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of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Case #: 88132 Date: 08-01-2024

MINUTES OF
BOARD MEETING
OF

AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964

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206-10001-10007

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

August 5, 1964 *All members + JPC were in Omaha except Baker and Murphy*

1. 8:30 P.M. Depart Andrews AFB via Special Mission aircraft (Constellation)
2. 11:00 P.M., CST Arrive Offutt AFB
(approx.) Remain overnight at Offutt Inn

August 6, 1964

No agenda

All members except one above

- | Item | Time | Subject |
|------|----------------|--|
| 1. | 8:00 - 9:30 | Meeting with General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, and SAC Command Post Status Briefing |
| 2. | 9:30 - 10:00 | Intelligence Warning |
| 3. | 10:30 - 11:00 | Intelligence War Planning |
| 4. | 11:00 - 12:15 | Soviet Bloc Threat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Information Deficiencies b. Coverage Deficiencies c. Impact on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) |
| 5. | 12:15 - 1:00 | Lunch |
| 6. | 1:00 - 2:00 | Continue with Item 4 |
| 7. | 2:00 - 2:30 | Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) |
| 8. | 2:30 - 3:00 | SAC-NSA Special Project |
| 9. | 3:10 | Depart Offutt AFB |
| 10. | 9:10 (approx.) | Arrive Andrews AFB |

August 7, 1964

All members here

1. 9:00 - 9:30 Chairman's Time
2. 9:30 - 10:15
10:20 Current Intelligence Briefing on the Situations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba

Mr. Ray Cline
Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA
with Mr. Hargraves

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Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

Item	Time	Subject
3.	10:15 - 11:15 <i>11:45</i>	The National Reconnaissance Program: <u>a.</u> Resume of Operations - CY 1964 <u>b.</u> Concepts for Advanced Satellite Reconnaissance Systems (GAMBIT 3, FULCRUM, others) <u>c.</u> Budget Outlook Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, NRO <i>with Col. John Skand</i>
4.	11:15 - 12:00 <i>11:45</i>	Foreign Intelligence Budgeting and Management: <u>a.</u> Budget Patterns for this Fiscal Year <u>b.</u> Budget Outlook as to Principal Trends and Problems Over the Next Five Years Mr. Kermit Gordon <i>not here</i> Director, Bureau of the Budget Mr. Eimer Staats <i>not here</i> Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget Mr. Robert Amory Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget
5.	12:00 - 12:45	Lunch - The White House Mess
6.	12:45 - 1:00 <i>1:50 - 2:25</i>	Executive Session <i>for Mr. Kelly, Mr. Sharrett, Col. Belmar, Mr. Ray, Mr. Clark, Mr. T. H. Dugan</i>
7.	1:00 - 2:00	Audio Surveillance Collection and Counter-measures Efforts of the Intelligence Community: <u>a.</u> USIB conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the effort Mr. Tom Karamessines, CIA Mr. Robert Bannerman, CIA <u>b.</u> Final USIB assessment of audio penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow Mr. Howard Osborn, CIA Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Department of State
8.	2:00 - 2:15	Executive Session
9.	2:15 - 3:15 <i>2:40 - 3:30</i>	Status Report on Developments Pertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF Director, Defense Intelligence Agency <i>with Col. Hyatt, Col. Kallis, Mr. Huffine</i> Handle via BYEMAN Control System

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Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Subject</u>
10.	3:15 - 4:00	Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations Mr. Ash <i>not covered</i>
11.	<i>3:30 5:15</i> 4:00 - 5:30	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John A. McCone <i>with Mr. Kirk -</i> <i>patrick</i>
12.	5:30 - End of Day	Executive Session

Mr. Clifford: Mr. McCone will join
the Board at 3:15 PM.

13. Added later - See p. 4 of Memo to Chairman
14. Added later - See p. 8 of Memo to Chairman

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: August 6-7, 1964, Meeting of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

August 6, 1964

The first day of this scheduled 2-day meeting of the Board was devoted to an all-day visit at SAC Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, on August 6. In attendance were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Langer, Pace, Gray, Land, and Coyne. Board members Murphy and Baker were unable to join the meeting at SAC.

