proved to be the President's wish then the Board should take steps to insure that it received full briefings from the agencies concerned. Chairman Killian stated that there were no limitations on the Board's access to such information and that this is well established.

At the request of Chairman Killian, Mr. Murphy briefly informed the Board concerning the meeting which he, and Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne had recently with Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA on the subject of covert action programs. Mr. Murphy said that the briefing covered operations in certain Latin American countries (the subject of Cuba was excluded because that was to be covered at today's Board meeting) and the briefing consisted primarily of "light touches", and was of such routine nature that it seemed to downgrade the importance which the Board attached to covert action operations and requirements.

Mr. Coyne informed the Board of a request from Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA who asked that the scheduled CIA briefing of the
Board on clandestine operations with regard to Cuba, be scheduled
outside of the presence of Mr. Cottrell, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, who was
scheduled to join the Board meeting at the same time that the
CIA briefing was to be given. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained that
the DCI urged these briefings to be separate because the CIA
briefing would include a discussion of covert action operations
which Mr. Cottrell was not privy to.

Later in this Board meeting, during discussions with the DCI, Mr. McCone was asked whether the terms of the U. S.-Cuba Prisoner Exchange Agreement were of a nature which would affect the conduct of present or future U. S. intelligence and covert operations with respect to Cuba. The DCI replied that Castro had not imposed any conditions which would preclude the U. S. from the conduct of such activities.

The Board was briefed by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald of CIA. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelligence teams that CIA was sending into Cuba were primarily confined to intelligence—gathering missions rather than covert action, although the teams would have missions involving "low key resistance and subtle sabotage". The CIA representative stated that monthly plans of the CIA for infiltrating these teams into Cuba were approved by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. Mr. Fitzgerald added that CIA was not receiving policy guidance with respect to positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, and he indicated that a decision regarding this was being sought during the coming week.

The Board meeting was joined by Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State who explained that he was serving as Chairman of an Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee established at the direction of the President, to provide a focal point for coordinating policy recommendations and the execution of approved policies with respect to Cuba. Mr. Coyne raised the question which had been brought up earlier by Mr. Fitzgerald concerning the absence of policy guidance with respect to covert actions conducted by CIA. Mr. Cottrell said that with the release of prisoners in Cuba, in his opinion, the time had come for more aggressive sabotage operations with respect to Cuba.

Meeting of June 25-26, 1963

A large part of this meeting was taken up with reports by various Board Panel Chairmen concerning the status and adequacy of the implementation of recommendations which the Board had made to date. As Chairman of the Panel on CIA, General Doolittle reported on those Board recommendations concerning CIA which were being acted upon; and Board Chairman Clifford asked that at the next Board meeting General Doolittle identify areas in which CIA was not carrying out Presidentially-approved recommendations of the Board (one of the CIA-related recommendations which was presumably to be included in General Doolittle's next report would be one in which the Board recommended deeper cover for CIA's covert action operations).

In the course of giving the report of his Panel on CIA organization and related matters, Chairman Clifford included a reference to the Board recommendation that the President be protected against identification with clandestine and covert action programs. Mr. Clifford said that the need for this was pretty well understood in appropriate quarters.

At another point in the Board meeting, when the DCI, Mr. McCone, was reporting to the Board on CIA operations against Cuba, the DCI referred to certain covert actions. Among these were operations (approved by the Special 5412/2 Group) to promote disaffection in the Cuban military; hampering the Cuban economy; and sabotage.

Meeting of September 12-13, 1963

This Board meeting was attended by Mr. McGeorge Bundy whom Chairman Clifford had invited for a discussion of several subject matters listed in the Chairman's memorandum of invitation. As to the subject of covert actions, Mr. Bundy said in frankness that he did not know precisely how the Board went about its coverage of NSC 5412/2 matters. He said that he looks to CIA from time to time for reports on the status of particular covert action programs, but preferred not to have in his office a current compilation of all of them. However, Mr. Bundy said that he was prepared to facilitate any review of covert action programs that a Board Panel might want to make.

Meeting of November 21-22, 1963

During a report given at this Board meeting by the DCI, Mr. McCone urged that the Board urge President Kennedy to take actions (public statements, for example) to correct the bad public image which CIA was acquiring as the result of charges that CIA had engineered the anti-Diem coup in South Vietnam, and was acting as a "Third Government" in that country. The DCI asserted that the CIA role in Vietnam was not to overthrow governments, but to carry out other tasks. Referring to paramilitary operations in Vietnam, the DCI said that there were problems involving the question as to whether CIA or Special Forces should have the responsibility for such activities (Mr. Colby of CIA later told the Board that paramilitary matters in Vietnam were being transferred to U. S. Special Forces).

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