August 7, 1964

On the second day of its meeting the Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on August 7 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C. Present were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Murphy, Langer, Pace, Baker and Gray; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. (Board member Land joined the meeting a little later on.)

Chairman Clifford commented on the valuable experience gained by the Board in the course of its visit to SAC headquarters the previous day, during which the Board had an opportunity to examine some fundamental intelligence problems confronting the U. S. and the USAF. Mr. Clifford mentioned the usefulness of the Board getting out of the atmosphere of "theory" in Washington, in order to view intelligence activities and problems on the scene. He thought that the Board's visit to SAC might well lead to action on the part of the Board with respect to some of the matters examined and discussed at Omaha.

Mr. Clifford pointed out that events of the last few days in the Gulf of Tonkin had necessitated some last minute changes in the agenda of the Board's meeting, and that particular attention would today be devoted to intelligence aspects of the Vietnam situation.

The Chairman informed Board members that Presidential action on the Board's May 2 report and recommendations concerning the National Reconnaissance Program awaits the outcome of pending considerations and discussions between Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone. Mr. Bundy, who has been following the McNamara-McCone discussions in the hope of seeing those officials reach agreement on the organization and management of NRP activities, recently asked Chairman Clifford if the Board could take part in these discussions with a view to facilitating agreement on the part of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Mr. Clifford, speaking for the Board, told Mr. Bundy that the Board felt that

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increase is expected over the next 5 - 6 years (except for new reconnaissance systems for which CIA might become responsible).

Mr. Gray asked for the DCI's views on the capability of the intelligence estimating mechanism to avoid being influenced by the wishful thinking of responsible officials, as in the case of the erroneous estimate on Cuba prior to the Soviet missile crisis in 1962. Mr. McCone said that a better example than Cuba was the estimate on Brazil which was bitterly resisted by people in Government who nevertheless later saw the accuracy of the estimate proved by developments.

Chairman Clifford observed that at SAC headquarters the day before, SAC representatives suggested that they should have representation on COMOR in USIB. The DCI said that the AF already has a representative on COMOR, and if SAC were specifically added then a similar request would be made by other commands such as NORAD and CINCEUR. Mr. Coyne observed that the representation desired by SAC was on behalf of the SAC Commander in his role on the Joint Strategic Planning Group.

In response to Mr. Murphy's query about Cuba, the DCI said that an estimated 5,000 Soviets had departed since May 1, leaving 2,000 on the island. The Cubans now have control of air defense and coastal defense but the question is whether they have unlimited control of the SAM sites.

Chairman Clifford turned to another subject, asking for any new views the DCI might have on the desirability of creating the position of "Chief U. S. Intelligence Officer" who would be divorced from direction of the CIA. Mr. McCone said he had thought a lot about it but does not believe that such an official could be effective if not linked to the CIA which by law has the responsibility for coordinating all intelligence from all sources.

Mr. Pace expressed the opinion that it is not possible for the head of CIA to render abstract opinions in the capacity of DCI. Mr. Clifford urged the DCI to help the Board explore the possibilities of new organizational approaches to this problem, now that 17 years have passed since the CIA was established under the National Security Act. Mr. McCone said that he sees the problem as having arisen because CIA has become a member agency of the intelligence community as well as being charged by law to serve as coordinator of all intelligence; and perhaps we are not managing properly the arrangement that presently exists.

Mr. McCone agreed to have a study made of the matter raised by the Chairman, as soon as possible.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 5:10 p.m.

At 5:20 p.m. the Board adjourned, closing its 2-day meeting.

A. R. Ash

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures
Efforts of the Intelligence Community

In Executive Session Mr. Ash will brief the Board on significant developments relating to the subject which members may wish to keep in mind when USIB representatives discuss the matter with the Board.

Following Mr. Ash's briefing, Mr. Tom Karamessines, Assistant to CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, and Mr. Robert Bannerman of CIA's Deputy Directorate for Support, will brief the Board on the U. S. Intelligence Board's conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the audiosurveillance effort. (On June 26, 1964 following the Board's recommendations to the President, Mr. Bundy requested the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the USIB, to present coordinated proposals for the most effective possible organization, management, and coordination of the intelligence community's resources and capabilities for research and development, and the operational application, of techniques for audiosurveillance collection and audiosurveillance countermeasures. The organization and management aspects of this problem are indicated by the fact that under present arrangements: (1) research and development of audiosurveillance collection and countermeasure devices and techniques are pursued separately by State, Defense and CIA; (2) the coordination of audiosurveillance collection operations is the responsibility of the FBI in the U. S., and is the responsibility of the DCI overseas; and (3) the coordination of audiosurveillance countermeasures activities is the responsibility of an NSC interagency committee chaired by the Department of State.)

Next Mr. Howard Osborne, Director of CIA's Office of Security, and Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of Security at the Department of State, will bring the Board up to date on the USIB's final assessment of the audio and electromagnetic penetrations of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow which were discovered in April.

(At the last meeting the Board was provided with results of USIB's preliminary assessment of damage caused by these

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penetrations. Subsequent to the last meeting the President requested the Chairman, USIB, to provide a final assessment of damage in time for consideration by the Board at its August 6-7 meeting.)

J. P. Coyne
J. P. Coyne

Addendum: Enclosed for the information of the Board is a memorandum entitled "Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow" which was submitted to the Chairman by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, following his oral presentation to the Board subsequent to his on-the-scene examination of developments at the Embassy in Moscow.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clark M. Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

SUBJECT: Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow

During my recent trip to Moscow I visited the American Embassy and had a number of conversations with Mr. Musser who has the responsibility for assuring that the building is secure against listening devices. I also examined a number of key offices in the Embassy building, including several in which microphones had been found, and examined the special secure rooms that have recently been installed. I formed the following judgments regarding the present situation.

1. There is no convincing basis for concluding that additional listening systems do not exist in the building.

2. The soundproof rooms and the special room containing the teletype equipment appear to be secure, though the former are not electrically shielded. The lack of shielding is probably not serious because the rooms are in the interior of the building and under guard at all times so that the use of microphones or of electromagnetic listening devices in them would be extremely difficult.

3. The physical security of the building seemed a bit less than adequate. For example, it was possible for us to go in and out of the room housing the telephone switchboard with no one but the telephone operator--who I believe was a Russian girl--seeing us. I understand that at night no one is in the room. Physical security is complicated somewhat by the fact that the building is also the residence for Embassy employees and by the fact that the local guard staff is very small; none the less this is a problem that should receive attention.

4. Mr. Musser is extremely competent but the task at the Embassy is more than any one person could handle at this time.

I would recommend the following measures:

1. Provide Musser with some assistance. He has had some help from the American forces in Germany from time to

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time but when I was there he was working by himself. Because of the housing shortage the Embassy is reluctant to add to the staff. The fact is, as I have already said, in spite of Musser's outstanding ability he cannot do the job that now must be done without substantial continuing assistance. He also needs additional equipment.

2. A very complete physical examination must be made of any room that is to be used for confidential conversations. This should include x-ray or neutron examination of the walls, floors and ceilings if possible. Possibly other techniques can be found which would also help locate hidden equipment.

3. If x-ray examination is not feasible, physical examination of the outside of the building should be considered.

4. In critical areas new wall surfaces should be provided. Expert advice is needed to determine whether plastering or paneling would provide the best protection.

5. Dr. Land's proposal for inducing masking sounds into the walls should be pursued. It should be possible to introduce such sounds directly into the walls without creating objectionable sound levels in the rooms. This should be investigated before a decision is made regarding new wall covering.

6. Screening should be provided against electromagnetic-reflection listening devices.

7. The possibility of providing continuous monitors for signals from such devices should be investigated.

8. More effort should be made to understand the purpose of the microwave signal directed at the Embassy, or failing in this, to stop it. It is hard to understand why we have been so unconcerned about it.

9. An effort should be made to insure that the telephone system cannot be used as a distribution system for listening devices.

10. I understand that head sets and microphones exist that permit secure conversations. Though they may be awkward they should be used for confidential discussions held outside of the secure rooms until greater confidence can be established in the security of the building.


11. I believe that there is a desperate need for a

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professional group in the government to develop protective techniques for our embassies. Such a group should work with or at least have full access to a group whose task is to develop sophisticated penetration devices so that its work is effectively directed against all of the real threats that can be imagined.


Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner

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